the anglicisation of political marketing; how blair out-marketed clinton

8/2/2019 The Anglicisation of Political Marketing; How Blair Out-marketed Clinton

1/13

The anglicisation of political marketing:

How Blair `out-marketed' Clinton

Peter Ingram and Jennifer Lees-MarshmentReceived in revised form: 21st August, 2001

Dr Jennifer Lees-Marshment, Department of Management Studies, University of Aberdeen, Edward

Wright Building, Dunbar Street, Old Aberdeen, AB24 3QY, Scotland, UK; tel: +44 (0)1224 272720; fax:

+44 (0)1224 273843; e-mail: [email protected]; web: www.abdn.ac.uk/management/

jm.hti

Peter Ingram is completing his doctorate on

foreign policy and the US Congress in the Department of American Studies, Keele Uni-

versity.

Jennifer Lees-Marshment is a lecturer in the

Department of Management Studies at the Uni-

versity of Aberdeen, where she researches and

teaches political marketing. She is organising the

Political Marketing Conference to be held at

Aberdeen University, 19th21st September

2002.

ABSTRACTDespite increasing academic interest in political

marketing, confusion remains over its meaning and

scope. Whilst most research focuses on its use in

election campaigns, some argue that marketing

inuences other aspects of political behaviour. This

paper contends that a lack of comparative research

has contributed to this confusion. Theories derived

from country-specic studies may not be broadly

applicable due to the impact of systemic differences.

To show this, it analyses the case studies of

Clinton in the 1992 US presidential election andBlair in the 1997 UK general election. Compar-

ing the use of marketing in the two cases reveals

that while systemic features created the scope for a

broader, more coordinated and delivery-oriented

approach in the case of Labour, in both cases

marketing inuenced the design as well as the

presentation of the `products' on offer. This sug-

gests that the potential applications of political

marketing are broader than conventional denitionsimply.

KEYWORDS: political marketing, parties,

Blair, Clinton, UK, USA

Recent years have seen increasing academic

interest in the use of political marketing, but

some observers have suggested that existing

research remains somewhat limited in theo-

retical understanding and scope (see Butler

and Collins 1996: 32). In particular, it is

argued that most empirical research hasplaced an emphasis on explaining how mar-

keting is used to `sell' politicians or parties in

election campaigns and has largely neglected

the inuence that marketing can have on

other aspects of political behaviour (Lees-

Marshment 2001a, b; Scammell 1999: 718

19). As Lock and Harris (1996: 30) argue, the

`conceptual development of political market-

ing is still in its infancy and much work has

focused on the narrow setting of the immedi-

ate build-up to elections.'1

Problems of scopeand denition reect the relative newness of

political marketing as a research topic and

the practical difculties of utilising a cross-

disciplinary approach which draws upon

both political and management science, but

also the relative lack of comparative research

is a signicant contributing factor. Country-

ge 44

urnal of Public Affairs Volume 2 Number 2

Journal of Public AffairsVol. 2 No. 2, 2002, pp. 4456&Henry Stewart Publications,ISSN1472-3891


2/13

specic studies generate concepts of political

marketing that are unlikely to be broadly

applicable (see Baines et al. 1998). The ori-

gins of political marketing have been traced

to the USA (O'Shaughnessy 1990; Kavanagh

1995: 2187; Scammell 1995: 26998 and1997) and the use of marketing in the USA

has naturally been a focus of research (see

Niffenegger 1989; O'Shaughnessy 1990;

Newman 1994). Due to the substantial sys-

temic differences between the USA and

parliamentary democracies, however, con-

cepts of political marketing based on its

application in the USA may not be reective

of its use in parliamentary systems, such as

Britain. This paper will examine the use of

political marketing in both the UK and USA,by analysing two case studies: Bill Clinton in

his 1992 bid for the presidency and Labour in

the run up to the 1997 election. It will assess

whether similar concepts and techniques are

applied in both countries and consider if

current denitions of political marketing

need to be adjusted. The paper starts by

discussing the debate over the meaning and

scope of political marketing and considering

the potential impact of systemic features on

how marketing is applied. A comparison is

then made over how Clinton and Blair usedpolitical marketing. From this analysis a con-

sideration is made of what the two cases

demonstrate about political marketing in

Britain and the USA and the implications for

the comprehension and study of political

marketing.

POLITICALMARKETINGANDTHE IMPACT

OF SYSTEMIC FEATURES

Political marketing involves the application

of marketing concepts and techniques bypolitical actors and organisations in order to

achieve their goals. Conventional academic

denitions have been somewhat narrower

and focused on the use of marketing techni-

ques by candidates and parties in the execu-

tion of election campaigns. Bowler and

Farrell (1992: 5), for example, dene market-

ing as an exchange that `occurs at election

time when, to ensure maximum revenue, the

sellers market themselves through an applica-

tion of directed promotional activities'. This

emphasis on elections is understandable but

may be over-reective of marketing practicein US public affairs and obscure the potential

for the application of marketing to inuence

other aspects of political behaviour.

O'Shaughnessy (1990: 31) argues that

marketing is `largely an American invention'

and re ects many of its political system's

distinctive features. He argues that the weak-

ness of its political parties and the candidate-

centred focus of election campaigns have

created the scope for `merchandised politics'

(O'Shaughnessy 1990: 336). BecauseAmerican parties have little direct control

over either candidate selection or the run-

ning of campaigns, key decisions about cam-

paign strategy are made at the level of the

individual candidate and the emphasis of

marketing primarily concerns how the candi-

date is sold to the electorate. Research on US

political marketing has therefore concen-

trated on the use of new technologies and

marketing techniques in the presentation of

individual candidates (see Niffenegger 1989;

O'Shaughnessy 1990; Newman 1994). Incontrast, in the UK, stronger parties and

parliamentary style elections encourage mar-

keting decisions to be taken at the party level.

Strong political parties running centralised

campaigns have greater capacity to use poli-

tical marketing in a coordinated and far-

reaching manner. Lees-Marshment (2001a)

argues that political marketing is not simply

used by parties to determine the style and

substance of election campaigns and takes a

Comprehensive Political Marketing (CPM)approach to political marketing that has sev-

eral distinctions from previous work:

CPM views marketing as more than sim-

ply political communication

CPM applies marketing to the whole be-

haviour of a political organisation

Ingram and Lees-Mar

P


3/13

CPM involves marketing concepts, not

just techniques

The CPM approach is therefore more com-

prehensive because it takes account of the

whole behaviour of an organisation, not just

the presentation, uses marketing more widely

(concepts not just techniques) and views

marketing more broadly. Taking the CPM

approach, Lees-Marshment creates a model

of a Market-Oriented Party, which argues

that a political party does not simply use

marketing to sell its product, but in the design

of that product. The product can include any

aspect of its behaviour, organisation, person-

nel or policies that most inuence the target

voters whose support it is trying to attract. AMarket-Oriented Party identies voters' de-

mands and then designs its product to match

them. In order to secure long-term electoral

success, it is also crucial that the party strives

to deliver the product as promised once in

ofce and to satisfy voters.2 Lees-Marshment

(2001a, b) argues that a market-oriented

party would go through a multistage market-

ing process. For the purposes of this paper,

however, whose focus is the cross-country

empirical use of political marketing, this

model is adapted and summarised in Figure 1

and below.3

Stage 1: Market intelligence

The party engages in market intelligence in

order to identify voter demands, which can

include formal quantitative research (ie sur-

veys and polls), formal qualitative research (ie

focus groups) and informal discussions within

the party.

Stage 2: Product design

The party alters its behaviour its product

in response to voter demands, ensuring

that their promises are clearly dened and

achievable. Its product can include its leader-

ship, candidates for election to the legislature,

policies and organisational structure.

Stage 3: Communication andcampaign

The party conveys its new product design to

the electorate using the most appropriate and

effective communication techniques. This

stage encompasses both general communica-

tion and the formal election campaign, and

the party will strive to ensure that all of its

communication with the public will help it

to achieve electoral success.

Stage 4: Election anddelivery

The party goes through the election andseeks to carry out their promises once in

government. Although many barriers may

impede its ability to deliver, delivery is

crucial to ensure voter satisfaction and there-

by long-term electoral success.

The ability of parties to follow this model

can be constrained or facilitated by a number

Stage 1

Market intelligence

Stage 2

Product design

Stage 3

Communication and campaign

Stage 4

Election and delivery

Figure 1: The marketing process for aMarket-OrientedParty (adapted from themodel outlined inLees-Marshment 2001a,b).

e anglicisation of political marketing: How Blair `out-marketed' Clinton

ge 46


4/13

of systemic features in a particular country.4

American parties have always existed as loose

electoral coalitions lacking in centralised

structures and mass membership and election

campaigns are extremely candidate-centred

(see Broder 1972; Wattenberg 1991;Herrnson 1988). Although the national party

committees play a supportive role, candidate

image, character and policy pledges are the

prime products on offer in elections, rather

than party behaviour or policy platforms. By

contrast, British parties are more ideologi-

cally cohesive and disciplined, with centra-

lised and hierarchical national organisations.

British party leaders have more scope for

directing the behaviour of the whole party in

the search for ofce. Despite increasing focuson party leaders recently, attention remains

on national party policy than on candidate

character. The potential product is also much

broader, consisting of the party's leader,

policies, MPs, membership and organisa-

tional structures.

Signicant differences between the two

countries in the structure of the media may

also have an impact on the marketing process

because of the affects they have on the

conduct of campaigns. The British media

consists of a more established nationwidesystem of press and broadcasting, with recog-

nised national dailies and television news

coverage. By contrast, American papers are

almost all local and television news coverage

contains a far higher proportion of local

news. Moreover, the size of the market for

national campaigns is of course much larger.

As a result, the emphasis placed on develop-

ing effective communication strategies and

techniques may therefore differ signicantly.

Differences in American and British gov-ernmental structures and inter-branch re-

lationships also inuence the ability of

candidates and parties to deliver once elected.

Presidents usually face obstacles to delivery

because although they can attempt to per-

suade and cajole Congress, the process of

coalition building often results in major com-

promises over the content of legislation.

Major policies can be lost in the system or

altered beyond recognition, effectively pre-

venting delivery on election pledges. British

party leaders are in contrast aided by execu-

tive dominance of the legislature and highparty unity, which enables governments with

reasonable majorities to pass their pro-

grammes with minimal disruption. British

parties may therefore be better placed to

utilise a long-term approach to marketing

which focuses on delivery. It is therefore

proposed here that systemic differences be-

tween the USA and Britain will condition

the use of political marketing in the two

countries and may create the scope for its

broader application in Britain. This is testedby analysing the use of marketing by the

Clinton campaign in 1992 and the Labour

party in 1997.

THE USE OFMARKETING BYCLINTON AND

LABOUR

These two cases provide a useful opportunity

for a comparative study due to the marked

similarities and close links between Clinton

and Blair and their respective parties.5 The

Democrats in 1992 and Labour in 1997 were

in similar electoral situations as both wereseeking to overturn the recent dominance of

their conservative rivals by moving closer to

the political centre. A number of senior

campaign staff from each party worked for or

advised the other, providing technical gui-

dance and strategic advice. American staff

assisted Labour in 1992 and 1997, whilst

Philip Gould worked for Clinton in 1992

and 1996, and for Labour in 1992 and 1997.

As a result of the similarities in their positions

and the exchange of advice, there were alsomarked parallels in the style and substance of

the Clinton and Labour campaigns. Both

talked of `new' Democrat or Labour politics

in an effort to shed their `tax and spend'

image and sought to project themselves as

the party of aspiration and opportunity. Both

also combined policies intended to please

Ingram and Lees-Mar

P


5/13

traditional constituencies with themes de-

signed to appeal to target middle-class voters,

including tough anti-crime measures, cutting

government waste, welfare to work provi-

sions and competent economic management.

These similarities suggest that Clinton andBlair used marketing in a similar manner:

furthermore, that Labour simply imitated the

strategy used by the Democrat campaign.

Closer analysis will, however, indicate a dif-

ferent conclusion.6

Stage 1: Market intelligence

In many key respects, Clinton and Blair

carried out and used market research in a

similar manner. In both cases, early market

intelligence took the form of informal andbroad-based discussions. Clinton consulted a

wide network of friends and colleagues prior

to his formal declaration for the presidency,

discussing his prospects and how his cam-

paign should take shape, particularly with the

Democrat Leadership Council (DLC). The

DLC had been set up by moderate-to-

conservative Democrats following their de-

feat in 1984 with the mission of promoting

new policy themes to help Democrats regain

middle-class voters. Clinton was a founding

member and recent chairman of the DLCand gained guidance from its ideas and think

tank, the Progressive Policy Institute (Walker

1997: 815, 1078; Woodward 1994: 14

17; Rae 1994: 11326). Similarly, Blair's

changes built on the modernisation debate

begun after Labour's defeat in the 1983

general election. This stimulated the creation

of six Policy Commissions on various topics,

and ensured signicant discussion took place

throughout the party. Both Blair and Clinton

therefore became party leaders against abackground of debate and discussion about

the direction of policy.

Clinton and Blair also made use of formal

market intelligence, including private polls

and focus groups to pre-test their product

prior to the formal elections campaigns. The

Clinton campaign tested his main campaign

themes using focus groups and a nationwide

survey of 1,000 respondents, part of a stra-

tegic exercise dubbed the Manhattan Project

(see Greenberg 1996: 2246). For Labour,

Phillip Gould conducted focus group re-

search on swing Conservative voters, and thepolling organisation NOP began a regular

survey in November 1993. Focus groups

were also used to pre-test its draft manifesto,

New Labour, New Life for Britain, in 1996.

Stage 2: Product design

To an extent, both Clinton and Blair de-

signed their `product' to suit voter demands.

First, in terms of leadership, both can them-

selves be seen as market-oriented `products'

because they were selected through revisedprocedures designed to produce candidates

with broader electoral appeal. Clinton bene-

ted from the Democrats' front-loading of

the primary calendar with a series of south-

ern contests that helped moderate-to-conser-

vative candidates gain frontrunner status

early in the contest (Baker 1993: 525; Rae

1994: 1367). Blair was elected party leader

under the one-man-one-vote system intro-

duced by John Smith, which extended the

vote to individual party and union members.

As Seyd (1998: 65) argues, this system helpedto downgrade the power of activists and

thereby arguably encourage the selection of

a leader more representative of the wider

electorate.

Secondly, once elected, marketing in-

formed the presentation of the leader. The

Democrat campaign devoted considerable

energy to re-launching Clinton following

the market research carried out in May and

June. Focus group ndings indicated that

voters viewed Clinton as a slick and privi-leged politician who was not sincere about

change (see Walker 1997: 1378; Greenberg

1996: 2247). To counter these negative

perceptions, a short biographical lm high-

lighting Clinton's favourable characteristics

was put together and used at the Democrat

national convention and later in campaign


ge 48


6/13

commercials (see Smith 1994: 213; Whillock

1994: 302; Walker 1997: 1378). As Rein

(1994: 194 6) relates, Clinton's hair, weight

and clothes were altered in order to make

him appear older and more like a `family

man'. Clinton's choice of Al Gore, who wasa Vietnam veteran, as running mate also

offset some of his own character weaknesses

(see Newman 1994: 121). Like Clinton,

Blair's behaviour was inuenced by market

intelligence. After his selection, he adopted a

strong leadership style and exerted strict con-

trol over the rest of the party, reprimanding

and sometimes demoting those who strayed

from the party line. Although this style

aroused some criticism, market research had

indicated that voters wanted a determinedleader with a clear sense of direction.

Marketing also inuenced policy, how-

ever. In the case of Clinton in the USA, the

affect was on the President rather than the

party, but it had signicant impact on his

policy pledges. After the primaries, market

research indicated that voters discounted

Clinton's `message-ideas' put forward in the

primaries and did not believe that he would

deliver change. His team attempted to de-

velop a more coherent set of policy themes

and put an unusual amount of emphasis onoutlining detailed policy plans (see

Greenberg 1996: 2278 and Walker 1997:

137). Clinton also addressed policy problems

of concern to both target middle-class voters

and traditional Democrat supporters, such as

the economy and healthcare. At the same

time he distanced himself from the type of

large government programmes that Demo-

crats had traditionally endorsed but many

voters now regarded as wasteful and ineffec-

tive. He also differentiated himself from theRepublican President Bush by attacking his

economic record and encouraging voters to

view the election as a referendum on Bush's

economic management (see Abramson et al.

1995: 49; Arterton 1993: 76). Furthermore,

the Clinton camp attempted to make their

claims as plausible as possible. Considerable

effort was put into developing a detailed

economic plan drawn which scaled back a

number of Clinton's spending pledges and

other promises, including his plans for infra-

structure spending and decit reduction, in

order to make them more feasible (seeWoodward 1994: 2744).

Labour's marketing also informed the de-

sign of policy, but in contrast, the focus and

effects of product design were far broader in

the case of Labour and had a more obvious

impact on policy. They also inuenced sev-

eral aspects of the party's membership and

organisation. The party made a number of

substantial changes to long-standing policy

commitments to remove apparent weak-

nesses and better reect the concerns of targetvoters. In order to distance itself from its

damaging `tax and spend' image, the party

committed itself to existing government

spending plans and promised not to raise

income tax. It also tried to promote a busi-

ness-friendly image by releasing a business

manifesto and holding a number of highly

publicised meetings between Blair and busi-

ness leaders. In April 1995, Blair also suc-

ceeded in changing Clause IV, s. IV of the

party's constitution, which implied a policy

commitment to state ownership of the meansof production, to a commitment to a market

economy, reecting the views of the electo-

rate. It also had important symbolic value as

it helped to convey to voters that Labour was

offering a new and different product. Labour

also focused on areas of most interest to target

voters: health and education. It created new

policy pledges to meet voter demands. Its

plan to impose a windfall tax on privatised

utilities, for example, responded to voter

concerns about such companies making ex-cessive prots. Labour also included policies

on constitutional reform designed to appeal

to its traditional constituencies, including

pledges to hold referendums on devolution

to Scotland and Wales and to abolish the

right of hereditary peers to sit in the House

of Lords. As Sanders (1998: 226) argues, in

Ingram and Lees-Mar

P


7/13

`each of the policy areas that voters consid-

ered important, Labour had positioned itself

carefully'.

Like Clinton, Labour sought to make its

policy promises plausible, but did so more

determinedly. It made a ten-point `contractwith the people' (rstly ve pledges, later

extended to ten for the manifesto), as the box

opposite.

Labour made the list short and included

details on how certain commitments would

be met, which made the pledges seem more

plausible. In contrast, Clinton's advisers

warned against including extensive detail (see

Woodward 1994: 27 and 3942) so the nal

version was still vague with respect to many

key policy areas (see Clinton and Gore1992).

Another difference between the two cases

is that for the UK Labour party, the product

also included its membership and organisa-

tion, which were also inuenced by market-

ing. First, following research indicating that

Labour's close links with trade unions had

lost it votes in previous elections, the party

sought to distance itself from them. The

voting-share of the trade unions in the party's

Electoral College was brought in line with

that of MPs and the constituency parties.Blair made it clear that the unions could not

expect special deals from Labour if it did get

into government and the party sought alter-

native sources of funding in order to reduce

its reliance on union contributions. Second,

the leadership tried to ensure that the candi-

dates standing for election followed the

`New Labour' design. A subcommittee of

the NEC drew up short lists of candidates for

by-elections, from which the local party

constituencies made the nal choice and thenational leadership overruled some constitu-

ency selections for the general election. Simi-

larly senior MPs most loyal to the leadership

were promoted, while those more critical of

the reforms were moved to lower positions.

These steps represented an orchestrated effort

to alter the behaviour of the party at all levels

Box 1: Labour's ten-point contract with the

people, April 1997

1. Education will be our number one

priority, and we will increase the

share of national income spent oneducation as we decrease it on the

bills of economic and social failure.

2. There will be no increase in the basic

or top rates of income tax.

3. We will provide stable economic

growth with low ination, and pro-

mote dynamic and competitive busi-

ness and industry at home and

abroad.

4. We will get 250,000 young unem-

ployed off benet and into work.5. We will rebuild the NHS, reducing

spending on administration and in-

creasing spending on patient cases.

6. We will be tough on crime and the

causes of crime, and halve the time it

takes persistent juvenile offenders to

come to court.

7. We will help build strong families

and strong communities, and lay the

foundations of a modern welfare state

in pensions and community care.

8. We will safeguard our environment,and develop an integrated transport

policy to ght congestion and pollu-

tion.

9. We will clean up politics, decentralise

political power throughout the Uni-

ted Kingdom and put the funding of

political parties on a proper and ac-

countable basis.

10. We will give Britain the leadership in

Europe which Britain and Europe

need.

Source: The Labour Party (1997)

and had potential long-term implications.

For the purposes of the election, a more loyal

and cooperative party membership and ma-

chinery would help to promote a unied


ge 50


8/13

image, in contrast to the divisions of the past.

Post-election, it would assist in the delivery

of Labour's policy pledges by reducing the

likelihood of rebellions or dissent. The inu-

ence of marketing on the behaviour of the

Democrat party was in comparison far morelimited. The party did make an effort to

communicate a moderate and unied image

through its nominating convention in New

York (Baker 1993: 636; Rae 1994: 143;

Smith 1994: 20910; Abramson et al. 1995:

42; Walker, 1997: 1478) but this was a

one-off effort with limited lasting signi-

cance.

Whilst Clinton and Blair both adopted a

market-oriented approach to product design,

the changes made by Labour were thereforemore explicit and substantial. The Clinton

campaign was informed by a clear awareness

of voter attitudes and the alterations made to

his image and policies were not insignicant.

Its efforts, however, took place over a more

concentrated period of time and were more

ad hoc. Furthermore, many of the changes

were renements rather than new ideas. By

contrast, Labour redened much of its pro-

duct over an extended period. Its changes

were also more far reaching because they

inuenced so many important aspects ofthe party and had implications for its post-

election behaviour.

Stage 3: Communication andcampaign

Both Clinton and Blair ran well-organised

and sophisticated campaigns that communi-

cated their central messages well and im-

proved on recent Democratic and Labour

performances, although the American cam-

paign proved more inventive and ambitious

in its use of the media and new technology.Clinton put together a strong team of experi-

enced campaign professionals, the core of

which included James Carville, Paul Begala,

George Stephanopolous, Frank Greer,

Mandy Grunwald and Stanley Greenberg.

After the primaries, the campaign developed

a centralised operation under James Carville,

with a `war room' in Little Rock (see

Newman 1994: 124). Clinton's image re-

launch began at the convention with the

Man from Hope biography and followed on

with campaign infomercials based on the lm

and a series of appearances on popular tele-vision and radio programmes. The Repub-

lican team consistently attacked Clinton's

character and record with a string of allega-

tions, so an image counter offensive was

maintained for the duration of the campaign.

The Clinton team focused the campaign

agenda on the economy, using commercials

and speeches to highlight Bush's record,

whilst presenting Clinton's economic plan as

the more concrete (Arterton 1993: 76;

Hohenberg 1994: 10910; Abramson et al.1995: 54 5). Clinton also made efforts to

stress his New Democrat credentials, hoping

to upset Republican attempts to label him a

`tax and spend' liberal (see Popkin 1995:

2201). He used his convention speech to

reach out to a non-Democrat audience,

offering them a choice that `is not conserva-

tive or liberal, Democratic or Republican'

(quoted in Hohenberg 1994: 72) and ran

television commercials depicting himself and

Gore as `a new generation of Democrats'

(Abramson et al. 1995: 54). Overall, theClinton campaign managed to downplay the

character question somewhat, whilst pro-

moting his core messages of a moderate

image and the economic referendum inter-

pretation.

The campaign utilised innovative tech-

niques. Clinton followed the independent

candidate Ross Perot's example of using the

so-called `counter political' media to reach

the electorate, with appearances on MTV

and the Arsenio Hall Show. Such programmesprovided free exposure, which helped the

campaign to get through a period when it

was low on funds (Whillock 1994: 301) and

were less likely to scrutinise Clinton's poli-

cies and record, allowing him to show what

the Manhattan Project described as his `hu-

man side' (see Arterton 1993: 901; Walker

Ingram and Lees-Mar

P


9/13

1997: 138). Market research had also indi-

cated that voters were more likely to change

their view of Clinton if they heard him speak

at length (Popkin 1995: 217). For similar

reasons, Clinton also made frequent use of

electronic town hall meetings, which al-lowed even more direct and unfettered access

to voters (see Arterton 1993: 95; Muir 1994:

34164). In anticipation of attacks on Clin-

ton's character by the Bush campaign, the

Democrat camp also established a rapid re-

sponse unit designed to issue swift and de-

tailed responses to any charges levelled

against Clinton within one news cycle (see

Arterton 1993: 85). The Clinton campaign

also targeted its campaign communication.

As Newman (1994: 115) outlines, the De-mocrat concentrated its purchase of commer-

cials in the states where support had not yet

been won, so-called `play-hard' states (see

also Abramson etal. 1995: 55). Satellite feeds

to local television stations allowed Clinton or

members of his team to give interviews in

crucial media markets, whilst a mapping

operation made it possible to coordinate

public appearances with spots on the local

media in order to maximise their impact (see

Arterton 1993: 92).

Labour ran a similarly well-organised cam-paign. Blair also had an `inner circle' of

advisers which included Peter Mandelson

and Alastair Campbell, both of whom had

extensive media experience, as well as Philip

Gould. Its communication strategy was care-

fully planned and tightly run from a centre in

Millbank Tower, with regular and clear

communications between senior party g-

ures, staff, agents and candidates. Like Clin-

ton, Labour also targeted its campaign

through its `Operation Victory' that focusedcommunication on selected voters in 90

targeted seats, contacting them by telephone

and direct mail. Alastair Campbell also de-

signed a strategy to improve the party's

relationship with the popular press, including

newspapers traditionally favouring the Con-

servatives. Additionally, if any section of the

media produced a report that was deemed to

be unreasonably negative, party ofcials

would often contact them and complain.

Labour's effort however was not as inven-

tive as the Clinton campaign, and the party

was in some respects playing catch-up, intro-ducing techniques and practices developed

and previously used in the USA. The Mill-

bank campaign centre, for example, was

based on the Little Rock `war room' and

included a rebuttal unit imitating the Clinton

model. Arguably Labour did not have to be

as sophisticated as the Democrats. Many of

the innovations introduced by Clinton, such

as the mapping operation and satellite feeds

to local stations, were designed to reach

target voters in the larger and more fragmen-ted US media market. Whilst the Clinton

team was struggling to redene his image and

agenda, Labour's was entering the nal phase

of a communications strategy that had been

planned and executed over the previous two

years long before the formal election cam-

paign. Furthermore, because Labour's pro-

duct was clearer and more market-oriented,

communicating it to the electorate was more

straightforward. The campaign simply reiter-

ated what it had been saying during the pre-

election communication stage.

Stage 4: Election anddelivery

Both Clinton and Blair won their elections

and brought to an end long periods of

electoral failure for their parties. Clinton

won with 370 electoral votes in 32 states, and

saw the Democrats maintain control of both

the House and Senate. The result put a

Democrat in the White House for the rst

time since 1980 and ended 12 years of divi-

ded government, thereby raising the prospectof more cooperative relations between the

presidency and Congress. Nonetheless, Clin-

ton only won 43 per cent of the popular vote

and ran behind all but ve members of

Congress. He could not therefore claim to

possess a clear mandate and Democrat mem-

bers of Congress did not feel indebted to him


ge 52


10/13

for their success (see Edwards 1996: 235). It

was also the case that most congressional

Democrats did not see themselves as New

Democrats, so certain Clinton policies

clashed with the preferences of many Demo-

crat lawmakers (see Quirk and Hinchcliffe1996: 2627). Labour won 43.2 per cent of

the popular vote and 419 seats, securing a

Commons majority of 179. Signicantly, it

took seats normally considered unwinnable

by any party other than the Conservatives

and attracted a wide base of support in terms

of age, socio-economic status and region.

Because of its large majority and the systemic

features outlined above, Labour was there-

fore placed in a better position to deliver.

In his rst two years, Clinton had a mixedrecord of success in delivering on his major

policy pledges. Of his main three domestic

priorities, the decit reduction plan was the

only one passed by Congress. His economic

stimulus package was eventually abandoned

and health care reform did not even come to

a vote. Clinton did enjoy a number of

legislative successes, endorsing a variety of

liberal measures held up under the Bush

administration and securing the passage of a

major crime bill in 1994. Clinton could not

really claim to have delivered on many of hismost important election pledges, and one of

his most impressive legislative victories, the

North American Free Trade Agreement

(NAFTA), had hardly featured in his cam-

paign. Additionally, many commentators ac-

cused him of failing to make good on his

promise to be a new, more moderate Demo-

crat and he was dogged by a number of

scandals. His mixed record of success and

tarnished image undoubtedly played a signi-

cant part in the massive losses suffered by theDemocrats in the 1994 midterms, which saw

the Republicans take control of both houses

for the rst time in 40 years. Thereafter,

Clinton lost control of the legislative agenda.

As a result, his post-1994 leadership was

dened and assessed more by how he re-

sponded to the Republican's programme

than by the delivery of his 1992 pledges.

Nonetheless, the healthy state of the Amer-

ican economy in 1996: for which Clinton

could at least claim some credit, played a

signicant part in his re-election and repre-

sented an important area where he couldclaim to have made good on his 1992

campaign (see Bailey 1999).

As for Labour, it remains too early to

complete an assessment of Labour's delivery

or voters' perception of it. Labour have

frequently discussed their record on delivery

since taking power. The government even

issued annual reports on its progress in de-

livering (see The Labour Party 1999 and

2000). The 2000 report had a link to a

website where it discussed its performanceon every manifesto promise in great detail.

Labour has therefore encouraged voters to

assess its delivery of its contract style pledges

in an effort to produce voter satisfaction.

Clearly it has succeeded on some aspects of

constitutional reform, with the introduction

of devolution in Scotland and Wales and the

removal of hereditary peers from the House

of Lords. There are, however, a number of

possible pitfalls, which may undermine its

approach. Even if Labour do, and are per-

ceived to, achieve specic pledges, such asreducing health service waiting lists and class

sizes, this could be overshadowed by a failure

to make more wholesale improvements in

the health service and education, or by a

failure to deal with pressing issues that

emerged whilst in government. The delivery

of its broader pledges, such as its promise to

`clean up politics' and to `give Britain the

leadership in Europe which Britain and

Europe need', will obviously be open to

considerable debate and could prove to be aliability if the government fails to dene such

ambitions in a meaningful manner. Although

Labour's delivery-oriented approach is an

interesting and signicant innovation, deliv-

ery is inevitably the most problematic stage

of the marketing process and will undoubt-

edly provide the toughest test of Blair's

Ingram and Lees-Mar

P


11/13

strategy and indeed the use of comprehensive

political marketing.

CONCLUSION: THEPOTENTIAL OF

POLITICALMARKETING

This paper has revealed interesting perspec-tives on political marketing. First, it demon-

strated how political marketing is wider in

scope than generally portrayed. The tradi-

tional assumption has been challenged that

political marketing principally involves the

selling of politicians and parties through

campaigns, by applying a broader political

marketing framework that takes the CPM

approach to the case studies of Clinton and

Blair. Second, this analysis suggested that the

use of political marketing by Clinton andBlair extended way beyond the use of market

techniques in political communication and

campaigning than we might otherwise think,

providing analytical perspectives that existing

empirical descriptive accounts (despite their

undoubted detail and plentiful content) do

not make clear. In certain respects the Clin-

ton campaign approach was more consistent

with traditional denitions of political mar-

keting as it placed more emphasis on the

formal campaign and the techniques used to

package and present their candidate. None-theless, it was found that the Clinton team

used marketing to do more than `sell' or

communicate its product to the electorate.

Both Clinton and Blair went through the

basic process of identifying and responding to

voter demands. The changes made by the

Clinton team were less obvious, but aspects

of his behaviour and policies were altered in

line with voter attitudes, as were some ele-

ments of the Democrat party's behaviour,

albeit on a small-scale and temporary basis.Third, the paper explored not just the links

and similarities between Blair and Clinton,

but the differences in their behaviour and the

extent to which they utilised comprehensive

political marketing. Labour's approach was

far broader in scope, inuencing aspects of its

policies, personnel, internal organisation, and

leadership behaviour. It was more directed

and planned. Whilst Clinton made an effort

to present a plausible policy plan, Labour's

strategy was also more delivery-oriented,

reecting a greater condence about its abil-

ity to deliver once in power. It made it clearwhat was on offer prior to the election and

has sought to demonstrate the delivery of its

pledges since winning ofce.

Finally, the paper showed how systemic

differences between the two countries, the

UK and USA, substantially condition the

scope, focus and application of political mar-

keting. Contrary to what we might expect,

there is more potential for the use of political

marketing in Britain, due to the more cen-

tralised nature of political parties and cam-paigns and to the delivery component of the

marketing model. Whilst American cam-

paigns may be the breeding ground for

technological innovation and new media

strategies, conditions in Britain allowed

Labour to use marketing in a broader, more

deliberate and long-term manner. This has

not been argued or even considered before.

As suggested at the outset, there is a lack of

comparative research on political marketing,

particularly within a comprehensive political

marketing framework, and this piece there-fore begins to address a signicant gap in the

literature. The paper has challenged two

conventional views of marketing in Britain

and the USA: that the USA is the leader in

political marketing and Tony Blair simply

copied Bill Clinton's 1992 success. By con-

sidering systemic differences and a compre-

hensive political marketing framework it can

be seen that far from simply following in

Clinton's footsteps, Tony Blair and the

Labour party were able to `out-market' Clin-ton by utilising an anglicised version of

political marketing.

NOTES

(1) For a comprehensive and up to date

review of the political market literature,


ge 54


12/13

see Scammel (1999: 71839). For a use-

ful compilation of work conducted in

the eld, see Newman (1999).

(2) In practice, market-oriented decisions

can often be made subconsciously and

parties may not use a fully comprehen-sive and coordinated marketing strategy,

but marketing still has a far-reaching

impact on party behaviour before, during

and after election campaigns.

(3) The original model with full theoretical

explanation is published elsewhere (see

for example Lees-Marshment 2001a, b)

but further detail on this theoretical

framework is beyond the scope of this

paper.

(4) Here, there has been no attempt toprovide a full analysis of the signicant

systemic differences between Britain and

America, which are both numerous and

well known, but rather to highlight

several of the major features that have the

potential to inuence the marketing pro-

cess.

(5) Other cases could be taken, such as

Reagan and Thatcher in the 1980s, but

the similarities between Clinton and

Blair have attracted greater commentary

and are more recent. A future case studymight be conducted on the recent pre-

sidential election in 2000 of Republican

George Bush, but UK elections seem to

occur at a time-lag, eg the UK compar-

able case might potentially be the Con-

servative Party not this next election but

the one after, so a case study on Bush and

whoever cannot yet be made.

(6) Here existing research and accounts have

been used in order to examine how

Labour and Clinton approached eachstage of the marketing process. For

further detail on the Labour case see

Lees-Marshment (2001a, Ch. 5); US

material, which has not been analysed

from a CPM perspective before, will be

referenced more specically throughout

the text.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The authors thank Chris Bailey for his help-

ful comments on a previous draft of this

paper.

REFERENCES

Abramson, P., Aldrich, J. and Rohde, D. (1995)

Change and Continuity in the 1992 Elections.

Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly

Press.

Arterton, C. (1993) `Campaign 92: Strategies and

Tactics of the Candidates' in G. Pomper (ed),

The Election of 1992, 74109. Chatham:

Chatham House.

Bailey, C. (1999) `Clintonomics' in P. Herrnson

and D. Hill (eds), The Clinton Presidency: The

First Term 19926, 85 103. London: Macmil-

lan Press.Baines, P., Newman, B. and Harris, P. (1998)

`Political Marketing: Towards a Cross-Cultural

Model', paper to the Political Marketing Con-

ference, National University of Ireland at

Cork, 17 19 September.

Baker, R. (1993) `Sorting Out and Suiting Up:

The Presidential Nominations' in G. Pomper

(ed), The Election of 1992, 3973. Chatham:

Chatham House.

Bowler, S. and Farrell, D. (eds) (1992) Electoral

Strategies and Political Marketing. Basingstoke:

Macmillan Press.Broder, D. (1972) The Party's Over: The Failure of

Politics in America. New York: Harper.

Butler, P. and Collins, N. (1996) `Strategic

Analysis in Political Markets', The European

Journal of Marketing, 30(10/11): 3244.

Clinton, B. and Gore, A. (1992) Putting People

First. New York: Times Books.

Edwards, G. (1996) `Frustration and Folly: Bill

Clinton and the Public Presidency' in Camp-

bell, C. and Rockman, B. (eds), The Clinton

Presidency: First Appraisals. Chatham: Chatham

House, 23461.

Greenberg, S. (1996) Middle Class Dreams: ThePolitics and Power of the New American Majority.

New Haven: Yale University Press.

Herrnson, P. (1988) Party Campaigning in the

1980s. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Hohenberg, J. (1994) The Bill Clinton Story:

Winning the Presidency. New York: Syracuse

University Press.

Ingram and Lees-Mar

P


13/13

Kavanagh, D. (1995) Election Campaigning: The

New Marketing of Politics. Oxford: Blackwells.

Labour Party (1997) Labour Party Manifesto. The

Labour Party.

Labour Party (1999) The Government Annual Re-

port 98/99. London: The Stationery Ofce.Labour Party (2000) The Government Annual Re-

port 99/00. London: The Stationery Ofce.

Lees-Marshment, J. (2001a) Political Marketing and

British Political Parties: The Party's Just Begun.

Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Lees-Marshment, J. (2001b) `The Marriage of

Politics and Marketing', Political Studies 48,

August.

Lock, A. and Harris, P. (1996) `Political Market-

ing vive la difference', The European Journal

of Marketing, 30(10/11): 2131.

Muir, J. (1994) `Clinton Goes to Town Hall' in

S. Smith (ed), Bill Clinton on Stump, State and

Stage: The Rhetorical Road to the White House.

Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press,

34164.

Newman, B. (1994) The Marketing of the President:

Political Marketing as Campaign Strategy. Thou-

sand Oaks: Sage.

Newman, B. (ed) (1999) The Handbook of Political

Marketing. Thousand Oaks: Sage.

Niffenegger, P. (1989) `Strategies for Success

from the Political Marketers', Journal of Con-

sumer Marketing, 6(1): 4561.

O'Shaughnessy, N. (1990) The Phenomenon of Political Marketing. Basingstoke: Macmillan.

Popkin, S. (1995) `Strategic Perspectives on the

1992 Campaign' in J. Thurber and C. Nelson

(eds), Campaigns and Elections American Style,

21323. Boulder, CO: Westview.

Quirk, P. and Hinchliffe, J. (1996) `Domestic

Policy: The Trials of a Centrist Democrat' in

C. Campbell and B. Rockman (eds), The

Clinton Presidency: First Appraisals, 26289.

Chatham: Chatham House.

Rae, N. (1994) Southern Democrats. Oxford: Ox-

ford University Press.

Rein, I. (1994) Ìmagining the Image: Reinvent-

ing the Clintons' in S. Smith (ed), Bill Clinton

on Stump, State and Stage: The Rhetorical Road tothe White House, 187200. Fayetteville: Uni-

versity of Arkansas Press.

Sanders, D. (1998) `The New Electoral Battle-

ground' in A. King (ed), New Labour Triumphs:

Britain at the Polls, 209 48. Chatham: Chatham

House.

Scammell, M. (1995) Designer Politics: How Elec-

tions are Won. Basingstoke: Macmillan.

Scammell, M. (1999) `Political Marketing: Les-

sons for Political Science', Political Studies,

47(4): 71839.

Seyd, P. (1998) `Tony Blair and New Labour' in

A. King (ed), New Labour Triumphs: Britain at

the Polls, 4974. Chatham: Chatham House.

Smith, L. (1994) `The New York Convention:

Bill Clinton and `À Place Called Hope''' in S.

Smith (ed), Bill Clinton on Stump, State and

Stage: The Rhetorical Road to the White House,

201 23. Fayetteville: University of Arkansas

Press.

Walker, M. (1997) Clinton: The President They

Deserve. London: Vintage.

Wattenberg, M. (1991) The Decline of American

Political Parties 19521988. Harvard: Harvard

University.Whillock, R. (1994) Èasy Access to Sloppy

Truths: The '92 Presidential Media Campaign'

in S. Smith (ed), Bill Clinton on Stump, State

and Stage: The Rhetorical Road to the White

House, 292313. Fayetteville: University of

Arkansas Press.

Woodward, B. (1994) The Agenda: Inside the

Clinton White House. New York: Simon and

Schuster.


the anglicisation of political marketing; how blair out-marketed clinton

Documents