“Armored cars and tanks are greatlysuitable for this war. We shall see iftime proves me right.”1 Major Fran-cisco Franco Bahamonde, commanderof the Ist Bandera (battalion) of theSpanish Foreign Legion, wrote thesewords following the less than auspi-cious debut of Spanish armor duringthe battle of Ambar in northern Mo-rocco. Fought on March 18, 1922, Am-bar saw the first use of tanks by theSpanish Army, and their earliest de-ployment on the African continent.

In order to better understand theSpanish Army’s use of armor duringthe Rif Rebellion, a brief history of theconflict would be useful. Since 1909,Spanish forces in the eastern portion ofthe Spanish Protectorate in Moroccohad pushed outwards from Melilla to-wards the heartland of the Rif, and by1921 they had almost reached theshores of Alhucemas Bay. In a bid fornational independence, Mohamed benAbd-el-Krim, along with his youngerbrother Mhamed, had led fellow tribes-men against Spain.

Fighting was most intense in a regionthe Spanish Army called the coman-dancia de Melilla. In late July 1921,the Krim brothers led an harka (warparty) of tribesmen against Annual,Spain’s main outpost in the area. Thisattracted the attention of Manuel Fer-nandez Silvestre, an audacious and im-petuous cavalry general, commanding20,000 men, who was pushing deepinto rebel territory, hoping to reach Al-hucemas Bay without securing hisflank or rear. Krim counterattackedwith roughly 3,000 warriors. Sur-rounded, and cutoff from reinforce-ments, one outpost after another fell toKrim’s men.2 Instead of a fighting re-treat, Silvestre’s army fell apart, aspanic-stricken conscripts dropped theirweapons and ran for their lives. TheRiffians slaughtered those they caught,with soldiers and civilians alike beingput to the knife. In the end, Spanishcasualties numbered, at minimum,12,000, with another 600 taken pris-

oner and held for ransom. Silvestre alsoperished at Annual, although it wasnever fully established if by the enemy,or his own hand. What had taken Spaintwelve years of blood and treasure toconquer had been lost in only a fewdays. Spain’s ignominious rout at thehands of Riffian tribesmen was thegreatest defeat suffered by a Europeanpower in an African colonial conflict inthe twentieth century.

The Annual disaster had two seriousconsequences for Spanish officials: anarmy of 20,000 men had been renderedmilitarily ineffective, and the rebels —who up to that time had been armedsolely with antiquated rifles and dag-gers — were now in possession of avariety of modern artillery, small arms,and thousands of rounds of ammuni-tion. The herculean task of reconquer-ing the Melillan Command was givento the battle-tested Tercio de Extran-jeros (the Spanish Foreign Legion) andthe Regulares (native Moroccan troopscommanded by Spanish officers). Spainrushed these units from the WesternZone of the Protectorate to save the en-clave of Melilla from succumbing tothe Riffians. The going was tough, withhard-fought battles taking place nearlyevery day, and with the Legion andRegulares always comprising the van-guard of Spanish forces. The cost inmen and materiel, along with the diffi-culty of the terrain and the tenacity ofthe rebels, led to rumblings within theSpanish government to abandon itsProtectorate completely. Krim’s suc-cesses led to more and more tribesflocking to his side, which resulted inan open rebellion throughout the Pro-tectorate.

By early 1922, Spanish forces contin-ued with their drive to recover the areaSpain had lost the previous year. Themajor outposts of Nador, Tauima, andMonte Arruit were back in Spanishhands, while the push to cross the KertRiver was next on the agenda. Thiswas done on January 10 with the cap-ture of Dar Drius. Dar Drius served as

the HQ for Spanish operations duringthe spring offensives in the region.

The major drive of the year, againstthe Beni Said and Beni Ulixechkabyles (tribes), began in March whenthe weather became more favorable formilitary offensive operations. Mean-while, Lieutenant-Colonel Jose Millan-Astray, founder and commanding offi-cer of the Spanish Foreign Legion, hadreturned to the front on February 14 af-ter having been wounded for the sec-ond time during the campaign. GeneralFederico Berenguer Fuste, brother ofthe High Commissioner, led the maincolumn against the rebellious tribes-men. Millan-Astray led the Ist and IIndBanderas of the Legion (commandedby Majors Franco Bahamonde and Ro-driguez Fontanes, respectively) on theadvance which was scheduled to com-mence on March 18. Ambar/Anvar wasthe objective of that day’s operation.3

By the standards of 1922, this offen-sive employed very modern equipment.Following the Annual disaster, theSpanish military realized the impor-tance of utilizing the best weaponsavailable to crush the rebellion. A com-mission, directed by the then Chief ofStudies of the Infantry’s TestingGround (Escuela Central de Tiro), vis-ited several European countries in thehope of acquiring tanks. He consideredthe British Whippet, but financial andpolitical reasons led him to pass on it

26 ARMOR — January-February 1997

Tank Warfare During the Rif Rebellion1921-1927

by José E. Alvarez

in favor of French equipment. France’sgeographic proximity to Spain, as wellas its shared interest in Morocco, con-tributed to the deal being consummatedbetween Paris and Madrid. Conse-quently, in August 1921, the Frenchprime minister authorized the sale oftanks, artillery, and airplanes to theSpanish Army. The tanks, known as“carros de combate/asalto” in Spain,arrived in January of the followingyear.4

The initial delivery to the Army num-bered twelve 6.5-ton Renault FT-17s;eleven were armed with a 7-mmHotchkiss machine gun, one served asa command tank (FT-17TSH). Thesetwelve tanks were delivered to the Es-cuela Central de Tiro. Six SchneiderCA1 tanks were also purchased andplaced at the disposal of the artillerybranch of the Army.

The FT-17s were incorporated into acompany (“Compañia de Carros deAsalto”), with a command staff usingthe TSH, two platoons of five tankseach, as well as a support and repairunit. The twelfth tank would remain atthe Testing Ground to be used in train-ing. The company equipment also in-cluded twelve Renault tank transporttrucks, two Hispano-Suiza tankertrucks, and a Ford light truck to trans-port stores. In addition, a repair truckwhich remained in Segovia, was neverdelivered. The staff consisted of a cap-

tain, two lieutenants, one sergeant-ma-jor, eight sergeants who would serve asTCs, and forty enlisted men (eleventank drivers, twenty truck drivers, andnine mechanics and service person-nel).5

King Alfonso XIII saw a demonstra-tion of the new tanks at a militarycamp outside Madrid soon after theirarrival. After a brief period of instruc-tion for the new unit, the General Staffordered that the tank company betransferred by rail to the port of Malagaon March 8, and from there by ship toMelilla. Once there, the unit was im-mediately sent to the encampment atDar Drius. However, suitable shelter forthe tanks from the inclement weather,as well as repair facilities, had not beenestablished. This led the company com-mander, Captain José de Alfaro, to pena terse report to Army HQ in Melilla.As a result, all tanks needing major re-pairs had to be sent from Dar Drius tothe artillery’s machine shop in Melilla.6

No more than two months had goneby since the tanks had arrived in Spainand they would now be pressed intoservice against the Beni Said tribe. OnMarch 17, the company joined GeneralF. Berenguer Fuste’s column at the for-ward outpost of Itihuen/Ichtiuen. Thefollowing morning, at 0600 hours, thetank company began its advance withthe infantry of the Foreign Legion de-ployed behind the FT-17s. The opera-

tion, which called for the capture ofTuguntz, succeeded in reaching and oc-cupying the houses of Ambar/Anvar.Once there, however, they began totake heavy fire from their left flank.The tanks had advanced, over brokenterrain, faster than their infantry, and adistance of some 800 meters separatedthem. The Riffians, undaunted by theappearance of these new war machines,surrounded the unprotected tanks andbegan hurling stones at them. Findingthe machine gun’s blind spots, theythrust their daggers (gumias) throughthe vision slits, injuring one machinegunner’s face. Many of the tank’s ma-chine guns, installed the day before,jammed during firing due to faulty am-munition.

The tanks had to withdraw to rejointhe Legionnaires, but during the with-drawal, fighting continued, forcingsome of the tankers to abandon theirdisabled or disarmed vehicles. The out-come of this less than auspicious eventin the history of Spanish armor left twosergeants and one enlisted driverwounded, and three tanks disabled.Lacking the necessary recovery equip-ment, two of the tanks had to be left onthe battlefield where the Riffians blewthem up with dynamite four days later.7

The Army’s General Staff examinedthe lackluster performance of the tanks,and concluded that the determining fac-tor in the fiasco was the lack of coop-

ARMOR — January-February 1997 27

eration between the infantry and tanks.The gap which developed between thetwo elements, as well as the failure ofthe machine guns, were also importantcontributing factors. It was also notedthat the tanks had been rushed to thefront without the opportunity for coor-dinated training/exercises with the in-fantry.8

For the remainder of the campaign inthe Protectorate, tanks were used on asmaller scale, to provide support duringretreats, in punitive operations, inwheeled-vehicle recovery, and in re-connaissance operations with cavalryand infantry units. They would onceagain be used in a major operation dur-ing the amphibious landings at Alhuce-mas Bay in September, 1925, wherethe company of FT-17s were to disem-bark first in order to provide fire sup-port for the infantry who followedthem ashore. The landing craft, how-ever, struck a shoal, forcing the infan-try and artillery to disembark unas-sisted. The tanks were brought ashorethe following day, where they providedsupport for the left flank of the beach-head and, with the collaboration of theVIth and VIIth Banderas of the Le-gion, advanced to take the strategicheights/line of Malmusi Alto, MalmusiBajo, and Morro Viejo.9 With the suc-cessful landing at Alhucemas Bay bythe Spanish Army, the defeat of Krimand his “Rif Republic” was assured.The war would continue, with less in-tensity, until peace was declared inmid-1927.

In conclusion, Spain’s first use of ar-mor during the Rif rebellion in Mo-rocco resulted in a minor setback. Nev-ertheless, among the farsighted officersof the Army, the use of tanks in a colo-nial setting, where difficult terrainwould be encountered, was a reality. Inthis type of campaign, it was of the ut-most importance that armor and infan-try provide mutual support. If not,either could be easily cut off and de-stroyed.

This not only happened to Spanishtanks at Ambar, but to Italian armorduring the Italo-Ethiopian War of 1935-36. Greater mechanical reliability, alongwith better ammunition, improved thefighting capability of Spanish tanksduring the rebellion, and even thoughthey did not play a major role duringthe Alhucemas Bay landings, they wereavailable to provide fire support ifcalled upon to do so.

Within the Spanish Army, there wasno turning back. Armor was here to stay.

Notes1Francisco Franco Bahamonde, Marruecos:

Diario De Una Bandera (Madrid: 1922), p.177. On pp. 177-179, Franco detailed his per-sonal opinions on the employment of tanks inthe Moroccan Campaign, as well as his numer-ous recommendations for improvement. Whileothers in the military declared that ‘The tankshave failed,’ or ‘Tanks are useless in Morocco;they are inappropriate in this terrain,’ he (alongwith Genereal Damaso Berenguer Fuste, HighCommissioner of the Spanish Protectorate inMorocco) believed otherwise. He boldly statedthat, “Los carros de asalto y tanques son degran aplication en esta guerra. Veremos si eltiempo me da la razon.”

2David S. Woolman, Rebels in the Rif: Abd elKrim and the Rif Rebellion (Stanford: StanfordUniversity Press, 1968), p. 102.

3John Scurr, The Spanish Foreign Legion, Os-prey Men-At-Arms Series, no. 161 (London:Osprey Publishing Ltd., 1985), pp. 11-12.

4Defensa, no. 144, April 1990, “Los Carros deAsalto Españoles en la Campaña de Marreu-cos,” p. 62.

5Ibid., p. 63. TSH is the Spanish translation ofthe French TSF (i.e., Telegraph without wire orradio-equipped). Javier de Mazarrasa, BlindadosEn España, 1a Parte: La Guerra Civil 1936-1939, No.2 (Valladolid: Quiron Ediciones,1991), p. 18. This source recorded that onlyeleven FT-17s were purchased, including theTSH. For more on the FT-17 light tank, includ-ing specifications, see Kenneth Macksey andJohn H. Batchelor, Tank: A History of the Ar-mored Fighting Vehicle (New York: CharlesScribner’s Sons, 1970), pp. 38-39, and Christo-pher F. Foss, The Illustrated Encyclopedia ofthe World’s Tanks and Fighting Vehicles: Atechnical directory of major combat vehiclesfrom World War I to the present day, with aForeword by Richard M. Ogorkiewicz (NewYork: Chartwell Books, Inc.,), pp. 70-71.

6Defensa, p. 63.7Ibid., pp. 63-64. Franco, pp. 175-177. Wool-

man, p. 105. It is interesting to note that duringthe Italian-Ethiopian War of 1935-1936, theEthiopians fought the Italian CV-33/5 lighttanks in similar fashion. Major General J.F.C.Fuller, The First of the League Wars, its lessonsand omens (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode,1936), p. 68, (n. 1), described Ethiopian anti-tank methods thus:

They lay up for tanks when they attempt tocross difficult ground, rushed them from be-hind, scrambled on their backs, and then lean-ing over the roof of the cab smashed the muz-zles of the [2] machine guns with a rock. I alsoheard that sometimes they poured petrol over atank and set it alight.

For more on the role of the Legion, whichsuffered 86 casualties during this battle (one ofthem being Major Fontanes, CO of the IIndBandera, who was KIA), see José E. Alvarez,“The Betrothed of Death: The Spanish ForeignLegion during the Rif Rebellion, 1920-1927”(Ph.D. diss., Florida State University, 1995), pp.147-149.

8Defensa, p. 64. On page 9 of a manuscriptprovided to the writer by Colonel of Infantry(Legion) Ramón Moya Ruiz entitled “LosMedios Blindados y La Legion,” the authornoted the following causes for the failure of thetanks at the battle of Ambar and what needed tobe done to rectify the situation:

•It was necessary to install two machine gunsinstead of the single one provided.

•Improve the quality of the ammunition toavoid interruptions [jamming].

•Better trained personnel with combat experi-ence.

•Tanks, in this type of campaign, should beemployed with mutual support from infantry.

•The threat to tanks will come from: artillery,antitank rifles [i.e., the 13-mm Mauser T-Gewehr of 1918] and machine guns.

9Moya Ruiz, pp. 11-12. Defensa, p. 64. Scurr,pp. 16-17.

Renault FT-17—Technical Data

Crew: 2.

Armament: One Hotchkiss 7mm machinegun.

Armor: 22mm (0.87in) maximum; 6mm(0.24in) minimum.

Dimensions: Length (with tail) 16ft 5in (5m);width 5ft 9in (1.74m); height 6ft 7in(2.14m).

Weight: Combat 15,432 lbs (7,000kg).

Ground Pressure: 8.5lb/in2 (0.59kg/cm2).

Engine: Renault four-cylinder water-cooledgasoline engine developing 35bhpat 1,500 rpm.

Performance: Road speed 4.7mph(7.7km/h); road range 22 miles(35km); vertical obstacle 2ft (0.6m);trench crossing (with tail) 5ft 11in(1.8m), (without tail) 4ft 5in (1.35m);gradient 50 percent.

Adapted from Christopher F. Foss, The Il-lustrated Encyclopedia of the World’sTanks and Fighting Vehicles.

28 ARMOR — January-February 1997

Dr. José E. Alvarez is an As-sistant Professor of History atThe University of Houston-Downtown, and an honorarymember of the Brotherhood ofFormer Gentlemen Legion-naires of the Spanish ForeignLegion (Ceuta chapter).