The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 7 | Issue 46 | Number 1 | Article ID 3250 | Nov 16, 2009

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The Battle of Okinawa 2009: Obama vs Hatoyama [Japanesetranslation]

Gavan McCormack

The Battle of Okinawa 2009: Obamavs Hatoyama [Japanese translationa n d d e b a t e h e r e(http://eigokiji.cocolog-nifty.com/blog/2009/11/post-1cbf.html)]

沖縄戦２００９ーーオバマ対鳩山

Gavan McCormack

The making of an unequal, unconstitutional,illegal, colonial and deceitful US-Japanagreement.

Yes We Can – But You Can’t

Elections at the end of August gave Japan anew government, headed by Hatoyama Yukio.In electing him and his Democratic Party ofJapan (DPJ), the Japanese people, like theAmerican people less than a year earlier, wereopting for change – a new relationship withboth Asia and the US, including a much moreequal one with the latter. Remarkably,however, what followed on the part of theObama administration has been a campaign ofunrelenting pressure to block any such change.

The Obama administration has targeted inparticular the Hatoyama desire to re-negotiatethe relationship with the United States so as tomake it equal instead of dependent. Go back, itseems to be saying, to the golden days of“Sergeant-Major Koizumi” (as George W. Bushreportedly referred to the Japanese PrimeMinister) when compliance was assured andannual US policy prescriptions (“yobosho”)were received in Tokyo as holy writ; forgetabsurd pretensions of independent policies.

The core issue has been the disposition ofAmerican military presence in Okinawa and theUS insistence that Hatoyama honour anagreement known as the Guam Treaty.

The Guam Treaty

The “Guam International Agreement” is the US-Japan agreement signed by Secretary HillaryClinton and Japanese Foreign MinisterNakasone Hirofumi in February and adopted asa treaty under special legislation in May 2009,in the first days of the Obama administration.Support for the Aso government in Japan wascol laps ing and the incoming Obamaadministration moved urgently to extractformal consent to its plans in such a way as toensure that any such agreement would bindany subsequent Japanese government.

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Okinawa: Futenma and Henoko location

8,000 Marines and their 9,000 family memberswere to be relocated from Okinawa to Guam,and the US marine base at Futenma would betransferred to Henoko in Nago City in NorthernOkinawa, to a new base to be built by Japan.The Japanese government would also pay $6.09billion towards the Guam transfer cost ($2.8billion of it in cash in the current financialyear). [1] The effect in Okinawa would be thatthe US military would vacate some of its largerbases in the densely populated south butconcentrate and expand those in the north ofthe island.

Cape Henoko, Projected base ConstructionSite

Henoko Base Design, showing V-shapedRunways

These matters (save for the detailed financialclauses) had all been resolved by a previousagreement, nearly four years earlier underKoizumi - the October 2005 agreement on “US-Japan Al l iance: Transformat ion andRealignment for the Future” reconfirmed bythe May 2006 “United States-Japan Roadmapfor realignment Implementation.” [2] Now, tocompel compliance, Article 3 of the newAgreement declared that “The Government ofJapan intends to complete the Futenmareplacement facility as stipulated in theRoadmap [i.e. by 2014]” even though theparties had virtually given up hope that thatwas possible in the face of entrenchedOkinawan opposition. [3]

The Agreement was one of the first acts of apopular, “reforming” US administration andone of the last of a Japanese regime in fataldecline after half a century of LDP rule. It set inunusually clear relief the relationship betweenthe world’s No 1 and No 2 economic powers.The Agreement is worthy of close attentionbecause, as analysed below, it was unequal,unconstitutional, illegal, colonial and deceitful.

Unequal

First, it was in the classic sense of the term, an“unequal treaty.” The Government of Japaninterpreted it as a binding treaty, while for theUS it was merely an “executive agreement”,lacking Congressional warrant. [4] It obligedJapan to construct and pay for one new basecomplex for the US on Okinawa and tocontribute a very substantial sum towardsconstructing another on Guam, while on theAmerican side it merely offered an ambiguouspledge to withdraw a number of troops (on thatambiguity, see below). Though binding onJapan, it was not binding on the US (whicheven reserved to itself the right, under Article8, to vary it at will). [5] Furthermore, it may bethat the Guam Treaty is in breach of US law: as

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a revenue raising measure (stipulating the sumof $6 billion to be supplied by Japan), itrequires Congressional authorization but hasmerely presidential executive authority. Atreaty binding on one side only is by definitionan unequal treaty.

Unconstitutional

Second, it was unconstitutional . Under Article95 of the Constitution, “A special law,applicable only to one local public entity,cannot be enacted by the Diet without theconsent of the majority of the voters of the localpublic body concerned, obtained in accordancewith law.” The Guam treaty was plainly aspecial law in its effect on the single prefectureof Okinawa, yet not only was no attempt madeto consult the people of Okinawa, but the Dietrode roughshod over their well-known wishes.

Furthermore, to ram the Agreement throughthe Diet, the Aso government util izedextraordinary constitutional powers under aprocedure (Article 59) unused for more thanhalf a century that allowed adoption of a billrejected by the Upper House if passed a secondtime by a two-thirds majority in the Lower.Ramming the bill through the Diet on 13 May2009, Aso was sidelining, in effect abolishing,the Upper House in a kind of constitutionalcoup d’état. [6] Much of the rest of Aso’slegislative record during his 9 months in office– ten major bills including the Terror SpecialMeasures Law and virtually all the legislationof importance to Washington – was of dubiousconstitutional propriety for this same reason,though it must have been pleasing toWashington.

Illegal

Third, the Guam treaty is in breach of Japaneselaw. Since the Treaty took precedence overdomestic law, it also had the effect ofdowngrading, in effect vit iat ing, therequirements of Japan’s environmentalprotection laws. Any serious and internationally

credible environmental impact assessment(EIA) would surely conclude that a massivemilitary construction project was incompatiblewith the delicate coral and forest environmentof the Oura Bay area. But it was taken forgranted that Japan’s EIA would be a mereformality and the treaty further underminedthe procedure.

F u r t h e r , t h e D i e t a n d t h e O b a m aadministration were pre-empting any order thatmight issue from the San Francisco courtwhere a judge is hearing a suit againstdefendants including the Pentagon. The judgehas already ordered the Pentagon to takeconservation measures as required by theNational Historic Observation Act, and torequire the same of the Government of Japan,in relation to the Henoko construction project.[7]

Sakurai Kunitoshi, president of OkinawaUniversity and a specialist on environmentalassessment law, argues that since 2005Japanese governments have been in breach ofthe Environmental Assessment Law in the waythey have pursued the Futenma ReplacementFacility. Therefore, the process must bereopened. He concludes that any serious andinternationally credible EIA would concludethat the FRF cannot be built at Henoko. [8] IfSakurai is right, the Japanese government’sEIA is fatally flawed and an internationallycredible, independent scientific survey has tobe launched.

Colonial

Fourth, it was colonial. The US had grownincreasingly irritated at the lack of progressfollowing the 2005-6 Agreements andperemptory in spelling out what Japan had todo. In November 2007, Defense SecretaryRobert Gates instructed Japan to resume itsIndian Ocean naval station (then hotlydebated), maintain and increase its paymentsfor hosting US bases, increase its defensebudget, and pass a permanent law to authorize

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overseas dispatch of the SDF whenever theneed arose. It was essentially the position ofthe Armitage-Nye report on the US-JapanAlliance through 2020 published earlier thatyear. [9] Armitage, Gates and other US officialsgenerally added the pious sentiment thateverything was up to the sovereign governmentof Japan. Occasionally, however, they spelledout the consequences of non-compliance, aswhen Secretary Gates bluntly told Japan that itcould not hope to receive US support in its bidfor a permanent seat on the Security Councilunless it pursued the prescribed agenda. [10]

Richard Lawless, who as Deputy DefenseSecretary had headed the negotiations thatculminated in the Roadmap, told the Asahi inMay 2008 that the alliance was drifting.

“What we really need is a top-downleadership that says, ‘Let'srededicate ourselves to completingall of these agreements on time;let's make sure that the budgetingo f the money i s a na t iona lpriority’… Japan has to find a wayto change i ts own tempo ofdecision-making, deployment,integration and operationalizing[sic] this alliance.” [11]

He castigated Japan for “self-marginalization”and for “allowing the alliance to degeneratetowards sub-prime because of its withdrawalsyndrome.”[12] Under that pressure, PrimeMinster Aso appears to have buckled, clingingto power through 2008 and early 2009 at leastin part to try to do Washington one last favourby adopting the “top-down” steps it wasdemanding for “operationalizing” the alliance.That had to be done while the LiberalDemocratic Party (LDP) still enjoyed theKoizumi majority in the Lower House preciselybecause support for Aso had sunk below 20 percent with virtually no prospect of recovery.

In keeping with its colonial character, theObama administration was firing a shot acrossthe bow of the then opposition DemocraticParty of Japan (DPJ), assuming withoutquestion the prerogative of intervention in theJapanese political process. By pressing theGuam treaty on Japan, sending Hillary Clintonto Tokyo as enforcer in its opening weeks, theObama administration was maintaining thedefining features of Bush diplomacy:paternalistic, interventionist, anti-democratic,intolerant of any Japanese search for anindependent, regional or UN-centred foreignpolicy. Secretary Clinton spoke withsatisfaction of the deal: "I think that aresponsible nation follows the agreements thathave been entered into, and the agreement thatI signed today with Foreign Minister Nakasoneis one between our two nations, regardless ofwho's in power." [13] What she meant was this:You in the DPJ had better learn which side yourbread is buttered on.

Characteristic of colonial policy, the “natives”were to be guided but not consulted, so thethinking of the people of Okinawa was alwaysirrelevant in the deliberations that culminatedin the Guam Treaty.

Deceitful

Fifth, the treaty was characterized by what inJapanese is known as “gomakashi” – trickeryand deceit dressed in the rhetoric of principleand mutuality. There is no precedent for asovereign country paying to construct amilitary base in another country. Thus theGovernment of Japan had to minimize debateand rely on lies.

Although reported as a US concession to Japan,a “withdrawal” designed “to reduce the burdenof post-World War II American militarypresence in Okinawa,” [14] it was actuallysomething quite different: a design to increasethe Japanese contribution to the alliance byhaving it pay an exorbitant sum towardsconstruction of US military facilities on Guam,

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in US territory, and by having it substitute anew, high-tech, and greatly expanded base atHenoko for the inconvenient, dangerous, andobsolescent Futenma.

The Agreement was riddled with deception. Itstipulated withdrawal of “8,000 Marines fromOkinawa to Guam” and the Japanesegovernment insisted this was the key toreducing the burden of the bases on Okinawa,yet interpellations in the Diet early in 2009revealed that there were only 12,461 Marinesactually stationed in Okinawa, and since theGovernment of Japan insisted that 10,000 wasthe necessary deterrent force, it meant thatfewer than 3,000 would actualy be withdrawn.[15] And only in a San Francisco courtroomhearing a suit on behalf of the endangereddugong was it revealed that the so-called“Futennma replacement” included a 214 meterlong wharf. The Government of Japan had notthought to mention that the Futenma facilitieswere to be expanded by addition of a deep-water Oura Bay port capable of hosting nuclearsubmarines.

One of the last acts of the Aso government wasto hand over 34 billion yen, $363 million, as itsfiscal year 2010 contribution towards the Guamconstruction costs, although the US had yet toproduce any detailed cost estimates, let aloneto appropriate its proportion of the funds.Months later, Congress slashed by 70 per centthe appropriation sought by the Pentagon forthe same year, from $300 million to $89million, about one-quarter of the Japanesecontribution. [16] So dire are the US financialstraits that it is far from certain that Congresswill authorize any more. The Guam Agreementcommitted the US side to use the moneys onlyin the stipulated ways, but Japan had no rightto supervise the expenditure. Once thePentagon pocketed the money it seems highlyunlikely Japan will ever see it returned,whether the base works proceed or not.Furthermore, the housing for the GuamMarines was calculated at 70 million yen per

unit (enough to construct the most extravagantmansions, three-quarters of a million dollarseach. Put differently, this was about 14 timesthe going rate for housing construction inGuam.

One Japanese member of the Diet protested,what happens if, indeed, the US Congressdecides not to fund the Guam plan? WouldJapan get its money back? [17]

Obama and the DPJ

While working to tie Japan’s present and futuregovernments by the Guam Agreement, the USknew full well that the then opposition DPJ’sposition was clear: no new base should be builtwithin Okinawa and Futenma should bereturned tout court. [18] US pressure rosesteadily through the months leading to theparty’s electoral triumph in August 2009 andfrom then to this day.

When DPJ leader Ozawa began to adumbrate ashift in Japanese foreign and defense policyfrom a Washington centre to a UN-centre,ending its deployment of the Maritime Self-Defense Forces to the Indian Ocean in serviceto the US-led war effort in Iraq (then hotlydebated), Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer, whotill then had refused to meet him, suddenlydemanded a meeting, and prominent USscholar bureaucrats joined in issuing thinlyveiled threats about the “damage” that Ozawawas causing to the alliance. [19] During HillaryClinton’s February visit to Japan, Ozawa Ichirospent a perfunctory 30 minutes with her, whilehe found three times as much time a week laterto meet and discuss the future of the regionwith the Secretary of the Chinese CommunistParty’s International Section. He also madeclear his dissent from the new president’sresolve to expand and intensify the AfghanistanWar, and then went further, raising thepossibility of reducing the US presence inJapan to the (Yokosuka-based) US 7th fleet. Hismessage was clear. If the 7th Fleet was indeedsufficient to all necessary purposes for the

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defense of Japan, then the bases – all thirteenof them with their 47,000 officers and militarypersonnel – were unnecessary. Immediatelyafter stating these controversial views, Ozawawas caught up in a corruption scandal involvingstaff misuse of funds, late in May resigning asparty chief and being replaced by HatoyamaYukio. Though it must have given Washingtonsatisfaction to see Ozawa shunted from partyleadership, he remains the party’s undisputedgrey eminence. The DPJ issue was not so easilysettled.

The Futenma replacement issue graduallybecame the centrepiece in the confrontationbe tween the Obama and Ha toyamagovernments. Obama’s “Japan team” simplyinherited the Bush-Cheney-Rumsfeld agendaand applied steadily heightening pressure onJapan to “honour” i t s Guam Trea tycommitment. So much for those in Okinawawho hoped that Obama’s administration mightactually mean “change”.

With the exception of the new US Ambassadorto Japan, John V. Roos, Obama retained thesame personnel who had played formative rolesin the negotiation of the agreements since2005: Kurt Campbel l , who had beenresponsible for the Futenma negotiations underBush became Obama’s Deputy Secretary ofState for East Asia, Wallace Gregson, marinecommander in Okinawa under Bush becamehead of the Department of Defense’s Asia-Pacific section, and Kevin Maher, Consul-General in Okinawa under Bush becamedirector of the State Department’s Office ofJapan affairs. [20] The policy settings of theNye-Armitage vision were adopted, apparentlywithout question. Joseph Nye, principalarchitect of post-Cold War US Japan policy,issued two unmistakable warnings to the DPJ.In a Tokyo conference in December 2008, hespelled out the three acts that Congress wouldbe inclined to see as “anti-American”:cancelation of the Maritime Self-DefenseAgency’s Indian Ocean mission, and any

attempt to revise the Status of ForcesAgreement or the agreements on relocating USForces in Japan. [21] He repeated the samebasic message when the Democratic Party’sMaehara Seiji visited Washington in the earlydays of the Obama administration to convey hisparty ’s wishes to renegot iate theseagreements, again warning that to do so wouldbe seen as “anti-American.” [22]

As the year wore on and as the new agenda inTokyo became apparent before and after theAugust election, the confrontation deepened.Warnings became more forceful. Kurt Campbelltold the Asahi there could be no change in theFutenma replacement agreement. [23] MichaelGreen, formerly George W. Bush’s top adviseron East Asia, though moved under Obama tothe pr ivate sector a t the Centre forInternational and Strategic Studies, warnedthat “it would indeed provoke a crisis with theUS” if the Democratic Party were to pushahead to try to re-negotiate the militaryagreements around the Okinawa issue.” [24]Gregson, for the Pentagon, added that the UShad “no p lans to rev ise the ex is t ingagreements. [25] Ian Kelly, for the StateDepartment, stated that there was no intentionon its part to allow revision. [26] Kevin Maher(also at State) added a day later that therecould be no reopening of negotiations onsomething already agreed between states. [27]A “ s e n i o r D e p a r t m e n t o f D e f e n s espokesperson” in Washington said it would be a“blow to trust” between the two countries ifexisting plans could not be implemented. [28]Summing up the r i s ing i r r i ta t ion inWashington, an unnamed State Departmentofficial commented that “The hardest thingright now is not China. It’s Japan.” [29]

The drumbeats of “concern,” “warning,”“friendly advice” from Washington thatHatoyama and the DPJ had better notimplement the party’s electoral pledges andcommitments rose steadily leading up to theelection and its aftermath, culminating in the

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October Tokyo visit by Defense Secretary Gatesand Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,Michael Mullen. Gates is reported to haveinsulted his Japanese hosts, refusing to attend awelcoming ceremony at the Defense Ministryor to dine with senior Japanese Defenseofficials. [30]

Gates’ message was no-nonsense:

“The Futenma relocation facility isthe lynchpin of the realignmentroad map. Without the Futenmarealignment, the Futenma facility,there will be no relocation toGuam. And without relocation toG u a m , t h e r e w i l l b e n oconsolidation of forces and thereturn of land in Okinawa.” [31]

For Michael Green, architect of Japan policyunder George W. Bush, this showed that Gateswas a “shrewd judge of his counterparts,” andthat Hatoyama and his government would notbe able to “continue slapping around theUnited States” or to “play with firecrackers.”[32] In case there remained any shadow ofdoubt in Japanese minds, Admiral Mullen addedthat the Henoko base construction was an“absolute requirement.” [33] “Challenge theGuam Treaty at your peril,” was the Obamaadministration’s unambiguous message.

Intimidation had an affect. Defense SecretaryKitazawa Toshimi was first to yield and suggestthat there was no real a l ternative toconstruction at Henoko. [34] Foreign MinisterOkada Katsuya began to waver. In late July, amonth before the election, Okada had a briefexchange with U.S. Under Secretary of Defensefor Policy Michele Flournoy: [35]

Fluornoy: The reorganization of US forces inJapan is in accord with agreement between thetwo countries.Okada: There are 64 years of history dragging

along behind the US-Japan relationship.

Weeks after the victory, he told Britishjournalist Simon Tisdall, “If Japan just followswhat the US says, then I think as a sovereignnation that is very pathetic.” [36] He seemedclear on the point that building a new base atHenoko was not the way to reduce the burdenon the people of Okinawa. “It should beinconceivable in ordinary thinking,” he said,“for the sea to be destroyed to construct abase.” [37] It was also Okada who said, “Thewill of the people of Okinawa and the will of thepeople of Japan was expressed in the elections… I don’t think we will act simply by acceptingwhat the U.S tells us…” [38]

One day after the Gates and Mullen statements,however, Okada shifted ground to say thatmoving the Futenma base out of Okinawa was“not an option” (kangaerarenai) and to suggest(23 October) that the functions of the FutenmaMarine base might after all be transferredwithin Okinawa. He declined to endorse theHenoko project, but proposed Futenma’sfunctions be merged with those of the relativelyclose US Air Force base at Kadena, and thatthe agreement be limited to 15 years.

Okada’s suggestion of a transfer of theFutenma functions within Okinawa, eventhough through this rather novel formula,caused shock waves of disbelief in Okinawa. 80per cent of Kadena township is alreadyoccupied by the existing base. The prefecture’sRyukyu shimpo in a passionate editoriallamented the incapacity of the new Hatoyamagovernment to counter the “intimidatorydiplomacy” of Gates and Mullen, and the driftback towards “acceptance of the status quo offollowing the US.” If that is to be the newgovernment,” it concluded, “then the change ofgovernment has been a failure.” [39]

The Okinawan Perspective

Okinawa “reverted” from the US to Japan in1972, but nearly four decades later most major

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US bases remain intact, taking up one-fifth ofthe land surface of Okinawa’s main island.Nowhere is more overwhelmed by the USmilitary presence than the city of Ginowan,which has grown around the US Marine CorpsFutenma Air Station. The US and Japan agreedin 1996 that Futenma would be returned, butmade return conditional on construction of areplacement, which would also have to be inOkinawa, and not just anywhere in Okinawa butin environmentally sensitive north, the coraland forest environment of Henoko in Nago City,where a precious colony of blue coral wasd iscovered on ly in 2007 , where theinternationally protected dugong graze on seagrasses, turtles come to rest, and multiple rarebirds, insects, animals thrive.. Thirteen yearson, there the matter still stands.

Futenma Marine Air Station surrounded byGinowan City

Between 1996 and 2005, a peace andenvironment citizens’ coalition fought the firstversion of that plan – for a pontoon-supportedstructure on the reef just offshore from Henoko

(originally a modest “helipad,” as it wasreferred to in 1996, 45 metres in lengthaccording to the first designs), [40] whichgradually grew to have a runway stretching to2,500 meters across the coral – to such effectthat in 2005, Prime Minister Koizumi cancelledit, citing "a lot of opposition." It was anunprecedented triumph for a mobilizedcitizenry over the combined resources of thetwo powerful states. The second, and current,version, adopted in 2006, was for a significantlyexpanded project, this time based on anonshore site in the same Henoko district. Itwould be built on land and landfill extendingfrom the existing Camp Schwab US base intoOura bay and would boast dual 1,800 meterrunways stretching out into Oura Bay, plus adeep sea naval port and other facilities, and achain of helipads scattered through the forest -a comprehensive air, land and sea base able toproject force throughout Asia and the Pacific.

Time and again, the project was blocked bypopular opposition, but time and again theJapanese government renewed and expandedit. The struggle continues throughout Okinawaa g a i n s t t h i s l a t e s t , l a r g e s t , m o s tenvironmentally devastating design. On thesea-floor from 2007, teams of divers acting assurveyors for the state, and even backed by aMaritime Self-Defense Force frigate,confronted civic opponents determined todefend the sea and its creatures; in SanFrancisco, a judge continued hearings in a suitagainst the Pentagon on behalf of theOkinawan dugong and their marine habitat;and at Henoko and Takae (deep in the forest)the sit-in continued.

Japan’s nation state under the “old regime” to2009 of the Liberal-Democratic Party insistedthat military priorities prevail over civil ordemocratic principle, the interests of theJapanese (and American) states over those ofthe Okinawan people, and the US alliance overthe constitution. As government in Tokyostruggled to secure the compliance of the

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Okinawan people to their own continuingsubordination to the military, Okinawa becameJapan’s domestic “North Korea” in the sense ofa prefecture committed to “Songun” (Military-First-ism). Except that in this case, it was aforeign military power imposing its will. It wasbitter for Okinawans to have Nobel Peacelaureate Obama continuing to thrust suchpriorities on them.

On the only occasion the people of Nago wereconsulted as to whether they would accept anew base, in a 1997 plebiscite, despite massivegovernment intervention designed to swayt h e m i n f a v o u r , t h e o u t c o m e w a sunambiguously negative. In a bizarre outcome,the then mayor flew to Tokyo to announce theoutcome, reject it on behalf of the City, andannounce his resignation. For almost a decadethereafter, the views of Nago citizens werestudiously ignored save that monies werepoured in to “development” projects designedto subvert them. By dint of enormous effort,however, the people thus far have thwartedTokyo’s and Washington’s plans.

In October 2009, the “sit-in” protest launchedby that opposition at Henoko in 2004 passed its2,000th day, well outlasting the SolidarnoscPolish worker sit-ins to become the longest inmodern history. Despite pressures from thestate, anti-base opinion in the prefectureseems, if anything, to have strengthened.Where, in 1999, opinion had been almostevenly divided between those who opposedrelocation within Okinawa and those who wereready to accept it, a May 2009 survey by theOkinawa Times found prefectural opinionrunning at 68 per cent against and only 18 percent in favour. [41] Six months later, in theheat of the current “battle of Okinawa,” a jointMainichi shimbun and Ryukyu shimpo surveyfound the number of Okinawans who wantedthe Futenma base shifted outside of Okinawa,whether in Japan or overseas, had risen to 70per cent, while hardly anyone – a derisory 5 percent – endorsed the Guam Agreement formula –

the formula on which Washington andWashington were insisting, for a base to beconstructed at Henoko. [42]

In the national elections of August 2009, DPJcandidates swept the polls in Okinawa,recording a higher vote than ever before in theproportional section and sweeping aside therepresentatives of the “old regime.” Bothprefectural newspapers, the majority in theOkinawan parliament (the PrefecturalAssembly, elected in 2008), are also opposed,[43] and 80 per cent of Okinawan mayorsbelieve the Futenma base substitute should beconstructed either overseas or elsewhere inJapan. [44] On 2 November, the Naha CityAssembly passed a unanimous resolutioncalling for Futenma to be relocated beyondOkinawa, whether in Japan or elsewhere. [45]

Okinawan newspapers hardly circulate outsidethe prefecture, or mainland ones within it, andmainland Japanese opinion is remarkablyignorant, and unsympathetic, to Okinawa. Eventhe “liberal” Asahi editorially scolded theHatoyama government, saying “There is a limitto Washington’s impatience … It would be veryunfortunate for both countries if the Futenmaissue became blown out of proportion.” [46]Okinawan civic thinking was paid littleattention. At the time of Hillary Clinton’sFebruary 2009 February visit to Tokyo, arepresentative group of Okinawan civic leaderswrote her an “Open Letter.” It read, in part:[47]

“Okinawa, a small island, has livedunder such great stress for oversixty years. The presence of USmilitary bases has distorted notonly the politics and economy ofOkinawa, but also its society itselfand people’s minds and pride.

We do not need to remind you thatOkinawa is not your territory. Yourfifty thousand military members

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act freely as if this is their land,but, of course, it is not. Pleaseremember that we, the Okinawapeople, own “the inherent dignity”and “the equal and inalienablerights of all the members of thehuman family,” which is stated inthe Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights, just as your familyand friends do.

The governments of the UnitedStates and Japan legitimized theUS military occupation of Okinawawith the San Francisco Treaty in1952, and the revers ion ofadministrative rights in 1972created a structure of economicand financial dependency inexchange for the presence of USmilitary bases on Okinawa. Thegovernments have changed theirstrategy for maintaining the basepresence from using force to usingmoney.

This is very cruel treatment. Thepeople of Okinawa have increaseddependency on such money. Themoney has created a system whichhas corrupted our minds. It hastaken away alternatives. Theacceptance of US bases is seen asthe only way to live. … It is as ifthe Japanese government hasmade Okinawa a drug addict andthe US government takes fulladvantage of the addiction, inorder to maintain its militarypresence …

I n 2 0 0 5 a n d 2 0 0 6 , t h egovernments of the United Statesand Japan reached agreement onthe construction of new bases andit seems that they are trying to

make the US military presence inOkinawa permanent. This planwould add a further burden on thepeople of Okinawa who havesuffered long enough.”

They ended by demanding cancellation of theHenoko plan, immediate and unconditionalreturn of Futenma, and further reductions inthe US military presence.

However, although “old regime” thinking,predicated on absolute compliance with the USand on continuing priority to US strategy andplanning in determining Okinawa policy, longcultivated by conservative LDP governments inTokyo, never sank roots in Okinawan society, itd i d s w a y h i g h l e v e l s o f O k i n a w a nadministration, especially the prefecturalgovernor and the Nago mayor. In the LDPsystem, such local dignitaries focussed on“development,” “employment” and the“promotion” of Okinawa, avoiding any stanceon base issues, while Tokyo poured in moneydesigned to serve those purposes. A May 2007law extended nation-wide the policy pioneeredin Nago and Okinawa’s northern districts ofreward for cooperation and punishment forrecalcitrance in promoting US base interests.

Tokyo’s cultivation of regional dependenceencouraged cynicism and corruption, whileblocking development rooted in local needs.After a decade of such a system, Okinawa’sincome levels remained the lowest in thecountry, unemployment was roughly double thenational average, and virtually all localgovernments were in the th roes o funsustainable fiscal crisis.

But, despite the “betrayal of the clerks,” thepolitical winds of 2009 suggested that theOkinawan social consensus against basedevelopment had strengthened under thechange of government. Certainly the politicalcredibility of the promise of “development” inreturn for submission had been fatally

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weakened by failure to deliver. However, whenin August 2009 the government of Japan thathad tried unsuccessfully by every means toweaken, split, buy off and intimidate thoseopposed to the construction of the new basewas itself thrown from office, the localrepresentatives of the system in Okinawa, theGovernor of the Prefecture and the Mayor ofNago, remained in office (till elections in 2010).

Both tried to shield their submission by seekinga slight revision of the Guam Agreement – toshift the construction design a short distanceoffshore – as if a reversion to the basic schemeof 1998-2005 would somehow solve theproblem. Knowing the American resistance tothe idea, they made it only in perfunctory way,with no attempt to insist on it. GovernorNakaima also spoke of a “best” solution – evenif it was impractical - being relocationsomewhere outside the prefecture.

Governor Nakaima

It was characteristic of the Governor’svacillation that he chose to absent himself fromthe prefecture on the occasion of the 8November All-Okinawa Mass Meeting toexpress opposition to the Futenma relocationwithin Okinawa. When Okinawans joined indemanding the closure of the “world’s mostdangerous base,” their Governor was inWashington. Days before the Mass Meeting, he

stood alongside Kanagawa GovernorMatsuzawa Shigefumi who, as head of theAssociation of Base-Hosting JapanesePrefectures, told their hosts that he saw noalternative to construction at Henoko of theFutenma replacement. [48] Nakaima protestedonly in the most feeble terms.

Regime Change

In the 64 years since the Marines stormedashore on Okinawa amid a rain of fire andsteel, the islands have known no peace. Theintractable nature of the prefecture’s problemstems from the fact that the base issue is set ina procrustean bed of assumptions andprinciples inherited from the US occupationand the Cold War. Hatoyama might declare theaspiration for “equality” in the relation with theUnited States, but submission, and theassumption that to please the United Stateswas the first principle of Japanese diplomacywas deeply entrenched. Apart from the $6billion “relocation costs” for the Guam transferi t is est imated that the Henoko baseconstruction, if it went ahead, would costaround one trillion yen (some $11 billion).These sums come on top of the annual subsidyof around 200 billion yen (roughly $2.2 billion)Japan has been paying the US ever since thereversion of Okinawa in 1972 under the rubricof “omoiyari” (consideration or sympathy,known in the US as “Host Nation Support”),[49] the $13 billion subsidy towards the costs ofthe Gulf War and the many subsequentappropriations towards the costs of theAfghanistan and Iraq wars. [50] It was oncesaid of George W. Bush that he was inclined tothink of Japan as “just some ATM machine” forwhich a pin number was not needed. Hatoyamahas made no move to close the “sympathy”spigot, and must know that to do so wouldprovoke Washington even more than hisattempts to renegotiate the Guam Treaty.

The Japanese state of the “old regime” becamea “mercenary in reverse,” one that paid to

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subject itself. To explain such a peculiar stateformation and its accompanying psychology, Ihave suggested thinking of Japan as America’s“Client State,” i.e. a state that enjoys theformal trappings of Westphalian sovereigntyand independence, and is therefore neither acolony nor a puppet state, but which hasinternalised the requirement to give preferenceto “other” interests over its own. [51]

Prime Ministers of the “old regime” soughtways to channel Japanese monies toWashington, while seeking in return help inshoring up their government and resisting thewill of the Japanese people. It would be toomuch to think that a single election couldsecurely install a “new regime,” but theHatoyama government has taken some steps inthat direction.

Throughout the post-1945 decades, there hasnever been such a confrontation between theUS and Japan as grew during 2009 around thechange of government in Tokyo. At issue, theRyukyu Shimpo insisted on the eve of the All-Okinawa Mass Meeting, was nothing less thanwhether the Japanese constitution’s guaranteesof popular sovereignty, basic human rights, andpeace applied to Okinawa. [52] The Hatoyamagovernment is split: Defense Minister Kitazawafor implementation of the Guam Agreement andconstruction at Henoko, Foreign MinisterOkada for merger of Futenma facilities withthose of the USAF base at Kadena on a 15 yearlimited basis, while Prime Minister Hatoyamahas called for prioritizing the views ofOkinawans.

By November, despite their worries, officials inWashington must have felt with satisfactionthat they had accomplished a lot in a shortspace of time, opening divisions within theHatoyama government. They would have notedwith pleasure that Okinawa Governor Nakaimaand Nago Mayor Shimabukuro had both kept alow profile as the crisis grew and maintainedtheir distance both from the new Government

in Tokyo and the Okinawan popular movement,and that both were conspicuously absent fromthe platform of the All-Okinawa Mass Protestmeeting of 8 November. Washington would bebound to pay more attention to that fact, and tothe message of quiet reassurance that Nakaimawas delivering to his American hosts, than tothe message of the Mass Meeting that followeddays afterwards.

All Okinawa Mass Meeting on 8 November,Ginowan City)

Rejecting the Provisions of the GuamTreaty and demanding immediate,

unconditional return of Futenma MarineAir Station (Ryukyu shimpo)

With the last shots from the Washingtonbarrage still exploding around him [53] andObama’s visit imminent, Hatoyama continuedto study his options and Washington to insist onits demands. Hatoyama faced an impossiblechoice: he could reject the US demands, riskinga major diplomatic crisis, or he could submit tothem, provoking a domestic political crisis anddriving Okinawans to despair. The optimismone could feel just a few short months ago asthe new Government was elected slowlydrained away.

Gavan McCormack is emeritus professor atAustralian National University, coordinator of

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The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, author,most recently, of Client State: Japan in theA m e r i c a n E m b r a c e(http://www.amazon.com/dp/184467133X/?tag=theasipacjo0b-20) (in English, Japanese,Chinese, and Korean), and contributes amonthly co lumn to the Korean da i lyKyunghyang shinmun. For his earlier articleson Okinawan matters, see The Asia-PacificJournal. A much abridged version of this articleis to be published in Korean in Kyunghyangshinmun on 10 November and in Japanese inRyukyu shimpo on 11 November.

Recommended citation: Gavan McCormack,"The Battle of Okinawa 2009: Obama vsHatoyama," The Asia-Pacific Journal, 46-1-09,November 16, 2009.

Notes

[1] “Agreement between the Government ofJapan and the Government of the United Statesof America concerning the Implementation ofthe Relocation of 111 Marine ExpeditionaryForce Personnel and their Dependents fromOkinawa to Guam,” Tokyo, 17 February 2009.L i n k(http://www.mofa.go.jp/POLICY/treaty/submit/session171/agree-4.html)[2] For details, see my Client State: Japan inthe American Embrace, London and New York,Verso, 2007.[3] Admiral Timothy Keating, head of USPacific Command, told a New York pressconference in November 2008 that he did notexpect the Roadmap target of 2014, “or maybeeven 2015,” to be met. “Obama and Japan –Futenma relocation a pressing issue,” YomiuriShimbun, 20 November 2008.[4] Reply by Prime Minister Aso to Dietquestion from Teruya Hironori, 5 March 2009.L i n k(http://www.shugiin.go.jp/itdb_shitsumon.nsf/html/shitsumon/a171187.htm )[5] Sato Manabu, "Obama seiken no Amerika,"in Miyazato Seigen, Arasaki Moriteru, and

Gabe Masaaki, Okinawa jiritsu e no michi womotomete, Tokyo, Kobunken, 2009, pp. 83-94[6] It was used on 26 occasions between 1947and 1957, to pass 28 laws, then not till Asorevived it in 2008, when he used it to railroad10 bills on 8 occasions (Jimbo Taro, “Mediahihyo” (20), Sekai, August 2009, pp. 92-99, atp. 92).[7] For details, see , Yoshikawa Hideki(http://japanfocus.org/-Hideki-YOSHIKAWA/3044), “Dugong Swimming in Uncharted Waters:US Judicial Intervention to Protect Okinawa's"Natura l Monument” and Hal t BaseConstruction,” The Asia-Pacific Journal 7February 2009.[ 8 ] S a k u r a i K u n i t o s h i(http://japanfocus.org/-Sakurai-Kunitoshi/3223),"The Guam treaty as a Modern 'Disposal' of theRyukyus."[9] Richard L. Armitage and Joseph S. Nye(http://www.cisi.org/media/cisi/pubs070216_Asia2020.pdf),” The US-Japan Alliance: GettingAsia Right through 2020,” CSIS Report,February 2007.[10] Kaho Shimizu, “Greater security role is inJapan’s interest: Gates,” Japan Times, 10November 2007.[11]Yoichi Kato, “Interview/ Richard Lawless:Japan-U.S. alliance faces 'priority gap’,” Asahishimbun, 2 May 2008.[12] Quoted by Funabashi Yoichi, “Obamaseiken to Nichibei kankei - Heiji no domeitsuikyu suru toki,” Asahi shimbun, 26 January2009.[13] "Clinton praises strong U.S.-Japan Ties,"Yomiuri shimbun, 18 February 2009.[14] AFP, “Clinton, Japan sign US troops pull-out deal,” Sydney Morning Herald, 18 February2009.[ 1 5 ] H a t t o r i P e a c e - N e t(http://www.hattori-peacenet.com/2009/06/post-1.html), “Guam kyotei iten no mondaiten,” 15June 2009. See also Yamaguchi Hibiki,“Kaiheitai Guam iten,” Peoples Plan, Summer2009, pp, 2-15.[ 1 6 ] S a t o s h i O g a w a(http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/20091107

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TDY01302.htm ), “U.S. senate cuts funds formarines’ Guam move,” Daily Yomiuri Online, 7November 2009.[17] Hattori, cit.[18] “Futenma wa kengai isetsu” (Futenma tobe moved outside of Okinawa), See theDemocratic Party’s “Okinawa Vision 2008.”However, in the 2009, pre-election version, thepledge was qualified to “move in the directionof re-examining the realignment of U.S.military forces in Japan.”[19] Kurt Campbell and Michael Green,“Ozawa’s bravado may damage Japan foryears,” Asahi shimbun, 29 August 2007.[20] Maeda, pp. 15-18.[21] Quoted in Narusawa Muneo, “Shin seikenno gaiko seisaku ga towareru Okinawa kichimondai,” Shukan Kinyobi, 25 September 2009,pp. 13-15[22] Asahi shimbun, 25 February 2009. Seealso Maeda Tetsuo, ‘Juzoku’ kara ‘jiritsu’ e –Nichibei Ampo o kaeru, Kobunken, 2009, pp.17, 25.[23] Yoichi Kato, “U.S. warm to proposal toreaffirm security pact,” Asahi shimbun, 23 July2009.[24] Quoted in Mure Dickie and DanielDombey, “Prospect of power softens DPJ’sstance,” Financial Times, 21 July 2009.[25] “Bei kokan ‘minaosanu’ tsugitsugi,”Ryukyu shimpo, 3 September 2009[26] Hiroshi Ito, “U.S. on Futenma revisit:Forget it,” Asahi shimbun, 2 September 2009.[27] “’Kokka-kan no goi’ kyocho,” OkinawaTimes, 4 September 2009.[28] “Futenma isetsu dekineba Nichibei kankeini dageki,, Bei kokan ga keikoku,” Asahishimbun, 18 October 2009.[29] John Pomfret and Blaine Harden(http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/10/21/AR2009102100746.html?nav=emailpage), “U.S. pressures Japan onmilitary package,” Washington Post, 22October 2009.[30] Ibid.[31] “Joint Press Conference with JapaneseDefense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa and

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates,” Tokyo, 21October 2009, Department of Defense, NewsT r a n s c r i p t . L i n k(http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2009/10/mil-091021-dod01.htm)[ 3 2 ] M i c h a e l G r e e n(http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/blog/12381 ),“Tokyo smackdown,” The New ForeignPolicy.com, 23 October 2009.[33] “Joint Chiefs chairman: Futenma mustmove to Nago,” Yomiuri shimbun, 24 October2009.[34] “Hatoyama, key ministers split onF u t e n m a , ”(http://www.japanupdate.com/id=9897) WeeklyJapan Update, 29 October 2009.[35] “Beigun saihen meguri gekiron – MinshuOkada kanjicho to bei kokubo jikan,” NikkeiNet, 26 July 2009.[36] The Guardian, 10 August 2009.[37] “Gaisho – Henoko-an o saimonshi,Futenma isetsu,” Okinawa Times, 23 October2009.[38] “Japan urges U.S. to respect ‘democracy’over base,” AFP, 22 October 2009.[39] “Okada gaisho hatsugen – boso suruHatoyama seiken no genkai, Ampo no Okinawaizon kara dakkyaku o,” Ryukyu shimpo, 25October 2009.[40] Shimokobe Jun, then Vice-Minister at theNational Lands Agency, quoted in SatoManabu, “Obama seiken no Amerika,” cit, p.90.[41] “Futenma hikojo daitai, kennai isetsuhantai 68%,” Okinawa Times, 14 May 2009. Inthe Northern Districts (including Nago Ciy)opposition was even higher, at 76 per cent.[42] “Futenma iten: Genko keikaku ni ‘hantai”67%, Okinawa yoron chosa,” Mainichi shimbun,2 November 2009; for a partial Englishaccount, “Poll: 70 percent of Okinawans wantFutenma moved out of prefecture, Japan,”Mainichi Daily News, 3 November 2009.Foreign Minister Okada’s “Kadena option” alsohad scant support. 72 per cent of peopleopposed it.[43] Gavan McCormack and Matsumoto

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T s u y o s h i( h t t p : / / j a p a n f o c u s . o r g / - g a v a n -mccormack/2825), “”Okinawa says “No” to USbase plan,” Japan Focus, 21 July 2008.[44] 34 of 41 local government heads inOkinawa. “Futenma ‘kengai’ ‘kokugai’ 34 nin,”Okinawa Times, 30 October 2009.[45] “Nahashi gikai Futenma no ‘kengaikokugai’ motome ikensho aketsu,” Ryukyushimpo, 2 November 2009. Five Communistmembers absented themselves from theChamber during the vote, but their positionwas that it was too soft; only Futenma’simmediate and unconditional return wouldsatisfy them.[46] “Relocating Futenma Base,” Asahishimbun, 23 October 2009.[47] “Hirari R. Kurinton Beikokumu chokan eno shokan (Open Letter to Secretary of StateClinton), by Miyaazato Seigen and 13 otherrepresentative figures of Okinawa’s civilsociety, 14 February 2009, (Japanese) text at“Nagonago zakki,” Miyagi Yasuhiro blog, 22March 2009; English text courtesy SatoManabu.[48] Nakaima uttered the bizarre remark that

he might not necessarily share Matsuzawa’s“tastes.” (“teisuto ga sukoshi watakushi to hachigau ka mo shirenai,” (“Futenma kengaiisetsu ha fukano’ ho-Bei chu no Kanagawa chijiga koen,” Ryukyu shimpo, 6 November 2009; See also “Kanaga chiji, Henoko-an osu‘Futennma isetsu,” Okinawa Times, 7November 2009.)[49] The figure of 5.5 trillion yen, 50 billiondollars, is the best estimate of the Japanesesubsidy to Pentagon coffers over the years.[50] On the latter, see my Client State: Japan inthe American Embrace, passim.[51] The definition here is one I adopt in therevised Japanese, Korean and Chinese editionsof my 2007 book, Client State: Japan in theAmerican Embrace.[52] “Okinawa no min-i – Kennai isetsu ‘No’ gasenmei da,” Ryukyu shimpo, editorial, 3November 2009.[53] Ian Kelly of the Department of State, wasquoted one week before Obama’s visit as saying“Japan has to decide what kind of relationshipit wants with the US.” (“Futenma de Nihonseifu no boso ken’en, Beikokumucho,” Tokyoshimbun, 4 November 2009).

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