The Bomb in the Basement: How Israel Went Nuclear and What That Means for the World byMichael KarpinReview by: Lawrence D. FreedmanForeign Affairs, Vol. 85, No. 2 (Mar. - Apr., 2006), p. 193Published by: Council on Foreign RelationsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20031935 .

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Recent Rooks

which side would collapse from exhaustion first. Doughty confirms that it was only the

British and the Americans who kept the French staggering forward. Pyrrhic it might have been, but it still felt like a victory to the French-unlike 1940 which, despite far fewer casualties, was a defeat.

The Bomb in the Basement: How Israel Went Nuclear and What ThatMeansfor the World. BY MICHAEL KARPIN. Simon

& Schuster, 2006, 416 pp. $26.oo.

Israel's nuclear capability is shrouded in calculated ambiguity: its existence will never be officially confirmed, but occasional revelations are helpfil in giving its deterrent value a boost at appropriate moments (for example, in a time of superterrorism and Iranian nuclear aspirations). The Israeli nuclear program's basic history- the French giving Israel the wherewithal to become a nuclear power, the discovery of the Dimona reactor and the resulting tensions with the United States in the early 1960s, the development of the Jericho missile-was told by Avner Cohen (Israel and the Bomb) in 1998. The novelty of this account lies in Karpin's ability, as a journalist, to get participants in the project to talk on the record and in its addition of many fascinating details to

what was already known. Karpin is good on the interaction between the nuclear decisions and the wider strategic debates under way in the Israeli government today, as well as on how its policy of ambiguity has been developed and sustained.

The Utility ofForce: TheArt of War in the Modern World. BY GENERAL SIR RUPERT

SMITH. Allen Lane, 2005, 448 pp. ?25.00. Up through his retirement as NATO'S Deputy Supreme Commander Allied

Powers Europe, Smith was one of the most outstanding contemporary British generals, closely involved with Northern Ireland, the 1991 Persian GulfWar, Bosnia, and Kosovo. His book is not a memoir but a reflection on his experience, backed up by a lot of historical analysis, with a focus on the transition from industrial

war to "war amongst the people." The influence of Bosnia on his thinking comes through very clearly in one of the best chapters, for there he saw firsthand how the anxieties and vacillations of politicians could cause confusion in the execution of missions. At times, this book reads like a terse military briefing explaining to politicians the complicated world in

which force is now being employed and the danger of configuring forces for wars that armies will not be called up to fight.

The shift may not be as clear-cut as Smith suggests, and understanding the problems of contemporary war does not always mean that the solutions are obvious, but this book nonetheless deserves careful reading.

Amateur Soldiers, Global Wars: Insurgency and Modern Conflict. BY MICHAEL C. FOWLER. Praeger Security International, 2005, 200 pp. $49.95.

Fowler follows the same line as Rupert Smith in pondering the implications of the shift from conventional war to insurgency.

His book lacks the authority, lucidity, and historical sweep of Smith's, but he has some interesting observations on how today's "amateurs" are able to perform comparable functions to professionals in preparing their military operations. Insur gent leaders can mobilize and train their troops, develop strategies, collect intelli gence, raise money, and procure weapons, tasks all made easier by globalization.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS March/April2006 [193]

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