The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 10 | Issue 21 | Number 2 | Article ID 3755 | May 19, 2012

1

World War Zero? Re-assessing the Global Impact of theRusso-Japanese War 1904-05　　第０次世界大戦？１９０４−１９０５年日露戦争の世界的影響を再評価する

Gerhard Krebs

World War Zero? Re-assessing the GlobalImpact of the Russo-Japanese War1904-05

Gerhard Krebs

On the occasion of its centennial, the Russo-Japanese War drew great attention amonghistorians who organized many symposia andpublished numerous studies. What have beenthe recent perspectives, debates and insightson the historical impact of the Russo-JapaneseWar on the imperial world order, evolution ofinternational society, and global intellectualh i s tory? Gerhard Krebs prov ides acomprehensive historiographical essayintroducing the major works published in thelast ten years on the world-historical impact ofthe Russo-Japanese War, including works inJapanese, Russian, English and German.

The Russo-Japanese War, 1904-5: A Collectionof Eight Volumes. Compiled & Introduced byIan Nish. Folkstone: Global Oriental 2003(hereafter: Nish).

Rotem Kowner, Historical Dictionary of theRusso-Japanese War. Lanham, Md.: ScarecrowPress 2006 (hereafter: Kowner/Dictionary).

Josef Kreiner, ed., Der Russisch-JapanischeKrieg (1904/05). Bonn: Bonn University Press2005 (hereafter: Kreiner).

John W. Steinberg, Bruce M. Menning, DavidSchimmelpenninck van der Oye, David Wolff

and Yokote Shinji, eds., The Russo-JapaneseWar in Global Perspective: World War Zero.Bd,1, Leiden: Brill 2005. (History of Warfare,Vol. 29) (hereafter: Steinberg).

David Wolff, Steven B. Marks, Bruce W.Menning, David Schimmelpenninck van derOye, John W. Steinberg and Yokote Shinji, eds.,The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective:World War Zero. Vol. 2, Ibid. 2007. (History ofWarfare, Vol. 40) (hereafter: Wolff).

Maik Hendrik Sprotte, Wolfgang Seifert andHeinz-Dietrich Löwe, ed., Der Russisch-Japanische Krieg 1904/ 05. Anbruch einerneuen Zeit? Wiesbaden, Harassowitz Verlag2007. (hereafter: Sprotte).

Rotem Kowner, ed., The Impact of the Russo-Japanese War. London and New York:Routledge 2007. (Routledge Studies in theModern History of Asia, Vol. 43) (hereafter:Kowner/Impact).

Rotem Kowner., ed., Rethinking the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-05. Vol. I: CentennialPerspectives. Folkstone: Global Oriental 2007(hereafter: Kowner/Rethinking).

John Chapman and Inaba Chiharu, eds.,Rethinking the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-05.Vol. II: The Nichinan Papers. Folkestone:Global Oriental Ltd 2007 (hereafter:Chapman/Inaba).

Cemil Aydin, The Politics of Anti-Westernism inAsia: Visions of World Order in Pan-Islamic andPan-Asian Thought. New York: Columbia

APJ | JF 10 | 21 | 2

2

University Press 2007 (hereafter: Aydin,Politics).

Cemil Aydin, “A Global Anti-Western Moment?The Russo-Japanese War, Decolonization andAsian Modernity”, Sebastian Conrad andDominic Sachsenmaier, eds., Competing Viewsof World Order: Global Moments andMovements, 1880s-1930s. New York: PalgraveMacmillan 2007 (hereafter: Aydin, Global).

Hirama Yōichi, Nichi-Ro sensō ga kaetasekaishi. “Samurai” Nihon no isseiki [TheWorld History, Changed by the Russo-JapaneseWar. One Century of the “Samurai”-NationJapan]. Tōkyō: Fuyō Shobō 2004 (hereafter:Hirama).

Gunjishigakkai hen [Study Society for MilitaryHistory, ed.], Nichi-Ro sensō [The Russo-Japanese War], Vol. I: Kokusaiteki bunmyaku[The international Context]. Tōkyō: Kinseisha2004 (also Vol. 40, 2/3, = Nos. 158/159 of theJourna l Gun j i sh igaku ) (herea f te r :Gunjishigakkai I).

Ibid., Vol. II : Tatakai no shisō to isan[Comprehensive Aspects and the Heritage ofthe Fight]. Ibid. 2005 (= Gunjishigaku Vol. 41,1/2, = Nos. 161/162) (hereafter: GunjishigakkaiII).

Nichi-Ro sensō kenkyūkai hen [ResearchSociety on the Russo-Japanese War, ed.], Nichi-Ro sensō no shin-shiten [New Aspects of theRusso-Japanese War]. Yokohama: Seibunsha2005. (hereafter: Nichi-Ro sensō).

Alex Marshall, The Russian General Staff andAsia, 1800-1917. London and New York:Routledge 2006. (Routledge Studies in theHistory of Russia and Eastern Europe, 4)(hereafter: Marshall, Staff).

Felix Patrikeeff and Harold Shukman, Railwaysand the Russo-Japanese War: TransportingWar. London and New York: Routledge 2007(hereafter: Patrikeeff/Shukman).

Martin Aust and Ludwig Steindorff, eds.,Russland 1905. Perspektiven auf die ersteRussische Revolution. Frankfurt/M.: Peter Lang2007 (hereafter: Aust/Steindorff).

Renée Worringer, ed., The Islamic Middle Eastand Japan: Perceptions, Aspirations, and theBirth of Intra-Asia Modernity. Princeton: NJ,Markus Wiener 2007 (= Princeton Papers:Interdisciplinary Journal of Middle EasternStudies, 14, 2007) (hereafter: Worringer).

Shimazu Naoko, Japanese Society at War:Death, Memory and the Russo-Japanese War.Cambridge University Press 2009 (hereafterShimazu).

Steven Ericson and Allen Hockley, eds., TheTreaty of Portsmouth and its Legacies.Hanover, New Hampshire: Dartmouth CollegePress 2008 (hereafter: Ericson/Hockley).

Matsumura Masayoshi, Baron Kaneko and theRusso-Japanese War, 1904-5: A Study in thePublic Diplomacy of Japan. Morrisville, NorthCarolina: Lulu Press 2009 (hereafterMatsumura).

Turning Points and Historiography

At the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War, noone outside Japan had envisaged a Russiandefeat. Indeed, the very existence of theTennō’s empire appeared endangered. TheJapanese victory, however, was immediatelyrecognized as a turning point in world history.For the first time in modern history an Asiannation had defeated a European great power.Japan immediately became an important actorin world politics. The impact of the war took ona regional and global character, opening theway to a new constellation of powers andbecoming a prelude to World War I. In their co-edited volumes, Steinberg and Wolff refer to“World War Zero.” The Russo-Japanese Warwas a forerunner of the trench and fortificationwarfare on the Western Front in 1914-18 (K.Hildebrand in Kreiner) and of the sacrifice of

APJ | JF 10 | 21 | 2

3

mass armies in offensive as well as defensivewarfare (J. W. Steinberg et al. in Steinberg pp.xix-xxi): For example, Port Arthur may be seenas a test ground for Verdun. Likewise theRussian revolution of 1905, which grew out ofthe war, in important ways anticipated theOctober Revolution of 1917 (J. W. Steinberg etal. in Steinberg pp. xix-xxi) – and the end ofmonarchies in the defeated nations. Japaneseauthors use such titles as “The Russo-JapaneseWar as World History” and “The Century of theRusso-Japanese War,” a war that was followedby a chain reaction. Shillony/Kowner in KownerR e t h i n k i n g ( p . 4 ) a n d K o w n e r i nChapman/Inaba also interpret the conflict of1904-05 as a path to World War I, since itchanged the balance of power in Europe byleading to the Entente and finally the Triple-Entente, thereby isolating Germany and leadingto a large-scale arms race. In contrast to laterwars, however, no other countries were drawninto the Russo-Japanese conflict. Therefore, thewar did not assume the character of total war,as R. Kowner in Kowner/Impact (p. 4) stresses.

J. W. Steinberg et al. (in Steinberg pp. xix-xxi)also conclude that global conflicts started, notin 1914, but with the Russo-Japanese War,which was fought on foreign territory, financedto a large extent by foreign money, and forwhich other countries provided most of theships and weapons. Peace was also concludedon foreign territory. Furthermore, despiteseveral declarations of neutrality, the variousalliance systems made themselves felt, and thewar stirred up national passions in colonialterritories and among the population underRussian rule in Eastern Europe.

R. Kowner (Dictionary p. XIII) complains thatthe Russo-Japanese War was largely forgottenafter the first boom years following the peacetreaty. At the centenary, however, historianspromoted a second boom, with Kowner as oneof the main instigators.

The War’s Impact on Revolutionary and

Democratic Currents

Japan was more democratic than Russia, havinga constitution and an elected parliament,political parties and a legal opposition, greaterfreedom of the press and a population with abroad education (Shil lony/Kowner inKowner/Rethinking p. 8). Therefore, forRussian society, defeat in the war wascompelling proof of the bankruptcy of rule bypolice and a reactionary bureaucracy. Lenin inexile rejoiced at the fall of Port Arthur, not onlyas weakening the regime of Tsar Nicholas II,but also as the triumph of progressive Asia overreactionary Europe and as the victory of theoppressed against the oppressors (F. R.Dickinson in Steinberg pp. 523-24). Strangely,after World War I, Japanese Marxists criticisedJapan’s war as “imperialist” in Lenin’s sense (I.Chiba in Wolff p. 369). The coincidence of warand revolution prevented Russia from fightingat full strength against both Japan and internalsocial strata. The long war, which ended indefeat and imposed heavy hardships on theRussian people, led to the first Russianrevolution, which in the Western imagination issymbolized by the story of the armored cruiserPotemkin. J. Kusber in Kowner/Rethinkingdeals with the unrest among the demobilizedsoldiers, many of whom mutinied andimplanted a revolutionary spirit in thepopulation, particularly the farmers, withimplications that extended to 1917. In anearlier monograph Kowner demonstrated theinterrelationship of the Russo-Japanese Warand the first revolution in the Tsar’s empire.

APJ | JF 10 | 21 | 2

4

The Russo-Japanese War was closely followedby a globalized media. Depicted in countlesscartoons such as this.

J. Bushnell, in Steinberg, views the revolutionand the mass strikes as the beginning of theroad to the October manifesto of 1905, whenthe Tsar felt compelled to guarantee civil rightsand a parliament (Duma) with legislativeauthority. Even before that date Nicholas II hadappointed the relatively liberal Sergei Witte aspresident of the ministers’ council, therebystrengthening his position as head of theRussian delegation at the PortsmouthConference to resolve the issues of the Russo-Japanese War (see also Schimmelpenninck inKowner/Rethinking p. 41). Before that timeRussia had been the only European powerwithout a constitution; one was finally enactedin 1906 with the Basic Law of the Stategranting voting rights, a parliament (Duma)and a Council of Ministers (Binder-Iijima inSprotte pp. 10-11). Within months, however,the reforms were restricted, and Witte lost hisposition (D. Dahlmann in Kreiner; D. McDonaldin Steinberg; J. Frankel in Kowner/Impact).H.D. Löwe in Sprotte (pp. 41-42) sees a parallelbetween the changes of 1905-06 and the firstreform movement resulting from the defeat in

the Crimean War of 1863-66. That movement,too, lost some of its vigor later.

The victory of Japan, a constitutional monarchy,over autocratic Russia also strengthenedmovements for a constitutional policy in suchcountries as Iran. Russia was so busy with herinternal conflicts and the war that she could nolonger back the Shah’s autocratic regime andcould not continue its centuries-long meddlingin the affairs of the neighboring country. Thisnew situation strengthened the position ofIranian revolutionaries, who interpretedJapan’s victory as a triumph of democracy andnow, following the model of the Russianrevolution, viewed as a mass uprising against atyranny, demanded a constitution and aparliament. The shah, facing growing unrest,agreed on August 5, 1906, but limited the rightto vote to a small minority (see Bieganiec inKowner/Rethinking; Hirama pp. 134-35).Developments in Russia and in Iran werejealously watched by reform-minded officials inTurkey, who perceived them as a provocationto their own superiority and pride, since theOttoman Empire had enacted a constitution asearly as 1876 and established a parliament oneyear later, though the sultan had suspendedthese reforms in 1878. Turkey had observedthe war with great interest, since Russia wasseen as the greatest enemy of the OttomanEmpire; officially, Turkey remained neutral, attimes even adopting an attitude of benevolentneutrality towards Russia in order not toprovoke St. Petersburg; any news of the warwas censored,. This policy is described by D.Akarca in Kowner/Rethinking, but the authordemonstrates that in Turkish public opinionand in intellectual circles there was greatenthusiasm for Japan, and not only becauseJapan was defeating the enemy, Russia, butalso because of Japan’s rise against the West.The revolutionary Young Turks’ press in exilealso rejoiced at “progressive” Japan’s victoryover ”reactionary” Russia; thus they indirectlyattacked their own government. The sultanfound himself in a precarious situation. Though

APJ | JF 10 | 21 | 2

5

he also welcomed the military defeat of his archenemy, Russia, he is said to have regretted thesetback to the autocratic form of government,the more so as he feared the spread ofrevolutionary currents (see also H. Nezi-Akmeşe in Worringer pp. 67-70). Thatcircumstance Turkey, too, as in 1908 the YoungTurks enforced the reinstallation of theconstitution.

In Polit ics, Aydin offers a rare globalperspective on the various ways religioustradition and the experience of Europeancolonialism interacted with Muslim and non-Muslim discontent concerning Western-dominated globalization, the internationalorder and modernization. With a comparativefocus on Ottoman pan-Islamic and Japanesepan-Asian visions of world order from themiddle of the nineteenth century to the end ofWorld War II, he offers a global-historicalperspective on modern anti-Western critiques,Aydin gives full treatment to the Russo-Japanese War, but he concludes that the anti-Western movement in both countries startedmuch earlier, with Christian-Islamic tensions inthe case of Turkey and racial antagonisms inthe case of Japan. In this strained atmospherethe Russo-Japanese War delivered a blowleading to the liberation of both societies. Itempowered the claims of non-Westernintellectuals in the debates about race, theOrient, and progress and provided thestrongest evidence against the discourse ofpermanent and eternal superiority of the whiterice over the colored races.

A contemporary Russian cartoon of the war.

This led to an increase of pan-Islamic thoughtin Turkey and pan-Asian ideology in Japan, andto growing self-confidence in other regions ofAsia, where underdevelopment came to beviewed as merely a temporary delay in progressthat could be altered by reforms, such as thoseMeiji Japan had implemented in just threedecades (Aydin, Politics pp. 9-10). ThoughJapanese pan-Asianists were mainly inopposition to their government until the late1920s, they gained influence in the 1930s withtheir claim that, given the superiority of Asiancivilization against the declining West, it wasbetter for Japan to be the leader of a future freeAsia than to be simply a yellow-race partnerdiscriminated against in the club of white greatpowers. Eventually the pan-Asian idea would beused to achieve the aims of Japaneseimperialism under the slogan invented inTōkyō: “Return to Asia” (ibid. pp. 11, 160-89).

Aydin proves that even before the Russo-Japanese War contacts and cooperation existedbetween such pan-Islamists as AbdurresidIbrahim and anti-Western Japanese pan-Asianists, such as Tōyama Mitsuru, UchidaRyōhei and Inukai Tsuyoshi; these onlyintensified thereafter (Politics pp. 83-89). TheRussians, who had fought the war under thebanner of Christ ianity and had beenencouraged in that stance by Wilhelm II and

APJ | JF 10 | 21 | 2

6

other German propagandists, had to recognizethat, together with nationalism, three majornon-Western world religions—Islam, Buddhism,and Hinduism—experienced a reawakening andrevival in the aftermath of the Russo-JapaneseWar (Aydin, Politics p. 78).

Similarly, Turkish enthusiasm for Japan forracial reasons is dealt with by Bieganiec inKowner/Rethinking. Intellectuals weresympathetic to the victory of an Asian nationover a European one, since they accused theWestern countries of treating the Turks,together with the “yellow” Japanese, as beingat the bottom of the racial hierarchy. Now theTurks would also recover their pride. Thereseemed to be clear evidence that modernizationneed not necessarily mean Westernization (soalso Hirama pp. 126-30).

In Worringer, the author maintains thatprovincial Arab elites under Ottoman ruleviewed Japanese ancestral rites as a pattern forMuslims to emulate in revering their Arabforefathers. Their admiration for Japan,however, had a negative effect on Turkey: theArabs gained neither cultural recognition as aspecial group within the empire nor a share inreal political power. As a result, they deepenedtheir identity as Arabs, and the discourse onJapanese modernity in the pages of the Arabicpress shifted to a politicized critique ofOttoman failures in comparison with Japanesesuccesses, particularly in the area of education.

D. Akarca, in Kowner/Rethinking, mentions thatTurkey dispatched an officer as militaryobserver, Colonel Pertev Demirhan, to theJapanese, while Russia refused to consent tosuch an endeavor. For this episode the readerwould have welcomed a more detailednarrative. Since Japan and Turkey had nodiplomatic relations, German interventionbecame necessary. Pertev was lucky to be ableto count on an influential mediator, GeneralColmar Freiherr von der Goltz, who in 1883-96had been in the service of the Ottoman

government for the modernization of theTurkish army. Not only was Goltz Pertev’sformer superior, a deep friendship also existedbetween them. The German general succeededin convincing the sultan to dispatch Pertev tothe Far Eastern war theatre. He furtherprovided letters of recommendation to theJapanese army in favor of Pertev, who wasattached to the staff of General Nogi Maresuke.Remaining near the front, he was evenwounded once. From there he carried on anextensive correspondence with Goltz, writing inGerman, and visited him in Königsberg on hisway back to Turkey. In this way the Germanmilitary obtained first-hand reports about thecourse of war. Goltz, as impressed by theJapanese military achievements as was hisformer student, recommended the Tennō’sempire as a model for Turkey, since it haddemonstrated that the necessary fighting spiritcould enable a weaker nation to defeat astronger one. It is therefore small wonder thatan enthusiastic Pertev prophesied that theOttoman Empire would in the near future risewith the same brilliance as Japan.

H. Nezir-Akmeşe, in Worringer, stresses theobvious cultural significance of militarytraditions in both countries—the samurai codein Japan and the warrior ethos in Ottomansociety. It is therefore no surprise that theOttoman armed forces looked to Japan for ideason how to integrate the military into themodern state. Seeing developments in theTennō’s empire, they believed it possible that inTurkey the army could also function as an eliteguard to protect the country, educate themasses and guide the state polity intomodernity. Many of the figures influenced bythe Japanese example in their earlier days atthe military War College, including MustafaKemal Atatürk and Ismet Inönü, were amongthe leaders who, after the First World War,founded and nurtured the Turkish Republic, Incontrast, before 1908, as the author stresses,the army had been kept under firm politicalcontrol by the ruling sultan, and any political

APJ | JF 10 | 21 | 2

7

activity on the part of officers or men had beenseverely repressed. The turning point camewith the constitutional monarchy, in which thereigning sultan and his ministers would becontrolled by an elected parliament. The YoungTurks believed that traditional Turkish moralvalues, and in particular Turkish martial values,such as courage and readiness for self-sacrifice, were the bedrock of a powerful armyand nation. Western science, technology andmethods of organization must be adopted, butEastern moral values must be maintainedalongside them. Japan’s success over theRussians was invoked as justification for thisview. The Young Turks argued that theJapanese had combined their indigenous moralvalues with an imitation of Western technicalimprovements and had thereby achieved theircurrent power and status. This perfectcombination of old and new, manifested in theJapanese army, was worthy of emulation(Nezir-Akmeşe in Worringer pp. 65-66).

Emperor of Japan and his British and Americanwell-wishers according to a Russian cartoon.

The contribution of E. Binder-Iijima in Sprotteon the “oriental question,” centering on theBalkans, also covers Turkey. The authorattributes to the Russian defeat in 1905 theBosnian Annexation Crisis of 1908/09, whichanticipated the July Crisis of 1914 in manyrespects and can be viewed as the road to theFirst Word War. At this time, the Tsar’s navyhad its main base in the Black Sea, where itcontrolled its only fleet that still deserved thename. To reach the open sea, however, it hadto pass though the Turkish straits. Meanwhile,Russia was defending the interests of Serbia onthe issue of Bosnia-Herzegovina, controlled byAustria-Hungary. According to the treaty ofBerlin, signed in 1878, Bosnia Herzegovina wasstill under Ottoman jurisdiction and the YoungTurks’ revolution of 1908 reinforced the oldconstitution, which included this Austria-Hungarian controlled area. Russian aimsconcerning the straits, however, failed becauseof British opposition, and Russian approval ofthe annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina byAustria-Hungary in 1908 was followed by asharp protest from Serbia. In the end empty-handed, St. Petersburg experienced a“diplomatic Tsushima“ (Binder-Iijima p. 13).

After Japan’s victory over Russia, China alsoexperienced a certain enthusiasm for Japan. A.Li (in Wolff p. 503) goes so far as to speak ofthe “shock waves” that were running throughevery level of Chinese society. Throughout thecountry, pride was felt because of the successof the Japanese victory over a European greatpower; by contrast Russia earned contempt.The euphoria led to the end of the Chinesemonarchy, which was unable to reformsuccessfully. The imperial government, headingfor the revolution of 1911 and a phase ofmodernization, was now frequently comparedto the weakened tsarist regime. Many Chinesewent to study at Japanese universities, andofficers to attend the military academy. So,

APJ | JF 10 | 21 | 2

8

from 1908 to 1910, did Chiang Kai-shek, whoas the future leader of the Kuomintang wouldrule the country for a considerable period Militarization also appeared as a path tostrengthen China. Sun Yat-sen, the father of theChinese revolution, rejoiced at the Japanesevictory (G. Müller in Sprotte pp. 210-11,230-31; Hirama pp. 105-11; Aydin, Politics pp.72-73). The constitutional movement in Chinareceived fresh impetus. Constitutionalistsargued that Japan’s status as a constitutionalstate had led to her victory over an autocracyand therefore had made her the model for a“revolution from above” (H.Z. Schiffrin inKowner/Impact; G. Müller in Sprotte pp.216-19; A. Li in Wolff pp. 503-04). Meanwhile,the first Russian revolution of 1905 alsoexerted great influence on Sun’s nationalistmovement. In the same year the first politicalparty in China was founded, and thefoundations established for a constitutionalmonarchy. Government reforms includedestablishment of an elected assembly. In themeantime Sun Yat-sen was looking for politicala l l i e s i n T ō k y ō ( H . Z . S c h i f f r i n i nKowner/Impact; Y. Shichor in Kowner/Impactpp. 213-16).

Russo-Japanese War Battle Maps

The war a l so s t rengthened Japan ’sconstitutional system, Prince Saionji Kinmochibecame the first Japanese prime ministerappointed on the basis of political partyleadership (the Seiyūkai), in contrast to allprevious prime ministers, who belonged to theoligarchy dominating the state. Furthermore,public opinion attained greater weight, sincepopular discontent had erupted in connectionwith the 1905 Portsmouth treaty concludingthe Russo-Japanese War. The governmentbecame more and more dependent on theLower House, which had to approve thebudget, first for warfare and later forpeacetime rearmament. As a result, theoligarchs increasingly made compromises andentered into alliances with the political parties.This was a prelude to the “Taishō democracy“which emerged after World War I. These eventsare descr ibed by N. Ovsyannikov inKowner/Rethinking. Itō Yukio wrote a

APJ | JF 10 | 21 | 2

9

monograph on the influence of the war withRussia on the development of the constitutionalstate in Japan. He is of the opinion that if ItōHirobumi had not resigned from his position aspresident of the Seiyūkai in July 1903 tobecome president of the Privy Council, hisparty would have continued its efforts for anabatement of tensions with Russia and mighthave avoided war. The new prime minister,Katsura Tarō, and his foreign minister, KomuraJūrarō, in contrast, were convinced that anunderstanding with Russia would only postponethe conflict that was in any case inevitable.This topic was thoroughly discussed by Y.Teramoto, in Ericson/Hockley, who argued thatthe cabinet came under strong pressure fromthe army, making war increasingly likely.

In Kowner/Impact, R. Kowner views the war asa continuity of the preceding Meiji policy ratherthan as a caesura in Japanese history. He thusdiffers from most other authors. He alsostresses the extent of the mi l i tary’sintervention in politics, enforcing large-scalerearmament as result of the achievements inthe war . (pp . 40 -42) . Y . Sh ichor , inKowner/Impact, deals with a certainradicalization that was undoubtedly noticeablein Japan. Though he perceives some critique ofthe war from the Socialist camp, he concludesthat as in Europe in World War I, nationalidentity largely overshadowed class identity.Eventually this resulted in the fragmentation ofthe Socialist movement. Furthermore, theincreasing military successes had weakenedpacifism, and many former Socialists hadentered the nationalist camp. In the process anational-socialist movement in the true sense ofthe word had developed; its most prominentideologue became Kita Ikki, an agitator whosubsequently was held responsible for themilitary coup d´état of February 1936 and wassentenced to death. Christians, Shichormaintains, had also become increasinglypatriotic to avoid being regarded any longer asthe “fifth column” of the West.

On the other hand, St. Lone detects very strongantimilitaristic and pacific voices in MeijiJapan—sentiments that had been silenced onlytemporarily by national passion, particularlyduring the war with Russia, but had beenrevived immediately after the conclusion ofpeace. They were particularly strong in ruralareas, where conscription, war injuries and taxincreases imposed greater hardships than werefelt in the big cities. In Ericson/Hockley, S.Konishi finds a similar tendency amongintellectuals, expressed in an antiwarmovement and anarchism. Their circle alsoestablished contact with such similarly mindedRussian intellectuals as Pyotr Kropotkin andLev Tolstoi. For them, war and imperialismwere simply inhumane (similarly, M.-H. Sprottein Sprotte). Shimazu, in her monograph, alsodemonstrates that an antiwar movement arose,including among other groups journalists -particularly from the newspaper HeiminShinbun - Socialists, pacifists and Christians.

Painting of Admiral Togo on the Bridge of theJapanese Battleship Mikasa before the Battle ofTsushima in 1905

It is surprising that, according to Shimazu, themood of low-level patriotism did not changeduring the victorious campaigns as the result ofofficial hero worship during and after the war.

APJ | JF 10 | 21 | 2

10

The soldiers did not believe themselves to bethe successors of the glorious samurai class butsaw themselves as the underdogs of themodern state. Their loyalty was paid, not toabstract concepts, such as state or throne, butto family and locality, the concrete sources ofindividual identity. The ordinary soldier was notinterested in the “honorable war death” ofgovernment propaganda but wanted to survivein order to return home to continue to fend forhis family. Those who survived received ahero’s welcome, while the fallen soldiers weregiven funeral services and commemorationceremonies by local elites and enshrinementinto the Yasukuni Shrine by the state.

The Impact on Korea and China

In the years following the peace treaty itbecame evident that Korea and China were theprincipal victims of the Russo-Japanese War.This fact was not, however, sufficiently takeninto consideration in the volumes introducedhere, perhaps because few scholars from thesetwo countries are among the authors. At thebeginning of the war Korea was too weak to doanything other than declare her neutrality, asS.-H. Lee in Chapman/Inaba recounts. Thisaction was the continuation of earlier policy,conducted in the hope that tensions betweenRussia and Japan would lead to a balance ofpower between the two rivals. Lee, however,maintains that the Korean emperor and hisgovernment had trusted too much in Russianprotection and leaned too far towards theTsar’s empire, thereby prompting growingpressure from Japan. The result was that Seoulwas forced to conclude an alliance with Japanin February 1904. The expectation that the warwould be limited to Manchuria and concentrateon solving the Manchurian problem, so thatKorea would stay in the shadow of the conflictand preserve her independence, was soondispelled. S. I. (possible reading of the familyname: Yi) in Nichi-Ro sensō characterizesKorean hopes as an illusion born out of theincorrect estimation that Manchuria alone was

the source of the discord leading to the Russo-Japanese War. Eventually, as Lee shows, Koreawas abandoned by both Great Britain, whichhad no significant economic interests there,and the United States, which anticipatedexpanded trade opportunities in a Korea“civilized” by Japan. K. J. Kim in Wolff, as wellas W. Seifert in Sprotte, stresses Americanexpectations in this “civilizing” mission.

Including the prehistory of the conflict, D. Ku inWolff deals with Korea from the end of theSino-Japanese War to the treaty with Tōkyō(1895-1905), a period that is usually called theLost Decade. Ku views Korea’s situation duringthis time as living under the “sword ofDamocles”. After the assassination of the queenin 1895, the Korean monarch soughtrapprochement with the Tsar’s empire. He notonly backed the wrong horse, but also, as theauthor claims, failed to carry out criticalreforms. In this period the country also lostconsiderable sympathy in the Anglo-Saxonnations, which were shocked by the prevailingchaos and the monarch’s ineptitude. The resultwas that Great Britain as well as the UnitedStates were increasingly willing to tolerateJapanese predominance. Both St. Petersburgand Tōkyō had a “fifth column” at the ready inSeoul. N. Kanno in Nichi-Ro sensō uses theexamples of the diplomat Yamaza Enjirō andthe entrepreneur Ōmiwa Chōbei and theircooperation to demonstrate the variety of semi-official and unofficial channels linking Japanand Korea. At the very beginning of the warwith Russia, Japan violated Korea’s neutralityby launching operations from her territory. Thisaction prompted no international protest.According to D. Ku in Wolff, the monarchyunderstood only too late the danger the warposed to Korea’s independence. The reader,however, must question whether there had everbeen a chance to save Korean sovereignty,since the country was betrayed by the wholeworld.

In Wolff, K.-J. Kim presents in greater detail the

APJ | JF 10 | 21 | 2

11

American attitude. Hoping to strengthencooperation with Japan, the United States notonly conceded a free hand to Tōkyō in Koreaduring the Russo-Japanese war but alsosevered the first diplomatic relations withKorea immediately after s igning theprotectorate treaty in 1905. The principle ofthe open door, declared by the USA in 1899,had opposed European colonialism indemanding equal opportunities for economicactivities and trade. The abrogation of theunequal treaties for Korea soon after theconclusion of the Protectorate Treaty did notstrengthen the rights of Seoul but securedJapanese rule at the cost of other great powers(see M. Asano in Nichi-Ro sensō).

H. Seok, in Kowner/Rethinking, sees the roadto the annexation of Korea in 1910 as runningfrom the Russo-Japanese convention of 1907through a second one in 1910, which dividedManchuria into spheres of interest that grantedRussia special rights in Outer Mongolia, amongother agreements. Only then could Japan beassured of a fully free hand from Russia for theannexation of Korea, which in the author’sopinion, was merely a by-product of the policyof rapprochement with St. Petersburg. Thesesecret concessions became public only on thepublication of Russian documents after theOctober Revolution in 1917. Seok maintainsthat even after the Portsmouth treaty, Japanhad to proceed cautiously so as to avoid riskingintervention by other nations and avertinghumiliation as had occurred during the tripleintervention in 1895. How much the annexationof 1910 traumatized the Koreans to this daycan be understood from the contribution of G.Podoler and M. Robinson in Kowner/Impact. Inretrospect, the authors conclude, the complexissues arising from that experience led to anexaggeration of the opposition movement and abelittling of the extent of collaboration.

As for China’s neutrality, decided by thegovernment in Peking as early as the end of1903, it became a problem for Korea, as shown

by Sh. Kawashima in Gunjishigakkai I. Theauthor explores at length the musings of theminister to St. Petersburg, Hu Weide. Hedebated whether a Russian or a Japanesevictory would be more favorable for his countryconcerning the recognition of Chinesesovereignty over Manchuria. He did notimagine that, in case of Japanese victory,Russia would cede all rights and interests inthe contested region, possibly leaving someroom to play both rivals off against each other,while the extent of Tōkyō’s expectations wasunclear. Minister Hu Weide thereforerecommended strict neutrality instead of abenevolent attitude favoring Japan. After theoutbreak of war on February 12, 1904, Chinadeclared her neutrality over her entireterritory. The warring parties, however, had noqualms about violating China’s sovereignty,turning foreign territory into battlefields atwill.

China belatedly realized the danger arisingfrom the Japanese victory in 1905. On a tripthrough the Suez Canal, Sun Yat-sen, acting asa Chinese nationalist, established bonds ofsolidarity with ordinary Egyptians, proudlyaccepting their congratulations on the Japanesetriumph (Aydin, Global pp. 215-16; Aydin,Politics pp. 72-73); he viewed the outcome ofthe war as a victory of Asia over Europe. Theenthusiasm many Chinese intellectuals feltabout Japan is strange in view of the arroganceand disdain the victorious nation showed to the“weak” country, making it clear how stronglyRussia’s weakened position placed China at themercy of the new hegemonic power. A. Li inWolff (p. 491) therefore calls their applausesomewhat naïve, all the more so as the Pekinggovernment had fully recognized the dangerand therefore had earlier urged mediation toprevent the war or at least to bring it to a quickend. Eventually China had insisted, though invain, on participation at the peace conference,a request that is fully dealt with by S. Hirakawain Wolff and in Gunjishigakkai I in a rare studyon this historic chapter about the official policy

APJ | JF 10 | 21 | 2

12

of the Qing/Manchu-Dynasty, which wasfighting for survival. Both warring parties—aswell as President Theodore Roosevelt, whofeared complications if a nation could bring itswishes to bear without belonging to therecognized great powers—declined the Chineserequest to participate. Not even Chineseobservers were admitted. This provoked amassive boycott of American goods in China.Yet the Chinese government had no choice butto accept the terms o f the Treaty o fPortsmouth. At the same time tensions grewbetween China and the United States becauseof US restrictions on Chinese immigration.President Roosevelt’s assertion in the contextof the Portsmouth treaty that he would struggleto maintain China’s integrity had no weight inlight of the power realities in East Asia. ThoughManchuria formally returned to China after theevacuation of Russian troops, it was de facto atempting vacuum for an aggressive greatpower such as Japan, which, because of thecession of the Kwantung leased territory andthe assignment of the South ManchurianRailway by Russia, largely controlled China’snortheast (Kreiner in Kreiner pp. 60-61). Smallwonder then that even those Chinese who wereenthusiastic about Japan’s victory in 1905 weresoon disappointed.

The United States, too, felt deceived by Japan.President Theodore Roosevelt had expectedTōkyō to support his Open Door Policy,particularly in Manchuria. Instead, Japanmoved to exclude other countries fromeconomic activities there just as Russia haddone earlier. Furthermore, Tōkyō and St.Petersburg divided Manchuria into spheres ofinterest that left no space for the United States.C. Oberländer in Kreiner stresses the commoninterest of Japan and Russia in opposition tothe Open Door Policy in China as demanded bythe US. Ironically, Tōkyō, in its rhetoric beforethe war, had justified her determination to goto war with the promise to defend the principleof the Open Door in China against Russianmachinations in order to gain American and

English good will, as Y. Katō in Wolff explains.This argument for free trade, together with therationale of spreading civilization, was alsoused by such moderate Japanese intellectualsas Yoshino Sakuzō to justify an attack against“uncivilized” Russia (Katō in Wolff pp. 222-24).Later Yoshino was to become the model liberalof Taishō democracy.

A Japanese propaganda map depicting Russiaas the “black octopus”

Japanese-American Relations After 1905

All authors view the Russo-Japanese War as aturning point in the deterioration of relationsbetween Tōkyō and Washington (for example,D.A. Ballendorf in Gunjishigakkai II) beingdiametrically opposed to rapprochementbetween Tōkyō and St . Petersburg .Tovy/Halevi, in Kowner/Impact, see the conflictthat ended with the Portsmouth treaty as thebeginning of a Japanese-American cold warover control of the Pacific. This situationpersisted until it burst into hot war inDecember 1941 (see a lso Kowner inKowner/Impact p. 21). Thus the Russo-JapaneseWar influenced the outbreak of the Pacific Warmore crucially than affected World War I. Onecould, however, object to this kind ofdeterminism, premised on the view that overseveral decades all options had remained open.

Kowner, in Kowner/Impact, does not view

APJ | JF 10 | 21 | 2

13

Japan’s rise to great-power status as the resultof the victory over Russia; rather, he views theJapanese empire as a regional power as late as1906. No earlier than World War I, whichforced other nations to limit their engagementin East Asia while China disintegrated, didJapan become a great power or even a worldpower (p. 30). In any case, Japan, whoseexistence had been viewed as a curiosity beforethe war, after its victory over Russia wastreated as an equal by the great powers; all ofthese elevated their legations in Tōkyō to therank of embassies.

The change in the attitude of influentialAmericans from sympathy for underdog Japanto fear of a revival of the “yellow peril” isdemonstrated by J. Henning in Kowner/Impact.According to the author the shock of the victoryover white, Christian Russia was deep and ledto anti -Japanese demonstrations andculminated in immigration restrictions. Y.Hashimoto, in Nichi-Ro sensō, deals with therenewed fear of the “yellow peril”; his exampleis the writer Jack London, who was sent by theHearst Press to Japan immediately before theoutbreak of war but stayed only half a year.London was disappointed that the authoritiestried to keep him from the front in everypossible way; he was apprehended severaltimes on suspicion of espionage. At the sight ofRussian prisoners of war, London developed a“white” solidarity, a sympathy he did not loseover many decades. In 1910 he published abook titled The Unparalleled Invasion, about afictional war of the West against China and hermasses, awakened by the Russo-Japanese Warand modernized under Japanese guidance, tobe fought in 1976 using biological and chemicalweapons. Daniel A. Métraux (“Jack London,Asian Wars and the 'Yellow Peril,'" The Asia-Pacific Journal, 4-3-10, January 25, 2010 (here)has shown that London’s attitude towards EastAsia can be interpreted in a completelydifferent way. In his view, Jack Londondeserves to be remembered as a writer whodirectly confronted Western racism against

Asians, denounced such concepts as the“yellow peril" and showed great sympathy forJapanese and Chinese in his literature. Metrauxnotes how London saw that Asia was in theprocess of waking up and that such countriesas Japan and China would emerge as majoreconomic powers with the capacity to competeeffectively with the West as the twentiethcentury progressed. London even urgedWesterners to make concerted efforts to meetwith Japanese and Chinese so as to understandeach other as equals. The image of theJapanese spread by London’s writings,however, was bad enough to allow use ormisuse of the author for a propaganda movieduring World War II, thirty years after hisdeath. Director Samuel Bronston’s 1943 filmwas based loosely on London’s widowCharmian’s 1921 biography of her husband andstarred Michael O’Shea, Virginia Mayo andSusan Hayward. The movie almost entirelyrestricted London’s life to the months he spentin Korea in 1904 and presented him asprophesying the growing Japanese militarismthat would result in Pearl Harbor. Furthermore,one of the Liberty Ships was named for him.

Even the small minority of Japanophiles, mostlyAmerican missionaries who stressed thealleged higher level of Japanese civilizationcompared with that of the Russians, could notovercome the rising fear based on racism. InKowner/Impact, J. Henning introduces a coupleof strange race theories, both those favoringthe Japanese as well as those criticizing them.Despite the fact that President TheodoreRoosevelt criticized the racist immigration lawsin Hawaii and California—which Washingtonwas helpless to override, since these wereregional decisions—there are indications thathe had an equal dislike of both Russia andJapan and would have preferred that bothcountries slaughter one another, thusexhausting themselves in the war. But whatled to deadly American-Japanese tensions wasthe fact that, as a result of the war of 1904/05both were expanding imperialist nations in the

APJ | JF 10 | 21 | 2

14

Asia-Pacific, so that it was natural that theybecame rivals. In the preceding years theUnited States had acquired or conqueredseveral territories in Asia, notably Hawaii,Midway, Guam and the Philippines. Now theUS was so heavily engaged in East Asia that itchallenged the new great power Japan. Since1907, each state’s naval strategic planningtargeted the other as the most probable enemy(see Hirama pp. 144-56). These growingbilateral tensions also made the alliance withJapan problematic for Great Britain, as Seokpoints out in Kowner/Rethinking. When therenewal of the treaty in 1911 exempted theUnited States as a possible enemy, GreatBritain’s obligation for military assistanceagainst the United States in favor of Japanceased. In the long run, therefore, Great Britainwould have to choose between Japan and theUS as her most important partner; duringWorld War I the decision fell more or lessautomatically in favor of Washington.

The Japanese navy required a principalenemy—or, as constructed in 1907 in the US,“enemy no. 1” was necessary for the Japanesenavy if only to get its plans for rearmamentapproved. With the decline of Russian navalpower, the Tsar’s fleet could no longer serve asthe justification for naval rearmament. Thenavy’s plans, however, met with stiff resistancefrom its rival, the army, for which Russia wasstill the probable main enemy and which alsostruggled for a greater share of the militarybudget. . This rivalry is dealt with by J. C.Schencking in Steinberg; he who particularlydescribes the endeavor, which was temporarilysuccessful, to conclude a political alliance withthe political party Seiyūkai. The navy thusreceived parliamentary support for its ownbudget demands, and, in the person ofYamamoto Gonnohyōe, in 1913 an admiral waseven appointed prime minister. A corruptionscandal involving navy officers who hadreceived bribes from the German Siemenscompany toppled the cabinet the followingyear. The army thereby gained the upper hand,

but could not alone dictate policy and struggledwith the navy for superiority, both trying to usethe political parties for their own purposes.Schencking disputes the opinion, often found inhistoriography, that the navy in contrast to thearmy, “apolitical”.

Despite the fact that American-Japanese rivalrywas becoming obvious, very few predictedJapan’s subsequent policy, which led to war inthe Pacif ic . One of these few was theautodidact Homer Lea, who published his viewas early as 1909. As his foreword explains, hewrote the manuscript immediately after thepeace treaty of Portsmouth but published itonly four years later, so as to see if hishypothesis would be borne out. Lea warnedagainst neglecting American armament in theface of the growing military might of Japan,which would be enabled to open hostilities byconquering the Philippines, Hawaii, Alaska andthe West coast of the United States, fromWashington State to California. As confirmed inDecember 1941, he even correctly predictedthe landing sites for the Japanese invasion ofthe Philippines. Though his book was widelyread in the US, he was treated condescendinglyas a writer of science fiction. After PearlHarbor, he suddenly gained the reputation of afar-sighted prophet, and his work wasimmediately reprinted. In contrast to theUnited States where very few military officerstook him seriously, in Japan, the translation ofhis book became a bestseller and compulsoryreading for naval officers. A short time later,Lee also criticized the short sightedness ofGreat Britain, whose alliance he viewed as agrave mistake: the drive of Russian expansionwould be turned from the Far East to CentralAsia and India. Furthermore, in his opinionJapan had become stronger than the BritishEmpire by the victory of 1905, had won asphere of influence including all Britishterritories in the area, and the situation wasgrowing worse through American indifference.While Lea was not the only one to foresee theJapanese attack. the publications under review

APJ | JF 10 | 21 | 2

15

here pay almost no attention to the PearlHarbor prophets who were fascinated andinfluenced by the Russo-Japanese War; only inscience fiction did a future American-Japanesewar become a frequent theme. While HomerLea is mentioned, if only in passing (P. Towle inKowner/Rethinking p. 328; A. Hashimoto inNichi-Ro sensō pp. 219-20, 227; T. Saitō in Ibid.p. 386), other Pearl Harbor prophets, such asHector C. Bywater und Satō Kōjirō, are notdealt with at all.

The reason for ignoring the impending dangermay be that at the time Japanese policyfollowed a moderate course. In the first cabinetof Prince Saionji Kinmochi, Hayashi Tadasuserved as foreign minister for most of thecritical years 1906-08. His policy is dealt withby Y. Teramoto in Nichi-Ro sensō. Hayashi ischaracterized as an exception among theJapanese policy makers of his time in that headvocated reasonable and rational ideas,including the fair treatment of China. As aformer minister and later ambassador toLondon, he struggled to continue a policy ofclose cooperation with Great Britain and theUS, despite potential tensions. Furthermore, heaimed at preventing Japan’s isolation byseeking better relations with France andRussia. The policy towards the Asian continent,however, was in contradiction to theseinterests since Tōkyō attempted to tighten itsgrip on Manchuria. Hayashi’s diplomacybecame a difficult balancing act.

Japanese-Russian Peace Treaty Signed onSeptember 5, 1905

The Impact of the War on the ColonizedPeoples

An additional reason for deteriorating relationswith the Unites States was the fact that theJapanese victory over Russia made a deepimpression on the people of the US-ruledPhilippines, awakening hopes of independence(Hirama pp. 160-69). Beyond the Philippinesthere emerged worldwide attention to theRusso-Japanese War, which challenged theclaim of the white race to dominate otherpeoples. Asian intellectuals felt particularlyencouraged by the Japanese victory, seeing itas a stimulus for pan-Asianist, pan-Islamic, anti-colonial and anti-imperialistic ideas. The Russo-Japanese War, though itself an imperialistconflict par excellence, ignited the fight againstimperialism in the colonies and half-colonizedcountries, such as China and Korea (so also A.Iriye in Wolff pp. 2-3). As a result, despite greatadmiration for Japan in Europe, many voicesclaimed that their own interests wereendangered by the strengthened empire of theTennō, which had awakened Asia (A. Iikura inC h a p m a n / I n a b a ; G . W e s t e r m a n i nKowner/Rethinking pp. 413-15).

Several contributions in the publications underreview deal with the disappearance of theuniversal v iew that “white rule“ wasirrevocable. The mood of awakening amongcolonized peoples is the focus of Y. Hirama’smonograph on the Russo-Japanese war as aturning point in world politics. In this studyJapan’s military endeavors appear mainly asrebellion against “white colonialism,” begun asearly as the Meij Restoration. Not only had thepeoples of Asia been inspired to independencemovements, but so had Turks, Arabs andAfricans as well as Finns and Poles. Hiramaobviously expects gratitude to Japan from othernations, but he ignores the fact that the victoryof 1905 was a blow for the independence of

APJ | JF 10 | 21 | 2

16

China and even more so for Korea, which hadthe treaty of protection imposed on her in thesame year. The author’s justification is thatKorea would unquestionably have come underRussian rule if war had been avoided. Hefurther maintains that the Japanese victory in1905 had given China the chance, utilizedparticularly by Sun Yat-sen and numerousstudents, to prepare necessary reforms in theirfatherland, using Tōkyō as their base. Hefurther stresses— and exaggerates— theinfluence of the Comintern in interwar Asia tojustify Japan’s military interventions on thecontinent (pp. 172-85, 197-99). Hirama viewsthe Japanese proposal at the Versailles PeaceConference of 1919 to declare the equality ofraces as an extension of the “yellow man’sburden” while criticizing its rejection by theWestern powers. Oddly, he also sees theexpulsion of the colonial powers after thePacific War as part of this continuity; he furtherprovides long-winded explanations of theJapanese empire’s justification for global ruleunder the slogan hakkō ichiu (the eight cornersof the world under one roof) as beingdetermined by a humanitarian spirit, incontrast to Western-style racism. Though it istrue that in World War II Japan used itsprestige as an anti-Western power in SoutheastAsia to find collaborators, particularly in Burmaand Indonesia, those “liberated” peoples soonrecognized that their situation had changedfrom bad to worse. The author does not restricthis study to Japan’s influence on independencemovements in many parts of the world; he alsoincludes pan-Asianist ideas after the war withRussia, as, for example, is evident in the case ofthe nationalist leader Ōkawa Shūmei (OnŌkawa’s activities, see also Aydin, Politics, pp.111-24, 150-1, 143-4, 147-50, 152-3, 167-74,177, 181f, 184-6, 195-6, 199; on Ōkawa’sinterest in Islam, Aydin in Worringer), and onthe emergence of nationalist societies in Japan.Ōkawa became famous for his modern-sounding theory of the “clash of civilizations,”forecasting as early as the mid-1920s militaryconfrontation between the United States and

Japan (Aydin, Politics p. 112).

Hirama’s study is reminiscent of Japanesepropaganda from the 1930s to the end of WorldWar II, including that in schoolbooks, whichpresented the Russo-Japanese War as theprologue to the war for Asian liberation and theGreater East Asia War as its conclusion. It issmall wonder, therefore, that on the occasion ofthe centenary of the Russo-Japanese War, thesame author wrote an article on the “liberationof the colored peoples” for a publication of thecontroversial Yasukuni Shrine. The ”jewel inthe British crown” of all territories, colonialIndia, responded with sheer enthusiasm to theJapanese victory, which was seen as Asia’sdefeat of Europe (G. Dharampal-Frick inSprotte; T. R. Sareen in Nichi-Ro sensō and inKowner/Impact; St. G. Marks in Steinberg; Y.Hashimoto in Wolff pp. 396-400) and as agleam of hope for the longed for independence.Evidence of leaders of the movement likeMahatma Gandhi who does not appear as verypacifist-minded and Pandit Nehru, who nowviewed Japan as a model and the other Asiansas co-victors, speaks for itself. So it was naturalthat Japanese pan-Asianists closely cooperatedwith Indian activists fighting for independenceand took care of them while in exile in Tōkyō(Aydin, Politics pp. 111-21). Gandhi as well asNehru, however, during World War IIdenounced Japanese colonialism’s advance inthe name of Asian solidarity (Aydin, Politics pp.181-82).

It is an irony of history that the Japanesevictory of 1905, so greatly admired in India, ledto a revision of Japan’s 1902 alliance with GreatBritain, such that Tōkyō’s obligations forsupport in case of war would no longer berestricted to East Asia but would include India.The British now feared that Russia could directher drive for expansion in the direction ofAfghanistan and India. By the treaty revision,London gained the additional advantage ofbeing able to withdraw a great part of its navyfrom Indian waters back to Europe, to be

APJ | JF 10 | 21 | 2

17

deployed against the steadily expandingGerman fleet. Dharampal-Frick in Sprotte (p.275) and Hirama (pp. 202-211) view the 1942alliance between Japan and the Indiannationalist leader Subhas Chandra Bose againstGreat Britain as a consequence of the Russo-Japanese War. T.R. Sareen in Kowner/Impact aswell points out the longevity of the enthusiasmof Indians, who even organized relief actionsfor wounded soldiers and bereaved families inJapan . Many s tudents , hop ing tha tindependence was imminent, went to study inJapan. After all, as Sareen maintains, theBritish recognized the growing ”maturity” ofthe Asians, conceding them more politicalparticipation in the administration of thecolony. Thus, the victory of their ally became adouble-edged sword for India; it would still taketwo world wars to reach independence.

G. Westermann, in Kowner/Rethinking, appearssomewhat isolated in her judgment on thereactions to the war in such colonies as theP h i l i p p i n e s , V i e t n a m a n d B u r m a .Acknowledging the overt admiration for Japanin Southeast Asia, the author neverthelessdenies that the victory had any, decisivebearing on the anticolonial l iberationmovements; she maintains that Marxism,Woodrow Wilson’s call for self-determination ofthe peoples and the Indian Congress all exertedgreat influence. Similar conclusions concerningSoutheast Asia are found in P. A. Rodell, inSteinberg, but this author exempts thePhilippines and Vietnam, since only thesecolonial areas in Southeast Asia had nationalistmovements sufficiently developed to allow theJapanese victory to have long-term effects.

The long-term intellectual result of the war isquestionable, however, since it did not evokespontaneous upheavals in the colonial regions:Major intellectuals in colonized Asia who wereimpressed by Japan, such as Nehru and Gandhiin India, Sukarno in Indonesia and Ba Maw inBurma, did not turn their pro-Japanesesympathies into any political action. Only after

several decades, during Japanese claim ofleadership in Asia during the Pacific War, somenationalists who had pro-Japanese inclinationsin 1905 decided to cooperate with the JapaneseEmpire. Ahmed Sukarno, one of the mostprominent leaders of the Indonesianindependence movement, deeply impressed bythe Japanese victory over Russia in 1905,predicted as early as the 1920s that a greatwar between Japan and the Anglo-Saxonnations would occur. Even if Japan were to losethis great battle, Sukarno maintained, thisconflict among Japan and other empires wouldinspire the oppressed peoples of Asia. A clashbetween the Japanese empire and whiteempires in Asia would also give Egypt, China,India and Indonesia with the opportunity ofliberation, and they would then take over theleading roles.

Almost all authors, for example Y. Shichor, inKowner/Impact, draw conclusions that differfrom those of G. Westermann. They argue thatafter 1905 great segments of the peoples ofSoutheast Asia developed great self-confidenceand strong nationalism. The Filipinos, however,who had been deeply impressed by theJapanese victory and had themselves foughtand lost a war for independence against theirnew American masters some years earlier,were disappointed by Tōkyō’s policy at thattime: Japan recognized American rule over thePhilippines in return for American recognitionof Japanese supremacy over Korea. ThereforeJapan reduced contact with Philippine patriotsafter 1905 to a minimum. From that time onthe Filipinos struggled to gain greater rightsthrough pragmatic cooperation with the UnitedStates (Kowner in Kowner/Rethinking p. 20).Therefore, the interest of Philippine patriots inthe “Japanese model” waned (see also P. A.Rodell in Steinberg, pp. 650-52; Hirama, pp.118-20).

Tōkyō’s attitude towards Vietnam, then underFrench domination, was very similar. Theleader of the anticolonial opposition, Phan Bōi

APJ | JF 10 | 21 | 2

18

Châu, stressed the importance of the Japanesevictory in stimulating the national awakening ofhis people (Aydin, Global, p. 216; Y. Shichor, inKowner/Impact, pp. 211-12; Hirama, pp.113-18). Japanese policy, however, wastroublesome for this Vietnamese anti-colonialcause. Aiming at equality with the Europeannations, Japan, as a “Western power”,supported the French colonial empire inIndochina, even banishing activist Vietnamesestudents from Japan following pressure fromthe government in Paris. Indeed, in 1909, PhanBōi Châu was forced to leave Japan.

Japan even embraced British rule as a modelfor her own colonial empire. In 1910 PrimeMinister Ōkuma Shigenobu stated that theEnglish colonial experience in Egypt was amodel for Japanese domination of Korea.Ironically Egypt herself saw in the Japanesevictory of 1905 a torch for decolonization(Aydin, Global pp. 222-23; Aydin, Politics pp.78-79). The idea to “Egyptianize” Korea may betraced back to the 1894-95 Sino-Japanese War.Japanese cooperation with the white imperialistpowers was harmful to the colonized peopleslonging for independence and led to ill feeling,with Japan accused of having betrayed its Asianbrothers (A. Iriye in Wolff p. 3). Until the1894-95 war with China, Japan recognized asimilarity between her own situation and thatof Egypt, since both countries suffered fromunequal treaties that placed them permanentlyin danger of semi-colonial dependence.

M. Laffan, in Kowner/Impact, describes theways Japan, in the Muslim world of SoutheastAsia, engendered enthusiasm as the “light ofAsia“ or the “Mecca of modernity”. BecauseJapan had appeared as the savior from Dutchcolonialism, it could count on cooperationfollowing the invasion of Indonesia in 1942. Inother parts of the Islamic world, stretching tothe Balkans, the Japanese victory wascelebrated as a liberation of the coloredpeoples suffering under Western colonialism ortutelage, and the Tennō’s empire, rather than

the detested West, was viewed as a possiblemodel for modernization, particularly in theOttoman Empire and Egypt (Aydin, Global;A y d i n , P o l i t i c s ; R . B i e g a n i e c i nKowner/Rethinking). So it is small wonder thatS. Esenbel, in Kowner/Rethinking, can trace thecooperation of Japan with Muslims under pan-Asian slogans in the 1930s back to contactsstarted during the Russo-Japanese War. Theextent to which Japan became the idol ofintellectuals in Egypt—a country that would notescape the British grip for several decades—isd e m o n s t r a t e d b y B i e g a n i e c i nKowner/Rethinking, St. G. Marks in Steinbergand Hirama (pp. 130-33). There was even thehope of collective conversion to Islam of theJapanese, including the emperor, who wouldthen become caliph (Laffan in Kowner/Impactp. 220; Hirama pp. 136-39). Eich in Worringerand Worringer in Worringer detail how variousArab writers recast the implications of “yellowperil“ into a metaphor of Asian liberation.Particularly persuasive was the fact that Japanhad modernized without giving up her ownculture and heritage (ibid. p. 4).

Though official Tōkyō disassociated from thecolored peoples in order not to revive fear ofthe yellow peril, several nationalist societieswere founded in Japan to propagate pan-Asianaims and claim leadership for the Tennō’sempire (Aydin, Global pp. 220-23). Such ideaswould become official policy only in the nextgeneration. S. Saaler, in Chapman/Inaba, dealswith the “clash of races,” from yellow-perilpropaganda through pan-Asianism and theUnited States’ racist immigration policy to theideas of global race conflict of the 1930s thatdominated politics at that time. The obsessionof the Japanese to be recognized by the West ascivilized in contrast to “barbarian” Russia isdealt with by N. Shimazu in Steinberg. Now, incontrast to the pre-1904 years, the “yellows”became the civilized people and the “whites”the wild ones. It is an irony of history thatRussia, whose defeat in 1905 was celebratedwith enthusiasm by the colonized peoples,

APJ | JF 10 | 21 | 2

19

claimed to be the advocate of the “colored”races against “white imperialists” after WorldWar I and even more so after World War II.

And What Of Africa?

Most publications emphasize the novelty of anAsian nation defeating a European great power,as occurred in the Russo-Japanese War. Most ofthe authors, however, do not seem to realizethat it was not in fact the first victory of a“colored” nation over a “white” one. Thatpioneering feat was achieved by Ethiopia in1896, in the decisive battle of Adua in her waragainst Italy. The Italians had to endure themockery of other Europeans, including theRussians. Among colonized peoples, however,Adua produced the same result as did theJapanese victory in 1905, so that for the newworld order arising in the twentieth centuryboth events should be regarded as a doubleimpetus for a global anticolonial and anti-Western movement. With minor exceptions,however, the publications under review hereignore Africa. Thus Hirama (pp. 10-11) refersgenerally to the impact of the Russo-JapaneseWar on the development of an anti-colonial oran emancipation movement in Africa andamong Afro-Americans, while K. Hildebrand, inKreiner (p. 36) mentions Russian mockery atthe expense of the Italians because of theirdefeat at Adua. M. Berg, in Sprotte (p. 253),points to the fact that a spokesman for AfricanAmericans, the civil rights and anti-colonialactivist W.E.B. Du Bois, rejoiced at theJapanese victory, which had, after all,frightened white oppressors in Europe andAmerica. Until the 1930s, therefore, manyAfrican Americans did not regard Japan as theaggressor or rival of the US but as thepredominant power opposing white colonialismin Asia.

The battle of Adua 1896 in a traditionalEthiopian painting (Collection Krebs)

W.E.B. Du Bois, who often mentioned that hew a s b o r n i n t h e y e a r o f t h e M e i j iRestoration—1868—pinned his hopes on anAfrican-Asian partnership as shown in hisstatement: “[T]he fire and freedom of blackAfrica, with the uncurbed might of her consortAsia, are indispensable to the fertilizing of theuniversal soil of mankind, which Europe alonenever would nor could give this aching world.”For Du Bois the future was predetermined bythe result of the war of 1905: the brown andblack races would join in the upheaval of theAsians unleashed by Japan. He viewed pan-Asianism and pan-Africanism as two sides ofthe same coin, and he was convinced that thepolit ical fronts in the world would bedetermined by the borderline between whiteand colored. After 1905 other AfricanAmericans also showed enthusiasm for Japan;assuming common interests, they hoped forJapanese leadership of an alliance of coloredpeoples. An odd theory that the Japanesepeople were descendants of dispersed Africanswas even proposed. Marcus Garvey, the radicalAfrican American activist who was born inJamaica and became the spiritual father of theRastafari movement named after the EthiopianEmperor Haile Selassie, also demonstratedgreat enthusiasm for Japan in his campaigns.He spent many years in the United States,where he led an organization for African

APJ | JF 10 | 21 | 2

20

American emancipation. The African Americanmasses were much more strongly attracted toGarvey than they were to Du Bois and otherprotagonists of the rights of African Americansand pan-Africanism. In response to the Russo-Japanese War, Garvey called for a bond to beformed between black people and the Japanese.The United States authorities observed hismovement with great mistrust, not onlybecause he mobilized large sections of AfricanAmericans but also because he proclaimedsolidarity with Japan. It is not surprising,therefore, that one of the Pearl Harborprophets, General Satō Kōjirō, included in hisscenario of a Japanese invasion of the UnitedStates an insurrection of ten million AfricanAmericans under the leadership of MarcusGarvey. In 1927, however, Garvey wasdeported to Jamaica.

Not unlike interpreters of the 1905 Japanesevictory, some European observers viewed the1896 battle of Adua as a menace to world whitesupremacy and the I ta l ian defeat asdisadvantageous for all of Europe, which mightbe conquered by an awakened Africa in thefuture. It may be pure coincidence that EnricoCaviglia, the officer who was an Italianobserver posted in Tokyo during the war of1904/05, had participated in the battle of Adua.

The great idol of Africans, African Americansand the black population of the Caribbean, alllonging for liberty and civil rights, was,naturally, the Empire of Ethiopia. With US-protected Liberia, it was the only independentcountry in Africa. It was opened to the West inthe mid-nineteenth century, almost at the sametime as Japan; both countries had beensequestered since the seventeenth century asprotection against the dominating influence ofthe Portuguese and the Jesuit missions.Ethiopia thereafter was also modernizingthough not with the same speed and success asJapan. The worship of a divine emperor wasimportant in both countries to promote theunity of the nation and its struggle for

progress. Eventually Ethiopia developed asense of camaraderie with the Tennō’s empire,based on their parallel history and similarsituation in the world. That feeling can betraced only from the 1920s on, however, whenJapan’s rise became a model for Ethiopia’s ownmodernization...

Japan’s first diplomatic contacts were possibleafter Ethiopia became a member of the Leagueof Nations in 1923. In 1927 the two countriesconcluded a Treaty of Friendship and Trade,and three years later an ambassadorextraordinary from Japan attended HaileSelassie’s coronation ceremony in Addis Ababa.In 1931 Foreign Minister Heruy Wolde Selassiespent seven weeks in Japan, where themodernization of the country impressed himdeeply. At this time Japanese nationalists withpan-Asian ideals sympathized with Ethiopia,dreaming of a future day when they join forceswith this African country to begin to fight thewhite world to eliminate colonialism andimperialism.

A group of Ethiopian intellectuals, called “Japanizers“ and led by Foreign MinisterHeruy pursued reforms based on the Japanesemodel after World War I. Part of this effort wasthe introduction of a constitution in 1931 thatlargely took the Meiji constitution of 1889 as amodel with the founding of a bicameralparliament. This constitution elevated theposition and prestige of the Ethiopian emperor,not least by its written declaration of a mythicalorigin. While the Japanese constitution namedEmperor Jinmu the founder of the dynasty thatruled the country in an unbroken line, Ethiopiaaccorded this position to King Solomon ofJerusalem, the alleged father of EmperorMenelik I, whose alleged mother was theQueen of Sheba. This formulation was retainedin the revised Ethiopian constitution of 1955.While Emperor Jinmu was the descendant ofthe sun goddess Amaterasu, Menelik as well ashis father Solomon were descendants of David,to whose house Jesus also belonged. Thus, in

APJ | JF 10 | 21 | 2

21

contrast to occidental divine right as the basisfor the legitimacy of European monarchies,another type of divine nature is attributed tothe Tennō as well as to the Ethiopian emperor,differentiating their rule and legitimacy fromthose in other countries.

Emperor Haile Selassie clearly hoped tostrengthen his prestige abroad by introducingconstitutionalism and a parliamentary system,thereby securing the independence of hiscountry. His reform policy following theJapanese model may be traced back to theadmiration of his father, Ras (= Prince)Makonnen, the hero of Adua, who had lookedup to the Tennō’s empire after the victory overRussia proved that a non-European nation wasequal to the West in culture and technologyand could defy it.

Comic style Ethiopian painting: King Solomon,the Queen of Sheba and their offspring Menelik(Collection Krebs)

In 1931 or 1932 Lij Araya Abebe, a youngEthiopian nobleman and relative of theemperor, wanted to marry a Japanese woman.The idea met with favor in Tōkyō, and thesearch for a suitable candidate began. KurodaMasako, the daughter of Viscount KurodaHiroyuki, was chosen. A young woman with asense of adventure, she joyfully agreed; the

news was announced in the press in January1934. The plan was given up, however, soonafterwards, not least out of fear of internationalimplications for Ethiopia. Major colonialpowers —Italy, France and Great Britain—hadopposed to this plan due to foreign policyimplications of such a marriage. It seems thatdue t o s im i l a r ob j ec t i ons f rom therepresentatives of European empires, andunder pressure of the government in Tōkyō,negotiations that a private Japanese companyconducted with Ethiopian Foreign MinisterHeruy in 1933 about the acquisition of vastestates in Ethiopia were discontinued. This landwould have allowed the growing of rice,vegetables, tea, coffee and tobacco whileallowing the possibility of a certain amount ofimmigration from Japan.

According to Haile Selassie’s autobiography,the plan of leasing land to Japanese was anunfounded rumor arising from Italianpropaganda,, but some foreign observersbelieved that the project was authentic. What iscertain is that Japan had become the mostimportant partner for Ethiopia for both theimport of raw cotton and export of yarn.Therefore, Italy, the nation that had most tofear from competition, watched Japan with thegreatest mistrust.

Many countries also feared the assumedmenace of fraternization by “yellows” and“blacks” against ”whites.” Thus, the mere factof the independence of Ethiopia was perceivedas a “storm center,” since it threatened toattract colonial areas to follow its model,becoming a danger to Western imperialism byencouraging an alliance of “yellow peril” and“black peril”. Therefore, Italy’s 1935aggression could count on a certain tolerancedespite lip service in the League of Nations,which demanded that the independence ofEthiopia be observed; Italy’s move might evenappeared as a preventive measure against afoothold by Japan. At the time the Abyssinianconflict was heading to its close, the British

APJ | JF 10 | 21 | 2

22

King Edward VIII declared frankly to ItalianAmbassador to London Dino Grandi, thatMussolini’s war was a necessary surgicaloperation to cure Africa of a centuries-oldinfection; he held out the prospect of English-Italian cooperation concerning colonial politics.In February 1936 London had refused HaileSelassie’s appeal to Edward VIII to take over aprotectorate or mandate of Ethiopia so that thecountry could remain independent from Italy.

At this time, semiofficial writers from racistGermany agitated against Ethiopia as well asagainst Japan—at a time when Hitler wasdelivering weapons and military equipment toHaile Selassie—seeking to promote an alliancewith Mussolini. This opened the way to the1935 tripartite Germany-Italy-Japan 6pact.

In 1934-35, before the outbreak of the war,official Japan assumed such an unclear attitudeconcerning the rising tensions betweenEthiopia and Italy that mass protests againstJapan were organized in Rome, while during itsdefense against Italian invasion Ethiopiaenjoyed great sympathy in the Japanese public,inc lud ing the press and r ight -wingorganizations. For example, in 1935 and early1936 the nationalist society Kokuryūkai, whichf o r s o m e t i m e h a d s t r e s s e d t h einterconnections between pan-Asianism and thesituation of colonized Africans, waged acampaign in its organ Dai Ajia Shugi (GreatAsianism) against the Italian war in Ethiopia.Mussolini was blamed for treating theEthiopians, presented as descendants of Arabswith Asian roots, with contempt despite theirlong glorious history. The campaign stressedthat one of the motives for the war was revengefor Adua, and that European powers consideredEthiopian-Japanese economic relations amenace. In the same journal the diplomatKajima Morinosuke, speaking in the name ofJapan as the leader of the suppressed colorednations of Asia, criticized the passivity of GreatBritain and the League of Nations, whom heheld responsible for Mussolini’s triumph in

Ethiopia. According to Kajima, in the 1904-05war against Russia, Japan had demonstratedhow to resist the expansionist policy of a whitepower and how military buildup was a necessityfor colored peoples.

Official Japanese policy changed only near theend of the conflict, with Tōkyō moving closer toMussolini as outlines of the emergence of the“Axis” powers emerged. On January 1, 1936,the Japanese government established a legationin Addis Ababa; an Ethiopian consulate generalhad existed in Osaka for some time. Mussolini’sAbyssinian war, however, soon put an end todiplomatic relations which had been taken uphesitantly. Therefore, the legation in AddisAbaba was converted to a consulate general inDecember 1936, de facto recognizing theconquest by Italy. Mussolini reciprocated byopening a consulate general in Mukden—thatis, in the Japanese puppet state of Manchukuo.

In 1935, when Mussolini’s war of revenge wasraging in Ethiopia, W.E.B.Du Bois expressedthe hope that Japan would act as the leader ofall colored peoples. At the end of 1936, theAfrican American leader spent several weeks inJapan, where he was received by high officialrepresentatives and by private organizations.The Japanese-Chinese war, which broke out thefollowing year, rocked the belief on the part ofAfrican Americans in a united front bynonwhite people, but Du Bois for some timeexpressed sympathy for Japan while portrayingChina as the “Asian uncle Tom”, too obsequioustowards the West. Du Bois would havepreferred an alliance of the two great “yellow”nations against the white world, but that wasnot to be. Saying that he could not understandwhy the Chinese showed greater hostilitytoward Japan than they did toward the West, heheld the white powers responsible for the warthat broke out between Japan and China in July1937. Later, during the Pacific War, hedenounced US internment of citizens ofJapanese origin as racist. In contrast to DuBois, another African American journalist, and

APJ | JF 10 | 21 | 2

23

author, Trinidad-born George Padmore, whobelonged to the Communist camp, warnedEthiopia against rapprochement with theimperialist powers. To this extent he was inunison with the Soviet Union, but a short whilelater, when Moscow encouraged Italianaggression, justifying the war in Africa, a breakwith many African Americans includingPadmore occurred. The Soviet goal was to keepMussolini in the anti-German camp and toprevent a possible Japanese expansion in EastAfrica. Out of sheer opportunism Stalin deniedsupport for the anti-imperialistic fight of anAfrican people, favoring the interests of the“white” Italians over the yellow perilthreatening from Japan.

Lothrop Stoddard's "Distribution of the primaryraces" from Lothrop Stoddard, The Rising Tideof Color Against White World-Supremacy (NewYork: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1920). Thisracial map of the world illustrates the characterof geopolitical racial thinking in the first threedecades of the 20th century.

Italy took revenge on Ethiopia because of thedefeat at Adua in 1896, which remainedtraumatic even 40 years on. Stalin justified hisentrance into the war against Japan in August1945, breaking a neutrality pact on the groundsof the humiliation Russia had suffered in 1905(see Sh. Yokote in Wolff p. 106 and inE r i c s o n / H o c k l e y p . 1 2 1 ; W o l f f i nEricson/Hockley p. 130), also exactly 40 years

later. Documents in Russian archivesdeclassified in the 1990s suggest that theSoviet entrance in the war against Japan in1945 was in fact motivated in part by revengefor the defeat of 1905 and its consequences.

A final note: the Japanese and Ethiopianemperors are the only nonwhites who to datehave been inducted into the British Order ofthe Garter: Meiji 1905 (see N. Kimizuka inGunjishigakkai I), Taishō 1912, Shōwa(Hirohito) 1929 (expelled 1941, reinducted1971), Haile Selassie 1954, Akihito 1998. OnOctober 14, 1975, the Order held a memorialserv ice for Hai le Se lass ie , who wasassassinated that year.

Emperor Haile Selassie was the first head ofstate after World War II to pay state visits tothe vanquished nations of Germany (1954) andJapan (1956), the former allies of Italy. Withthese visits, at least this chapter of the historyof the twentieth century found a conciliatoryend.

This is a revised version of a review articleoriginally published in German as: “World WarZero oder: Der Nullte Weltkrieg? NeuereLiteratur zum Russisch-Japanischen Krieg1904/05“, Nachrichten der Gesellschaft fürNatur- und Völkerkunde Ostasiens/Hamburg(OAG), 183-184, 2008, pp. 187-248.http://www.uni-hamburg.de/Japanologie/noag/noag183_184.html. I am grateful to SteveBarnett for correcting my English manuscript.

Gerhard Krebs (krebs.takedea@gmail.com)born in 1943, taught at universities in Tokyo,Freiburg, Trier and Berlin and worked inresearch institutes in Tokyo and Potsdam. Nowliving as a free historian in Berlin. His booksinclude Japan's Deutschlandpolitik 1935-1941.2 Vols., Hamburg 1984; Das moderne Japan1868-1952, München 2009; Japan imPazifischen Krieg, München 2010.

Recommended citation: Gerhard Krebs,"World War Zero? Re-assessing the Global

APJ | JF 10 | 21 | 2

24

Impac t o f t he Russo - J apanese War 1904-05," The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol 10,Issue 21, No 2, May 21, 2012.