the anthropology of science part i: science as a humanity

6 Evolutionary Anthropology

The Anthropology of Science Part I: Science a s a Humanities JONATHAN MARKS

While we may be disappointed at the level of science literacy in contemporary society, there has also been a quiet revolution in the humanities with respect to the nature of science itself, situating it within the general sphere of human thought and activity. Much of what is now accepted as commonplace within the humanities concerning science is commonly either unacknowledged or perceived as threatening by scientists. A broader perspective about science is called for, one that will facilitate communication between scientists and nonscientists, that will assist the teaching and general acceptance of science, and to which the field of anthropology should be central.

It was nearly four decades ago that C.P. Snow reflected on the gulf that he saw dividing intellectuals in the sciences and the humanities. Perhaps the most important aspect of Snow’s classic essay The Two Cultures is his ex- plicit description of the intellectual communities as cultures “not only in an intellectual but also in an anthropological sense.”’

In the intervening years, the study of science-how it works, and what scientists think and do-has become an active area of research and scholar- hip.^,^ Somewhat paradoxically, how- ever, the study of modes OF thought and codes of behavior in communities does not fall within the general academic canon of “science.” Incorporat- ing history, philosophy, sociology, cultural studies, psychology and, more generally, anthropology, it is, rather, a “humanities” or “social science.” To alarge extent, then the schol-

Jonathan Marks is associate professor in the Department of Anthropology at Yale University. His primary research focus is molecular anthropology, and he has published extensively on DNA and chromosome evolution in the Hominoidea. He is co-author of €vo/ut iona~Anthfo~o/~y (Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1992), and author of Human Biodiversity (Aldine de Gruyter, 1995).

arly study of science is itself situated outside the sciences.

If Snow’s perceived division within academics still obtains-and most would agree that the rift has grown rather than shrunk-it follows that the study of science might be generally unfamiliar terrain to scientists themselves. The study of science is occa- sionally even perceived as intrinsically hostile to science and scientists. For example, the interest in fraud by ob- servers of science46 could superfi- cially suggest that they regard science as fundamentally corrupt. In a recent book by two scientists, the critical analysis of science by philosophers, historians, and social scientists is grouped together with creationism, animal liberation, Afro-centrism, and other fundamentally anti-intellectual and antiscientific movement^.^ The more recent episode in which, as a hoax, a scientist published a manuscript in a humanities journal under false pre- tensesS-’O even provoked occasional gloating on the part of scientists, though the act itself represented the very em- bodiment of academic fraud.”

Where science is perceived as being under siege, a paranoid reaction may be understandable. But it is probably more productive to consider carefully what the stakes are, what the issues are, and what the sides are. After all, the same issue of Erne magazine hav-

ing a coverlZ labeled “Science Under Siege,” which featured a scientist cow- ering under a microscope, also asked prominently “Do we have too many lawyers?”

Science is not under organized at- tack from the humanities, but there are some unarticulated intellectual ex- travagances of the scientific community-collectively known as scientism -that are. These include assumptions about the value-neutrality of scientific claims, the independence of scientific statements from the cultural biases of the scientist making them, and the crucial distinction between the many statements that are scientific and the relatively few that are actually true. Distinguishing science from scientism is not necessarily in the best interest of scientists; hence a supporter of the Human Genome Project can be on record that “our fate is in our genes,”13 as if genetics were high-tech astrology. And why not? It is certainly in a geneticist’s interests (especially funding interests) to have listeners think that their fates lie in what the geneticist studies. And certainly people, includ- ing scientists, can generally be counted on to act in their perceived interests.

On the other hand, distinguishing science from scientism is of consider- able importance in the modern world. For example, genetic determinism of crime, if it is true, may imply a social agenda. Yet, every generation this idea seems to be proposedI4 and every generation it seems to be refuted.’5 His- tory may in fact be of greater assistance in analyzing such claims than science is. If our fate is not actually in our genes at all-if the Human Genome Project is worthwhile inde- pendently of whether we even have fates, in any significant sense of that

155UE5 Evolutionary Anthropology 7

term-then scientists should probably not utter such dubious statements in its name. If science is to be understood as an anthology of truths about the universe, then it is untruths clothed as science that undermine science, not the people who point them out.

What we have here are best understood as classic anthropological situ- ations. First, all societies believe that their explanations for things consti- tute the truth. It is exceedingly difficult to convince them otherwise and, in fact, it is somewhat impolite even to try. Consequently, one might reason- ably expect that an insufficiently sen- sitive attempt to impose scientific thought on nonscientists might be perceived as hostile or threatening. Though sometimes rationalized from the standpoint that science is “true” (i.e., empirically valid), this stands up poorly in historical context. While science attempts to map itself onto reality, and succeeds in the long run, the most obvious implication of its domi- nant falsificationist methodology is that most scientific ideas turn out to be false, but are no less scientific for it. Only a relative few are retained, by the fundamental processes through which science operates, and even these are constantly modified. At the very least, this undermines the gross equation of “scientific” and “true.”

Moreover, there is a basic conflict between what people in a society think they are doing and what they appear to an outsider actually to be doing. Members of a culture see themselves, their beliefs, and behav- iors, one way; people with a different language, different frames of references, and different traditions of thought see them another way. There may be several ways of interpreting the same set of activities or beliefs, but it is an axiom of ethnography that a cultural system cannot be fully comprehended without stepping outside of it.

HOW SCIENCE SEES ITSELF AND HOW IT APPEARS TO OTHERS

As we all know, scientists collect data and test hypotheses to formulate explanations about how the universe works. But that is an incomplete description of the process of science, for it takes the scientist for granted; it is

an analysis of a social process that ig- nores both the actor and the context.

After all, when an hypothesis is falsified, its advocates rarely call it quits and go into the dry-goods business. If one’s life, education, and work are bound up in a particular idea, one may not be willing to give it up quite so easily. Consequently it may be easier to disregard the test as having been inadequate, rather that the idea as having been falsified.16J7 Purely abstract rational judgments, therefore, may be superseded by other considerations;

Data rarely if ever “speak for themselves,” and serve very little function except in the service of a theoretical issue.

theories are not determined by data, they are under-determined by data.ls

Further, experiments and observa- tions are neither made nor analyzed in a theoretical vacuum. They are inter- pretable only within a set of ideas; sometimes they exist only within a set of ideas; and they are often interpreted differently by other scientists with different sets of ideas.I9 Data rarely if ever “speak for themselves,” and serve very little function except in the service of a theoretical issue. Since contrasting analytical frameworks are often avail- able, the presentation of data involves some form of advocacy, explaining why the data were collected and what they are adduced to demonstrate.

In other words, there are two com- ponents to a scientific advance (as there are to any element of culture change). One is an individual component, an idea or experimental result; the other is a social component, the dissemination of that work, support for it, and its ultimate adoption or re- jection by the community at large.20.21 A particularly valuable demonstration of this disjunction has recently been

given for the polymerase chain reaction in molecular genetics22

If science were a simple march forward to the truth, there would be no need to make t h s distinction, for all good ideas would promptly be recog- nized and accepted, and all bad ideas would not. And yet, obviously, sometimes wrong ideas are widely accepted and right ideas are These tem- porary derailments of the truth train reveal aspects of the workings of science that are independent of the workings of nature.

In molecular genetics, for example, it was shown elegantly in 1944 that the hereditary material most likely is DNA, not protein.24 Yet the community of interest failed to accept this conclusion until a different set of experiments, no more elegant, were published in 1952.25 This eight-year lag has been attributed in large part to the forceful opposition of biochemist A.E. Mirsky to the idea of DNA as the hereditary material.26

Science takes place in a social ma- trix of power, position, and influence. To ignore that is to miss many of the interesting questions in its hstory and development, and to misrepresent how contemporary science works. Aside from the obvious clout wielded by powerful individuals in the community to shape scientific opinion, there are also ideological considerations of a more general nature that in- tervene between a good idea and its acceptance. Gregor Mendel’s ideas, for example, published in the 186Os, failed to take adequate account of what contemporary scientists saw as the intimate relationship between heredity and development, which would not be conceptually divorced for several decades. Mendel’s work examined heredity without development, and consequently made little sense. By the turn of the century, in the context of a clear distinction between germ and soma (i.e., reproductive and bodily tis- sue), Mendel’s work could be understood, precipitating its rediscovery and appreciation.27 28

There can thus never really be ideas “ahead of their time,” whether they be Dart’s promotion of an isolated child’s Austvalopithecus skull as a “missing link”29 or Wegener’s promotion of con- tinental drift in the absence of a

8 Evolutionary Anthropology ISSUES

mechanism for it.30 Scientific facts are contingent facts. They are specific to a time, place, technology, ideology, and working conditions. General relativity theory and the chromosome theory of inheritance could not have been devel- oped in ancient Rome. Were an Ein- stein or a Morgan time-transported to ancient Rome to present them, the theories would be incomprehensible, undocumentable, and rejected. At best they might be seen in retrospect as overlooked “ideas before their time.”

All cultures have rational explanations for things, and the scientific explanation for the same things, being bound to ideology and technology, may not be at all self-evident. The an- thropologist Bronislaw Malinowski found himself unable to convince the natives of the Trobriand Islands of the relationship between sex and procrea- tion, not so much through his own scientific incompetence, but by virtue of the cleverness of the arguments his ad- versaries presented, and by the power of their own (nevertheless inaccurate) explanati~n.~l

Likewise, the Micronesian who doubted the heliocentric solar system on very rational grounds:

I am well aware of the foreigner’s claim that the earth moves and the sun stands still, as someone once told us; but this we cannot believe, for how else could it hap- pen that in the morning and eve- ning the sun burns less hot than in the day? It must be because the sun has been cooled when it emerges from the water, and to- wards setting it again approaches the water. And furthermore, how can it be possible that the sun re- mains still when we are yet able to observe that in the course of the year, it changes position relative to the stars?32

REASON, REALITY, AND SCIENCE

Rationality is thus not the same as empirical validity. Science is “reality- driven,” but only in the long run. Sci- ence is “rational,” but within limits. So, of course are other belief systems. Scientists of the nineteenth century saw a progression in intellectual history from magic or superstition to re- ligion to ~c ience .3~~6 The arrogance of

this position lies in the empirical fact that, unlike stone tools, superstition is still with us, and apparently as strong as ever.

Whether it is on the baseball dia- mond or in the molecular biology laboratory, participants in our culture (and in all cultures) harbor supersti- tious beliefs and carry out supersti- tious actions. Why? Obviously, these fill a role for people in ordinary situ- ations to which science is inadequate.

Is this scandalous? Hardly. It is less an expression of general stupidity or intellectual backsliding than it is the consequence of an inaccurate and

Science is “rational,” but within limits. So, of course, are other belief systems.

nonanthropological view of human behavior. It is not that science has re- placed superstition. It is, rather, that we hold concurrent parallel belief systems, with different functions and different effects. People who read horoscopes do not necessarily believe that the stars determine their fates, and people who avoid mentioning a no-hitter to a pitcher in the eighth in- ning do not necessarily believe that their utterances can affect the out- come. The remonstrations of scientists notwith~tanding,~’ our daily lives are filled with unscientific actions and thoughts. Some may be interesting, some amusing, and even some enrich- ing, though not necessarily in a rational intellectual sense.

The idea of people leading all aspects of their lives by scientific princi- ples has been attractive to utopian

but in the last two centuries most attempts to implement reforms in that direction have failed. For example, decimal time-keeping (as opposed to, for example, the 24-hour day, 60- minute hour, and 7-day week) was un- successful following the French Revolution’s attempt to establish a sci-

entific society and following the Soviet Revolution’s attempt to do the same.39

Conceptions of what scientific ra- tionalities should govern modern Iives are invariably strongly culture bound. The American geneticist Charles Dav- enport envisioned a scientific society in which people would “fall in love in- telligently”40 Not only were the eugenicists attempting to impose a cold rationalism upon a fundamentally inappropriate substrate, but their idea of scientifically intelligent mating essentially excluded any partner who was not wealthy, abstemious, and Nor- dic. Davenport’s influential eugenic ideas were nevertheless temporally sandwiched between two more fa- mous doctrines involving the advocacy of scientific rationality on the citizenry: Social Darwinism4’ and Rassei.rhygiene.42 And thus, somewhat paradoxically, a year after champion- ing biology at the Scopes trial, Clarence Darrow was bashing it, con- demning the “age of meddling, pre- sumption, and gross denial of all individual feelings and emotions.. .. Amongst the schemes for remolding society [eugenics] is the most sense- less and impudent that has ever been put forward by irresponsible fanatics to plague a long-suffering race.”43

This does not mean that the imposi- tion of scientific rationality in general life is wrong, only that one needs to consider its track record before plat- ing one’s bets. Utopian scientific vi- sions notwithstanding, the ridicule to which hyper-rationalism is subjected in science-fiction plots (a random episode of “Star Trek” will serve) shows the consistent theme that such hyper- rationalism represents an incomplete personality, something less-than-humanity, if not fundamentally contrary to human nature. Perhaps, indeed, the sciences can learn about human nature from the humanities.

SCIENCE, EVOLUTION, AND WORLD-VIEW

A scientific explanation has the goal of empirical validity Other explanations also have that as a goal among others, but what makes modern science unique is that it is the only goal. For example, all cultures have origin myths to explain how people came to exist. Evolution is the origin myth that

ISSUES Evolutionary Anthropology 9

maps on to reality most completely. On the other hand, unlike many other origin myths, it does little to affirm one’s sense of individual worth or importance, to provide codes of morality or standards of conduct, or to evoke strong emotional bonds of solidarity to a community.

If we accept science’s criterion that empirical validity is the only standard, then science’s theory wins. But that is an obviously rigged game. The fact that many Americans are uncomfort- able with the scientific origin myth di- rectly implies that they have other criteria by which to judge it, even if scientists do not. If one wishes to learn the scientific explanation for things, evolution is it, but there is consider- able ideological baggage associated with compelling nonscientists to think as scientists.44 It may be worth reflect- ing on the implications of denying people the other qualities that nonsci- entific origin myths provide.45

This is not to defend creationism, with which fundamentalist Christians seek to subvert science education. Representing creationism as science is quite simply fraudulent. But it is crucial to note that science provides a re- stricted set of answers to a very large set of questions that people in all cd - tures have, and that science can easily be judged inadequate if we look be- yond the sole criterion of empirical valid it^.^^ Science has only recently and marginally come to consider its re- sponsibilities, and in our culture the responsibility that comes with telling people authoritatively that they are unimportant in the universe47 should be a large one.

And it may be worth considering as a question of scientific ethics whether, without considering the ramifica- tions, in an insecure world, science can actually be doing more harm than good to people in actively undermin- ing their images of self-worth in a be- nevolent cosmos. Perhaps the teaching of science as one set of ideas about the universe that follow a particular historical development and serve a particular function-in other words, a humanistic, anthropological approach to science-may be a more effective way of getting its central mes- sage across, rather than asserting science aggressively in opposition to

whatever else is popularly and igno- rantly believed. Teaching how scientists think about science is a fundamentally different goal than compelling people to think as scientists do (or as they are supposed to).

THE ULTIMATE ETHNOCENTRISM

Science is the truest explanation of things that we have. Scientists are ex- perts, and the product of science- technology-works.

On the other hand, scientists of every generation believe that, and their graduate students ultimately correct their mistakes. Science is a self-correcting process. If science were true, it stands to reason that it would not require constant correcting. If only the minor fringes of science were being corrected, it might be supposed that the number of active scientists would dwindle as the number of problems solved increases and the number of problems remaining decreases. And yet there are more scientists now than have ever been. On the face of it, this seems difficult to reconcile with the proposition that as science marches onward it success- fully closes the doors on the problems it has addressed.

Science has provided answers to fundamental questions about nature. Yet paradoxically, the characteristic of an intellectually vigorous field is that its core concepts are in dispute or flux as, for example, ‘‘~pecies’’~8~~9 and “gene”50,51 are in systematic and molecular biology, respectively. Nature may be out there, but she is often difficult to identify.52 Certainly, then, it is unwise and misleading to confuse the fact that we can teach undergraduates to memorize simple definitions for unadorned natural phenomena with the nonfact that those simple definitions are adequate and true.

The history of science is to a large extent the discernment of the “more right” alternative out of the many “more wrong” alternatives. That implies that at any time there are many more wrong scientific ideas out there than right ones. If science proceeds by “conjecture and refutationffs3 or “pro- posal and disposal,”54 and many more ideas are proposed than are disposed, it follows that most scientific ideas in existence at any time are wrong. They

will be disposed, refuted, or modified in the normal course of the fields pro- gress.

Is it fair, then, for scientists to tell citizens of our nation, or of any nation, “You are wrong and we are right”? This is an ideological position widely held by powerful societies in confrontation with the beliefs of less powerful societies. It is the rawest form of ethnocentrism.

Is ethnocentrism wrong?55,56 It is certainly an ineffective way of getting people to like you or respect you. It is an effective way of getting people to fear and resent you. If science adopts such a stance, it is not terribly difficult to predict the reaction it will engender.

A reasonable alternative to the eth- nocentric presentation of science is to present science in an anthropological framework. In other words, to present science not so much as the one true answer in opposition to the many false ones (which has a familiarly evangeli- cal if intolerant appeal), but as an answer constructed within a particular cultural framework, satisfying certain criteria well (notably empirical validity) but other meaningful criteria poorly.

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0 1996 Wiley-Liss. Inc

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the anthropology of science part i: science as a humanity

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