terrorism and separatism-briefing paper

8/6/2019 Terrorism and Separatism-briefing Paper

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Thereafter, on 20 September, US President George W. Bushaddressed the Joint Session of the US Congress and identifiedOsama Bin Laden, a Saudi (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia)-bornbillionaire, as the prime suspect, recognized leader and financier ofAl-Qaeda, a collection of loosely-organized Islamic extremist groups,

behind the despicable strike. Bush cited evidences gathered bythe Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) that established thelinkage of Bin Laden and Al Qaeda with other organizations andterrorists in more than 60 countries. They are allegedly broughtto camps in places like Afghanistan, where they are trained in thetactics of terror to plot evil and destruction in their home countryas well as other countries of the world. Moreover, he insisted thatevery nation in every region must decide: either you are with us(the United States) or you are with terrorists. (Bush 2001).

On a similar vein, Philippine President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo wentalong Bushs flawed logic when she made the same pronouncementin February 2002, after her official visit to the US. This wasspecifically intended to rally the people against the homegrownMuslim extremist group, Abu Sayyaf, and counter opposition againstthe conduct of joint US-RP military exercise (dubbed as Balikatan[Shoulder-to-Shoulder] 02-1) in close proximity to Abu Sayyafs lairs.Filipino nationalists believe that the exercise is a flimsyjustification in allowing foreign military forces to intervene intoPhilippine domestic affairs, a conflict considered purely local, henceconceived as an affront to Philippine sovereignty. While on one hand

both Bush and Arroyo oversimplified the complex issue by drawingthe line between we (anti-terrorists) and them (pro-terrorists),when the more significant question is, why such group emerged?the so-called nationalists, on the other hand, reduced it betweenus and they when the query should be, is it solely nationsaffair?

In the most recent development following US retaliation against itsperceived non-state enemy (Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda network) andAfghanistans Taliban government (USs former ally against Russianinvasion in late 1980s), accused of coddling the terrorists, the US

has only proven its military capability to suppress and demobilize itsadversaries, and perhaps those in the future. However, such militarymight is neither an indication that the sole superpower of the worldwas able to extirpate the roots of terrorism, nor a manifestationthat terrorist activities would be a less attractive option for peoplewho believe that their fundamental rights are restrained by worldscurrent order.

In fact, US intensive bombings of known burrows and training campsof Al Qaedas did not boost Americas confidence but reinforced its

own fear, short of being paranoid. Bush admitted in his State of theUnion Address on 29 January 2002 that his budget for the military


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nearly $400 billion is the largest increase in defense spending intwo decades. (Bush 2002). The amount is half of military spendingin the world! Ironically, Americas insecurity has swelled at the timewhen its military power has become overwhelming.

As the chain of events unfold, the world is witnessing not the clashof civilization as Huntington (1966) predicted or what Bush tried toproject as civilizations fight for pluralism, tolerance andfreedom, (Bush 2001) but the re-emergence of Cold War,perhaps colder than before, with terrorism replacing communism.As a former colony and loyal ally of the US, the Philippines hasunequivocally placed its stake in the fight against terrorism in spiteof meager defense budget. However, this is to be fought in acompletely different political setting, context, and environmentresponding to distinct causes and achieving purposes servinginterests on its own.

Against this backdrop, the paper attempts the explore thesignificant issues, concerns, and questions behind the phenomenaof rising terrorist movements in the world as they interface with sub-national, especially Islamic, groups seeking for an independent statein the Philippines. Given the limitation of space, the exposition is notaimed at resolving the complex and profound problem behindworlds terrorism and separatism in the Philippines. Instead, this ismeant to contribute to the body of literature in comprehending andunderstanding the dynamics of terrorism and it relates to the

continuing concern of the country in maintaining political stabilityand legitimacy in the face of unabated struggle of Muslims for self-determination.

A Question of Definition

Terrorism is a term that has yet to be defined. The broad anddivergent interpretations on what constitutes a terrorist act continueto baffle social scientist And to date, no consensus has been arrivedat on the precise meaning of terrorism. As Jonathan Whites

Terrorism: An Introduction (1991) revealed, terrorism has a multipleof definitions classified according to type:

Simple - Violence or threatened violence intended to producefear or change.

Legal - Criminal violence violating legal codes and punishableby the state.

Analytical - Specific political and social factors behindindividual terrorist acts.

State-sponsored- Terrorist groups used by small states and

the Communist bloc toattack western interests.


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State - Power of the government used to terrorize its peopleinto submission

In a survey of 100 scholars who defined terrorism, Alex Schmids

Political Terrorism (1983) concluded that it is an abstract and highlysubjective concept whose content and substance is dependent onthe view-and standpoint of a victim or target of a terrorist act. Onthe part of a terrorist, Bruce Hoffman disclosed that he/she isprepared to use and committed to employ force in the attainment ofhis/her goals. Terrorists believe their cause to be altruistic andserving for the betterment of society. (1998: 43). Moreover, inletters hand-written in Arabic left behind by suicide hijackers in the11 September 2001 tragedy, investigators analyzed that terroristssee themselves as fighting alongside their ancestors whodeliberately embrace death as a consequence of their heroic act martyrdom in battle.2 For the Islamist terrorists, to kill (slaughter)and be killed in battle brings one closer to Allah, a radicalinterpretation ofJihad(Holy War) as ordered by the Prophet,Mohammad. (Paz 2001, see also http://www.ict.org.il).

In the United States Code (2000), terrorism is defined in Section2656f(d), Chapter 38 (Department of State), Title 22 (ForeignRelations and Intercourse) as:

Premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated

against noncombatant3targets subnational groups orclandestine agents;

International terrorism refers to terrorism involving citizensor the territory of more than one country; and

Terrorist group is any group practicing, or which hassignificant subgroups which practice, international terrorism.

As far as the U.S. government is concerned, attacks on militaryinstallations or on armed military personnel when a state of militaryhostilities does not exist at the site such as bombings against US

bases in any part of the globe is an act of terrorism. For analyticaland statistical reasons, the government has utilized the aforeciteddefinition since 1983. (US Department of State 2000: 7).

The absence of a precise definition of terrorism that gaineduniversal acceptance makes it difficult to distinguish the differencebetween a violent act victimizing civilians and noncombatantsdirectly conducted by the state and/or its instrumentalities againstits own people on one hand, and violence instigated by a non-stateand sub-national group affecting same group of people on the otherhand; between legitimate self-determination struggles and assertion

of states sovereign right; between violence brought about byiniquitous socio-economic and political structures and violence that


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brings about instantaneous deaths and destruction to properties.How different is the death of about 4,000 innocent people from theWorld Trade Center in 11 September from more than 500,000suspected communists who died during American-supportedSuhartos regime in Indonesia in 1965? From 200,000 civilian

casualties in East Timors campaign for self-determination? From10,000 noncombatant Acehnese killed by Indonesian military since1976? From roughly 60,000 Muslims slaughtered at the height ofMarcos campaign against the separatist movement in early to mid-1970s? How about hundreds of thousands of civilians who lost theirlives in Americas bombs in Vietnam, Iran, Iraq and Afghanistanamong others? Or from 40,000 children who die everyday in Asia,Africa, and Latin America due to poverty, malnutrition, and diseasebecause of states apathy, corruption, and poor governance? Arethese not acts of terrorism too?

How about acts of non-state actors, like multinational corporationswhereby 360 of them account for 40 per cent of worlds trade andwhose business operations have polluted the environment andthrown indigenous peoples from their traditional homelands in theinterest of development? And how about the effects of globalizingeconomy that perpetuated the yawning gap between rich and poorwhere 358 dollar billionaires have as much wealth as the poorest 49per cent of the worlds population estimated to be six billion people,20 per cent of them (1.2 billion) are living in less than US$1 a day?Are these horrifying conditions of worlds population different from

the sufferings of people who died from hijackings, bombings, gasattacks, and bullets of terrorists?

The ambiguity in the term makes it hard to delineate the line thatseparates a terrorist act from an act that advances lawful dissentwithin the purview of defending democratic socio-economic, politicaland cultural rights. The Peoples Republic of China and RussianFederation, for instance, rode the crest of US anti-terrorist campaignby justifying their military policies against separatist andindependence groups in Xinjiang Uighur and Chechnya. Thisprompted US National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice to state in

late 2001 (prior to APECs [Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation]meeting), that President Bush intends to tell the leaders of Russia,the Peoples Republic of China, and other Asian nations that hesupports their anti-terrorism effort at home but they must draw aline between legitimate dissent and genuine terrorism and nottrample human rights. (Sakamoto 2002: 3). However, when theArabs proposed in the United Nations to exclude nationaldetermination and liberation movements from the concept ofterrorism, US and its Western European allies opposed it. (Sakamoto2002: 4). Consequently, it stalled the sealing of a new anti-terrorist

treaty.


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In another case, the haziness of the term strained the long andclose relationship between the United States and Israel as theformer launched its diplomatic offensive to rally the world in its anti-terrorist posture at the expense of the latter. Israel was infuriatedwhen Bush announced in October 2001 that US was not against the

creation of a Palestinian state in Israels occupied territoriesinhabited by Palestine Arabs West Bank and Gaza strip. PrimeMinister Ariel Sharon retorted that Israels policy against Palestinianterrorists was no different from USs against Afghan and Al-Qaedaterrorists, insinuating USs repressive and military approach againstself-determination struggles.

Obviously, the debate on the definition of terrorism and whatconstitutes a terrorist act rages not only between states (bothcontending and allied) and political forces but also among socialscientists. The arguable issue on the concept includes also activitiesthat are to be judged as either anti-state terrorism or state-sponsored terrorism. Given its ambiguity, it is sufficient to avow atthis point that terrorism and anti-terrorism have to be defined interms of specific political contexts.

Nonetheless, for the purposes of this paper, Bruce Hoffmans (1998)definition is chosen to distinguish terrorists from other types ofcriminals and terrorism from other forms of crime. In Hoffmansmind, terrorism is:

Ineluctably political in aims and motives; Violent or threatens violence;

Designed to have far-reaching psychological repercussionsbeyond the immediate victim of target;

Conducted by an organization with an identifiable chain ofcommand or conspiratorial cell structure (whose memberswear no uniform or identifying insignia); and

Perpetrated by a sub-national group or non-state entity.

While acceding that Hoffmans definition is still debatable, it

nevertheless approximates the current context and perspective ofterrorism given the present situation and problem.

The Changing World and the Rise of Ethno-political and religious Terrorism

The end of the Cold War and greater integration of worlds economyunder the baton of neo-classical liberalism saw the relative declineof what was traditionally considered as ideological terrorism thatgained prominence in 1968.4 The disintegration of USSR (Union of

Socialist Soviet Republics) and fall of totalitarian states in EasternEurope placed anti-capitalist, Marxist-oriented, and communist-


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motivated political terrorist organizations into quandary apart fromdiminishing support and sympathy of the people on their cause.Francis Fukuyama (1989) assessed the phenomenon as the end ofhistory signifying the triumph of liberal democracy overauthoritarianism.

Although some left-leaning organizations manage to survive theideological battle like the Italian Red Brigades and Anti-ImperialistTerritorial Nuclei, Japanese Red Army, Perus Shining Path (SenderoLuminoso or SL) and Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA),Turkish Revolutionary Peoples Liberation Party/Front (DHKP-C),Greeces 17th November, and Columbias Revolutionary ArmedForces (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN), amongothers, these terrorists groups have been overshadowed byreligious, ethnic, or right-wing groups which are increasinglymotivated by campaigns of ethnic nationalism or religiousextremism. Oftentimes, these drives go together such as theaspirations of fundamentalist Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ), whichseeks to establish an Islamic state in Egypt and Sikh militants for anindependent state of Khalistan. And terrorism has intermingled withother political violence, as in Bosnia, Rwanda, and Chechnya.

The depolarization and democratization of the world in late 1980sunfolded the deeply-rooted contradictions in society restrained andsuppressed by almost 50 years of authoritarian regimes and highlycentralized governance. Thomas Franck (1992: 46-91) views the

momentous developments stimulated and reinforced therecognition of a right to democratic governance in international law.

In spite of the positive gains derived from the democratization ofstates institutions and economic liberalization, it also shrunk thesocial space where perceived new opportunities have produced anarrower social base. The complex impacts brought about bymodernization effectively created new vulnerabilities and newresponses that fed into the rise of ethnic consciousness and newethnic assertions. The seeming economic growth with real spatialshrinkage resulted in social conflicts between the majority and

minority peoples as they compete for scarce resources andbenefits. As Kothari says:

Developmentalism, as economism, has become a source of neweconomic vulnerabilities, and new inequalities. In multi-ethnicsocieties, where overlap has existed between religious and regionalidentities and economic functions, issues of economic insecurityand contradictions are very conveniently transformed by the eliteinto issues of ethnic, caste and religious issues (1989:36).

Ted Gurr (1993: 123-138) adds that global processes involving thegrowth of global economy and communications revolution enhance


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and facilitate the intensification of violence. The contagion ofconflict, moreover, is diffused when communal groups straddleinter-state boundaries that consequently drag another state into theconflict.

The sharpened conflicts was not between classes, as the Marxistsexpected, but between ethnic groupings, i.e., one who holds politicaland economic power on one hand, and those marginalized whoaspire to redeem their lost power, on the other hand. These arereactions against the centralism of the state which tries tohomogenize the entire poly-ethnic society under a single dominantculture held by the power-wielders in order to effectively respond tothe imperatives of world capitalism:

Ethnicity is a response including reaction to the excesses of themodern project of shaping the whole humanity (and its natural

resource base), around the three pivots of world capitalism, theState system and a world culture based on modern technology, apervasive communications and information order and auniversalizing educational system. The project of modernityentails a new mode of homogenizing and of straightjacketing thewhole world (Kothari 1989:16).

Hence, the homogenizing thrusts of capitalism, the nation-state, andtechnology are endeavors to assimilate, culturally unify, andintegrate diverse social formations into a global marketplace underthe secular authority of the State. However, the process ofdemocratization where people are empowered or being empoweredeither by the societys institutions or sheer and conscious as well asorganized efforts to empower themselves emboldened politicalmovements to challenge the current political structures andinstitutions of existing nation-state in particular and worlds liberalmarket economy in general.

Viewed from a broader perspective, the vicissitudes on the practiceof democracy transpiring in the world today hinge on the evolvingconfiguration of political development. Whatever form it takes andcourse it traverses, political development remains to affect and alter

societys structure. A change that is either incremental ordialectical, producing development or regression (decay), besidesperiods of stagnation. When it happens in and to society, it issubject to the principle of congruence.

The surge of sub-nationalism (Surendra 1989: 278) which hastaken kaleidoscopic forms religious, cultural, secessionist,irredentist, or even diasporic in almost all states of the world isgenerally hinged on the principle of self-determination. Often,secessionist movements are further fueled when the stateinstitutionalizes policies of ethnocide, thus threatening the

continued survival of their identity and ethnic rights to determinetheir own future as defined by their religion, culture, institutions,


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and systems. In other words, when compromises between centraland indigenous systems of governance become unfeasible,separatist movements arise. Only in such situation do:

More often than not, the use of force is utilized, i.e., acts of

revolutionary violence, to express rejection of the prevailingpolitical and social system and the determination to bring aboutprogressive changes by overthrowing the system (Lim and Vani1985:32).

As Gurr observes, rebellion and violent protests have increasedalmost fourfold (up to 360% from 1950-55 to 1985-89) with theindigenous peoples and ethnonationalists experiencing the greatestproportional increase in conflict magnitudes globally. (1993: 89-122). Furthermore, in his 1994 study of 50 conflicts all over the

world, Gurr concludes that half followed as a result of powertransitions, with nine (9) that began within five (5) years after theestablishment of the state and 11 within three (3) years ofrevolutionary seizures of power (including coups). While power-transition conflicts declined after 1987, ethno-political conflicts inpost-1987 period were more intense. Ten power transition conflictsafter 1987 were responsible for twice as many deaths and refugeesas the 13 others. (See Table 1). On the other hand, Table 2 showsthat half of 50 conflicts started under autocratic regimes followed bytransitional regimes at 17 against eight (8) in democratic regimes,confirming the causal relationship between democracy and ethnic

conflict. It is to be noted, moreover, that one-third of all seriousethno-political conflicts started in transitional regimes.

Table 1. Conflicts Following Shifts in PoliticalPower

IssuesNumber of

Conflicts andMean Magnitude

BeganBefore1987

BeganAfter1987

All Ethno-political ConflictsN and % 50 54% 46%

Magnitude 2.85 2.59

Began Within 5 Years ofEstablishment of New State

N and % 9 44% 56%

Magnitude 4.09 3.23

Began Within 3 Years ofRevolutionary Power Shift

N and % 11 64% 36%

Magnitude 2.08 3.66

Began Following any Power ShiftN and % 25 60% 40%

Magnitude 2.79 3.28

None N and % 25 48% 52%Magnitude 2.92 2.05


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Source: Ted Gurr, Peoples Against States: Ethnopolitical Conflict and theChanging World System, Commentary(Issue 50), Canadian Security IntelligenceService, Ottawa, Ontario.

Table 2. Conflicts by Type of Political Regime atTheir Onset

IssuesNumber of

Conflicts and MeanMagnitude

BeganBefore1987

BeganAfter1987

All Ethno-political ConflictsN and % 50 54% 46%

Magnitude 2.85 2.59

Autocratic Regimes

N and % 25 64% 36%

Magnitude 3.43 2.91

Democratic RegimesN and % 8 63% 37%

Magnitude 2.44 1.30

Transitional RegimesN and % 17 35% 65%

Magnitude 1.67 2.67

Source: Ted Gurr, Peoples Against States: Ethnopolitical Conflict and theChanging World System, Commentary(Issue 50), Canadian Security IntelligenceService, Ottawa, Ontario.

Apparently, the advancement of democracy and globalizationconsequently created a structure of inequity and discrimination bothat the domestic and transnational levels. By the end of the 20th

century, irresistible interdependence was a leitmotif of everypolitical, economic, ecological, and technological event. Informationtechnology renders national boundaries increasingly meaninglessand Internet defies national regulation. As information is generatedand disseminated all over the world through cable and at a click of amouse, disadvantaged people become progressively more aware of

global inequities and inequalities. Thus, a growing number of themarginalized sectors harbor resentment and bitterness as theyhear, read, and see before their eyes the affluence of the few. Thisheightened ethnic and racial consciousness. As viewed by Sakamoto(2002:8), Americas global standard has not only driven thewedge further apart between rich and poor but also eroded thefreedom to disagree with America in defense of ones culturalvalues.

Far from being extinguished and melted down, ethnic identities

have ossified much to the chagrin of liberal and socialist scholarsalike who predicted that ethnic, racial, religious, and national ties


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would gradually wither away as the world becomes increasinglyunified through the rising centrality of the state, international trade,and mass communications. (Lijphart 1977: 48; Premdas et.al. 1990:18). Ethnic identities, rather than dissolved have ossified andpersisted over class solidarity. Neither did ethnic loyalties concede

to the greater interest of the nation nor yield to the market forces.What have withered away are the conditions under which diverseidentities can together share a social space.

Unsurprisingly, under a post-industrial and post-print age, groupsand nationalities organize themselves across geographicalboundaries, bringing diaspora together and fusing issue-orientedgroups and religions through the course of globalization. Ethnicnationalism, separatism, and irredentism continue to be thesignificant motivational factor in a number of terrorism campaigns.Some of these have been long-standing like the Liberation Tigers ofTamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka, Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HUM) inKashmir, Irish Republican Army (IRA) in Northern Ireland, andPalestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) in Palestine among otherswhile some are quite recent such as the Uighers in China, Chechensin Russia, and Pattanis in Thailand.

Aside from ethno-nationalists, the emergence of religious extremistgroups is another outcome of the shrinking and integrating world.This does not refer only to Muslim but Christian groups as well.While on one hand, Islamic movements have provided Muslims with

a strong sense of identity that enabled them to resist theindiscriminate cultural globalization promoted by the West andopposed both Western corporate expansionism and US militaryhegemony, Christian religious radicals like the Aryan Nations andMilitia Movement in North America and Jewish Defense League inIsrael and the Occupied Territories have afforded Christians andJews respectively a sense of oneness to redeem their greatnessand glory on the other hand. Unlike the ethno-nationalists whoaspire to re-create their homeland and establish a nation-statewithin the geographical territory of an internationally recognizedsovereign state, militant Islamists, Christians, or Jews neither

envision to re-construct a nation-state of their own nor oweallegiance to a particular homeland.

In the case of Islamic fundamentalists, they are devoted to Islam,committed toJihad(Holy War) and profoundly motivated to freethe world from infidels. Their souls yearn for the day where theother world would reward their sacrifices and heroism in aneverlasting paradise. Their so-called fanaticism and zeal have theirown reasons that liberal rational thought or conceived marketinterest will not succeed in fathoming.


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Although Muslim terrorists are divided between Sunni (Sunnite) andShia (Shiite or Shiite) sects5 the schism does not deter them tocollaborate in certain activities. By and large, their difference alsofollows their mode of carrying out their functions. The Sunnisundertake their operations alone without any loyalty to any Muslim

organization. This makes it more difficult for anti-terrorist groups totrace and identify them. On the other hand, Shias pursue theirgoals in a more structured and collective manner. (CSIS 1999).

Without ignoring the dangers pose by Christian terrorists, Muslimextremists are currently regarded as major threat not only to stateslegitimacy but also worlds stability in terms of religious terrorism.They are often Mujahideens (religious fighters) who have combatexperience in Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Chechnya. They areeducated in handling weapons, explosives, and communicationequipments and know the importance of the Internet, fax machines,cellular telephones, and encryption. A computer literate terrorist canalter computer files and change dates of airline tickets, hotels, etc.Their ability to maintain a global network of small and self-sufficientcells, whose members are blood-related or know each otherpersonally, which parallels digital global integration, makes it easyfor them to permeate geographic boundaries and statesovereignties. All of which make tracking, infiltrating, andcountering them extremely difficult. Furthermore, access toweapons and methods of increasing lethality, or methods targetingdigital information systems that attract wildly disproportionate

effects and publicity, will allow terrorists to be seen as non-affiliated with larger, better financed subversive organizations orstate sponsors.

Inasmuch as globalism is a phenomenon that would be hard torestrain as more states increasingly integrate their economies underthe framework of free market system, it also becomes inevitablethat countries with significant number of Muslim communities beaffected by the growing trend of Islamic extremism whose terroristattacks have ever more lethal over recent years. The Philippines for

one has about five million Muslims in southern Mindanao whosequest for self-determination remains to be a continuing concern ofthe government. Given the predicament of the country, it becomesan inescapable task to join the world, as part of the community ofnations, not only in mitigating the effects of terrorism but also indesigning proactive policies that would extirpate the roots ofdomestic terrorism. However, this can only be done aftercomprehending the cause of Muslim separatism in the country. It isin this light that the following section of the paper will be treated, inspite of limited space.


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The Case of Muslim Separatism in the Philippines: AQuestion of Nationality or Perception

The Moro national question has been a continuing concern of the

Philippines. The successful conclusion of the 1996 GRP-MNLF(Government of the Republic of the Philippines-Moro NationalLiberation Front) Peace Agreement under former President Fidel V.Ramos was no guarantee of sustained peace simply because thatMNLF does not authoritatively hold as the sole spokesperson orlegitimate representative of 13 ethno-linguistic groups of Muslims inthe Philippines, not even representing three (3) major ethnic groups(Tausug-Samal, Maguindanao, and Maranao), to say the least,6

despite OICs (Organization of Islamic Conference) acknowledgment.The Muslims of southern Philippines remain to be deeply dividedalong ethnic lines with their respective identities, histories,languages, values, and world-views. Their parochialism andprimordial interests persisted, to a significant degree, attributable tostates overall failure in penetrating and affecting their socio-economic, political, and cultural domains leading towards de-linkingtheir lives from the Philippine polity.

Contrary to the belief of many, including reputed scholars, (Phelan1959; Majul 1973; Jocano 1975; George 1980; Gowing and McAmis1979; Gowing 1979; Molloy 1988; Bauzon 1991; Che Man 1990; Tan1993, among others), Moro identity or sense of oneness was not

shaped as a consequence of their historical struggles againstSpanish and American colonialisms proselytization. Although Islamwas conceded as the overarching symbol of unity, Islamicconsciousness was neither deeply ingrained into the minds andhearts of the people nor they were able to transcend their ethnicloyalties in favor of a higher stature of unity Islam. Though it maybe assumed that Islamic rhetoric and appeals were made to arouse,mobilize, and organize opposition to Spanish colonization inMindanao and Sulu sultanates, there is meager historical proof tolink that resistance movements against aggressive Christianizationprecipitated heightened Islamic consciousness and identity or

evidenced of a strong sense of Moro-ness among the Muslimpopulace. (Buendia 2001; McKenna 1998; Warren 1981; Ileto 1971).Contemporary Muslim nationalists and leaders of separatistmovements, supported by some historians and political analysts,have clung to the myth of Morohood and uncritically accepted theexistence of distinctive Islamic culture and consolidated Morohistory for reasons of their own.

The difficulty among Muslim ethno-linguistic groups to cometogether and unite into a single political force with definitive

strategic program for a self-ruling government is a concretemanifestation that the Bangsa Moro7 (Moro Nation) is an imagined


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community that is yet to be realized. Aside from the MNLF,dominated by Muslim Tausug-Samal, and MILF (Moro IslamicLiberation Front), predominantly Maguindanaoan Muslims, otherMuslim ethno-linguistic groups have not historically and seriouslychallenged the legitimacy of the Philippine state. The terrorist Abu

Sayyaf (Bearer of the Sword) Group or ASG, another Tausug-Samalcontrolled armed organization that gained worlds recognition for itsnotoriety in kidnapping foreign and local non-combatant nationalsfor ransom as well as beheadings, both Muslims and Christians, hadnot only embarrassed the Philippine government before theinternational community but also drove the wedge further apartbetween itself and Muslim masses on hand and the Mororevolutionary organizations on the other hand. ASGs activities andextremist tendencies have offended the sensibilities of Christiansand Muslims alike who believe that even wars should be foughthumanely and honorably where civilians should be spared fromarmed conflict between protagonists. In other words, the unificationof the Muslims of southern Philippines is far from being pulled off. Ithas been saddled by internal centrifugal forces brought about bydiffering ethnic loyalties, political agenda and interests, and modesof achieving their objectives as one people and one Bangsa.

Despite the disunity among Muslims and inchoate concept of aBangsa Moro, the collective feeling and sentiment of the Moropeople as a separate people from the Filipinos have beenunrelenting. The perception of discrimination and alienation from

the Filipino people has not completely expired. The questionwhether such perception of prejudice and feeling of estrangementfrom the Christianized majority rest on valid grounds or not cannotand will not be ascertained in this paper. What is certain, though, isthe emotional attachment that has wrapped the complexities of themajority-minority relation in the country.

The countrys experiment on regional self-governance through thecreation of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao under thePhilippine unitary state for the past decade has not resulted inmeaningful self-rule among the Muslims as envisioned. Neither the

experience with the Southern Philippine Council for Peace andDevelopment (SPCPD) nor programs and projects conceived andimplemented within the last few years under the said Councilcontributed in substantial alleviation of peoples economic andsocial development.

Even though Nur Misuari was unable to uplift the dire socio-economic condition and political marginalization of Filipino-Muslimsduring his five-year reign as ARMM Governor and SPCPDChairperson, he cannot be fully blamed for his inadequate

administrative skills and failure to check corruption and nepotism inARMMs offices. Besides, graft and corruption is a plaguing problem


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that had characterized not only ARMM but also the entire Philippinebureaucracy since the countrys independence in 1946. Admittedly,it is nearly impossible for Misuari to extirpate the deep and age-longradix of Muslim socio-economic and political deprivation given thelimited time and under a political environment of structural

constraints.

In fact, the national government cannot be absolved from theresponsibility of a feeble regional government. Under a unitarygovernmental set-up where powers of central government areupheld over those of sub-national governmental levels, the fullestcommitment and actual rendition of administrative assistance,technical aids, and financial support to ARMM are vital requisites forpolitical autonomy to materialize. Unfortunately, national assistancewas far from sufficient to fully answer the needs and demands ofMuslim empowerment and development. Corollary, Misuarismanagement style and absentee leadership in the regioncontributed not only to the dismal performance of ARMM but also tothe frustrations and disappointments of his fellow Muslims.

Moreover, Misuaris subsequent ouster as MNLF Chairperson by theCouncil of 15 in April 2001 and replacement as ARMM Governorand SPCPD Chairperson by Dr. Parouk Hussin after the 26 November2001 regional election sharpened the conflict between and amongMuslims. On that instance, the national government acted neither asan arbiter in resolving conflict nor a disinterested party in the

contestation for regional power. It effectively used its power andinfluence, presumably within allowable limits, to support thecandidature of Hussin and ditched Misuari (both Muslim-Tausug).This was a clear manifestation of the governments intervention intothe intra-ethnic discord rather than allowed the indigenousmechanism of conflict resolution to operate in settling their politicaldifferences.

Similarly, the filing of corruption and malversation of public fundcharges against Misuari and his subsequent incarceration inPhilippine jail after Malaysia facilitated his deportation was

interpreted by his supporters as a form of ethnic persecution andnot a legitimate case of breach public trust or treason. Misuarisrenewed call for secession and subsequent hostage-taking of bothMuslim and Christian civilians in Sulu staged by Misuaris followers,largely MNLF integrees, only denoted two things. One, governmentsmishandling of inter-and intra-ethnic relation among Muslims andtwo, unwavering general belief among Moros, despite theirdifferences, that they are a separate people, viewed as inferior, andwould never be able to gain appropriate respect and equaltreatment from by the Christianized majority people under the

current politico-administrative set-up of governance. These twocrucial factors, among others, made it convenient for any Muslim


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leader (current or future, traditional or non-traditional) to use ethnicissues and corresponding symbolisms to arouse, organize, and rallythe people against the state for claims that may neither necessarilybe politically legitimate nor essentially responding to their ownpeoples interests.

Beyond objective economic and political grievances, the issue ofseparatism is basically an issue of subjective feelings, ofperceptions, and of language exploited by leaders (traditional ornon-traditional) whose interests and agenda are not necessarily inconformity with peoples desires, needs, and demands. And whenconflicts escalate, perceptions and languages are distorted withinthe warring parties. The distortions are partly spontaneous andpartly organized to rally the people to engage in warfare, bear theeconomic burdens, and face the human misery of war. Conceivably,when war breaks out, truth is its first victim.

Therefore, making the Moros feel that they are part and foremoststakeholder of the Philippine nation is the ultimate if not the mostchallenging task of government.

Conclusion

As the paper argued, terrorism is a subjective concept and nebulousterm that is to be defined on a specific political context. Given its

ambiguity, the contesting forces of terrorism and counter-terrorismare battles that are most effectively fought in ones mindset. In spiteof its subjectivity, the rise of terrorism in the post-cold war era wasa product of objective oppressive political and social structuresemanating from homogenizing effects of liberal free marketeconomy and democratic notions that primarily benefited westerneconomies. The global dominance of global capital precipitatedglobal disparity and inequity between the rich and poor countries.The resurgence of ethno-nationalist and religious extremistmovements asserting ethnic, political, economic, and cultural rightsmanifested through terrorism, insurgency, and civil war against the

state and the world are therefore expressions of identities that needto be recognized if indeed the principles of pluralism and democracyhave to thrive.

The worlds situation is no different in the case of the Philippines.The country is similarly faced with serious Muslim separatistmovement searching for effective political autonomy within theunitary set-up. However, far from being a national question, the self-determination struggle of the Muslims is actually a matter ofperceived alienation from the Philippine nation-state. In other words,

the minorities in general and Muslims in particular have harbored aprofound feeling of segregation and do not consider themselves as


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part of the Filipino nation as a consequence of states historicalflaws in managing majority-minority as well as inter- and intra-ethnic relations. Thus, the option to secede from the Republic thefinal alternative to redeem their traditional right to self-governanceand re-claim social justice that has been long denied is definitely

understandable.

Finally, the paper concludes that world terrorism can be addressedin the long-term by sustained, organized, and systematic manner ofbringing the world back to the marginalized, destitute, neglectedpeople. And for the Philippines, it is time for the government tomake the people, especially the minorities, feel that they are part ofthe Philippine homeland.


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1

Endnotes

Few days after the 11 September 2001 attack in the US, e-mails circulated around the world citingthe

inevitability of the horrendous event as predicted by Nostradamus, an ancient astrologer. (seeEdgar Leoni

Nostradamus and his prophecies, 2000 and John Hogue, Nostradamus: the complete prophecies,

2000)

2 For the original copy of the letter as published by the FBI see:www.fbi.gov/pressrel/pressrel01/letter.htm

3 Apart from civilians, noncombatant includes military personnel who at the time of theincident are

unarmed or not on duty.4

In 1968, three (3) members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) hijacked anEl Al

Boeing 707, en route from Rome to Tel Aviv, and flown to Algiers Dar al-Bada Airport. Afterlengthy negotiations, 38 passengers and 10 crew as well as the aircraft and hijackers were

eventually released. The incident was widely acknowledged as the beginning of moderninternational terrorism.

5 Sunni or Sunnite refers to the orthodox majority of the followers of Islam. The term refersto the

Traditional Way (sunna) of the prophet Mohammad. While Shia or Shite or Shiite Muslims rejectthe first

three caliphs and recognize Ali (Mohammads son-in-law) as the rightful successor of Mohammad.6

The 13 Muslim ethnolinguistic groupings in the Philippines are as follows: Maranao, Maguindanao,Tausug,Samal, Yakan, Sangil, Badjao, Kalibugan, Jama Mapun, Iranun, Palawani, Molbog, and

Kalagan. Ofthese three are major ones occupying identifiable territories: Maranao in Marawi; Maguindanao in

Cotabato; and Tausug-Samal, in Tawi-Tawi and Sulu.

7 The term bangsa or bansa is a Malay word that usually refers to nations, castes,descent groups or

lines, races or estates. Milner (1982: xv) says that the term has a Sanskrit origin. On the contrary,Dewey

(1962: 231) contends that the term has its Chinese derivation. Nonetheless, the former seemsmore

plausible. The composite term Bangsa Moro, which sometimes appeared in MNLF and MILFliterature

as well as in a number of scholarly writings refer to it as Moro Nation. For the purpose of thispaper,

Bangsa Moro shall be used to mean the Moro Nation as imagined by Filipino Muslims and

Bangsamoro to refer to the people inhabiting the territorial jurisdiction of the autonomousregion of

Muslim Mindanao.

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