text comment - summa contra gentiles, book iv, chapter 32 and 33

8/12/2019 Text Comment - Summa Contra Gentiles, Book IV, Chapter 32 and 33.

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Text Comment Thomas Aquinas

Summa contra Gentilesiv.32-33

Introduction: the author and his method

St Thomas Aquinas (c. 1225-1274) was a friar member of the Order of Preachers, a

university teacher, and a theologian of incomparable depth. His work has influenced

greatly the theological, philosophical, and ethical thought of Western Christianity well

beyond the reaches of the Dominican order or Roman Catholicism.

Aquinas authorship encompasses a vast number of works on a wide range of topics

including commentaries on various Biblical texts and on the works of Aristotle; however,

his three most important works remain the Commentary on Peter Lombards Sentences

or Scriptum super Sententiis, the Summa contra Gentiles or De Veritate Catholic

Fidei contra Gentiles, and the most studied of all, the Summa Theologi.

Aquinas works are representative of the Scholastic method the method of the

schools, or universities. Scholasticism was the result of class disputations; a method of

teaching largely abandoned nowadays, but very common in mediaeval universities.

Indeed, Aquinas himself used this method as a teacher and some of his works are the

product of his class disputations. Scholastic works were written in and organised in very

formal structures, with material grouped under broad topics or questions1.

1Cf. Norman KRETZMANN, Eleonore STUMP(ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas, Cambridge

University Press(Cambridge, 1993) 5


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TheSumma contra Gentiles

Thomas began to compose the Summa contra Gentiles (SCG) towards the end of his

second Parisian period when he was Master of Theology (c. 1259); however, there is

some disagreement on whether or not this was a direct product of his university

teaching.

St Raymund of Peafort, Thomas biographer, indicates that the intended readers of the

SCG were Dominican missionaries in Spain and North Africa engaged in preaching

against unbelievers, typically Jews and Muslims; but the validity of this claim which

may have been inferred by St Raymund because of Thomas own forewords in SGC i.2.iii

has been the subject of some debate in the twentieth century2. Nevertheless, the

apologetic tone of the SCG, and its systematic approach and literary genre suggest very

distinctly that the work may have been composed as a manual in which the truth that

the Catholic faith professes, and []the errors that are opposed to it3are examined in

detail and systematised for the benefit of students, and probably also preachers.

The SCGis composed of four volumes in which Aquinas expounds the Catholic faith by

means of using natural reasonsomething that all people are bound to give their assent

to4. The first three books focus on natural revelation, meaning that truth that the human

reason is naturally endowed to know5 about God and creation. The fourth book

illustrates the Christians revelation as those realities which necessarily transcend the

capacity of natural reason6. Notably however, even in this last volume Thomas relies

heavily on the use of philosophy in order to demonstrate that the Christian revelation,

though transcendent, is not opposed to natural reason7.

2Cf. Brian DAVIES, The Thought of Thomas Aquinas, Oxford University Press (Oxford, 1992) 63SCG i.2.ii4Cf. SGC i.2.iii5SCG i.7.i6Cf. SCG i.7.i7Cf. SGC iv.1.x


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Chapter Thirty Two and Thirty Three considered below are extracts from the fourth

volume.Here Aquinas employs the philosophical language of matter, form, essence, and

species to support Christian belief about the existence of a soul in Jesus Christ.

Chapter Thirty Two: Did Christ have a soul? and what kind of soul was it?

Aquinas begins this chapter by reminding the reader about the Apollinarian error with

regards to Christhuman body; namely that the Word of God was changed (conversum8)

into flesh at the incarnation, rather than assuming flesh. He then moves to consider

the Apollinarian heresy with regards to the rational soul of Christ and its resultant

rejection of any moral development in the person of Jesus.

However, the first consideration Thomas wants to make is whether or not Christ had a

soul and so he brings Arius into the argument9 to for this purpose. Aquinas does not

rehearse completely the Arian doctrine which denied the equality of the Son to the

Father, as this is outlined and refuted earlier in the book; rather Aquinas chooses to

focus his attention on the philosophical consequences of Arianism, on the existence of a

soul in Christ. Arianism held that Christ did not have a soul because the Word of God

itself was the animating force (anima) in him.

Thus, perhaps surprisingly, Aquinas groups together Arius and Apollinarius even

though the latter affirmed the fullness of divinity of Christ remaining a strong opponent

of the Arianism. Nevertheless, Thomas affirms that whether one holds that the Word of

God is equal with God or created by Him, it remains impossible for God or a

supercelestial spirit to be the form of a human being, due to their essential differences10.

Aquinas therefore, concludes that Christ must have had a soul.

8Cf. SCG iv.31.vi9Cf. SCG iv.32.ii10Cf. SCG iv.32.iii-iv


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Thomas then illustrates three further points. In doing so, he wants to affirm that Christ

necessarily had a soul that made him fully human. First, Aquinas affirms that the soul

constitutes the form of the human essence11. Thus, if one were to deny its existence in

Christas both Arius and Apollinarius did to different degreeshis humanity would

not have been complete, and if humanity had not been complete, Christ could not be

described as human (homo,1Tim 2:5)12.

Secondly, Thomas affirms that the presence of the soul provides meaning to the whole

body. With the soul gone, he holds, the body parts of a dead person lose their value13. If

Christ had not had a soul, the divine nature could not take its place, and his physical

presence would not have had the same significance; it would just have been a body.

Thirdly, Aquinas affirms that whatever is generated from another14, has to be of the

same specie of the one from whom it originates in order to be its proper offspring.

Therefore, if Christ had not had a soul he would not have been a true human being and,

consequently, of a different species to the Virgin Mary whom Scripture calls his

mother.

Having established philosophically that Christ must have assumed a soul, Aquinas

considers briefly what Scripture suggests about the type of soul this is; namely, Thomas

observes that Jesus feared, ate and drunk in response to the appetites and passions of

the sensitive soul15and that this soul had no divine attributes16.

In the next chapter Aquinas moves on to consider whether or not a merely sensitive soul

is the type of soul most fitting to Christ.

11SCG iv.32.v12Cf. SCG iv.32.v13Cf. SCG iv.32.vi14SCG iv.32.vii15SCG iv.32.x16Cf. SCG iv.32.viii-xi


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Chapter Thirty Three: sensitive vs. rational soul

Apollinarianism conceded that the soul of Christ had a soul that was sensitive and

responsive to the appetites such as hunger or thirst, but it denied that any higher

function was performed by a rational soul. The divine nature would be the source of the

intellect and of the reason, as well as being the seat of self-consciousness in the

Messiah17. However, Aquinas wants to illustrate that the soul of Christ can be thought

rational as well.

First, he goes back to the language of species upon which he touched earlier in SCG

iv.32.vii broadening the argument and asserting that because all humans are endowed

with a rational soul, the Christ must have had a rational soul too in order to be of the

same species as us18.

Secondly, Aquinas considers whether or not Jesus could be one of a kind among the

species endowed only with sensitive soul, or a genus apart from the rest. However

Thomas observes that, due to the intimate correlation between matter and form,

between the essence of something and its physicality, if Christ had soul that differed in

type from ours, than Christ body would not have been like ours. Again, both of these

suppositions would make Christ different from human beings19.

Thirdly, Aquinas considers Christ sense of wonder as manifested in Scripture through

the lens of philosophy. The sense of wonder is proper the human soul alone and it

involves a necessary yearning for knowledge. It is neither fit for divine naturebeing

omniscient precludes wondering at the cause of things, nor it is fit for the sensitive soul

whose cares are concerned only with the appetites and lower passions. Thus, if Christ

did wonder, than he must have had a human soul20.

17Cf. SCG iv.33.i18Cf. SCG iv.33.ii19Cf. SCG iv.33.iii-iv20Cf. SCG iv.33.v


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Lastly, Aquinas turns to the field of Biblical exegesis. After comparing the words flesh

(caro) and soul (anima) with other recurrences of it in Scripture. Thomas affirms that

both flesh and soul are used in the Bible to mean the whole man21and thus the correct

interpretation of John 1:14 is that at the incarnation the Word of God wasnt converted

into flesh, rather he assumed all those characteristics that typically define being human,

namely a body and a rational soul.

As a coda to this chapter, Thomas refutes Origen stance that the soul of Christ was

created and united to the Word before the Incarnation, on the ground that a pre-existing

of the soul wold not be fit for the human species22. Once again, if the soul of Christ had

differed on this point, Christ would not have come to share humanity in its fullness.

Conclusion

For Aquinas the soul is the animating force of a creature23; it is also the essence of its

form and linked to the physicality of the creature. The soul and the body cannot be

successfully considered separately, as each separately forms an incomplete substance24

which, as in SCG iv.32.vi, cannot be termed a person. In the case of human beings their

soul is a rational one, capable of wonder and reason as well as of performing the roles of

the sensitive soul.

Did Christ then have a soul or was his body animated by the divine nature alone? Was

that soul sensitive or rational? Why was it rational? These are some of the questions

behind the text considered in this paper. Aquinas addresses them whilst defending the

Catholic faith against three types of heresies. The first affirmed that Christ had no soul

21SCG iv.33.vi22Cf. SCG iv.33.vii23Cf. Brian DAVIES, (1992) 20924THOMASAQUINASin F.C. COPLESTON,Aquinas, Penguin Books (Aylesbury, 1970) 160


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(Arianism), the second that he had a sensitive soul only (Apollinarianism), and the third

that his soul had been created before his conception (Origenism).

To these Thomas answers that Christ assumed a rational soul equal to any other human

soul in every respect. If this were not so, Christ would have been essentially different

from us and the fullness of his humanity, as affirmed in Scripture, would have been

compromised.

Moreover, these chapters also show how Aquinas chooses to expound the faith in a way

which could make it more intelligible to non-believers. Aquinas could have relied solely

on the authority of Scripture and Tradition as these heresies had been tackled by the

Church long before his time, but he chooses to employ a variety of reasonable

philosophical arguments, as far as these did not contrast with the Christian faith. Thus,

here Aristotle provides the basis for Aquinas claims about the nature of souls, and the

essentially human desire for knowledge.


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Bibliography

THOMASAQUINAS, Summa contra Gentiles, Joseph KENNY(ed.), Hanover House(New York, 1957)

E-text, dhspriory.org/thomas/ContraGentiles.htm (Last accessed Jan. 2014)

F.C. COPLESTON,Aquinas, Penguin Books (Aylesbury, 1970) Brian DAVIES, The Thought of Thomas Aquinas, Oxford University Press

(Oxford, 1992)

Norman KRETZMANN, Eleonore STUMP(ed.), The Cambridge Companion toAquinas, Cambridge University Press(Cambridge, 1993)

Joseph RICKABY, Of God and His Creatures: An Annotated Translation (withsome abridgement) of the Summa contra gentiles of Saint Thomas Aquinas,

Burns & Oates (London, 1905)

E-text, nd.edu/Departments/Maritain/etext/gc.htm (Last accessed Jan. 2014)

Eleonore STUMP,Aquinas, Routledge (Abingdon, 2005)


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Appendix

Extract from http://dhspriory.org/thomas/ContraGentiles4.htm (June 14)

Caput 32

De errore Arii et Apollinaris circa animamChristi

Chapter 32

ON THE ERROR OF ARIUS ANDAPOLLINARIS ABOUT THE SOUL OF

CHRIST

Non solum autem circa corpus Christi, sedetiam circa eius animam aliqui male sensisse

inveniuntur.

[1] It is, however, not only about the body ofChrist but also about His soul that one finds

some bad opinions.

Posuit enim Arius quod in Christo non fuitanima, sed quod solam carnem assumpsit, cuidivinitas loco animae fuit. Et ad hoc ponendum

necessitate quadam videtur fuisse inductus.Cum enim vellet asserere quod filius Dei sit

creatura et minor patre, ad hoc probandum illaScripturarum assumpsit testimonia quae,

infirmitatem humanam ostendunt in Christo. Etne aliquis eius probationem refelleret, dicendoassumpta ab eo testimonia Christo non

secundum divinam naturam, sed humanamconvenire, nequiter animam removit a Christo,

ut, cum quaedam corpori humano convenire nonpossint, sicut quod miratus est, quod timuit,quod oravit, necessarium fiat huiusmodi inipsum filium Dei minorationem inferre.Assumpsit autem in suae positionis assertionem

praemissum verbum Ioannis dicentis, verbumcaro factum est: ex quo accipere volebat quodsolam carnem verbum assumpserit, non autemanimam. Et in hac positione etiam Apollinariseum secutus est.

[2] For Arius held that in Christ there was nosoul, but that He assumed only flesh, and thatdivinity stood to this as soul. And he seems to

have been led to this position by a certainnecessity. For he wanted to maintain that the Son

of God was a creature and less than the Father,and so for his proof he picked up those Scriptural

passages which show human infirmity in Christ.And to keep anyone from refuting him by sayingthat the passages he picked referred to Christ not

in His divine, but in His human, nature, he evillyremoved the soul from Christ to this purpose:

since some things are not harmonious with ahuman body, that He wondered, for example,that He feared, that He prayedall such mustnecessarily imply the inferiority of the Son ofGod Himself. Of course, he picked up for the

assertion of his position the words of John justmentioned, The Word was made flesh, andfrom this he wanted to gather that the Word onlyassumed flesh, not a soul. And in this positioneven Apollinaris followed him.

Manifestum est autem ex praemissis hanc

positionem impossibilem esse. Ostensum estenim supra quod Deus forma corporis esse non

potest. Cum igitur verbum Dei sit Deus, utostensum est, impossibile est quod verbum Deisit forma corporis, ut sic carni pro anima esse

possit.

[3] But it is clear from what has been said that

this position is impossible. For it was shownAmes that God cannot be the form of a body.

Since, therefore, the Word of God is God, as wasshown, it is impossible that the Word of God bethe form of a body, so as to be able to stand as a

soul to flesh.

Utilis autem est haec ratio contra Apollinarem,qui verbum Dei verum Deum esse confitebatur:et licet hoc Arius negaret, tamen etiam contraeum praedicta ratio procedit. Quia non solumDeus non potest esse forma corporis, sed nec

etiam aliquis supercaelestium spirituum, inter

quos supremum filium Dei Arius ponebat:- nisiforte secundum positionem Origenis, qui posuit

[4] This argument, of course, is useful againstApollinaris, who confessed the Word of God tobe true God; and granted Arius would deny thislast, the argument just given goes against him,also. For it is not God alone who cannot be the

form of a body, neither can any of the

supercelestial spirits among whom Arius held theSon of God supreme. Exception might be made


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humanas animas eiusdem speciei et naturae cumsupercaelestibus spiritibus esse. Cuius opinionisfalsitatem supra ostendimus.

for the position of Origen, who held that humansouls were of the very same species and nature asthe supercelestial spirits. The falsity of thisopinion was explained above.

Item. Subtracto eo quod est de ratione hominis,verus homo esse non potest. Manifestum estautem animam principaliter de ratione hominisesse: cum sit eius forma. Si igitur Christusanimam non habuit, verus homo non fuit: cumtamen apostolus eum hominem asserat, dicens, Iad Tim. 2-5: unus est mediator Dei et hominum,homo Christus Iesus.

[5] Take away, moreover, what is of the essenceof man, and no true man can be. Clearly, ofcourse, the soul is chiefly of the essence of man,since it is his form. Therefore, if Christ had nosoul He was not true man, whereas the Apostledoes call Him man: There is one mediator ofGod and men, the man Christ Jesus (1 Tim.2:5).

Adhuc. Ex anima non solum ratio hominis, sed

et singularium partium eius dependet: unde,remota anima, oculus, caro et os hominis mortuiaequivoce dicuntur, sicut oculus pictus autlapideus. Si igitur in Christo non fuit anima,necesse est quod nec vera caro in eo fuerit, necaliqua alia partium hominis: cum tamendominus haec in se esse perhibeat, dicens,Lucae, ult.: spiritus carnem et ossa non habet,sicut me videtis habere.

[6] It is on the soul, furthermore, that not only

mans essence, but that of his single parts,depends; and so, with the soul gone, the eye, theflesh, and the bone of a dead man areequivocally named, like a painted or a stoneeye. Therefore, if in Christ there was no soul, ofnecessity there was neither true flesh in Him norany of the other parts of man, whereas our Lordsays that He has these in Himself: A spirit hasnot flesh and bones, as you see Me to have (Luke24:39).

Amplius. Quod generatur ex aliquo vivente,filius eius dici non potest nisi in eandemspeciem procedat: non enim vermis dicitur filiusanimalis ex quo generatur. Sed si Christusanimam non habuit, non fuit eiusdem specieicum aliis hominibus: quae enim secundumformam differunt, eiusdem speciei esse nonpossunt. Non igitur dici poterit quod Christus sitfilius Mariae virginis, aut quod illa sit matereius. Quod tamen in evangelica Scripturaasseritur.

[7] Further, what is generated from anothercannot be called his son unless he comes forth inthe same species; the maggot is not called theson of the animal from which it is generated.But, if Christ had no soul, He was not of thesame species as other men, for things whichdiffer in form cannot be identical in species.Therefore, one will not be able to say that Christis the Son of the Virgin Mary or that she is HisMother. Nonetheless, Scripture asserts this in theGospels (Mat. 1:18; Luke 7:7).

Praeterea. In Evangelio expresse dicitur quodChristus animam habuit: sicut est illud Matth.26-38, tristis est anima mea usque ad mortem; etIoan. 12-27, nunc anima mea turbata est.

[8] There is mo re. The Gospel expressly saysthat Christ had a soul; Matthew (26:38) forinstance: My soul is sorrowful even untodeath, and John (17:2.7): Now is My soultroubled.

Et ne forte dicant ipsum filium Dei animamdici, eo quod, secundum eorum positionem,loco animae carni sit: sumendum est quoddominus dicit, Ioan. 10-18, potestatem habeoponendi animam meam, et iterum sumendi eam;

ex quo intelligitur aliud esse quam animam inChristo, quod habuit potestatem ponendi

[9] And lest they say perhaps that the very Sonof God is called soul because in their position Hestands to the flesh as soul, one must take ourLords own saying: I have power to lay My souldown: and I have power to take it up again

(John 10:18). From this one understands thatthere is another than the soul in Christ, which


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animam suam et sumendi. Non autem fuit inpotestate corporis quod uniretur filio Dei velsepararetur ab eo: cum hoc etiam naturaepotestatem excedat. Oportet igitur intelligi in

Christo aliud fuisse animam, et aliud

divinitatem filii Dei, cui merito talis potestastribuitur.

had the power of laying the soul down and takingit up again. It was, of course, not in the power ofthe body to be united to the Son of God or beseparated from Him, since this, too, exceeds the

power of nature. One must, then, understand that

in Christ the soul was one thing and the divinityof the Son of God another, to whom such powerjustly is attributed.

Item. Tristitia, ira et huiusmodi passiones suntanimae sensitivae: ut patet per philosophum inVII Phys. Haec autem in Christo fuisse exEvangeliis comprobatur. Oportet igitur inChristo fuisse animam sensitivam: de quaplanum est quod differt a natura divina filii Dei.

[10] Another reason: Sorrow, anger and the likeare passions of the sensitive soul; thePhilosopher makes this plain. [Therefore Christmust have had a sensitive soul: This is plainlydifferent from the divine nature of the Son ofGod.]

Sed quia potest dici humana in Evangeliismetaphorice dici de Christo, sicut et de Deo inplerisque locis sacrae Scripturae loquuntur,accipiendum est aliquid quod necesse sit utproprie dictum intelligatur. Sicut enim aliacorporalia quae de Christo Evangelistae narrant,proprie intelliguntur et non metaphorice, itaoportet non metaphorice de ipso intelligi quodmanducaverit et esurierit. Esurire autem non estnisi habentis animam sensitivam: cum esuriessit appetitus cibi. Oportet igitur quod Christus

habuit animam sensitivam.

[11] But, since one can say that the human thingsin the Gospels are said of Christ metaphorically,just as the sacred Scriptures speak of God inmany places, one must take something which isunderstood properly of necessity. For, just asother bodily things which the Evangelists relateof Christ are understood properly and notmetaphorically, so it must not be understood ofChrist metaphorically that He ate and that Hehungered. Only he who has a sensitive soulhungers, since hunger is the appetite for food.

Necessarily, then, Christ had a sensitive soul.

Caput 33

De errore Apollinaris dicentis animam

rationalem non fuisse in Christo, et de errore

Origenis dicentis animam Christi ante

mundum fuisse creatam

Chapter 33

ON THE ERROR OF APOLLINARIS, WHO

SAYS THERE WAS NO RATIONAL SOUL

IN CHRIST; AND THE ERROR OF

ORIGEN, WHO SAYS THE SOUL OF

CHRIST WAS CREATED BEFORE THE

WORLD

His autem testimoniis evangelicis Apollinarisconvictus, confessus est in Christo animamsensitivam fuisse: tamen sine mente et

intellectu, ita quod verbum Dei fuerit illianimae loco intellectus et mentis.

[1] Won over, however, by this Gospeltestimony, Apollinaris confessed that there was asensitive soul in Christ; nonetheless, it was

without mind and intellect, so that the Word ofGod was in that soul in place of intellect andmind.

Sed nec hoc sufficit ad inconvenientia praedictavitanda. Homo enim speciem sortitur humanamex hoc quod mentem humanam et rationem

habet. Si igitur Christus haec non habuit, verushomo non fuit, nec eiusdem speciei nobiscum.

Anima autem ratione carens ad aliam speciem

[2.] But even this is not sufficient to avoid theawkward consequences described, for man getshis human species from his having a human mind

and reason. Therefore, if Christ did not havethese, He was not true man, nor was He of the

same species with us. For a soul which lacks


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pertinet quam anima rationem habens. Est enimsecundum philosophum, VIII Metaphys., quodin definitionibus et speciebus quaelibetdifferentia essentialis addita vel subtracta variat

speciem, sicut in numeris unitas. Rationale

autem est differentia specifica. Si igitur inChristo fuit anima sensitiva sine ratione, nonfuit eiusdem speciei cum anima nostra, quae estrationem habens. Nec ipse igitur Christus fuiteiusdem speciei nobiscum.

reason belongs to a species other than that of thesoul which has reason. For, according to thePhilosopher [MetaphysicsVIII, 3], in definitionsand species any essential difference which is

added or subtracted varies the species, just as

unity does in numbers. But rational is the specificdifference. Therefore, if in Christ there was asensitive soul without reason, it was not of thesame species with our soul, which does havereason. Neither, then, was Christ Himself of thesame species with us.

Adhuc. Inter ipsas animas sensitivas rationecarentes diversitas secundum speciem existit:quod patet ex animalibus irrationalibus, quae abinvicem specie differunt, quorum tamen

unumquodque secundum propriam animamspeciem habet. Sic igitur anima sensitiva

ratione carens est quasi unum genus sub seplures species comprehendens. Nihil autem estin genere quod non sit in aliqua eius specie. Si

igitur anima Christi fuit in genere animaesensitivae ratione carentis, oportet quod

contineretur sub aliqua specierum eius: utpotequod fuerit in specie animae leonis aut alicuiusalterius belluae. Quod est omnino absurdum.

[3] Again, among the sensible souls themselveswhich lack reason there exists diversity by reasonof species. This appears from consideration ofthe irrational animals which differ from one

another in species; nonetheless, each of them hasits species according to its proper soul. Thus,

then, the sensitive soul lacking reason is, so tosay, one genus including within itself manyspecies. But nothing is in a genus which is not in

one of its species. If, then, the soul of Christ wasin the genus of sensitive soul lacking reason, it

must have been included in one of its species; forexample, it was in the species of lion soul, orsome other beast. And this is entirely absurd.

Amplius. Corpus comparatur ad animam sicutmateria ad formam, et sicut instrumentum adprincipale agens. Oportet autem materiam

proportionatam esse formae, et instrumentumprincipali agenti. Ergo secundum diversitatemanimarum oportet et corporum diversitatem

esse. Quod et secundum sensum apparet: namin diversis animalibus inveniuntur diversae

dispositiones membrorum, secundum quodconveniunt diversis dispositionibus animarum.Si ergo in Christo non fuit anima qualis estanima nostra, nec etiam membra habuisset sicut

sunt membra humana.

[4] The body, moreover, is compared to the soulas matter to form, and as instrument to principalagent. But the matter must be proportionate to the

form, and the instrument to the principal agent.Therefore, consequent on the diversity of souls,there must be a diversity of bodies. And this is

sensibly evident, for in diverse animals one findsdiverse dispositions of the members, in which

they concord with the diverse dispositions of thesouls. Therefore, if in Christ there was not a soulsuch as our soul is, neither would He have hadmembers like the human members.

Praeterea. Cum secundum Apollinarem verbumDei sit verus Deus, ei admiratio competere nonpotest: nam ea admiramur quorum causamignoramus. Similiter autem nec admiratioanimae sensitivae competere potest: cum adanimam sensitivam non pertineat sollicitari de

cognitione causarum. In Christo autemadmiratio fuit, sicut ex Evangeliis probatur:

dicitur enim Matth. 8-10, quod audiens Iesus

verba centurionis miratus est. Oportet igitur,praeter divinitatem verbi et animam sensitivam,

in Christo aliquid ponere secundum quod

[5] There is more. Since, according toApollinaris, the Word of God is true God.wonder cannot be seemly in Him, for we wonderat those things whose cause we ignore. But, inthe same way, wonder cannot be fitting for thesensitive soul, since solicitude for the knowledge

of causes does not belong to the sensitive soul.But there was wonder in Christ; so one proves

from the Gospels. It says in Matthew (8:10) that

Jesus heard the words of the centurion andmarveled. One must, then, in addition to the

divinity of the Word and His sensitive soul put in


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admiratio ei competere possit, scilicet mentemhumanam.

Christ that which can make wonder seemly inHim; namely, a human mind.

Manifestum est igitur ex praedictis quod in

Christo verum corpus humanum et vera animahumana fuit. Sic igitur quod Ioannes dicit,verbum caro factum est, non sic intelligiturquasi verbum sit in carnem conversum; nequesic quod verbum carnem solam assumpserit; autcum anima sensitiva, sine mente; sed secundumconsuetum modum Scripturae, ponitur pars prototo, ut sic dictum sit, verbum caro factum est,ac si diceretur, verbum homo factum est; nam etanima interdum pro homine ponitur inScriptura, dicitur enim Exod. 1-5, erant omnesanimae quae egressae sunt de femore Iacob

septuaginta, similiter etiam caro pro totohomine ponitur, dicitur enim Isaiae 40-5,

videbit omnis caro pariter quod os dominilocutum est. Sic igitur et hic caro pro totohomine ponitur, ad exprimendam humanae

naturae infirmitatem, quam verbum Deiassumpsit.

[6] Manifestly, therefore, from the aforesaid

there was in Christ a human body and a truehuman soul. Thus, therefore, Johns saying(1:14), The Word was made flesh, is not thus tobe understood, as though the Word has beenconverted into flesh; or as though the Word hasassumed the flesh only; or with a sensitive soulwithout a mind; but after Scriptures usualmanner the part is put for the whole, so that onesays: The Word was made man. Soul issometimes used in place of man in Scripture;Exodus (1:5) says: And all the souls that cameout of Jacobs thigh were seventy; in the same

way, also, flesh is used for the whole man;Isaiah (40:5) says: All flesh together shall see

that the mouth of the Lord has spoken. Thus,then, flesh is here used for the whole man,also, to express the weakness of the human

nature which the Word of God assumed.

Si autem Christus humanam carnem ethumanam animam habuit, ut ostensum est,manifestum est animam Christi non fuisse ante

corporis eius conceptionem. Ostensum est enimquod humanae animae propriis corporibus nonpraeexistunt. Unde patet falsum esse Origenis

dogma, dicentis animam Christi ab initio, antecorporales creaturas, cum omnibus aliisspiritualibus creaturis creatam et a verbo Dei

assumptam, et demum, circa fines saeculorum,pro salute hominum carne fuisse indutam.

[7] But, if Christ had human flesh and a humansoul, as was shown, it is plain that there was nosoul of Christ before His bodys conception. For

it was shown that human souls do not pre-existtheir proper bodies. Hence is clear the falsity ofthat tenet of Origen, who said that in the

beginning, before all bodily creatures, the soul ofChrist was created with all other spiritualcreatures and assumed by the Word of God, and

that finally, toward the end of the ages, for menssalvation it was endowed with flesh.

text comment - summa contra gentiles, book iv, chapter 32 and 33

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