thayer vietnam: strategic partnerships and international security cooperation

7/30/2019 Thayer Vietnam: Strategic Partnerships and International Security Cooperation

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Vietnam on the Road to Global Integration:

Forging Strategic Partnerships ThroughInternational Security Cooperation

Carlyle A. Thayer

Paper to International Relations Panel

Fourth Vietnam Studies Conference

Vietnam Academy of Social Sciences and

Vietnam National University

Hanoi, November 2630, 2012


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Vietnam on the Road to Global Integration:

Forging Strategic Partnerships Through International Security Cooperation

Carlyle A. Thayer1

[inProceedings of the 4th

International Vietnamese Studies Conference]

Introduction

In 1991 the Seventh National Congress of the Vietnam Communist Party (VCP) called for

Vietnam to diversify and multilateralise economic relations with all countries and

economic organizations... and become the friend of all countries in the world

community, and struggle for peace, independence and development. In the more than

two decades since 1991 Vietnam has achieved notable success in achieving these goals.

Most foreign commentary has focused on Vietnams economic integration with the

global economy and the development of Vietnams bilateral political relations with

former foes. Little attention has been focused on the interrelationship between the

economic and political goals, on the one hand, the defence and security goals on theother.

This paper focuses on the new hierarchy in Vietnams foreign relations embodied in the

terms strategic partnership and strategic cooperative partnership. Particular attention is

paid to developments after the Eleventh National Party Congress held in 2011. The

Eleventh Congress set the goal of expanding Vietnams international defence and

security cooperation as one of its major objectives.

The paper is divided into two parts and a conclusion. Part one considers the eight states

that have already been classified as strategic partners: the Russian Federation (2001),

Japan (2006), India (2007) Peoples Republic of China (2008), Republic of Korea (2009),Spain (2009), United Kingdom (2010) and Germany (2011).

2Each of these case studies

provides a brief overview of bilateral relations leading to the formal declaration of a

strategic partnership, the main components of the strategic partnership, and defence

cooperation. Part two examines the cases of three countries with whom Vietnam has

comprehensive relations but has not yet formally established strategic partnerships

Australia, the United States and France.

1Emeritus Professor, The University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy,

Canberra. Email: [email protected]. Revised January 30, 2013.

2Vietnam has two other more restricted strategic partnerships, one with the Netherlands on climatechange adaptation and water management (October 2010), and the other with Denmark on global climate

change, energy, environment and green economic growth (November 2012). On January 21, 2013, after

this paper was presented, Vietnam and Italy became formal strategic partners.


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Part I. The New Hierarchy in Vietnams Foreign Relations

Russian Federation

From Strategic Partnership to Comprehensive Strategic Partnership

The foundation for Vietnams current strategic partnership with the Russian Federationis based on their close bilateral relations since they exchanged diplomatic relations in

1950, and more particularly, after 1954 when the Democratic Republic of Vietnam was

established in North Vietnam. Vietnam and the Soviet Union formed an alliance in all

but name in November 1978 when they agreed to a twentyfive year Treaty of

Friendship and Cooperation.3

The Soviet Union collapsed in late 1991 and relations went into the doldrums. In 1994

the two sides reset their relationship on a more equal footing by signing a Treaty on

Principles of Friendly Relations. Important developments took place in August 1998 with

the signing of a Joint Statement and in September 2000 with an agreement to step up

cooperation between enterprises, and to promote economic, scientific, technical andcultural cooperation between Vietnamese provinces and their Russian counterparts.

The most important bilateral mechanism is the decadesold VietnamRussia Inter

governmental Committee for Economic, Commercial, Scientific and Technical Co

operation which meets regularly to review progress and lay out future cooperation.

When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991 Moscow pressed Vietnam for a repayment of

debts totaling US $1.7 billion. Relations were strained for nearly nine years as a result of

haggling over the conversion rate for Vietnams ruble debt. In September 2000, Vietnam

finally agreed to acquit its debts over a twentythree year period through a combination

of hard currency payments, goods and services, and investment in joint enterprises.

Bilateral relations were further strained when Vietnam pressed Russia to pay an annualrent of US $300 million for continued access to Cam Ranh Bay. Russia declined and

withdrew.

Once the debt issue was settled Moscow and Hanoi raised their relationship to a

strategic partnership in March 2001 on the occasion of President Vladimir Putins visit to

Vietnam. This agreement set out broadranging cooperation including the development

of economiccommercial, scientifictechnical and investment ties, Russian support for

the development of Vietnams energy sector and cooperation in chemistry, mechanical

engineering, metallurgy electronics, agriculture, communications, science and

technology, culture, and education. Article 8 provided for military cooperation; it stated,

The two parties will strengthen their cooperation in military supplies to meetVietnam's and Russia's security demands and not to oppose any third country.

Since 2001, bilateral relations have been constrained by the poor state of the Russian

3For background see: Ramesh Thakur and Carlyle A. Thayer, Soviet Relations with India and Vietnam,

19451992 (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1993).


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economy. Prior to 2008 the strategic partnership had very thin underpinnings. 4 Since

then Russia has regained political stability and its economy has been bolstered by the

development of vast oil and gas reserves. Russia now seeks to exploit the market

opportunities in fast growing Vietnam and the transport links between Vietnam and the

Russian Far East. In brief, the bear is back.

There are eight major components of the strategic partnership: politicaldiplomatic,

military equipment and technology, oil and gas cooperation, energy cooperation for

hydro and nuclear power, trade and investment, science and technology, education and

training, and culture and tourism.

PoliticalDiplomatic. Political calculations play a role for both countries. Russias

economic recovery has emboldened it to play a larger role in AsiaPacific affairs.

Vietnam has acted as a bridge in Russias dialogue relations with the Association of

Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and a facilitator of Russian membership in the Asia

Europe Meeting process as well as East Asia Forum. The two countries exchanged visits

by state presidents in 2010.Oil and Gas Cooperation. In 1981, Vietnam and Russia formed Vietsovpetro, an oil and

gas joint venture. Cooperation in this area has steadily expanded to include exploration,

exploitation, transport and processing of oil and natural gas. Vietsovpetro has expanded

its operations from southern Vietnams continental shelf to the Gulf of Tonkin and to

Russia itself. Vietsovpetro has been Russias most profitable enterprise and the joint

venture has been extended to 2030. Further, Vietnam and Russia have agreed to

facilitate the operations of other joint ventures such as Rusvietpetro, Gazpromviet and

Vietgazprom to expand oil and gas exploration and exploitation activities to third

countries.

Other Energy Cooperation. Russia also cooperates with Vietnam in building upVietnams coal mining and hydroelectricity sectors. Russian equipment and specialists

are involved in a number of hydroelectric projects in southern and central Vietnam.

Russia has agreed to give Vietnam a soft loan of US $10.5 billion to build its first nuclear

power plant, Ninh Thuan 1.

On July 27, 2012, President Truong Tan Sang met with his Russian counterpart President

Vladimir Putin in the resort city of Sochi. The two leaders issued a Joint Statement

raising their relations to a comprehensive strategic partnership. The Joint Statement

upheld the status quo in the South China Sea by reiterating that territorial disputes

should be resolved by peaceful means without the use of force or the threat to use

force based on international law including the United Nations Convention on Law of theSea. Both also agreed to include regional security on the agenda of the East Asia

Summit.

4For a Vietnamese overview consult: Vu Dinh Hoe and Nguyen Hoang Giap, Hop tac chien luoc VietNga:

Nhung quan diem, thuc trang va trien vong (Hanoi: Nha XuatBan Chinh Tri Quoc Gia, 2008);.


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Economic Relations. Prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union, Moscow provided massive

assistance to Vietnam including over 300 projects and enterprises (mining, construction,

agriculture, cash crops, chemical industry etc.). These projects and enterprises were

built with Sovietmanufactured equipment and parts. This legacy has provided a basis

for revived commercial cooperation especially Russias provision of spare parts and

technical advice on modernization. Trade and investment are both growing but theoverall figures are modest. Bilateral trade reached US $1.8 billion in 2009 with

Vietnamese exports accounting for US $415 million.

In 2011, twoway trade grew slightly to US $2 billion. Both sides expect that twoway

trade will grow to $5 billion in 2015 and $10 billion in 2020. Russia ranks twentythird on

the table of countries and territories investing in Vietnam.

Negotiations are underway for a free trade agreement in goods, services and

investment with the Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan Customs Union. Russian companies

are reluctant to accept letters of credit from Vietnam and many tariff and nontariff

barriers will have to be removed.Security Cooperation

Military Equipment and Technology. Russian arms sales to Vietnam are perhaps the

largest and most significant component of the strategic partnership. Vietnam's armed

forces are dependent on Sovietera spare parts and equipment in such key areas as: air

force, navy, armour and antiaircraft defence. Between 1993 and 2001 Russia sold to

Vietnam Su27SK and Su27UB Flanker jet aircraft, four radars, two missile attack

corvettes, and other military equipment.

Since 2008, the Vietnam Peoples Army (VPA) navy has taken delivery of two Gepard

class guided missile frigates and four Svetlyakclass fast patrol boats. The navy alsoprocured forty Yakhont/SSN26 and some four hundred Kh35 Uran/SSN25 antiship

missiles. The Yakhonts are the export versions of Onik and are part of the Bastion

coastal defence system. VPA airdefences force took delivery of two batteries of S

300PMU1 surfacetoair systems, two hundred 9M311/SA19 Grison surface to air

missiles, four Kolchnya air defence search radars and three VERA passive radio locators.

In 201012, the air force acquired twenty Su30MK2V combat aircraft armed with Kh

59MK antiship cruise missiles; it also procured one hundred R73 (AA11 Archer) short

range airtoair missiles. The army took delivery of two batteries of the K300P Bastion

coastal defence missiles.

Today the Russian Federation remains Vietnams largest provider of big ticket militaryequipment and technology. Notable future acquisitions include six Kiloclass

conventional fast attack submarines (SSK), Vietnams largest arms procurement package

from Russia. In 2008, Vietnam and Russia reached an agreement in principle on the sale

six Project 636M Kiloclass submarines. During 2008 Vietnams defense minister and

state president made separate visits to Moscow to clinch the deal. In 2009 Russian

industry sources went public. On April 24, Vladimir Aleksandrov, the general director of


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Admiralteiskie Verfi (Admiralty Shipyard) in St. Petersburg, announced that his company

had been identified to execute a contract for six Improved Kiloclass Project 636

submarines. The submarines were priced at US $300350 million per unit or US $1.82.1

billion in total.

The formal contract to purchase the six Kilos was signed in Moscow by the Russian arms

exporter, Rosoboronexport, and the Vietnamese Ministry of National Defense in

December 2009. The signing was witnessed by President Vladimir Putin and Prime

Minister Nguyen Tan Dung. Admiralty Shipyards began construction of the submarines

with the first keellaying ceremony on August 24, 2010. The first Kilo was launched on

August 28, 2012 and the second on December 28 , 2012. Both are schduled for deliverey

to Vietnam in August 2013.

The Kilos will likely be armed with heavy torpedoes (5356 or TEST 76) and antiship

missiles (3M54E or 3M54E1). In July 2011, Russian industry sources confirmed that

Vietnam will take delivery of the Novator KlubS (SSN27) antiship cruise missile, an

advanced capability with a range of around 300km. Vietnams Defence Minister said in

August 2011 that he expects to deploy a modern submarine fleet by 20162017.

The RussiaVietnam submarine contract also included provisions for in addition to the

delivery of the six submarines crew training and the construction of an onshore

maintenance facility. In March 2010, Vietnam formally requested Russian assistance in

constructing a submarine servicing facilities at Cam Ranh Bay . This total cost of the Kilo

purchase is now estimated at US$3.2 billion due to the costs of procuring armaments

and the construction of service and maintenance facilities at Cam Ranh Bay. Russia and

Vietnam plan to coproduce antiship cruise missiles and Vietnam is expected to order

more Su30 Sukhoi multirole jet fighters.

In October 2012, Senior Lt. Gen. Do Ba Ty, VPA Chief of the General Staff and DeputyMinister of National Defence made an official visit to Russia for discussions with General

Makarov Egorovich, his counterpart. The two sides agreed to enhance cooperation in

professional military education and military technology.

Vietnam prefers a multipolar world as it seeks to develop relations with all the major

powers. Developing a comprehensive strategic partnership with Russia is part of this

larger strategy. Russia does not seek to balance against the United States so much as re

establish itself as a major player in the AsiaPacific.

Japan

Strategic Partnership

Japan and Vietnam formally established diplomatic relations on September 21, 1973.

Vietnams bilateral relations with Japan rapidly evolved over the period 200406. In

2004 their foreign ministers agreed to a Joint Statement Toward a Higher Sphere of

Enduring Partnership. Two years later, on October 19, 2006, Prime Ministers Shinzo Abe

and Nguyen Tan Dung issued a Joint Statement Toward a Strategic Partnership for Peace


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and Prosperity in Asia.5 This document was comparatively modest and called for

frequent highlevel visits, exchanges of views, and the establishment of a ministerial

level Joint Cooperation Committee (JCC). The JCC met for the first time in May 2007.

HighLevel Visits. Prime Minister Abe paid a reciprocal visit to Hanoi in November 2006.

In November 2007 President Nguyen Minh Triet became the first Vietnamese president

to make an official visit to Japan. Triet held discussions with Prime Minister Yasuo

Fukuda. They issued a Joint Statement that included a fortyfour point Agenda Toward a

Strategic Partnership between Japan and Vietnam. The Agenda was divided into seven

substantive areas of cooperation: exchanges, cooperation in policy dialogue, security

and defence; comprehensive economic partnership; improvement of the legal system

and administrative reforms; science and technology; climate change, environment,

natural resources and technology; mutual understanding between the peoples of the

two countries; and cooperation in the international arena.

Point 4 of the Agenda addressed defence exchanges; it noted that the PoliticoMilitary/MilitaryMilitary Dialogues had promoted defence exchanges including staff

talks and cooperation military education. The Agenda stated, the two sides express

their willingness to further promote the defense relations by continued exchanges of

military delegations, including highlevel defence officials visits and naval goodwill visits

by the Japan Maritime SelfDefense Force.

On July 26, 2008 Japanese Foreign Minister Komura Masahiko attended the 2 nd

VietnamJapan JCC meeting in Hanoi.

In April 2009, VCP Secretary General Nong Duc Manh undertook a fourday trip to Japan

where he met with Prime Minister Taro Aso. The two leaders reaffirmed their

commitment to the October 2006 declaration Towards the Strategic Partnership for

Peace and Prosperity in Asia and the December 2007 Cooperation Programme

Towards the Strategic Partnership between Vietnam and Japan. It was agreed that the

Joint Cooperation Committee would meet annually. The two leaders also agreed to hold

a Strategic Partnership Dialogue at deputy foreign minister level and exchanges on

security and defence by senior officials.6

The VietnamJapan JCC held its third meeting in Tokyo on January 17, 2010. Deputy

Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Pham Gia Khiem was hosted by Foreign Minister

Katsuya Okada. The agenda included strengthening economic, cultural and science and

5For a concise overview consult: Tsuboi Yoshiharu, JapanVietnam Strategic Partnership, Paper to the

4th International Vietnamese Studies Conference, cosponsored by the Vietnam Academy of Social

Sciences and Vietnam National University, Hanoi, Vietnam, November 2630, 2012.

6Takayuki Ogasawara, The Prospects for a Strategic Partnership Between Japan and Vietnam.AJISS

Commentary, No. 124, June 16, 2011, 2. AJISS is a an acronym for the Association of Japanese Institutes of

Strategic Studies.


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technology relations and cooperation in multilateral venues such as the Asia Pacific

Economic Cooperation forum.

Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung made a threeday working visit to Tokyo in May 2009.

Prime Minister Dung returned to Japan in late Octoberearly November 2011 on an

official visit. He met with Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda and the two issued a JointStatement on the Action Plan under the Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity

in Asia. The two prime ministers agreed to conduct highlevel visits on an annual basis,

double twoway trade by 2020, and enhance cooperation in the fields of energy, natural

resources and climate change.

In January 2013, newly reelected Prime Minister Shinzo Abe visited Vietnam first in a

threenation swing through Southeast Asia. Abe and Prime Minister Dung reiterated

their opposition to changing the status quo in the South China Sea by force and agreed

to deepen bilateral security cooperation. Prime Minister Abe also pledged $500 million

in loans to Vietnam to finance infrastructure and construct thermal power plants.

Economic Relations. JapanVietnam twoway trade grew steadily from US $8.5 billion in

2005, US $10 billion in 2006, US $12 billion in 2007, to US $17 billion 2008. Trade

slumped during the Global Financial Crisis to US $12.2 billion in 2009 before rising to US

$16 billion in 2010. In 2009 Japan was Vietnams second largest trade partner after

China and second largest importer after the United States.

Japan is the largest contributor of development assistance to Vietnam. In Fiscal Year

2009 Japan contributed US $1.56 billion. Japan was also the third largest investor in

Vietnam with a total registered capital of US $16 billion invested in 735 projects.

In May 2008, Japan pledged to assist Vietnam in carrying out its nuclear energy strategy

including drafting a Law on Nuclear Power and developing its first nuclear power plant.

In December 2008, Vietnam and Japan signed the VietnamJapan Economic Partnership

Agreement covering goods, services, investment, business environment improvement,

labour and technical cooperation. Discussions on the agreement began in January 2007

and were completed in October 2008 after nine rounds.

Security Cooperation

HighLevel Visits. The Chief of Staff of the Japan Ground SelfDefense Force, General

Tsutomi Mori, visited Hanoi on March 6, 2007 for discussions with his counterpart, the

Chief of the VPA General Staff Lt. General Pham Hong Loi. The two sides discussedcooperation in exchanges of delegations, maritime salvage, search and rescue, and

training in information technology

Japans Deputy Defence Minister Nobuo Kishi visited Hanoi in May 2009 for discussions

with Deputy Minister for National Defence Lt. Gen. Nguyen Chi Vinh. The bilateral talks

focused regional security issues, bilateral defence cooperation, exchanges of military

delegations, and search and rescue and disaster relief. In January 2010, Japans Deputy


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Defence Minister Kimito Nakae held discussions with his counterpart, Lt. Gen. Nguyen

Chi Vinh in Hanoi.

Japans Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa paid an official threeday visit to Vietnam in

October 2010 coincident with the 1st Strategic Partnership Dialogue at deputy foreign

minister level (see below) and the inaugural meeting of the ASEAN Defence MinistersMeeting Plus (ADMM Plus).

On September 15, 2011, during a visit to Hanoi by General Shigeru Iwasaki, Chief of Staff

of the Japan Air SelfDefense Force, Japan and Vietnam agreed to cooperate in training

and exchanges in military aviation with a focus on air defence. General Iwasaki was

hosted by Lt. Gen. Nguyen Quoc Khanh, Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the

Vietnam Peoples Army.

In late September 2011, Deputy Minister for National Defence, Lt. Gen. Nguyen Chi

Vinh, attended the 3rd JapanASEAN Deputy Defence Ministerial Meeting in Tokyo.

General Vinh held bilateral discussions with his counterpart Deputy Defence MinisterKimito Nakae on the sidelines of this meeting.

Vietnam Minister of National Defence, General Phung Quang Thanh, paid an official

visit to Japan from October 2328, 2011 for a meeting with his counterpart Defense

Minister Yasuo Ichikawa. Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea was high on the

agenda. The two ministers signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to enhance

defence cooperation including holding regular defence talks at deputy minister level,

reciprocal ministerial visits, and exchanges between the JSDF and the VPA, and

cooperation in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR). In November 2011

Japan and Vietnam agreed to hold defence talks at deputy defence minister level.

Agreement was reached during the fourday to Japan visit by Prime Minister NguyenTan Dung hosted by Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda.

In May 2012, General Shigeru Iwasaki, Chief of the Joint Staff of Japans SelfDefense

Force visited Hanoi for discussions with General Do Ba Ty, VPA Chief of Staff. Their

agenda included: promoting national defence relations, exchanges of highlevel visits,

hosting national defence policy dialogues, personnel training, information technology,

military medicine, counterterrorism, and HA/DR.

Defence Dialogue. Japan and Vietnam held their 5th

Diplomatic and Defence Dialogue at

senior official level in Tokyo in November 2008. In April 2010, Japan and Vietnam held

their 6th

Diplomatic and Defence Dialogue at senior official level in Hanoi.

In December 2010, Japan and Vietnam held their 1st

Strategic Partnership Dialogue in

Hanoi. Japans Deputy Foreign Minister Koro Besssho was hosted by his counterpart, Ho

Xuan Son. The 2nd

Strategic Partnership Dialogue was held in Tokyo in December 2011.

Naval Ship Visits. On January 23, 2007, Japan and Vietnam conducted a joint search and

rescue operation off the coast of Da Nang in central Vietnam. Japan Coast Guard Patrol


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Vessel Yashima PLH22 participated in the exercise and paid a fourday visit to Da Nang.

The exercise involved a simulated rescue at sea by ships and helicopters. Rear Admiral

Osanai, Deputy Director of the Japan Coast Guard, represented Japan while Lt. Gen.

Nguyen Duc Soat, Deputy Chairman of the National Committee for Search and Rescue,

represented Vietnam.

Three JMSDF destroyers, Yamayuki, Masuyukiand Hamayuki, made a fiveday goodwill

visit to Ho Chi Minh City from March 37, 2008.

India7


Vietnams diplomatic relations with India date to the 1950s when India established

Consulate General in Hanoi in 1954 and Vietnam opened a Consulate General in New

Delhi (1956). Full diplomatic relations were established on January 7, 1972. Since 1982,

India and Vietnam have managed their bilateral relations under the umbrella of the

Joint Committee for Economic, Cultural, Scientific and Technological Cooperation.8 TheJoint Commission draws up an Action Plan every three years. A major step up in bilateral

relations took place in May 2003 when the two governments issued a Joint Declaration

on The Comprehensive Cooperation Framework between India and Vietnam.

In July 2007, Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung made his second official visit to India for

discussions with his counterpart. The two prime ministers conducted an indepth review

of their bilateral relations with a view to deepening their partnership. The result was the

adoption of a 33point IndiaVietnam Joint Declaration on Strategic Partnership in

November 2007. The Joint Declaration on Strategic Partnership mapped out

cooperation in five major areas: political, defence and security cooperation; closer

economic cooperation and commercial engagement; science and technologycooperation, cultural and technical cooperation and multilateral and regional

cooperation.

Economic Relations. Twoway trade between India and Vietnam rose from US $2.68

billion in 2010 to US $3.9 billion in 2011. Both sides have set the goal of raising twoway

trade to US $7 billion by 2015. Indian companies have invested a total of US $868

million. Of this amount, US $400 million is invested in Vietnams oil and gas sector,

including US $225 million by ONGCVidesh (OVL) in blocks in the South China Sea.

HighLevel Visits. In November 2008, President Pratibha Devisigh Patil paid a state visit

to Vietnam and was received by President Nguyen Minh Triet. The two presidentsagreed to enhance their strategic partnership by increasing cooperation in politics,

7For background see: Ramesh Thakur and Carlyle A. Thayer, Soviet Relations with India and Vietnam,19451992 (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1993).

8The fourteenth meeting of the Joint Commission was held in Hanoi in 2009.


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economics, trade, investment, agriculture, information technology, health care,

education, security and national defence.

President Truong Tan San paid a return visit to India from October 1113, 2011. At the

conclusion of discussions the two presidents issued a Joint Statement that noted there

still remains considerable potential for cooperation and agreed to strongly enhance thecomprehensive strategic partnership between the two countries based on the key pillars

of politics, defence, security, economic, cultural and H.R.D. [human resource

development] cooperation. During President Sangs meeting with Defence Secretary

Shashi Kant Sharma and Minister of State for Defence Pallam Raju he requested Indian

assistance in four areas: submarine training, pilot conversion training to fly the Su30,

modernization of Nha Trang port, and the transfer of mediumsized warships. Indian

defence officials reaffirmed that India would continue to assist Vietnam in military

training, human resource development and information sharing.


Political, Defence and Security Cooperation. The November 2007 Joint Declaration on

Strategic Partnership set out six areas for political, defence and security cooperation:

First, India and Vietnam agreed to inaugurate a Strategic Dialogue at vice ministerial

between their foreign ministries. Prior to the declaration on strategic partnership, India

and Vietnam conducted their bilateral relations through the IndiaVietnam Joint

Commission and the IndiaVietnam Foreign Office Consultations.

Second, the two sides agreed to continue the existing institutional frameworks for

cooperation with a future emphasis on defence supplies, joint projects, training

cooperation and intelligence exchanges.

Third, the two sides agreed to enhance contacts and exchange visits between their

defence and security establishments.

Fourth, in light of shared maritime interests, the two sides agreed to enhance

cooperation in capacity building, technical assistance and information sharing between

relevant agencies with a particular attention to security of sea lanes, antipiracy,

prevention of pollution, and search and rescue.

Fifth, the two sides resolved to strengthen bilateral cooperation to combat terrorism

and to promote cooperation in cyber security. Sixth, the two sides agreed to cooperate

to address nontraditional security issues including drug trafficking, natural disasters,climate change, energy security, HIV/AIDS, avian influenza and other epidemics

HighLevel Visits. On December 17, 2007 defense cooperation was stepped up as a

result of the visit by Defense Minister A. K. Anthony to Hanoi. Minister Anthony met his

counterpart, General Phung Quang Thanh. The two ministers agreed to a MOU on

defence cooperation covering national defence, navy, air defence and training. Anthony

announced India would transfer 5,000 spare parts to assist Vietnam in maintaining its


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Petyaclass ships and that India would send a team to Vietnam to assist in training for

UN peacekeeping operations. India also has assisted Vietnam develop its antisubmarine

warfare capabilities and provided professional military education and training to

Vietnamese defence personnel. In September 2009, a total of fortynine Vietnamese

officers attended courses sponsored by the Indian Navy and Army, and sixtyfour

Vietnamese attended English language courses.

On February 26, 2008, Admiral Sureesh Mehta, Chief of the Army Staff Committee, held

discussions in Hanoi with Senior Lt. Gen. Nguyen Khac Nghien, Chief of Staff of the

Vietnam Peoples Army.

In October 2009, a defence delegation let by Lt. Gen. Nguyen Thinh, head of the

Defence Research Centre, visited India for discussions with the Defence Research and

Development Organisation. General Thinh reportedly was interested in technical

assistance in producing cruise missiles. In November 2009, Defence Minister General

Phung Quang Thanh visited India.

Lt. Gen. Pham Hong Loi, VPA Deputy Chief of Staff hosted the visit by the Chief of the

Indian Army, General Vijay Kumar Singh to Hanoi from July 2629, 2010. General Singhs

agenda included cooperation in reciprocal language training, humanitarian assistance,

search and rescue, and sharing of experiences in United Nations peacekeeping missions.

This was the first visit by Indias Army Chief in fifteen years.

Defense Minister A. K. Anthony returned to Hanoi in 2010 to attend the inaugural

meeting of the ADMM Plus held in October. During his visit he held bilateral discussions

with his counterpart, General Thanh. The two ministers agreed to implement a MOU on

defence cooperation including exchange visits, joint training in mountain and jungle

warfare, naval ship repair and maintenance, and search and rescue. India agreed toassist Vietnam in training its forces for UN peacekeeping, establish a foreign language

centre, and exchange information on their navies and air forces. Vietnam offered to

provide facilities to repair, maintain and fuel Indian naval ships.

In mid2011 Vice Admiral Nguyen Van Hien, Chief of Naval Staff, made a visit to India to

solicit assistance in constructing naval ships. Press reports indicated that private

shipyards would be awarded contracts to produce Offshore Patrol Vessels and Fast

Attack Craft. Hien received assurances that India would continue to train Vietnamese

naval personnel and help Vietnam maintain Russian equipment. India also agreed in

principle to sell Vietnam Brahmos antiship missiles and possibly Privthi surface to

surface missiles.9 In September 2011, at the 14th meeting of the IndiaVietnam JointCommission, External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna and Foreign Minister Pham Binh

Minh agreed to give greater content to bilateral relations in defence and security,

9Saurav Jha, Vietnam, India Boost Naval Ties to Counter China, World Policy Review, July 29, 2012, 38

39.


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including a Vietnamese request for Indian assistance in training naval crews for its

future Kiloclass submarines.

Defence Strategy Dialogue. On October 15, 2009, India and Vietnam held their 1 st

Defence Strategy Dialogue and 4th Political Consultative Meeting in New Delhi at deputy

foreign minister level. The two deputy minister discussed cooperation in politicalrelations, economics, trade, investment, credit, oil and gas, science and technology, IT,

communication, national security, education and culture.

India and Vietnam held their 2nd Defence Strategy Dialogue and 5th Political Consultation

in Hanoi in August 2011. The agenda included political relations, economics, trade,

investment, culture and education, national defence and security, and training in

advanced technology and human resources.

India and Vietnam held their 3rd Defence Strategy Dialogue at deputy defence minister

level from November 2729, 2007. Deputy Defence Minister Vijay Singh hosted Senior

Lt. Gen. Nguyen Huy Hieu. The two sides discussed experiences in combating terrorism,maritime security, border management and control, and the increasing role of the state

and political and social organizations in security affairs. India and Vietnam held their 4th

Defence Strategy Dialogue on October 10, 2008 and their 5 th Defence Strategy Dialogue

at deputy defence minister level in New Delhi from June 2325, 2010.

The 6th

IndiaVietnam Defence Strategy Dialogue at deputy defence minister level was

held in Hanoi on September 14, 2011. Agreement was reached on continuing to

exchange delegations and information, training and information technology. They also

discussed measures to boost cooperation between their navies, air forces, infantry and

defence industries. The most recent IndiaVietnam Defence Strategy Dialogue, the

seventh, was held in New Delhi on September 28, 2012. Vietnam will host the 8th

Defence Strategy Dialogue in 2013.

Naval Port Visits. Between 20082012, Indian naval ships made five goodwill visits to

Vietnam. The first visit took place in April 2008 when Indian naval ships, INS Kora and

INS Kirpan, called in at Haiphong. The Indian ships were led by Vice Admiral R. P. Suthan,

Flag Officer Commanding the Indian Eastern Naval command. Admiral Suthan was

received by the VPA Deputy Chief of Staff, General Tran Quang Khue. A year later, in

April 2009, two Indian naval ships made the second goodwill visit; INS Ranvirand INS

Mumbai, paid a friendship visit to Haiphong. In MayJune 2010, two Indian ships, INS

Kulish and INSJyoti, made a third port visit to Haiphong. In May 2011, two Indian naval

ships undertook the fourth visit; INS Delhiand INS Kirch, paid a port call to Ho Chi MinhCity led by Rear Admiral H.C.S. Bisht, Flag Officer Commanding the Eastern Fleet. On July

19, 2011 the INSAiravatcalled in at Nha Trang before proceeding to Haiphong (July 25

28) for Indias fifth ship visit. In May 2012, two India naval ships, INS Shivalikand INS

Karmuk, made the sixth friendship visit to Haiphong, while the INS Sudarshini, a training

ship, called in at Da Nang in late December 2012early January 2013.


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India and Vietnam have convergent security interests not the least of which is to

maximize their room for maneuver in dealing with China and other major powers within

their respective regions, South Asia and Southeast Asia. Indias relations with Vietnam,

as with other Southeast Asian states, provides a basis for a larger Indian role in East Asia

if not globally. Vietnams relations with India enhance its drive to avoid dependency on

any one major external power. Both share mutual benefits in the defense relationship.Indias sale of arms, equipment and spares enhance Vietnams ability to modernize its

armed forces and avoid complete dependency on Russia.

Peoples Republic of China

From Strategic Partnership to Strategic Cooperative Partnership

In March 1999, a summit meeting of the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)

and the VCP adopted a sixteencharacter guideline calling for longterm, stable, future

orientated, goodneighborly and allround cooperative relations. In 2000, a summit

meeting of state presidents from China and Vietnam codified their bilateral relations in

a Joint Statement for Comprehensive Cooperation in the New Century. This document

has served as the framework for longterm statetostate relations up to the present.

In 2006, in a major development, Vietnam and China set up a Joint Steering Committee

on Bilateral Cooperation at deputy prime ministerial level to coordinate all aspects of

their relationship. The Steering Committee meets on an annual basis alternating

between capital cities.10

In June 2008, following another summit of party leaders in Beijing, bilateral relations

were officially raised to that of strategic partners, and a year later this was upgraded to

a strategic cooperative partnership. As strategic partners China and Vietnam have

developed a dense network of party, state, defence and multilateral mechanisms tomanage their bilateral relations.

Vietnam and China hold irregular summit meetings of their party leaders. These

meetings provide the opportunity for wideranging discussions and an impetus for the

resolution of various outstanding issues. Partytoparty relations are cemented by the

frequent exchange of party delegations from Central Committee Departments,

administrative units, and specialists on socialist ideology. The VCP and CCP have also

conducted a series of seminars on ideology.

Partytoparty ties form an integral part of the bilateral relationship and provide a

conduit of interaction unique to relations between socialist states. For example, inFebruary 2011, immediately after Eleventh VCP National Congress, the new Secretary

General, Nguyen Phu Trong, dispatched a special envoy, Hoang Binh Quan, to Beijing.

Quan met with Hu Jintao, President and General Secretary of the CCP, and briefed him

10The first meeting was held in November 2006, the second in January 2008, the third in March 2009 and

the fourth in JuneJuly 2010.


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on the outcome of the party congress. Quan also extended an invitation to Hu and other

Chinese party and state leaders to visit Vietnam. In return, Hu extended an invitation to

Secretary General Trong to visit China.11 In deference to China, and in light of Chinese

assertiveness in the South China Sea, Trong made the first visit.

In October 2011, VCP Secretary General Nguyen Phu Trong visited Beijing for discussionswith his counterpart Hu Jintao. The Joint Statement issued after their discussions

included a paragraph on stepped up defence cooperation that read:

Fourthly, to promote indepth cooperation between the two armies, increase contact

between highranking army leaders of the two countries; continue to organise good

strategic dialogues at deputy ministerial level; accelerate the establishment of a

direct telephone line between the two defence ministries; increase cooperation in

personnel training and exchanges between junior officers; conduct trial joint patrols

along the land border at a convenient time; continue to hold joint naval patrols in the

Gulf of Tonkin; increase cooperation in such fields as mutual visits by the two

countries naval ships.

12

VCP Politburo member and Secretary of the VCP Central Committee, To Huy Rua, paid

an official visit to China from February 1420, 2012 at the invitation of the CCP Central

Committee. Rua held talks with Li Yuanchao, Politburo member and head of the CCP

Organisation Department, on personnel work, cadre training and planning. They agreed

to step up cooperation between their two party Organisation Departments and share

experience in human resource training to further strengthen the VietnamChina

comprehensive partnership. Rua also met with Le Changchun, permanent member of

the CCP Politburo.

Statetostate relations are structured through the Joint Steering Committee. On

September 6, 2011, China and Vietnam held the fifth annual meeting of their bilateralJoint Steering Committee in Hanoi. China was represented by State Councillor Dai

Bingguo who met with his counterpart Deputy Prime Minister Nguyen Thien Nhan.

In December 2011, Vice President Xi Jinping made an official visit to Hanoi and met with

all of Vietnams top party and state leaders. Xis visit was primarily a get to know you

visit as he is widely viewed as Hu Jintaos heir apparent. It was later revealed that Xi

warned each of the senior Vietnamese leaders whom he met to keep [their] distance

from the United States on the sensitive issue of territorial disputes in the South China

Sea.13

11Chinese president vows to further ties with Vietnam, Xinhua, 18 February 2011 and Chinas Hu Jintao

invites Nguyen Pho Trong, Voice of Vietnam News, 19 February 2011.

12Tuyen bo chung hai nuoc Viet Nam va Trung Quoc, Vietnam News Agency, October 15, 2011, point

4(iv).

13Kyodo, China warns Vietnam not to cozy up to U.S. on S. China Sea issue: sources, Mainichi, January

21, 2012


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In February 2012, Foreign Minister Pham Binh Minh made a fourday official visit to

China for discussions with his counterpart Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi. The two

ministers reviewed bilateral relations in all areas of cooperation and discussed measures

to enhance their comprehensive strategic partnership in the future. Minh held a

working session with Wang Jiarui, head of the CCP Central Committees International

Liaison Department, to promote relations between the VCP and CCP. Minh was alsoaccorded meetings with Zhou Yongkang, member of the CCP Politburo Standing

Committee and State Councillor Dai Bingguo.

In September 2012, Presidents Truong Tan Sang and Hu Jintao met on the sidelines of

the 20th APEC Summit in Vladivostok. Also that same month, Prime Minister Nguyen Tan

Dung and Vice Premier Xi Jinping took the opportunity of their attendance at the 9 th

ASEANChina Expo and the ChinaASEAN BusinessInvestment Summit in Nanning,

Guangxi to meet. Xi remarked that Dungs attendance show that the Vietnamese Party

and State attach importance to strengthening the comprehensive strategic partnership

between Vietnam and China. Xi also stressed, the Chinese Party, State and people

attach great importance to the relations with Vietnam and are ready together withVietnam to deepen their comprehensive strategic partnership. Dung invited Xi to visit

Vietnam after the conclusion of the 18th National Congress of the CCP.

Economic Relations. China is now Vietnams largest trading partner with twoway trade

estimated at $36.9 billion in November 2012. China supplies Vietnam with machinery,

refined oil and steel. In return, Vietnam supplies China with unrefined oil, coal and

rubber. The single most important issue in the trade relationship is the imbalance in

Chinas favor. In 2007, Vietnam had a trade gap of $9.1 billion with China. This figure has

continued to rise.14

Vietnams trade deficit reached $11.6 billion in 2008, $11.1 billion in

2009 and $12.6 billion in 2010 and $14.5 billion in November 2012.

Chinas trade surplus has figured at every highlevel summit in recent years. Party and

state leaders agree that efforts should be made to make it more balanced. But how?

The structure of Vietnamese exports had changed little over the years and no major

change is expected in the future. Vietnamese domestic manufacturers cannot produce

quality goods that are competitive in the Chinese market place. Restricting Chinese

imports is not a viable option.

Vietnams massive trade deficit with China must be placed in the context of Vietnams

current trade deficit of $19 billion with the rest of the world (2009). Vietnam needs

continued access to markets in the United States where it has a $13.1 billion surplus

(2011).

Vietnamese leaders have called for increased Chinese investment to mitigate the trade

imbalance. Although China has responded, the total amount of investment ($3 billion) is

modest when compared to other foreign investors. Bui Hong Phuc, former Ambassador

14Pham Huyen, Vietnam dizzy with trade gap with China, VietNamNet Bridge, December 29, 2010.


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to China, has suggested encouraging Chinese businessmen to set up a production base

in Vietnam to lower the amount of imports from China.15

15Pham Huyen, Inviting Chinese manufacturers to Vietam Why not?, VietNamNet Bridge, February 15,

2011.


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Defence Cooperation

There are three major components to Vietnams security cooperation with China:

exchange of highlevel visits, strategic defence and security dialogues, and naval port

visits. This section reviews China and Vietnam defence cooperation since 2008.

Highlevel Visits. Vietnams Defense Minister General Phung Quang Thanh visited Chinain April 2010. In October 2010, the Chinas defence minister General Minister Liang

Guanglie attended the inaugural ADMM Plus meeting in Hanoi. China agreed to join

Vietnam as cochair of the ADMM Plus Expert Working Group on Humanitarian

Assistance and Disaster Relief. The Political Commissar of the VPA Navy, Tran Thanh

Huyen, visited Beijing in November 2010.16

In April 2011, Senior Lieutenant General Guo Boxiong, vice chairman of Chinas Central

Military Commission, visited Hanoi at the invitation of General Phung Quang Thanh,

Minister of National Defence. Lt. Gen. Guo was also received by Prime Minister Nguyen

Tan Dung and party Secretary General Nguyen Phu Trong. Prime Minister Dung

proposed the two sides talk and seek fundamental and longlasting measures that bothsides are able to accept for the East Sea [South China Sea] issue 17 The joint press

communiqu issued after the conclusion of Guos visit outlined a number of cooperative

military activities, including increasing the scope of joint naval patrols in the Gulf of

Tonkin, but no mention was made of the South China Sea.18

In June 2011 the Chinese and Vietnamese defence ministers met on the sidelines of the

Shangrila Dialogue in Singapore and discussed South China Sea issues.

From September 1419, 2011, China hosted a visit by General Ngo Xuan Lich, head of

the VPAs General Political Department and member of the Central Military Party

Committee.19

General Lich held discussions with his counterpart, Li Jinai, who was also a

member of Chinas Central Military Commission. Their meeting focused on developing

ties between the two militaries. Significantly General Lich was also received by Vice

President Xi Jinping, the vice chairman of the Central Military Commission 20 and heir

apparent to the post of state president on the retirement of Hu Jintao in 2013.

16China, Vietnam Need to Enhance Cooperation: Senior Chinese Military Officer, Xinhua, November 23,

2010.

17Party Leaders Meeting with Chinese General, Vietnam News Agency, 14 April 2011.

18Li Qiong, China, Vietnam Issue Joint Press Communiqu on CMC Vice Chairman Guo Boxiongs Visit to

Vietnam, Xinhua, 17 April 2011.19

Doan can bo chinh tri quan su cap cao nuoc ta tham Trung Quoc, Vietnam TV, September 18, 2011

and Zhous Feng, Chinese defence official holds talks with Vietnamese counterpart, PLA Daily,

September 16, 2011.

20Pho chu tich Trung Quoc tiep doan quan su cap cao Viet Nam, Thanh Nien Online, September 18,

2011; Chinese vice president eyes enhanced relations with Vietnam, Xinhua, Beijing, September 16,

2011 and China, Vietnam pledge to enhance ties amid row in S China sea, Press Trust of India,

September 17, 2011.


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In October 2011, Defence Minister General Phung Quang Thanh accompanied party

Secretary General Nguyen Phu Trong to Beijing (see above). General Thanh met with his

counterpart, Senior Lt. General Liang Guanglie, to review their bilateral defence

relations. They noted that since 2003 the two sides signed five documents that provided

the legal basis for defence cooperation and relations between the PLA and VPA have

become a pillar of the comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership between thetwo parties and states. They also agreed that their two armies should exercise restraint

and caution in speech and action to avoid escalating the [South China Sea] issue

In April 2012, Senior Lt. Gen. Do Ba Ty, Deputy Minister of National Defence and VPA

Chief of Staff, led a highlevel delegation to China at the invitation of Senior Lt. Gen.

Chen Bingde, PLA Chief of Staff, to discuss future defence cooperation activities.

General Ty proposed opening direct communication between their two defence

ministries and effectively using the existing direct line between their two navies. The

two generals noted that bilateral defence relations have become a pillar of the

comprehensive strategic partnership between China and Vietnam. General Ty was also

received by Vice president Xi Jinping; both are members of their countrys respectiveCentral Military Commissions. Finally, General Ty visited the Shanghai Naval Base (East

Sea Fleet) and Shanghai Garrison.

Strategic Defence and Security Dialogues. Vietnam and China held their first Strategic

Defence and Security Dialogue in Hanoi on November 27, 2010.21 Vietnam was

represented by Deputy Defence Minister Lt. Gen. Nguyen Chi Vinh who hosted Senior Lt.

Gen. Ma Xiaotian, PLA Deputy Chief of the General Staff. At the conclusion of the

meeting both sides agreed to increase cooperation between their navies and border

guards, promote military science research and training. They also agreed to set up a hot

line between their respective defence ministries.22

China and Vietnam held their 2nd Strategic Defence and Security Dialogue in Beijing on

August 28, 2011 under the cochairmanship of Senior Lt. Gen. Ma and Lt. Gen. Vinh. The

two deputy ministers reached agreement to accelerate cooperation in exchanging

delegations, the early establishment of a defence hot line, and the expansion of both

short and longterm training. Both also agreed to step up the dissemination of

information among their armed forces to reinforce traditional friendship and practical

cooperation for mutual benefit. General Ma also agreed to share experience in UN

peacekeeping with Vietnam.

The third VietnamChina strategic defence dialogue took place in Hanoi on September 3,

2012 under the chairmanship of Vietnamese Deputy Minister of Defense, Senior Lt. Gen.

21ChinaVietnam boost defence cooperation. Voice of Vietnam News, November 28, 2010; Vietnamese

party, army senior officials meet with Chinese military delegation, Xinhua, November 28, 2010; and

Defence officials meet in dialogue with China, Viet Nam News, November 29 2010.

22Vietnam News Agency, ChinaVietnam boost defence cooperation, Voice of Vietnam News, November

28, 2010.


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Vinh, and Chinese Senior Lieutenant General Ma. According to Voice of Vietnam News

(September 3, 2012):

During the dialogue, both sides discussed regional and global issues that affect their

respective countries national security and defence, as well as plots by hostile forces

that threaten their revolutionary causes.

They also discussed measures to boost mutual understanding and promote defence

ties to reaffirm the fine traditional relationship between Vietnam and China, despite

the dispute in the East Sea, and dispel distorted arguments that threaten the

relationship between the two countries.

Joint Naval Patrols and Port Visits. In November 1991, as Vietnam and China were

normalizing their political relations, a Peoples Liberation ArmyNavy (PLAN) JiangweiII

guided missile frigate made the first visit by a Chinese warship to a Vietnamese port

since unification in 1975. The frigate visited Ho Chi Minh City. No further port calls were

made until November 2008. Subsequently, PLAN ships have made goodwill port visits in

August 2009, December 2010, and April 2012. In January 2013, three PLAN ships twoguided missile frigates and a replenishment ship stopped in Ho Chi Minh city for a five

day goodwill visit after completing their deployment to the Gulf of Aden.

In 2000, Vietnam and China reached agreement to delimit the Gulf of Tonkin and on

fisheries. In April 2006, the navies of both countries commenced joint patrols in the Gulf

of Tonkin and thirteen patrols have been conducted between then and June 2012.23

The

most recent joint patrols also included a Search and Rescue Exercise (SAREX) between

China and Vietnam and antipiracy exercises. In June 2009, in an historic first, two

Vietnamese naval ships made a visit to Zhanjiang port in Guangdong province in

Southwestern China. After the eleventh joint patrol was concluded, the Vietnamese

ships paid a visit to Zhanjiang, Guangdong, Vietnams second ever port call to China.24

Republic of Korea

Strategic Cooperative Partnership

Vietnam and the Republic of Korea established diplomatic relations on December 22,

1992. Seventeen years later, Presidents Nguyen Minh Triet and Lee Myungbak met in

Hanoi and agreed to raise their Comprehensive Partnership in the 21t Century to a

Strategic Cooperative Partnership.25 The two presidents committed themselves to

23Margie Mason, Vietnam and China hold joint naval patrol amid spat, Associated Press, June 21, 2011

and Agence France Presse, China, Vietnam hold joint sea patrols near disputed Spratlys, June 23, 2011.China and Vietnam have also conducted seven joint fishery patrols between 2007 and April 2012

24Vietnamese naval ships on friendly visit to China, Quan Doi Nhan Dan Online, June 22, 2011; China,

Vietnam engage in Joint naval patrols, Peoples Daily Online, June 22, 2011 and Vietnamese naval ships

wrap up visit to China, Quan Doi Nhan Dan Online, June 27, 2011.

25For an overview of the strategic cooperative partnership (doi tac hop tac chien luoc) see: Nguyen Hoang

Giap, Nguyen Thi Que and Nguyen Van Duong, Quan he Viet NamHan Quoc Tu Nam 1992 Den Nay va

Trien Vong Phat Trien Den Nam 2020 (Hanoi: Nha Xuat Ban Chinh Tri Quoc Gia, 2011), 62126.


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stepping up contacts and visits by high and seniorlevel officials and to establish a

strategic dialogue mechanism at deputy foreign minister level. The two presidents also

identified the following key areas for bilateral cooperation: politics and security, judicial

and consular relations, economics, trade, investment, development cooperation,

science and technology, environment and culture and education. Finally, it was agreed

to set up a joint working group to study the possibility of a Republic of KoreaVietnamFree Trade Agreement.

HighLevel Visits. President Truong Tan Sang paid an official visit to South Korea from

November 810, 2011. After discussions with his counterpart, President Lee Myungbak,

the two leaders issued a Joint Statement that promoted cooperation in the

development of Vietnams nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, climate change,

sustainable lowcarbon growth, and economic development.

Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung visited South Korea to attend the 2nd Nuclear Security

Summit. Dung held talks with his counterpart Kim Hwangsik on March 28. The two

leaders agreed to continue reciprocal highlevel visits, to boost diplomatic, security anddefence dialogues, develop closer economic linkages through trade and investment, and

continue preparations for a Free Trade Agreement. They also agreed to cooperate in

trade, industry, energy, construction and science and technology.

Economic Relations. Twoway trade between South Korea and Vietnam reached US $18

billion in 2011. South Korea ranks second among states and territories investing in

Vietnam. South Korea registered US $24 billion in capital investment in 3,000 projects.

The Republic of Korea also ranks second on the list of providers of development

assistance to Vietnam. In 2011 South Korea earmarked US $215 million for various

development projects in Vietnam.


HighLevel Visits. Deputy Minister of National Defence, Senior Lt. Gen. Nguyen Huy Hieu,

paid a working visit to South Korea from December 1218, 2009 at the invitation of the

Ministry of National Defense and Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA).

General Hieu held discussions with Deputy Defense Minister Chang Sooman and the

head of DAPA, Byun Mookyun. General Hieu also visited the Daewoo Shipbuilding and

Marine Engineering Company Ltd. and LIG Nex1 Company Ltd., an aerospace company,

to review agreements already underway.

South Koreas Minister of National Defense, Kim Tae Young, travelled to Vietnam inOctober 2010 to attend the inaugural meeting of the ADMM Plus and participate in an

official bilateral meeting with his Vietnamese counterpart, General Phung Quang Thanh.

The two ministers signed a MOU on defence cooperation covering defence technology,

information sharing, personnel training and cooperation between defence industries.

Other Exchange Visits. In May 2012, Vietnam hosted a visit to Hanoi by a delegation

from the Korea National Defense University led by its Director, Lt. Gen. Shim Youngsik.


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The visiting delegation was received by VPA Deputy Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Tran Quang

Khue.

In July 2012, Vietnam hosted a visit by the Chief of the Republic of Koreas Defense

Security Command Army, Lt. Gen. Bae Deagsig. General Bae held meetings with the

General Political Departments Security Defence Department and Viettel, the militaryrun telecommunications group. The Deputy Director of the VPA, Lt. Gen. Luong Cuong,

received General Bae.

Strategic Dialogue. Vietnam and South Korea held their 1st Dialogue on Defence Policies

in Hanoi on June 28, 2010. South Korea was represented by the Ministry of National

Defences Director of Foreign Policies, Cho Baesang; Vietnam was represented by the

director of its Department of Foreign Relations, Ministry of National Defence.

Vietnam and South Korea held their 1st Strategic Dialogue on Diplomacy, Security and

National Defence in Hanoi on April 26, 2011. South Korea was represented by its First

Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Park Suk Hwan; Vietnam was representedby Permanent Deputy Foreign Minister Pham Binh Minh.

On March 19, 2012, Vietnam and South Korea held their 1st National Defence Strategy

Dialogue at deputy defence minister level in Hanoi. The meeting was cochaired by

Deputy Minister of National Defence Lt. Gen. Nguyen Chi Vinh and Deputy Defence

Minister Lee Younggeol. The deputy ministers agreed to hold the second dialogue in

Seoul in 2013.

Naval Port Visits. Two Republic of Korea naval ships, the destroyer Chungmugan Yi

Shushin and the logistic ship Hwa Cheon, paid a threeday friendship visit to Ho Chi Minh

City in September 2009. The following year, the Republic of Korea warship, Dae Yeong,

paid a goodwill visit to the port of Ho Chi Minh City from January 58. In October 2012,

the warship Wang Goen called in at Ho Chi Minh City to mark the twentieth anniversary

of diplomatic relations.

Coast Guard Interaction. A delegation from South Koreas Coast Guard paid a working

visit to Hanoi for discussions with the Vietnam Maritime Police in December 2009. The

two sides discussed management, information sharing, antipiracy, transnational crime

and search and rescue.

Spain


Vietnam and Spain established diplomatic relations in July 1977. In December 2009,

President Nguyen Minh Triet paid a state visit to Spain at the invitation of Prime

Minister Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero. In their discussions they agreed to raise bilateral

relations by establishing a Forward Looking Strategic Partnership. The two presidents

then witnessed the signing of a Joint Action Program covering their bilateral

relationship.


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Vietnamese diplomatic sources provide two accounts of the origins of the Vietnam

Spain strategic partnership. The first account avers that it was Prime Minister Zapatero

who first raised the idea in his discussions with President Triet. Triet sought to be

accommodating and readily agreed. The second account argues that Vietnam initiated

the idea of a strategic partnership with Spain in the hope that it would induce France to

follow suit (see discussion on France below).

Economic Relations. Twoway trade was valued at US $1.4 billion in 2009. Foreign

investment from Spain totalled US $21 million in 2012 and involved seventeen projects.


On September 21, 2010, the Spanish State Secretary for National Defence, Constantino

Mendez Martinez, visited Hanoi where a MOU on defence cooperation was signed with

Deputy Defence Minister Lt. Gen. Nguyen Chi Vinh. The MOU focused on cooperation

between national defence industries and military education and training. Martinez

visited Vietnams Navy Command, an indication of one possible area of futurecollaboration.

In 2011, Vietnam purchased three Airbus Military C212 maritime patrol aircraft from

Spain for use by it Maritime Police. Industry sources speculate that Vietnam might be

interested in procuring the Airbus Military C295 to meet its antisubmarine warfare

requirements.26

Subsequently, the VietnamSpain strategic partnership has languished because of

Spains economic difficulties.

United Kingdom


Vietnam and the United Kingdom (UK) established diplomatic relations on September

11, 1973. Thirtyseven years later the two countries issued a Joint Declaration

establishing the VietnamUnited Kingdom Strategic Partnership. The strategic

partnership was signed by Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Pham Gia Khiem

and Foreign Secretary William Hague during the formers visit to London. The Joint

Declaration identified seven priority areas for cooperation: politicaldiplomatic, regional

and global issues, trade and investment, sustainable socioeconomic development,

education, training, science and technology, security and defence, and peopletopeople

exchange. Ministries from both countries were tasked with coordinating specific Action

Plans for each priority area. According to defence industry sources, the strategic

26Leithen Francis, SE Nations Seek Improved ASW, AEW,Aviation Week, February 17, 2012.


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partnership agreement included cooperation among strategic industries including

aerospace (BAE Systems) and defence.27

Economic Relations. Vietnam and the United Kingdom established a Joint Economic

Trade Committee (JETCO) to manage their commercial relations. The fourth JETCO

meeting was held in London on November 2010 and the fifth meeting was held in Hanoia year later. Twoway trade between Vietnam and the UK was valued at US $2 billion in

2010. British investors have provided US $2.5 billion to capitalize 131 projects in

Vietnam. The UK is the largest investor in Vietnams finance, banking and insurance

sector. The United Kingdom provides an estimated US $100 million in nonrefundable

aid annually; it is the European Unions largest contributor.

Political Consultations. Vietnam and UK conducted their 1st Political Consultation at

deputy foreign minister level on January 13, 2009. They held their their 2nd

Political

Consultations at deputy foreign minister level in Hanoi on April 6, 2011. Jeremy Brown,

Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, was hosted by Deputy

Foreign Minister Nguyen Quoc Cuong. The two deputy ministers discussed theimplementation of their 2011 Action Plan and pledged to raise twoway trade to US $4

billion and UK investment in Vietnam to US $3 billion by 2013.


Strategic Dialogue. Vietnam and the United Kingdom held their 1st

Strategic Dialogue in

London on October 26, 2010. Vietnam was represented by Deputy Foreign Minister Bui

Thanh Son, who was accompanied by officials from the Ministries of Public Security and

National Defence. The UK was represented by Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Minister of State Jeremy Brown, who was accompanied by officials from the Home

Office and Ministry of Defence. The agenda for this meeting included bilateral issues,defence cooperation, organised crime, counter terrorism and regional security.

According to the joint communiqu issued after the Strategic Dialogue, the Ministers

looked forward to closer defence cooperation, including more frequent exchange of

delegations and the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding on defence

cooperation.

Defence Cooperation. Vietnam and the UK signed a MOU on defence cooperation on

November 24, 2011 on the occasion of the threeday working visit to London by Deputy

Minister for National Defence Lt. Gen. Nguyen Chi Vinh. General Vinh met with Lord

Astor of Hever, the Parliamentary Under Secretary of Defence. The MOU provides a

framework for the conduct of bilateral defence relations and cooperation including theexchange of views and information on defencerelated matters, exchange of highlevel

delegations, defence industry cooperation, and training and education for officers and

27Jon Grevatt, UK and Vietnam ink strategic industrial partnership pledge, Janes Defence Weekly,

September 13, 2010.


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technical staff. The MOU also included setting up a Joint Working Group on conducting

research on defence strategy and military technique.

The British Ambassador to Vietnam, Anthony Stokes, noted that the MOU covered three

specific areas: politicaldefence cooperation, research, and military equipment supply.

According to Ambassador Stokes, Vietnam and the UK will hold regular defencedialogues at senior level; he also underscored that there was scope for Britains defence

and security industry to supply military equipment to Vietnam.28

During Lt. Gen. Vinhs November 2011 working visit to the UK he visited the Royal

College of Defence Studies. In May 2012, Lt. Gen. Vinh received a visiting delegation

from the Royal College of Defence Studies led by its deputy commander, Major General

Andrew Kennet.

On March 28, 2012 Vietnam and the United Kingdom signed the 2012 Action Plan to

further their Strategic Partnership. The Action Plan included a provision for stepping up

defence cooperation in training, defence trade and peace support operations.

29

As afollow up to this agreement, Defence Under Secretary of State Lord Astor of Hever

visited Vietnam in January 2013 to open a defence industry forum sponsored by the

UKs Trade and Investments Defence and Security Organisation.

Germany


Vietnam and the Federal Republic of Germany established diplomatic relations on

September 23, 1975. Vietnam and Germany exchanged visits by their foreign ministers

in June 2011 to prepare for the historic visit by Chancellor Angela Merkel later in the

year. Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle visited Hanoi on June 4. Deputy PrimeMinister and Foreign Minister Pham Gia Khiem visited Berlin on June 9. His host, Foreign

Minister Westerwelle, spoke positively about the prospects for a strategic partnership.

Thirtysix years after the establishment of diplomatic relations, Germany and Vietnam

raised their bilateral relations to a strategic partnership according to a Joint Statement

issued in Hanoi on October 11, 2011 on the occasion of the twoday state visit by

Chancellor Angela Merkel. Under the provisions of the Joint Statement, signed by

Chancellor Merkel and Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung, the two sides will increase the

exchange of highranking delegations including government and parliamentary agencies,

political parties and scientific and strategic research institutes.

In order to implement the Joint Statement Vietnam and Germany agreed to set up a

strategic management group cochaired by a State Secretary from Germanys Federal

28Thuy Ngan, Ambassador hopeful about VNUK cooperation, Tuoi Tre News, December 8, 2011.

29Jon Grevatt, Vietnam and UK agree defence cooperation action plan,Janes Defence Weekly, March

29, 2012.


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Foreign Office and a Deputy Foreign Minister from Vietnams Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The strategic management group will convene under the framework of the ongoing

political consultations between foreign ministries.

Political Consultations. On February 8, 2010 Vietnam and Germany held their 2 nd

Political Consultation at deputy foreign minister level in Berlin. Deputy Foreign MinisterNguyen Quoc Cuong was hosted by Secretary of State Foreign Office WolfRuthart Born.

Economic Relations. Twoway trade between Germany and Vietnam was valued at US

$4.7 billion in 2009, a decline of eight percent from 2008. In 2009, German investment

reached a total registered capital of US $809 million invested in 153 projects. Germany

pledged to provide development aid valued at US $137 million in 2010, a drop of more

than twentyfive percent from 2009.


In October 2004, Vietnam and Germany signed a MOU signed outlining collaboration in

defencerelated science and technology programs and military medicine. ThussenKrupp

set up representative offices in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City.

On September 9, 2010, Secretary of State for Defence, Rdiger Wolf, visited Hanoi for

discussions with Lt. Gen. Nguyen Chi Vinh on extending the 2004 MOU. The two agreed

to future cooperation by defence industries and in military science and technology,

military training, exchange visits at all levels, peacekeeping and dealing with the

consequences of war.

Exchanges of Visits. Deputy Defence Minister Senior Lt. Gen. Nguyen Thanh Cung paid a

working visit to Germany from March 1217, 2012. He met with Rdiger Wolf, State

Secretary, Federal Ministry of Defence. General Cung was briefed on the organisationalstructure, functions and tasks of Germanys military judicial system.

In June 2012, Hans Christian Schmidt, Parliamentary State Secretary, Federal Ministry of

Defense, paid a working visit to Hanoi for discussions with Senior Lt. Gen. Nguyen Thanh

Cung. General Cung suggested that the two countries should promote the exchanges of

highlevel military delegations and cooperate in education and training, defence

industry, and overcoming the consequences of war in Vietnam. Mr. Schmidt responded

by pledging that Germany would assist Vietnam in education and training, defence

industry and sharing new demining technologies.

Part II. Potential Strategic Partners

Australia

Bilateral relations between Australia and Vietnam developed considerable breadth and

depth particularly in the decade of the 1990s after the resolution of the Cambodian

conflict. In 2008, Vietnam approached Australia and suggested they formally raise their

bilateral relationship to strategic partners. Reportedly, Prime Minister Kevin Rudd


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rejected the term strategic partners as inappropriate for two reasons. First, Rudd did

not favour a term that was merely symbolic; he wanted it to have practical

connotations. Second, Rudd felt that the term strategic should be reserved for close

allies, such as the United States.30

In the end Australia and Vietnam agreed to characterise their bilateral relationship acomprehensive partnership.31 This was announced during the visit of VCP Secretary

General Nong Duc Manh to Canberra in September 2009.32 During Manhs visit, Deputy

Prime Minister Julia Gillard and Deputy Prime Minister Pham Gia Khiem signed a Joint

Statement formally establishing a Comprehensive Partnership.33

This statement

highlighted six major areas of cooperation: political relations and public policy

exchanges; economic growth and trade development; development assistance and

technical cooperation; defence and security relations; peopletopeople links; and global

and regional agenda. The Joint Statement indicated that this declaration would be

followed up with an Action Plan.

On December 17, 2009, Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung met with Prime Minister KevinRudd in Copenhagen. During their discussions Dung suggested that Vietnam and

Australia should formulate a program of action to implement the Joint Statement on

Comprehensive Partnership. Rudd agreed that both should work hard on a program of

action so it could be signed in 2010. The Plan of Action to realize the Comprehensive

Partnership for the years 201013 was agreed in October 2010. The AustraliaVietnam

Comprehensive Partnership was composed of three pillars: political and security

cooperation; economic cooperation; and peopletopeople cooperation through the

great bridge of education.34

On October 11, 2010 Australia and Vietnam signed their latest MOU on defence

cooperation. This agreement makes provision for enhanced practical cooperation instrategiclevel policy dialogue, joint military training and exercises, and humanitarian

assistance and disaster relief. This MOU falls under the framework of the 2009 Australia

Vietnam Comprehensive Partnership Agreement.

30UcViet thuc day quan he doi tac, BBC Vietnamese, September 7, 2009.

31For an overview see: Carlyle A. Thayer, The AustraliaVietnam Comprehensive Partnership, Paper to

Beyond EastWest dialogues: Implications for Research and Knowledge Production, 3rd

International

Conference on Engaging with Vietnam, cosponsored by Monash University; International Studies

Department, University of Social Sciences and Humanities, Vietnam National University; Australian

Embassy in Vietnam; and Vietnam Airlines, Hanoi, Vietnam, December 45, 2011.

32Secretary General Manh was accompanied by Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs,

Minister of Planning and Investment, and the Minister of Industry and Trade.

33AustraliaViet Nam Comprehensive partnership, September 7, 2009.

http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/vietnam/comprehensive_partnership_vietnam.html.

34Kevin Rudd, Australia and Vietnam: Partners in shaping our region for the 21

stcentury, Speech to

RMIT University, Ho Chi Minh City, April 13, 2011.


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United States

The United States normalized diplomatic relations with Vietnam on July 12, 1995.

Defence relations developed slowly over the next eight years.35

Defence Relations

HighLevel Visits. In 2003 Vietnam and the United States agreed to exchange official

visits by their defence ministers at three yearly intervals. In 2003 Defense Minster

General Pham Van Tra visited Washington. In 2006 Secretary Donald Rumsfeld visited

Hanoi. In December 2009, Defence Minister Phung Quang Thanh made an official visit to

Washington where he lobbied for an easing of US restrictions on military sales.36

The most recent ministerial visit was undertaken by Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta

in June 2012. The main purpose of these consultations was to review progress on the

first formal United StatesVietnam MOU on defense cooperation reached in September

2011 at the 2nd Defense Policy Dialogue (see below).

At a joint press conference held after their meeting, Secretary Panetta noted inprepared remarks that the new U.S. defense strategy entailed developing the

capabilities of our Asian partners, such as Vietnam and to try to take this relationship

to a new level. He noted that agreement had been reached to expand some very

important cooperation in the five key areas outlined in the 2010 MOU. Secretary

Panetta proposed establishing an Office of Defense Cooperation to meet these

objectives. Panetta also revealed that he discussed how the United States and the

ADMM Plus group could improve the maritime rights of all nations.

In his prepared remarks, Minister of National Defence General Phung Quang Thanh

confirmed that the bilateral talks focused on the implementation of the 2010 MOU. He

flagged future cooperation in addressing nontraditional security issues such ashumanitarian assistance and disaster relief and search and rescue. General Thanh also

noted a longstanding Vietnamese concern to elicit further support from the U.S. to

address legacies from the Vietnam War. This was a reference to the Agent Orange and

unexploded ordnance disposal issues.

Defence Policy Dialogue. The United States and Vietnam have been conducting an

annual defence dialogue since 2004. This dialogue has evolved over time to include

senior officials. In 2008 the dialogue was raised to a Political, Security and Defense

dialogue involving officials from their respective foreign affairs and defense ministries.

This dialogue continues to be held annually. The 5th

U.S.Vietnam Political, Security, and

35For an overview see: Carlyle A. Thayer, The Prospects for Strategic Dialogue, in Catharin E. Dalpino

editor, Dialogue on U.S.Vietnam Relations: Ten Years After Normalization (San Francisco: The Asia

Foundation, 2005), 2630.

36The October 2010 visit to Hanoi by the then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates was to attend the

inaugural meeting of the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM Plus). It was not part of the

formal exchange visits by defense ministers.


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Defense Dialogue was held in Hanoi on June 20, 2012. It was cochaired by Deputy

Foreign Minister Le Luong Minh and Assistant Secretary of State for PoliticalMilitary

Affairs Andrew Shapio.

In August 2010, the USVietnam defense dialogue was upgraded to a Defense Policy

Dialogue between officials at deputy minister level and the first meeting was held in

Hanoi. Vietnam was represented by Deputy Minister of National Defence Lt. Gen.

Nguyen Chi Vinh and the U.S. was represented by Robert Scher, Deputy Assistant

Secretary of Defence for South and Southeast Asia. The two sides reached agreement on

military exchanges, training and collaboration in search and rescue and humanitarian

assistance and disaster relief.37

The 2nd

Defense Policy Dialogue was held in Washington on September, 19, 2011. The

meeting was cochaired by Deputy Assistant Secretary Scher and Deputy Minister

Nguyen Chi Vinh. The two signed an MOU on defence cooperation that included five

priority areas: regular highlevel dialogues between defense ministries; maritime

security; search and rescue; studying and exchanging experiences on United Nations

peacekeeping; and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

The United States conducts a strategic dialogue with Vietnam as part of official DOD

engagement policy. The United States hopes to institutionalize defense cooperation

across a number of areas and to habituate Vietnam into cooperating with the United

States. In other words, the U.S. hopes to evolve the relationship from oneoff

arrangements to regular activities that become a normal part of defense cooperation

over time. For example, Vietnam restricts all foreign countries to one naval port visit

each year. The U.S. gently prods Vietnam to lift this restriction.

Ship Repair Agreement. In 2009, Vietnams Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung

dramatically announced that the commercial repair facilities at Cam Ranh Bay would beopen to all navies of the world. The U.S. was the first country to take up the offer. The

following year the United States and Vietnam signed a contract for the minor

maintenance and repair of U.S. Navy Sealift ships. Five ships were subsequently

repaired: the USNS Richard E. Byrdunderwent voyage repairs in FebruaryMarch 2010,

August 2011, and June 2012; the USNS Walter S. Diehl in October 2011 and the USNS

Rappahannockin February 2012.

Strategic Partnership?

This idea of Vietnam becoming a strategic partner of the United States was first

mentioned in the 2010 Quadrennial Defence Review. Vietnam was listed alongside

Indonesia and Malaysia as a potential strategic partner. This US term is muchnarrower in meaning that the term strategic partner used by Vietnam.

37In August 2011, the United States and Vietnam signed their first bilateral defence agreement, a

Statement of Intent to cooperate in health, and a precursor for exchanges and research collaboratin in

military medicine.


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Sometime in 2010 Vietnam and the United States began diplomatic discussions on

raising their bilateral relations to that of a strategic partnership. Vietnamese sources

claim that the idea was first raised by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. When Secretary

Clinton visited Vietnam she stated that all the fundamentals in the bilateral relationship

were in place to raise relations to the next level. But, she noted, Vietnams record of

human rights violations remained a major impediment. Indeed, in late 2010 informeddiplomatic sources told the author that discussion on a strategic partnership had stalled

over U.S. insistence that a special chapter on human rights be included. Vietnam wanted

human rights to be subsumed in a chapter dealing more broadly with political relations.

France

Vietnam and France established diplomatic relations at ambassadorial level on April 12,

1973. According to Vietnams Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the two

thayer vietnam: strategic partnerships and international security cooperation

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