tactical commander's handbook information operations - public

CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED (CALL)COMBINED ARMS CENTER (CAC)

FORT LEAVENWORTH, KS 66027-1350

For Official Use Only

For Official Use Only

Tactical Commander’s HandbookInformation Operations

Operation Iraqi Freedom(OIF)

MAY 2005

FOREWORD

This handbook provides the tactical operator, commander, and battle staff with information onplanning, executing, assessing, and sustaining information operations (IO). The handbook isbased on observations collected in Iraq during July and August 2004 by an IO collection andanalysis team (CAAT). The application of this tool is both for training and real-world events theSoldier may encounter in the Iraqi area of operations.

Because Soldiers are primarily warfighters, this handbook emphasizes those concepts key tooperational planning for conflict. It provides a basis for Soldiers to understand the relevance ofinformation operations and a planning framework for the implementation of informationoperations.

The language and organization of information operation concepts continue to evolve and thedebate continues at the highest levels. This handbook is a collection of observations, issues,lessons, and best practices from Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and provides Soldiers awarfighter’s orientation to information operations. It is for use in training as Soldiers prepare fordeployment and operations in Iraq.

LAWRENCE H. SAULCOL, FADirector, Center for Army Lessons Learned

INFORMATION OPERATIONS HANDBOOK

Table of Contents

Chapter 1: Introduction 1

Chapter 2: Organizing and Executing for Information Operations (IO) 7

Appendix A: Glossary A-1

Appendix B: Military Decision-Making Process Aid B-1

Appendix C: Information Operations Intelligence Preparation of the BattlefieldCenter of Gravity Aid

C-1

Appendix D: Information Operations Battle Damage Assessment Aid D-1

Appendix E: Information Operations Training Considerations E-1

Appendix F: Information Operations Targeting and Effects Aid F-1

CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

Director Colonel Lawrence H. Saul

Managing Editor Lon Seglie

Project Analyst Robert J. Meier

Editors, Layout, and Design Jenny Solon

Valerie Tystad

Cover Design and Graphics Mark Osterholm

Labels and Distribution Carrie Harrod

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY i


ACKNOWLEDGMENTS: The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) has collaboratedwith the Department of the Army (DAMO-ODI), Washington Army National Guard InformationOperations Group (WA ARNG IO GP), U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center andSchool (USAJFKSWCS), United States Military Academy (USMA), Command and GeneralStaff College (CGSC), Vermont Army National Guard Information Operations TrainingBattalion (VT ARNG IO TNG BN), U.S. Army Field Artillery School, U.S. Army CombinedArms Doctrine Directorate (CAAD), and Combined Arms Center Information OperationsProponent (CAC G7) to prepare and publish this handbook. The collaboration efforts includedcollection of information operations observations; issues; lessons; and tactics, techniques, andprocedures (TTP) in the Iraqi area of operations in order to help save U.S. and coalition livesthrough efficient and effective application of information operations across the range of militaryoperations.

This information was deemed of immediate value to forces engaged in the GlobalWar on Terrorism and should not be necessarily construed as approved Armypolicy or doctrine.

This information is furnished with the understanding that it is to be used for defensepurposes only; that it is to be afforded essentially the same degree of securityprotection as such information is afforded by the United States; that it is not to berevealed to another country or international organization without the writtenconsent of the Center for Army Lessons Learned.

If your unit has identified lessons learned or tactics, techniques, and procedures, please sharethem with the rest of the Army by contacting CALL:

Telephone: DSN 552-3035 or 2255; Commercial (913) 684-3035 or 2255Fax: DSN 552-4387; Commercial (913) 684-4387E-mail Address: [email protected] Site: http://call.army.mil

When contacting us, please include your phone number and complete address.

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We solicit your feedback to make this a more useful tool for Soldiers. Please use our ArmyKnowledge Online (AKO) collaboration Web site:

1. Sign into AKO.

2. Enter this URL into the address line and click "go."https://www.us.army.mil/suite/portal.do?$p=515

3. You will be taken to the IO TTP Collaboration site.

4. Click on the "Send Feedback" link, approximately ¼ of the way down the page, slightly leftof center; this will open a separate "Send Feedback" window.

5. You will see a drop down menu that lists "Help Desk." Select "Page Creator." Click"Continue" and follow the directions to submit feedback to the IO proponent.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY iii


Chapter 1

Introduction

A. Operational Environment (OE)B. What does IO do for me?C. Doctrine and this handbookD. What is Information Operations (IO)?E. What IO is notF. IO in the Iraqi Area of Operations (AO)

“IO, however, provides a company commander an opportunity to take control of his sector,earning the respect of local officials and citizens.”

Infantry Company Commander, Operation Iraqi Freedom

“IO is not everything, but everything we do has an IO effect.”

A. Operational Environment (OE). The Iraqi operational environment (IOE) is characterizedby numerous contradictions in the manner U.S. Army units have been configured, resourced, andtrained. The U.S. Army is without peer in today’s world and is configured, resourced, andtrained to execute combat and related operations in a sequential, fluid environment, as ablydemonstrated by V Corps in the major combat operations (MCO) phase of operation IraqiFreedom OIF. See Figure 1-1 below:

Figure 1-1

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The IOE, however, is quite different from the OE for which Army units were configured,resourced, and trained. While combat operations are a part of everyday life for the Soldier inIraq, the primary mission is to set the conditions, by means of stability and reconstructionoperations (S&RO), for an Iraqi government and a populace that is not hostile to the U.S. Notonly are these operations different, but they are executed in a much different and complexenvironment. Units in the IOE operate from fixed bases and conduct numerous operationssimultaneously. See Figure 1-2 for post-MCO (PMOC) situation:

Figure 1-2

IO is relevant to Soldiers because commanders in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) have found theproper synchronization of information to be the main effort in making up the difference betweenhow we are configured (conventional Army) and how we operate (what we’re doing) in thisS&RO environment.

B. What does IO do for me? Everything the U.S. Army plans and executes is for the purposeof achieving an effect or effects. Whether it is closing with and destroying an enemy or relatingto the local populace, Army units operate to achieve effects. IO assists the commander to shapehis environment by achieving effects, both lethal and non-lethal. He achieves effects through thecoordination and synchronization of the use of information among all unit activities. OIF hasdemonstrated that units are more likely to achieve desired effects when information is properlycoordinated and synchronized.

Example: A unit commander approved an operation that included a deception componentto the plan. The deception component required the enemy to have functionalcommunications for three days or for the duration of the deception, so the enemy could

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“intercept” coalition communications that allegedly indicated operational intent. Thecommunications nodes, however, were scheduled for destruction by lethal fires in thenext 24 hours which would render the deception plan ineffective. The IO working group(IOWG) synchronized the need for the use of deceptive information in the deceptionplan, and the destruction of the enemy’s communications was delayed until the deceptionplan no longer had need for them. The deception plan was effective, and Soldiers' liveswere saved as a result.

Example: A unit commander’s intent is to cause the maximum number of enemy tosurrender as possible. The staff coordinates and synchronizes the use of informationusing all available assets and arrives at this objective. See Figure 1-3:

Figure 1-3

C. Doctrine and this handbook. FM 3-13, Information Operations: Doctrine, Tactics,Techniques, and Procedures, (Nov 2003), defines information operations as “the employmentof the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychologicaloperations, military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting andrelated capabilities, to affect or defend information and information systems, and to influencedecision-making."



Because an underlying theme in most observations concerning IO is the lack of published IOtactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) at the tactical level, this handbook is configured withinformation and TTP that have been found to work, whether or not they are published.

Many officers involved in planning IO are not trained in IO. They typically are civil affairs(CA) psychological operations (PSYOP), field artillery (FA), or assistant S3 (AS3) officers whohave been detailed to the task. While FM 3-13 offers an excellent tutorial on planning IO, it doesnot effectively show TTP for specific IO tasks. This requires IO officers and noncommissionedofficers (NCOs) who may or may not be experts in the disparate elements of IO to somehowglean these TTP from data mining the Internet, discussions with peers, or their imaginations.The purpose of this handbook is to provide TTP-level information for the commander and staff,along with suggested planning and synchronizing products.

The use of “IO speak” in this handbook has been minimized because the focus of the handbookis the brigade and battalion commanders and staffs, not the trained IO officer.

D. What is IO?

For commanders, IO:

• Is a tool to influence the use of information to meet your intent in every operation

• Is a horizontal staff synchronization process through all elements of combat power andconducted within the construct of the military decision-making process (MDMP)

• Aligns the use of information by all the unit’s existent functions and operations andfocuses on the commander’s intent

• Is both lethal and non-lethal, directed under the S3/G3/C3, and vertically integratedwith higher and lower plans and with coalition and host nation (HN) IO efforts

• Synchronizes effects

See Figure 1-4 shows a range of agencies that are normally involved in a successfully integratedIO. At G staff level, these are often assigned special staff officers; at brigade and battalion levels,these are additional duties for designated staff officers.



Figure 1-4

In other words, IO coordinates and synchronizes the use of information within all elements ofcombat power across the spectrum of command and staff activities to achieve effects. See Figure1-5:

Figure 1-5



FM 3.0 states that commanders combine the elements of combat power - maneuver, firepower,leadership, protection, and information - to meet constantly changing requirements and defeatan enemy. Commanders do this by synchronizing the elements of friendly force combat power tocreate overwhelming effects at the decisive time and place. Massed effects created bysynchronizing the elements of combat power (all five elements use information) are the surestmeans of limiting friendly casualties and swiftly ending a campaign or operation. IO assists you,as the commander, to mass the effects of actions and messages in the information environmentto accomplish the mission.

E. What IO is not. IO:

• Is not magic, rocket science, or nuclear fusion

• Does not compete with the MDMP and is not an independent planning activity, nor dostaff elements fall under it

• Does not have command and control (C2) of other staff elements (staff elementscontinue to work for their current boss while synchronizing the use of informationthrough IO to support the commander’s intent)

• Is not a separate independent staff element, another C3/G3/S3, or just another staffproduct

• Does not develop separate IO themes and messages; public affairs [PA] and PSYOPare the doctrinal staff elements that transmit themes and messages).

• Is not only non-lethal

• Is not another battlefield operating system (BOS)

F. IO in the Iraqi AO. Brigades and battalions plan and execute information operations (IO)continuously in the Iraqi AO. IO had been considered primarily strategic or operational in natureand was, therefore, planned only at the highest levels, theater, corps, and some divisions. This isno longer the case; brigade and below are on the front lines of IO planning and execution.Tactical commanders realize that success (mission accomplishment) often equates to effectiveemployment of IO within their AO. IO must be tailored to local circumstances, area leaders, andthe local populace. IO is nested with the overall theater-level IO plan.

While there are no easy solutions for complex IO situations, this handbook provides a sample"way ahead" for the commander and staff. It provides a somewhat detailed discussion of IO atthe unit level. It leverages current and emerging doctrine, discusses principles and fundamentalsrelated to IO, and provides a framework for the unit commander and staff to use when planning,executing, evaluating, and sustaining IO.



Chapter 2

Organizing and Executing for Information Operations (IO)

A: Considerations for Brigade and Battalion Staffs

B. Importance of the Iraqi Culture

C. Brigade IO Staff Tasks

D. Battalion IO Staff Tasks

E. Coordination

F. Integrating and Deconflicting

G. Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP)

“You have to know what is important in the daily life of the average Iraqi - security, services,

and jobs."

A: Considerations for Brigade and Battalion Staffs

1. Command Emphasis. Successful IO relies on command emphasis to achieve itsintegrating and synchronizing effects. Successful brigade and battalion IO includes amember of the command group providing oversight of the IO process. In previousrotations, this oversight has been provided by either the executive officer (XO) oroperations officer (S3). Ultimately a command group link to the commander has resultedin successful IO; units without a command group link or command emphasis have beensignificantly less successful.

2. The critical organic staff positions at the brigade and battalion level are the IOcoordinator (IOCOORD), public affairs officer (PAO), IO plans officer, operationssecurity (OPSEC) officer, electronic warfare officer (EWO), chaplain, and civil militaryoperations officer (S5). Psychological operations (PSYOP) support is provided by thesupporting PSYOP tactical PSYOP detachment (TBD) (brigade) or tactical PSYOP team(TPT) (battalion). Other essential staff participants are reflected in Figure 2-1.

3. There are normally insufficient staff resources at the tactical level to dedicate entirelyto the execution of IO. To address this need, commanders have assigned additionalduties to some staff officers and detailed others to support their IO program. Below is asynthesis of how previous commanders have addressed the staffing requirements. Anoutline of the staff members’ duties is listed below.



Figure 2-1

B. Importance of the Iraqi Culture

1. The importance of culture in determining the effects of IO cannot beunderestimated. IO effects such as deny, degrade, influence, and disrupt C2 or the flowof information can be difficult to measure; however, the means to achieve the effect ismore apparent. It requires some understanding of basic human behavior and the cultureyou are dealing with, as well as the efforts of an adversary to counter your efforts.Culture is defined as:

• The gate through which all people receive, process, and act on information.

• Learned and shared attitudes, values, and ways of behaving in a society.

• Customs, folkways, manners, mannerisms, etiquette, behaviors, body language,gestures, celebrations, milestones, dress, outlooks, perceptions, and thought patterns.

• History, art, myths, legends, and heroes.

• Language, world view, beliefs, behavior, attitudes and values, religion, technology,law, politics, education, history, social organization.



VIGNETTE:

During a movement along a main supply route (MSR), a convoy of five U.S. militaryvehicles moved through a sparsely populated area and observed a bus driving in theopposite lane strike a young goat herder. The commander stopped the convoy anddispatched two of his combat medics to render immediate first aid; the commander, localtribal leader, and the boy’s uncle decided to evacuate the boy for required urgent medicalcare.

The young boy was rushed into the emergency room with a broken leg and internaldamage. The two natives asked the commander why such an important man as himselfwould take the time to help a goat herder, a boy with very little value. He answered “Iam a guest in your country and if this had of happened to someone in my family then Iwould have wanted someone to help them.” This concept seemed strange to them, that anAmerican would spend his time on a boy from his tribe, whom he did not know nor towhom he was related. The boy was treated and released to the commander and family,with a follow-on appointment the following Saturday. The commander provided themwith a ride back to their family.

The following Saturday morning the U.S. military completed the follow-up appointmentand delivered some clothes, sporting equipment, and miscellaneous supplies to thefive-family compound. Women and teenage girls greeted the returning child and U.S.Soldiers. This is very unusual and showed that the village leaders had a measure of trustin the Soldiers. This was a direct effect of the incident with the boy.

The command wanted to insure they leveraged (as a non-lethal effect) the goodwilldeveloped as a result of the humanitarian aid. The deputy commander wanted to insurethat a follow-up hasty village assessment was conducted and that subsequent CA/civilmilitary operation (CMO) projects (e.g. water well, school repair, and medical clinic)were planned and conducted. The humanitarian aid incident and the subsequentCA/CMO efforts directly supported several information operations and effects basedtargeting objectives (e.g., facilitate national government).

This incident fully illustrates how integration of a non-lethal effect (CMO) within effectsbased operations (EBO) both supports and enhances the IO campaign plan and assists thecommander to achieve his desired combat objectives. There are second and third ordereffects of the humanitarian aid and subsequent CMO actions. As a non-kinetic effect,some percentage of the commander’s relative combat power was preserved because thesingle event provided a stabilizing catalyst, thus minimizing security requirements alongthe MSR.

2. Comparison of U.S. and Iraqi cultures. The following table is a very generalizedsummary of key differences between U.S. and Iraqi culture.

U.S. Basic Values Iraqi Basic Values

Doing Being

Change and action Stability and harmony with discussion

Individualism/independence/self-reliance Belongingness, interdependence, relianceupon others



Example: “Mission first, people always” Example: Relationships come first,business is secondary follows

U.S. Interaction Norms Iraqi Interaction Norms

Competition individual Group competition cooperation

Verbal directness Verbal and non-verbal

Impersonal Personal

Example: Winning is everything. Timeis money

Example: Maintaining status The processis as important as the end product. “Let’sdrink tea.”

U.S. Social Structure Iraqi Social Structure

Individualistic Collective

Nuclear family Extended family

Achieved status Ascribed status

Example: “I did it my way.” “Self-mademillionaire.”

Example: An individual’s value isdetermined by their family heritage, tribe,etc.

U.S. Psychological Orientation Iraqi Psychological Orientation

Psychology of abundance Psychology of scarcity

Need for achievement Need for affiliation

Weak uncertainty avoidance Strong uncertainty avoidance social order

Guilt (internal) Shame (external)

Examples: Abundance. “The world is myoyster.”

Guilt. Comes from within; does not relyon external judgments.

Examples: Scarcity. Life is a zero sumgame. Anything my neighbor gets issomething I cannot have.

Shame. Depends on getting caught.Derived from others perceptions of you.

Culture, Communication and Conflict, Dr. Gary Weaver, pp. 75-76



3. Iraqi cultural environment characteristics.

"History, Geography, and Culture are the surest predictors of the future.

Robert Kaplan

Iraq as a sovereign nation is a 1920s creation of the Western powers. The concept ofIraqi nationality and loyalty to the Iraqi state is not strongly rooted among many of theinhabitants of Iraq. The people of Iraq are made up of a number of different religious andethnic groups. The three main groups in order of size are Arab Sh’ia Muslims, ArabSunni Muslims, and Kurds. Smaller groups include Turkomans, Assyrians, Chaldeans,Yezidis, and Druze. Most Iraqis view their identity as first the family tribe or clan theybelong to and then Shi’a, Arab Sunni, Kurd or whichever of the above groups they wereborn into. Feelings of loyalty to the Iraqi state generally are strongest among ArabSunnis. The generalizations below may be useful, but tactical leaders must understandsuch generalizations are not accurate for all individuals and group. Successful tacticalleaders must understand the cultural operating environment of their particular AO andtailor their IO to suit the people.

• History:

º What is now Iraq was:

� One of the birth places of human civilization.

� Home to the Sumerians, Bablyonians, and Assyrians before the time ofChrist.

� The center of Islamic civilization from 680 AD-1258 AD. During thistime Islamic civilization was the most advanced civilization in theworld, far in advance of the West.

� The birthplace of Shi’a Islam as a separate sect of Islam. Iraqi Shi’asview their history as one of near continuous oppression at the hands ofthe Sunnis.

� Not considered a nation until 1920 and was ruled as three distinctprovinces: Mosul, Baghdad and Basra.

º Between 1921 and 2003, Arab Sunnis held most of the political power in Iraq.

� Many Iraqi Arab Sunnis view their post 1920 history as struggle toassert the Iraqi state’s independence from Western control and regaintheir ancient position as leader of the Arab world.

� Many Iraqis, who are not Arab Sunnis, view their modern history as astory of discrimination and often persecution at the hands of ArabSunnis.



º Many Sh’ia and some Kurds feel that the U.S. encouraged them to rebel againstSaddam Hussein after the 1991 Gulf War and then withheld expected support,which they believe permitted Hussein to slaughter them.

º Saddam Hussein's regime was one of the most brutal dictatorships of the postWorld War II era. Iraqis were frequently executed for statements and actionsviewed as critical of the regime.

• Geography: The varied geography of Iraq contributes to various styles of living andwork activities among the people of the different regions.

º North is mountainous

º West and southwest are largely barren desert

º Southeast is a marshy river delta

º Central corridor is a plain divided by the Tigris and Euphrates rivers andnumerous canals.

º Iraq has the second largest proven oil reserves in the world and has more waterresources than most countries in the Middle East.

• Culture: Each sect have separate and distinct cultures with some points ofcommonality:

• Ethnic Groups:

º Arab Sh’ia Muslims

º Arab Sunni Muslims

º Kurds

º Turkomans

º Assyrians

º Chaldeans

º Yezidis

º Druze

• Religion: Plays a preeminent or at least very important role in the identities andbehavior of each of these groups.



• Characteristics:

Family:

� All the cultures of Iraq place a high emphasis on the importance of thefamily and extended family. Many Iraqis value the reputation andwell-being of their family above personal achievement. Some groupsalso have strong clan and tribal loyalties.

� Within families and extended families, older members exercise strongauthority over younger members and males over females.

• Social:

º Personal relationships are valued over impartial adherence to a set of principlesand are the basis of cooperation. Rarely can effective business take place if apersonal relationship has not been established

º Most groups are very conservative about social interaction between unrelatedmales and females.

º Honor and shame are the strongest factors shaping behavior. Affronts to honormust be avenged.

º Many Muslims reject ideas about rules for society and the structure ofgovernment if these rules originate from non-Muslims.

º Many Iraqis agree with the Arab proverb that “1000 years of tyranny is betterthan one day of anarchy” and are willing to tolerate a repressive governmentthat ensures order.

º Many Iraqis do not consider themselves to have rights or responsibilities to thegovernment or state. If they are well connected (having wasta in Iraqi terms),they will exploit the power, influence, and wealth of the state. If they are weakor not well-connected, they fear government and expect it to exploit or terrorizethem.

º One common expectation among most Iraqis is that government will maintainlaw and order, though most Iraqis expect the state to do this without theirindividual participation

º Many Iraqi groups feel that personal and group possession of weapons is theonly sure guarantee against aggression by rival groups (other tribes, Shia vs.Sunni, Arab vs. Kurd etc.).

º Iraqis tend to follow news of political events very closely. Rumors and“conspiracy theories” often receive much attention and carry great weight inthe minds of many Iraqis.



Figure 2-1

4. Tactical leaders’ critical cultural knowledge. These are cultural questions everytactical leader should ask themselves. If they do not know the answer, they should seekassistance in getting the answer.

• What is your local area of operations (AO)? What is your area of interest (AI)?

• What is the local peoples’ basic world view? Their world view is shaped by theirlearning and experience in the following areas:

º Religion

º Language

º Beliefs

º Education

º Law



º Social Organization

º Government

• Answers to the following questions can help create a better understanding of the worldview of the people in your area of responsibility (AOR):

º What things are the people in your local area willing to die for? Being awareof what people are will to die for will give you insight into what there arewilling to fight for. If the mission is to foster positive relations, this insight willallow you to distance your Soldiers from areas sensitive to flare ups, i.e., thelocals are willing to die for family honor, do not do things that will bringdishonor to the family.

º What is the basic social structure of the of your local AO? Is the prime unit thefamily, clan, tribe, neighborhood, village, political party, religiouscongregation, or a combination of these? Understanding the social structurewill allow you to identify the local power brokers.

º Who holds the social, political, economic, and religious leadership in your localarea? Do they have an armed following? If yes, what are the size, training,equipment, and loyalty of this following?

º Who are the “protectors” (armed citizens, clan or religious militia, police, andarmy) for the basic social unit (family, clan, tribe)?

º What is the religious affiliation of the local people in your area? To whatextent are the local people in your area influenced by religion in daily life?What are the dynamics and structure of the local religious leadership?

º Do the people in your local area have loyalties, dependencies, or connections(family, clan, tribe, ethnic group, religious sect) that cross outside theboundaries of your AO?

º Are there cultural, religious, or ethnic fracture lines in your local area? Whatare the points of friction between the groups?

º How do people earn their living in your local area?

º What is the primary legal industry (agriculture, manufacturing, etc.) and what,if any, illegal activities provide significant income (smuggling, drugtrafficking, robbery/banditry, black marketeering, etc.). Which of the illegalactivities are considered socially acceptable, tolerable, or are habituallyoverlooked by law enforcement?

º What percent of the people are unemployed? What percent do not have basicnecessities: drinkable water, food, shelter, clothing, food? Is unemployment asignificant problem? If so, do people have difficulty acquiring basicnecessities: water, food, shelter, clothing?



º How, when, and where do the people buy and sell or acquire goods andservices, especially essentials such as food, water, fuel, medicines and medicalcare, clothes, seed, livestock, building materials, vehicles, vehicles repairs?

º What are the patterns of influence and corruption? What services requirepayment of bribes, and who receives the payments?

º What are the points of social etiquette, customs, and mores that can eitherenhance or harm your acceptability and effectiveness with the people of yourlocal area?

º How do the people of your local area get their information or news? Whichsources have credibility among the local people? How do rumors andconspiracy theories start and spread among the people? What is your feedbackloop to know what the people are really thinking and saying?

º What is the most credible source of news/information for the people? Do localelites value a different source?

C. Brigade IO Staff Tasks

1. Information operations coordinator (IOCOORD)

• Advises the commander on IO effects in the context of planned lethal, and non-lethalactivities in support of tactical operations. Focuses on the status of friendly, neutral,and adversary IO capabilities and vulnerabilities.

• Ensures IO effects are integrated into operations planning and the resulting operationsorder (OPORD).

• Ensures that IO actions (performed by assigned or augmenting IO assets) arecoordinated, integrated, and synchronized with the brigade plan/order and that divisionreceives IO feedback.

• Obtains and processes relevant information and intelligence to achieve IO situationalawareness (SA). Provides IO SA information input to the common operational picture.

• Ensures the IO element performs required staff coordination for IO support fromhigher headquarters (HQ) and to subordinate units.

• Provides assessments of IO situation and capabilities to support the ongoing militarydecision-making process (MDMP).

2. IO plans officer

• Integrates IO into the MDMP in support of higher command’s IO program.

• Produces OPORD/fragmentary order (FRAGO) and other planning material to supportthe synchronization of IO across the brigade.

• During wargaming, represents the action, counteraction, and reaction of friendly,neutral, and hostile forces



• Ensures that both offensive and defensive IO tasks are included in planning.

3. PAO

• Conducts media analysis within the brigade AOR.

• Supports media inquiries and visits.

• Adapts higher talking points to the command’s AOR. Plans and integrates PAOactivities with the rest of the IO team.

• Conducts local media engagement.

4. Operations security (OPSEC) officer

• Conducts periodic OPSEC awareness training in units within the command.

• Develops and posts OPSEC awareness products.

• Conducts periodic OPSEC assessments and conducts remedial training to addressdeficiencies.

• Integrates OPSEC posture with IO to protect friendly vulnerabilities.

5. Electronic warfare officer (EWO)

• Plans and supervises execution of electronic operations and equipment.

• Collects, evaluates, and prepares reports on threat capabilities.

• Coordinates activities to ensure EW equipment is updated, maintained, and available.

• Monitors division for updates to countermeasures to protect friendly operations.

• Ensures friendly use of EW does not conflict with friendly operation of theelectro-magnetic spectrum.

6. S5

• Coordinates CMO projects with IOCOORD, PAO, military police (MP), and engineer(ENG).

• Tracks CMO conducted by brigade and battalions.

• Develops and tracks measures of effectiveness (MOE).

• Reports project status and MOE indicators to division.

7. Command, control, communications, and computer (C4) officer. (The S6 is thestaff officer for all C4 matters.) IO-related responsibilities include:

• Provides a representative to the IO cell.



• Provides IO instructions in the C4 operations annex.

• Directs the actions of subordinate net operations.

8. Net operations (NETOPS) officer. (The NETOPS officer integrates missioninformation applications with information system [INFOSYS] and communications andcomputer operations of the warfighting information network.) The NETOPS componentsare:

• Network management. Provides commanders with the ability to review and managetheir networks to support ongoing IO and to adjust or reallocate network capabilities.

• Information dissemination management. Capability to provide a managed flow ofrelevant information based on the command’s missions.

• Information assurance (IA). Includes issuing plans, orders, and policies thatminimize the vulnerabilities of information, INFOSYS, and networks consistent withthe defense-in-depth concept. Its goal is to protect and defend INFOSYS and networksagainst exploitation, degradation, and denial of services.

9. Chaplain. In the Iraqi operating environment, chaplains are key members of theIOWG. They have education, skills, and experience to improve U.S. effectiveness inoperating in the Iraqi cultural environment and in conducting perception managementoperations. Major subordinate command (MSC) staff officers all stated that the MSCassistant chaplain was their most valuable advisor on issues of how to dealcross-culturally with Iraqis. The chaplain brought much more than simply the culturalperspective to the IOWG; the chaplain brought the interrelated cultural-religiousperspective, which is a broader, more dynamic view of the Iraqi populace than simplyhistorical-cultural information. This perspective speaks to the “who, what, when, where,and why” as it pertains to the ethical framework of the Iraqis and the stark contrasts ofthe Iraqi culture with our Western culture. The effect on the IOWGs was dramatic. TheIOWG members used this perspective-changing information in the development of IOrelated actions (all IOWG members) and themes and messages (PAO and PSYOP).

The world view of many Iraqis is shaped and animated by Islam, and many chaplainshave extensive insight into Islam through training in world religions. Others, as a resultof their biblical studies and, sometimes, travel, have extensive knowledge of MiddleEastern history, geography, and cultural customs.

Chaplains often aid the “atmospherics” in dealing with Iraqis. Some Iraqis oppose U.S.operations because they represent American culture. To these Iraqis, American culture,based on what they have seen in American movies and television, is godless andimmoral. By accompanying leaders on meetings with Iraqis, chaplains help dispel thisview.

• Chaplains are valuable in the planning and implementation of information operationsperception management efforts and should be employed as advisors for cross-culturalcommunication.

• Chaplains can be invaluable members of the IOWG by providing the members with thedrastically different cultural-religious perspective of the populace, among whom ourSoldiers must relate and operate.



D. Battalion IO Staff Tasks

1. IOCOORD

• Advises the commander on IO effects in the context of planned lethal and non-lethalactivities in support of tactical operations. Focuses on the status of friendly, neutral,and adversary IO capabilities and vulnerabilities.

• Ensures IO effects are integrated into operations planning and the resulting OPORD.

• Ensures IO actions (performed by assigned or augmenting IO assets) are coordinated,integrated, and synchronized with the brigade plan/order and that brigade receives IOfeedback.

• Obtains and processes relevant information and intelligence to produce IO SA.Provides IO SA information input to the common operational picture.

• Ensures the IO element performs required staff coordination for IO support fromhigher HQ.

• Provides assessments of IO situation and capabilities to support the ongoing MDMP.

2. IO plans officer

• Integrates the capabilities and vulnerabilities of IO into the MDMP in support of thedivision IO program.

• Produces OPORD/FRAGO and other planning material to support the synchronizationof IO across the battalion.

• During wargaming, represents the action, counteraction, and reaction of friendly,neutral, and hostile forces.

• Ensures both offensive and defensive IO tasks are included in plans.

3. PAO

• Conducts media analysis within the battalion AOR.

• Supports media inquiries and visits.

• Plans and integrates PAO activities with the rest of the IO team. Adapts division andbrigade talking points to the command’s AOR.

• Conducts local media engagement.

4. OPSEC officer

• Conducts periodic OPSEC awareness training in units within the command.

• Develops and posts OPSEC awareness products.



• Conducts periodic OPSEC assessments and conducts remedial training to addressdeficiencies.

• Integrates OPSEC posture with IO to protect friendly vulnerabilities.

5. EWO

• Plans and supervises execution of electronic operations and equipment.

• Collects, evaluates, and prepares reports on threat capabilities.

• Coordinates activities to ensure EW equipment is updated, maintained, and available.

• Monitors brigade for updates to countermeasures to protect friendly operations.

• Ensures that friendly use of EW does not conflict with friendly operation of theelectro-magnetic spectrum.

6. S5

• Develops CMO projects in coordination with the IOCOORD.

• Develops MOE for CMO projects.

• Tracks CMO projects and MOE and keeps the brigade S5 informed.

• Plans and executes local contracting and purchasing in accordance with (IAW)battalion needs.

• Provides MOE feedback to the IOCOORD.

• Supports the IO intent in preferential selection of contacts and purchases.

7. Chaplain. In the Iraqi operating environment, chaplains are key members of theIOWG. They have education, skills, and experience to improve U.S. effectiveness inoperating in the Iraqi cultural environment and in conducting perception managementoperations. Major subordinate command (MSC) staff officers all stated that the MSCassistant chaplain was their most valuable advisor on issues of how to dealcross-culturally with Iraqis. The chaplain brought much more than simply the culturalperspective to the IOWG; the chaplain brought the interrelated cultural-religiousperspective, which is a broader, more dynamic view of the Iraqi populace than simplyhistorical-cultural information. This perspective speaks to the “who, what, when, where,and why” as it pertains to the ethical framework of the Iraqis and the stark contrasts ofthe Iraqi culture with our Western culture. The effect on the IOWGs was dramatic. TheIOWG members used this perspective-changing information in the development of IOrelated actions (all IOWG members) and themes and messages (PAO and PSYOP).

The world view of many Iraqis is shaped and animated by Islam, and many chaplainshave extensive insight into Islam through training in world religions. Others, as a resultof their biblical studies and, sometimes, travel, have extensive knowledge of MiddleEastern history, geography, and cultural customs.



Chaplains often aid the “atmospherics” in dealing with Iraqis. Some Iraqis oppose U.S.operations because they represent American culture. To these Iraqis, American culture,based on what they have seen in American movies and television, is godless andimmoral. By accompanying leaders on meetings with Iraqis, chaplains help dispel thisview.

• Chaplains are valuable in the planning and implementation of information operationsperception management efforts and should be employed as advisors for cross-culturalcommunication.

• Chaplains can be invaluable members of the IOWG by providing the members with thedrastically different cultural-religious perspective of the populace, among whom ourSoldiers must relate and operate.

E. Coordination

1. Strength of IO and the IO Team. When connected and employed effectively, thestrength of the entire IO effort will be strengthened and effective.

• Commander provides direction, emphasis, interest, focus, and his intent.

• XO or S3 functions as the command group link.

• IOCOORD takes the lead for the IO staff.

• IO augmentation supports the IOCOORD and provides the experience and expertise toguide and support IO throughout the process.

• Unit staff sections (EW, S6/CNO, PSYOP, military deception [MILDEC], OPSEC,PA, S5/CA/CMO, physical destruction, information assurance, physical security, S2,counterdeception, counterpropaganda, and others) officers/elements operate withintheir functional lanes to integrate and synchronize IO throughout the operationsprocess.

2. Organizational Staff Relationships with the IO Process

• S1

º Can establish a population count of local villages/towns and identify changes inpopulation numbers and demographics (age, sex, main occupations, number offighting age males) on a monthly basis.

º Can track locals interested in translation support and their availability.

• S2

º Monitors enemy forces communications: ultra high frequency (UHF), veryhigh frequency (VHF), cell phone systems, commercial, couriers, signalingmirrors, etc.

º Looks at the civilian populace communications: cell phone systems, hard linephones, radio, TV (satellite and antennae), and newspapers.



º Monitors the international media (satellite TV, radio, and print) for pro- oranti-coalition effects.

º Should track and report enemy propaganda events: night-letters, recruitingefforts, posters, and graffiti. Be aware of movement of enemypropaganda/recruiting teams within or through the AOR. What is the EWcapability and availability, and what will be its effect?

º Should look at developing a green/amber/red/white format for reporting locallevels of cooperation (white is unknown at present).

• IOCOORD

º Plans, coordinates, and supervises OPSEC and MILDEC.

º Integrates PSYOP into IO and planning and considers product dissemination.

º Identifies and disseminates subjects for command information to task force(TF) Soldiers.

º Tracks PSYOP/IO product dissemination (who, where, when, how many,which product, local national [LN] reaction).

º Identifies potential messages specific to AOR and coordinates with the tacticalhuman intelligence team (THT).

º Tracks themes, objectives, and messages emphasized by higher headquarters.

º Emplaces and tracks bulletin boards and coordinates with Iraqi security forces(ISF)/Iraqi police (IP) as well as THT for local national (LN) reaction.

º Requests products from higher PSYOP.

º Recommends mission-specific products for higher production.

º Tracks messages being broadcast by friendly Peace radio.

º Identifies and tracks enemy propaganda efforts with the S2.

(Note: Related activity support to the IOCOORD would be combat camera (COMCAM)to identify opportunities, request support, and attach COMCAM Soldiers to subordinateunits based upon mission and COMCAM troops available. PAO would coordinate formedia imbeds (journalists), identify to higher PAO potential success stories, and collectall available print media for analysis. CMO would identify Class X for distributionrequirements and reporting: where, when, who, what, and how much. CMO wouldidentify reactions from the local populace; identify specific requirements by village;provide support to cooperative leaders and withhold support from uncooperative leaders;track CMO projects, dollars spent, location, effect; and build a report for the battalioncommander.)



• S4

º Resources to support CMO.

º Establishes unit basic load (UBL) of humanitarian daily rations (HDRs); basesactivity upon surge and daily requirements.

º Procures and stores HDRs.

º Requests Class X supplies through higher headquarters.

º Collects and distributes sundry pack excess.

º Maintains humanitarian assistance (HA) kits.

º The medical staff would normally be a part of CMO and should be coordinatedwith the IO plan. The medical staff would:

� Conduct an AOR-wide analysis of endemic illnesses: tuberculosis (TB),hepatitis (HEP), goiter, etc. and develop and track a program to providemedical support to meet the intent of the battalion commander.

� Schedule clinics and inoculations of locals in coordination with thebattalion commander, battalion IOCOORD, and company commanders.

� Request medical supplies to support civil military assistance (CMA).

� Conduct “tailgate CMA” in support of battalion combat operations.

º Develop/track “local needs” matrix for 3/6/9 months out.

º Conduct local medical training (including feasibility of training localmidwives).

• Engineer staff responsibilities, like medical operations, need to follow an IOobjective. These activities might include:

º Conducting and tracking a road repair analysis.

º Determining the feasibility of repairing ground lines of communication(GLOC) to increase task force mobility as well as increase LN mobility.

º Identifying and storing excess construction material for delivery through ISF/IPto local cooperative leaders.

• Company commanders can assist with IO at the local level by:

º Conducting village assessments and reporting initial assessments and changesthrough the IOCOORD to the battalion commander.

º Establishing a presence as the single point of contact (POC) for all activitieswithin their assigned company AOR.



º Developing rapport with cooperative LN leaders and establish dominance overuncooperative leaders through leveraging CMO/CMA and access to higherresources.

º Identifying the type and requirement for CMO/CMA within villages

º Facilitating, through the IOCOORD, nongovernmental organization (NGO)support within supportive villages

º Tracking and reporting, through the IOCOORD, CMO projects to the battalioncommander.

F. Integrating and Deconflicting

1. Brigade

The brigade commander has the tools and assets available to achieve his desired effectson an enemy or populace. To synchronize these tools and assets, he must organize thebrigade staff for efficiency. If this is not done, the brigade staff will become a network ofstovepiped entities, each moving out on a different azimuth.

Figure 2-1

Training environments have seen brigade tactical operations centers (TOCs) composed ofmultiple, seemingly independent cells. It is not unusual to see a current operations cell, aplans cell, a separate project coordination cell (PCC), and a separate effects coordinationcell (ECC) or fires and effects coordination cell (FECC). Each of these cells are soindependent that orders or instructions sent to subordinate units are not synchronized to



achieve the commander’s desired effect. All too often they conflict with each other. Tocorrect this, brigade TOCs organize under two overarching cells, plans and currentoperations. As overall managers and staff section supervisors, the duties andresponsibilities of the brigade XO and S3 remain valid. Due to the intensity of operations,it is not uncommon and entirely appropriate for the commander to direct the S3 to focushis efforts on current operations, while the XO focuses on planning future operations.The S3 task organizes within the section with available officers to manage the variousstaff coordinating cells to accomplish the mission.

PSYOP tactical PYSOP detachment (TPD) is task organized to support the BCT. TheTPD commander wears dual hats. As the TPD commander, he provides command andcontrol (C2) for all PSYOP forces attached to or under operational control (OPCON) ofthe brigade and is responsible for the planning, integration, and monitoring of all tacticalpsychological operations (TACPSYOP) within the brigade AOR. As the PSYOP staffofficer, his responsibilities include:

• Advising the brigade commander and staff on the psychological effects of brigadeoperations on the indigenous population.

• Serving as the commander’s resident staff expert on the indigenous culture and psyche.

• Assisting the S-3 and IOCOORD in the planning and coordination of operations aimedat influencing, informing, deceiving, disrupting, delaying, degrading, or destroying theadversary’s means of command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence(C4I) and IO

• Developing PSYOP objectives that support brigade information operations and higherheadquarters PSYOP objectives.

• Writing the PSYOP appendix to the brigade OPORD.

• Recommending brigade-specific PSYOP plans and programs to higher headquarters.

• Coordinating with higher headquarters for print, audio, audiovisual, and aviationsupport for brigade PSYOP operations.

• Monitoring and assessing the effectiveness of PSYOP.

• Monitoring and assessing indigenous demographic, cultural, and political trends withinthe population.

• Identifying and monitoring enemy propaganda and its sources and recommendingactions to mitigate the effects of misinformation.

• Planning and synchronizing aerial loudspeaker and leaflet drop operations in supportof brigade operations.

• Identifying and leveraging indigenous media sources, including print, radio, andtelevision, to support division and brigade PSYOP/IO/public affairs (PA) operations.

The staff judge advocate (SJA), a special staff officer, is responsible for providing situationalunderstanding of the legal environment in which the brigade operates. The SJA anticipates thelegal implications of expected actions under international law and U.S. law, and the potential



perception of those actions based upon the HN legal system. Understanding local legal systemswill allow the SJA to forecast the likely actions of enemy forces and potentially availableavenues of influencing others to either support the U.S. mission or not resist friendly activities.The SJA works in conjunction with CA to restore or support judicial functions in a localgovernment.

The PCC is responsible for resourcing, prioritizing, and executing CMO to achieve thecommander’s desired effects.

Level 1 (sewage, water, energy, academics, trash, medical , security [SWEAT-MS]) isthe basic life support requirements of the population. Level 2 (communications, religion,economy, governance [CREG]) is secondary to Level 1 and is focused on as time andresources become available. As with Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, until the Level 1requirements are adequately established, SWEAT-MS elements are the BCT’s priority.

LEVEL 1 (SWEAT-MS) Sewage, Water, Energy, Academics, Trash, Medical ,Security

LEVEL 2 (CREG) Communications, Religion, Economy, Governance

The CA officer (S5), a permanent staff member, establishes and supervises the PCC. TheS5 and the CA Team Bravo (CATB) team leader are the principal advisors to thecommander on CMO. The S5 ensures each COA effectively integrates civilconsiderations (the “C” of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and supportavailable, time available, and civil considerations [METT-TC]). The CA officer considersnot only tactical issues, but also combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS)issues. HN support and care of displaced civilians are of particular concern. The CAofficer’s analysis considers the impact of operations on public order and safety andprotection of culturally significant sites. If the unit does not have an assigned CA officer,the commander assigns these responsibilities to another staff member.

CATB is task organized to support a BCT in current operations. As with the PSYOPteam, these teams have proven to be an invaluable combat multiplier. The CATBoperational focus is on the civil center of gravity (COG) and on establishing,maintaining, influencing, and supporting the commander’s interaction with governmentorganizations, NGOs, and international organizations.

The engineer coordinator (ENCOORD) is the commander of the engineer unit supportingthe BCT. The assistant brigade engineer (ABE) is a permanent staff member who, in theabsence of the ENCOORD, acts as an liaison officer (LNO) to the brigade commanderand staff. In an environment where units are conducting combat operations and stabilityoperations and support operations simultaneously, the ABE’s role in the PCC is tocontract or coordinate/task out military troop projects within approved CMO initiativesand track the progress of ongoing projects. The ABE’s other vital role is to assess supplyroutes and nominate targets based on enemy activity on supply routes. Additionally, theABE provides terrain data and geospatial information to aid in the analysis of enemyoperations. The ABE utilizes reach-back capability to the National Mapping Agency andthe Corps of Engineers to coordinate for products and professional expertise.

The provost marshal officer’s (PMO) role in the PCC is to provide, in coordination withthe CATB, assessments to the command on civil defense and local police. Based on



assessments and the ground tactical plan, the PMO develops recommendations toimprove civil defense and local police. The PMO advises the command on the properhandling of both combatant and noncombatant detainees. In conjunction with CA, thePMO establishes liaison with the local police to assess the local law enforcementsystem’s ability to deal with the types and categories of noncombatant detainees foreventual prosecution. Additionally, the PMO provides route assessment to the ABE.

The medical support officer provides the PCC with an assessment and projectrecommendations on civilian medical facilities and general populace health within thebrigade AOR.

The comptroller or resource manager (RM) is a position that must be filled to accuratelyaccount for funds used for CMO. The RM tracks the amount and sources of fundingavailable to the brigade. The RM briefs available funding amounts and limitations as wellas amounts already obligated to specific projects or operations.

2. Battalion

Given the vast amount of terrain and populace a battalion commander must manage, IObecomes critical to accomplishing their complex missions. First, it provides commandersthe ability to focus actions and messages to achieve battlefield effects - the end state onan adversary or populace. Second, it provides a method to plan future operations focusingon achieving an objective that are proactive and holistic in countering the enemy.Developing holistic plans designed to achieve a desired effect allows the TF commanderto organize all assets in time and space, massing lethal and nonlethal elements of combatpower, and forcing the enemy to become reactive. Current TF structure requires amodification in the way the commander and staff think. Commanders and staffs plan,execute, and assess fully integrated operations, using all elements of combat power toachieve overwhelming effects.

Understanding the dynamics associated with continuous combat and stability operationsand support operations; realizing the information from every element executing anoperation; and shifting focus from the enemy to effects on threats, populace, andcivil/tribal leaders are fundamental to achieving success on today’s battlefield. They arethe paths to accomplishing the theater commander’s campaign plan.

In the current environment, IO is central to the concept that every action taken or nottaken sends a message to the population, insurgents, and external actors. Whether activeor passive, such messages generate behavioral responses. Knowing this, unitscontinuously evaluate and shape their words and actions to ensure they supportoperations designed to achieve the desired effect. Popular support and proper militaryaction are complementary and feed off each other. Good operations, including nestedCMO, IO, and military operations, generate popular support and accomplish the missionset forth in the campaign plan.

At the battalion level, bringing together the efforts of the battalion fire support element(FSE), civil affairs team alpha (CATA), S5, TPT, PAO, and SJA will provide criticalresources for the commander to focus CMO, fires, and IO to support maneuveroperations.



Figure 2-2

Patrol debriefs are an invaluable source of information that provide enormous feedbackon daily activities throughout the entire battalion’s AOR and its interaction among thepopulace or with the enemy. Debriefs should be formulated to answer commander’spriority intelligence requirements (PIR), specific information requirement (SIR), andspecific operational requirement (SOR). At the battalion level, debriefs are so importantthat the battalion TOC should track them carefully, making sure every patrol is debriefed,and the debrief is analyzed and passed to higher headquarters. This is not a small task andit cannot be ignored. Within the common operating environment (COE), every elementleaving a forward operating base (FOB) should be considered a combat or reconnaissancemission. During the processing and analysis of patrol debriefs, both the S2 and the ECCprovide a separate but equal analysis of data. The S2 examines debriefs from an enemyand populace perspective, and the ECC examines the data to assist in gauging theprogress the TF is having in regards to the campaign plan.

3. Company

Execution begins and planning ends at the company level. Company commanders focuson issuing orders, verifying pre-combat checks and pre-combat inspections are performedto standard, controlling operations, and ensuring debriefs are conducted after everymission. When the battalion issues orders, the company commander receives the task,purpose, and SIR/SOR for each mission. The company commander’s role is to ensureeach mission is executed, the purpose achieved, and SIR/SOR are answered to focusfuture battalion and brigade operations. Given the fact that a company has no staff, thecompany commander should turn to his traditional effects coordinator, the fire supportofficer (FSO), to help manage these new IO tasks.



The traditional role of the company fires support team (FIST) to coordinate lethal fires insupport of a maneuver company has evolved to include coordination of both lethal andnonlethal effects. The company FIST coordinates nonlethal effects by developing SOI,tracking Level 1 (SWEAT-MS) and Level 2 (CREG) CMO projects, implementingspecific information operation themes and messages and tracking their effectiveness, andacting as company PAO. In addition, FISTs integrate nonlethal combat multipliers suchas CATA, TPTs, and human intelligence (HUMINT) teams. Company FISTs areorganized to execute lethal effects.

Current trends show company headquarters FSEs are not manned adequately to conduct24-hour operations. The FSE also lacks the tools and systems to effectively conduct thefull range of military operations (ROMO). They must brief and debrief patrols, track SOI,and maintain their capability to deliver lethal effects on a 24-hour basis.

Experience has shown all convoys are combat operations and must be briefed anddebriefed along with all other maneuver-centric patrols or operations. A company willhave multiple SOIs to track and communicate within its AOR. The traditional method ofoperations used by company FISTs in a non-stability operations and support operationsenvironment is overwhelmed. Company FSEs must operate like a battalion FSE or effectscell.

The company FSO works with the company commander during operations tosuccessfully accomplish all company essential effects tasks. While the maneuvercommander is responsible for integrating lethal, nonlethal, and maneuver, the FSO mustunderstand the scheme of maneuver as well as the company commander understands it.On the basis of the commander’s guidance, the FSO develops his effects plan andpresents it to the commander for approval.

Company operations need to mirror battalion operations. Standing operating procedures(SOPs), tools, and systems to gather and manage information need to be in place to meetrequirements from battalion. There is a need to have a dedicated lethal and nonlethal cellat the company command post (CP). Without this element, critical information is nottracked, gathered, or managed in the detail required to be successful in combat operationsand the stability operations and support operations environment.

The company must analyze the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) planand determine the company’s collection requirements, and then brief those requirements(along with the talking points and MOE) during the mission brief to focus patrols ongathering specific information critical to the planning and refinement at battalion andbrigade. FSE themes, messages, and MOE need to be posted in the company for everyleader and Soldier to view along with PIR and SIR/SOR.



In today’s environment, there are several different missions a company is expected toconduct simultaneously. See Figure 2-3:

Figure 2-3

A matrix tool is needed to assist the company in tracking patrol operations as well astracking maneuver and the different missions they are currently executing. An example ofa tracking matrix tool is shown below.

COMPANY TRACKING MATRIX

Element Mission DTG

start

DTG

end

Objectives SOR/SIR Brief Debrief

Figure 2-4



It is imperative that the company conducts patrol briefs with all elements executingmissions. Patrol briefs provide focus to the patrol on gathering specific information thatmay answer PIR or IO indicators. Patrol briefs should follow a prescribed format. Anexample of a patrol brief format is shown below.

PATROL BRIEFS

• PIR, SIR/SOR

• Copy of MOE (indicators)

• Pertinent info from previous patrol

• Any specialty teams attached and mission

• Specific indicators to observe and report (propaganda, negative hand gestures,throwing objects)

• Non-lethal target status

• Current CMO project status

• Previous patrols' activities (promises)

• Target folder review

• Themes and messages

• Talking points

Figure 2-5



Patrol debriefs are the preferred method for seizing “ground truth.” Debriefs should beconducted upon completion of the patrols and involve all Soldiers in the patrol. Thedebrief should focus on answering SIR/SOR. MOE extracted from the patrol debriefshould be forwarded daily to the battalion for review and utilized during the combatsynchronization meeting. The current status of CMO projects should be debriefed andupdated as well. An example of a CMO Project Tracking Matrix is shown below.

TOWN: UNIT: POC: DTG:

SYSTEM ISSUE ACTIONS STATUS CONTACT PROMISED

DUE DATE

SEWAGE

WATER

ELECTRICITY

ACADEMICS

TRASH

EMPLOYMENT

MEDICAL

SECURITY

Figure 2-6



It is imperative that CMO projects are tracked in detail at company level. TheSWEAT-MS (including employment) tracking matrix is a valuable tool in tracking vitalinfrastructure and systems and providing the company commander and battalion staffwith an accurate picture of the status, contacts, actions taken at company level, andpromised date for completion. It assists the battalion staff with established priorities and afocus within the AOR.

G. Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

1. Information flow

To gain information superiority, commanders rely on ISR, information management(IM), and IO. The synchronization of these activities allows commanders the ability tosee first, understand first, and finish decisively. Bottom-fed information comes in manyforms. CA assessments, PSYOP assessments, battalion task force commanderassessments, bilateral negotiation records, and patrol debriefs are a few. Taken togetherand analyzed by the staff, they paint a picture for the commander. Staffs must havesystems in place to collect this information, update staff estimates, and present thisinformation to the commander in the form of a mission analysis brief. Once staffs andSoldiers understand the paradigm shift of becoming a bottom-fed organization andemplace functional systems to collect such information, they will recognize theimportance of IO. These systems enable information superiority. They are critical inallowing the commander to visualize, describe, and direct actions within the brigade orbattalion AOR.

2. Planning

Include the higher HQ goals and/or objectives within the unit’s mission statement as wellas in the key tasks and end state of the commander’s intent. By doing this, leadersprovide subordinates the use of these effects as the basis for initiative.

A key to effective planning is a clear understanding of the decisive operation. Definingthe decisive operation in today’s complex environment requires commanders to describethe effect desired against an actor (enemy, local leader, or civil population). To define thedecisive operation, commanders must:

• Determine the actor (or group of actors) representing the greatest threat to fulfilling thecampaign plan.

• Describe the decisive operation as a “what” (desired effect), not a “who” (identifyingthe unit to accomplish the decisive operation). For example, a commander could say,“The decisive operation is the identification and neutralization of insurgent C2 cells.”

3. Information Operations Working Group (IOWG). The following are attributes andcharacteristics of functional IOWGs. IOWGs can be informal at brigade and battalionlevel.

• Command emphasis. The commander must support and direct the efforts of theIOWG.

• Meeting purpose and tone. The purpose of the IOWG is to coordinate andsynchronize specific actions with specific IOWG members. It is not a tasking meeting.IO officers who use the IOWG to task IO elements without input from those elements



risk misusing IOWG members. Coordination and synchronization will not occur in anenvironment where IOWG members feel alienated.

• Due outs. The meeting should identify “due outs,” proposed supporting actions,members take back to their sections for discussion and/or planning and execution, witha defined date and time when the staff section must report feasibility or progress.

• Sample meeting flow:

º Status of ongoing projects (review of MOE and status report on due outs).

º Statement of new problem, commander’s guidance/estimate, or next phase ofthe IO plan.

º How can IO support?

º How might each activity support?

� What is currently being done by each member’s section?

� What new/different/modified actions might be taken?

º Consensus on possible courses of action (COAs).

º Approximate time lines necessary for each activity to complete its part of theCOA.

º Request that members: 1) Staff proposals in their sections; 2) Secure theirprincipal’s approval/disapproval; and 3) Report back on Section ability to takethe considered action (time: to be announced (TBA) based on time line).

º Recap of new due outs.

• Agenda. An agenda must be used, it must be published in a read-ahead packet, and theagenda’s topics should remain relatively constant.

• Read-ahead packet. The purpose of the read-ahead packet is to recommend an agendafor the next IOWG meeting and to recommend those IOWG members whoseattendance is necessary. All IOWG members are welcome to attend every meeting. Itis more efficient to let the meeting agenda dictate who should attend each meeting.One of the most important effects this technique creates is that IOWG members aremore likely to attend meetings on a regular basis since they know their time will not bewasted when they do attend. At battalion level, the read-ahead packet may not benecessary due to the small size of the IOWG.

• Moderator/Noncommissioned officer in charge (NCOIC). The moderator must besomeone with excellent time management skills who can keep the group on task andon schedule. He must be polite, yet firm. The moderator performs the function of timekeeper and note taker. He also assembles and disseminates the read ahead packet. Thisallows the IOCOORD/officer to run the IOWG without being the drill sergeant.Several units have found that NCOs make the best moderators.



• Time limit. IOWG meetings should only long enough to accomplish goals listed inthe agenda. Issues that require additional time should be handled in break-out sessions.Once the moderator identifies an issue that requires more time than the agenda callsfor, he schedules a break out session with specific IOWG members. This ensures thatonly those members involved are required to invest their time on any given topic.Meetings lasting longer than 60 minutes create challenges to team building and focus.

• Due Outs. Attendees must leave the meeting knowing what their due outs are. Followup IOWG meetings with a memo to the XO and S-3 if IO team members were notpresent.

4. MOE

• MOE are a prerequisite to the performance of combat assessment. (JP 1-02).Subjective indicators that the outcomes of tactical actions have achieved or contributedto achieving the desired effect. MOE articulate where to look and what to measure inorder to determine if the desired effect has been achieved.

• Combat assessment is the determination of the overall effectiveness of forceemployment during military operations. Combat assessment is composed of threemajor components:

º Battle damage assessment

º Munitions effectiveness assessment

º Re-attack recommendation

• MOE characteristics:

º Focused on assessing the achievement of the objective.

º Measurable and observable: quantitative values or qualitative descriptions.

º Timely/responsive: Collection and analysis is rapid enough to support timelydecision-making.

º Cost effective

• How to develop IO MOE

º Step 1: Develop the MOE statement. Use the objective’s target, effect, andpurpose as a guide to determine what must be observed, reported, and assessed.

º Step 2: Develop the leading indicators that support the MOE statement.Leading indicators are quantifiable signs that measure trends or progresstowards attaining the objective. The IO planner should wargame potentialleading indicators that will assist in measuring achievement of the IO objective.This is normally done in conjunction with the intelligence representative to theIO cell and other members of the IOWG. The purpose of developing indicatorsis to:



� Establish a baseline of activity from which success or lack of progresscan be measured. All indicators should have a baseline of activity fromwhich to measure progress.

� Assist the intelligence representative in determining intelligencecollection requirements.

� Focus the other members of the staff and the components to potentialcollection requirements.

º Step 3: The IO cell’s job is to make known the intelligence requirementsand establish a mechanism for tracking progress on accomplishing theobjectives.

Example:

Statement: Leadership is influenced to not attack relief operationspersonnel.

Indicators:

� Decrease in the number of kidnapings or attempted kidnapings ofdisaster relief personnel.

� Decrease in the number of attacks on U.S. military personnel.

� Leadership changes rhetoric in open press.

� Leadership increases contact with third party envoy.

� Intercepts of leadership communications directing no aggression

º Step 4: Coordinate with the intelligence representative on collectionrequirements related to MOE and indicators.

º Step 5: Examine the adversary and friendly force structures anddetermine where to focus IO efforts to achieve the IO objectives. Thisanalysis should lead to developing critical capabilities and critical requirementsthat are most vulnerable to IO capabilities.

º Step 6: Determine what effect you want to have on the most critical andvulnerable functions and select the IO capability or capabilities that canbest achieve that effect.

� Analyze the initial force structure to determine if the apportioned forcesroughly possess adequate IO capabilities.

� Identify any shortfalls and request additional resources from higher.

• Potential MOE. MOE in CMO could include the following:

º Drops in mortality rates in the population below a specified level per day.



º Increase in water available per day to various levels established for humanconsumption, to support sanitation measures, and for livestock consumption.

º Increase of available electricity.

º Increase in the presence and capabilities of NGOs and internationalorganizations.

º Increase in oil /gas refinery capacity.

• The last prerequisite for success entails establishing and monitoring MOE for CMOthat are useful at strategic, operational, and tactical levels. When looking at MOE forCMO, determine what the standard was before arrival and consider this the baselinethat must be improved upon.



Appendix A

Glossary

Part I: Abbreviations and Acronyms

ABE assistant brigade engineer

AOR area of responsibility

BCT brigade combat team

BDA battle damage assessment

BDE brigade

C2 command and control

C2W command and control warfare

C4command, control, communications, and

computers

C4Icommand, control, communications,

computers, and intelligence

C4ISRcommand, control, communications,

computers, intelligence, and reconnaissance

CA civil affairs

CATA civil affairs team alpha

CATB civil affairs team bravo

CENTCOM Central Command

CI counterintelligence

CMA civil military assistance

CMO civil military operations

CNA computer network attack

COA course of action

COE common operating environment

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY A-1


COG center of gravity

COMCAM combat camera

COMPUSEC computer security

CP command post

CREGcommunications, religion, economy

governance

CS combat support

CSS combat service support

DOD Department of Defense

DTG date/time group

ECC effects coordination cell

EEFI essential elements of friendly information

ENCOORD engineer coordinator

ENG engineer

EP electronic protection

ETO effects tasking order

EW electronic warfare

FECC fires and effects coordination cell

FIST fires support team

FSE fire support element

FSO fire support officer

GLOC ground lines of communication

HA humanitarian assistance

HDR humanitarian daily ration

HEP hepatitis

A-2 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY


HN host nation

HUMINT human intelligence

IM information management

INFOSEC information security

IO information operations

IOWG information operations working group

IPB intelligence preparation of the battlefield

IP Iraqi police

ISF Iraqi security forces

ISO in support of

ISRintelligence, surveillance, and

reconnaissance

IW information warfare

JTF joint task force

JRTC Joint Readiness Training Center

LN local nation/nationals

LNO liaison officer

MCO major combat operations

MDMP military decision-making process

MEDCAP medical civil action/affairs program

MEDEVAC medical evacuation

METL mission essential task list

METT-TCmission, enemy, terrain and weather,troops and support available, timeavailable, and civil considerations

MOE measures of effectiveness



MRE mission readiness/rehearsal exercises

NBC nuclear, biological, and chemical

NETOPS net operations

NGO nongovernmental organization

Obj objective

O© observer controller

OPFOR opposing force

OPLAN operations plan

OPORD operations order

OPSEC operations security

PAO public affairs officer

PCC project coordination cell

PIR priority intelligence requirements

PA public affairs

PMCO post major combat operations

PMO provost marshal officer

POC point of contact

PSYOP psychological operations

RCP radar communication processor

RISTAreconnaissance, surveillance, and target

acquisition

RM resource manager

ROMO range of military operations

SA situational awareness

SIO special information operations


SIR specific information requirement

SITEMP situation template

SJA staff judge advocate

SOF special operations forces

SOPs standing operating procedures

SOR specific operational requirement

SWEAT-MSsewage, water, energy, academics, trash

medical, security

TB tuberculosis

TBA to be announced

TCP traffic control points

TF task force

TOC tactical operations center

TPD tactical PSYOP detachment

TPT tactical PSYOP team

TTP tactics, techniques, and procedures

UBL unit basic load

XO executive officer



Part II: Terms and Definitions

A. Terms

Civil Affairs. The activities of a commander that establishes, maintains, influences, or exploitsrelations between military forces and civil authorities, both governmental and nongovernmental,and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile area of operations in order to facilitatemilitary operations and consolidate operational objectives. Civil affairs may include performanceby military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of local government.These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They mayalso occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Joint Pub 1-02

Command and Control. The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designatedcommander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Commandand control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment,communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing,coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission. JointPub 1-02

Communications Security. The protection resulting from all measures designed to denyunauthorized persons information of value which might be derived from possession and study oftelecommunications, or to mislead unauthorized persons in their interpretation of the results ofsuch possession and study. Communications security includes a. Crypto security and physicalsecurity - The component of communications security that results from the provision oftechnically sound cryptosystems and their proper use. b. Transmission security - The componentof communications security that results from all measures designed to protect transmissions frominterception and exploitation by means other than cryptanalysis. c. Emission security - Thecomponent of communications that results from all measures taken to deny unauthorized personsinformation f value that might be derived from intercept and analysis of compromisingemanations from crypto-equipment and telecommunications systems. d. Physical security - Thecomponent of communications security that results from all physical measures necessary tosafeguard classified equipment, material, and documents from access thereto or observationsthereof by unauthorized persons. Joint Pub 1-02

Computer Network Attack. Operations to disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy informationresident in computers and computer networks, or the computers and networks themselves. JointPub 1-02

Computer Security. The protection resulting from all measures to deny unauthorized accessand exploitation of friendly computer systems; also called COMPUSEC. Joint Pub 1-02

Counterdeception. Efforts to negate, neutralize, diminish the effects of, or gain advantage froma foreign deception operation. Counterdeception does not include the intelligence function ofidentifying foreign deception operations. Joint Pub 1-02



Counterintelligence. Information gathered and activities conducted to protect againstespionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assignations conducted by or on behalf offoreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, orinternational terrorist activities. Also called CI. Joint Pub 1-02

Deception. Those measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion, orfalsification of evidence to induce him to react in a manner prejudicial to his interested. JointPub 1-02

Defense Information Infrastructure. The shared or interconnected system of computers,communications, data applications, security, people, training, and other support structuresserving DoD local, national, and worldwide information needs. The Defense InformationInfrastructure connects DoD mission support, command and control, and intelligence computersthrough voice, telecommunications, imagery, video, and multimedia services. It providesinformation processing and services to subscribers over the Defense Information SystemsNetwork and includes command and control, tactical, intelligence and commercialcommunications systems used to transmit DoD information. Also called DII. Joint Pub 1-02

Defense Information Operations. Integration and coordination of policies and procedures,operations, personnel, and technology to protect and defend information and informationsystems. Defensive information operations are conducted though information assurance, physicalsecurity, operations security, counterdeception, counterpsychological operations,counterintelligence, electronic warfare, and special information operations. Defensiveinformation operations ensure timely, accurate, and relevant information access while denyingadversaries the opportunity to exploit friendly information and information systems for their ownpurposes. Joint Pub 1-02

Incident. In information operations, an assessed event of attempted entry, unauthorized entry,or an information attack on an automated information system. It includes unauthorized probingand browsing, disruption, or denial of service; altered or destroyed input, processing, storage, oroutput of information; or changes to information system hardware, firmware, or softwarecharacteristics with or without the users’ knowledge, instruction, or intent. Joint Pub 1-02

Indications and Warning. Those intelligence activities intended to detect and report timesensitive intelligence information on foreign developments that could involve a threat to theUnited States or allied/coalition military, political, or economic interests or to U.S. citizensabroad. It includes forewarning of enemy actions or intentions; the imminence of hostilities;insurgency; nuclear/non-nuclear attack on the U.S., its overseas forces, or allied/coalitionnations; hostile reactions to U.S. reconnaissance activities, terrorists’ attacks; and other similarevents. Also called I&W. Joint Pub 1-02

Information. 1. Facts, data, or instructions in any medium or form. 2. The meaning that ahuman assigns to data by means of the known conventions used in their representation. Joint Pub1-02



Information Assurance. Information operations that protect and defend information andinformation systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, andnonrepudiation. This includes providing for restoration of information systems by incorporationprotection, detection, and reaction capabilities. Also call IA. Joint Pub 1-02

Information-Based Process. Processes that collect, analyze, and disseminate information usingany medium or form. These processes may be stand-alone processes or sub-processes which,taken together, comprise a larger system or system of systems or processes. Joint Pub 1-02

Information Environment. The aggregate of individuals, organizations, or systems that collect,process, or disseminate information; also included is the information itself. Joint Pub 1-02

Information Operations. Actions taken to affect adversary information and informationsystems while defending one’s own information and information systems. Also called IO. JointPub 1-02

Information Security. Information security is the protection and defense of information andinformation systems against unauthorized access or modification of information, whether instorage, processing, or transit, and against denial of service to authorized users. Informationsecurity includes those measures necessary to detect, document, and counter such threats.Information security is composed of computer security and communications security. Also calledINFOSEC. Joint Pub 1-02

Information Superiority. The capability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterruptedflow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary’s ability to do the same. Joint Pub1-02

Information System. The entire infrastructure, organization, personnel, and components thatcollect, process, store, transmit, display, disseminate, and act on information. Joint Pub 1-02

Information Warfare. Information operations conducted during time of crisis or conflict toachieve or promote specific objectives over a specific adversary or adversaries. Also called IW.Joint Pub 1-02

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield. An analytical methodology employed to reduceuncertainties concerning the enemy, environment, and terrain for all types of operations.Intelligence preparation of the battle space builds an extensive database for each potential area inwhich a unit may be required to operate. The database is then analyzed in detail to determine theimpact of the enemy, environment, and terrain on operations and presents it in graphic form.Intelligence preparation for the battle space is a continuous process. Also called IPB. Joint Pub1-02

Leveraging. In information operations, the effective use of information, information systems,and technology to increase the means and synergy in accomplishing information operationsstrategy. Joint Pub 1-02



Military Deception. Actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary military decisionmakers as to friendly military capabilities, intentions, and operations, thereby causing theadversary to take specific actions or inactions that will contribute to the accomplishment of thefriendly mission. The five categories of military deception: 1. Strategic military deception -military deception planned and executed by and in support of senior military commanders toresult in adversary military policies and actions that support the originator strategic militaryobjectives, policies, and operations. 2. Operations military deception - military deceptionplanned and executed by and in support of operations-level commanders to result in adversaryactions that are favorable to the originator’s objectives and operations. Operational militarydeception is planned and conducted in a theater of war to support campaigns and majoroperations. 3. Tactical military deception - military deception planned and executed by and insupport of tactical commanders to result in adversary actions that are favorable to theoriginator’s objectives and operations. Tactical military deception is planned and conducted tosupport battles and engagements. 4. Service military deception - military deception planned andexecuted by the Services that pertain to Service support to joint operations. Service militarydeception is designed to protect and enhance the combat capabilities of Service forces andsystems. 5. Military deception in support of operations security OPSEC - military deceptionplanned and executed by and in support of all levels of command to support the prevention of theinadvertent compromise of sensitive or classified activities, capabilities, or intentions. DeceptiveOPSEC measures are designed to distract foreign intelligence away from, or provide cover for,military operations and activities. Joint Pub 1-02

Offensive Information Operations. The integrated use of assigned and supporting capabilitiesand activities, mutually supported by intelligence, to affect adversary decisions makers toachieve or promote soporific objectives. These capabilities and activities include, but are notlimited to, operations security, military deception, psychological operations, electronic warfare,physical attack and/or destruction, and special information operations, and could includecomputer network attack. Joint Pub 1-02

Operations Security. A process of identifying critical information and subsequently analyzingfriendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities to: 1. Identify those actionsthat can be observed by adversary intelligence systems. 2. Determine indicators hostileintelligence systems might obtain that could be interoperated or pieced together to derive criticalinformation in time to be useful to adversaries. 3. Select and execute measures that eliminate orreduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation.Also called OPSEC. Joint Pub 1-02

Perception Management. Actions to convey and/or deny selected information and indicators toforeign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, and objective reasoning, and tointelligence systems and leaders at all levels to influence official estimates, ultimately resultingfrom foreign behaviors and official actions favorable to the originator’s objectives. In variousways, perception management combines truth projection, operations security, cover anddeception, and psychological operations. Joint Pub 1-02

Physical Security. The part of security concerned with physical measures, designed tosafeguard personnel, to prevent unauthorized access to equipment, installations, material, and



documents; and to safeguard them against espionage, sabotage, damage, and theft. Joint Pub1-02

Probe. In information operations, any attempt to gather information about an automatedinformation system or its on-line users. Joint Pub 1-02

Physical Operations. Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators toforeign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately thebehavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose ofpsychological operations s to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behaviors favorable to theoriginator’s objective. Also called PSYOP. Joint pub 1-02

Public Affairs. Those public information, command information, and community relationsactivities directed toward both the external and internal public with interest in the Department ofDefense. Also called PA. Joint Pub 1-02

Special Information Operations. Information operations that by their sensitive nature, due totheir potential effect or impact, security requirement, or risk to the national security of the UnitedStates, require a special review and approval process. Also called SIO. Joint Pub 1-02

Vulnerability. 1. The susceptibility of a nation or military force to any action by any meansthrough which its war potential or combat effectiveness may be reduced or its will to fightdiminished. 2. The characteristics of a system which cause it to suffer a definite degradationincapability to perform the designated mission as a result of having been subjected to a certainlevel of effects in an unnatural manmade hostile environment. 3. In information operations, aweakness in information system security design, procedures, implementation, or internal controlsthat could be exploited to gain unauthorized access to information or an information system.Joint Pub 1-02

Vulnerability Analysis. In information operations, a systematic examination of an informationsystem or product to determine the adequacy of security measures, identify security deficiencies,provide data from which to predict the effectiveness or proposed security measures, and confirmthe adequacy of such measures after implementation. Joint Pub 1-02

B. Definitions

Defensive IO - integrates and coordinates policies, procedures, operations, personnel, andtechnology to protect and defend information and information systems. Defensive IO isconducted through information assurance, OPSEC, physical security, counterdeception,counterpropaganda, counterintelligence, EW, and SIO. Defensive IO ensures timely, accurate,and relevant information access while denying adversaries the opportunity to exploit friendlyinformation and information systems for their own purposes. Defensive IO ensures the necessaryprotection and defense of information and information systems upon which forces depend toconduct operations and achieve mission objectives. Four interrelated process support defensiveIO -- information environment protection, attack detection, capability restoration, and attack



response. Because they are interrelated, full integration of offensive and defensive IO isessential.

Information - Facts, data, or instructions in any medium or form. It is the meaning that a humanassigns to do by means of the known conventions used in their representations. The sameinformation may convey different messages to different receipts and thereby provide mixedsignals to information gathers and users to include the intelligence community.

Information Assurance - IO that protects and defends information systems by ensuring theiravailability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and non-repudiations. This includesproviding for restoration for information systems by incorporating protection, detection, andreaction capabilities.

Information-Based Process - processes that collect, analyze, and disseminate information usingany medium or form. These processes may be stand alone processes or sub-processes which,taken together, comprise a larger system or systems or processes. At the tactical level,information- based processes include reconnaissance plans, decision making, and local trafficcontrol points in austere areas.

Information Environment - the aggregate of individuals, organizations, or systems that collect,process, or disseminate information, including the information itself.

Information Operations - actions taken to affect adversary information and informationsystems while defending one’s own information and information systems. IO requires close,continuous integration of offensive and defensive capabilities and activities, as well as theeffective design, integration, and interaction of C2 with intelligence support. Major capabilitiesto conduct IO include, but are not limited to, OPSEC, PSYOP, military deception, EW, andphysical attack/destruction, and could include CNA. IO-related activities include, but are notlimited to, PA and CA.

Information Superiority - the capability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterruptedflow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary’s ability to do the same.Information superiority may be all pervasive in the AOR or it may be function-aspect-specific,localized, and temporal.

Information System - the entire infrastructure, organization, personnel, and components thatcollect, process, store, transmit, display, disseminate, and act on information. The informationsystem also includes the information- based processes.

Information Warfare - information operations conducted during a time of crisis or conflict toachieve or promote specific objectives over a specific adversary or adversaries.

Offensive IO - OPSEC, military deception, PSYOP, electronic warfare, physical attack,destruction, and computer attack. Offensive IO can be conducted in a variety of situations andcircumstances across the range of military operations. Offensive IO may have the greatest impactprior to open hostilities, but applies to all levels of war.



IO Organization

Unit commanders should establish a fully functioning IO cell to develop and promulgateguidance/plans for IO that are passed to subordinate units for decentralized planning andexecution. The IO cell integrates a broad range of potential actions and activities that helpcontribute to the commander’s desired end state in the area of responsibility. The commander’scell must be structured to plan and coordinate IO and sufficiently flexible to accommodate avariety of planning and tactical circumstances. All principal staff must be an active part of IOplanning.

IO Planning

IO planning is accomplished in MDMP. IO planning must be broad based and encompassemployment of all available capabilities. IO planning must analyze the risk of compromise,reprisal, escalation of hostilities, and insubordination or inadvertent counteraction of IO.



Appendix BAppendix B

IO a

nd M

DM

PIO

Inte

grat

ion

with

IPB

•C

ondu

ct in

itial

ass

essm

ent o

f inf

o op

•D

eter

min

e IO

pla

nnin

g re

quire

men

ts

•U

nder

stan

d IO

situ

atio

n•

Ana

lyze

HH

Q in

form

atio

n op

erat

ion

•D

efin

e &

ana

lyze

the

info

env

ironm

ent a

ndth

reat

•D

evel

op IO

mis

sion

sta

tem

ent &

obj

ectiv

es•

See

k co

mm

ande

r’s IO

gui

danc

e

•ID

frie

ndly

IO c

apab

ilitie

s &

vul

nera

bilit

ies

•D

evel

op IO

con

cept

of s

uppo

rt

•V

isua

lize

oper

atio

ns in

the

info

env

ironm

ent

•W

arga

me

IO c

once

pt o

f sup

port

agai

nst

how

the

enem

y w

ill e

mpl

oy it

s in

form

atio

nsy

stem

s an

d as

sets

•A

naly

ze &

eva

luat

e IO

sup

port

to e

ach

CO

A

•Fi

naliz

e de

tails

of t

he in

form

atio

n op

erat

ion

•P

repa

re IO

ann

ex &

inpu

t to

base

or

der/p

lan

MD

MP

Ste

pIO

Foc

us

Def

ine

the

Bat

tlefie

ld

Des

crib

e th

eB

attle

field

’s

Effe

cts

Eva

luat

e th

e Th

reat

Det

erm

ine

Thre

at C

OA

s

IPB

Ste

pIO

Foc

usA

naly

sis

Pro

duct

Def

ine

the

Info

rmat

ion

Env

ironm

ent

Des

crib

e th

eIn

form

atio

n E

nviro

nmen

t’sE

ffect

s

Eva

luat

e th

e Th

reat

s’ In

foS

yste

m

Det

erm

ine

Thre

at A

ctio

nsin

the

Info

Env

ironm

ent

Com

bine

d In

form

atio

nO

verla

y-S

igni

fican

t ch

arac

teris

tics

of th

ein

fo e

nviro

nmen

t &ef

fect

s on

ope

ratio

ns

Thre

at C

OG

Ana

lysi

s-

Crit

ical

vul

nera

bilit

ies

Thre

at T

empl

ates

-Who

m

akes

dec

isio

ns; w

hat

node

s, li

nks,

& s

yste

ms

the

thre

at u

ses;

how

in

fo a

sset

s ar

e em

ploy

ed

Info

rmat

ion

SIT

EM

P-

Whe

n, w

here

, & w

hy

the

thre

at w

ill s

eek

toga

in in

fo s

uper

iorit

y

Key

Def

initi

ons

Info

rmat

ion

Ope

ratio

ns:

The

empl

oym

ent o

f the

cor

e ca

pabi

litie

s of

EW

, CN

O, P

SYO

P, m

ilita

ry d

ecep

tion,

an

d O

PS

EC

, in

conc

ert w

ith s

peci

fied

supp

ortin

g an

d re

late

d ca

pabi

litie

s, to

affe

ct o

r def

end

info

rmat

ion

and

info

rmat

ion

syst

ems,

and

to in

fluen

ce d

ecsi

onm

akin

g.

(FM

3-1

3)

Info

rmat

ion

Env

ironm

ent :

The

aggr

egat

e of

indi

vidu

als,

or

gani

zatio

ns, o

r sys

tem

s th

at c

olle

ct, p

roce

ss, o

r di

ssem

inat

e in

form

atio

n; a

lso

incl

uded

is th

e in

form

atio

n its

elf.

(FM

3-0

)

Info

rmat

ion

Sup

erio

rity :

The

ope

ratio

nal a

dvan

tage

de

rived

from

the

abili

ty to

col

lect

, pro

cess

, and

di

ssem

inat

e an

uni

nter

rupt

ed fl

ow o

f inf

orm

atio

n w

hile

ex

ploi

ting

or d

enyi

ng a

n ad

vers

ary'

s ab

ility

to d

o th

e sa

me.

(FM

3-0

)Fi

eld

Sup

port

Div

isio

n

M

ay 2

004

Rec

eipt

of

Mis

sion

CO

A

App

rova

lO

rder

s P

rodu

ctio

n

Mis

sion

A

naly

sis

CO

A

Dev

elop

men

t

CO

A

Ana

lysi

s

CO

A

Com

paris

on

IO P

lann

er’s

Aid

Exam

ple

Com

bine

d In

form

atio

n O

verla

y

Com

bine

d In

form

atio

n O

verla

y

Civ

ilian

info

infr

astr

uctu

re m

ust b

e in

terd

icte

d to

redu

ce th

reat

ad

vant

age

Info

Sub

-Env

ironm

ent C

: Sou

ther

n Pl

ains

•P

opul

ace:

Den

sely

pop

ulat

ed b

y G

roup

Y (9

5%)

•In

fo fl

ow: F

ollo

ws

grou

nd L

OC

s•

Info

Infra

stru

ctur

e: W

ell d

evel

oped

info

infra

stru

ctur

e; s

uppo

rts

milit

ary

C2;

key

nod

es in

citi

es•

Sup

port:

Stro

ng s

uppo

rt fo

r cur

rent

gov

ernm

ent r

egim

e•

Favo

rs e

nem

y op

erat

ions

Info

Sub

-Env

ironm

ent A

: Nor

ther

n Pl

ains

•P

opul

ace:

Gro

up X

Maj

ority

(80%

)•

Info

flow

: Prim

ary

info

sou

rce

is o

utsi

de c

ount

ry•

Info

infra

stru

ctur

e: U

nder

deve

lope

d &

dila

pida

ted

•S

uppo

rt: L

arge

ly a

nti-g

over

nmen

t reg

ime

•Fa

vors

frie

ndly

forc

e op

erat

ions

Info

Sub

-Env

ironm

ent B

: Cen

tral

Mou

ntai

ns•

Pop

ulac

e: S

pars

ely

popu

late

d by

Gro

up Y

•In

fo fl

ow: I

nfor

mat

ion

vacu

um•

Info

infra

stru

ctur

e: C

anal

ized

alo

ng g

roun

d LO

Cs

•S

uppo

rt: A

mbi

vale

nt to

war

d go

vern

men

t-reg

ime

•N

o si

gnifi

cant

impa

ct o

n fr

iend

ly fo

rce

oper

atio

ns

Gra

phic

por

traya

l of i

nfor

mat

ion

envi

ronm

ent

Coa

x

Roa

ds

Key

Nod

es

Inf

o Fl

ow

Sig

nific

ant c

hara

cter

istic

s of

eac

h in

form

atio

n su

b-en

viro

nmen

t

Exte

rnal

info

flow

& in

fluen

ce fr

om

neig

hbor

ing

coun

try

IO M

issi

on S

tate

men

t

IO O

bjec

tives

Task

s to

IO E

lem

ents

How

IO w

ill s

uppo

rt th

eco

mm

and’

s m

issi

on(W

ho, W

hat,

Whe

re,

Whe

n, W

hy)

Wha

t IO

will

do

to a

ffect

the

info

env

ironm

ent

(Effe

ct, O

bjec

t of E

ffect

[Tar

get],

Pur

pose

of

the

Effe

ct)

3-5

Obj

ectiv

es p

er P

hase

Wha

t act

ions

the

elem

ents

will

per

form

toex

ecut

e th

e in

fo o

p (T

ask,

Pur

pose

)

Task

, Pur

pose

IO C

once

pt o

f Sup

port

How

the

info

ope

ratio

nw

ill b

e co

nduc

ted

(Cdr

’s In

tent

for I

O,

Info

Sup

erio

rity

for t

he

Ope

ratio

n, G

ener

al P

lan

for I

O, P

riorit

y of

Sup

port,

Res

trict

ions

on

the

Em

ploy

men

t of I

O)

Task

s to

Uni

ts

Mis

sion

to T

ask

Prod

ucts

Ex

ampl

e IO

Mis

sion

and

Obj

ectiv

es(T

actic

al C

orps

mis

sion

)

IO O

bjec

tives

:

•D

isru

pt 1

st O

SC

AD

C2

in o

rder

to p

reve

nt c

oord

inat

ed

enga

gem

ent o

f XX

Cor

ps’d

eep

atta

cks.

•D

estro

y 1s

t OS

C h

eadq

uarte

rs in

ord

er to

neu

traliz

e co

mm

and

and

cont

rol b

etw

een

battl

ezon

ean

d re

serv

e fo

rces

.

•D

isru

pt o

pera

tiona

l res

erve

CP

san

d co

mm

unic

atio

n ne

ts

in o

rder

to d

elay

em

ploy

men

t of r

einf

orci

ng o

r co

unte

ratta

ck fo

rces

.

•In

fluen

ce c

ivilia

n po

pula

ce in

occ

upie

d ar

eas

in o

rder

to

min

imiz

e in

terfe

renc

e w

ith X

X C

orps

’ope

ratio

ns.

•D

eny

SP

F de

tect

ion

and

iden

tific

atio

n of

XX

Cor

ps’m

ain

and

tact

ical

CP

sin

ord

er to

pre

vent

targ

etin

g by

1st

OS

C

artil

lery

fire

s.

IO M

issi

on:

On

orde

r, X

X C

orps

IO d

isru

pts

1st O

pera

tiona

l S

trate

gic

Com

man

d (O

SC

) gro

und

and

air d

efen

se fo

rces

’ co

mm

and

and

cont

rol,

influ

ence

s ci

vilia

n po

pula

ce p

erce

ptio

ns,

and

prot

ects

Cor

ps’ c

ritic

al in

form

atio

n in

the

AO

R in

ord

er to

fa

cilit

ate

dest

ruct

ion

of 1

st O

SC

forc

es.

PD EW PSYO

PC

APATi

me

Line

Phas

e I

Phas

e II

Phas

e III

IO A

sses

smen

t

1

3

7

64

5

2

Info

rmat

ion

Supe

riorit

y:1s

t OSC

una

ble

to c

ondu

ctsy

nchr

oniz

ed re

actio

n to

the

Coa

litio

n m

ain

atta

ck.

IO O

bjec

tives

:•

Des

troy

1st O

SC

C2

IOT

neut

raliz

e C

2 be

twee

nba

ttlez

one

and

rese

rve

forc

es.

•In

fluen

ce p

opul

ace

IOT

min

imiz

e in

terfe

renc

e w

ithC

oalit

ion

oper

atio

ns.

IO E

lem

ent T

asks

:P

D:

1. D

estro

y C

orps

and

Div

isio

n C

Ps.

2. D

estro

y fo

rwar

ds o

bser

vers

and

reco

n in

zon

e.EW

:3.

Jam

Cor

ps-D

ivis

ion

C2

nets

.PS

YOP

: 4.

Inf

orm

pop

ulac

e of

coa

litio

n in

tent

ions

, loc

atio

nof

HA,

and

DC

rout

es a

nd c

amps

.5.

Em

ploy

TP

T in

dire

ct s

uppo

rt of

man

euve

r uni

ts.

Civ

il Af

fairs

:6.

Dis

tribu

te H

A to

DC

cam

ps.

Pub

lic A

ffairs

:7.

Pub

liciz

e C

oalit

ion

role

in H

A s

uppo

rt.

SPF

I

E W

XX

XXX

TAC

XXX

Mai

n

XX

I

E W

46

5

2

1

1

1

1

2

2

3

3

3

3

44

4

4

4

51 6

6

7

77Main

Attack

Exam

ple

Cou

rse

of A

ctio

n Sk

etch

(Del

iber

ate

Atta

ck M

issi

on)

Ass

essm

ent

Map

of A

O w

ith

loca

tions

of I

O ta

sks

IO c

once

pt o

f sup

port:

ob

ject

ives

and

task

s (fo

r thi

s m

issi

on)

Tim

elin

e (b

y ph

ase)

of I

O ta

sk e

xecu

tion

This

pro

duct

pro

duce

d by

U.S

. Arm

y, 1

stIn

form

atio

n O

pera

tions

Com

man

d (L

and)

Doc

trin

al E

ffect

s Fo

r IO

(FM

3-1

3)

Des

troy

–D

amag

e a

com

bat s

yste

m s

o ba

dly

that

it c

anno

t pe

rform

any

func

tion

or b

e re

stor

ed to

a u

sabl

e co

nditi

on

with

out b

eing

ent

irely

rebu

ilt.

Dis

rupt

–In

info

rmat

ion

oper

atio

ns, m

eans

bre

akin

g or

in

terru

ptin

g th

e flo

w o

f inf

orm

atio

n be

twee

n se

lect

ed C

2 no

des.

Deg

rade

–In

info

rmat

ion

oper

atio

ns, i

s us

ing

non-

leth

al o

r te

mpo

rary

mea

ns to

redu

ce th

e ef

fect

iven

ess

or e

ffici

ency

of

adve

rsar

y co

mm

and

and

cont

rol s

yste

ms,

and

info

rmat

ion

colle

ctio

n ef

forts

or m

eans

.

Den

y –

In in

form

atio

n op

erat

ions

, ent

ails

with

hold

ing

info

rmat

ion

abou

t Arm

y fo

rce

capa

bilit

ies

and

inte

ntio

ns th

at

adve

rsar

ies

need

for e

ffect

ive

and

tim

ely

deci

sion

mak

ing.

Dec

eive

–C

ause

a p

erso

n to

bel

ieve

wha

t is

not t

rue.

Expl

oit –

In in

form

atio

n op

erat

ions

, is

to g

ain

acce

ss to

ad

vers

ary

com

man

d an

d co

ntro

l sys

tem

s to

col

lect

in

form

atio

n or

to p

lant

fals

e or

mis

lead

ing

info

rmat

ion.

Influ

ence

–C

ause

adv

ersa

ries

or o

ther

s to

beh

ave

in a

m

anne

r fav

orab

le to

Arm

y fo

rces

.

Gen

erat

ing

Effe

cts Ph

ysic

al(M

aneu

ver &

Cbt

Ops

)•I

nfo

syst

ems

& a

sset

s•N

etw

ork

Infra

stru

ctur

e

Info

rmat

ion

(C2

& IM

)•I

nfor

mat

ion

–qu

ality

, flo

w &

con

tent

•Inf

o sy

stem

func

tions

-co

llect

ion,

pro

cess

ing,

&

dis

sem

inat

ion)

Cog

nitiv

e(D

ecis

ion-

mak

ing)

•Per

cept

ions

•Atti

tude

s•U

nder

stan

ding

Info

rmat

ion

Env

ironm

ent

Dom

ains

Effe

cts

1st O

rder

Effe

cts

Exe

cute

task

s to

cau

se

effe

cts

in th

e ph

ysic

al

dom

ain

2nd

Ord

er E

ffect

sS

um o

f 1st

ord

er

effe

cts

crea

te 2

ndor

der e

ffect

s

3rd

Ord

er E

ffect

sS

um o

f 2nd

ord

er e

ffect

s ge

nera

te a

3rd

ord

eref

fect

Focu

s IO

Obj

ectiv

esH

ere

Focu

s IO

Task

sH

ere

Mod

ified

IO A

nnex

For

mat

1. S

ITU

ATI

ON

.a.

Are

a of

Ope

ratio

ns.

Des

crib

e th

e in

fo e

nviro

nmen

t. b.

Ene

my

Ope

ratio

ns in

the

Info

Env

ironm

ent.

Des

crib

een

emy’

s de

cisi

on-m

akin

g st

ruct

ure;

C4I

SR

ass

ets,

sys

tem

s,

and

func

tions

, ass

ets

and

orga

niza

tions

ava

ilabl

e to

affe

ct th

e in

form

atio

n en

viro

nmen

t and

frie

ndly

C4I

SR

; and

crit

ical

ca

pabi

litie

s &

vul

nera

bilit

ies.

c. F

riend

ly C

ap. &

Vul

nera

bilit

ies

in th

e In

fo E

nviro

nmen

t. d.

Civ

il C

onsi

dera

tions

. e.

Atta

chm

ents

and

Det

achm

ents

. Li

st o

rgan

ic a

nd

supp

ortin

g as

sets

ava

ilabl

e to

exe

cute

the

info

ope

ratio

n.2.

MIS

SIO

N.

Sta

te th

e IO

mis

sion

.3.

EX

EC

UTI

ON

.a.

Con

cept

of S

uppo

rt. D

efin

e in

fo s

uper

iorit

y an

d ex

plai

n ho

w IO

will

hel

p ac

hiev

e it.

Des

crib

e th

e in

fo o

pera

tion

(i.e.

,ho

w IO

will

be

cond

ucte

d an

d w

ho w

ill p

erfo

rm it

) fro

m

begi

nnin

g to

end

; to

incl

ude

enem

y ca

pabi

litie

s &

vu

lner

abili

ties

to b

e at

tack

ed a

nd fr

iend

ly c

ritic

al

vuln

erab

ilitie

s to

be

prot

ecte

d.b.

Ass

essm

ent.

b. T

asks

to S

ubor

dina

te U

nits

. c.

IO C

ell.

Lis

t ins

truct

ions

not

list

ed in

the

SO

P.

d. C

oord

inat

ing

Inst

ruct

ions

. 4.

SE

RV

ICE

SU

PP

OR

T.

5. C

OM

MA

ND

AN

D S

IGN

AL.

Plan

ning

Fire

s an

d Ef

fect

s fo

r IO

•Cro

ss-w

alk

IO &

fir

e sp

tann

exes

•Writ

e fir

es p

arag

raph

of

& fi

re s

uppo

rt an

nex

Ord

ers

Pro

d.

•Non

e•B

rief f

ire s

uppo

rt pl

an

as p

art o

f eac

h C

OA

CO

A

App

rova

l

•Inp

ut to

TS

M•F

inal

ize

Con

cept

of

Fire

s•F

inal

ize

HP

TL•D

evel

op T

SM

•Dev

elop

fire

sup

port

cont

rol m

easu

res

CO

A

Ana

lysi

s &

C

omp.

•Inp

ut to

Con

cept

of

Fire

s (o

r E

ffect

s)•N

omin

ate

targ

ets

to H

PTL

•Dev

elop

Con

cept

of

Fire

s (o

r Effe

cts)

•Dev

elop

initi

al H

PTL

•Qua

ntify

effe

cts

for

EFS

Ts

CO

A D

ev.

•Nom

inat

e ta

rget

s to

HV

TL•D

eter

min

e su

ppor

ting

IO

capa

bilit

ies

•Dev

elop

IO

obje

ctiv

es o

r E

IOTs

•Det

erm

ine

spec

ified

, im

plie

d, &

ess

entia

l fire

su

ppor

t tas

ks•D

eter

min

e H

VTL

•Tra

nsla

te fi

re s

uppo

rt as

sets

into

cap

abili

ties

•Dev

elop

dra

ft ta

rget

ing

obje

ctiv

es o

r EFS

Ts

Mis

sion

A

naly

sis

IO A

ctio

nTa

rget

ing

Act

ion

MD

MP

Appendix CAppendix C

Med

iaPo

pula

ceIn

form

atio

n In

fras

truc

ture

Com

bine

d In

form

atio

n O

verla

y

Exa

min

e th

e A

O to

iden

tify

sign

ifica

nt c

hara

cter

istic

s of

eac

h in

fo e

nviro

nmen

t dom

ain.

Ana

lyze

:•T

erra

in –

cana

lizat

ion

and

com

partm

enta

lizat

ion

•Pop

ulat

ion

dem

ogra

phic

s –

dist

ribut

ion,

lang

uage

, rel

igio

n, e

thni

city

, ed

ucat

ion

•Soc

ieta

l stru

ctur

es a

nd o

rgan

izat

ions

–po

litic

al, g

over

nmen

t, re

ligio

us, p

aram

ilitar

y, c

rimin

al•C

ivilia

n in

form

atio

n in

frast

ruct

ure

–ke

y lin

ks a

nd n

odes

•Med

ia –

radi

o, T

V, p

rint,

inte

rnet

, inc

ludi

ng a

udie

nce

& u

sers

•Thi

rd p

arty

org

aniz

atio

ns –

non-

gove

rnm

ent a

nd p

rivat

e•I

nfor

mat

ion

–ke

y id

eolo

gies

, per

cept

ions

and

bel

iefs

that

may

ca

use

spec

ific

frien

dly,

thre

at o

r thi

rd p

arty

beh

avio

r

Det

erm

ine:

•Phy

sica

l Dom

ain

–W

hat a

spec

ts o

f the

terr

ain,

wea

ther

, in

frast

ruct

ure,

and

pop

ulac

e w

ill im

pact

the

empl

oym

ent o

f in

form

atio

n sy

stem

ass

ets

and

the

linki

ng o

f inf

orm

atio

n sy

stem

sin

to n

etw

orks

?•I

nfor

mat

ion

Dom

ain

–W

hat i

nfor

mat

ion

and

its q

ualit

y, fl

ow, a

nd

dist

ribut

ion

will

impa

ct in

form

atio

n sy

stem

s’ fu

nctio

ns (i

.e.,

the

colle

ctio

n, p

roce

ssin

g, a

nd d

isse

min

atio

n of

info

rmat

ion)

?•C

ogni

tive

Dom

ain

–W

hat p

opul

ace

perc

eptio

ns, a

ttitu

de,

awar

enes

s, u

nder

stan

ding

, and

kno

wle

dge

will

influ

ence

dec

isio

n-m

akin

g?

C2

& IM

IO In

tegr

atio

n w

ith IP

B

Def

ine

the

Bat

tlefie

ld

Des

crib

e th

eB

attle

field

’s

Effe

cts

Eva

luat

e th

e Th

reat

Det

erm

ine

Thre

at C

OA

s

IPB

Ste

pIO

Foc

usA

naly

sis

Pro

duct

Def

ine

the

Info

rmat

ion

Env

ironm

ent

Des

crib

e th

eIn

form

atio

n E

nviro

nmen

t’sE

ffect

s

Eva

luat

e th

e Th

reat

s’ In

foS

yste

m

Det

erm

ine

Thre

at A

ctio

nsin

the

Info

Env

ironm

ent

Com

bine

d In

form

atio

nO

verla

y-S

igni

fican

t ch

arac

teris

tics

of th

ein

fo e

nviro

nmen

t &ef

fect

s on

ope

ratio

ns

Thre

at C

OG

Ana

lysi

s-

Crit

ical

vul

nera

bilit

ies

Thre

at T

empl

ates

-Who

m

akes

dec

isio

ns; w

hat

node

s, li

nks,

& s

yste

ms

the

thre

at u

ses;

how

in

fo a

sset

s ar

e em

ploy

ed

Info

rmat

ion

SIT

EM

P-

Whe

n, w

here

, & w

hy

the

thre

at w

ill s

eek

toga

in in

fo s

uper

iorit

y Fi

eld

Sup

port

Div

isio

n

O

ctob

er 2

002

Exam

ple

CIO

CIO

–Th

e “M

CO

O o

f the

Info

rmat

ion

Env

ironm

ent”

Des

crib

e th

e In

form

atio

n En

viro

nmen

t’s E

ffect

s

Info

rmat

ion

Envi

ronm

ent C

onst

ruct

Def

ine

the

Info

rmat

ion

Envi

ronm

ent

Key

Ref

eren

ces

JP 2

-01.

3, J

oint

TTP

for I

ntel

ligen

ce P

repa

ratio

n of

the

Bat

tlesp

ace

(MA

Y 00

)FM

34-

130,

Inte

llige

nce

Pre

para

tion

of th

e B

attle

field

(JU

L 94

)1s

tIO

CM

D (L

and)

Info

rmat

ion

IPB

TTB

(Dra

ft)

Phys

ical

•Th

e ta

ngib

le, r

eal w

orld

•W

here

info

sys

tem

s an

d ne

twor

ks

resi

deInfo

rmat

ion

•A

bstra

ct c

onst

ruct

bas

ed o

n in

fo

theo

ry•

Whe

re in

form

atio

n ex

ists

, as

wel

l as

the

med

ium

by

whi

ch in

fo is

co

llect

ed, p

roce

ssed

, and

di

ssem

inat

ed

Cog

nitiv

e•

Indi

vidu

al a

nd c

olle

ctiv

e co

nsci

ousn

ess

•W

here

dec

isio

ns a

re m

ade

•Per

cept

ions

•Aw

aren

ess

•Und

erst

andi

ng

Civ

ilian

info

infr

astr

uctu

re m

ust b

e in

terd

icte

d to

redu

ce th

reat

ad

vant

age

Key

Cha

ract

eris

tics

Info

rmat

ion

Env

ironm

ent

Dom

ains

IPB

Ste

ps

1.D

efin

e th

e B

attle

field

Env

ironm

ent

2.D

escr

ibe

the

Bat

tlefie

ld’s

Effe

cts

3.E

valu

ate

the

Thre

at4.

Det

erm

ine

Thre

at C

ours

es o

f Act

ion

(CO

As)

1.A

naly

ze e

ach

dom

ain’

s si

gnifi

cant

cha

ract

eris

tics

in d

etai

l an

d te

mpl

ate:

2.C

ombi

ne th

e si

gnifi

cant

cha

ract

eris

tics

of th

e do

mai

ns to

de

velo

p ag

greg

ate

effe

cts

for t

he e

ntire

info

env

ironm

ent.

3.P

lot a

naly

sis

to c

reat

e a

Com

bine

d In

form

atio

n O

verla

y (C

IO).

Th

e C

IO d

epic

ts w

here

and

how

the

info

rmat

ion

envi

ronm

ent’s

po

tent

ial e

ffect

s w

ill im

pact

mili

tary

ope

ratio

ns.

Con

side

ratio

ns:

Info

Sub

-Env

ironm

ent C

: Sou

ther

n Pl

ains

•P

opul

ace:

Den

sely

pop

ulat

ed b

y G

roup

Y (9

5%)

•In

fo fl

ow: F

ollo

ws

grou

nd L

OC

s•

Info

Infra

stru

ctur

e: W

ell d

evel

oped

info

infra

stru

ctur

e; s

uppo

rts

milit

ary

C2;

key

nod

es in

citi

es•

Sup

port:

Stro

ng s

uppo

rt fo

r cur

rent

gov

ernm

ent r

egim

e•

Favo

rs e

nem

y op

erat

ions

Info

Sub

-Env

ironm

ent A

: Nor

ther

n Pl

ains

•P

opul

ace:

Gro

up X

Maj

ority

(80%

)•

Info

flow

: Prim

ary

info

sou

rce

is o

utsi

de c

ount

ry•

Info

infra

stru

ctur

e: U

nder

deve

lope

d &

dila

pida

ted

•S

uppo

rt: L

arge

ly a

nti-g

over

nmen

t reg

ime

•Fa

vors

frie

ndly

forc

e op

erat

ions

Info

Sub

-Env

ironm

ent B

: Cen

tral

Mou

ntai

ns•

Pop

ulac

e: S

pars

ely

popu

late

d by

Gro

up Y

•In

fo fl

ow: I

nfor

mat

ion

vacu

um•

Info

infra

stru

ctur

e: C

anal

ized

alo

ng g

roun

d LO

Cs

•S

uppo

rt: A

mbi

vale

nt to

war

d go

vern

men

t-reg

ime

•N

o si

gnifi

cant

impa

ct o

n fr

iend

ly fo

rce

oper

atio

ns

Gra

phic

por

traya

l of i

nfor

mat

ion

envi

ronm

ent

IO In

tegr

atio

n w

ith IP

B

•C

an th

e A

O b

e di

vide

d in

to d

istin

ct s

ub-in

form

atio

n en

viro

nmen

ts?

•H

ow d

oes

info

rmat

ion

flow

in th

e A

O?

•Is

ther

e ke

y te

rrai

n in

the

info

rmat

ion

envi

ronm

ent?

Dec

isio

n-M

akin

g

MN

VR &

C

BT

Ops

Coa

x

Roa

ds

Key

Nod

es

Inf

o Fl

ow

1 2 3

124

Sig

nific

ant c

hara

cter

istic

s of

eac

h in

form

atio

n su

b-en

viro

nmen

t

•Inf

orm

atio

n qu

ality

•Inf

orm

atio

n flo

w•I

nfor

mat

ion

dist

ribut

ion

•Ter

rain

(geo

grap

hy)

•Wea

ther

•Inf

rast

ruct

ure

•Pop

ulac

e

Coa

x–

Secu

re c

omm

unic

atio

ns, b

ut n

etw

ork

cove

rage

is

limite

d; u

sed

by m

ilita

ry fo

r C2

Roa

ds–

Use

d fo

r cou

riers

; rel

ativ

ely

wel

l dev

elop

ed b

ut n

ot

easi

ly tr

affic

able

dur

ing

incl

emen

t wea

ther

Cel

lula

r–O

nly

relia

ble

tele

phon

e sy

stem

; com

plet

e co

vera

ge in

nor

ther

n an

d so

uthe

rn p

ortio

ns o

f the

AO

Sate

llite

–Ex

clus

ive

use

by g

over

nmen

t offi

cial

s, o

nly

avai

labl

e in

maj

or c

ities

Infr

astr

uctu

re p

aral

lels

ro

ads

betw

een

maj

or c

ities

. R

ural

are

as la

ck

conn

ectiv

ityC

oax

R

oads

C

ellu

lar

Sa

telli

te

Exte

rnal

info

flow

& in

fluen

ce fr

om

neig

hbor

ing

coun

try

Info

SIT

EMP

–Ph

ase

IIIIn

fo S

ITEM

P –

Phas

e II

Info

SIT

EMP

–Ph

ase

IIn

form

atio

n In

fras

truc

ture

Tem

plat

e

Info

rmat

ion

Tact

ics

Tem

plat

e

Dec

isio

n M

akin

g Te

mpl

ate

This

pro

duct

pro

duce

d by

U.S

. Arm

y, 1

stIn

form

atio

n O

pera

tions

Com

man

d (L

and)

Valid

ity T

estin

g fo

r CO

Gs

Will

dest

ruct

ion,

neu

traliz

atio

n, o

r sub

stan

tial w

eake

ning

of t

he C

OG

re

sult

in c

hang

ing

the

thre

at’s

CO

A o

r den

ying

its

obje

ctiv

e?

Doe

s th

e fri

endl

y fo

rce

have

the

reso

urce

s an

d ca

pabi

lity

to

acco

mpl

ish

dest

ruct

ion

or n

eutra

lizat

ion

of th

e th

reat

CO

G?

If th

e an

swer

is “n

o”, t

hen

the

thre

at’s

iden

tifie

d cr

itica

l fac

tors

mus

t be

revi

ewed

for o

ther

crit

ical

vul

nera

bilit

ies,

or p

lann

ers

mus

t rea

sses

s ho

w to

atta

ck th

e pr

evio

usly

iden

tifie

d cr

itica

l vul

nera

bilit

ies

with

ad

ditio

nal r

esou

rces

.

Crit

eria

for C

V A

naly

sis

(CA

RV

ER

)•C

ritic

ality

. An

estim

ate

of th

e C

Vs

impo

rtanc

e to

the

enem

y. A

vu

lner

abilit

y w

ill si

gnifi

cant

ly in

fluen

ce th

e en

emy’

s ab

ility

to c

ondu

ct

or s

uppo

rt op

erat

ions

.•A

cces

sibi

lity.

A d

eter

min

atio

n of

whe

ther

the

CV

is a

cces

sibl

e to

the

frien

dly

forc

e in

tim

e an

d pl

ace.

•Rec

uper

abilit

y. A

n ev

alua

tion

of h

ow m

uch

effo

rt, ti

me,

& r

esou

rces

th

e en

emy

mus

t exp

end

if th

e C

V is

suc

cess

fully

affe

cted

.•V

ulne

rabi

lity.

A d

eter

min

atio

n of

whe

ther

the

frien

dly

forc

e ha

s th

e m

eans

or c

apab

ility

to a

ffect

the

CV

.•E

ffect

. A d

eter

min

atio

n of

the

exte

nt o

f the

effe

ct a

chie

ved

if th

e C

V

is s

ucce

ssfu

lly e

xplo

ited.

•R

ecog

niza

bilit

y. A

det

erm

inat

ion

if th

e C

V, o

nce

sele

cted

for

expl

oita

tion,

can

be

iden

tifie

d du

ring

the

oper

atio

n by

the

frien

dly

forc

e, a

nd c

an b

e as

sess

ed fo

r the

impa

ct o

f the

exp

loita

tion.

Eval

uate

the

Thre

at -

Cen

ters

of G

ravi

ty

Def

initi

ons

Cen

ter o

f Gra

vity

(CO

G):

Prim

ary

sour

ce o

f mor

al o

r ph

ysic

al s

treng

th, p

ower

, and

resi

stan

ce.

Crit

ical

Cap

abili

ty (C

C) :

Prim

ary

abili

ties

whi

ch m

erit

a C

OG

to b

e id

entif

ied

as s

uch

in th

e co

ntex

t of a

giv

en

scen

ario

, situ

atio

n, o

r mis

sion

.

Crit

ical

Req

uire

men

t (C

R) :

Ess

entia

l con

ditio

ns,

reso

urce

s, a

nd m

eans

for a

crit

ical

cap

abili

ty to

be

fully

op

erat

ive.

Crit

ical

Vul

nera

bilit

y (C

V) :

Crit

ical

requ

irem

ents

(or

com

pone

nts

ther

eof)

whi

ch a

re d

efic

ient

or v

ulne

rabl

e to

at

tack

or i

nflu

ence

in a

man

ner a

chie

ving

dec

isiv

e re

sults

.

1.Id

entif

y po

tent

ial t

hrea

t CO

Gs.

Vis

ualiz

e th

e th

reat

as

a sy

stem

of

func

tiona

l com

pone

nts.

Bas

ed u

pon

how

the

thre

at o

rgan

izes

, fig

hts,

m

akes

dec

isio

ns, a

nd it

s ph

ysic

al a

nd p

sych

olog

ical

stre

ngth

s an

d w

eakn

esse

s, s

elec

t the

thre

at’s

prim

ary

sour

ce o

f mor

al o

r phy

sica

l st

reng

th, p

ower

, and

resi

stan

ce.

2.Id

entif

y C

ritic

al C

apab

ilitie

s (C

C).

Eac

h C

OG

is a

naly

zed

to d

eter

min

e w

hat p

rimar

y ab

ilitie

s (fu

nctio

ns) t

he th

reat

pos

sess

es in

the

cont

ext

of th

e ba

ttlef

ield

and

frie

ndly

mis

sion

that

can

pre

vent

frie

ndly

forc

es

from

acc

ompl

ishi

ng th

e m

issi

on. E

ach

iden

tifie

d C

C m

ust r

elat

e to

the

CO

G, o

ther

wis

e it

is n

ot c

ritic

al in

the

cont

ext o

f the

ana

lysi

s.

3. Id

entif

y C

ritic

al R

equi

rem

ents

(CR

s) fo

r eac

h C

C. A

CR

is a

con

ditio

n,

reso

urce

, or m

eans

that

ena

bles

thre

at fu

nctio

ns o

r mis

sion

. CR

sar

e us

ually

tang

ible

ele

men

ts s

uch

as c

omm

unic

atio

ns m

eans

, wea

pons

sy

stem

s, o

r eve

n ge

ogra

phic

al a

reas

or f

eatu

res.

The

re m

ay b

e m

ore

than

one

CR

per

CC

.

4. Id

entif

y C

ritic

al V

ulne

rabi

litie

s (C

Vs) f

or e

ach

CR

. A C

V is

a C

R, o

r co

mpo

nent

of a

CR

, whi

ch is

vul

nera

ble

to a

ttack

or i

nflu

ence

. As

the

hier

arch

y of

CR

s, a

nd C

Vs a

re d

evel

oped

, int

er-r

elat

ions

hips

and

ov

erla

ppin

g be

twee

n th

e fa

ctor

s ar

e so

ught

in o

rder

to id

entif

y C

Rs

and

CVs

that

sup

port

mor

e th

an o

ne C

C. W

hen

sele

ctin

g C

Vs,

CV

an

alys

is is

con

duct

ed to

pai

r CV

s ag

ains

t frie

ndly

cap

abilit

ies.

CO

G A

naly

sis

Step

s

CO

G

CC

CC

CC

CV

CV

CV

CV

CR

CR

CR

CR

CV

CV

CO

G A

naly

sis

Hie

rarc

hy

Det

erm

ine

Thre

at A

ctiv

ities

in th

e In

form

atio

n En

viro

nmen

tTe

mpl

atin

g (c

ontin

ued)

Eval

uate

the

Thre

at -

Tem

plat

ing

Info

rmat

ion

SIT

EM

P–

Whe

re, W

hen,

& W

hyth

e th

reat

will

empl

oy it

s in

form

atio

n sy

stem

s. R

esul

t is

an o

vera

ll co

ncep

t and

sup

porti

ng

obje

ctiv

es th

at d

escr

ibes

how

the

adve

rsar

y w

ill op

erat

e in

the

info

rmat

ion

envi

ronm

ent.

•W

hy –

Like

ly in

form

atio

n co

ncep

t & o

bjec

tives

and

task

&

purp

ose

of p

rimar

y in

form

atio

n as

sets

•Whe

re –

Loca

tion

of p

rimar

y in

form

atio

n as

sets

•Whe

n –

Pre

dict

ion

of w

hen

in th

e op

erat

ion

info

ass

ets

will

be

empl

oyed

Form

al L

ink

Info

rmal

Lin

kM

ilita

ryPo

litic

alR

elig

ious

Num

erou

s in

form

al li

nks

allo

w

deci

sion

-mak

ers

to s

eek

guid

ance

ou

tsid

e fo

rmal

dec

isio

n ch

ains

XXXX

XXXX

Dec

isio

n-M

akin

g Te

mpl

ate

–W

hoin

an

orga

niza

tion

mak

es

deci

sion

s. P

urpo

se is

to d

eter

min

e ho

w a

n ad

vers

ary

orga

niza

tion

oper

ates

to a

chie

ve it

s m

issi

on o

r go

als.

Con

side

r:•S

truct

ure

of th

e or

gani

zatio

n•C

ritic

al li

nkag

es &

inte

r-re

latio

nshi

ps•K

ey d

ecis

ion

mak

ers

•Dec

isio

n-m

akin

g ch

arac

teris

tics

(i.e.

cen

traliz

ed, d

ecen

traliz

ed,

othe

r)

Info

rmat

ion

Infra

stru

ctur

e Te

mpl

ate

Wha

tnod

es, l

inks

, ass

ets,

and

m

eans

an

orga

niza

tion

uses

to

colle

ct, p

roce

ss, &

dis

sem

inat

e in

form

atio

n. P

urpo

se is

to id

entif

y cr

itica

l adv

ersa

ry in

form

atio

n sy

stem

no

des,

link

s, &

sys

tem

s (to

incl

ude

thos

e as

sets

cap

able

of i

mpa

ctin

g th

e in

form

atio

n en

viro

nmen

t).

Con

side

r:•I

nfor

mat

ion

node

s an

d lin

ks•C

omm

unic

atio

ns m

eans

•Sup

port

syst

ems

XXX

Coax

Mili

tary

C

ounc

il

XX X

Satellite

Tactic

alCellu

larCourie

r

Mos

tLe

ast

Pref

eren

ce

Dis

tanc

e (K

M)

8

-12

7-10

5

-6

1

1

10-2

5

Info

rmat

ion

Tact

ics

Tem

plat

eH

owth

e ad

vers

ary

will

empl

oy

avai

labl

e in

form

atio

n as

sets

. P

urpo

se is

to id

entif

y ad

vers

ary

info

rmat

ion

and

info

rmat

ion

syst

em

capa

bilit

ies,

vul

nera

bilit

ies,

and

su

scep

tibilit

ies.

Con

side

r:•D

octri

ne•I

nfor

mat

ion-

capa

ble

asse

ts•E

mpl

oym

ent o

f inf

orm

atio

n as

sets

SPF

Mili

tary

C

ounc

il

I I

I MI I MI

I I E W

XXX

TAC

Com

s In

to:

Mil

Cou

ncil

DIV

Mai

nD

IV T

AC

XXX

Mai

n

FEBA

XX XX

34

3

Mod

el th

e th

reat

by

prod

ucin

g te

mpl

ates

that

por

tray

the

norm

al o

r doc

trina

l (hi

stor

ical

) com

posi

tion

and

orga

niza

tion

ofth

e ad

vers

ary’

s in

form

atio

n sy

stem

and

its

asse

ts.

The

resu

lt sh

ould

iden

tify

adve

rsar

y ca

pabi

litie

s an

d vu

lner

abili

ties

unde

r ide

al c

ondi

tions

in th

e in

form

atio

n en

viro

nmen

t.

NO

TE:

Tem

plat

es w

ill v

ary

wid

ely

by o

pera

tion.

The

ex

ampl

es p

rese

nted

in th

is g

uide

are

illu

stra

tive

only

.

Thre

at In

fo O

bjec

tives

:1.

Prev

ent c

oalit

ion

inte

l col

lect

ion

2.D

egra

de c

oalit

ion

C2

3.Fo

rman

t civ

ilian

dis

cont

ent

Publ

ic In

form

atio

n:T:

Hig

hlig

ht c

olla

tera

l dam

age

P: D

iscr

edit

coal

ition

mis

sion

M: I

nt’l

med

ia, l

ocal

TV

& ra

dio

Prop

agan

da:

T: In

fluen

ce p

opul

ace

(DC

s)P:

Cau

se in

terf

eren

ce w

ith c

oalit

ion

ops

M: P

rint

pro

duct

s, A

M ra

dio,

HU

MIN

T ag

ents

EW:

T: J

am ta

ctic

al S

IGIN

TP:

Pre

vent

col

lect

ion

agai

nst f

orw

ard

elem

ents

M: C

orps

EW

bat

talio

n

SOF:

T: A

ttack

Cor

ps a

nd D

ivis

ion

CPs

P: S

low

offe

nsiv

e co

mba

t ops

M: D

irect

act

ion,

art

iller

y fir

es

1 3

SPF

I

E W

XX

1

1

1 1

XXX

TAC

1

13 XXX

Mai

n

XX

Cor

ps ta

ctic

al

and

cellu

lar

com

ms

are

the

vita

l lin

k in

the

C2

arch

itect

ure

2 4

4

4

2

2

Sate

llite

XXX

XXX

I

E W

13

FSD

FSD

The

purp

ose

of p

erfo

rmin

g a

thre

at C

OG

ana

lysi

s is

to

dete

rmin

e an

d ev

alua

te th

e en

emy’

s (a

nd o

ther

s’) c

ritic

al

vuln

erab

ilitie

s fo

r exp

loita

tion.

Sin

ce th

is to

ol is

use

d to

eva

luat

e th

e th

reat

, the

app

ropr

iate

tim

e to

per

form

this

ana

lysi

s is

dur

ing

Ste

p 3

(Eva

luat

e th

e Th

reat

) of I

PB

. Th

e re

sults

of C

OG

ana

lysi

s ar

e la

ter u

sed

durin

g C

OA

Dev

elop

men

t to

expl

oit i

dent

ified

vul

nera

bilit

ies.

CO

G a

naly

sis

of th

e th

reat

sho

uld

be c

ondu

cted

by

the

G2.

Th

e IO

sta

ff w

ill p

rovi

de in

put t

o, a

nd u

se, C

OG

ana

lysi

s to

de

term

ine

wha

t asp

ects

of t

he th

reat

IO s

houl

d en

gage

.

Thre

at C

OG

Ana

lysi

s an

d th

e M

DM

P

Fiel

d S

uppo

rt D

ivis

ion

Dec

embe

r 200

2

Key

Def

initi

ons

Cen

ter o

f Gra

vity

(CO

G):

Cha

ract

eris

tics,

cap

abili

ties,

or s

ourc

es o

f pow

er fr

om

whi

ch a

milit

ary

forc

e de

rives

its

freed

om o

f act

ion,

phy

sica

l stre

ngth

, or w

ill to

fig

ht. (

JP 5

-00.

1)

Crit

ical

Cap

abili

ty (C

C):

Cap

abili

ties

that

are

con

side

red

cruc

ial e

nabl

ers

for

the

adve

rsar

y’s

CO

G to

func

tion

as s

uch,

and

are

ess

entia

l to

the

acco

mpl

ishm

ent o

f the

adv

ersa

ry’s

ass

umed

obj

ectiv

e(s)

. (JP

5-0

0.1)

C

ritic

al R

equi

rem

ent (

CR

): E

ssen

tial c

ondi

tions

, res

ourc

es, a

nd m

eans

for a

cr

itica

l cap

abili

ty to

be

fully

ope

ratio

nal.

(JP

5-0

0.1)

C

ritic

al V

ulne

rabi

lity

(CV

): A

spec

ts o

r com

pone

nts

of th

e ad

vers

ary’

scr

itica

l ca

pabi

litie

s (o

r com

pone

nts

ther

eof),

whi

ch a

re d

efic

ient

or v

ulne

rabl

e to

ne

utra

lizat

ion,

inte

rdic

tion,

or a

ttack

in a

man

ner a

chie

ving

dec

isiv

e or

si

gnifi

cant

resu

lts. (

JP 5

-00.

1) Threat

CO

G A

naly

sis

Aid

5.Pr

iorit

ize

CVs

. C

AR

VE

R is

a S

OF

met

hodo

logy

use

d to

pr

iorit

ize

targ

ets.

The

met

hodo

logy

can

be

used

to ra

nk-

orde

r crit

ical

vul

nera

bilit

ies,

ther

eby

prio

ritiz

ing

the

targ

etin

g pr

oces

s. A

pply

the

six

crite

ria a

gain

st e

ach

CV

to

det

erm

ine

impa

ct o

n th

e th

reat

org

aniz

atio

n. S

ee

App

endi

x D

, FM

34-

36 fo

r mor

e in

form

atio

n on

CA

RV

ER

.

1.Id

entif

y Th

reat

Cen

ter(

s) o

f Gra

vity

(CO

G).

Vis

ualiz

e th

e th

reat

as

a sy

stem

of f

unct

iona

l com

pone

nts.

Bas

ed

upon

how

the

thre

at o

rgan

izes

, fig

hts,

mak

es d

ecis

ions

, an

d its

phy

sica

l & p

sych

olog

ical

stre

ngth

s an

d w

eakn

esse

s, s

elec

t the

thre

at’s

prim

ary

sour

ce o

f mor

al

or p

hysi

cal s

treng

th, p

ower

, & re

sist

ance

. N

ote:

D

epen

ding

on

the

leve

l (i.e

. stra

tegi

c, o

pera

tiona

l, ta

ctic

al),

CO

Gs

may

be

tang

ible

ent

ities

or i

ntan

gibl

e co

ncep

ts.

Valid

ity T

estin

g fo

r CO

Gs:

2.Id

entif

y C

ritic

al C

apab

ilitie

s (C

C).

Eac

h C

OG

is

anal

yzed

to d

eter

min

e w

hat p

rimar

y ab

ilitie

s (fu

nctio

ns)

the

thre

at p

osse

sses

in th

e co

ntex

t of t

he b

attle

field

and

fri

endl

y m

issi

on th

at c

an p

reve

nt fr

iend

ly fo

rces

from

ac

com

plis

hing

the

mis

sion

. N

ote:

CC

s ar

e no

t tan

gibl

e ob

ject

s bu

t rat

her a

re th

reat

func

tions

.

Valid

ity T

estin

g fo

r CC

s:

CO

G A

naly

sis

Step

s

Key

Ref

eren

ces

JP 5

-00.

1, J

oint

Doc

trine

for C

ampa

ign

Plan

ning

(Jan

200

2)FM

3-0

, Ope

ratio

ns (J

un 2

001)

FM 3

4-36

, SO

F In

tellig

ence

and

EW

Ope

ratio

ns (S

ep 1

991)

1s

t IO

CM

D In

form

atio

n IP

B T

TP (D

raft)

CO

G A

naly

sis

Hie

rarc

hyC

OG

CC

CR

CR

CR

CC

CC

CR

CV

CV

CV

CV

CV

Cen

ter o

f Gra

vity

(CO

G).

At t

he s

trate

gic

leve

l the

re is

us

ually

onl

y on

e C

OG

. A

t ope

ratio

nal a

nd ta

ctic

al le

vels

th

ere

may

be

mor

e th

an o

ne C

OG

. A

CO

G m

ay s

hift

as a

n op

erat

ion

chan

ges

phas

es.

Crit

ical

Cap

abili

ty (C

C).

Eac

h C

OG

can

hav

e m

ultip

le

criti

cal c

apab

ilitie

s in

the

cont

ext o

f the

bat

tlefie

ld a

nd

frien

dly

mis

sion

.

Crit

ical

Req

uire

men

t (C

R).

Eac

h C

C c

an h

ave

seve

ral

criti

cal r

equi

rem

ents

. C

ritic

al re

quire

men

ts m

ay b

e sh

ared

by

mul

tiple

CC

s.

Crit

ical

Vul

nera

bilit

y (C

V).

Eac

h C

R c

an h

ave

seve

ral

criti

cal v

ulne

rabi

litie

s. C

ritic

al v

ulne

rabi

litie

s m

ay b

e sh

ared

by

mul

tiple

CR

s.

3.Id

entif

y C

ritic

al R

equi

rem

ents

(CR

s).

Eac

h C

C is

an

alyz

ed to

det

erm

ine

wha

t con

ditio

ns, r

esou

rces

, or

mea

ns th

at e

nabl

es th

reat

func

tions

or m

issi

on. N

ote:

C

Rs

are

usua

lly ta

ngib

le e

lem

ents

suc

h as

co

mm

unic

atio

ns m

eans

, wea

pons

sys

tem

s, o

r eve

n ge

ogra

phic

al a

reas

or t

erra

in e

atur

es.

Valid

ity T

estin

g fo

r CR

s:

4.Id

entif

y C

ritic

al V

ulne

rabi

litie

s (C

Vs).

Eac

h C

C is

an

alyz

ed to

det

erm

ine

whi

ch C

Rs,

or c

ompo

nent

s th

ereo

f, ar

e vu

lner

able

to n

eutra

lizat

ion,

inte

rdic

tion,

or

atta

ck.

Not

e: C

Vs

may

be

tang

ible

stru

ctur

es o

r eq

uipm

ent,

or it

may

be

an in

tang

ible

per

cept

ion,

po

pula

ce b

elie

f or s

usce

ptib

ility

.

Valid

ity T

estin

g fo

r CVs

:

CO

G A

naly

sis

Step

s (c

ontin

ued)

Cen

ter o

f Gra

vity

(CO

G)

Crit

ical

Cap

abili

ty (C

C)

Crit

ical

Req

uire

men

t (C

R)

Crit

ical

Vul

nera

bilit

y (C

V)

Rec

eipt

of M

issi

on

Mis

sion

Ana

lysi

s

CO

A D

evel

opm

ent

CO

A A

naly

sis

MD

MP

Step

CO

A C

ompa

rison

CO

A A

ppro

val

Ord

ers

Pro

duct

ion

Step

3, I

PB: C

OG

Ana

lysi

s:•

Iden

tify

thre

at C

OG

(s),

CC

s, &

CR

s•

Iden

tify

CVs

Step

1, A

naly

ze R

elat

ive

Com

bat

Pow

er:

•Pr

iorit

ize

CVs

(CAR

VE

R A

naly

sis)

CO

G A

naly

sis

Step

s (c

ontin

ued)

Will

the

dest

ruct

ion,

neu

traliz

atio

n, o

r sub

stan

tial w

eake

ning

of

the

CO

G re

sult

in c

hang

ing

the

thre

at’s

CO

A o

r den

ying

its

obje

ctiv

e(s)

?

Is th

e id

entif

ied

criti

cal c

apab

ility

a pr

imar

y ab

ility

in c

onte

xt

with

the

give

n m

issi

ons

of b

oth

thre

at a

nd fr

iend

ly fo

rces

? Is

the

iden

tifie

d C

C d

irect

ly re

late

d to

the

CO

G?

Will

expl

oita

tion

of th

e C

V d

isab

le th

e as

soci

ated

CR

? D

oes

the

frien

dly

forc

e ha

ve th

e re

sour

ces

to e

ffect

the

iden

tifie

d C

V?

Will

the

abse

nce

or lo

ss o

f the

iden

tifie

d C

R d

isab

le th

e th

reat

’s

CC

?D

oes

the

thre

at c

onsi

der t

he id

entif

ied

CR

to b

e cr

itica

l (do

not

m

irror

imag

e)?

••C

ritic

ality

. A

n es

timat

e of

the

CV’

s im

porta

nce

to th

e en

emy.

To

wha

t ext

ent w

ill th

e vu

lner

abilit

y in

fluen

ce th

e en

emy’

s ab

ility

to c

ondu

ct o

r sup

port

oper

atio

ns.

•A

cces

sibi

lity.

A d

eter

min

atio

n of

whe

ther

the

CV

is a

cces

sibl

e to

th

e fri

endl

y fo

rce

in ti

me

and

plac

e. I

n ot

her w

ords

, doe

s th

e fri

endl

y fo

rce

have

the

reso

urce

s an

d ca

pabi

lity

to a

ccom

plis

h de

stru

ctio

n or

neu

traliz

atio

n of

the

CV?

•

Rec

uper

abilit

y. A

n ev

alua

tion

of h

ow m

uch

effo

rt, ti

me,

&

reso

urce

s th

e en

emy

mus

t exp

end

if th

e C

V is

suc

cess

fully

af

fect

ed.

•Vu

lner

abilit

y. A

det

erm

inat

ion

of w

heth

er th

e fri

endl

y fo

rce

has

the

mea

ns o

r cap

abilit

y to

affe

ct th

e C

V.

•Ef

fect

. A d

eter

min

atio

n of

the

exte

nt o

f the

effe

ct a

chie

ved

if th

e C

V is

suc

cess

fully

exp

loite

d.

•R

ecog

niza

bilit

y. A

det

erm

inat

ion

if th

e C

V, o

nce

sele

cted

for

expl

oita

tion,

can

be

iden

tifie

d du

ring

the

oper

atio

n by

the

frien

dly

forc

e, a

nd c

an b

e as

sess

ed fo

r the

impa

ct o

f the

ex

ploi

tatio

n.

Fitti

ng F

riend

ly C

OG

Ana

lysi

s in

to th

e M

DM

P

Fiel

d S

uppo

rt D

ivis

ion

Dec

embe

r 200

2

Key

Def

initi

ons

Cen

ter o

f Gra

vity

(CO

G):

Cha

ract

eris

tics,

cap

abili

ties,

or s

ourc

es o

f pow

er fr

om

whi

ch a

milit

ary

forc

e de

rives

its

freed

om o

f act

ion,

phy

sica

l stre

ngth

, or w

ill to

fig

ht. (

JP 5

-00.

1)

Crit

ical

Cap

abili

ty (C

C):

Cap

abili

ties

that

are

con

side

red

cruc

ial e

nabl

ers

for

the

frie

ndly

CO

G to

func

tion

as s

uch,

and

are

ess

entia

l to

the

acco

mpl

ishm

ent

of th

e ad

vers

ary’

s as

sum

ed o

bjec

tive(

s). (

mod

JP

5-00

.1)

Crit

ical

Req

uire

men

t (C

R):

Ess

entia

l con

ditio

ns, r

esou

rces

, and

mea

ns fo

r a

criti

cal c

apab

ility

to b

e fu

lly o

pera

tiona

l. (J

P 5

-00.

1)

Crit

ical

Vul

nera

bilit

y (C

V):

Asp

ects

or c

ompo

nent

s of

the

frie

ndly

criti

cal

capa

bilit

ies

(or c

ompo

nent

s th

ereo

f), w

hich

are

def

icie

nt o

r vul

nera

ble

to

neut

raliz

atio

n, in

terd

ictio

n, o

r atta

ck in

a m

anne

r ach

ievi

ng d

ecis

ive

or

sign

ifica

nt re

sults

. (m

odifi

ed J

P 5

-00.

1)

Friendly

CO

G A

naly

sis

Aid

1.Id

entif

y Fr

iend

ly C

ente

r(s)

of G

ravi

ty (C

OG

). S

elec

t the

fri

endl

y fo

rce

desi

gnat

ed to

exe

cute

the

oper

atio

n’s

mai

n ef

fort

as th

e C

OG

. If

the

mai

n ef

fort

chan

ges

durin

g th

e op

erat

ion

(i.e.

by

phas

e), t

hen

so w

ill th

e C

OG

.Va

lidity

Tes

ting

for C

OG

s:

2.Id

entif

y C

ritic

al C

apab

ilitie

s (C

C).

Sel

ect t

he m

ain

effo

rt’s

key

task

s id

entif

ied

by th

e G

3 pl

anne

r. T

hese

ta

sks

beco

me

the

criti

cal c

apab

ilitie

s fo

r tha

t pha

se o

f the

op

erat

ion.

Va

lidity

Tes

ting

for C

Cs:

CO

G A

naly

sis

Step

s

Key

Ref

eren

ces

JP 5

-00.

1, J

oint

Doc

trine

for C

ampa

ign

Plan

ning

(Jan

200

2)FM

3-0

, Ope

ratio

ns (J

un 2

001)

FM 3

4-36

, SO

F In

tellig

ence

and

EW

Ope

ratio

ns (S

ep 1

991)

1s

t IO

CM

D C

OA

Dev

elop

men

t TTP

(Dra

ft)

CO

G A

naly

sis

Hie

rarc

hyC

OG

CC

CR

CR

CR

CC

CC

CR

CV

CV

CV

CV

CV

3.Id

entif

y C

ritic

al R

equi

rem

ents

(CR

s).

Eac

h C

C (t

ask)

ne

eds

criti

cal a

sset

s in

ord

er to

exe

cute

the

task

. Th

ese

criti

cal a

sset

s be

com

e th

e cr

itica

l req

uire

men

ts fo

r tha

t C

C.

Valid

ity T

estin

g fo

r CR

s:

4.Id

entif

y C

ritic

al V

ulne

rabi

litie

s (C

Vs).

The

CR

sid

entif

ied

have

inhe

rent

vul

nera

bilit

ies

as w

ell a

s vu

lner

abili

ties

base

d up

on th

reat

cap

abili

ties.

The

se

iden

tifie

d C

Vs

mus

t be

acco

unte

d fo

r whe

n de

velo

ping

C

OA

sso

redu

ce th

e op

erat

iona

l ris

k as

soci

ated

with

the

mis

sion

.Va

lidity

Tes

ting

for C

Vs:

CO

G A

naly

sis

Step

s (c

ontin

ued)

Cen

ter o

f Gra

vity

(CO

G)

Crit

ical

Cap

abili

ty (C

C)

Crit

ical

Req

uire

men

t (C

R)

Crit

ical

Vul

nera

bilit

y (C

V)

Rec

eipt

of M

issi

on

Mis

sion

Ana

lysi

s

CO

A D

evel

opm

ent

CO

A A

naly

sis

MD

MP

Step

CO

A C

ompa

rison

CO

A A

ppro

val

Ord

ers

Pro

duct

ion

Step

1, A

naly

ze R

elat

ive

Com

bat

Pow

er:

•Id

entif

y fri

endl

y C

OG

(s),

CC

s, &

CR

s•

Iden

tify

CVs

Step

4, D

evel

op S

chem

e of

M

aneu

ver:

•Pa

ir th

reat

cap

abilit

ies

agai

nst f

riend

ly C

Vs

to d

eter

min

e de

gree

of v

ulne

rabi

lity.

CO

G A

naly

sis

Step

s (c

ontin

ued)

The

purp

ose

of p

erfo

rmin

g a

frien

dly

CO

G a

naly

sis

is to

de

term

ine

and

eval

uate

the

frien

dly

forc

e’s

criti

cal

vuln

erab

ilitie

s. O

nce

iden

tifie

d, th

ese

vuln

erab

ilitie

s ar

e ad

dres

sed

as a

def

ensi

ve p

lan

with

in th

e ov

eral

l con

cept

of t

he

oper

atio

n.

Sin

ce th

is to

ol is

use

d to

iden

tify

frien

dly

forc

e vu

lner

abili

ties

rela

tive

to th

e pl

anne

d sc

hem

e of

man

euve

r, th

e be

st ti

me

to

perfo

rm th

is a

naly

sis

is d

urin

g C

OA

Dev

elop

men

t:C

ente

r of G

ravi

ty (C

OG

). T

he fr

iend

ly ta

ctic

al /

oper

atio

nal

CO

G is

the

forc

e de

sign

ated

to e

xecu

te th

e m

ain

effo

rt.

Sin

ce th

e m

ain

effo

rt sh

ifts

as a

n op

erat

ion

chan

ges

phas

es, s

o w

ill th

e C

OG

.

Crit

ical

Cap

abili

ty (C

C).

Crit

ical

cap

abili

ties

of th

e fri

endl

y C

OG

are

thos

e ke

y ta

sk(s

) tha

t the

mai

n ef

fort

mus

t ac

com

plis

h.

Crit

ical

Req

uire

men

t (C

R).

Eac

h C

C c

an h

ave

seve

ral

criti

cal r

equi

rem

ents

. C

ritic

al re

quire

men

ts m

ay b

e sh

ared

by

mul

tiple

CC

s.

Crit

ical

Vul

nera

bilit

y (C

V).

Eac

h C

R c

an h

ave

seve

ral

criti

cal v

ulne

rabi

litie

s. C

ritic

al v

ulne

rabi

litie

s m

ay b

e sh

ared

by

mul

tiple

CR

s.

This

pro

duct

pro

duce

d by

U.S

. Arm

y, 1

stIn

form

atio

n O

pera

tions

Com

man

d (L

and)

(Mai

n E

ffort)

(Key

Tas

ks)

(Crit

ical

Ass

ets)

5.Pr

iorit

ize

CVs

. Th

e C

AR

VE

R m

etho

dolo

gy c

an b

e us

ed

to ra

nk-o

rder

crit

ical

vul

nera

bilit

ies,

ther

eby

prio

ritiz

ing

the

oper

atio

ns to

miti

gate

thes

e vu

lner

abili

ties.

See

App

endi

x D

, FM

34-

36 fo

r mor

e in

form

atio

n on

CA

RV

ER

.

•C

ritic

ality

. A

n es

timat

e of

the

CV’

s im

porta

nce

to th

e fri

endl

y fo

rce.

To

wha

t ext

ent w

ill th

e vu

lner

abilit

y in

fluen

ce th

e fri

endl

y fo

rce’

s ab

ility

to c

ondu

ct o

r sup

port

oper

atio

ns.

•A

cces

sibi

lity.

A d

eter

min

atio

n of

whe

ther

the

CV

is a

cces

sibl

e to

th

e th

reat

in ti

me

and

plac

e. I

n ot

her w

ords

, doe

s th

e th

reat

ha

ve th

e re

sour

ces

and

capa

bilit

y to

acc

ompl

ish

dest

ruct

ion

or

neut

raliz

atio

n of

the

CV?

•

Rec

uper

abilit

y. A

n ev

alua

tion

of h

ow m

uch

effo

rt, ti

me,

&

reso

urce

s th

e fri

endl

y fo

rce

mus

t exp

end

if th

e C

V is

su

cces

sful

ly a

ffect

ed.

•Vu

lner

abilit

y. A

det

erm

inat

ion

of w

heth

er th

e th

reat

has

the

mea

ns o

r cap

abilit

y to

affe

ct th

e C

V.

•Ef

fect

. A d

eter

min

atio

n of

the

exte

nt o

f the

effe

ct a

chie

ved

if th

e C

V is

suc

cess

fully

exp

loite

d.

•R

ecog

niza

bilit

y. A

det

erm

inat

ion

if th

e C

V, o

nce

sele

cted

for

expl

oita

tion,

can

be

iden

tifie

d du

ring

the

oper

atio

n by

the

thre

at,

and

can

be a

sses

sed

for t

he im

pact

of t

he e

xplo

itatio

n.

Not

e: T

his

met

hodo

logy

for a

naly

zing

the

frie

ndly

forc

e is

bas

ed

on th

e as

sum

ptio

n th

at th

e fr

iend

ly fo

rce

CO

G is

the

mai

n ef

fort

for t

he o

pera

tion.

Thi

s co

ncep

t is

mos

t val

id a

t the

ope

ratio

nal

and

tact

ical

leve

ls.

Will

the

dest

ruct

ion,

neu

traliz

atio

n, o

r sub

stan

tial w

eake

ning

of

the

CO

G re

sult

in c

hang

ing

the

frien

dly

CO

A o

r den

ying

its

obje

ctiv

e(s)

?

Is th

is ta

sk c

ritic

al to

the

succ

ess

of th

e m

ain

effo

rt in

the

cont

ext o

f the

giv

en m

issi

on (t

ask)

? If

the

CO

G d

oes

not s

ucce

ssfu

lly e

xecu

te th

e C

C, w

ill th

e C

OA

ch

ange

?

Will

expl

oita

tion

of th

e C

V d

isab

le th

e as

soci

ated

CR

? D

oes

the

thre

at h

ave

the

reso

urce

s to

effe

ct th

e id

entif

ied

CV

?C

an th

e C

V b

e ef

fect

ed b

y an

y ot

her e

ntity

oth

er th

an th

e th

reat

?

Can

the

CO

G c

ondu

ct th

e C

C w

ith th

e lo

ss o

f the

iden

tifie

d C

R?

Appendix DAppendix D

33%

Inc

reas

e in

Neg

ativ

e In

cide

nts

2 N

eg1

Pos

0 N

eg3

Pos

5 N

eg

2 N

eg

1 N

eg0

Neg

2 Po

s

3 N

egW

eekl

y A

vera

ge:

•N

egat

ive

-12

•P

osit

ive

-6

Neg

ativ

e In

cide

nts

•V

iole

nce

agai

nst

Frie

ndly

For

ce2

•In

terf

eren

ce w

/ Fri

endl

y Fo

rce

5

•E

thni

c V

iole

nce

2

•P

olit

ical

Vio

lenc

e

2

•C

ivil

Dis

obed

ienc

e0

•H

osti

le P

ropa

gand

a1

•O

ther

Inc

iden

ts

1

Tot

al 1

6

Pos

itiv

e In

cide

nts

•P

eace

ful D

emon

stra

tion

s 1

•R

efug

ees

& I

DP

s0

•O

ther

Pos

itiv

e In

cide

nts

2•

Pop

ulac

e C

oope

rati

on

3T

otal

6

Exam

ple

Tren

d A

naly

sis

Four

Wee

k A

sses

smen

t Per

iod

(Jan

uary

)

Tren

d A

naly

sis

Ass

essm

ent t

ools

sup

port

BD

A, M

OE

, and

CA

by

help

ing

corre

late

eve

nts

(i.e.

, est

ablis

h ca

use

and

effe

ct) i

n th

e ph

ysic

al, i

nfor

mat

ion,

& c

ogni

tive

dom

ains

to IO

task

s,

obje

ctiv

es, a

nd m

issi

on.

Two

com

mon

ly u

sed

asse

ssm

ent t

ools

are

:Tr

end

Ana

lysi

s–

Mea

sure

s ch

ange

s in

the

oper

atin

g en

viro

nmen

t. C

an b

e us

ed to

:•

Org

aniz

e ob

serv

ed a

ctiv

ities

in th

e in

form

atio

nen

viro

nmen

t in

a w

ay th

at a

ssis

ts th

e dr

awin

g of

co

nclu

sion

s.•

Pro

vide

indi

rect

indi

cato

rs (e

.g.,

even

ts /

actio

nsno

t con

clus

ivel

y co

rrela

ted

to th

e in

form

atio

nop

erat

ion,

but

may

be

the

resu

lt of

IO) t

o su

ppor

tes

timat

ion

of a

ggre

gate

IO e

ffect

s.Im

pact

Ass

essm

ent –

A P

SY

OP

tool

use

d to

det

erm

ine

the

effe

ctiv

enes

s of

an

oper

atio

n by

pro

vidi

ng in

dica

tors

of

beh

avio

rs o

r atti

tude

s re

lativ

e to

the

oper

atio

n’s

obje

ctiv

es.

Can

be

used

to:

•P

rovi

de in

dica

tors

that

obj

ectiv

es a

re re

sulti

ng in

the

desi

red

2nd

and

3rd

orde

r effe

cts.

•D

eter

min

e ef

fect

iven

ess

of th

e in

form

atio

n op

erat

ion.

This

pro

duct

pro

duce

d by

U.S

. Arm

y, 1

stIn

form

atio

n O

pera

tions

Com

man

d (L

and)

Dev

elop

ing

an A

sses

smen

t Pla

n1.

Dev

elop

BD

A fo

r key

IO ta

sks.

•BD

A s

houl

d de

term

ine

wha

t frie

ndly

and

adv

ersa

ryac

tions

occ

urre

d in

the

phys

ical

and

info

dom

ains

(1st

& 2

nd o

rder

effe

cts)

.2.

Dev

elop

MO

E to

det

erm

ine

effe

cts

in th

e in

form

atio

nan

d co

gniti

ve d

omai

ns (2

nd &

3rd

ord

er e

ffect

s).

•Writ

e on

e or

mor

e M

OE

to a

sses

s ea

ch IO

obje

ctiv

e.3.

Dev

elop

CA

to d

eter

min

e re

sults

in th

e co

gniti

vedo

mai

n (3

rd o

rder

effe

cts)

. •C

A s

houl

d as

sess

if d

ecis

ion-

mak

ers

are

resp

ondi

ng a

s pr

edic

ted.

4. W

rite

the

asse

ssm

ent p

lan;

incl

ude

in IO

ann

ex.

5. D

evel

op a

mec

hani

sm to

obt

ain

info

rmat

ion

need

edto

det

erm

ine

1st,

2nd,

& 3

rd o

rder

effe

cts:

•Sub

mit

RFI

s ba

sed

upon

the

asse

ssm

ent p

lan.

•Dev

elop

IO in

put t

o C

CIR

.•C

oord

inat

e w

ith B

DA

repo

rting

with

DO

CC

and

targ

etin

g bo

ard.

•Rev

iew

ass

essm

ents

at I

OW

Gs.

•Mon

itor i

ntel

ligen

ce &

ope

ratio

ns in

cide

nt re

porti

ng.

Ass

essm

ent T

ools

Exam

ple

Ass

essm

ent f

or a

n O

bjec

tive

IO O

bjec

tive:

Dis

rupt

gro

und

forc

e co

mm

ande

r’s C

2 in

or

der t

o pr

even

t syn

chro

niza

tion

of c

orps

and

div

isio

n op

erat

ions

. 1s

t Ord

er E

ffect

(BD

A) f

or

Phy

sica

l Dom

ain

•D

estro

yed

corp

s &

div

isio

n H

Qs.

•D

estro

yed

or

capt

ured

reco

n,

inte

llige

nce,

su

rvei

llanc

e, &

ta

rget

acq

(RIS

TA) a

sset

s.

•D

estro

yed

or

jam

med

com

mo

node

s.

•N

o at

tack

s ag

ains

t frie

ndly

fo

rce

criti

cal

asse

ts.

2nd

Ord

er E

ffect

(B

DA

/MO

E) f

or

Info

Dom

ain

•D

ecre

ased

co

rps

&

divi

sion

-leve

l co

mm

o tra

ffic.

•1s

t & 2

nd

oper

atio

nal

grou

ps u

nabl

e to

syn

chro

nize

fir

es a

nd

man

euve

r ab

ove

divi

sion

le

vel.

3rd

Ord

er E

ffect

(M

OE

/CA

) for

C

ogni

tive

Dom

ain

Ene

my

Cdr

co

mm

its re

serv

efo

rce

to th

e ea

staw

ay fr

om fr

iend

ly

forc

es’m

ain

atta

ck.

1. D

eter

min

e fre

quen

cy o

f ana

lysi

s.2.

Det

erm

ine

wha

t act

ivity

/ ev

ents

mus

t be

reco

rded

. 3.

Est

ablis

h ba

selin

e ac

tivity

.4.

Mea

sure

and

ana

lyze

mag

nitu

de a

nd ra

tes

of c

hang

e to

the

base

line

in te

rms

of ti

me,

pla

ce, a

nd ty

pe o

f act

ivity

.

Tim

e–

Perio

d of

ass

essm

ent

durin

g w

hich

the

inci

dent

s oc

curr

ed

Activ

ity–

Type

of a

ctiv

ity a

nd

num

ber o

f inc

iden

ts d

urin

g th

e as

sess

men

t per

iod Plac

e–

Loca

tion

in A

O w

here

re

cord

ed in

cide

nts

occu

rred

•Im

pact

indi

cato

rs a

re o

bser

vabl

e be

havi

or th

at

indi

cate

suc

cess

or f

ailu

re to

ach

ieve

the

IO

obje

ctiv

es.

•Tw

o ty

pes

of in

dica

tors

: P

ositi

ve –

Act

ivity

that

co

rrela

tes

with

the

obje

ctiv

es’ e

ffect

s. N

egat

ive

–A

ctiv

ity th

at is

opp

osite

of t

he th

e ob

ject

ives

’ des

ired

effe

cts.

Impa

ct A

sses

smen

t

Exam

ple

Impa

ct In

dica

tor A

naly

sis

IO O

bjec

tives

Influ

ence

po

pula

ce to

su

ppor

t US

oper

atio

ns

Den

y in

surg

ent

supp

ort f

rom

loca

l po

pula

ce

Dis

rupt

ext

rem

ist

influ

ence

Indi

cato

rs

3 Vi

olen

t dem

onst

ratio

nsdi

rect

ed a

gain

st U

S Fo

rces

Tens

ions

eas

ing

betw

een

Gov

erno

r A a

nd U

S Fo

rces

Polit

ical

lead

ers

publ

icly

pra

ise

US

pres

ence

and

ope

ratio

ns

Insu

rgen

ts p

aid

rew

ards

to k

illpr

o-U

S go

vern

men

t offi

cial

s3

Inci

dent

s of

insu

rgen

t rec

ruiti

ng

Incr

ease

d po

pula

ce re

port

ing

on in

surg

ent a

ctiv

ity

Har

dlin

er ra

lly p

oorly

atte

nded

Loca

l new

spap

er d

enou

nces

extr

emis

t lea

der

Ass

essm

ent

AN

o C

hang

e

RN

o C

hang

e

GIm

prov

emen

t

Ass

essm

ent T

ips

1.Ke

ep th

e in

form

atio

n op

erat

ion

sim

ple,

or

asse

ssm

ent o

f 2nd

and

3rd

ord

er e

ffect

s m

ay

be im

poss

ible

.

2.Be

as

obje

ctiv

e as

pos

sibl

e w

hen

asse

ssin

g B

DA

. A

sses

smen

t of t

he in

form

atio

n an

d co

gniti

ve d

omai

ns w

ill b

e pa

rtial

ly, i

f not

en

tirel

y, s

ubje

ctiv

e.

3.U

se a

naly

sis

tool

s to

sup

port

conc

lusi

ons.

•D

o no

t fix

ate

the

asse

ssm

ent e

ffort

on th

e ph

ysic

al d

omai

n.

•S

eek

to e

stab

lish

caus

e an

d ef

fect

in e

ach

info

rmat

ion

envi

ronm

ent d

omai

n.

•It

is n

eces

sary

to u

nder

stan

d IO

’sag

greg

ate

effe

cts

in th

e ph

ysic

al d

omai

n in

ord

er to

dra

w a

va

lid c

oncl

usio

n ab

out e

ffect

s in

the

info

rmat

ion

and

cogn

itive

dom

ains

.

MO

E

Fiel

d S

uppo

rt D

ivis

ion

D

ecem

ber 2

002

Mea

sure

s of

Effe

ctiv

enes

s (M

OE)

Key

Def

initi

ons

Bat

tle D

amag

e A

sses

smen

t (B

DA

): T

he ti

mel

y an

d ac

cura

te e

stim

ate

of d

amag

e re

sulti

ng fr

om th

e ap

plic

atio

n of

mili

tary

forc

e, e

ither

leth

al o

r non

leth

al,

agai

nst a

pre

dete

rmin

ed o

bjec

tive.

(JP

1-2

0)

Mea

sure

s of

Effe

ctiv

enes

s (M

OE

): T

ools

use

d to

m

easu

re re

sults

ach

ieve

d in

the

over

all m

issi

on a

nd

exec

utio

n of

ass

igne

d ta

sks.

MO

E a

re a

pre

requ

isite

to

the

perfo

rman

ce o

f com

bat a

sses

smen

t. (J

P 3

-60)

Com

bat A

sses

smen

t (C

A) :

The

det

erm

inat

ion

of th

e ov

eral

l effe

ctiv

enes

s of

forc

e em

ploy

men

t dur

ing

milit

ary

oper

atio

ns.

(JP

3-6

0)

IO A

sses

smen

t Aid

Bat

tle D

amag

e A

sses

smen

t (B

DA

)

Hie

rarc

hy o

f Effe

cts

BD

A m

easu

res

the

effe

cts

of fr

iend

ly a

ctio

ns a

gain

stad

vers

ary

info

sys

tem

s an

d as

sets

in th

e ph

ysic

al d

omai

nin

ord

er to

det

erm

ine

whe

ther

IO ta

sks

or s

ets

of ta

sks

have

acc

ompl

ishe

d th

e in

tend

ed p

urpo

se.

As

a m

inim

um,

key

IO ta

sks

shou

ld h

ave

BD

A.

Not

e: B

DA

mus

t be

obje

ctiv

e.

Phys

ical

(Man

euve

r & C

btO

ps)

•Inf

o sy

stem

s &

ass

ets

•Net

wor

ks

Info

rmat

ion

(C2

& IM

)•I

nfor

mat

ion

–qu

ality

& c

onte

nt•I

nfo

syst

em fu

nctio

ns -

colle

ctio

n, p

roce

ssin

g,

& d

isse

min

atio

n)

Cog

nitiv

e(D

ecis

ion-

mak

ing)

•Per

cept

ions

•Atti

tude

s•U

nder

stan

ding

Info

rmat

ion

Env

ironm

ent

Dom

ains

MO

E e

stim

ate

the

aggr

egat

e ef

fect

s of

IO ta

sks

to d

eter

min

e if

the

IO o

bjec

tives

are

cre

atin

g th

e de

sire

d ef

fect

s in

the

info

and

co

gniti

ve d

omai

ns.

2nd

Ord

er M

OE

–E

stim

ate

effe

cts

in th

e in

fo d

omai

n (in

fo

qual

ity, c

onte

nt, &

flow

).

3rd

Ord

er M

OE

–E

stim

ate

effe

cts

in th

e co

gniti

ve d

omai

n(e

nem

y &

oth

er ld

rs’p

erce

ptio

ns, a

ttitu

des,

& u

nder

stan

ding

).

Writ

ing

MO

E:

•E

ach

IO o

bjec

tive

shou

ld h

ave

one

or m

ore

MO

E.

•If

poss

ible

, MO

E s

houl

d be

obs

erva

ble,

qua

ntifi

able

,pr

ecis

e, a

nd c

orre

late

d to

the

effe

ct o

f the

obj

ectiv

e.•

Use

the

obje

ctiv

e’s

purp

ose

as a

gui

de to

wha

t mus

t be

obse

rved

, rep

orte

d, a

nd a

sses

sed.

•If

an M

OE

is d

iffic

ult t

o w

rite

for a

par

ticul

ar o

bjec

tive,

then

re-v

isit

the

obje

ctiv

e to

ens

ure

it ha

s a

clea

rly d

efin

ed,

atta

inab

le e

ffect

. If

nece

ssar

y, re

-writ

e th

e ob

ject

ive.

Form

at–

MO

E s

tate

men

ts in

clud

e:•

A m

etric

-a s

tand

ard

of m

easu

rem

ent s

uch

as a

cha

nge

in

the

info

env

ironm

ent o

r adv

ersa

ry e

ffort

/ tec

hniq

ue,

resp

onse

or n

on-r

espo

nse.

•W

hatd

ata

is to

be

obse

rved

, col

lect

ed, &

mea

sure

d (in

term

sof

num

ber,

time,

etc

).•

Exa

mpl

e: I

ncre

ase

(the

met

ric) o

f loc

al p

opul

ace

supp

ort f

or

frien

dly

forc

es (w

hat i

s to

be

mea

sure

d).

Ass

essm

ent M

etho

dolo

gyIn

form

atio

n O

pera

tion

IO

Mis

sion

IO T

asks

to

Ele

men

ts&

Uni

ts

IO

Obj

ectiv

es

MO

Efo

r eac

hIO

Obj

ectiv

e

BD

A fo

r Key

IO T

asks

Ass

essm

ent

Tool

Ass

essm

ent

Focu

s

Pro

ceed

with

, or c

hang

e, p

lan

Effe

cts C

omba

t Ass

essm

ent (

CA

)C

A a

sses

ses

the

over

all e

ffect

of t

he in

form

atio

n op

erat

ion

(par

ticul

arly

in th

e co

gniti

ve d

omai

n) in

ord

er to

det

erm

ine

whe

ther

IO is

ach

ievi

ng it

s m

issi

on.

Res

ults

are

use

d to

de

cide

if th

e IO

pla

n (c

once

pt o

f sup

port)

sho

uld

proc

eed

or c

hang

e.

•C

A is

an

aggr

egat

e of

MO

E a

sses

smen

ts.

•C

A a

nsw

ers

the

ques

tions

-W

hat d

id IO

do?

Did

IOac

hiev

e th

e de

sire

d ef

fect

in th

e co

gniti

ve d

omai

n?S

houl

d th

e in

form

atio

n op

erat

ion

be m

odifi

ed?

1st O

rder

Effe

cts

Effe

cts

resu

lting

from

ac

tions

aga

inst

info

sy

stem

s &

ass

ets

2nd

Ord

er E

ffect

sE

ffect

s on

info

rmat

ion

& in

form

atio

n flo

w

3rd

Ord

er E

ffect

sE

ffect

s on

adv

ersa

ry &

othe

rs’ d

ecis

ion-

mak

ing

Ass

essm

ent

of

IO O

bjec

tives

(Effe

cts)

Com

bat

Asse

ssm

ent

of In

fo O

p(R

esul

ts)

1. P

hysi

cal A

sses

smen

tQ

uant

itativ

e es

timat

e of

the

exte

nt

of p

hysi

cal i

mpa

ct o

n sp

ecifi

c in

fo

syst

ems

and

asse

ts.

Mea

sure

s th

e ou

tcom

e of

a s

ingl

e ta

sk.

2. F

unct

iona

l Ass

essm

ent

Estim

ate

of th

e fu

nctio

nal

cons

eque

nces

to a

dver

sary

info

sy

stem

s an

d as

sets

. In

ferr

ed fr

om

the

phys

ical

ass

essm

ent o

f an

IO

task

. 3. T

arge

t Sys

tem

Ass

essm

ent

Asse

ssm

ent o

f the

ove

rall

impa

ct

and

effe

ctiv

enes

s of

IO ta

sks

agai

nst a

n en

tire

info

sys

tem

ca

pabi

lity.

Est

imat

es th

e ou

tcom

e of

mul

tiple

IO ta

sks.

IO T

asks

BD

A

BDA

con

sist

s of

thre

e di

ffere

nt

asse

ssm

ents

Ove

rall

asse

ssm

ent b

y on

as

sess

men

t of o

bjec

tives

Ass

essm

ent f

or

each

Obj

ectiv

e

Ass

essm

ent

of K

ey IO

Task

s(A

ctio

ns)

Exam

ple

Obj

ectiv

e A

sses

smen

tIO

Obj

ectiv

e #2

:i.e

.: “D

isru

pt

grou

nd fo

rce

Cdr

’s C

2 IO

T….”

Out

com

e of

Tas

ks

Uni

t des

igna

tion,

geo

grap

hica

l re

gion

, or o

ther

met

hod

of

quan

tifyi

ng ta

sk a

ctio

ns

Effe

cts

of IO

task

s –

Res

ults

of

phys

ical

, fun

ctio

nal,

or ta

rget

sy

stem

ass

essm

ent

Dis

rupt

Cor

ps &

D

ivis

ion

C2

Des

troy

1st

Ech

elon

Rec

on T

eam

s

Key

Tas

k #3

Tim

e Pe

riod

PredictiveAssessment

A Key

Tas

k #4

Key

Tas

k #5

Start

IIaIIb

III

RR

AA

A

GG

AA

R1s

t C

orps

HQ

Des

troy

ed

2nd

Cor

ps H

QD

estr

oyed

1st O

p G

rp

Div

HQ

sD

isru

pted

Res

erve

Div

HQ

sD

egra

ded

2nd

Op

Grp

D

iv H

Qs

Dis

rupt

ed

Exam

ple

Com

bat A

sses

smen

t

IO M

issi

on:

Dis

rupt

Cor

ps &

D

iv C

2

Res

ults

of I

O O

bjec

tives

Tim

e Pe

riod

Start

IIa

PredictiveAssessment

Uni

t des

igna

tion,

geo

grap

hica

l re

gion

, or o

ther

met

hod

of

quan

tifyi

ng th

e ob

ject

ives

’ effe

cts

Des

troy

1st

Ech

lnR

econ

Tea

ms

IO O

bjec

tive

#3:

IO O

bjec

tive

#4:

IIbIII

A

Effe

cts

of IO

obj

ectiv

es –

Estim

ate

of 2

nd a

nd 3

rd o

rder

ef

fect

s

RR

RA

A

AA

GR

G

1st E

chln

C2

Des

troy

ed

2nd

Echl

nC

2D

isru

pted

Res

erve

C2

Deg

rade

dG

GA

AR R

RA

AA

Arm

y C

drun

able

tosy

ncfo

rces

Appendix E

Training Considerations for Information Operations (IO)

General

Prior to establishing an IO training program, unit personnel should consult FM 7-0, Training the

Force; FM 7-1, Battle Focused Training; FM 3-0, Operations; FM 3-13, Information

Operations Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures; and Joint Pub 3-13, Joint

Doctrine for Information Operations for tips on effective IO training.

Effective employment of IO depends on the ability to organize and train in the manner we willfight. What this means at the tactical level is that we train personnel directly responsible forexecuting the IO mission by integrating unit training throughout the live, virtual, andconstructive environments; focusing on the area of operations (AO); and using a crawl-walk-runmethodology culminating in a collective event stressing the IO team. While IO education can betaught separately, collective unit training should build on ongoing IO activities within the AOand transition to possible courses of action (COAs) responding to real-world contingencies, e.g.,crisis deterrence, conflict resolution, etc. The intent of this appendix is to provide ideas andinformation for IO training. In the end, training IO is no different than training for othercollective events, in that the basic tenants of Army training must be applied, which includesconducting an after-action review (AAR) after all training.

Unit training focusing on either offensive or defensive IO must consider all available andpotential available capabilities, which include multinational, Department of Defense (DOD), andjoint assets.

Normally, offensive and defensive IO training are integrated, emphasizing protection anddefense of information and information systems. Therefore, when planning IO training, considerthe appropriate scope and duration of the exercise. Remember, some IO capabilities fall outsidethe normal Army chain, and scripting of multinational, DOD, and joint capabilities needconsideration. Thus, in order to obtain the true complexity of IO, you must incorporate thosechallenges of coordinating IO activities with other agencies, including nongovernmental.

Whenever possible, the commander accomplishes IO training through combined-armsoperations. Even at the tactical level, the commander uses IO to disrupt or destroy enemyinformation systems through electronic warfare (EW) and physical destruction, which is mostcommon at the brigade and battalion level. IO, applied correctly, is a combat multiplier thatenhances the potential for friendly forces to defeat enemy forces in detail. The commandermaintains access to his information system through operations security (OPSEC)/informationsecurity (INFOSEC) and electronic protection (EP). He seeks access to the adversary’s systemthrough counter-command and control (C2) and manipulates both systems to create aknowledge-based battlefield advantage that can be exploited by military forces to achieve themission objective. Commanders who successfully plan and conduct IO significantly increase thepotential of their force’s combat power and control the tempo of the battle. IO is the means bywhich Army forces will fight and win the information war.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY E-1


As you build your IO plan, consider the three methods for executing IO training: stand alonetraining, supported training, and supporting training. In stand alone training, your focus is on theadversary and your desire to affect the way he operates; that is, mitigating and interdicting hismethod of operating. You can use supported training when the focus is on IO in the main effort.There will be time when this is the case, so you ought to plan for this occasionally. Lastly, youcan use supporting IO training when IO is applied as a force multiplier coupled with aconventional tactical operation, which is most of the time.

Essentials for Planning IO Training

The following considerations are fundamental for planning IO exercises. While this list is not allinclusive, it provides a basic road map for planning, conducting, and evaluating a unit exercise.

For additional information on Army training, see FM 7-0, Training the Force, and FM 7-1,

Battle Focused Training.

• Determine the environment in which the training will take place: live, constructive, orvirtual (see Chapter 4 of FM 7-1).

• Will the training leverage on-going unit training, and, if so, how will trainingintegration take place?

• Develop concrete attainable IO objectives (see Chapter 3 of FM 7-1).

• Create a realistic IO environment attempting to emulate the unit’s operatingenvironment.

• Exercise all six IO activities in the context of the exercise.

• Provide for sufficient IO actions to support exercise objectives.

• Assess and evaluate IO employment.

• Exercise both offensive and defensive IO using all the capabilities available to the unitwhere it will operate.

• Exercise intelligence support to IO.

• Plan for and use appropriate security measures to protect IO tactics, techniques, andprocedures (TTP).

Organization for Training

Whenever possible, the IO cell should have representatives from the targeting cell, targetingboard, joint operations and targeting coordination board, or whatever integrating process thecommander uses to integrate and synchronize his resources. If these assets are not available,scripting should be considered. Additionally, each element of command and control warfare(C2W), along with the civil affairs (CA) and public affairs (PA), should be represented as well.Replicating tactical combat operations, the targeting representative may become the focus ofactivity. When training, consider the functions of the IO, which are:

E-2 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY


• Planning the overall IO effort for the commander.

• Developing IO concepts to support the scheme of maneuver.

• Establishing IO priorities to accomplish planned objectives.

• Determining the availability of IO resources to carry out plans.

Consolidated tasking will assist in the integration and synchronization required for effective IO.As the spectrum of engagement moves between peace to war and back again, it is appropriate tostand up an IO cell and exercise it. Listed below is a graphically diagramed notional IO cell foryour consideration. The actual configuration depends on your situation and operationalenvironment.

Figure E-1



IO WorkingGroup

(IOWG)*S3

S6/SignalOfficer

S2

OPSEC

MilitaryDeception

PSYOP

EWOfficer

Targeting/Fire Spt

Chaplain

IO Augmentation Rep

PAO

CivilAffairs

S3 Plans/Mil Deception

Chairperson

IOO

SJA

MP Rep POLAD

* May include others, i.e., ADA, AVN, ENG, NBC, SOF, LNOs, S4

Considerations for Training

Effective IO first requires specific information products on the adversary’s military (C2,intelligence, and capabilities), social, religious, and economic background that may have to beprovided by exercise planners. The data needed to create, update, and use these products needs tobe built into the exercise scenario and master scenario events list.

Secondly, the opposition force should have an IO capability consistent with the exercisescenario. Realistic IO are essential to evaluating friendly IO.

Finally, consistent with the tenets of the exercise, free play of IO must take place by both Blueand Red forces. Pre-structured, mechanical IO will degrade the participant’s ability to gainvaluable experience from the demands of mental agility and creativity that unstructured IO canprovide. Senior exercise participants should allow, even welcome, the C2 chaos that effectiveIO can cause to the exercise participants, and work through such problems.

Well before the exercise, you must develop a basic IO mission essential task list (METL) thatincludes tasks and subtasks. If it is possible, obtain the IO METL from the unit you may backfillin theater and compare the lists. Nevertheless, whatever list you develop, there must be tasks foreach IO capability available to your unit. The IO METL enhances the objective of achievinginformation dominance at selected places and times during an operation. Consider the followingtasks for inclusion:

• Determining required IO information and how to get answers.

º Identify the commander’s IO critical information requirements, priorityintelligence requirements (PIR), and high-priority targets and synchronizeintelligence and information plans and military plans on a near-real-time basis.

º Establish information-linked strategic, operational, and tactical collection,fusion, and report processes (incorporating reconnaissance, surveillance, andtarget acquisition [RISTA]/sensor and counterintelligence [CI]/humanintelligence [HUMINT] data) to develop continuous, timely IO intelligencepreparation on the battlefield (IPB).

• Knowing your IO capabilities and vulnerabilities in relation to the enemy, thenatural environment, the political setting, international law, and so forth.

º Identify and prioritize IO essential elements of friendly information (EEFI).

• Knowing enemy IO capabilities and vulnerabilities.

º Maintain a continuous IO estimate of potential adversaries and/or otheroperational situations in support of IO situational awareness and battlefieldvisualization.

º Assess adversary command, control, communications, computers, andintelligence (C4I)/C2W operations, strengths, and vulnerabilities continuously.

E-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY


• Knowing how the enemy sees your capabilities and vulnerabilities in terms of IO,the battlefield, and PIR.

º Understand the enemy’s decision-making process.

º Identify the enemy’s critical IO nodes.

º Develop enemy leader personality profiles.

º Understand the enemy’s decision-making doctrine, tactics, and standingoperating procedures (SOPs).

• Protecting critical and vulnerable friendly IO.

º Establish open-source processes to obtain, process, provide, secure, and releasecritical IO information, including PA, CA, governmental, and nongovernmentalinformation, within legal and policy constraints.

º Establish and maintain critical, secure, intertheater/intratheater militarycommunications and computer networks that support IO: for example,digitization, radar communication processor (RCP), situational awareness,battlefield visualization, distribution, and C2 across the battlespace.

º Assess friendly C2 vulnerabilities and C2; protect operations continuously andadjust to maintain C2 effectiveness.

º Achieve C2 protection in support of data integrity and infrastructure protection,IO/C2 node protection, spectrum superiority/control, and graceful degradation.

º Establish procedures to regain information dominance when it is discoveredthat the enemy has achieved information dominance.

• Attacking critical enemy IO vulnerabilities.

º Establish C2-attack targeting and battle damage assessment (BDA) andestablish links to expedite dissemination of adversary information, to includetimely sensor-to-shooter links.

º Attack, deny, degrade, exploit, and/or influence adversary C4I/C2Wcapabilities or other operations using lethal and nonlethal means.

(Note: Portions of the above information were extracted from Appendix D of FM 3-13,

Information Operations Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures; and Chapter VI of JP

3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations.)



Appendix FAppendix F

Key

Def

initi

ons

Targ

etin

g: T

he p

roce

ss o

f sel

ectin

g ta

rget

s an

d m

atch

ing

the

appr

opria

te re

spon

se to

them

, tak

ing

acco

unt o

f op

erat

iona

l req

uire

men

ts a

nd c

apab

ilitie

s. (

JP 1

-02/

FM

101-

5-1

)Ta

rget

: A

n ar

ea, c

ompl

ex, i

nsta

llatio

n, fo

rce,

equ

ipm

ent,

capa

bilit

y, fu

nctio

n, o

r beh

avio

r ide

ntifi

ed fo

r pos

sibl

e ac

tion

to s

uppo

rt th

e co

mm

ande

r’s o

bjec

tives

, gui

danc

e an

d in

tent

. (J

P 3

-60/

FM 1

01-5

-1)

Fire

s: T

he e

ffect

s of

leth

al o

r non

-leth

al w

eapo

ns.

(J

P

1-02

)Ta

rget

ing

Effe

cts:

The

exp

ecte

d re

sults

of w

eapo

ns

agai

nst s

peci

fic ta

rget

s.

Fiel

d S

uppo

rt D

ivis

ion

May

200

4

Key

Ref

eren

ces

FM 6

-20-

10, T

TP fo

r The

Tar

getin

g P

roce

ss (M

AY

96)

FM 3

-13,

Info

rmat

ion

Ope

ratio

ns:

Doc

trine

, Tac

tics,

Te

chni

ques

, and

Pro

cedu

res

(NO

V 0

3)

IO T

arge

ting

&

Effe

cts

Aid

Term

s

Hig

h V

alue

Tar

get (

HV

T):

A ta

rget

the

enem

y co

mm

ande

r re

quire

s fo

r the

suc

cess

ful c

ompl

etio

n of

the

mis

sion

. Th

e lo

ss o

f hig

h-va

lue

targ

ets

wou

ld b

e ex

pect

ed to

ser

ious

ly

degr

ade

impo

rtant

ene

my

func

tions

thro

ugho

ut th

e fri

endl

y co

mm

ande

r’s a

rea

of in

tere

st.

(JP

1-0

2)

Hig

h P

ayof

f Tar

get (

HP

T): A

targ

et w

hose

loss

will

si

gnifi

cant

ly c

ontri

bute

to th

e su

cces

s of

frie

ndly

cou

rses

of

actio

n. H

igh-

payo

ff ta

rget

s ar

e th

ose

high

-val

ue ta

rget

s id

entif

ied

thro

ugh

war

-gam

ing,

whi

ch m

ust b

e ac

quire

d an

d su

cces

sful

ly a

ttack

ed fo

r the

suc

cess

of t

he c

omm

ande

r’s

mis

sion

. (J

P 1

-02)

Ess

entia

l Fire

Sup

port

Task

(EFS

T):

A ta

sk fo

r fire

sup

port

to a

ccom

plis

h th

at is

requ

ired

to s

uppo

rt a

com

bine

d ar

ms

oper

atio

n.

Ess

entia

l Fie

ld A

rtille

ry T

ask

(EFA

T):

A ta

sk fo

r Fie

ld

Arti

llery

that

mus

t be

acco

mpl

ishe

d to

ach

ieve

an

EFS

T.

Ess

entia

l Inf

orm

atio

n O

pera

tions

Tas

k (E

IOT)

: A

task

for

IO th

at m

ust b

e ac

com

plis

hed

to a

chie

ve a

n E

FST.

Doc

trin

al E

ffect

s Fo

r IO

(FM

3-1

3)

Des

troy

–D

amag

e a

com

bat s

yste

m s

o ba

dly

that

it

cann

ot p

erfo

rm a

ny fu

nctio

n or

be

rest

ored

to a

usa

ble

cond

ition

with

out b

eing

ent

irely

rebu

ilt.

Dis

rupt

–In

info

rmat

ion

oper

atio

ns, m

eans

bre

akin

g or

in

terru

ptin

g th

e flo

w o

f inf

orm

atio

n be

twee

n se

lect

ed

C2

node

s.

Deg

rade

–In

info

rmat

ion

oper

atio

ns, i

s us

ing

non-

leth

al o

r tem

pora

ry m

eans

to re

duce

the

effe

ctiv

enes

s or

effi

cien

cy o

f adv

ersa

ry c

omm

and

and

cont

rol

syst

ems,

and

info

rmat

ion

colle

ctio

n ef

forts

or m

eans

.

Den

y –

In in

form

atio

n op

erat

ions

, ent

ails

with

hold

ing

info

rmat

ion

abou

t Arm

y fo

rce

capa

bilit

ies

and

inte

ntio

ns

that

adv

ersa

ries

need

for e

ffect

ive

and

tim

ely

deci

sion

mak

ing.

Dec

eive

–C

ause

a p

erso

n to

bel

ieve

wha

t is

not t

rue.

Expl

oit –

In in

form

atio

n op

erat

ions

, is

to g

ain

acce

ss to

ad

vers

ary

com

man

d an

d co

ntro

l sys

tem

s to

col

lect

in

form

atio

n or

to p

lant

fals

e or

mis

lead

ing

info

rmat

ion.

Influ

ence

–C

ause

adv

ersa

ries

or o

ther

s to

beh

ave

in

a m

anne

r fav

orab

le to

Arm

y fo

rces

.

Doc

trin

al T

arge

ting

Effe

cts

(FM

6-2

0-10

)

The

follo

win

g ar

e th

e st

anda

rd “l

etha

l”ta

rget

ing

effe

cts

used

by

the

fire

supp

ort e

lem

ent:

Lim

it –

Red

ucin

g th

e op

tions

or c

ours

es o

f act

ion

avai

labl

e to

the

enem

y co

mm

ande

r.

Dis

rupt

–P

recl

ude

effe

ctiv

e in

tera

ctio

n or

the

cohe

sion

of

ene

my

com

bat a

nd c

omba

t sup

port

syst

ems.

Del

ay –

Alte

r the

tim

e of

arri

val o

f for

ces

at a

poi

nt o

n th

e ba

ttlef

ield

or t

he a

bilit

y of

the

enem

y to

pro

ject

co

mba

t pow

er fr

om a

poi

nt o

n th

e ba

ttlef

ield

.

Div

ert –

Tie

up c

ritic

al e

nem

y re

sour

ces.

Des

troy

–To

rend

er ta

rget

a ta

rget

so

dam

aged

that

it

cann

ot fu

nctio

n as

inte

nded

nor

be

rest

ored

to a

use

able

co

nditi

on w

ithou

t bei

ng e

ntire

ly re

built

.

Plan

ning

Fire

s an

d Ef

fect

s fo

r IO

•Cro

ss-w

alk

IO &

fir

e sp

tann

exes

•Writ

e fir

es p

arag

raph

of

& fi

re s

ptan

nex

Ord

ers

Pro

d.

•Non

e•B

rief f

ire s

uppo

rt pl

an

as p

art o

f eac

h C

OA

CO

A

App

rova

l

•Inp

ut to

TS

M•F

inal

ize

Con

cept

of

Fire

s•F

inal

ize

HP

TL•D

evel

op T

SM

•Dev

elop

fire

sup

port

cont

rol m

easu

res

CO

A

Ana

lysi

s &

C

omp.

•Inp

ut to

Con

cept

of

Fire

s (o

r E

ffect

s)•N

omin

ate

targ

ets

to H

PTL

•Dev

elop

Con

cept

of

Fire

s (o

r Effe

cts)

•Dev

elop

initi

al H

PTL

•Qua

ntify

effe

cts

for

EFS

Ts

CO

A D

ev.

•Nom

inat

e ta

rget

s to

HV

TL•D

eter

min

e su

ppor

ting

IO

capa

bilit

ies

•Dev

elop

IO

obje

ctiv

es o

r E

IOTs

•Det

erm

ine

spec

ified

, im

plie

d, &

ess

entia

l fire

su

ppor

t tas

ks•D

eter

min

e H

VTL

•Tra

nsla

te fi

re s

uppo

rt as

sets

into

cap

abili

ties

•Dev

elop

dra

ft ta

rget

ing

obje

ctiv

es o

r EFS

Ts

Mis

sion

A

naly

sis

IO A

ctio

nTa

rget

ing

Act

ion

MD

MP

IO In

put t

o th

e Ta

rget

ing

Cyc

le

•A

naly

ze th

e C

DR

’sm

issi

on, i

nten

t, co

ncep

t and

initi

al p

lann

ing

guid

ance

.•

Dev

elop

inpu

t to

targ

etin

g ob

ject

ives

.•

Dev

elop

IO e

ssen

tial e

ffect

s ta

sks

whi

ch s

uppo

rt th

e ta

rget

ing

obje

ctiv

es.

•D

eter

min

e w

hich

targ

ets

to e

ngag

e (le

thal

and

non

-leth

al) –

how

, whe

n, &

de

sire

d ef

fect

.•

Pro

vide

inpu

t to

Atta

ck G

uida

nce

Mat

rix (A

GM

) or T

arge

ting

Syn

chro

niza

tion

Mat

rix (T

SM

).•

Pro

vide

inpu

t to

asse

ssm

ent p

lan.

•U

pdat

e th

e H

PTL

& A

GM

/TS

M.

•E

xecu

te th

e en

gage

men

t IA

W th

e A

GM

/TS

M.

•E

valu

ate

if th

e de

sire

d ef

fect

s w

ere

achi

eved

.•

Bas

ed o

n as

sess

men

t, pr

opos

e ta

rget

re

-eng

agem

ent /

cha

nges

to

enga

gem

ent s

chem

e.

Targ

etin

g St

ep

AS

SE

SS

DE

LIV

ER

Act

ions

DE

CID

E1

DE

TEC

T2 3 4

DEL

IVER

ASS

ESS

3

4

PU

RP

OS

E:

Exe

cutio

n of

the

targ

etin

g pl

an in

acco

rdan

ce w

ith th

e TS

M /

ES

M.

IO T

AS

KS

:•

In c

onju

nctio

n w

ith th

e FE

CC

/DO

CC

:-

Ens

ure

ratio

nale

for e

ngag

emen

ts is

stil

l val

id.

-C

oord

inat

e en

gage

men

ts a

s re

quire

d.•

Col

lect

BD

A fr

om e

xecu

ted

enga

gem

ents

to fe

ed in

to

asse

ssm

ent e

fforts

.•

Beg

in c

olle

ctio

n of

MO

P a

nd M

OE

to fe

ed in

to

asse

ssm

ent e

fforts

.

PU

RP

OS

E:

Det

erm

ine

the

over

all e

ffect

iven

ess

of th

eIO

por

tion

of th

e ta

rget

ing

plan

. Th

is e

ffort

shou

ldfo

cus

on o

bjec

tives

to d

eter

min

e if

the

desi

red

effe

cts

are

bein

g ac

hiev

ed.

IO T

AS

KS

:•

Exe

cute

ass

essm

ent p

lan:

−

Mon

itor t

he in

form

atio

n en

viro

nmen

t in

orde

r to

iden

tify

and

asse

ss in

dica

tors

of c

hang

e.−

Mon

itor a

dver

sary

act

ions

and

sta

tus

for a

ny

indi

catio

ns th

at IO

eng

agem

ents

are

hav

ing

an

impa

ct.

−M

onito

r frie

ndly

forc

es’ s

tatu

s fo

r ind

icat

ions

that

ad

vers

ary

oper

atio

ns in

the

info

rmat

ion

envi

ronm

ent a

re h

avin

g su

cces

s.−

Det

erm

ine

the

effe

ctiv

enes

s of

mes

sage

s an

d ho

w

they

sho

uld

be re

fined

for g

reat

er e

ffect

.•

Re-

enga

gem

ent R

ecom

men

datio

n: B

ased

on

the

asse

ssm

ent,

dete

rmin

e if

the

targ

et re

quire

s re

-en

gage

men

t and

/or i

f the

met

hod

of d

eliv

ery,

del

iver

y as

set o

r mes

sage

requ

ires

mod

ifica

tion.

•A

djus

tmen

ts to

the

enga

gem

ent p

lan

(TS

M /

ES

M) a

s ap

prop

riate

to a

ccom

plis

h th

e de

sire

d ef

fect

s.

NO

TE:

Rep

rese

ntat

ive

exam

ple;

form

ats

vary

by

com

man

d, b

ut th

e sa

me

type

info

rmat

ion

will

be p

rese

nted

. IO

targ

ets

and

enga

gem

ents

sho

uld

be e

mbe

dded

in th

e pl

anni

ng p

rodu

cts

to

impr

ove

sync

hron

izat

ion.

DET

ECT

2P

UR

PO

SE

: V

alid

ate

targ

ets

sele

cted

for e

ngag

emen

t and

id

entif

y ot

her t

arge

ts fr

om in

form

atio

n ga

ined

thro

ugh

the

colle

ctio

n pl

an.

IO T

AS

KS

: •

Mon

itor e

xecu

tion

of IO

-rel

ated

task

s in

the

ISR

sy

nchr

oniz

atio

n m

atrix

/ co

llect

ion

plan

.•

Ens

ure

targ

ets

of in

tere

st to

IO a

re tr

acke

d.•

Mod

ify th

e tim

ing

and

prio

rity

of e

ngag

emen

ts a

nd d

esire

d ef

fect

s ba

sed

on e

volv

ing

situ

atio

n.

Targ

et /

Effe

cts

Sync

hron

izat

ion

Mat

rix

(TSM

/ ES

M)

•To

ol fo

r pla

nnin

g an

d sy

nchr

oniz

ing

leth

al a

nd n

on-

leth

al e

ngag

emen

ts.

•Th

e TS

M /

ES

M is

pro

duce

d by

FE

CC

/DO

CC

, with

inpu

t fro

m th

e IO

sec

tion

and

the

battl

e st

aff.

This

pro

duct

pro

duce

d by

U.S

. Arm

y, 1

stIn

form

atio

n O

pera

tions

Com

man

d (L

and)

, Fie

ld S

uppo

rt D

ivis

ion

DEC

IDE

PU

RP

OS

E:

Pro

vide

an

over

all f

ocus

for t

arge

ting

effe

cts

and

set p

riorit

ies

for i

ntel

ligen

ce c

olle

ctio

n an

den

gage

men

t pla

nnin

g.

IO T

AS

KS

:•

In c

onju

nctio

n w

ith th

e in

telli

genc

e ce

lls b

oth

insi

de

targ

etin

g ce

ll an

d th

e IO

sec

tion

(if a

vaila

ble)

, ide

ntify

kn

own

/ em

ergi

ng fr

iend

ly a

nd th

reat

cap

abili

ties

and

vuln

erab

ilitie

s.•

Iden

tify

inte

llige

nce

gaps

in in

form

atio

n en

viro

nmen

t an

alys

is a

nd re

fine

IRs

for i

nclu

sion

in th

e co

llect

ion

man

ager

’s c

olle

ctio

n pl

an.

•D

eter

min

e w

hich

thre

at v

ulne

rabi

litie

s th

at m

ust b

e at

tack

ed a

nd fr

iend

ly c

apab

ilitie

s th

at m

ust b

e pr

otec

ted

in th

e in

form

atio

n en

viro

nmen

t in

orde

r to

achi

eve

the

desi

red

effe

cts.

•Id

entif

y an

d pr

iorit

ize

targ

ets

& ta

rget

set

s fo

r IO

. Th

ese

targ

ets

are

HV

Ts(i.

e., k

ey le

ader

s, C

2, c

ivilia

n po

pula

ce, t

hrea

t gro

ups,

etc

.).•

Det

erm

ine

the

time

(incl

udin

g du

ratio

n) a

nd p

lace

in

the

battl

espa

cew

hen

the

effe

ct m

ust b

e ac

hiev

ed to

su

ppor

t the

com

man

der’s

sch

eme

of m

aneu

ver.

•P

rovi

de th

is in

put t

o ta

rget

ing

obje

ctiv

es.

1

Writ

ing

MO

E•

Eac

h IO

ET

shou

ld h

ave

one

or m

ore

MO

E.

•U

se th

e ta

sk’s

pur

pose

as

a gu

ide

to w

hat m

ust b

e ob

serv

ed, r

epor

ted,

and

ass

esse

d.•

MO

E s

houl

d in

clud

e bo

th o

bjec

tive

and

subj

ectiv

e m

etric

s to

mak

e a

mor

e ho

listic

eva

luat

ion

of s

ucce

ss.

•S

ubje

ctiv

e M

OE

sho

uld

be o

bser

vabl

e, q

uant

ifiab

le,

prec

ise,

and

cor

rela

ted

to th

e ef

fect

of t

he IO

ET.

•O

bjec

tive

MO

E s

houl

d be

dire

ctly

tied

to th

e IO

ET,

and

gi

ves

the

com

man

der a

dire

ct in

put i

nto

asse

ssm

ent.

•If

an M

OE

is d

iffic

ult t

o w

rite

for a

par

ticul

ar IO

ET,

then

re-

visi

t the

IOE

T to

ens

ure

it ha

s a

clea

rly d

efin

ed, a

ttain

able

ef

fect

. R

e-w

rite

if ne

cess

ary.

Form

at–

MO

E s

tate

men

ts in

clud

e:•

A m

etric

-a s

tand

ard

of m

easu

rem

ent s

uch

as a

cha

nge

in

the

info

env

ironm

ent o

r adv

ersa

ry e

ffort

/ tec

hniq

ue,

resp

onse

or n

on-r

espo

nse.

•W

hatd

ata

is to

be

obse

rved

, col

lect

ed, &

mea

sure

d (in

te

rms

of n

umbe

r, tim

e, e

tc).

•E

xam

ple:

Inc

reas

e (th

e m

etric

) of l

ocal

pop

ulac

e su

ppor

t fo

r frie

ndly

forc

es (w

hat i

s to

be

mea

sure

d).

Exa

mpl

e M

OE

: •

(Sub

j) Le

vel o

f par

amili

tary

influ

ence

on

the

popu

lace

.•

Per

cent

age

of p

ositi

ve /

neut

ral /

nega

tive

artic

les

publ

ishe

d in

loca

l new

spap

ers.

DEC

IDE

(con

tinue

d)•

Dev

elop

dis

cret

e E

ssen

tial I

O T

asks

(EIO

Ts).

EIO

Tsar

e ke

y ta

sks

that

mus

t be

exec

uted

to a

chie

ve th

e co

mm

ande

r’s ta

rget

ing

obje

ctiv

es a

t the

iden

tifie

d tim

e an

d pl

ace.

Ava

ilabl

e as

sets

sho

uld

be p

riorit

ized

to e

xecu

te

thes

e E

IOTs

abov

e al

l oth

er ta

sks.

•Id

entif

y ta

rget

(s) w

hich

sho

uld

be e

ngag

ed to

sup

port

iden

tifie

d E

IOTs

. Th

ese

are

HP

Ts

•D

eter

min

e th

e de

sire

d ef

fect

for t

he E

IOT.

Thi

s sh

ould

cl

early

iden

tify

wha

t is

to b

e ac

com

plis

hed

by e

ngag

ing

the

targ

et.

•E

IOTs

shou

ld b

e w

ritte

n:E

ffect

: D

estro

y, D

egra

de, D

isru

pt, D

ecei

ve, D

eny,

In

fluen

ce, e

tc.

Targ

et /

Targ

et S

et:

The

obje

ct o

f the

inte

nded

effe

ct.

P

urpo

se:

The

expl

anat

ion

of w

hyth

e ta

rget

set

or t

arge

t m

ust b

e en

gage

d.

•D

evel

op a

pla

n to

ass

ess

IO e

ffect

s an

d ta

sks.

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