Texas City, TXTexas City, TX

Amanda EnglerAmanda Engler

Texas City, TexasTexas City, Texas

• ““Explosions and Explosions and tragedy a way of tragedy a way of life in Texas city “life in Texas city “

• BP oil refinery in BP oil refinery in Texas City Texas City

• March 24, 2005 March 24, 2005 was it preventable?was it preventable?

April 16, 1947 April 16, 1947

• The port of opportunityThe port of opportunity– Thriving communityThriving community– Chemical plants and refineries provided good Chemical plants and refineries provided good

jobsjobs• The Grandcamp was at the port loaded withThe Grandcamp was at the port loaded with

– oil-field machineryoil-field machinery– drill stemsdrill stems– PeanutsPeanuts– sisal twine sisal twine – small-arms ammunition small-arms ammunition – ammonium nitrate fertilizerammonium nitrate fertilizer

The fireThe fire

• The ship caught on fire shortly after The ship caught on fire shortly after 8:00 AM8:00 AM– The smoke was a peach colorThe smoke was a peach color– Many people from the town came to Many people from the town came to

watchwatch

• 8:45 AM the fire department came8:45 AM the fire department came– Ship hatch had blown offShip hatch had blown off– Fire was too hot to put out with waterFire was too hot to put out with water

• The fire could not be controlledThe fire could not be controlled

9:12 AM the ship exploded9:12 AM the ship exploded

• Heard from 150 miles awayHeard from 150 miles away

• The sky appeared as if it was on fireThe sky appeared as if it was on fire

• Mushroom cloud rose 2,000 feet Mushroom cloud rose 2,000 feet

• A tidal wave swept people awayA tidal wave swept people away

• Heavy debris flew thousands of feetHeavy debris flew thousands of feet

• 1.5 ton anchor flew 2 miles1.5 ton anchor flew 2 miles

• Secondary explosions were ignited Secondary explosions were ignited

The explosionThe explosion

The Grandcamp's propeller The Grandcamp's propeller shaft shaft

Tidal wave damageTidal wave damage

Secondary explosion at a Secondary explosion at a refineryrefinery

The High FlyerThe High Flyer

• In the port that day for repairIn the port that day for repair

• Loaded with fertilizerLoaded with fertilizer

• Damaged by the first explosionDamaged by the first explosion

• Tried to move the ship away from shoreTried to move the ship away from shore

• Flames were spotted Flames were spotted

• The alarm was soundedThe alarm was sounded

• Exploded at 1:00 AMExploded at 1:00 AM

• More secondary explosionsMore secondary explosions

The aftermathThe aftermath

• Death toll 576 people Death toll 576 people

• 5,000 injured5,000 injured– Broken bonesBroken bones– Lost limbsLost limbs

• Thousands of homes destroyedThousands of homes destroyed

• Local churches and businesses goneLocal churches and businesses gone

• Area refineries destroyedArea refineries destroyed

The recoveryThe recovery

• People opened their homes to People opened their homes to those who’s had been destroyed.those who’s had been destroyed.

• Many major industries pledged to Many major industries pledged to rebuildrebuild

• Received $1 million in relief Received $1 million in relief funds funds

• Received $4 million in insurance Received $4 million in insurance paymentspayments

• Sunday, June 22, 1947, a day of Sunday, June 22, 1947, a day of closureclosure

Industry changesIndustry changes

• Improved disaster preparedness Improved disaster preparedness

• Ports evaluated their safety Ports evaluated their safety proceduresprocedures

• Community Awareness Response in Community Awareness Response in Emergencies (CARE)Emergencies (CARE)

BP oil refinery BP oil refinery Texas CityTexas City

• Constructed in 1934Constructed in 1934

• BP’s largest refinery at 1,200 acresBP’s largest refinery at 1,200 acres

• Third largest in the nationThird largest in the nation

• 1,600 employees1,600 employees

• World’s most complex refineryWorld’s most complex refinery

A history of accidentsA history of accidents

• October 1988 fire halted operations in the October 1988 fire halted operations in the isomerization unitisomerization unit

• April 6, 1992 leak of flammable liquids April 6, 1992 leak of flammable liquids explodes severely burning an employee, he explodes severely burning an employee, he died 15 days laterdied 15 days later

• July, 1995 another explosion, no one injuredJuly, 1995 another explosion, no one injured

• April 19, 1999, 50 pounds of hydrogen April 19, 1999, 50 pounds of hydrogen ignited, worker suffered second degree burnsignited, worker suffered second degree burns

History continuedHistory continued

• August 2000, fire in cooker unit, 20 people August 2000, fire in cooker unit, 20 people escaped without injuryescaped without injury

• March 30, 2004, explosion and fire, no March 30, 2004, explosion and fire, no one injured, OSHA found 14 safety one injured, OSHA found 14 safety violationsviolations

• Sept. 2, 2004, three men exposed to Sept. 2, 2004, three men exposed to superheated steam, two diedsuperheated steam, two died

• March 23, 2005, explosion in isomerization March 23, 2005, explosion in isomerization unit kills 15, over 100 injuredunit kills 15, over 100 injured

March 23, 2005March 23, 2005

Where it happened?Where it happened?

• Isomerization Unit– Converts low

octane feeds to higher octane components

– Feed octane is between 67-70

– Product octane is between 83-85

The isomerization unitThe isomerization unit

Raffinate Splitter

HydrotreaterNonaromati

c stream

Heavy raffinate

Light raffinate

Sulfur Nitrogen

Isomerization

Reactor

Vapor Recovery

Unit

Final Product

What happened?What happened?

•Unit was shutdown•Explosion happened during the restart•Vapor and liquids shot out of a

ventilation stack •Truck may have provided the spark for

the explosion •Explosion was felt in buildings up to 5

miles away

Was it preventable? A closer Was it preventable? A closer looklook

• The vent stackThe vent stack– Used as pressure relieve from fluids and gas buildup in Used as pressure relieve from fluids and gas buildup in

the isomerization unitthe isomerization unit– The industry norm is to use a flare for thisThe industry norm is to use a flare for this

• The American Petroleum Institute says that vent The American Petroleum Institute says that vent stacks are old technology and are slowly being stacks are old technology and are slowly being phased outphased out

• 1992 OSHA citing1992 OSHA citing– The equipment at the center of the blast “allowed toxic The equipment at the center of the blast “allowed toxic

gases to vent to the atmosphere ... thus exposing gases to vent to the atmosphere ... thus exposing employees to flammable or toxic gases." employees to flammable or toxic gases."

– OSHA recommended that the unit should be OSHA recommended that the unit should be reconfigured so the vapors went to a flare or air reconfigured so the vapors went to a flare or air monitors should be installed on the unitmonitors should be installed on the unit

Could the death toll have been less severe? Could the death toll have been less severe? Trailer placementTrailer placement

• 11 of 15 were in a portable trailer 100 to 11 of 15 were in a portable trailer 100 to 150 feet from vent stack150 feet from vent stack– "People who were injured or suffered fatalities "People who were injured or suffered fatalities

had nothing to do with that unit," said Charles had nothing to do with that unit," said Charles Ramirez, a safety representative for contractor Ramirez, a safety representative for contractor JE Merit. JE Merit.

– Other industry leaders place trailers as far Other industry leaders place trailers as far away from equipment as possibleaway from equipment as possible

– ““BP's own 2001 internal form for siting trailers - BP's own 2001 internal form for siting trailers - a 31-point checklist - set a threshold of 350 a 31-point checklist - set a threshold of 350 feet between trailers and refining units or else feet between trailers and refining units or else a special risk analysis must be performed. “a special risk analysis must be performed. “

• Two blast-proof control rooms at the site Two blast-proof control rooms at the site seemed to have suffered minimal damageseemed to have suffered minimal damage

What can we take away What can we take away from this tragedy?from this tragedy?

Questions/CommentsQuestions/Comments

ReferencesReferences• “The Explosion 50 years later, Texas City still remembers,”

http://www.chron.com/content/chronicle/metropolitan/txcity/phoenix.html

• “Investigation Into Plant Explosion That Killed 15 Under Way,” US News March 24, 2005.

• “FBI rules out terrorism in plant explosion,” US News, March 25, 2005.• Fiegel, Eric, “Death toll in refinery blast rises to 15,” Fiegel, Eric, “Death toll in refinery blast rises to 15,” US News, March 24,

2005. • Moran, Kevin,” 15th body pulled from refinery rubble,” Moran, Kevin,” 15th body pulled from refinery rubble,” Houston

Chronicle, 2005.• ““BP EXPLOSION; LOCATION OF TRAILER DIDN'T MEET GUIDELINES; BP EXPLOSION; LOCATION OF TRAILER DIDN'T MEET GUIDELINES;

Mobile office at refinery was too close to stack,“ Mobile office at refinery was too close to stack,“ Houston Chronicle, April 10, 2005.

• ““THE BP EXPLOSION; Refineries under stricter rules overseas; Laws in THE BP EXPLOSION; Refineries under stricter rules overseas; Laws in the U.S. do much less to protect workers than those in Great the U.S. do much less to protect workers than those in Great Britain ,“Britain ,“Houston Chronicle, April 5, 2005.

• “Idling engine may have set off BP explosion; Witnesses claim the driver tried to turn off the truck during vapor vent,” Houston Chronicle, April 1, 2005.

• “Ignition, hydrocarbon release likely explosion cause,” The Associated Press State & Local Wire , March 30, 2005.

• “Volatile liquid distilling device may be cause of refinery blast,” Houston Chronicle, March 27, 2005.

References ContinuedReferences Continued• “Two-inch error killed two BP workers in 2004, report shows,” The

Associated Press State & Local Wire, March 26, 2005.• “Explosions and tragedy a way of life in Texas city,” The

Associated Press State & Local Wire, March 24, 2005.• “Facility has costly history; Past incidents have cost owners

millions in OSHA fines and lawsuit settlements,” The Houston Chronicle, March 24, 2005.

• “OSHA faulted BP for unrepaired Texas City chemical leak,” The Associated Press State & Local Wire, April 13, 2005.

• “Probe is closing in on BP blast's cause; The refinery's computer records are being analyzed,” The Houston Chronicle, April 14, 2005.

• “Other accidents happened at Texas City refinery unit,” The Associated Press State & Local Wire, April 11, 2005.

• ““Fatal industrial Fatal industrial accidentsaccidents in Texas,” in Texas,” The Associated Press State & Local Wire,, MarchMarch 23, 2005. 23, 2005.

• ““Texas City,Texas City, Texas, Gasoline Refinery Returns to 'Near Normal' Texas, Gasoline Refinery Returns to 'Near Normal' after Blaze” after Blaze” The Houston ChronicleThe Houston Chronicle, , AprilApril 1, 2004. 1, 2004.

• ““OSHA issued warning about dangerous ventilation stack OSHA issued warning about dangerous ventilation stack in 1992,” in 1992,” The Houston ChronicleThe Houston Chronicle, , AprilApril 8, 2004. 8, 2004.