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The Challenges of Political Programming:International Assistance to Parties and Parliaments

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International IDEAThe International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance

The Challenges of Political Programming: International Assistance to Parties and Parliaments

Discussion Paper for International IDEAby Greg Power and Oliver Coleman, Global Partners and AssociatesNovember 2011

InternationalIDEAresourcesonPoliticalParticipation

ThisdiscussionpaperhasbeenpreparedaspartofInternationalIDEA’sprojectonEffectivePartyAssistanceanditsspecificfocusontherelationshipbetweenpoliticalpartyandparliamentarysupport.

Thepaperwascommissionedtoidentifythefactorslikelytopreventorpromotegreaterintegration,coordinationandimpactbetweenthetwofieldsandtomakerecommendationsonhowsupportcanbestbeintegratedatthestrategicandpracticallevels.

©InternationalInstituteforDemocracyandElectoralAssistance2011.

TheInternationalInstituteforDemocracyandElectoralAssistance(InternationalIDEA)publicationsareindependentofspecificnationalorpoliticalinterests.ViewsexpressedinthispublicationdonotnecessarilyrepresenttheviewsofInternationalIDEA,itsBoardoritsCouncilmembers.

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InternationalIDEAPublicationsOfficeStrömsborgSE-10334StockholmSweden

Acknowledgements

This paper was written for the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (InternationalIDEA)byOliverColemanandGregPowerofGlobalPartnersandAssociates.ThepreparationofthepaperwasoverseenbyBjarteTørå,SamvanderStaakandElinFalgueraofInternationalIDEA.

Contents

Executive summary............................................................................................................................................8

List of Abbreviations........................................................................................................................................ 11

International strategies for parliamentary and party assistance..................................................................12

Thedevelopmentofparliamentaryandpartyassistance..............................................................................14

Thechallengesfordonorsinpartyandparliamentarysupport................................................................... 15

Conclusions.................................................................................................................................................18

From strategic objectives to project implementation..................................................................................... 19

Conclusions..................................................................................................................................................2 4

Four case studies: Support to parties and parliaments in practice...............................................................25

DeepeningDemocracyinTanzania.............................................................................................................2 6

TheDeepeningDemocracyProgrammeinUganda.....................................................................................31

NIMD’sworkwithpoliticalpartiesinGhana..............................................................................................37

TheWFD’sworkwiththeMacedonianParliament.....................................................................................4 4

Conclusions: Continuing challenges for political programming.................................................................5 0

Bibliography.....................................................................................................................................................55

Notes.................................................................................................................................................................59

International IDEA at a glance.......................................................................................................................61

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Executive summary

Donor efforts to support democracy and good gov-ernance have, in the past few years, been shaped bytwo dominant trends in international assistance todevelopingcountries.Thefirstistheaideffectivenessagenda, following declarations in Paris and Accra,which aims for greater impact and results-orientedprogramming. The second is the increasing use ofpolitical economy analysis to better understand thefactors that determine the quality and outcomes ofthe political decision-making process. In the desireforgreater impact,donorstrategies forworkingwithparliaments and political parties have increasinglyrecognized theneed toengageatadeeper levelwiththe politics of the countries in which they work inordertoachieveresults.Thishasinvolvedgreaterco-ordination between donors at the strategic level andprompted suggestions that the support provided toparliamentsandpartiesneedstobebetteralignedtoachievepoliticalchange.

This paper examines the ways in which differentdonor agencies and implementing organizations areaddressingthechallengesofthistypeofprogramming.Forthepurposesofthepaperweusetheterm‘politi-calprogramming’ todescribe the recentattemptsbydonoragenciestoapplymorepoliticalformsofanaly-sis(suchas‘driversofchange’)inthedesign,deliveryand implementation of projects to achieve ‘political’outcomes;thatis,wheredonorsandimplementersareseekingtoengagewithpoliticalincentivesandstruc-turestoachievechange,ratherthansolelyrelyingontechnical support. It draws on interviews with stafffrom agencies and implementing partners as well asanumberofindependentconsultantsworkingonthedesign, delivery and evaluation of party and parlia-mentaryprojects.Italsoincludesananalysisofstrat-egypapersandplanningdocumentsfromavarietyoforganizationsandanin-depthexaminationofpoliti-calprogrammeswithpartiesandparliamentsinfourcountries.

It suggests that while there is a degree of consensusat the strategic level, donors are struggling to trans-latetheirstrategic insights intoprojectdesignontheground. In addition, it argues that the dynamics oftheaideffectivenessagendaarepullinginadifferentdirection to the logic of political economy analysis.Ultimately,theway‘managingforresults’ isnowin-terpretedbydonorsmay,infact,beunderminingboththequalityandtheimpactofpoliticalprogrammesinthelongterm.

Thepapercontainsfourchapters.Chapter 1providesabriefoverviewof international strategies forparlia-mentaryandpartyassistance.Highlightingtheweak-nessesof ‘traditional’ interventionstosupportparlia-mentsandparties,itexaminestheincreasingemphasisfromdonorsonmorepoliticalformsofprogramminginboth spheresof activity.At the strategic level, theemerging priorities are characterized by a desire tounderstand the incentives that shape parliamentaryandpartyactivity,andtackletheunderlyingcausesofweaknessinboth.Yet,suchprogrammesfacefoursetsofchallenges:i)translatingstrategyintoprojectdesignand implementation; ii) continuing fears of politicalinterference;iii)theproblemofestablishingpoliticallyrealisticobjectivesforprogrammes;andiv)integratingsupporttodifferentpartsofthepoliticalsystem,notleastpartiesandparliaments.Inshort,theadoptionofcommonprinciplesforinternationalassistancetopar-tiesandparliamentsstillleavesanumberofpracticaldifficulties,andtherehasbeenrelatively littleassess-mentofhowthesearebeinghandled.

Chapter 2 looks specifically at recent developmentsinthedesignanddeliveryofprojects.Inparticularitlooks at the tensions and difficulties that donors arefacing in moving from the strategic to the specific.Theevidenceindicatesthatalthoughprogrammesareincreasinglybeinginformedbyasophisticatedpoliti-calanalysis,manyoftheprojectsthemselvesarefall-ingbackon traditionalmethods. Inparticular there

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seemstobeatendencytoshyawayfromengagingwithpoliticalrealitiesontheground.Inshort,despitetherhetoricofaideffectiveness,thereisacontinuinglackofclarityandcoherencearoundmuchoftheworkinthisfield.

Chapter 3 examines four case studies designed tounderstand these dynamics and difficulties in moredetail.Eachofthefourcasestudiesisbasedonade-tailed analysis of project documents and interviewswith stakeholders and staff. It should be made clearthat the projects were not chosen as a representa-tive sampleofparliamentary andparty supportpro-grammes,butrathertheopposite.Theprojectsdifferfrom the vast majority of programmes in that theyallhaveovertlypoliticalobjectivesandtooneextentoranotherhavesoughttointegratesupporttoparlia-mentsandpoliticalparties.Theyprovidetestcasesinwhichdonorshaverecognizedandsoughttomanagethe challenges that come with political intervention,and thus illustrate some of the innate difficulties inthisareaofprogramming.

The first two case studies examine the deepeningdemocracy programmes in Tanzania and Uganda,respectively. Both were multi-donor programmes,thepremiseforwhichwastheinterdependenceofthedifferent institutions of democracy and the need fora set of activities which engaged with the politicaldriversofchange.Yet theyprovideverydifferentex-periences and insights of the difficulties in translat-ingpoliticalanalysis intotheplanning,managementand delivery of projects. Ultimately, the deepeningdemocracy programme in Tanzania was undone bya nervousness about the implications of encourag-ingpoliticalreform,whichaffectedthewayinwhichactivities were designed and was compounded by acomplex and ambiguous management structure. ItprovidesausefulcontrastwiththesimilarprogrammeinUganda,whichwasbasedonastatedintentiontoalterthebalanceofpower.Thatclarityfromtheout-set meant stakeholders understood the nature of theprogramme—even if they did not support it—andthatpoliticaltensionscouldbeaddresseddirectly.

TheothertwocasestudiesaretheworkoftheNether-landsInstituteforMultipartyDemocracy(NIMD)inGhanaandtheworkoftheWestminsterFoundationforDemocracy(WFD)inMacedonia.TheGhanacasestudyprovidesanexampleofaprojectexplicitlydesignedto strengthenpoliticalpartiesbutwhich sought alsotoinfluenceotheraspectsofthepoliticalsystem,notleasttheparliament.TheMacedoniacaseisanexam-pleofaprojectthatsoughttostrengthenparliamentby

workingthroughandwiththepoliticalparties.Bothprojects were based on a detailed understanding ofthepoliticaldynamicsinthosecountriesandengageddirectly with them in order to foster institutional,culturalandbehaviouralchange.However,bothreliedonlocalpartnersasthedriversofpoliticalchange,andhighlightthedelicatebalancebetweenlocalownershipandexternalpressure.Theyrevealsomeofthepoten-tial problems such programming can face, not leastdependencyonlocalstakeholderbuy-inandtheneedtocombineincentiveswithownership.

The final chapter seeks to draw together the mainlessons forpoliticalprogramming forparty andpar-liamentarysupportandarguesthatthemostsuccess-fulprojectsarethosewhichfirstallowforsignificantflexibility in project implementation; and, second,establishrealisticpoliticalobjectives.Inthefirstplace,political programming—not least support to partiesand parliaments, the focus of this research—has tobebasedonananalysisoftheinterdependenceofthepolitical institutions in a particular country. In thiscontext, numerous interviewees commented that thebestprojectswerethosethatdivergedfromtheorigi-nal planning documents. A rigid programme designignores the fact that politics is never static and thatpoliticalprogrammesneedtorespondto this reality,sothattheplanningprocess itselfshouldevolveovertime.Althoughtheobjectivesshouldremainconstant,theactivitiesandinterventionsshouldbecontinuallyadapted.Intoomanyprogrammesitistheotherwayaround.

Second,political programming is still, to a large ex-tent, based on a ‘hit and hope’ strategy. It relies onspecificactivitiesandinterventions,whichmeansthatthere is, atbest,a tenuous linkbetweensomeof thetechniquesusedandthehoped-foroutcomes.Politicalchangeisnotlinear,butmessy,haphazardandunpre-dictable.Yetthereisalmostnoevidenceofastrategyformanaging these activities towardsparticular out-comes.Contrast thiswith thebusinessworld,wherethere is a whole sub-industry built around ‘changemanagement’. Most businesses have a broadly hier-archical structure that looks relatively straightfor-wardcomparedwiththecomplexitiesandcompetinginterests that existwithin aparliamentor apoliticalparty.Yet,nochangemanagementstrategywouldseektodealwithonepartoftheorganizationasifitwereindependent fromotherpartsof thebusiness. In thesameway,politicalprogrammesneedastrategywhichisnotjustbasedonanintegratedanalysis,buthasanintegratedstrategytoachievechange.

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The paper concludes by arguing that greatereffectivenessandintegrationinpartyandparliamen-tary supportdependsondonors changing their role.It means altering the way in which projects are de-livered, with a better translation of political analysisintoprojectdesign,andgreaterflexibility in thewaytheyareimplemented.However,the‘aideffectiveness’agenda,inparticularitsemphasison‘results’,appearsto bepullingprogrammes away from this approach.This isgenerallybeing interpretedbydonoragenciesastheneedfora‘returnoninvestment’withtangiblesigns of change, but this risks distorting the way inwhichsuchprojectsaredelivered.IthasbeendescribedbyThomasCarothersasa‘projectization’ofsuchwork,whichplacesgreateremphasisonfittingworkintothestructureofbureaucraticformsrequiredbydonors.Asa seniorfigure fromadonor agencyput it, itmeansthatgovernmentsare‘moreinterestedindoingthingsthe right way, than in doing the right things’. Theemphasis on ‘results’ runs the risk of reducing theeffectiveness of such political programmes, as thedesireforquantitativedatameansthatprojectsendupwiththewrongindicators,whichinturnmeansthattheyendupdoingthewrongthings.

Donorsshouldbemovingintheoppositedirectioniftheyareseriousaboutachievingmeaningfulpoliticalchange.Projectsshouldbedrivenbyoutcomesratherthan process. In addition, the logic of programmesmustreflectthefactthatpoliticalchangeisaninter-nallydrivenexercise. Insuchcircumstances, theroleof the donor agency or institute becomes less about‘implementation’ than about being a consultant orfacilitator to theprocess,providingadviceandguid-ance. It also means that a more effective approachtoparties andparliaments requiresflexibility so thatprogrammes evolve and adapt to changing politicalcircumstances. It means that project implementersneedtobeastuteenoughtoidentifythesynergiesbe-tween party and parliamentary support, and able tointegratethemaroundthedesireforspecificpoliticaloutcomes.Aflexibleandgenuinelyoutcome-orientedformofprogrammingwouldmean thatdonors takegreaterresponsibilityfortheresultsoftheirinterven-tions,butultimatelyexerciselesscontroloverthewaytheyareimplemented.Atpresent,suchdevelopmentsseemhighlyunlikely.

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List of Abbreviations

CCM ChamaChaMapinduzi(Tanzania)CRC ConstitutionalReviewCommitteeDP DemocraticParty(Uganda)DCSP DemocracyConsolidationStrategy Paper(Ghana)DDP DeepeningDemocracyProgramme (Uganda)DDTP DeepeningDemocracyinTanzania ProgrammeDemo PoliticalPartiesofFinlandFinland forDemocracyDFID UKDepartmentforInternational DevelopmentDUI DemocraticUnionforIntegration (Macedonia)EAF ExpertAdvisoryFund(DDP)EU EuropeanUnionFDC ForumforDemocraticChange (Uganda)GPPP GhanaPoliticalPartiesProgrammeIEA InstituteofEconomicAffairs(Ghana)InternationalInternationalInstituteforDemocracyIDEA andElectoralAssistanceIRI InternationalRepublicanInstituteIT InformationTechnologyJAP JointActionPlan(Ghana)NDC NationalDemocraticCongress(Ghana)NDI NationalDemocraticInstituteNDPC NationalDevelopmentPlanning CommissionNEX NationalExecutionNIMD NetherlandsInstituteforMultiparty DemocracyNORAD NorwegianAgencyforDevelopment Cooperation

NPP NewPatrioticParty(Ghana)NRM NationalResistanceMovement (Uganda)OC OversightCommittee(DDTP)ODI OverseasDevelopmentInstitutePCO ProgrammeCoordinationOffice(DDTP)PDG PartnersforDemocracyand Governance(Uganda)PDP PartyforDemocraticProsperity (Macedonia)PMU ProjectManagementUnit(DDP)RF ResearchFund(DDP)RPP OfficeoftheRegistrarofPolitical Parties(Tanzania)SADEV SwedishAgencyforDevelopment EvaluationSida SwedishInternationalDevelopment CooperationAgencyTCD TanzaniaCentreforDemocracyUNDP UnitedNationsDevelopment ProgrammeUPC UgandaPeople’sCongressUSAID UnitedStatesAgencyforInternational DevelopmentVMRO- InternalMacedonianDPMNE RevolutionaryOrganization- DemocraticPartyforMacedonian NationalUnityWFD WestminsterFoundationfor Democracy

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International strategies for parliamentary and party assistance

In the past two decades, democracy assistance hasbecomeasignificantfeatureintheworkofallthein-ternational aid agencies, particularly since what hasbecomeknownasthe‘thirdwave’ofdemocratizationwhich tookplace in the late1980sandearly1990s.1However, in key respects democracy assistance re-mainsanambiguousandamorphousareaofinterna-tionalactivity.Ithasbeenusedasawayofaddressinganumberofdifferentforeignpolicyanddonoragencypriorities, including security, geopolitical diplomacy,humanitarian aid and socio-economic development.Itshouldalsobeseenasaconstituentpartofawiderinternational‘goodgovernance’agenda,whichaimstoimprovemechanismsofaccountability,representationandtransparency—buthasanequalconcernforstatecapacityandpublicservicedelivery.Inaddition,sincetheattacksontheUnitedStatesinSeptember2001,agreateremphasishasbeenplacedontheneedtotacklefragile states as part of an international counterter-rorism policy, so that democracy support work hasincreasinglyfocusedonbuilding‘capableandeffectivestates’.

Within this broad approach, democracy assistancehas tended to focus on three main areas of work:support to electoral processes; institutional develop-ment; and strengthening civil society. Electoral as-sistancehasbeenthemostprominentand,itappears,thebest fundedareaofdonor activity, reflecting thetraditionalimportanceattachedtoelectionsasasignof a functioning democracy.2 Institution-buildinghasencompassedarangeofactivitiestoestablishtheconstitutional and judicial framework of a country.Supporttopoliticalpartiesandparliamentshastend-edtofallwithinthisarea,butbothaccountforonlya small proportion of activity.3 Instead, donors havetraditionallyshownagreaterpredilectionforworkingwithcivilsocietyorganizations,asthisisregardedasless politically sensitive and more cost-effective, andplays to their concerns for building social capital inemergingdemocracies.

However, the impact of such assistance, especiallyin its early stages, is highly questionable. ThomasCarothersinparticularhashighlightedarangeofdefi-cienciesthatcontinuetohamperdemocracyassistanceefforts.4Commoncriticismsinclude:thetendencyofdonors to use standard models for assistance, whichtakelittleaccountoflocalcontextorpoliticaldynam-ics;theattemptbydonorstoimposetheseideasratherthan build local commitment and support; and theadoptionofidealizedmodelsoftenbasedonUS/WestEuropeanideasofdemocracy.

In addition, democracy assistance has been under-mined by a lack of coordination and integration inthree main ways. First, donor agencies themselveshave, at times, duplicated and sometimes conflictedwith the work of others in a particular country.Second,democracysupportcanconflictwithadonorgovernment’s diplomatic and security objectives in aparticularcountry.Diplomacydependsonmaintain-inggoodrelationswiththeexecutiveofthedevelopingcountry, which may not be too keen on strengthen-ing either civil society or the institutions of democ-racy. Third, although an effective democracy relieson the interaction of its many different componentparts working together, democracy assistance hastended to treat each area of work in isolation, withlittle or no integration of programmes designed tosupportelections, institutionsandcivil society.Mostmarkedly for the purpose of this paper, despite theobvious overlapbetween support toparliaments andsupport to political parties, they exist as almost en-tirelyseparatedisciplines.

The approach to democracy assistance, however,has changed markedly in tone since the mid-2000s,reflectingtwosignificantdevelopmentsinthefieldofinternationalaid.Thefirstistheemphasisnowplacedon‘aideffectiveness’andthesecondisthegreaterin-terestinformsof‘politicaleconomy’analysisasawayofunderstandinghowgovernanceworksinpractice.

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On thefirst front, in2005 theParisDeclarationonaideffectivenessestablishedtheprincipleswhichnowgovernalmostalldonoractivity.Theseare,briefly:

• Ownership:Partnercountriesexerciseeffectiveleadershipovertheirdevelopmentpoliciesandstrategies,andcoordinatedevelopmentactions;

• Alignment:Donorsbasetheiroverallsupportonpartnercountries’nationaldevelopmentstrategies,institutionsandprocedures;

• Harmonization:Donors’actionsaremoreharmonized,transparentandcollectivelyeffective;

• Managingforresults:Managingresourcesandimprovingdecision-makingforresults;

• Mutualaccountability:Donorsandpartnersareaccountablefordevelopmentresults.

ThethrustbehindtheParisprincipleswasadesireforgreater impact from donor interventions, by takinggreateraccountofcountrycontextandworkingdirect-lywithpartnersinthosecountriestoachievecommonobjectives.Theseprincipleswerereinforcedin2008byasubsequentHigh-LevelForum,whichpublishedtheAccraAgendaforAction.TheAccradocumentfurtheremphasizedtheprinciplethatalldonoractivityshouldseek to strengthen domestic institutions and formsof accountability. In other words, rather than work-ingsolelywiththeexecutivearmofgovernmentinadeveloping country, or creating new systems for thedelivery and disbursement of aid, donors should useandenhanceexistinginstitutionsandprocesses.Accrathusenvisagedaspecificroleforparliamentsaspart-nersintheprocessofdevelopmentandhadpotentialimplications for support topoliticalpartiesasagentsofchange.

The second development, the increasing use of po-liticaleconomytechniquestoanalyseandunderstandgovernance,hasbeenledbyanumberofdonoragen-cies,mostnotablytheSwedishInternationalDevelop-mentCooperationAgency(Sida),theUKDepartmentforInternationalDevelopment(DFID)andtheDutchMinistry of Foreign Affairs. Each has developed itsownanalyticalframework,butallworkfromsimilarguidingprinciples.Forexample,Sida’sPower Analysis,‘involves gaining a deeper understanding of the po-litical, social,culturalandeconomicissuesatplay ina country; thepower relationshipsbetween actors atthesocietallevelandtheincentivesoftheseactorstoaffectorimpedechange’.5Inthesamevein,DFIDhasinvestedsignificantlyinitsDrivers of Change Analysis,

and subsequent tools suchas itsCountry Governance Analysis,whichdrawsonmanyofthesametechniques,to help ‘understand how incentives, institutions andideasshapepoliticalactionanddevelopmentoutcomesin the countries where we work’.6 In short, politicaleconomyanalysisisseenasawaytobetterunderstandthe factors that determine both the quality and theoutcomesofthepoliticaldecision-makingprocess.

The implicationof both the aid effectiveness agendaandtheuseofpoliticaleconomyanalysisforsupportprojects, as is recognized by many donors, is thatdonors need to engage with the process of politicalchange.Thismeansdesigninganddeliveringprojectswhich seek to address the deeper causes of politicalinstability, poor governance and lack of democracy.By definition, this takes agencies into more politicalterritory—asDFID’s2009WhitePaper,Building Our Common Future,notes:

[T]heUKwillincreasinglyputpoliticsattheheartofitsaction.Weneedtounderstandwhoholdspowerinsocietysowecanforgenewalli-ancesforpeaceandprosperity.… Inthefuture,understandingpoliticaldynamicswillshapemoreofourprogrammes.Thiswillchangethedecisionswemakeabouthowwespendouraidbudget,whatwewanttofocusonandwhowewanttoworkwith.7

DFID is not alone in this analysis. In 2009, theDanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs published itsDemocracyandHumanRightsstrategy,whichstated,‘It is now recognized that democratization is aboutprocessesofpoliticalchange.Democratizationaffectshow power is distributed, used, contested and con-trolled’.8Similar sentimentsare reflected in thepub-licationsofmanyoftheinternationaldonoragencies.Nonetheless, it isnot clear that this shift in rhetorichasbeenmatchedbyashiftindonorpractice.Infact,thedesireforadeeperlevelofengagementandamorepoliticalapproachtodemocracysupportpresentsfourdistinctsetsofproblems:

1. Translatingstrategyintoin-countryactivity. Althoughthereisgrowingconsensusabout

theprinciplesthatshouldunderpindemocracysupportandtheneedforgreaterpoliticalengagement,thiswouldmeanafundamentalchangeinthewaythatdonor-fundedprojectsaredesignedanddelivered.Ourresearchsuggeststhatthereis,asyet,littleevidenceofsuchachange.

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2. Thechallengeof‘political’intervention. Donoragencieshavehadalong-standingaver-

sionto‘politicalinterference’,thatis,beingaccusedofmeddlinginthedomesticpoliticsofanothersovereignnation.Greaterdemo-cracyultimatelymeanssomeredistributionofpower,however,withthoseingovernmentbeingmostlikelytoloseout.Inthatsense,itisovertlypolitical.Thechallengefordonorsistosquaretheconcernaboutinterferencewithprojectsthatrecognizetheirpoliticalimplications.

3. Settingrealisticandmeaningfulobjectives. Thechallengeofidentifyingtheimpactof

democracyassistanceisnotnew.Ithasalwaysbeendifficulttofindreliablequantitativeindicators,andtoidentifycauseandeffectindemocracyprogrammes.However,per-hapsmoresignificantly,therationalebehinddemocracyassistanceneedstorecognizethatpoliticalchangehappensincrementally,overalongperiodandisshapedbyanumberofdifferentfactors.Inshort,thescopefordonorstoinfluencethequalityofdemocracywillalwaysbelimited.

4. Integration. Noneofthecomponentpartsofafunctioning

democracyoperatesinisolation.Manyoftheneweranalysesofgovernancechallengesareexplicitinrecognizingtheinterdependenceofdifferentpartsofthesystem.Nonetheless,democracyassistanceisstructuredalmostexclusivelytodealwithonepartofthesystematatime.

Thesechallengesposeproblemsfordonoragenciesatmultiple levels and in many different areas of activ-ity.Thispaperexploreshowtheyareaddressingthem,specificallyinrelationtotheirworkwithparliamentsandpoliticalparties.Asismentionedabove,thesehavetraditionallyformedarelativelysmallpartofdemoc-racyassistance,reflecting,inpart,thefactthattheseweremoreovertlypoliticalareasofactivity.However,thedesiretoengagewithpolitics,combinedwiththefact that both parliaments and political parties areincreasinglybeingseenascriticalalliesindonoragen-cies’democracyprogrammes,meansthatbothspheresaregaininggreaterprominence.

The development of parliamentary and party assistance

Parliamentsremainthesinglemostimportantinstitu-tioninanyrepresentativedemocracy,astheprincipalforumforholdinggovernmenttoaccountinbetweenelectionsandconnectingthepublicwithgovernmentbyproviding the ‘nerve-endings’ of thepolitical sys-tem. The United Nations Development Progamme(UNDP) highlights that parliaments are importantbecausetheyempowerordinarypeopletoparticipateinthepoliticalprocess.9Donorsupporthasthereforesought to strengthen these key parliamentary func-tionsby focusingon theiroversight, lawmaking andrepresentativefunctions.

Donors have sought to deliver parliamentary pro-grammes most commonly based around four typesof activities. First, there are training seminars andworkshopsthatteachacertainstandardmodeltolo-calstakeholders,andaimtoimprovetheprocessesandfunctionsoftheparliament.Second,therearethebasictechnicalcapacitybuildingprogrammesthatprovideequipmentandresources.Third,studyvisitsareoftenincorporatedintotheprogrammeasawayofintroduc-ingideasofgoodpracticeandsuccessfulfunctioning.Lastly,thereareinterventionsthatestablishanewde-partmentorprocesstomakeupashortfallincurrentfunctioning. More recently, donors and practitionershave begun to include multiparty dialogue forumsaimedataparticular issue,but these remaina smallpartofoverallactivity.

The traditional approach to parliamentary supportis essentially a technical one—perhaps reflecting thefactthatparliamentarysupportishighlysensitiveifitactivelyincreasesoversightoftheexecutive.Providingequipment,resourcesortraining,bycontrast,ismuchless controversial—and often actively encouraged bytherecipients.Significantly,theapproachisshapedbythe expertise and experienceof thepractitioners andledalmostentirelybythem.

However, the impactof this approachhasbeen lim-ited.ItisbestsummedupbyThomasCarothers,whocommentedinanassessmentwrittenin1999:‘ifaskedtonametheareaofdemocracysupportthatmostoftenfallsshortofitsgoals,Iwouldhavetopointtolegis-lativeassistance’.10A2005Sidareportproposed fourreasonsforthisfailure,allofwhichremainpertinent.11First,donorsandpractitionersfocusontheparliamentas a ‘self-contained entity’, rather than its positionwithin a wider political system. Consequently, thedeficiencies identifiedbydonorsareoftenmerelythe

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symptomsofpoliticalproblemsratherthanthecause.Second, there is often a lack of commitment on thepart of the government or parliamentary authoritiestochangethestatusquo.Inmanynascentdemocra-cies,thesystemisdominatedbyasinglepartythathasnoincentivetoimplementqualitativechanges.Third,there is a fundamental misreading by donors of thepoliticaldynamicswithinagivencountry.Incentivesanddisincentivesthatmayhamstringprogressarenotwellunderstoodorarticulatedwithintheprogrammedesign. Lastly, there is a disconnect between theobjectivesandthemodesofdeliveringthem.Inotherwords,technicalsupportisunlikelytoachievepoliti-caloutcomes.

Support to political parties has followed a similartrajectory, but forms an even smaller part of overallassistance efforts than parliamentary development.Again, this reflects the traditional donor aversion toovertly political activity, and a preference for engag-ing with civil society. The dominant view has beenthatcivil societyplayedacatalyticrole inthespreadofdemocracy,particularlyinCentralandEasternEu-rope,andnegativeperceptionsof‘theparty’informerdictatorships have further diminished the reputationof these organizations among citizens and interna-tionaldonors.

However, inrecentyears therehasbeenarefocusingofpriorities,notleastduetothenumberofcountrieswhere strongcivil societyhas failed toovercome theweaknesses of political parties in order to produceviabledemocracies.12Academicandstrategicliteraturebegan todemonstrate the invaluable role thatpoliti-calpartiesplay in thepolitical system,13and,despitetheirdrawbacks, that they remain themost effectiveway to aggregate public opinion and represent citi-zens’concerns.Donorliteraturehasbeguntolookatpolitical party support and an increasing number oforganizationsaredesigningarangeofprogrammesinthepoliticalpartyfield.

The institutions and agencies working in this fieldtend to fall intooneof three typesof activity.First,therearethosethatsupportthemultipartysystemasawhole,andwhichviewpartysupportaspartofwiderdemocracyassistanceprogrammes.Second, therearethebilateralorganizations,mostnotablytheGermanStiftungen, which prioritize sister party support andarenot alwaysdirectly involved inwiderdemocraticdevelopment issues.Third, thereareanumberof in-stitutions,suchastheNetherlandsInstituteforMulti-partyDemocracy(NIMD),theNationalDemocraticInstitute (NDI) and the International Republican

Institute(IRI),whichprovidemultipartysupportthatalsoincludessomebilateralelements.

Again, party assistance has been subject to signifi-cant criticism for its reliance on a standard model.14Thechargesincludethatdonorsoftenrelyonanide-alized party model, which informs how they thinkabout theproblemsof and solutions for parties; andthat programming is built around activities that areonce again practitioner-centric—more often thannot characterized by workshops, training seminarsandstudyvisits—allofwhichrelyontheassumptionthatastandardmodel isapplicabletoallcontextsorthattheexperiencesofonecountryaretransferabletoanother.AsThomasCarothersnotes: ‘Westernpartyaidseemstobebasedonaold-fashionedideaofhowpolitical parties were in some earlier, more virtuousera,beforetheriseoftelevision-driven,image-centric,personality-driven politics … and the growing cyni-cismaboutpartisanpoliticsthatcharacterizespoliticallifeinmanyestablisheddemocracies.’15

Inaddition,muchpartyassistancehasbeendevoidofanywider links toa strategy fordemocracy support.There is a common tendency, especially among theparty-affiliatedorganizationsworking in thefield, toassume thatassistance topoliticalparties is,bydefi-nition,agoodthing.Oftenmotivatedbyadesire toenhancethepositionoftheirsisterparties,itistakenforgrantedthatpartysupportwillbemeaningfulandconstructiveinthelongterm,regardlessofcontentorcontext.Partyassistanceprojectshavealsofailedatthemorebasic level of simply ensuring that theprojectsareinlinewiththedesiredoutcomes.InareportforSida,theparty-affiliatedorganizationsinSwedenarestronglycriticizedforthelackofconnectionbetweenactivities and outcomes: ‘the effect on democracy isboth vague and, at best, very long-term’.16 As otherauthorshavenoted,theseproblemsarenotconfinedtoSweden—theGerman stiftungenhavebeencriticizedfortheirlackofaspecificstrategyforpartyassistance.17

The challenges for donors in party and parliamentary support

Donoragencies,recognizingtheweaknessesofprevi-ousstrategiesforparliamentsandpoliticalparties,havestartedtoaltertheirapproachinbothspheresofactiv-ity.Thishasalsobeeninfluencedbythewiderfocusongreaterimpactandaideffectivenessaswellasamoreovertly political analysis. The emerging priorities arecharacterizedbyadesire toengagewithbothparlia-mentsandpartiesatadeeperandmorepoliticallevel,

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addressingthe‘driversofchange’,andtounderstandandtacklethecausesoftheproblems,ratherthansim-plytreatthesymptoms.Yet,thefoursetsofchallengeslistedabovepresentspecificproblemsfordonorsandhaveaparticularsetofdynamicsinthefieldsofpartyandparliamentarysupport.

i) Translating strategy into actionIn both parliamentary and party assistance there isanemergingconsensuswithinthedonorcommunityabout the need for a more strategic approach whichdeals more directly with the political factors influ-encing the performance of parties and parliaments.Among those working on parliamentary assistancetherehasbeenamarkedeffort to improvecoordina-tion and collaboration between donor agencies atthe international level. For example, donors and in-stitutions such as theCommonwealthParliamentaryAssociation, the NDI, the UNDP, the World BankInstituteandtheInter-ParliamentaryUnionhavebeenat the forefrontof efforts todevelopbenchmarks forparliamentsinthepastfiveyears.Since2007,practi-tionersanddonoragenciesworkingwithparliamentshavemet several times to share experiences anddis-cuss commonchallenges atmeetings coordinatedbyDFID,theWorldBankInstituteandtheUNDP.

Inaddition,theemphasisontechnicalsupportisgiv-ing way to a more nuanced view of the factors thatdetermine parliamentary effectiveness. Recent devel-opmentssuggestthatdonorsarestartingtocongregatearound a shared understanding of the problem andanew strategy that seeks to engage at adeeper levelinorder toachievemeaningful change.Theoutlinesof this strategy exist in analyses commissioned bydonors such as DFID, Sida and the UNDP.18 Thepapersdisplay anotable levelof consensus in identi-fying theproblems thathave troubledparliamentaryassistanceprogrammesinthepast.Theyalsoprovideacommonagenda,closely linkedtotheParisDecla-ration, on how parliamentary assistance should de-velopinthecomingyears,placinggreateremphasisonprojects that are focused on getting tangible results,andthataresuitedtothepoliticalcontext,dealwithincentive structures, ensure ownershipby theparlia-mentaryinstitutionandarebasedonalong-termcom-mitmentbydonors.

Therehasbeen a similar setofdevelopments amongthose working with political parties. Initiated byInternationalIDEAandDFID,aconferenceatWiltonPark, UK, held early in 2010 brought together thekey institutionsandactors in thefieldtodiscuss the

mainchallengesforpartyassistancework.Itprovidedthebasisforanongoingsetofdiscussionsand,poten-tially,greatercoordinationinpromotingpartysupportwork.

Thecontentofpartyassistanceisalsoevolvingtoad-dresssomeofthedeeperpoliticalissues.Forexample,theNDI’sGuide to Political Party Development(2008)specifically addresses many of the political factorslikely toenhanceorhampersupportprogrammes. Itstresses the importance of understanding party in-terests,ensuringbuy-inforprogrammesbythepartyleadershipandencouraging theparty to takeowner-shipofanyprogramme.Thereisalsoincreasedinterestintheconditionsandincentivesthatcausepartiestobehaveincertainwaysand, inparticular, thefactorsthatencouragepartiestoadoptprogressiveorpro-poorpolicies.19

However, this process is being driven primarily bydonoragenciesat thestrategic level,andit isnotyetclearhowfartheseprinciplesarebeingtranslatedintopracticalprojectsontheground.Thatisnottosuggestthatsuchprojectsdonotexist.Thereareundoubtedlyindividual country-level projects working with par-liamentsandpartieswhichhavebuilt fromthe localpolitical context and engage with both at a morepoliticallevel,butthesemaybeexceptional.Thispapersuggeststhatthereislittleevidenceofafundamentalshift in the way that such projects are designed anddelivered.Thevalueofthestrategicanalysisanddonorconsensus is in theway they are applied inpractice,andasyet thereare few tangibleexamplesonwhichtodraw.

ii) The challenge of ‘political’ interventionAsisnotedatseveralpoints inthischapter, thenewemphasis on engaging with incentive structures anddriversofchangeinaparticularcountrytakesdonorsmoredeeplyintopoliticalterritory.Itisbasedontherecognitionthatattempting to improve theperform-ance of parliament or a political party means morethan simply providing technical support or improv-ing infrastructure. Ultimately, it is about changingpoliticalbehaviour.InevidencetotheBritishHouseof Commons All-Party Group on Africa, a seniorfigure fromoneof themain implementingorganiza-tionshighlightedtheneedforchangeinparliamentarysupport work, ‘Too often donors and implementers“teach”MPsabouttheir“role”.[Theproblem]isusu-allynotMPs’lackofunderstanding,buttheincentivestructurethatgovernstheirbehaviour.Programmingneedstofocusonchangingtheseincentivestructures,

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rather than simply “teaching” or “training” MPs’.20Inotherwords,theroleofdonorsislessaboutsupply-ingresourcesandcapacitytoparliamentsandparties,andmoreaboutshapingwhattheydoandhowtheydoit.

Asaresult,thereisagrowingsensethatdonorsneedto be more explicit about the fact that these formsof supportarenotonlypolitical,butalsopotentiallypartisan.Thatis,democracyassistancework,insofarasitseeksmoretransparency,accountabilityandrep-resentation,meansaredistributionofpoliticalpower.Somepoliticalactorswillbenefitwhileotherswillseetheirinfluenceconstrained.Itispartisaninthatitwillbenefitonepoliticalgroupingmorethananother.AsThomas Carothers argues, however, acknowledgingthepartisannature of support is not bydefinition abadthingifitforcesdonorstoaccepttheimplicationsoftheiractivity.21

This,however, takesdonors intoareasofwhichtheyhave long been wary. Yet, as the quality of govern-ancehasrisenintheorderofdonors’priorities,sotheneed toworkmorewithparliamentsandpartieshasbecomemorepressing–andtodosoinapoliticalway.Differentdonorshaverespondedindifferentways.Arecent‘Howtonote’onworkingwithpoliticalpartiespublishedby theDanishMinistryofForeignAffairssuggeststhatcountryofficesneedtobeclearabouttherationaleoftheprogrammeandtheeligibilitycriteriaofthepoliticalpartieswithwhichtheywillwork,andtobeawareofpoliticalsensitivitiesatdifferentstagesoftheelectoralcycle.22Othershavebeenmoreexplicitabout their political role, particularly in challengingenvironments.NIMD,forexample,statesthat:‘With-outcompromisingitsimpartiality,NIMD … cannothold to a traditional concept of neutrality and thusshould not shy away from exercising political pres-sure’.23

However, the fear of being accused of interfering inthepoliticalprocess,eitherthroughparliamentaryorpartysupport,meansthatmanyprojectsarecharacter-izedbytentativenessinengagingwithpoliticaldrivers.Establishingthestrategicprinciplestoguidesuchworkisimportant.However,implementationofaprojectonthe ground will have to take into account the needto negotiate the different political forceswithin thatcountryandthepotentialforthoseinpowertounder-minetheproject’sobjectives,andaimnottoconflictwithdonorcountries’otherdiplomaticobjectives.

iii) Establishing politically realistic objectives There is now a common acceptance among donororganizations that the process of democratic reformneedstobedrivenfromwithin,ratherthanimposedfrom the outside. If programmes to support parlia-ments and political parties are genuinely aimed atchanging the behaviour of key political actors, theaims and objectives of the support programme needtobeownedbythoseactors.Thismeansthatdonorshave to work with the grain of political will withinthe parliament or party, and work with, or around,thevarious incentive structureswhichdetermine theeffectivenessoftheinstitution.

Inthiscontext,programmesneedtoberealisticaboutwhat sort of change they can hope to effect. Therewilloftenbealimitedpoliticalwindowwithinwhichdonorscanoperateandprogrammesneedtobebuiltonmoremodest,but realisticobjectives.Thismeansthat programmes need to be designed and deliveredinadifferentway.AttheWiltonParkconferenceonsupport to political parties, one participant made aplea to the representativeofamajordonororganiza-tion:‘Whatweneedislessmoneyandmoretime’.Thecommentgeneratedmuchsympathyintheroomandwasarecognitionofthefactthatmanydonoragenciesare still expecting significant political change over arelativelyshorttimeperiod.Tothisend,areportforSidafrom2002madeapointformanyprogrammes:‘Theinsightthat institutionalreformrequiresdeeperchanges underscores how slow and difficult changewillbe.Wewillmostprobably,therefore,havetore-viseournotionof long-termchange fromfiveto tenyears,asatpresent,toseveraldecadesataminimum.’24Theconceptionofwhatisachievableoverwhattime-frameneedstobebasedonamorerealisticassessmentofhowpoliticalchangehappens.

iv) Integrating parliamentary and party supportAs is mentioned above, democracy support worktends to address items in isolation from each other,particularly when it comes to institutional devel-opment. This is a weakness, but it is particularlysignificant in support to parliaments and politicalparties. Parties are, of course, central to the qualityof parliamentary performance. In the first instance,they usually provide parliamentarians with theprincipal route to re-election and the means to apolitical career. Parliamentarians therefore look pri-marilytotheirpoliticalpartyforadviceandguidance

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onhowtheyshouldbehaveinparliament,whichwaytheyshouldvoteor fromwheretheir supportcanbeexpected to come. Perhaps more significantly, par-tiesprovidethebasis forparliamentaryorganization.While the standing orders or parliamentary by-lawsprovide the rules of the game, thepartiesdeterminethe games within the rules, providing the vehiclesfor negotiation between government and oppositionover legislationandparliamentarybusiness.Inshort,theyensurethesmoothfunctioning,ornot,ofparlia-ment.

Thequalityandcharacterofthepoliticalpartieswillthereforehaveasignificantimpactontheeffectivenessofparliament.Forexample,strong,disciplinedparties,suchasthosewhichexistinsomeAfricanstates,maymeanthatparliamentisentirelydominatedbythegov-ernment.Attheotherextreme,amultiplicityofpartieswithlittledisciplineorinternalcohesion,suchasexistinsomeLatinAmericancountries,makesparliamentunpredictableanddifficulttoorganize.Whereapartyhas no control over its parliamentarians, the legisla-ture will struggle to organize its business, let alonetake decisions over legislation or government policy.Bythesametoken,aparty’selectoralappealshouldbebased,atleastinpart,onitsrecordinparliament.Anineffective,badlyorganizedparliamentwhichfailstouseitspowerstoinfluencepolicydecisionsandlegisla-tionshouldbeofdirectconcerntothepoliticalpartieswithinit.

Inshort,supporttopartiesandparliamentsiscloselylinked.Practitionersworkingonpartyassistancewillengage with political parties in the course of theirwork,andneedtounderstandtheirinterestsineitherstrengtheningorweakeningtheparliamentandplaytothosepolitical incentives.Practitionersworkingwithpolitical parties are almost certain to be concernedwith the organization of the parliamentary caucus,howpolicypositionsarepursuedinparliamentortheimplementation of manifesto commitments throughthelegislativeprocess.

Given this level of interdependence it would seemobviousthatsupporttopartiesandparliamentsshouldbe better linked, but there has been little activitywhichdoessoeffectively.Forexample,althoughsomeorganizationsclaimtobeworkingwithpartiesinpar-liament,closerexaminationof suchprojects suggeststhatratherthanusingpartiestoaddresssomeofthefundamentalweaknessesoftheparliament,theparlia-ment is simply thevenue for traditionalparty assist-ancework.Althougheffortstosupportpoliticalinsti-tutions will involve donors working towards similar

aims,thedesignandimplementationofprogrammesfor parties and programmes for parliaments persists,withlittleattempttoalignobjectivesandoutcomes.

Conclusions

Thepurposeof thispaper is toexaminehowdonorsare meeting these challenges in projects in differentcountries.Asishighlightedabove,theshiftindonorattitudes to parliamentary and party assistance is arelativelyrecentdevelopment,withmostoftheactiv-itytakingplaceatthestrategiclevel—betweenthekeyactors from the headquarters of the main agencies.This is, it shouldbe stressed, an important andwel-come development. There is an emerging consensusabout the importance of both parliaments and par-tiestodonorobjectives,andtheneedtoengagewithbothatadeeperandmorepoliticallevel.However,theadoption of these principles still leaves a number ofpracticaldifficultiesandtherehasbeenrelativelylittleassessmentofhowthesestrategicchangesareplayingthemselvesoutinprojectsontheground.

Chapter 2looksinmoredetailatthechallengesfacingdonorsintranslatingstrategicrhetoricintoprojectsontheground,problemsofintegrationandcoordination,andtheeffectivenessofsuchprogrammes.Chapter 3explores these themes in relation to four case stud-ies:fromTanzania;Uganda;Macedonia;andGhana.Eachcasestudyreflectsadifferentapproachtoengag-ingwiththepoliticsofthereformprocessandeffortsto integratesupporttoparliamentsandpoliticalpar-ties.Chapter 4drawsontheseexamplestosetoutthemain lessons and recommendations in the develop-mentofsupporttoparliamentsandpoliticalparties.

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Chapter 1highlights the extent towhichdonors areseekingtoimprovethedeliveryandimpactofsupporttoparliamentsandpoliticalparties.Thishasinvolveda recognition by most donors of the need to engagewith thepoliticsof institutional change,drawingonmoresophisticatedformsofpoliticalanalysisandde-velopingprojectsonthatbasis.Thischapterprovidesabriefassessmentofthewayinwhichdonoragenciesaretranslatingthosestrategicinsightsintoprogrammedesign and implementation, and the continuing dif-ficultiestheyface.

Thischapterhasfoursections.Thefirstexaminestherecent emphasis on international standards and con-text-specific programming to improve effectiveness,thesecondlooksathowthesestrategiesarebeingap-pliedincountryprogrammes,thethirdassessescoor-dinationamongdonorsandintegrationofprogrammeobjectivesandthefourthlooksattheeffectivenessofsuch projects overall. It concludes that, despite therhetoric of aid effectiveness, there is a lackof clarityandcoherencearoundmuchoftheworkinthisfield,which undermines the continuing impact of parlia-mentaryandpartysupportwork.

i) Strategic approaches to parliaments and political party assistanceTheattempttoimprovetheimpactofbothparliamen-taryandpartyassistanceshouldbeunderstoodaspartofthewideremphasisonaideffectiveness.Mostdonoragenciesmakesupport toparliamentsandpartiesanexplicit part of their good governance and develop-ment programmes. For example, DFID has paid in-creasingattentiontoparliamentsandpartiesinrecentWhite Papers,25 and the UNDP describes legislativeassembliesasan‘integralcomponent’ofdevelopmentassistance,26 and states that ‘parliaments and parlia-mentarianshaveacriticalroletoplayinspurringandsustaining national action towards the [MillenniumDevelopment Goals, MDGs]’.27 Similarly, NIMD’s

From strategic objectives to project implementation

workwithpartiesispremisedonthebeliefthat‘with-out more accountable governments and better per-formingpoliticalsystems,theinternationalendeavourtodeliverontheMDGsisdestinedtofail’.28

As is noted in chapter 1, donors are attempting toaddress the challenges of engaging with politics andtranslatingstrategicinsightsintocountry-specificpro-gramming.Thepressuretoshowresultshasimprovedcoordinationbetweendonoragencies,andledtoade-greeofconsensusovertheprioritiesandapproachestothisend.Twodominanttrendshavebecomeapparentinrecentyears.Therehasbeenaconcertedattempttoidentifyuniversalstandards,benchmarksandindica-torstowhichparliamentsandpartiesshouldconform.Inaddition,therehasbeenanemphasisonunderstand-ingthespecificlocalcontextinwhichaparliamentorapartyoperates,andondesigningprogrammeswhichfitsuchcontexts.

In the field of parliamentary support, a number ofrecent initiatives from the NDI, the UNDP, theCommonwealth Parliamentary Association and theInter-ParliamentaryUnion(IPU),oftenincollabora-tionwithoneanother,havesoughttoestablishinter-nationally recognized standards.29 The concept restson an agreed set of international norms and bench-marksagainstwhichan institutioncanbemeasuredandthroughwhichinterventionscanbeplanned,anddraws heavily on the examples of human rights andelectoral standardswhich arewidelyused.Typically,thebenchmarkswillsuggestminimumstandardsforaparliamenton thepowersof committees, the rightto amend legislation and parliament’s control of itsown budget. Or, to take one specific example, theCanadianParliamentaryCentre’sParliamentary Report Card 30setsoutfourareaswhichare‘almostuniversallyregarded as the core functions of the parliament’:31legislation;oversight;representation;andbudgets.Thecardisthenusedtoscoretheperformanceofaparlia-mentintheseareas.

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There have been similar drives towards a standards-basedapproach topoliticalparties, themostnotableexponent being the NDI in its Minimum Standards for Democratic Functioning of Political Parties. Thisdocument was drafted in ‘response to requestsfrom [NDI]’s political party partners in emerg-ing democracies for universally accepted guidingprinciples and norms for open and democratic par-ties’.32Thestandardsaremeanttobothguidetheac-tivitiesofpractitionersandinformpoliticalpartiesontheirowndevelopment.NDIconsidersthestandardstobeareflectionofthecurrentpracticesandprinci-ples of established and broadly democratic politicalparties.33Thedocumentitselfconsistsofanumberofclauses,groupedintotwomainsections:partybehav-iourandpartyorganization.Theclausescoverawiderangeofissues,andthereisparticularemphasisontheinclusionofcross-cuttingissuesofhumanrights,free-domofspeech,minorityrepresentationandfinancialtransparency.Itisanattempttogroundpoliticalpar-tiesininternationallyacceptednorms.

Otherinitiativesusebroadcategoriestoinformtheirprogramming, describing the general function of aninstitution within the political system. For exampletheUnitedStatesAgency for InternationalDevelop-ment (USAID) publication Political Party Assistance(2003)establishescriteriaforassessingwhetherapartyisdemocratic,andwhetheritcanbeassistedasaresult.Thereisanacknowledgementthatthemajorityofpar-tieswillbesomewherealongthespectrum,ratherthanat one endor the other, and that theultimate crite-rionisademonstrablecommitmenttoreform.NIMDtakes a similar approach in A Framework for Demo-cratic Party Building(2004),whichexplainsthe‘insti-tutionalization’ofaparty,thatis,theprocess‘wherebypartiesbecomebetterorganized,practicedemocraticvalues and establish rules and procedures that willallowthemtocompetemoreeffectivelyandbemoresuccessful in elections and at implementing theirpolicypreferences.’34Thepublicationcontainsanalysisofthehallmarksofaninstitutionalizedparty,andofsomeofthepracticesthatmayhindertheiremergence.Therearelistsofpositiveandnegativepractices,whichsuggestthepossibleaimsofactivities.

Atthesametime,manyofthesedocumentsalsoem-phasize the need for a detailed analysis and under-standingofthelocalpoliticalcontext.Thisquotefromthe UNDP’s Parliamentary Strategy Note is typical:‘parliamentarydevelopmentprogrammesthatarenotpolitically contextualized can do as much harm asgood’.35 Beyond the broad strategic documentation,organizations frequently provide contextual studiesin programme literature, keen to demonstrate the

connectionbetweenthespecificshapeofthepoliticallandscapeandtheobjectivesoftheprogramme.Thisisoftenformedthroughtheuseofvariouspoliticalecon-omytoolssuch‘driversofchange’or‘poweranalysis’,whichallowpractitionerstochoosemoresuitableaidmodalities and tomake themmore ‘politically intel-ligentinterlocutorsandmoreeffectiveoperators’36bygroundingprogrammesinameticulousreadingofthepolitical context. This, in turn, is intimately linkedwith an emphasis on local ownership,which reflectsthe recognition that ‘programme sustainability, par-ticularly in political environments, requires localownershipandengagementinparliamentarystrength-ening’.37 Again, the aid effectiveness agenda is theprimary driver of this trend, stipulating that donorsshouldbe grounding supportwithin the institutionsandstrategiesofthepartnercountries.

ii) Managing the tension between universal standards and context-specific programmingAlthoughthesetwotrendsdonotdirectlycontradictone another, there is a tension between them whichthedesignanddeliveryof supportprojectswillneedtonavigatecarefully.Thedevelopmentofprogrammesthat conform to international standards for parlia-mentsandpoliticalpartiesispartlydrivenbyadesireto insulate donors from accusations of partisanshipandpoliticalinterference.However,thefocusonpo-liticaleconomyanalysisandlocalcontextisdesignedtoimmerseprogrammesmoredeeplyinthepoliticsofthecountry.Thishighlights,onceagain,thechallengeof applying strategic principles toproject documentsandcountry-specificprogrammes.

Although donors are evidently using political econ-omy tools in their assessments of parliamentary andparty support, this contextual analysis is oftenbroached in very broad terms and means that pro-gramme documents often shy away from any objec-tiveswhichmightbeconstruedaspolitical.Toooften,they fall back on generalized objectives, such as thefollowing which is taken from one agency’s projectdocument:

• Politicalpartiesbecomemoreinstitutional-ized,improvinginternalcapacitytoenablegreaterresponsivenesstocitizens,andim-provedrepresentationoftheirinterests.

• Theparliamentbecomesmoreinstitutionallyeffective,theworkofcommitteesandindi-vidualMPsisenhanced,andoversightandaccountabilityrolesarestrengthened.

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• Civilsocietyisincreasinglyengagedincon-nectingcitizenswiththepoliticalprocess.

Althoughtheseareworthyambitions,theyofferlittleguidanceorpolitical context, andwouldbedifficulttotranslateintoconcreteactivitieswithtargetedout-comes. The objectives merely reiterate the necessaryfunctionsoftheseinstitutionsinanydemocraticsys-tem.

The consultants and practitioners in the field withwhom we spoke were clear that most donors weresimplytoocautioustoapproachanythingdeemedpo-litical. Inparliamentarysupport,donorstendtotalkabout ‘strengthening oversight and accountability’,or ‘increased assertiveness’ and a cursory glancemight suggest that these aims are political as theymay enable parliament to challenge the governmentanditspolicies.Whilethisistruetoacertainextent,the objectives fail to articulate any partisan differ-encesthatexistbetweenindividualparliamentarians.Itislikelythatparliamentaryoversight,accountabilityandassertivenesswillbedrivenprimarilyby theop-positionmembers in the assembly, rather than thosefrom the ruling party with a stake in maintainingthe status quo. However, most parliamentary objec-tivesdonotdothis.Byregardingtheparliamentasaself-contained entity, its constituent members aresimilarlyseenfirstandforemostasgenericparliamen-tarians. This allows the donor to avoid accusationsof partisanship or bias, and makes it easier to keepactivitieswithinthesafeboundariesoftheparliamen-taryinstitution.

Political party objectives show a similar inclinationtowardsdepoliticization.Althoughindividualorgani-zations and programmes may differ in the specifics,the‘overallobjectiveremainsthatofbuildingpoliticalpartiesthat,throughimprovedorganizationalcapaci-ty,programmaticcoherence,andabidancebytherulesof good governance, can constitute a fundamentalbuildingblock for theconsolidationofdemocracy.’38Thetendencyistoviewthemultipartysystemasasin-gle institution,withparitybetween each constituentparty.Theeffectofthisisthatallpoliticalpartiesarediagnosed with similar capacity deficiencies that donottakeaccountof the inherentdifferencesbetweenthem.Theydonotexplicitlyacknowledgethedifferentrolesofagovernmentparty,ontheonehand,andanoppositionparty,ontheother.Thisisbecausetheim-plicationoftreatingthemaccordingtotheirseparaterolesandfunctionswouldbetoinviteaccusationsofpartisanshipandbias.

In that light, the existence of universal standards orbenchmarks is useful, and can provide a frameworkwithin which to work. The danger, however, is thatsuchindicatorsareusedinisolationandindependentofthepoliticalcontext.Ourinterviewssuggestedthatmuch support toparliaments andparties is still fall-ingbackonwhatThomasCarothersdescribesasthe‘standardmodel’,failingtounderstandtheincentivesthatdrivepoliticalactorsandrelyingonmethodsthatarenotnecessarilysuitedtolocalconditions.A2007analysisbytheOverseasDevelopmentInstitute(ODI)statesthat:‘donorsareoftennaiveaboutthepoliticalincentives which MPs work under, assuming incor-rectlyinmanycasesthattheyareprimarilyconcernedwith representing their constituents and holding theexecutivetoaccount,wheninfacttheyaremostinter-estedinretainingtheirseats.’39Thishighlightsoneofthemostnotablestandardsofparliamentaryandpartyassistance,whichviewsbothpoliticiansandpartiesasdrivenbyaltruismratherthanself-interest—theidealdemocrat who would instinctively support politicalreformasagoodthing.

This,inturn,hasaneffectonlocalownership.Ourre-searchhasshownthatlocallyownedprogrammesarestillthinontheground.Localstakeholdersarelargelyuninvolvedinbuildingstrategiesorshapingthedirec-tionandcontentofprogramming,andasaresultthereislittleenthusiasmorcommitmenttotheprogrammeitself.ThissituationresultsinwhatKumarhascalled‘benignneglect’,40inwhichrecipientsdonotactivelyopposeassistancebutarehardlyferventintheirdedi-cationtotheprogrammeanditsobjectives.Forsomeprogrammes, the most prevalent form of local own-ershiphasbeentoaskrecipientswhatassistancetheyrequire.Ostensibly,thisseemslikeanefficientwayofensuring that programmes are contextually appro-priate.However, thosewe spokewithwere generallyscathing about this approach, remarking thatparlia-mentariansandpartymemberswillnecessarilygravi-tatetowardsmaterialsupportortravelopportunities.Althoughthesemaybesuitable insomecases,manyinstitutionsindevelopingdemocraciesarenowmateri-allyandtechnicallyquiteproficient,andtheacquisi-tionofmoreresourcesisreallysurplustorequirements.

Itshouldbestatedexplicitlythatthedevelopmentofinternational standards for parliaments and politicalparties (and support to parliaments and parties) is apositivedevelopment,whichshouldimprovethewayin which many programmes are designed and deliv-ered. Most of the benchmarks and indicators, how-ever, stress theneed for them tobe accompaniedbyanunderstandingofthelocalpoliticalcontext.41Yet,it

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appearsthatmanyprogrammesarefailingtotranslatetheanalysisofpoliticaldriversintoprojectobjectivesas thepracticalitiesofapplying these insightson thegroundoftenpresentdifficulties.Devoidofthiscon-text,theuseofbenchmarkscouldencouragearelianceonastandardapproachandfurthershifttheemphasisawayfrom‘politicalprogramming’.

iii) Coordination and integration of objectivesOurresearchsuggeststhatthegapbetweenthetheoryofgreaterpoliticalanalysisanditsapplicationtopro-grammedelivery isalsoevident in theway inwhichprogrammes are designed and managed. In the firstplace, although contextual analyses will uniformlyemphasize the interdependence of political institu-tions,programmesareinvariablycompartmentalized,witheachinstitutiontreatedasaseparateanddiscretetargetforintervention.

This gap is especially apparent in relation to parlia-mentary and party support, where the role of oppo-sitionpartiesinparliament,orthepervadinginstitu-tionaldominanceoftherulingparty,areoftencentraltotheanalysis,buttheobjectivesrarelyaddressthesedynamics explicitly.Noting this trend, the academicPeterBurnellhasstatedthat‘thetwoareas[partyandparliamentary support] have tended to proceed inparallel and along separate lines, even when fundedor,even,carriedoutbythesameorganisation’.42Oneparliamentary consultant with experience of projectsintheAsia-Pacificregionnotesthatpartyandparlia-mentaryprojectsarerarelyco-designed,andbothwillcontinuetounderperformuntilthisisaddressed.

Parliamentary support has come under particularcriticisminthisregard.Sida’s2005reviewnotesthat:‘too often, parliamentary support programmes havefocusedontheparliamentasaself-containedinstitu-tionand,asaresult,haveconcentratedonthesymp-tomsofadysfunctionalpoliticalprocess,ratherthantheunderlyingcauses’.43Thislastpointisofparticularimportance. When viewed in isolation, institutionaldeficiencies are most frequently portrayed in termsof the capacity to fulfil certain functions, perceivedas integral to that institution alone. Without refer-ence toother cross-cuttingdynamics in thepoliticalsystem, there is a tendency toview theproblemas alackoftechnicalcapabilityorappropriatelegislation.Forexample,inUganda,onepractitioneractiveinthecountrytoldusthatdonorsupportsincethelate1990shasmeanttheparliamentistechnicallyproficient,andisconstitutionallycapableofholdingthegovernment

toaccount.However,thedominanceoftherulingNa-tionalResistanceMovement(NRM)partymeansthatlegislativeoversightisnotexercisedeffectively.Inotherwords,tounderstandtheweaknessoftheparliament,oneneedstounderstandthepowerbalanceamongtheparties.Oneexperiencedpractitionerhassaidthattheneedtoaddresspoliticalpartiesinparliamentaryworkremainsthe‘elephantintheroom’.

Thesecondfactoristhelackofcoordinationbetweendonors working with parliaments and parties in thesamecountry.AlthoughtheAidEffectivenessagendahas prioritized greater harmony of donor activities,thereremainsalackofcommunication,letalonefullcoordination, between organizations on the ground.AnexperiencedparliamentaryconsultantnotedafterarecentvisittoKosovothatdespitethelargenumberofdemocracysupportorganizationsworkingwiththeAssembly,therewasnocoordinationatall—andthatthissituationwasnotexceptional.

Onecountryweexaminedhastwomajordemocraticsupportorganizationsworkingwithpoliticalparties,implementing a whole spectrum of activities. Yet,despite the fact that both receive funding from US-AID, there is little formal cooperation between theorganizationsbeyondthemonthlyUSAID-organizedimplementers meeting. There is a tacit agreementnot to ‘tread on each other’s toes’, but, according toaformeremployeeofoneoftheagencieswhoisstillworkingas an independentconsultant in the region,therelationshipwascharacterizedbycompetitionbe-tweenthetwoorganizationsforterritoryandprojectspacewithkeypoliticians,partiesorcommittees,withneitherwillingtocedeground.Ourdiscussionswithconsultantsinpost-conflictcountriessuggestthatthebiggertheproject,thegreaterthepressureonthedo-noragencytoshowtangibleresults,andthegreaterthecompetitionbetweenthem.

The effect in such environments is that there is notjust duplication and waste of resources, but also oc-casionalcontradictionindonorapproaches.Althoughultimately these organizations are working towardssimilargoals,thelackofcoordinationcanhaveadet-rimentaleffectontheoverallaimsofprogrammes.Inbothpartyandparliamentarysupport,failuretocoor-dinateamongdonorshasallowedrecipientstomaxi-mizetheirresources.Asisnotedabove,severalinter-vieweesattestedtothetendencyforlocalstakeholderstosecurematerialsupport,regardlessofitsutility.The‘donormarketplace’meansthatrecipientscanrequestthis type of support and donors tend not to ask formuchcommitment in return, simplybecause the lo-

23

calstakeholderscanchoosetogoelsewhereifmaterialcomeswithtoomanyconditions.Inthewordsofoneinterviewee,‘donorsarefrequentlychasingtheirowntails’.Anexampleoftheeffectthiscanhaveonpro-grammingcanbeseeninmonitoringandevaluation.InoneextensivepartysupportprogrammeinEasternEurope,someoneinvolvedwiththeprogrammeindi-cated thateffectivemeans forcapturing institutionalchangewerehamstrungbythereluctanceofthedonortorequestanysubstantive informationfromthepar-ties,lesttheybaulkattheimpositionandsimplywalkaway from the programme. There is little stoppingthem when they can secure identical support fromotherdonors.

Insuchcircumstancesprojectscandevelopamomen-tumoftheirown,wheretheprojectteamisunderpres-surefromtheagencytoachievesomething.Bystrug-glingtoengagethelocalpartnersfullyintheoriginalobjectives of the programme, the project team findsitselfeitherpanderingtotherequestsofthosepartners,changingthoseobjectivesorsimplymeasuringsignsofactivityratherthantangibleoutcomes.

iv) Impact and effectWeweretoldcandidlybymorethanoneinterviewee,reflecting experience of projects in Africa, Asia, andCentralandEasternEurope,thattheprincipalprob-lemwasthatmostprojectswere‘rubbish’,orwordstothateffect.Suchwasthestrengthoffeelingaboutthequalityofmanyprojectsthatweshouldperhapsfinessethisreflection.Theeffectofthedesignproblemsnotedabovecanbesummarizedaspoorplanninganddesignresultinginunrealisticobjectives,afocusonoutputsratherthanoutcomesandamismatchbetweenactivi-tiesandoutcomes.

First,fewprojectsseemtobeunderpinnedbyaclearunderstanding of how political change happens.They seem to be premised on an assumption of lin-ear progress, so that certain activities will inevitablyleadtocertainresults.Mostofthepeopleworkingonsuch projects know that political change is difficult,messy,haphazardandrarelyquick—suchassumptionsarereinforcedbytheuseofpoliticaleconomyanaly-sis.Nonetheless,projectplanningdocumentsseemtoleavenoroomforsuchuncertainty,andarethusbuiltonfaultylogic.

This is most evident in the timeframe for suchprojects, which always seems to assume changecan happen within 2–3 years. At the strategic level,there isaclearacknowledgementoftheneedtotake

accountofthelongtimescalesrequiredtoseesubstan-tivepoliticalchange.DFID’s2007governancepolicypaper states clearly that: ‘buildingdemocratic valuesandinstitutionstakestime…progresscanbeslowanddifficult’.44 The Norwegian Agency for DevelopmentCooperation(NORAD)ismoreexplicitinitsreport:

Few,ifany,aidinterventionseverprovide‘quickfixes’toachallengeandthiscertainlyappliestoparliamentarystrengthening.Parliamentarystrengtheningrequiresalongtimehorizon.Effectiveness,letalonelong-termimpact,intermsoffunctioningparliamentscanonlybeachievedthroughpatientandpainstakingworkoverthelongrun.Adecadewouldbynomeansbeexces-sive.Itshouldberecalledthatelectoralcyclesaretypically4–5years.Hence,thedurationofaninterventionovertwoelectoralcycleswouldbejustified,preferablyeventhreeormore.45

Yetthese insightsrarelytranslate intoprojectdesign.As the NORAD report hints, electoral cycles are afavourite ‘window’ in which to implement a pro-gramme, yet this amount of time is woefully short.Despite the broad and ambitious wording of objec-tives,programmedocumentswilloftencontainasetofoutcomesbasedaroundthenextsetofelections,amaximumoffourorfiveyearsaway.Democracypro-gramming has become what Thomas Carothers hastermed ‘projectized’,46 that is,boundbybureaucraticstructures of systematic planning and evaluation—thereisapressuretoseequantifiableresultsasareturnondonors’ investment.Asaresult,thereisaconflictbetween the long-term, overarching objectives of aprogramme,andtheshort-termoutputsthatareusedtomeasuresuccess.Programmesneedtohaveaman-ageabletimeframetofitintotheevaluationculture.

Second, an additional effect of the difficulty recog-nizing the challenges of political change means thatactivities and outcomes are mismatched. Donors al-mostsetthemselvesuptofail.The2010NORADre-portdrawsattentiontotheconcreteproblemsthatcanarisefromapoorunderstandingofpoliticaldynamics.Thereportcharacterizes trainingofparliamentariansasa‘SisypheanTask’:onceonebatchofMPshasbeentrained,‘alargeproportionofthemwilllosethenextelection and be replaced by novices … the turnoverrateofparliamentariansoftenreaches30–50percent,and sometimes even more’.47 Two issues arise fromthisobservation.First, itdemonstrates thepitfallsofanarrow institutional viewofdemocratic assistance.Bywantingtoaffecttheparliamentinisolation,pro-grammesmiss theother elementsof the system that

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directly affect it. Second, it highlights the impor-tanceofunderstandingwhothekeyplayersareinthepolitical system, who shapes the rules of the gameand whose influence is more likely to transcend theconfinesoftheelectoralcycle.

Thereislittleevidenceinprogrammedocumentationthatdonorsand implementingagencies takeaccountofsuchfactors.Instead,donorsfrequentlytrytoaffectasmanypeopleaspossiblethroughanenormousrangeof training programmes. For example, one reportfrom an agency announces that its programmes ina Balkan state mean that their trainers worked withsome 11000 activists from 13 political parties andcoalitionsbetween2001and2006.Thistellsusnoth-ingaboutimpact.Itsuggeststheimportanceofquan-tityoverquality.This is a significantomissiongiventhat the next stage is where meaningful results willtakeplace, rather thanthe training itself.Asone in-tervieweeworking inapost-conflictcountrytoldus,the underlying principle appears to be ‘we throw asmuchmudatawallaswecan,andhopethatsomeofitsticks’.

Third,given thepressuresmentionedabove,projectstendtobebuiltaroundwhatcanbemeasured,whichtend to be quantitative indicators, rather than themoredifficultqualitativeindicatorswhicharelikelytoreflect genuine political change. As a result, projectstend to focus on measuring activity and outputsratherthangenuineoutcomes.InFebruary2010,theSwedish Agency for Development Evaluation(SADEV) reported on the impact of the supportprovided by Swedish party-affiliated organizationstointernationalpoliticalparties.Thereportrecordedthat while output objectives (concrete services andproducts) were mostly fulfilled, the achievement ofoutcome objectives (short- to medium-term change)tendedtovaryconsiderably.48Althoughmuchof thedonorcommunityworkinginthisareaiseagertofindbetter ways to measure the impact of such projects,thisisprovingelusiveand,inthemeantime,theyarerelyingonhard,quantitativedata.Theproblemisthatonce a project is built around measuring certain in-dicators, the activities are distorted towards meetingthoseobjectives.Inshort,ifyousetthewrongindica-tors,youendupdoingthewrongthings.

Conclusions

Ouranalysisofinternationalagencies’strategicdocu-ments and discussions with project implementers ina variety of countries with differing political envi-ronments suggests that most programmes are strug-

gling to translate their analytical insights into theirprogrammes on the ground. Donors are beginningto engage with the political dynamics of a country,ratherthansimplymakinganappraisalofthetechni-calcapacityofeachinstitution.InthecaseofGeorgia,ODI found that ‘most donors are very aware of thehurdlesandincentivesthatcurrentlylimitthecapacityandreachofmanyoppositionparties.Theseareoftenofapoliticalratherthanatechnicalnature,andtheyaregroundedinthehistoricallegaciesoftheSovieteraaswellasinthecurrentconstitutional,economicandpoliticalpoweroftherulingparty.’49Yet,theseanaly-sestendtoexaminethepoliticallandscapeinabroadnarrative that, while containing the main points,doesnotemployaconsistentmodelfordistillingandpresenting the information. Consequently, when theobjectives are set out, it can be difficult to make asound connection between the issues on the groundandthedesiredchange.Itisincreasinglyapparentthatdespite growing contextual awareness therehasbeenlittleimpactontheformandcontentofprogrammes,as is demonstrated by the increasing number ofpolitical economy and context-driven analyses butthe continued publication of traditional programmedocuments.

However,thesearegeneralizations.Thewayinwhichsuch programmes are implemented will vary fromorganizationtoorganization,andcountrytocountry.A basket committee rolling out a programme acrossthe entire range of political institutions is likely todiffergreatly in thepresentationand scopeofobjec-tives fromanorganizationworkingon themodelofsister-partysupport.Thepurposeofthischapteristohighlightsomeofthetensionsanddifficultiesdonorsfaceinmovingawayfromthestrategictothespecific.These trends and challenges are examined in moredetailineachofthecasestudiesinchapter3.

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Four case studies: Support to parties and parliaments in practice

This chapter examines the experience of support toparliaments and political parties with reference tofour specific programmes. The dynamics of assist-anceprogrammesvary fromcountry tocountryandfromagencytoagency.However,ourdiscussionswithagencystaffinthefield,thoseatheadquarters,andin-dependentconsultantsworkinginavarietyofcontextshighlighted a number of recurring problems. Theseproblemswere setout in chapter 1 in the four chal-lengesfacingdonorprogrammes:translatingstrategyintocountry-specificprojects;thechallengeofpoliti-cal engagement; establishing meaningful objectives;andintegratingparliamentaryandpartysupport.

The case studies below were chosen because eachhas sought to achieve overtly political outcomes.We recognize that the choice of countries is, insomesenses, arbitraryandcanonlypresentapartialanalysis. The purpose is not to assess the individualprojects, but instead to understand some of thechallenges of political programming with referenceto some illustrative case studies. We do not, how-ever,makeanyclaimthat theyare representative. Inthe process of identifying examples, we looked forprojects that actively sought to engage with thepoliticsofchange.Thatis,theyusedaformofpoliticalanalysis to identify theunderlyingproblems(suchasdriversofchange),andthesubsequentprojectdesignnotonlyreflectedthisanalysis,butalsosoughttousepolitical,ratherthansolelytechnical,meanstoachievethedesiredchange.Eachwasbasedonasophisticatedanalysisofthepoliticalcontextandsoughttoengagewith the political drivers and incentive structuresaffecting the performance of the parliament andpoliticalparties.Intheserespects,theydifferfromthemajorityofprojectsprovidingtechnicalsupport.Thestudiesalsohighlightthepracticaldifficultiesoftrans-latingstrategyintopractice,howprogrammeshandletherealityof sensitivepolitical interventionsandthechallenges that come with integrating assistance topartiesandparliaments.

The first two case studies are examples of multi-donorfunded‘deepeningdemocracy’projects:oneinTanzania and the other in Uganda. The premise forbothwasarecognitionoftheinterdependenceofthedifferent institutions of democracy and the need fora programme which integrated support to a diverseset of political institutions and actors. Nonetheless,they provide very different experiences and insights,highlighting the difficulty of translating politicalanalysisintotheplanning,managementanddeliveryofprojects.

The third and fourth case studies examine theworkofindividualinstitutionsinaddressingthechallengeshighlighted above. They examine, respectively, theworkof theNIMDinGhanaandthatof theWFDin Macedonia. The Ghana case study provides anexampleofaprojectexplicitlydesignedtostrengthenpolitical parties but which sought also to influenceotheraspectsofthepoliticalsystem,notleasttheparlia-ment.TheMacedoniacase,meanwhile,isanexampleofaprojectthatsoughttostrengthentheparliamentbyworking throughandwithpoliticalparties.Bothprojectswerebasedonadetailedunderstandingofthepoliticaldynamicsinthecountryandengageddirectlywiththeminordertofosterinstitutional,culturalandbehaviouralchange.Theyrevealsomeofthepotentialproblems such programming can face, not least de-pendence on local stakeholder buy-in, but also offersomeprincipleswhichmightinformfuturework.Thelessonsfromeachoftheseprojectsaredrawnoutinthebroader context of how international donor agenciesdesignandfundpoliticalprogrammesinchapter 4.

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Deepening Democracy in Tanzania

The Deepening Democracy in Tanzania Programme(DDTP),whichranfrommid-2007untilJune2010,wasaUNDP-implementedprojectthataimedtoaffectawiderangeofdemocraticinstitutionssimultaneous-ly.TheprogrammehadanumberofobjectivesrelatingtoinstitutionswithintheTanzanianpoliticalsystem,includingstrengtheningelectoralprocesses,civicedu-cation, parliamentary oversight and communication,andincreasingthecapacityofpoliticalpartiesandofapluralisticpartysystem.TheoverarchingrationaleoftheDDTPwastoexpandandentrenchexistingdemo-craticachievementsbybuildingthecapacityoftheseinstitutions. The Project Document (2007), signedby the UNDP and the Government of Tanzania in2007,putsspecificemphasisonthedesiretodevelopdemocratic‘principles,valuesandculture’,reflectingatacitrecognitionthatdemocraticdevelopmentmeanschangingpoliticalbehaviouraswellasitsinstitutionalstructures.

TheDDTP’s implementationwaspremisedon:first,abasiclevelofdemocracywithinTanzania;and,sec-ond,genuinecommitmentbykeypoliticalstakehold-ers to developing participatory politics. The openingparagraphsoftheProjectDocumentstressthiscom-mitmentandmakeitclearthattheprogrammerestsonarecordofdemocraticdevelopment.Ithighlightsevidenceofthreesuccessfulelectionssincethereturntomultipartypoliticsin1992,andespeciallythe2005elections which were broadly recognized by interna-tional observers as free and fair (albeit not withoutchallenges).50 The programme documentation identi-fiesalackof‘politicalliberalism’astheprimarychal-lenge for Tanzanian democracy,51 emphasizing thatthelackofademocraticpoliticalcultureisultimatelytiedtotheinstitutionsofthepoliticalsystem.

The DDTP evolved, to a large extent, from theUNDP-led basket committee, which supported the2005electoralprocess.TheProjectDocumentmakesclearthatthisintervention,andtheresponseofvariouslocalandinternationalstakeholderstoit,informedthedesignof theDDTP. Inparticular, thecoordinationofsupportthroughasinglebasketcommitteewasre-gardedasbeneficial,preventingoverlaporduplicationin assistance. The timeframe for the implementationof theprogrammewas set tocoincidewith the2010elections,and,accordingtothedevelopmentpartners

we interviewed, the elections provided the timeline,the objective and the bellwether of the programme’ssuccessorfailure.

Political context

Tanzania’s transition to multiparty politics beganin 1992, when the recommendations of the NyalaliCommissionwereimplemented.TheCommissionhadbeensetupin1991bythethen-president,AliHassanMwinyi, to consult with citizens and make recom-mendationsontheviabilityofareturntomultipartypolitics. Since 1963, Tanzania had been a de factoone-partystate,52andthesocialistChamaChaMap-induzi(CCM)haddominatedthepoliticalscenesincethe1977mergerofthemainlandTanganyikaAfricanNational Union and Zanzibar’s Afro-Shirazi Party.ThefallofcommunisminEuropeandthefailuresoftheNyerereadministration’seconomicpoliciesmeantthattheonepartystructurescouldnotbesustained.53The CCM therefore instigated a policy of reform,through the Nyalali Commission, which openedup the political system to a number of new partiesin 1992 and paved the way for multiparty electionsin1995.Theprocess of changewasdriven from thetopandcarefullymanagedby theCCM.TheCCMwasabletowinalandslideinthefirstelections,andremainedheadandshouldersabovetheotherpartiesforthenexteighteenyears.Althoughreformdidnotbeginandend in1992,andpositive stepshavebeentakentowardsgreaterdemocratizationsincethen,theCCM-dominated continuity means that there hasbeenlittle‘meaningfulalterationintheoperativerulesofthegame’.54

Three primary trends emerge from the UNDP’sanalysesintheprogrammedocumentation.First,theCCM’scontinuingdominanceofthestatemachinerymeansthattheinstitutionsthatguaranteeandimple-menttherulesofthegamehavenotchangedsignifi-cantly since the days of one-party rule. Second, thelegalframeworkthatgovernsthepoliticalsystemhasnotkeptpacewiththeneedsofmultipartydemocracy.Third, the population is generally ambivalent aboutdemocracy.Whiletheysupportdemocraticpoliticsaspreferabletothealternatives,thereislittleunderstand-ingofmultipartypolitics and support for theCCMremainshighdespitewidespreaddiscontentwith thepaceofreform.Asaresult,theDDTPobjectivesarestatedas:

• Supporteffortstoadvocatelegalreforms(and,possibly,constitutionalamendments)foramoreliberalizedpoliticalenvironment;

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• Strengthenandentrenchthehumanandmaterialelementsofexistingdemocraticpracticesandinstitutions,makingthemmorerobust,responsive,effectiveandefficientintheiroperation;

• Enhancedemocraticbeliefsandcultureandintensifyunderstandingofandrespectfordemocraticprinciples,cultureandvalues.55

Conceptssuchasbehaviour,culture,valuesandprinci-pleswereconspicuousintheearlystagesoftheDDTPdesign,andplayedaclearroleinexplainingtheration-aleoftheprogramme.Yet,therewasalsoanattempttogroundtheseculturalelementsofdemocracyintheinstitutions and legal frameworkof the state.At thestrategiclevel,theDDTPsuggeststhatanunderstand-ingofprinciplesandpoliticalcultureisboundupwiththepoliticalinstitutions,sothatstrengtheningthein-stitutionswillaffectthepoliticalculture.

Activities and outcomes

This section of the project document focuses on thepolitical parties and parliamentary components andtheirconnectionswitheachother.Althoughthetwoweremergedundertheheading‘GoodandAccount-able Governance’, implementation appears to haveremained separate—a point that is reflected in theTerminal Evaluation, which examines the two ele-mentsseparately.56

First, in relation toparliamentary strengthening, theprojectdocumentsidentify‘severecapacityconstraints’as a primary concern, with inadequate technical,materialandhumanresourcesidentifiedassignificanthurdles.57Inaddition,theweaknessoftheoppositioninrelationtotheCCMandtheexecutivemeansthereislittlecompetentorsustainedoversightandaccount-ability,asthesepartieshavelittlecapacityorpresencewithinparliament and the committees to fulfil theiroppositionalrole.Asaresult,legislationisoftenpassedwithlittledebate.58

Theanalysisinthedocumentationplacesthegreatestweightontheneedformoreinternalcapacity,andtheMid-term Evaluation lists the intended outcomes oftheparliamentarycomponentsas:

1. Strategiccoordinationofdonorcontributionstoparliament;

2. IncreasedcapacityofParliamenttocarryoutitsrolesmoreefficientlyandeffectively;

3. ImprovedresponsivenessofParliamenttoCivilSociety;

4. TrackingbyParliamentoftheprogresstowardstheMillenniumDevelopmentGoals.

These outcomes cover the whole spectrum of parlia-mentary activity. The first is a continuation of thesingle basket committee for the 2005 electoral sup-port,andreflectstheimportanceofharmonizedsup-port in theaideffectiveness agenda.The secondandthird outcomes are more general in scope, coveringa rangeofparliamentary functions,althoughamoredetaileddescriptionoftheseoutcomesisnotgiveninthe documentation. Finally, the fourth outcome tiesthe programme into the wider development agenda,whileenhancinglocalownershipandmanagementofthedevelopmentprocess.

There are few specific indicators for measuringprogresstowardstheseoutcomes,andnoquantifiablebaselinedatawerecollected.59 Instead, theMid-termEvaluation uses the list of interventions and activi-tiesasasetofoutputsforassessingprogress,butthereisnomentionoftheconnectionbetweenactivitiesandtheir effects. These activities are aimed primarily atplugging capacity gaps, and are technical in nature.For the most part they consist of training on infor-mation and communications technology, policy andresearchmethodologiesandcommunicationsskillsforparliamentarystaffaswellasseminarsforparliamen-tariansandcommitteemembers.Theprimaryactivityaimed at improving dialogue between parliamentar-ianswastobearegularlyheldbreakfastforum.How-ever,accordingtotheMid-termEvaluation,onlyoneofthesehadbeenheldatthetimeofwriting.60Overall,the implementationof theparliamentary componentwas heavily weighted towards the more traditional,capacity building activities, with qualitative, behav-ioural projects only making a marginal appearance.Ascribing qualitative changes to the DDTP wasdifficult not onlydue to thenature of the activities,but also because there were concurrent programmesrunbyotherorganizations such as theWorldBank,Political Parties of Finland for Democracy (DemoFinland) and USAID. That said, there have been anumberofnotedimprovementsconnectedtothemoretechnical activities. These include: improved parlia-mentary reporting, parliamentary committees referto and consult relevant ministries before presentingtheirreports;andnewskillsinvariousareashavebeenacquiredandappliedtoimproveefficiencyandeffec-tiveness.61

The political party component of the ProjectDocument notes that there has been a proliferationof parties since1992, butno corresponding increase

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ingenuinepoliticalcompetition.Infact,theperform-ance of opposition parties has not greatly improvedsincethefirstelections.Inthe2005presidentialelec-tion,CCMwon80percentof thevote,62comparedwith 61 per cent in the 1995 ballot. In 2010 therewas an improvement in political competition, withtheCCMshareofthevotereducedto62.8percent,meaningthattherehasnonethelessbeennoelectoralgain by the opposition since 1995.63 The UNDP’sProject Document identifies a number of barriers toamoreeffectivemultiparty system.These includeanobstructivelegalframework,poorpartycapacityandorganization and a lack of internal democracy. Theanalysislinkstheseproblemsdirectlytovoterdissatis-factionandthelowlevelsofsupportfortheopposition.Theintentionsoftheprojectwerethereforetoreducesystemicconstraintsonpoliticalparties, increase thecapacityofpoliticalparties andproduce anenviron-mentconducivetocompetitivepartypolitics.

In common with the parliamentary component, thepolitical party outcomes were kept general, encom-passing elements within both individual parties andthe multiparty framework in which they operate.In this way, the outcomes were in keeping with theUNDPanalysis thathighlighteddeficiencies inboththeseareas,althoughitishardtoidentifyanyelementofthepoliticalpartysystem,internalorexternal,thatisnotcoveredbytheseobjectives.

Throughoutthepoliticalpartycomponenttheempha-sis was on delivering interventions at the multipartylevel.Thiswastobeachievedthroughtwolocalinsti-tutions:theTanzaniaCentreforDemocracy(TCD),which is owned by the parties represented in parlia-mentandaimstocreateanenvironmentconducivetomultipartypolitics;andtheOfficeoftheRegistrarofPoliticalParties(RPP),whichisthegovernmentbodyresponsible for overseeing and facilitating the multi-partysystem.NIMDisoneoftheTCD’sprimaryex-ternalpartners.Theactivitiesinvolvedenhancingthecapabilitiesoftheorganizationsinordertoencourageparties’ ability to participate in the political system.Workshopsandtrainingseminarswereheldonpartyfinancing,partystructureandorganization,andcon-flict resolution. In addition, there were multipartyforums on inter-party dialogue and improving rela-tions between the parties around issues such as arevisedpartycodeofconductandanincreasedunder-standingoftheroleoftheRPP.

DespitethefactthattheDDTPanalysishighlightedparty capacity and internal democracy as primaryobstacles, there was no direct engagement or assist-

ancewithindividualparties.Instead,everythingwentthroughthetwomultipartyinstitutions.

Implementation management

TheDDTPhadacomplexmanagementmodalityand,accordingtothoseweinterviewed,theMid-termandTerminalEvaluationshadasignificantimpactontheimplementationoftheprogramme.Thekeymodalityaccording to the Mid-term Evaluation was NationalExecution (NEX), which meant that managementand institutional arrangements for the programmereliedonexistingnationalprocessesandsystems.Theexecuting agency for the DDTP was therefore theOffice of the President, which delegated responsibil-itytoaministerofstate.Theintentionwastoensurelocal ownership and harmonization with local strat-egies throughout the programme. However, as theTerminal Evaluation points out, this may not havebeenthemost‘appropriateagencytohouseaprocessdesignedtoencouragecapacitybuildingbetweencom-petingpoliticalparties’.64

As such, implementation laywith thebeneficiary in-stitutions, for example, the TCD and the RPP wereresponsible for planning, implementing, financialmanagementandreportingprogressofthepartycom-ponents,andtheUNDPprovidedadministrationandhandled the entire budget through its ProgrammeCoordinationOffice (PCO). Inotherwords, controland management of the programme rested with thelocal institutions,withtheUNDPtakingtheroleofadministrator and facilitator. In addition, an Over-sight Committee (OC) was created which includedleaddonoragencies,implementingbodies,thegovern-mentandtwoindependentinstitutions.However,ourinterviewswiththoseinvolvedintheprogrammein-dicatethatinpracticetheOCwaslimitedtothelocalimplementingagencieswithlittleinputfromtheleaddonors. To compensate for this lack of involvementintheOC,thedonorsanddevelopmentpartners,in-cludingDenmark,Ireland,theUnitedKingdom,theEuropeanUnion(EU)andtheUNDP,establishedabasket committee to review progress, provide adviceandguidelocalinstitutionswhenrequiredduringtheprogramme.

Further complicationswere added to the linesof re-sponsibilitybythefactthataleaddevelopmentpartnerwasappointedforeachofthefourprogrammecompo-nents.Theideawasthatthedonorwouldsupportben-eficiaryinstitutionsinplanningactivitiesandbriefthebasket committee on progress and challenges. How-ever, as the evaluations note, each lead development

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partner approached the role in different ways. Someweremoredirectlyinvolvedwiththeinstitutionsthanothers.

Analysis and assessment

Political analysis, technical activitiesOneofthestrengthsoftheDDTPwasitsexplicitac-knowledgementoftheneedtochangethedemocraticcultureandstructures.TheTerminalEvaluationnotedthepositiveandtimelynatureoftheprogramme,stat-ingthat‘thevisionandobjectivesoftheDDTPwereand remain critical and relevant to Tanzania’s con-tinuingdemocraticevolution’.ThisisseeninthemainthemesoftheUNDP’sanalysis.First, the imbalanceinpoliticalpowerwas themost significantchallengeto Tanzanian democracy, reflected in the weaknessof the opposition parties, the CCM’s dominance ofparliamentanditscontrolofgovernmentinstitutions.Second,thetop-downprocessofreformhadfailedtoinstiltherulesofthedemocraticgame.Third,amoreparticipatory,pluralisticdemocracyrequiredstrongeroppositionparties,asmovementsforrepresentingthepublicandasparliamentaryactors.

Redressing this imbalance was central to the mostbasic conception of the DDTP’s purpose. Even thetimeline was informed by the political cycle. Thosewespokewithsuggestedthatbecausethewholepro-gramme was aimed at creating more competition inthe2010elections,theDDTPwas‘inherentlypoliti-cal’.ThesechangescouldonlycomeattheexpenseoftheCCM.Fundamentally,theDDTPsoughttolevelthepoliticalplayingfield.

However, this analysis seemed to have little impacton project design and delivery. Our conversationswith development partners consistently highlightedthe tensionbetweenthepoliticalaimsof theDDTPandthetechnicalmeansusedtoachievethem.Allthepractitioners we spoke to suggested that the UNDPconceivedtheprojectasamechanisticexerciseratherthan one aimed at culture and behaviour, providingonlytechnicalsupporttothenationalinstitutions.Asone well-placed stakeholder put it: ‘The UNDP didnot have its political glasses on’. When developmentpartners pressed the UNDP about the discrepancybetween the political programme rationale and thetechnical interventions, the UNDP stated that thiswasadebatethatwasoccurring‘internallywithintheorganization’.Thisseemedtoreflecttheongoingten-sion,mentionedbyallthestakeholderswithwhomwespoke, within the UNDP, which acknowledged the

need to engage at apolitical levelbut found itdiffi-culttoworkthisintospecificactivities.ThisproblemisnotuniquetotheUNDP.Concernoverappearingpartisaniscommonacrossthesector.However,politi-cal programmingposesparticular difficulties for theUNDP.Asamultilateralorganization,whichplacesaparticularemphasisonpreservingitsneutrality,thereis a sense that ‘politics matters’ means an especiallydramaticcultureshiftfortheUNDP.

In terms of the DDTP itself, the documentation at-temptstoplacepoliticalinstitutionsasthekeygroundforthedevelopmentofpoliticalculture.However,al-thoughbehaviour is seenas akeycomponent in theopening parts of the project documentation, mostproject activity seemed to be based on building in-stitutional capacity. When the problems are viewedentirelythroughtheinstitutionalprism,interventionstendtofocusonthecapabilitiesofthatinstitutiontocarryoutitsfunction.Moreover,byconcentratingontheinstitutions,theybecomeviewedasself-containedentities,andtheircapabilitiesandfunctionsareviewedinisolationfromotherelementsofthepoliticalsystem.

Asa result, theDDTPdependsheavilyon technicalactivitytobuildcapacity.Thiswasnotwithoutsuccess—worktoimprovethematerialcapabilitiesofpoliticalparties and theparliamentmade significantprogresstowardsmeetingtheoutputs.However,effortstoalterthepoliticalcultureandpoliticalbehaviourwerelesssuccessful. For instance, attempts at multiparty dia-loguefaltered.AccordingtotheMid-termEvaluation,onlyoneoftheSpecialBreakfastForumsdesignedtobringpartiestogetherwasheldovertheperiod2007–2008,andtheinterpartyworkwiththeTCDfailedtogetoffthegroundduetothelackofaconsultant.Suchworkreliesongenuinecommitmentandbuy-infromlocal politicians, which can be time-consuming anddifficulttotrack.Thisisparticularlytrueincountriessuch asTanzania,where trust betweenpolitical par-tiesisminimal.Onestakeholderwhohadworkedonanumberof governanceprojects acrossAfricanotedthat endemic mistrust between politicians and thepersonalization of politics are among the most sig-nificant problems in Tanzania. As the leader of oneparty put itwhen askedwhyhis party ideology was‘conservative’—‘because the other options—socialistandliberal—hadalreadybeentaken’.

Overall, there seemed to be a disconnect betweenproject objectives and activities, and a lackofusefulindicators.TheMid-termEvaluationnotedthatwith-outindicatorsorabaselineassessment,almostanyout-comecanbedeemeda success—and that theactivi-

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tiesthemselvesbecometheonlybenchmarkbywhichto judge the programme. The contextual analysisexploressomeoftheproblemsfacingtheinstitutions,but it is difficult to discern how the context feedsdirectlyintotheinterventionsthemselves.Theseissuescanbe tracedto thereluctanceof theUNDPtode-signanovertlypoliticalprogramme.Thedifficultyofestablishingmeasuresofpoliticalandculturalchangebeset many agencies working in this field, but theproject documentation does not address the issue atall.

Management of the DDTPTheproblemsinprojectdesignwerecompoundedbythestructureformanagingtheproject.AlthoughtheDDTPattemptedtoincorporateeffectivelocalcontroland ownership over the programme, both the Mid-term Evaluation and the Terminal Evaluation drewattentiontoproblems.Thesecanbedividedintofourbroadareas:

First, theNEXmodalitywasstronglycriticized.Theevaluationidentifieditasasignificantobstacletoef-fectiveimplementation.Thedocumentsuggestedthatthis modality was chosen because it conformed toParis/Accraprinciplesof localownershipandbuy-in,butonestakeholderneatlysummeduptheproblembynoting that itmeant the implementingpartners andthebeneficiarieswerethesameorganizations.Inaddi-tion,theinstitutionsseemtohavelackedthecapacityto manage the programmes effectively and were un-able to produce the high-quality progress reports onwhich the OC, the basket committee and the PCOrelied.Thisinturnledtodelaysatallstagesofthepro-gramme,unsatisfactorymonitoringandunclearlinesof responsibility.Theproblemswith thenational in-stitutionsshouldnotcomeasasurprisegiventhattheDDTPaimedtohelpthemcarryouttheirmostbasicfunctions,whichwould suggest that theymightnotpossesstheexpertisetorunsuchalargeprogramme—orunderstandthesolutionstotheproblems.

Thesecondelement,connectedtothis,waslocalown-ership.Thebeneficiaryinstitutionsalsohadsignificantinputintotheformandcontentoftheactivities.TheUNDP approached the various national institutionsand asked them what interventions they felt wouldbemostbeneficial.Whilethis initself isaneffectivemethod of increasing local buy-in, our intervieweessuggested that theUNDPdidvery little toprobeorrationalizethesuggestionsoftheinstitutions.Invari-ably, theywould request technical, capacitybuildingprojectswhichsuitedtheUNDP’sactivitypreferences

andmovedtheprojectawayfrommoresensitivepoliti-calinterventions.

Third,tensionsexistedbetweenthedevelopmentpart-ners and the UNDP from the inception of the pro-gramme.ThoseinterviewedindicatedthattheUNDPrequired development partners because it could notapproach this typeofprojectunilaterally,becauseofthe potential political sensitivities. The developmentpartnersweretheretolendweighttotheDDTPandpresentaunitedsenseofpurposetothelocalinstitu-tions,sothatinadditiontothefinancialcontributionsmadebythedevelopmentpartners,theywerealsoex-pected toplay amore active role in theprogramme.However,thetermsofreferencewereneverclearlyde-lineatedbytheUNDP.TheTerminalEvaluationsug-gests thattherewasa ‘failuretodistinguishbetweenmanagement responsibilities and coordination andadvisoryfunctions’.65Furthermore,althoughthepro-grammedocumentmentionstheroleofaleaddonorforeachcomponent, the termsof referencemadenomentionofthis.66Asaresult,thedevelopmentpartnerssawtheirresponsibilitiesintermsofoversight,coordi-nationandtheprovisionofadvicetothevariouslocalstakeholders.TheUNDP,however,wantedhands-oninvolvement from the partners in working with thenational institutions. Furthermore, our intervieweesindicatedthattheUNDPvieweditselfasa‘disinter-estedparty’,whichwashostingtheprogrammeratherthan managing or implementing it. These tensionswereneverresolvedas far the intervieweeswerecon-cernedandthishadadetrimentaleffectontheeffec-tivenessoftheDDTP’sdesignandimplementation.

Finally, a number of administrative challengesaffected the DDTP. A great number of these werecausedeitherdirectlyorindirectlybythethreeissuesoutlinedabove.TheOCneverfulfilledthecrucialroleassignedtoitandrepresentationwaslimitedlargelytothelocalpartners.AstheOCwasintegraltocoordi-nating the disparate components of the programme,the failure toorganize it effectivelywas a significanthurdle. Inaddition,due to theconfused rolesof thevariousstakeholders,someelementsoftheprogrammefailed togetoff theground.Wewere toldabout thefailure to find consultants for activities and the lackofpermanentPCOstafftomanagesucha largeandcomplexsetofinterventions,problemsalsodiscussedintheTerminalEvaluation.67

Overall, the management problems experienced bythe DDTP were a result of the way in which theUNDP approached the more controversial elementsoftheprogramme,compoundedbythewidescopeof

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the activities and institutions involved. Ultimately,manyoftheelementsofamoreinnovativeprogrammewere there in theory. There was a clear emphasis onlocalownershipand involving stakeholders indecid-ing the form and content of activities. Furthermore,theDDTPensured theparticipationofanumberoftheleadingdonorsatvariouslevelsoftheprogramme.However,synthesizingalltheelementsofthemanage-mentstructureprovedaseriousobstacle.

Conclusions

The flaws in project design and implementationstructuresmeantthattheDDTPwasnotaseffectiveas it might have been, and did not live up to whatwere a sophisticated political analysis and a worthyset of project objectives. The five components of theprogramme were treated as separate interventions,planned by each target institution and guided bydifferentdevelopmentpartners.Thegeneralmanage-mentproblemsmeantthattheoversightandcoordina-tionrolesassignedtovariousactorswerenotadequate-lycarriedout.Onestrikingexamplecameoutoftheinterviews.TheTCDandtheRPPwouldhavebeenparticularlyeffectiveforumsforintegratingthepartyand parliamentary components of the programme.However,whiletheactivitieswerebeingimplemented,itwasdiscoveredthatbothinstitutionswerecarryingoutalmostidenticalfunctionswithoutknowing.TheUNDP’sresponse,inkeepingwiththeprojectmodal-ity,wastorequestthattheTCDandtheRPPsortoutthe problem themselves. Had there been a methodi-cal approach to coordination, this situation wouldhavebeenavoided.As itwas, therewasnocoherent,formalizedwayforthedifferentcomponentstocom-municate,andtheinstitutions‘sufferedasaresult’.68

Inaddition,thedelegationoftheplanningandman-agement of interventions to beneficiary institutionsprevented a strategic approach from being taken totheactivities.Treatedasseparate,isolatedinstitutionsthere was little chance that they would view them-selvesas intersectingwithotherpartsofthepoliticalprocess.Thisisdespitethefactthatanumberofinter-sectingissueshadbeenclearlyidentifiedintheprojectdocument, particularly in terms of the role of theoppositionpartiesinparliament,wherestrengtheningtheoppositionwasnotedasakeyelementofimprov-ing parliamentary oversight and accountability. Thesheer size of the programme and the relatively shorttimeframeof42monthsmeant that theprogrammewas ‘overly ambitious’,69 and that an organized andcoherentapproachrequiredtheUNDPtocarveupthepoliticallandscapeintomanageablechunks.Themost

obviousway todo thiswas along institutional lines.Oncetheprogrammewasviewedthroughtheinstitu-tionalprismitwasdifficulttoharmonizeorcoordinatethesepreviouslysegmentedelements.

Inpartduetothesizeoftheprogrammeanditsrigid,institutional design, the stakeholders we interviewedhighlightedalackofflexibilityintheapproachoftheDDTP.TheTerminalEvaluationalsohighlightedthefactthatdespitecriticismofmanagementstructuresintheMid-termEvaluation, therewasnoprogrammedtime in which to take stock of these challenges andrectify them.70 There seemed to be an inability tochangeandadapttotheevolvingcontextinTanzania,whichmeantthatsomeofthemostpressingproblemswent unaddressed. For example, there was a seriousbreakdownincommunicationbetweenthespeakeroftheZanzibarHouseofRepresentativesandoppositionMPs. This was paralysing the parliament and polar-izingtheparties.Despitethesignificanceofthisissue,theDDTPdidnotattempttoaddresstheproblemoreven open dialogue between the factions. Failing todealwithitundoubtedlyhinderedmanyoftheinter-ventions aimed at improving the functioning of theHouse.

The Deepening Democracy Programme in Uganda

The Deepening Democracy Programme (DDP) inUganda is a multiple intervention project developedbyPartnersforDemocracyandGovernance(PDG)71in conjunction with Ugandan stakeholders. It waslaunched formally by President Museveni in 2008and is scheduled to run until the 2011 elections.72Uganda’s first multiparty elections for 25 years wereheldin2006,andPDGdonorshadprovidedsupportleadingupto thepoll. Inresponse to thisevent, thedonors decided to examine opportunities for futureprogramming by reviewing previous assistance andconsulting local stakeholders. Despite differencesoverthemanagementandspecificcontentofthepro-gramme,therewasbroadconsensusamongthedonorsontheimportanceofinitiatingwide-rangingsupportto a variety of democratic institutions. As a result,the fundsof the sixdonorswerepooledandthefivecomponentsoftheDDPwereestablished.Thesecom-

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ponents are: 1) enhancing the integrity of elections;2) institutionalizing an effective multiparty politicalsystem;3) strengtheningparliamentaryautonomyandoversight; 4) encouraging more active and participa-tory civic engagement; and 5) strengthening a freemediatopromoteaccountability.Thischapterfocusesoncomponents2and3,whicharedirectlyconcernedwithpoliticalpartiesandparliaments.

The Ugandan context

ThemostsignificantfeatureofUganda’srecentpoliti-calhistoryisthenon-partysysteminitiatedin1986byPresidentYoweriMuseveni.Underthissystem,politi-calpartiescouldnotcampaign inordirectlycontestelections,andsowereeffectivelyirrelevant.Asaresult,theNationalResistanceMovement,ledbyMuseveni,became the dominant political force in the country.Elections were held on this non-party basis in 1996and2001,andMuseveniwonwithalandslideonbothoccasions. However, in July 2005 a referendum washeldtodecidewhethertoreturntoamultipartysys-tem.Despitethelowturnoutofaround47percent,73therewasoverwhelmingsupportforanendtotheno-partysystem(92.5percentvotedinfavour),74and,asaresult,thePoliticalPartiesandOrganisationActwaspassed. The following year saw the first elections in25yearstooffervotersachoiceofpoliticalparties.

Twoof theparties—theDemocraticParty(DP)andtheUgandaPeople’sCongress(UPC)—thatregisteredandcompetedinthe2006pollhadbeenestablishedasfarbackasthe1950s.However,thedisestablishmentof political parties after 1986 meant that, althoughindividual candidates may have had political experi-ence in the intervening period through standing asindependent candidates, the parties themselves hadno organizational memory of contesting elections.Furthermore, legal restrictions on freedom of asso-ciationbefore1995had left thepartieswith littleornocohesionorsupportbase,whichwouldhavebeenachieved through public meetings, rallies or confer-ences.Consequently, in2006all theoppositionpar-ties were entirely unprepared to undertake the mostbasic functions of a political party, such as coherentcampaigning, cadre-building, citizen outreach andpolicymaking.InthelightoftheNRM’selectoralandorganizationalcapabilities,itisnotsurprisingthattheEU’s Election Observers’ Mission Report bemoanedthelackofalevelplayingfieldinUganda.75

Thisimbalancewassubsequentlyreflectedinthedom-inanceoftheNRMinparliament.Despiteproceduraland constitutional changes, the Westminster system

means that the majority party controls the chamberandthecommittees,andthere-emergenceofthepartycaucussystemandtheuseofwhippinghasonlyem-phasizedthisinstitutionalcontrol.

The development of the DDP

In this political context, the DDP was established‘tocontribute to improveddemocraticgovernance inUganda’.Itspurpose‘ontheonehandistoincreasein-formed,activeandpluralisticparticipationofUganda’scitizensinthepoliticalprocess.Ontheotherhand,theDPPaimstobuildthecapacityofinstitutionscriticalinpromotingpublicparticipationandinholdingthestateaccountabletocitizens’needsandconcerns.’76

Underlyingthisratheranodynedescription,however,are clear political objectives—principally to increasethe influence of the opposition parties and addresstheimbalanceofpoliticalpower.Specifically,thepro-grammeaimstoaddresstheinstitutionalweaknessesofthepartiesandtheperformanceofthosepartiesinparliament.ThisisnottosuggestthattheDDPfocusesexclusivelyontheopposition.Theinter-partydialoguecomponentandthefundingofindividualpartiesbothaimtoincludeallpoliticalactors.Critically,however,theprogrammeisbuiltonarecognitionoftheinter-dependenceofthepartyandparliamentaryelements.

At first, the parliamentary strand of the programmesought to ‘strengthen parliamentary autonomyand oversight’. This, however, was less to do with alack of formal parliamentary power than the com-position of parliament. As one observer noted,‘parliament has the mandate and the authority toact’,77 but after the 2006 elections the NRM had67percentoftheseatsandthuscontrolled‘theagen-da of both the plenary and most committees’.78 Theproject identified three outputs contributing to thiscomponentobjective,eachofwhichhasasetofverifi-ablemeasuresofprogress:

• Moreeffectiveoversightoftheexecutive:anactiveandconstructiveopposition;wellinformedcommittees,producingmorereportsongovernmentpolicy;carefullyconsideredpolicyandlegislativeworkshops.

• Developingparliamentarysupportservices:improvementinthenumberofusersandintheirestimationsoftheserviceprovided;anincreaseinthenumberofpolicybriefingsproduced.

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• Improvingparliamentaryinfrastructure:targetedatbuildingcapacitywhereitmightbemosteffective,linkedtothesupportservicesthatcanenhanceparliamentaryscrutiny.79

Significantly,thefirstoutcomeexplicitlystatestheim-portanceoftheoppositiontoensuringaccountability,rather than treating all parliamentarians as equallyimportant to theprocessnomatterwhat theirpartyaffiliation.Thispoliticalinsight—thattheoppositionneedsassistancemore than the rulingparty—meansthatthedifferentialimpactoftheprogrammeonthepoliticalpartiesisacceptedattheoutset.Inaddition,theinfrastructuralcapacitybuildingcomponentistar-getedspecificallyatthosepartsoftheinstitutionthatwillmosteffectivelystrengthenoversight.

However,inacknowledgingacentraldifficultyofpo-litical programming, the DDP documentation high-lightsthequalitativenatureofsuchoutcomes,andad-mitsthelimitsofcapturingimpactobjectively,sayingthat it is ‘extremelydifficult tomeasure’.80However,itassertsthata‘triangulationofopinions’fromlocalandexternalstakeholders,recipientsandobservers,incombinationwithquantitativedatawhereapplicable,is sufficient for measuring progress. These observa-tionsare important inshapingthe formandcontentof the interventions themselves, throughbaseline as-sessments and an ongoing consultative process withthe local stakeholders. For example, the DDP willagree indicators with the parliament for measuringthe success of information technology (IT) capacitybuilding.Thespecificindicatorsdetailedintheprojectdocumentation for theparliamentary componentarea mix of qualitative and quantitative tools, and in-clude thequantityandqualityof committee reports;anincreasednumberofbriefingsandreportsforpar-liamentarians;increaseduseofabilltrackingsystem;andacknowledgementbylegislatorsandministersthatparliamentaryscrutinyisbecomingmoreeffective.

The political party element is built around the aimof ‘institutionalising an effective party system’. InUganda, the party system is still in its infancy andtheDDPviewsaneffectivepartysystemascomprisedofagenuinelycompetitivesystemandastablepoliti-calarena.Activitiestopromotethefirstobjectivearebuiltontwoprinciples:first, ‘multi-partydemocracywillthrivewherecitizenshaveasensethatpowercanalternate.[Forthis]theremustbetworelativelyevenlymatchedparties’.81However,theNRMcontested90.1percentoftheseatsin2006,andthenextparty(theForumforDemocraticChange,FDC)onlymanaged22.8percent.82Thesecondprincipleisthatthemulti-

partysystemshouldbecomemorewidelyaccepted.Atthemoment,aroundfourintenUgandansbelievethatpartypoliticsis‘divisiveandcausesconfusion’.83Theentirepoliticalsystemisunderminedifpartiesdonotgainlegitimacyamongvoters.ItissignificantthattheDDP explicitly targets party competition in general,andachievingviablealternativestothecurrentNRMdominanceinparticular.

Thesecondobjectivebuildsontheassumptions‘thatpartiesbecomethemajorcueforvoterchoiceinelec-tions, the patterns of party competition become in-creasinglymorepredictableover time,andthat localopinion formers and leaders accord parties greaterlegitimacy.’84 There is an emphasis on ensuring thatpartiesretainandimprovetheirelectoralpresenceandperformance,andthatcohesionandpartyloyaltyarestrengthened.Amorestablesystemwillalsoassistinimproving the public’s perception of the multipartysystem,whichiscurrentlyviewedasdivisive.

Measuring progress on the political party front de-pends on a variety of indicators. Developments aretracked using election results and Afrobarometerdata,reinforcedbyspecificmeasurementssuchastheincreaseintheproportionofcitizenssupportingmul-tipartypolitics,andthatpartycandidatessecurefirstorsecondplaceinhalftheseatscontested.Qualitativeindicatorsincludethosewhichfocusonthecohesionofparties, suchaswhetherachange inparty leader-shipcausesdefectionsordissatisfaction,oronwhethertrustincommunityleadersapproachesthesamelevelastheirelectoralsupport.Whatisnotableabouttheseindicators is that the DPP is attempting to capturequalitativechanges—cohesionandelectability—withobjectivelyverifiabledata.

Activities and implementation

In planning the parliamentary activities, the DDPProgrammeManagementUnit(PMU)workedincon-sultationwiththeParliamentaryDevelopmentCoor-dinationOffice,thecommitteechairs,thewhipsandthe Speaker. There was an acknowledgement by thedonors and theprojectmanagement that parliamen-tary support is inherentlypolitical. Previous supporttotheUgandanParliamentinthe1990shadbeenintheformoftechnical,capacity-buildinginterventions,and was seen as largely successful, but by the timeDDPwasindevelopmenttheparliamentwastechni-callyquitecompetent,anditspowerswere,intheory,strong. Thus, further technical support would havebeenredundantandtheprogrammeconcentratedonareasthatwouldenhancescrutiny:

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• AResearchFund(RF)fortheoppositioncabinet;

• AnExpertAdvisoryFund(EAF)forcommittees;

• ITcapacitybuilding;

• Legislativetrainingandseminars.

In these four elements, there is an emphasis on theavailability of reliable information and research, anditsimportancetotheeffectivefunctioningofthepar-liament.Thefirstcomponentisafundfortheshadowcabinet.TheRFallowsshadowministerstocommis-sion reports andgather information froma rangeofsourcesoutsidetheparliament.TheEAFismuchthesame,butisfortheexclusiveuseofparliamentarianswhoarecommitteemembers.TheDDPhasa listofapprovedsourcesthatcanbeusedtoconductresearch,whichincludesuniversitydepartments,professorsandthinktanks.While the list is theprimary source forboththeRFandEAF,theshadowcabinetisgrantedawiderlicenceforresearchprojects,andisabletoen-gagetheservicesofothercontactsandresearchers.

Naturally, the establishment of these research fundscreated a certain amount of political resistance. Inparticular, theparliamentaryresearchdirectorate feltthatthefundswereusurpingitsrolewithintheinsti-tutionandundermineditsauthority.Inaddition,theparliamentarycommissionandtheparliamentarystafffound theplanproblematic, and support specificallyto the shadowcabinetproved controversial.They allrequired careful handling and time to reassure keystakeholders.

Implementationofthefourcomponents,particularlytheEAF,hashadsomesuccess.Sevencommitteeshaveused theEAFtocommission15different reportsonvarioustopics,includingsensitivepolicyareassuchasmilitaryexpenditure.Thefundhasalsoinformedtheclimatechangebillandissuesofelectoralreform.TheshadowcabinetRFhasseenlessuse,inpartduetotheabsenceoftheleaderoftheoppositionforsixmonthsthrough illness. However, one DDP staff membersuggestedthatanotherfactormayhavebeenthattheshadowcabinetismadeupofMPsfromdifferentpar-ties.Currently,cooperationandcollaborationbetweenoppositionpartiesisnothigh,andthishashampereduse of the RF. Nevertheless, some shadow ministershavebeenkeentousethefund.NotableamongthemistheFinanceMinister,whohasfrequentlycommis-sionedthefundtoinformhiswork.Despitethislackofuse,shadowcabinetmembersaregenerallyenthu-

siastic and have seen how information has benefitedtheircolleagues.

Thefinal twocomponentsof theparliamentary sup-port (IT capacity-building and legislative training)havehadmixedsuccess.TheITinterventionshavees-tablishedthesystemssetoutintheprojectdocuments(e.g.abilltrackingsystem).However,therehavebeendifficulties getting the necessary information fromvariousdepartmentstoenterintothesystem.Theleg-islativeandpolicytraininghasbeenasmallproportionoftheparliamentarysupport,buthashelpedwiththepassage of a bill banning female genital mutilation,andiscurrentlybeingusedtogetanewdivorceandmarriagebillthroughparliament.

Accordingtothoseinvolvedwiththeprogramme,thepoliticalpartycomponenthasprovedtobemorecon-troversial than the parliamentary support. There arethreedimensionstothiscomponent:directgrantstopoliticalparties; inter-partydialogue;andenhancingcooperationbetweencivilsocietyandpoliticalparties.Thefirstof these is themost innovative andcontro-versial,despite its apparent simplicity.Thegenesisofthisdimensionisimportant.Duringtheconsultationphase,thePMUapproached28ofthe34politicalpar-tiesandaskedthemwhattheyneededthemost.Theresponsewasinvariably‘money’.Thisposedgreatdif-ficulties,buttheDDPfeltthatfinancialassistancewasnecessary for a number of reasons. In general, partyfundsareveryshort,andtheNRMisabletoutilizestate resources for financial support. Furthermore,direct funding to parties would aid the process ofinstitutionalization.

Inordertotakethegrantactivityforward,thePMUconductedadetailedassessmentofthe25partiesthattook part. Significantly, the NRM failed to respondtorequeststoparticipate,despiterepeatedinvitations.Theassessmentsinvolvedtheprimarygovernanceim-plementers active in Uganda: the NIMD; the NDI;andtheIRI.Inaddition,threeindependentacadem-icswereconsultedontheframeworkfortheproposedparticipatory party assessment. On completion, theassessmentsweresentforcommentstotheparties.Theassessmentsweredesigned tocheck that the fundingrequestsmadebythepartieswereinlinewiththere-quirementsidentifiedbytheassessments.Forexample,theFDCrequested funds to traincadres andcandi-dates;theUPCwantedtoincreaseinternalpartycohe-sion;andthePeoplesProgressivePartywantedtobuilditsbranch structures invariouspartsof thecountry.ThePMU felt that these requests fairly reflected themostpressingneedsoftheparties.

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Thenext stageofplanningcentredondevisinga setof criteria to judge a party’s eligibility for funding.This posed particular difficulties because the multi-partysystemwassonew.However,thePMUwaskeento ensure that it was not imposing a set of WesternstandardsandmodelsontheUgandanparties.Asoneintervieweesaid,itwantedtobasethecriteriaonwhatpartieswerecurrentlydoing,notonwhattheymightdo in the future.Themaincriteriadevised forgranteligibilityare:

• alegallimitonforeigndonationsofaboutUSD 230,000;

• partiesmustbecompliantwithcurrentpoliticalpartylaws;

• partiesmustnothavecommittedanyelectoraloffencesorhaveincitedviolence;and

• thesizeofthegrantcannotexceedtheaverageamountoffundsraisedannuallybythepartyitself.

Thislastcriterionwasimportant,asitmeansthatifaparty’sfundingdrops,thenthegrantwilldropbythesame amount. This ensures that the DDP never be-comes‘themajorityshareholder’inanyoftheparties.Additionally, it should encourage parties to increasetheirfundraisingefforts.Thegrantscannotbeusedforanydirectelectoralpurposes.

Interviewswithseveralstakeholdershighlightthefactthat the levelofpolitical sensitivitybecameapparentwhenPresidentMusevenimadehisuneaseaboutthegrants clear at an EU meeting. This reinforced theconcernsofseveraldonors,andsomereferredthemat-terupwards, seekingministerialclearancefromtheirhomedepartments.Inaddition,thedonorsurgedthePMUtoincludetheNRMinthegrantscheme,but,althoughtheywererepeatedlycontacted,officiallythepartyhassofarnotmadeadecisionaboutparticipa-tion.Asaresultofthesedifficulties,itwasdecidedtomakethegrantcomponentintoapilotprogrammetorununtil the endof2010, afterwhich itwill be re-viewed.

Of the 25 parties that applied for grants, six havebeen deemed eligible, and a further two were pro-vided with limited direct procurement of goods andservices.Thishasmostoftentakentheformofone-offdelegateconferences,forwhichtheDDPhasfinancedthehiringofthevenueandotherassociatedcosts.ThePMUrepresentativewe interviewedpointedout thatthegrantswereprovingtobegoodvalue formoney,in comparison to other direct funding activities, for

example,withcivilsociety.Thepartiesweresubjectedtoexternalaudits,whichsuggestedthattheymadethemaximumuseofthemoney,anddidnottouseittosimplybuycadresupport.

The seconddimension of the political party compo-nent focused on inter-party dialogue. This has beenimplementedthroughNIMD.Theaimwastofacili-tatediscussionaroundaspectsofprocedurewithinthepolitical system. Formally, there is commitment tothis process from all sides of the political spectrum.However, informally, those involved have indicatedthatthevariousactorsareplayinga ‘zero-sumgame’that limits the impact of these sessions.Thegovern-ment views every move by the opposition parties aspartof thepolitical game,while theoppositionuseseveryopportunitytoincreasepressureontheNRM.Additionally, there are differing perceptions aroundthepurposeofmultipartydialogue.Thegovernmentfeelsthatithasdoneenoughtobalancetherulesofthegame,andseesdiscussionsasawayofreinforcingtheirviewpoint.Ontheotherhand,theoppositionseesitasaconflictmanagementtool.

Finally, the activities involving civil society groupshave had some notable successes. The DDP has at-tempted to increase citizen outreach by producingshortpolicysegmentsforradiowitheachparty,whichwillbebroadcastby50stationsacrossthecountry.Theaimistoexpandthisintoafulldiscussionprogrammebased around a comparison of specific policy areas.Those involvedare realisticabout itsprospects.Theyrealize that it will not ‘trump vote buying’, but it isastarttowardsamoreinstitutionalized,policy-basedapproachtowinningsupport.


TheDDPinUgandaisdemonstratingboththediffi-cultiesandthepossibilitiesofinherentlypoliticalpro-gramming.TheDDP,muchlikemanyotherdemoc-racy supportprogramme,hasa setofobjectives thatseektochangethecultureandqualityofthepoliticalsystem.Yet, incontrasttoaprogrammesuchasthatinTanzania,itisarareexampleofaprogrammethathastranslateditspoliticalanalysisintoovertlypoliticalinterventionsthatclearlyaimtoredressimbalancesinthepoliticalsystem.

This has entailed numerous difficulties for the pro-gramme since its inception in 2006. The timeframealonedemonstratesthis.Althoughtheinitialideaforaprojectwasfirst raised fouryears ago, someof themostcontroversialelementshaveonlyrecentlybegun

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inearnest.Itisnotablethatthepoliticalpartygrant-makingtookoverayeartobegin,andthenonlyasalimitedpilotprogramme.Therecalcitranceoftherul-ingNRM, including its unwillingness toparticipatein the funding component, and the parliamentarydirectoratesisanindicationthattheactivitiesarechal-lengingthestatusquo.Inaddition,theparliamentarywork,partofwhichisaimedexclusivelyattheopposi-tion,has,accordingtooneinterviewee,causedseriousdisquietamongtherulingparty.

Giventhesesensitivities,theDDPhassoughttomiti-gatecertainrisks.Ithasproceededthroughintensiveand exhaustive consultation with a wide range ofstakeholders,localandinternational,governmentandopposition,inordertoensureadegreeofbuy-infromall elements of the political spectrum. For the partyandparliamentarycomponents,discussionsabouttheformandcontentoftheprogrammewereanintegralpart of designing the activities. Although the NRMdidnotparticipateineveryaspectoftheprogramme,the party was kept informed of every development.Thisisnottosaythatallproblematicissuesweresuc-cessfully resolved, and those involvedhave indicatedsome ways in which improvements could be made.However, the DDP does show how a programme ofthistypecanbegintoovercomesuchdifficulties.

The next stages of the DDP will build on these po-liticalinsights.The2011electionswillsignalapausein the programme as undertaking party and parlia-mentaryassistanceduringthecampaignwouldinviteheavy criticism from both Uganda’s ruling elite anddonors. Itwould alsohave limited impact.Theelec-tionswill thusprovide aperiod for reviewwhen thevariouscomponentswillbeassessedandalteredasap-propriate.Forexample,thoseweinterviewedbelievedthatonitsown,theimpactofmultipartydialoguewaslimited.Althoughthediscussionshavenotdisintegrat-ed,therehasbeenlimitedtangibleprogress.Therehadbeenformalcommitmenttotheprocess,buttheun-derlyingpoliticsandatmosphereofmistrustpreventedmeaningfuldialogue.Oneintervieweesuggestedthatthissituationwasunlikelytochangeaslongastherewasnochange-overofpower.Onlywhenboth sideshaveexperiencedbothsidesofthecoinwill therebethedegreeoftolerancerequiredforeffectivedialogue.

This willingness to adapt has informed the entireprogramme. Extensive consultations with numerousstakeholdershaveensuredthattheprogrammeistai-lored to the situation, while the interventions them-selvesallowforadegreeofflexibilityand localown-ership.Thefundingcomponentsoftheparliamentary

supportareagoodexampleofthis.TheDDPprovidestheresourcesforcommissioningreportsandgatheringinformation,butthespecificuseofthemoneyisde-cidedbytheparliamentariansthemselves.Theydecideexactlywhattheyneedmostandareabletoaccessthefundswhenappropriate.Inthisway,theprogrammestaysrelevanttothesituation.Thegrantstopoliticalparties work in much the same way. Although care-fullymonitoredandapprovedbytheDDP,themoneyisspentwhereandwheneachpartyitselfbelievesitismostnecessary.

Critically, the DDP does not impose a formula or alinear development plan on local stakeholders fromtheoutside.Thepartiesareprovidedwithfundswhichtheydecidehowtousebest,sothepartiesandparlia-mentarianscantakethemorleavethemastheywill.Onedownsideisthatthistendstomeanthatthemostengaged parliamentarians and the larger ‘function-ing’partiesaretheprimarybeneficiaries,whilethosewhicharelargelyinactivewillremainso.However,thepartiesthatareparticipatingnowrecognizethattheyneed tobe real parties to function effectivelywithinthe system. They understand the direction in whichtheyneedtotravelbecausetheyaredrivingdevelop-ment.However,thedesignoftheDDPmeansthattherequestsofthepartiesandparliamentariansdonotgounchecked.Thereisnoassumptionthatlocalowner-ship means a hands-off approach. It is rather aboutensuring that genuine consultation and buy-ins areprogrammed.

Conclusions

The overall strength of the Deepening DemocracyProgramme lies in the way in which the insightsfromtheanalysisofthepoliticalsituationinUgandahave been translated into project objectives and theimplementation of activities. The problem under-pinning both the parliamentary and political partystrands of the programme was the imbalance ofparty political power, which meant that parliamentwas simply not functioning as it should in terms ofholding the executive to account.Theparliamentarystrengthening element was therefore conceived interms of the political parties, making them partnersand, to a large extent, the principal drivers of thatcomponent.Supporttothepartiesinparliamentwasreinforcedbyworktostrengthentheorganizationandadministrationofpoliticalpartiesoutsideparliament.Itwasa tacit recognitionthat inorder toplayanef-fectiverole,thepartiesneedednotonlyparliamentaryresourcesbutalsoabetterorganizationalstructureaswellasamorerobustpartysysteminordertoincrease

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thepubliclegitimacyofandauthorityforthatparlia-mentaryrole.

Three aspects of the implementation of the deliveryof the programme are worth emphasizing. First, theprogramme accepted at the outset that the activi-tieswouldhaveadifferential impacton thepoliticalparties. In short, that itwouldbeofmorebenefit totheoppositionpartiesthanitwouldbetotheNRM.It is this sort of admission that donor programmeshave foundparticularly troubling in thepast, and itwasclearlyanissueforthisone.Thefactthatkeydeci-sions needed to be referred back to be signed-off byministersinthedonoragencies’countriesisanindica-tionof the levelofpolitical sensitivity.However, theprogrammeappearstobemanagingthosetensions.

Second, theprogramme is being runbypeoplewhounderstandandengagewiththepoliticaldynamicsinUganda.Ourdiscussionswithkeyindividualsdeliver-ingtheprogrammeindicatedthattheyunderstandtheincentives thatdrive thepoliticians and thepoliticalparties and, more importantly, they are comfortablehandlingthem.Thishasmeant,inturn,thatthepro-gramme has been flexible and adapted to the politi-calsituationasithasevolved,andthatthosestaffandconsultants have been able to anticipate and defuseproblems.

Third,thisflexibleapproachhasmeantthatthepro-grammeisstillbeingdrivenbyitsoutcomesratherthanby its activities. In too many political programmes,theactivitiesintheoriginalplanningdocumenttendto be regarded as set in stone, and are followed rig-orously,regardlessoftheireffectiveness.TheDDPinUgandaisbuiltonaclearandcommonunderstandingoftheneedtoredresspoliticalimbalancesandimprovethequalityofdemocraticpolitics.Withinthatoverallobjectivetheprogrammeidentifiedkeyareasforsup-port,suchasgreaterresearchcapacityordirectgrantsfor opposition parties, and could potentially expandits work to other committees, which would help toalter the balance of power. However, activities havebeenmodifiedandthetimingoftheprogrammehasbeen allowed to slip in order to stay focused on theoutcomes.

Theprogrammeisthusregardedasapositiveexampleofpoliticalprogramming,whichintegratestheobjec-tives of parliamentary and party support. However,it also highlights the difficulties of quantifying thatsuccess.Although indicatorsexist,various interview-ees expressed the same view that they did not trulycapturetheextentofchange,andthatitwasstilleasier

to use numbers to justify programme activity thanmorequalitative signsof shift.Ourdiscussions rein-forcedtheviewthatitisofteneasiertosensepoliticalchangethanitistomeasureit.Thishasimplicationsfor theway suchprogrammesare fundedbydonors,andtheseareexaminedinchapter 4.

NIMD’s work with political parties in Ghana

NIMD’s work on the Ghana Political Parties Pro-gramme (GPPP), which began in 2001, is an on-going joint initiative with the Accra-based Instituteof Economic Affairs (IEA). Since its inception, theprogrammehasworkedwiththefourpoliticalpartiesrepresentedintheGhanaianparliamenttodevelopa‘sharedagendafordemocraticreforms’intheformofaDemocracyConsolidationStrategyPaper(DCSP).85The DCSP provides a wide-ranging analysis ofGhana’sdemocraticlandscape,thequalityofitspoliti-calinstitutionsandfurtherreformmeasurestoextendthecountry’sdemocraticdevelopment.

TheprogrammeinGhanawasinitiatedthroughase-ries of identification visits made by NIMD in 2001and2002,whichculminatedinastart-upconferencewiththeIEAin2002.Animportantpartoftheseini-tial visitswere extensive talkswith representativesofthefourparliamentaryparties.Theaimwasto‘intro-ducetheNIMDtoawidespectrumofpoliticalstake-holdersinGhanaandtoengageinconsultationsaboutoptions to support—in impartial ways—the institu-tional development of political parties’.86 The key tothis initial process was the IEA, which was alreadyworkinginthefieldandwhichwasperceivedasaneu-tralactorontheGhanaianpoliticalscene.NIMDwaskeen to ensure that the political parties programmerevolvedaroundapermanentlocalpresenceinGhana.Asaresult,ownershipwasnotrestrictedtooccasionalinput from local stakeholders. The programme wasmanaged and shaped entirely by a local institution.TheIEAbecameatrustedforumforthepartiesatallstagesoftheprogramme.

Followingtheinitialcontact,consultationsattheIEAinvolving all parliamentary parties and the ElectoralCommission resulted in an expression of interest to

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participatein‘aplatformofpoliticalpartiestoidentifyanationalagendaaimingatconsolidatingthedemo-cracywithina spiritofnationalconsolidation’.87Theinvolvementoflocalactorsfromtheearlieststagesoftheprogrammeisofparticularnote.The2004Evalu-ationindicatesthatestablishingtheprogrammewasa‘sensitive process’, which was ‘successfully concludedbyNIMDbybringingonboardandreachingagree-ment with all main stakeholders, including the IEAas the programme facilitator’.88This is an importantelementof theNIMDapproach. It actsasa facilita-tororconsultanttoinitiatetheprogramme,providingguidanceandfundingasandwhenrequired.Thisalsoavoids a prescriptive approach to programme com-ponents and institutional set-up. Another significantpart of the programme design was that NIMD wasintuitivelyawareofthelengthoftimerequiredtoim-plement such a programme. The sensitive politics ofattemptingtoreshapethepoliticallandscaperequiresnotonlytheinputofallmajorstakeholders,butalsoresolveonthepartofthedonortotaketheincrementalandtime-consumingstepsnecessarytoensurethatthemyriadofcomplex issuescanberesolved.Forexam-ple,thefirstyearoftheprogrammehadtherelativelymodest objective of assessing ‘the opportunities andconstraints for the long-term institutional develop-mentofpoliticalpartiesinGhanaandtodevelopanagendaonhowthesechallengescanbeaddressedandsupported’.89

NIMD took a collaborative and inclusive approachin Ghana. Although the programme had a broadobjectiveattheoutset,topromote‘theprocessofde-mocratization by supporting political parties in theareaofcapacitybuilding’,90thesubstanceofthepro-gramme, its form and content, has been decided bylocalactorsandfacilitatedbythelocalpartner—theIEA. There is no list of preconceived objectives thatspecificallyaddresscertainissues.Instead,theideaforthe joint platform was reached through an inclusiveand extensive consultation process with the politicalparties.However, itplacesparty support in thecon-textofwiderdemocraticdevelopment.Inotherwords,parties should be viewed as the primary conduit forpoliticalchange,and,byensuringtheirengagementintheprogramme,otherinstitutionsandelementsofthepolitical landscapecanbereachedandaffected.ThisindicateswhyNIMDdecidedtoworkonlywiththoseparties represented in parliament, their institutionalreachisgreater.Onefinalpointtonoteisthedefini-tionofcapacitybuilding,which suggests a technicalapproachtoprogramming,butNIMD’sconceptionofcapacityexplicitlyincludes‘thepromotionofademo-craticcultureandbehaviour’.91The2004JointAction

Plan (JAP), signedby all fourparliamentaryparties,reflects this thinking. The priority is the creation of‘alevelplayingfieldforallpoliticalpartiesinGhana’.

The Ghanaian context

The timing of NIMD’s intervention in Ghana coin-cided with a significant turning point in Ghanaianpoliticalhistory.The2000electionsignalledthefirstdemocratic transition from one elected governmentto another, when John Kufuor of the New PatrioticParty (NPP) defeated the incumbent Jerry Rawlingsof the National Democratic Congress (NDC). Onewell-placedofficialwespoketoremarkedthatthiswasthemomentwhenGhanaiansrealizedthat‘democracyhadcometostay’andthattheyneededtotakecontroloftheirowndevelopment.

Ghana’sdemocratichistoryuptothispointwasrela-tively short. Between 1966 and 1981, the politicallandscapewascharacterizedbyendlessmilitarycoups,which ended when Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlingscametopowerin1981,abrogatedtheconstitutionandbannedmultipartypolitics.Overthenextdecade,do-mesticpressures forpolitical liberalization combinedwith‘officialdesirestoconformtoglobalandregionaltrendsand thuspre-empt theapplicationofpoliticalconditionalities by international donors led a reluc-tant [Rawlings’ administration] to plan the returnof constitutional rule’.92 A Constitutional AdvisoryCommitteewasappointedandrecommendedadraftconstitution, which was approved by popular refer-endum in April 1992. The presidential elections ofNovember 1992 returned Rawlings as the president,andin1993thenewconstitutionwasratifiedbypar-liament.

Of course, the transition was not as straightforwardas this simple narrative suggests, with one observerlabelling it ‘seriouslyflawed’.93The1992presidentialelectionswere characterizedbyNDC interference inthe electoral process and manipulation of voter reg-istration.94 As a result, the opposition boycotted theparliamentaryelectionsofDecember1992andvoterturnoutwasaround29percent.95Althoughthesitu-ation has improved markedly with each subsequentelection,atthetimeofthe2000electionsthepoliticalsystemwasstillcharacterizedbyahighdegreeofac-rimonybetweenthemainpoliticalplayers.However,theoppositionNPPgrewinstrengthintheeightyearsafter the 1992 elections and when Rawlings steppeddownin2000,attheendofhissecondterm,ashewasconstitutionallymandatedtodo,NPPcandidateJohnKufuorwonthePresidentialelection.

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Thistransitionwasrepeatedin2008whenJohnAttaMillsoftheNDCwonbackcontrolofthegovernmentfromtheNPPafteracloselyfoughtrun-offballot(with50.1percentofthevotesandamarginofonlyaround40,000 votes). It was the second peaceful transitioninGhana’smultipartyhistoryanddemonstratedthatGhana had acquired a genuinely competitive demo-craticsystem,withstrongdemocraticinstitutions(es-peciallytheElectionCommission)andwhereelectionswereabletoeffectachangeingovernment.

However,thesuccessandrelativestabilityofthepo-liticalsysteminGhanahasnotautomaticallyreducedtensions and mistrust between the principal parties,the NDC and the NPP. Their relationship has beenoneof‘persistentpolarisationandmutualloathing’,96to the extent that inprevious transitions the incom-inggovernmenthasthrownouteverysinglepolicyofthepreviousgovernmentwithout review.Unresolvedweaknesses in thepolitical systemhavebeenblamedforthecontinuationofthisdynamic.Oneparticularfocusforobservershasbeenthestrengthoftheexecu-tiveandtheallureofstatecapturethatcomeswithit.97Consequently,someofthepatrimonialpracticesasso-ciatedwiththepre-1992governmenthavecontinuedunabated,whichhas stalledkeygovernment reformssuch as regional devolution and local development.Once gained, governments are unwilling to releasethefinancialandpoliticalbenefitsthatcomewithcen-tralized control. Nonetheless, since the low turnoutin1992,voterparticipationinsubsequentballotshasbeenconsistentlyover70 percent,98andpublic sup-portfordemocracystandsatover79 percent.99

Thus,thepoliticalsituationinGhanaischaracterizedbytwoparticulartrends.First,thatthereturntomul-tipartypoliticshasbeensuccessfulandthepublicper-ceptionofdemocracyisextremelyfavourable.Further-more,agenuinelycompetitivemultipartysystemhasdeveloped inwhichpowerhas twicechangedhands.Themainpoliticalactorsarethereforesigneduptothedemocraticproject, andhave recognized thebenefitsoffurtherprogressandreform.Second,therearestillgapsinthesystemthatneedtobefilled.AcrimoniousrelationsbetweentheNDCandNPPhavebeendetri-mentaltotheoveralldevelopmentofGhana,andhavehamstrungsomemuchneededreforms.

Dialogue platform: Building commitment and consensus

ItisinthiscontextthattheNIMD/IEAprogrammestarted and developed. As is noted above, there was

nosetofpreconceivedobjectivesormodelofdevelop-mentfortheGPPP.Instead,theprogrammeformandcontentgrewentirelyinresponsetoconsultationswithlocalactors,facilitatedbytheIEA.Asthe2004Evalu-ationnotes:‘Theagendaforthedevelopmentofjointactivities is fullytheresponsibilityoftheplatformoftheSecretariesGeneralandtheCaucusofChairmenofthefourparties,supportedbytheirpolicyanalystsandfacilitatedbytheIEAstaff.’100Theseinitialconsul-tationssuggestedthatthewayforwardshouldbebasedaroundcreatingamultipartyplatformforaddressingtheconcernsofthepartiesandagreeingonastrategyfor future reform. This format for the programmereflectsthefactthatdespitetheantagonisticrelation-shipbetweenthemainpoliticalactors,thereisenoughcommitmenttodemocraticpoliticsfortheseactorstorecognizetheimportanceofcontinuedreforminthepublic interest and to increase the chance of havingpolicyinfluence.Themultipartyplatformwasseenasthebestwaytoimprovethe‘mechanismsofcommu-nication’whichareintegraltobuildingmutualconfi-denceamongtheparties,andthentothecreationofeffectiveworkingplans.101Itprovidesasafespacefordialogueinwhichpartiesdonothavetoplaytheactofenemiesbutaretransformedintopoliticalopponents.ThefirstyearoftheGPPP,2003,wasfocusedonthistaskof thedepolarizationandnormalizationof rela-tions, while admitting this would ‘require dedicatedtimeandattention’.The2003JAPshowsthemodest,short-term aims of the programme at that stage, in-cludingtheorganizationofpoliticalpartybroadcasts,thedraftingofacodeofconduct,andtheorganizationof joint symposia.Thiscautiousapproachappears tohavepaidoff,asthe2004JAPdemonstratesamuchbroader set of aims: the creation of a level playingfield;thestrengtheningoftheinstitutionalcapacityofpolitical parties; and enhancing the public image ofpoliticalpartiesinGhana.Inaddition,therewerefirmcommitmentstoestablishregularbi-monthlymeetingsbetweenthepartyrepresentatives,andthecompletionof the codeof conduct.The2004 agreement shouldbeseenasparticularlysuccessfulinthecontextofthegeneralelectionsheldthatyear,withalltheassociatedpoliticaldifficultiesplayinginthebackground.

After the first priority of NIMD/IEA, to bring theparties together,andto ‘institutionalize thedialogueprocess’ as one staff member put it, the programmerecognized that a multiparty dialogue could easilybreak down, or lead merely to more dialogue ratherthan concrete steps. The ongoing strategy has there-forebeentoensurethebuy-inandcommitmentofthepartiesasakeyprocessfortheGPPP.Firstandfore-most,NIMDhasgivencompleteownership to local

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stakeholders.Theprimaryconduitforthisisthelocalpartner,theIEA,whichhandlestheday-to-dayman-agementoftheprogramme.Inaddition,theIEAhasactedasa think-tank,producingreportsandprovid-inginformationforthepartiesandotherstakeholdersontopicsofrelevancetotheprogramme.Beyondthis,the IEAhas engaged the servicesof awide rangeofsources in the research process, from civil society totheparliamentarydirectorateitself.TheIEAhasthere-forebecomeafocalpointforthedisparateinstitutions,organizationsandindividualsinvolvedinthepoliticsofGhana,andisawell-regardedforumaroundwhichtheprogrammerevolves.Allthepartiesregarditasaneutralpartner.TheIEA iskeentopointout that ithas facilitated an open relationship with the parties,which feel they can approach the IEA when neededbothformallyandinformally.

Local ownership also extends to the political par-ties. The staff we interviewed emphasized that theprogrammeworksequallywithallfourofthepartiesrepresented in parliament, despite the overwhelmingdominanceoftheNPPandtheNDC(128seatsand94seats,respectively,inthe2004elections—116and107in2008outof230).Therewasnosingleownerofthe process among the parties and all enjoyed equalinputateverystage.Thestrategiesandrecommenda-tionsmadeduringtheprogrammehavethereforebeenreached by consensus among all the main politicalactors.NIMDhadapresenceatallthemeetings,butatnotimediditdictateorshapethedialogue.

Thesecondelementtoensurebuy-intotheprocesswastodemonstratethecompleteneutralityofthedialogueplatformandtheprogramme.ThismeantthatinthebeginningitwasimportantthattheGPPPshouldbefinancially independent of the domestic political ac-tors,butalsoasinclusiveandequitableaspossibleto-wardstheparties,perhapsespeciallythesmallerones,toguaranteeallvoicesandreservationswereheardandtaken seriously. This also means regular interactionwiththegroupofnon-parliamentarypoliticalpartieswhicharealsoinvitedtotheroundtablemeetingsthattakeplacetwiceperyear.

Third,NIMDalsooffered toworkdirectlywith theparticipating parties in supporting their organiza-tional capacity. When the JAP was signed in 2004,agreementsweremadeonthefundingoftheseactivi-ties.Accordingtotheprogramme,theseactivitiesareworthuptoEUR20,000perannumtotheGhanaianparties,tobeusedforcapacitybuilding,technicalas-sistanceandtraining.Thelocalpartiesareunderstand-ablyverykeentosecurethissupportfortheirorganiza-

tions.Allsupportanddetailedactivitiesaredecidedonthebasisoftheprioritiesidentifiedbythepartyitselfthroughaneedsassessmentprocess(SWOTanalysis).

Therationale,accordingtoNIMD, is that this indi-vidual party support may initially work as a simpleincentive, reflecting the political reality of party in-volvementwhich is invariably a combinationof self-interest and other incentives. Over time, however,thisstrictlyshorttermviewofthebenefitsisreplacedby genuine commitment to the dialogue process.Furthermore, the specific programme approach alsoincludes the use of specialist expertise and lessonsfrom the Dutch political party scene to support thedifferent country programmes on a needs basis. Inaddition, more and more valuable lessons are sharedbetween NIMD country programmes through so-calledpeer-exchanges.Organizationallytherearetwocyclesofmeetingsforthelocalstakeholders.Thefirstisasemi-annualRoundTablemeetingestablishedandattendedbyNIMD,atwhichpartiesandtheIEAre-viewprogress, identifycurrentdeficienciesandagreeactions and activities to focus on in the next year.Thesemonitoringandplanning sessionsarepresidedoverbythedesignatedpartyChairofthePlatform.

Second, the regular dialogue is ‘institutionalized’ inthe monthly meetings at the senior party politicallevel: the Secretaries General joined by their policyanalysts.TheChairmenof thepartiesalsomeetasacaucus to tackle escalated issues. The platform andcaucus are meant to provide regular forums for dis-cussionofpoliticaldevelopmentsandissuesingeneral,andtomonitortheprogressoftherecommendationsarisingfromthesemi-annualRoundTablemeetings.AccordingtoIEAstaff,thiswasthefirstjointplatform‘devoidofpartisanship’inGhana.Inpractice,italsofunctions as a tensionbreaker andpressurevalve forcontested issues. In addition to these meetings, theGPPP established a number of initiatives to involveotheractorsintheprogramme.TheIEAhasbroughttogethercivil societyorganizations ‘tobepartof thedialogueanddebateoncriticalpolicyissuesconfront-ingthecountry’.102Byengagingwithwiderelementsofsociety,andinvolvingthemintheprogramme,theGPPP is attempting to broaden the scope of politi-calinteractionsandinvolvement.Therehasalsobeenanemphasisonensuringthattheprogrammeiswellpublicized,understood and supportedby thepublic.TheIEAhasdisseminateddocumentationandreportsontheworkoftheGPPPnationwidetohelpcitizenssee both the benefits of multiparty politics and theprogressbeingmadebytheGPPP.Furthermore,therehasbeenaconcertedefforttoengagewiththemedia

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through workshops and retreats, which has resultedin a number of articles, television and radio broad-casts,andreportsontheGPPP,andhas‘contributedto [it] being recognized as an effective national pro-gramme’.103Thesuccessoftheseactivitieswasnotedinthe2004Evaluation,whichstatedthat‘theproactivepublic relationspolicyandpracticesof theIEAhavestimulatedtheexcellentcoverageofthejointactivitiesbythemedia’.104Themediaattentionhasalsohadaneffectonthepartiesthemselves,whichhavebeguntoseethebenefitsof‘promotingabetterimageofthem-selvesinthepublicperception’.105

Key outcome: The democracy consolidation strategy paper

Given these concrete developments in the establish-ment of the inter-party dialogue platform and theimprovement in inter-party relations, the partiesfelt that a next step should be made. In meetingswith NIMD in 2005 they proposed that thedisparaterecommendationsthathadcomeoutofthefirst years of the GPPP needed to be consolidatedinto a single strategy. That single strategy was theDemocracy Consolidation Strategy Paper. The factthat itwas theparties themselves thatcameupwiththe idea of the DCSP is an encouraging sign of theprogressmadebytheGPPPinitsfirstyears—theyhadrecognizedtheimportanceofconsensustodemocraticdevelopment.

In2006,theIEAinitiatedtheDCSPprocessbycon-tractingtwoexternalconsultants,onefromZimbabweandonefromGhana,tocarryoutinitialassessmentsoftheGhanaianpoliticalsituation.Thenextstagein-volvedanothergroupofexpertspreparingadocumentthatcouldbeusedincountrywideconsultations.ThiswassubmittedinDecember2006.Thefollowingyearsawawide-rangingconsultationwithstakeholdersatboththenationalandthelocallevels.Thisprocesswasdesigned to comment on the interim DCSP, and to‘solicitnewandfreshproposals’.106

The final document, published in August 2008, isboth an analysis of currentproblems in thepoliticalsituationandasetofpracticalreformsforaddressingtheseproblems.Itcoverstheentirespectrumofpoliti-calinstitutionsandactors,withaparticularemphasison:

• Themacro-politicalenvironment,examiningparticularlytheconstitution,politicalpartiesandtheelectoralsystem;

• Thelegislativeframeworkforgovernance,particularlyhowtomakeparliamentmoreeffective;

• Theagendaforgoodgovernance,coveringsuchtopicsasdecentralization,anti-corrup-tion,humanrights,mediaindependenceandtheroleofchiefs,womenandtheyouthingovernance;

• Judicialindependenceandthejusticesystemsystem;and

• Theroleofcivilsocietyorganizationsinthegovernancesystem.

Thisisawideremit,butitdemonstratesthecommit-mentof thepoliticalparties to addressing thewholespectrum of controversial issues. As is noted in thecontextualanalysis,theissuesofdecentralizationandparliamentary strengthening in relation to the ex-ecutiveareparticularlysensitiveinasysteminwhichpowerhasbeensohighlycentralizedintheexecutive.WhattheDCSPdemonstratesisthatpoliticalpartiesarethelynchpinofthedemocraticsystem.Bygainingtheirsupport,andbuildingconsensusamongthemona strategy fordevelopment, every elementof thepo-liticallandscapecanbeaffected.Totakeoneexample,someof themost troublesome issues thatparliamen-tarysupportprogrammeshavetriedtotackle—effec-tive oversight and accountability, funding of the ac-tivitiesofparliamentarians,andaccesstoinformationresources—haveallbeenaddressedspecificallyintheDCSP,notbyworkingdirectlywith theparliament,butbyworkingwiththepoliticalparties.Thispartisandynamicisoftenthemostsignificantdeterminantofparliamentarians’behaviour.Interestingly,theGPPP,by recognizing the centrality of the parties, has ob-tainedacommitmenttoimprovetheinstitutionalin-dependenceofparliament.Thefirstrecommendationfor theparliament in theDCSPtherefore states thatit‘shouldstrivehardtoestablishanidentitythatwillenableittoactasaneffectivecheckontheExecutive.Tobeabletodothis,[parliamentarians]shouldshedthe extreme partisanship that they bring to bear ondebate...’.107

The impact of the DCSP: Main results

ThereactiontotherecommendationsintheDCSPhasbeenpositive,andhashadanimpactatthemostseniorlevels of the political elite. Although the DCSP wasstarted under the Kufuor Administration, PresidentMills mentioned the programme in his State of theNationaddressandspokeofhiscommitmenttotaking

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its recommendations forward. This cross-party suc-cesswasalsoreflectedinthe2008electioncampaign.AllfouroftheparliamentarypartiesquotedfromtheDCSPintheirmanifestos,withaparticularemphasison constitutional reform. The IEA representative weinterviewedremarkedthatthiswasanunprecedentedshowofconsensusbetweentheparties,anditwaspar-ticularlynoteworthythatitcameatelectiontimewhenantagonismistraditionallyatitsapex.

Sincepublication,39issuesfromtheDCSPhavebeenidentifiedanddiscussed.Itisanencouragingsignthatall four parties have established committees specifi-callytaskedwithexaminingtheseissuesandformulat-ingpartypolicyoneachone.Thesecommitteeshaveengagedevery levelof thepartyhierarchy, includingsignificant consultations with the grassroots. TheseareparticularlyimportantdevelopmentsastheDCSPprocesshasresultedinamoretransparentandinclu-sive policymaking process within parties. Before theGPPP, one interviewee noted that parties were littlemorethanelectoralorganizationswithoutanycoher-entpolicyplatforms,whichmeantthatincominggov-ernmentshadnoagendafortheirterminoffice.TheGPPPhasbeenabletoshapeascenarioinwhichtheparties have recognized the benefits and importanceofarticulatingpoliciesandhavinganinstitutionalizedmethodforformulatingthem.Thisdemonstratestheimpactthateffectivemultipartydialogueprogrammescan have on the internal capabilities of individualparties.

Inaddition,thecommitmenttoconstitutionalchangehasnotbeenconfinedtoelectoralrhetoric.PresidentMillsafterhisinaugurationinitiatedaprocessofcon-stitutionalreformbythesettingupofaConstitutionalReview Commission (CRC) with a remit to reviewthemaingapsandunclearpassagesofthe1992con-stitution and recommend changes. This process willresultinafinalproposalforupdatingthetexttobeputto anational referendum.TheCRCconsists of nineprominent Ghanaians, including the IEA ExecutiveDirector,JeanMensa.Inthisregard,anNIMDrepre-sentativenotedthattheyviewworkingtogetherwiththeCommissionasthekeynextstepfortheNIMD/IEAprogrammeandinworkwithotherpartiestoim-plementtheconstitutionalchangesproposed.NIMDtherefore is inagoodposition for thisnextphaseofthepoliticalreformprocessthroughtheirgoodofficeswithallthemainGhanaianpoliticalactors.

The DCSP notes that ‘at most of the meetings andsymposiaofthepoliticalparties,representativeswereabletoreachconsensusonissuesthathadpreviously

appeared intractableandonwhichdifferent [parties]appearedtohavedivergentorevenirreconcilabledif-ferences.’108

A number of other direct outcomes of the DCSPare identified in the documentation. A Code ofConduct was produced for the 2004 elections, andrevised for 2008, which aims to achieve a ‘cleanerand more sober campaign’.109 A joint communiquéwas signedby all theparties, pledging toworkon acommon pro-youth policy regardless of each party’scurrent policy position, and a draft was made of aPoliticalPartiesAct,positioningpartiesaskeyactorsindemocratization.

OneotherexampleofthesuccessoftheDCSPisthePresidentialTransitionBill.Thishasbeenapointofsomesignificantcontroversyovertheyears,asoneofthekeyproblemsfacingpartiesinGhana‘istheexploi-tationofincumbencybyrulingparties’.110Governingpartieshavebeenunwillingtoaddressthisissue,bothbecauseofthebenefitstheygainwheninoffice,andthepotentialbenefitsfortheopposition.However,inthe wake of the DCSP, President Mills has set up acommittee to look into thepossibilityofpassing theBill,withthestipulationonlythattheDCSPrecom-mendations should serve as the basis for negotiationbecause it has the agreement of all the parties. Themeasures under discussion include state funding ofpolitical parties, and a more flexible framework forpartyfinancingfromcorporateandforeignsponsors.111

Lessons, challenges and priorities ahead

Despite the progress, NIMD has suggested threegroups of challenges which the programme contin-uestoface,andwhichmayhaveawiderrelevanceforpoliticalprogramming.Thefirst is the impactof theelectoral cycle on political reform. For example, theGPPPpartiesdevelopedandproposedadraftPublicFunding of Political Parties Bill, which enjoyed thesupportofthefourpoliticalpartiesandwasendorsedbytheElectoralCommission,butwaswithdrawnbythe president after it had been tabled in parliament.Thekeyissuewastiming—itwastabledjustbeforetheelections and was unpopular with the public. Manyofthekeyactorsfeltwaryofpursuingtheinitiativeatthattimeandinthefaceofpublicopposition.

Second, there is the significance of interpersonal re-lations to political dialogue. For example, a changein party leadership means new party representatives

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aroundthetable.Thisusuallyhasaninfluenceontheinter-partydialogue,astrustandmutualunderstand-ing will often need to be developed afresh betweenparty representatives. As a result, the dynamics canneverbetakenforgrantedandregularmeetingswithall parties are required to validate and ensure theircontinuedcommitmenttotheprocessandprinciples.

Third, there is the challenge of matching a flexibleapproach on long term development- and process-oriented work with the accountability and reportingdemands of the funders of the programme. Politicalprocessesarenotbasedsolelyoninput/outputactivi-ties,buttakealongtimeandafertileenvironmenttoflourish,whichisdifficulttoplanandcaptureintoolssuchaslogicalframeworksanddetailedbudgets.

Goingforward,theNIMD/IEAprogrammeisaimingtobuildonestablishedworking relations tobroadenthe impact of the project, for instance with theNational Development Planning Commission(NDPC),whichisresponsibleforthenationaldevel-opmentplan.Asafirststep,theNDPChasrequestedNIMD/IEAtofacilitatethelinkbetweenthepartiesandtheformulationofthenationaldevelopmentstrat-egybyaskingplanningexpertsfromthepartiestojoinin the process, and committees that previously weremadeuponlyofgovernmentandrulingpartyexperts.Thisisanexcitingnewstepsinceweunderstandthatinthepastthesedevelopmentplanswerepassedunilater-allybyeachnewgovernmentbutsubsequentlythrownoutbythenextadministration.AnNIMDrepresenta-tiveremarkedthatthislinktotheNDPCwasamajoropportunityforthemtolinkthemultipartydialoguestructuretothewiderdevelopmentprocessbecauseitprovidesanopportunitytoaligntheDCSPwiththenationaldevelopmentprogrammeandbudget.Inthisregard, the NIMD/IEA programme ties in with theoverarchingobjectiveofsomanyinternationalorgani-zations—thatdemocracybecomesanessentialpartofthewiderdevelopmentagenda.

Conclusions

TheexperienceofNIMDandtheIEAinGhanasug-geststhat,forthemostpart,partiesareeitherunableorunwillingtoaddresssuchissuesinaneffectiveman-ner,andthatittakesasignificantamountofground-work and political development to arrive at a stagewhereanyconnectionbetweendemocracyandpovertyalleviationisevenviable.TheNIMD/IEAprogrammeconcentratedonpoliticsforitsownsakeandisreap-ing the benefits as a result. Overall, it demonstratesthat small, targeted interventions, initially aimed at

improvingthecapacityofpartiesandmultipartydia-logue,canhaveaprofoundimpactacrossthesystem,simplybyunderstandingwhothekeyplayersareandhowlongdemocraticdevelopmentcantake.

NIMD’s programme design in Ghana is in markedcontrast to the original design of the deepening de-mocracy programmes in Tanzania and Uganda.Rather thanattemptingtotacklearangeofpoliticalinstitutions at once, it used thepolitical parties as asingle conduit throughwhichwiderpolitical changemightbepromoted.Assuch,itsoughttoengagethepartiesthroughamixtureofself-interestandpoliticalprioritiesand,asaresult,encouragedthemtobecomethecatalystsforawiderprocessofpoliticalreform,notleast in terms of parliamentary strengthening. How-ever,incommonwiththedeepeningdemocracypro-grammeinUganda,thebasisoftheprogrammewasanovertlypoliticalone,whichwas reflectedateverystageoftheproject.

Critically,theprogrammewasallowedtoevolvefromitsoriginalpremise—thatthepartiescouldaiddevel-opment across a range of democratic institutions. Itwasthe2004evaluationthatfirstproposedthiscon-nection,albeitingeneralterms,butastheprogrammedeveloped, itgatheredan internalmomentumwhichreached its peak with the parties’ promotion of theDCSP. This, in turn, has resulted in a number ofconcrete changes across the political system. Part ofthesuccessalsolayinacceptingthelongtimescalere-quiredforpoliticalchange,andavoidingpreordaineddeadlinesformeasuringsuccess.Theprojecthasthusbeencharacterizedbyaflexibilityofimplementation,allowing it torespondtopoliticaldynamicsover thecourseofitslife.Inotherwords,althoughtheprojecthada clear senseof its strategicobjectives at itsout-set,theactivitiesandprojectdeliverydidnothavetoconformtoanypredeterminedactivitiesormethods.Instead, they were allowed to emerge as the projectdeepenedanddeveloped.

Theothersignificantcharacteristicworthemphasizingisthebalancetheprojectstruckbetweenlocalowner-shipandexternalpressuretodeliver.Theprogrammesought to provide incentives to the parties for theircontinued participation, but responsibility for devel-opment laywith theparties,whichultimatelydeter-minedthepaceandcontentofpoliticalchange.Inthissense, the role ofNIMDwas less as implementer ofpoliticalreform,andmorethatofaconsultantandfa-cilitator.Thispoint—anditsimplicationsforfundingpoliticalprogrammes—iselaboratedinchapter 4.

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The WFD’s work with the Macedonian Parliament

In October 2008, the WFD began a parliamentarystrengthening programme in Macedonia. Accordingtotheprojectdocumentation,theprogramme‘aimstoenhance the capacity of parliamentary commissions,permanent parliamentary staff and political partiesto enable smoother functioning of the MacedonianParliament’.With the support of theBritishForeignandCommonwealthOfficeand theBritishEmbassyinSkopje,theintentionwastocontinueprojectimple-mentationforthreeyears.

TheWFDoperatesthroughtwoarmsofitsorganiza-tion. The parliamentary strengthening work is man-agedbyWFDstaff,althoughprojectdeliveryisoftencarried out in conjunction with a number of UKpartners.112TheWFDworkswiththegovernmentandoppositionpartiesinamultipartysetting,alongwithlocal academic, civil society and journalistic institu-tionstosupportandenhanceparliamentaryfunction-ing.PoliticalpartysupportisconductedbytheBritishpoliticalpartiesthroughtheWFDonabilateralbasis.Thisworkisaimedatbuildingthecapacityandskillsofsisterparties,andtherelationshipsbetweenpartiesare initially facilitatedby theWFD.TheMacedoniaprogrammelooksathowparliamentarystrengtheningwasapproachedbydirectengagementwiththepoliti-calpartiesinparliament.

Theparliamentaryprogrammeneedstobeunderstoodin thecontextofMacedonia’sdesire formembershipof the EU. The catalyst for the intervention by theWFDinMacedoniawasthepublicationofacriticalreport by the European Commission in 2007, as-sessing the country’s compatibility with EU normsand regulations. Macedonia became an EU candi-date country inDecember2005, and aspartof thisongoing process an Accession Partnership has beenestablished, based on a number of previous agree-ments,includingtheCopenhagenCriteria(1993),theZagreb Declaration (2000) and the ThessalonikiAgenda (2003). All these agreements prioritize andreiteratethedevelopmentofpeacefuldemocraticproc-esses in thecandidatecountry.Consequently,oneofthe‘keypriorities’oftheAccessionPartnershipisthe‘establishment of a constructive political dialogue’.113The annual EU reports that monitor Macedonia’s

progress towards these criteria have indicated that‘insufficientdialogue’hashampered theworkof theparliament.114 In other words, the reports and theAccession Partnership view dialogue between thepoliticalactorsasaprerequisiteforanygenuinedemo-craticdevelopment.ThereisabroadconsensusamongtheMacedonianpartiesontheneedtoworktowardsmembershipof theNorthAtlanticTreatyOrganiza-tionandtheEU,andtheannualreportshaveservedassomethingofa‘wake-upcall’forparliamentarians,accordingtoWFDstaffinthecountry.ThoseinvolvedintheWFDprogrammespokeofa‘flurryofactivity’on publication, when legislators were perhaps morewilling than usual to address the significant issuesremaining inMacedonia.Asaresult, inthewakeofthe2007report,theBritishEmbassyinSkopjeiniti-ated aprogrammewith theWFD, theprimary goalof which was to bring the parties towards achievingthisconstructivedialogue.Achievingsuccessfulmul-tipartydialogue, in thecontextof theEUAccessionPartnership, therefore became the foundation of theMacedoniaprogramme.

In our conversations with WFD staff, there was anoverriding aim of initiating and sustaining dialoguebetweentheparties,andprogressonthisfrontwastobe the first measure of success or failure of the pro-gramme.Thedocumentedobjectives,whichthepro-grammeaimstomeetbyMarch2011,aredividedintothreesections:115

1. ToenhancethecapacityofthePresidentoftheAssembly’sCabinettomanagethebusinessofparliamentmoreeffectivelythrough:

• Increasedskillsofadministrativeandexpertstaff

• Moreeffectivecoordinationandcommunica-tionbetweenthePresidentoftheAssemblyandParliamentaryCoordinators.

2. Todelivermoreeffectivepoliticalpartiesintheirrolesinoppositionandgovernment,resultinginmoreeffectivemanagementofparliamentarybusinessthrough

• MoreeffectivefunctioningofParliamentaryCoordinators

• Greatercross-partyscrutinyoflegislation

• Moreeffectivecross-partycaucuses

• Enhancedcrosspartyrelationshipsinparliament

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• ImprovedunderstandingoftherolesandresponsibilitiesofindividualMPs.

3. Tostrengthentheroleandimpactofparliamen-tarycommissionsthrough

• Moreeffectiveinternalcommissionmanage-mentandfunctioninginregardtouseofproceduresandpractices.

• Increasedskillsofcommissionmembersandexpertstaffinlegislativedraftingandscrutiny.

Two trends emerge from these objectives. First, thesmoothrunningofparliamentarybusinessisaninte-gral part of the programme rationale. Second, com-munication, coordination and dialogue between theactorsintheparliamentareofvitalimportancetothesuccessfulfunctioningoftheinstitution,andtheformandcontentoftheparliamentaryactivitiesnecessarilyinvolveamultipartydimension.Theindicatorsgivenin thedocumentation showhowdialogueunderpinsthesetwotrends:‘2.2ParliamentaryCoordinatorsandMPs have developed skills in mediation, negotiationand understand how to utilize current systems andprocedures inaconstructivemanner topresent theirpositioninParliament’.116

Anothernotableelementoftheprogrammedesignisthe implicit integration of party and parliamentarysupport,withbothspherescuttingacrossthethreesetsofobjectives.Whiletheemphasisisonimprovingtherunningofparliament,theprogrammeacknowledgestheroleplayedbothbytheparliamentaryleadersandthe parties themselves. This is most apparent in theprominent role given to theparliamentary coordina-tors—thetermusedbytheWFDtorefertothepartywhipsof theMacedonianParliament.Thecoordina-torshaveadualroleandthereforeadualimpact.First,theyareimportanttothefunctioningofthePresident’sofficebymakingsurethatparliamentarybusinessrunssmoothly,andarethereforeintegraltotheoverallsuc-cessoftheparliament.ThecoordinatorsarethemainpartycontactforthePresidentoftheParliamentandtheparliamentarystaff,andthereforetaketheleadinanymultipartyforuminparliament.Inotherwords,they have a collective duty to the parliament as aninstitution. Second, they ensure the effectiveness ofthepartiesinparliamentbypromotingcohesionandcoordinationamongcaucusmembers.Thecoordina-torsthereforestandatthenexusofbothparliamentaryandparty functioning, andare thebestplaced indi-viduals toeffectchange inboth. In theMacedoniancontext,whereantagonismbetweenthepartiesisoneof the main reasons for parliamentary dysfunction,

the WFD has identified the most efficient driver ofchangewithinboth institutions.Thedocumentationoutputssignaltheirdualrole.‘Strengthenedcohesive-nessofpoliticalpartiesingovernmentandopposition’is achieved by working ‘through the ParliamentaryCoordinators’, while a better understanding of par-liamentarymechanismsamong the coordinatorswill‘improveandinstitutionalisecross-partycoordinationforthemoreefficientfunctioningofParliament’.117

The Macedonian context

The Macedonian political context is integral to un-derstanding the form and content of the WFD’sprogramme. Since breaking away from Yugoslavia,Macedonianpartypoliticshasbeenshapedbyethnictensions between the Macedonian majority and theAlbanianminority(around25percent).Theproblemsarecentredonissuesofequalconstitutionalstatusforminorities, and the use of the Albanian language inpublic institutions. The war in Kosovo escalated thesituation within Macedonia and in 2001 a conflicteruptedbetweenanAlbanianmilitiaandgovernmentforces.Theviolence lasted formostof that year,buta peace agreement was brokered relatively quicklyby international actors in August 2001. The mainMacedonianandAlbanianpoliticalpartiessignedtheagreement, which granted a high degree of self-gov-ernmenttotheAlbanianareasofthecountry,soughttoincreasetherepresentationofminoritiesinstatein-stitutionsandestablishedadouble-majoritysysteminparliamentforvotingonminorityissues.

However, tensions between the political parties didnot diminish, and low-level violence between partyactivists continued. After the 2006 elections, themain Macedonian party, the Internal MacedonianRevolutionary Organization-Democratic Party forMacedonian National Unity (VMRO-DPMNE),refused to formagoverningcoalitionwith themainAlbanianparties,theDemocraticUnionforIntegration(DUI)andthePartyforDemocraticProsperity(PDP).Instead,thepartywentintogovernmentwithasmallerAlbanianparty, further antagonizing thebiggerpar-ties.Overthenexttwoyears,theDUIandthePDPperiodically boycotted parliament and there was abrawlbetweentheAlbanianfactionsinparliamentinSeptember2007.

The 2008 elections led to allegations of ballot stuff-ing, fraud and intimidation, and the coalition sawanothershiftinalliancesastheDUIjoinedtheVM-RO-DPMNE in coalition. Furthermore, the rulingparty rushed through a number of pieces of legisla-

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tion,includingnewparliamentaryrulesofprocedure,duringanoppositionboycott.Toa largeextent, thiswasdoneinordertopushthroughlegislationtomeetEU accession criteria. Despite the fact that all themajorparties agreeonEUmembership, themannerinwhichtheVMRO-DPMNEpassedthelegislationonly increased antagonism. At the time, committeessufferedfromaseverelackofadministrativeexpertiseand technical support,whichmeant that they couldnotbeusedeffectivelyforoversightandaccountability.When parliamentary procedures are used, however,they are used in a combative way by the oppositiontoprotestat therulingcoalition’sapparentdisregardfor the rules of the parliament. Institutional inertiacombinedwithahighlychargedpoliticalatmospheremeanthattheMacedonianParliamentisparticularlysusceptibletodisruptivetactics.Itisnoteworthythatsince 2001, virtually all the main parties have boy-cottedtheparliamentforseveralmonthsatonetimeoranother.

The two trends that emerged from the objectives—better functioning of parliamentary business andgreater communication—are clearly rooted in themost pressing political problems facing the country.ThoseintheWFDwespoketostressedthattherewasa‘virtualparalysis’oftheparliamentaryinstitutionin2008,andatotalabsenceofanydialoguebetweentheparliamentaryparties.Specifically,alackofconsensusonanewsetofproceduralrulesfortheparliamentwashamperinganymovementforward.

Activities and implementation

Theprogrammebeganwithaneventaimedatbring-ingthekeylocalstakeholderstogethertoagreeawayforward.Tothisend,theBritishEmbassyconvenedaprivatemeetingforseniorparliamentariansatWiltonParkintheUKin2008.Theintentionofthegatheringwas to overcome the initial barriers to dialogue andcoordination that had previously proved intractable.The neutral venue, away from in-country pressures,provedbeneficialinthreeways.First,itallowedsomeof the communication problems to be addressed,whichwasasignificantstep,consideringtheextremelyacrimonious relations between the parties. Second,the meeting demonstrated the commitment of theparliamentarians and their willingness to engage inconstructivedialogue.Finally,theeventbegantoin-stilasenseofinstitutionalownershipamongthepar-ticipants.Thishadbeen identified as a key obstacle.Parliamentariansfeltlittleprideinorengagementwiththeparliamentasaninstitution.Progressonthisfrontproveduseful inmaintainingmomentumduringthe

programmebyappealingtoasharedsenseofprideintheparliamentaryinstitution.

TheWiltonPark event set thepattern for thedirectworkwith theparliamentarycoordinators.This typeof consultative workshop therefore constituted themain kind of activity, with the cross-party elementalsofeaturingprominently.Thisformatwasofpartic-ularimportanceintheMacedoniancontextwheretheprimaryhurdlewassimplycreatingaspaceinwhichpolitical rivals could communicate constructively. ItisimportanttonotethattheWFDdoesnotattemptto‘teach’localstakeholderstheBritishparliamentarysystem through preconceived training programmesandseminars. Instead, theWFD’sprimary role is tofacilitate theworkshops and structure them in a co-herentway,onlyoneelementofwhichwastopresenttheBritishexperience.Theaimofeachworkshopwasfor theparliamentarians themselves to produce a setof recommendations and benchmarks that could actasabasis forfurtherdiscussionsor, ideally,couldbeimplementedintheirparliamentarywork.

Workshopstypicallylastedtwoorthreedaysandcon-sistedoffivedifferentstages:

1. Priortothecommencementoftheworkshopabaselineassessmentwascarriedouttohigh-lightissuesofparticularconcerntoparliamen-tarians.Thiswasthensenttothepartyofficesinorderforthepartiesjointlytodevelopanagendafortheworkshop.

2. ThefirstsessionpresentedanoverviewoftheWestminsterexperienceoftheparticularissue,focusingonthestrengthsandweaknessesofthecurrentsystem.

3. Inthesecondsession,theMacedoniansdiscussedtheirpositionsregardingtheissueandtheirindividualrolesintheparliamentarysystem.

4. Thethirdsessionattemptedtobringtogetherthedifferentopinionsoftheparticipantsandtodiscusspossibleimprovements.

5. Lastly,theclosingsessionaimedatdrawingupalistofpossibleactionpointsandrecommendations.Thesewerenotbinding,butwereusuallytakenforward.

Manyoftheneedsthatwereidentifiedintheassess-mentswerefirstraisedthroughvisitsbyparliamentar-ians to the British Parliament. For example, in June2009aMacedoniandelegationobservedtheworkof

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the committees and the public hearing process. Thesubsequentworkshopsthenfocusedonfiscalscrutinyand budgetary planning. Specifically targeted visitsandmeetingswithUKrepresentativeswereusedasalearningtool.InDecember2008,theSpeakeroftheMacedonianParliament,TrajkoVeljanoski,metwiththeSpeakeroftheHouseofCommonsandthePresid-ingOfficeroftheScottishParliament.Inadditiontoproviding an overview of the workings of these twoinstitutions, thevisithadtwodirectoutcomes.First,MrVeljanoskiintroducedtheideaofaweeklyPrimeMinister’s Questions session in the parliament, theproceduresforwhichwereincorporatedintothetrain-ingcurriculaforMPs.Second,thevisitincreasedtheSpeaker’sawarenessoftheimportanceofparliamenta-ryoversight,whichwasechoedintheextensivemediacoveragegarneredbythetrip.

Although theworkshops covered awide rangeof is-sues,theywerecarefullyplanned.AsWFDstaffpoint-edout, eachactivity contributed to the shapeof thewholeprogramme,workingtowardsthethreesetsofobjectives,while tacitly sustainingpoliticaldialogue.InJanuary2009,theparliamentarycoordinatorsandtheirdeputiesparticipatedinaworkshoponcommit-tee scrutiny and cross-party coordination. PreviousvisitsandthepresentationoftheBritishmodelplayedarole,buttheoutcomeswerefirmlygroundedinthepracticalitiesoftheMacedoniansystem.Forexample,participantsraisedtheissueofbettercoordinationofcommittees,giventhatroomswerefrequentlydoublebooked, and committee work was not well appor-tioned, leaving parliamentarians overburdened. Theresultwasanagreement to initiatediscussiononthecreationofacommitteethatcouldmonitorandcoor-dinatecommitteebusiness.

Cohesionandcontinuityintheprogrammewerealsoachieved through the involvement of the parliamen-tarycoordinatorsatalllevelsoftheprogramme.Theirparticipation extended beyond the activities aimedspecificallyattheirroles.Theywereinvitedtoalltheworkshopsinordertoincreasetheirunderstandingoftheentireparliamentaryprocess.Forexample,thefi-nancialoversightworkshopsweretargetedprimarilyatfinancecommitteemembers,butthecoordinatorsat-tendedandprovidedinputintoeachsession.Further-more, thecoordinatorsplayedan integral role in theplanningandmanagementoftheprogrammethroughtheSteeringCommittee.TheCommitteeconsistedoftheSpeaker, thecoordinators, aWFDrepresentativeandarepresentativeoftheBritishEmbassy.Thepur-poseoftheCommitteewastodiscussthedirectionoftheprogramme, the content of future activities, and

thenext steps required to implement theworkshops’recommendations. As a result, the coordinators en-joyeddirectinputintothedevelopmentoftheparlia-mentaryinstitutionatallstages.

InadditiontotheworkshopssetupbyWFD,aweeklycoordination meeting between the Speaker and thecoordinators became another central feature of theprogramme.ThiswasidentifiedbyWFDstaffasoneofthemostpositiveoutcomes,andcontributedsignifi-cantlytothesmoothrunningoftheotherprogrammecomponents, not to mention the parliament itself.Inter-party meetings involving the coordinators hadbeenarrangedatthestartoftheprojecttoovercomesome of the initial communication issues. However,theyprovedsosuccessful inbuildingtrustandcom-municationthatthecoordinatorsthemselvesrequestedthattheybecontinued.Theweeklymeetingsbecamean important multiparty forum in which a wholerange of relevant issues could be discussed. Accord-ing to the programme documentation, the meetingsallowed the Speaker and the coordinators to agree alegislativeagendaandonmotions fordebate, and tocoordinate important parliamentary projects.118 Themeetingsservedasmorethanaforumfordiscussion,and contributed directly to the functioning of theparliament.However,theydemonstratedthatsuccess-ful administration of parliamentary business is un-derpinned by constructive dialogue between parties.Understandably,thiswasviewedbyallstakeholdersasamajor step forward, given the complete absence ofanymeaningfuldialogueorcoordinationpriortothestartoftheprogramme.

The WFD staff have stressed that the primary suc-cesses of the programme have been the behaviouralchanges.The senseofpride in theparliamentary in-stitutionthatwasinstilledthroughtheworkshopsandmeetingshasbeenaparticularlyinterestingoutcome.Inthesamevein,thecoordinatorsandparliamentar-iansinvolvedhaveanincreasedsenseofownershipofandcontrolover the institutionand itsprocesses. Inaddition, the dialogue between the opposition andgoverningparties,whichwaspreviously lacking,hasbeenoneofthekeybenefitsoftheprogramme.Asaresult of these improvements, the other focus of theprogramme with the coordinators, increased coordi-nationofparliamentarybusiness,hasseensomeposi-tivedevelopments.Forexample,ataworkshopheldinOctober2009,thecoordinatorsandcommitteemem-bers reached a consensus on a number of proposalsand recommendations for improving the budgetaryplanningandoversightprocesses.For themostpart,the proposals consist of expressions of commitment

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to discuss specific issues that have arisen during theworkshop.

However,moving to the stagewhere theseproposalscan be implemented has proved problematic. In ourdiscussionswithWFDstaff,weweretoldthatinrecentmonths,dialoguehasstalledandthattheoppositionpartiesareboycottingtheweeklycoordinationmeet-ings.Therecommendationsofaworkshophadcom-mittedtotheestablishmentofanauditcommissiontooverseethegovernment’sfiscalpolicy.Intherun-uptoelections, thisproved controversial.The rulingpartyviewed the recommendation as antagonistic postur-ing,andadirectchallengetotheirpolicies.Theoppo-sitionfeltthatthereactionoftherulingpartywasanexcusetostallmeaningfuldevelopmentofparliamen-taryprocesses,andreturntounilateralpolicymakingbeyond the control of the opposition. Consequently,communicationsurroundingthese issueshasentirelyceased,andtheworkwiththeparliamentarycoordina-torshashalted.Theseeventsdemonstratehowrapidlyprogress can be eroded by contextual pressures andincentives,despitethefactthatlocalcommitmentandbuy-inhadbeenhigh.


WFD’sworkinMacedoniarevolvesaroundlocalown-ership. Ensuring that local stakeholders are engagedandincludedateverystageoftheprojectwastheover-riding feature of programmedesign.This is particu-larlytrueoftheparliamentarycoordinators,who,duetotheirposition,werenotonlyinvolvedinattendingactivities,butalsoorganicallyintegratedintotheplan-ningandimplementationoftheproject.Therationaleis clearly thatwithgreaterbuy-in comesgreater sus-tainability. In addition, input from local actors intoproject targets means that the most pressing needsare identified by the beneficiaries themselves. Theprogrammewasnotinitiatedextraneously,andcameindirectresponsetospecificin-countrydynamics.Inthisparticularcase,itwasaseriesofcriticalEUreportsthatprovidedtheimpetusforaction.Thisisanimpor-tant elementof theproject, as the local stakeholderswere intuitively aware of the programme’s objectivesbecause they were intimately involved in drawingthemup.Furthermore, itdemonstratedacertainde-greeofcommitmenttoparliamentarydevelopmentastheprogrammereliedonthemomentumofthelocalactorstomaketheworkshopshappen.

ThemeetingatWiltonParkin2008provedcrucialinsettingthetoneforthewholeproject.TheWFDstaffweinterviewedfeltthatthiswasamajorcontributorto

theinitialsuccessesoftheproject.Theeventbecamea ‘touchstone’ for the participants. For example, atoneworkshopthediscussionbecameheated,andoneparliamentarian began to rail against his oppositioncounterparts.Thesituationwascalmedwhenanothersaid:‘Let’snotreturntothedaysbeforeWiltonPark’.Theneutralvenuewasthefirstspaceinwhichparlia-mentarianshadbeenabletocommunicateanddiscussinaconstructivemanner.Theresultsof themeetingwere of such benefit that WFD attempted to use asimilareventasaspringboardforotherprogrammes.However,ithasnotalwaysmetwiththesamesuccess,indicating that abasic level ofwillingness and com-mitment to the aims of the programme is requiredfromthestakeholderspriortocommencement.

The Wilton Park meeting was important for threereasons:first,WFDbuiltinalevelofreciprocitythatallowedthelocalstakeholderstofeelincontroloftheprogramme;second,asaresult,thesestakeholdersbe-gantofeelasenseofinstitutionalprideanddirection;and, third, the meeting established multiparty dia-logueasthemainframeworkfortheprogramme.Theworkshopformatthatresultedfromthiswasdesignedtoallowmaximinputfromthecoordinatorsandpar-liamentarians, and allowed for adegreeof contextu-alization at every stage of the programme. As eachworkshopwasbasedontheneedsandissuesidentifiedby theparticipants, therewas a reduceddanger thattheactivitieswouldbecomeirrelevant.

AnothernoticeablefeatureofthisinclusivemodelwasthattheWFDdocumentationdidnotcontainanypre-conceivedindicatorsoralistofprioroutputs.Althoughtherewasasetofobjectives,theseremainedbroadandwereprimarilyinkeepingwiththeoriginalrequestforassistance,thatis,theyfocusedonimprovingcommu-nicationandthecoordinationofparliamentarybusi-ness.Asthose involvedwiththeprojectpointedout,nostandardsetofbenchmarkswoulddecidewhethertheparliamentwasfunctioning‘correctly’.Instead,theparliamentary coordinators and theparliamentariansthemselvesdecidedon themeasuresofprogress.Thefinalsessionsoftheworkshopsproducedthesemeas-uresintheirdraftrecommendations.Thebenchmarksarethereforeownedandunderstoodbythelocalstake-holders.TheWFDhasbeenafacilitator,moderatingtheworkshops,providingexpertisewhererequiredandensuringthatmomentumwasmaintained.

However,thisroleisnotwithoutitsdifficulties,asthebreakdownincommunicationbetweenthepartieshasdemonstrated.Therecommendationsproducedbytheworkshopsarelargelypledgesformorediscussion.Of

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course, given the previous problems with dialogue,thistypeofcommitmentshouldnotbedismissed.Yet,the fact remains that concrete steps and real institu-tionalchangesremainscant,andearlyin2010,whenestablishing the audit commission became a reality,there was a serious rupture. The fact that the WFDprogrammedidnotovertlyengagewiththesourcesofthesepoliticalsensitivities,notleastthedominanceoftherulingparty,meantthattheycastashadowoverthediscussions.

Thisisnottodetractfromthevalueofthemoreintan-gible,qualitativeoutcomesoftheprogramme.Onthecontrary,addressing issuessuchasa lackofdialogueoradearthofprideinparliamentaryinstitutionsisaprerequisite for any sortofbasic legislative function-ing.Thiscomponentoftheprogrammeisallthemorerelevantbecausethesetypesofissuesarecommoninnascent democracies and need to be addressed. TheWFD iskeen therefore to stressboth thequalitativeand the quantitative aspects of its programming. Itpoints out that too great an emphasis on either willskewthepicture.Whilethemeetingsandworkshopsweretakingplace,however,therewasasensethattheregular communication and increase in institutionalpridewereofsignificantvalue.Despiteitsrecentprob-lems,theWFDmodelhasbeencapableofincorporat-ingtheseimportantelementsintotheprogramme.

TheWFDtooktheviewthattheparliamentarycoor-dinators,withtheirdualroleaspartyorganizersandfacilitatorsoftheparliamentaryprocess,couldbethemostviableandeffectivepointsofentryforinterven-tionstostrengthenparliament.Asseniorpartyfigures,creating an arena fordiscussion andcommunicationbetween the coordinators was viewed as an integralpart of the whole development of Macedonian de-mocracy. They would act as both drivers of changewithin theparliamentandcatalysts forgreatercohe-sion and trustwithin theirparties.This coordinatedapproachispresentintheobjectives,wheretheroleofthecoordinatorsstraddlesboththeaimsfortheofficeofthePresidentandthoseforthepoliticalparties.Inaddition,byfocusingontheinterpersonalrelationsbe-tween individualparliamentariansandbyenhancingdialogue,theWFDattemptedtoaffecttheparliamentby first affecting the behaviour of the parliamentar-ians.Byworkingwiththecoordinators,theintentionwastohaveanimpactonboththeparliamentaryandthepartyinstitutions.

Conclusions

TheWFDprogrammeprovides auseful comparisonwiththeworkofNIMDinGhana.Bothprogrammes

have worked with key political figures to promotedialogue and wider political reform. In the case ofMacedonia, theobjectivesweremore tightly focusedfromtheoutsetandrevolvedentirelyaroundimprov-ingthefunctioningoftheparliamentbut,likeGhana,thiswastobeachievedprincipallythroughprovidinga trusted forum for multiparty dialogue. Both pro-grammes thus depended on the continued commit-ment and involvement of those key actors for theirsuccess.

However,thelimitstothatinvolvement,andtheim-plicationsofitswithdrawal,aremuchmoreevidentinMacedonia.StaffattheWFDhavesuggestedseveralreasonswhythishappened,andtheorganizationap-pears tobe applying these lessons in its approach tootherprogrammes.First,theincentivesforcontinuedinvolvementwerenotasapparentorexplicitasthoseinGhana.Itmaybethatfutureprojectswillestablishcer-tainpreconditionsatthestart.Second,theprogrammehighlights thedelicate balancebetween local owner-ship and external pressure. As in Ghana, the WFDconceivedof itself as a facilitator of the process, butrelyingonthepartiestobedriversofpoliticalchangemakestheprojectvulnerable,andwhenthedialoguebrokedowntheWFDhadfewformsofleverageoverthelocalpartnersandtheprojectstalled.

Third,theprojectneversoughttotackletheimbalanceofpowerbetweenthepoliticalparties.Initsattempttofosterdialogueandensuretheparties’faithintheneu-tral forum,theprogrammewasbasedontreatingallparties equally. However, political reform ultimatelymeanssomeredistributionofpower,evenifthisisonlyintheformofcloserscrutinyoftheexecutivebranchofgovernment.WhenthiswasbroachedinMacedo-nia,thebalanceofincentivesforthedominantpartysuddenly shifted away from continued participation.WhereasinUgandatheredressofpoliticalimbalanceswasatthecoreoftheprogramme,inMacedoniaitwasasubtexttothebroaderdiscussions.

However, these difficulties should not obscure theachievementsoftheproject.Simplygettingthepartiesaroundthesametable,openingthechannelsofcom-municationbetweenthemandbuildingagreatersenseofinstitutionalprideintheparliamentweresignificantchanges.Eventhoughdiscussionshavestalled,theba-sis on which the parties engage with each other haschangedandprovidesthegroundfortheprojecttode-velop.However,suchadevelopmentislikelytorelyonidentifyingnewincentivesforcontinuedparticipationand,inalllikelihood,linkingdialoguemoreexplicitlytokeyissuesofpoliticalreform.

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Conclusions: Continuing challenges for political programming

The four country case studies highlight some of thechallenges facing parliamentary and party supportprogrammes. All of them are informed by a sophis-ticated political analysis, and have sought to engagewith thedynamicsofpolitical reform ineachof thecountries.However,duetoprojectdesign,implemen-tationand,partially,thenatureofpoliticsitself,theymetwithvaryingdegreesofsuccess.

Our interviews with stakeholders suggest that thedeepening democracy programme in Tanzania wasundone by a nervousness about the implications ofencouraging political reform, which affected theway inwhich activitiesweredesigned andwas com-pounded by a complex and ambiguous managementstructure.ItprovidesausefulcontrastwiththesimilarprogrammeinUganda,whichwasbasedonaclearin-tentiontoalterthebalanceofpower.Thatclarityfromtheoutsetmeant stakeholdersunderstood thenatureoftheprogramme(eveniftheydidnotsupportit)andmeant that the political tensions could be addresseddirectly. The work of NIMD is of a different order,butplacedpartyassistance in thebroadercontextoftheparties’roleinGhanaiandemocracy,allowingthepartiesthemselvestoestablishandextendthenatureofthatrole.TheWFDworkedinanalternativedirec-tion,identifyingtheneedtostrengthentheparliamentthrough key political party figures, in this case theparliamentary whips. Both the latter projects took aflexibleapproachtoprogrammingandultimately re-lied on the local partners to determine much of thepace and contentofpoliticaldevelopment.This reli-anceonlocalbuy-inmeanssuchprogrammescanbevulnerable if one or more parties withdraws its sup-port.Itreflectsthecontinuingdifficultyinestablish-ingthetermsonwhichlocalpartnershipisbased,andtheextenttowhichadonoragencyorimplementingorganization can bind local partners into the over-arching ambitions of the project. This goes to theheart of political programming. If the point of suchprogrammes is tosecurepoliticalchange,thishasto

emerge from within—it cannot, ultimately, be im-posedfromtheoutside.

All the case studies highlight the advantages andchallengesofaligningtheobjectivesofpartyandpar-liamentaryassistance.Whereprogrammesareseekingto engage with the drivers of political change, theyhave to take account of the role of political partiesindetermining thequalityofparliamentary activity.Bythesametoken,theroleofpartiesascampaigningorganizationsandvehiclesforrepresentingthepublicinterestis intimatelytiedtowhattheythengoontodoinvariouslegislativeandcongressionalinstitutions.

However, the limitations to integration should bemadeexplicit.Inthefirstplace,itisnotanargumentfor integrating every aspect of party and parliamen-tarywork.Rather,thekeypointisthatdonoragenciesand implementers need to be able to identifywhere there are synergies—which usually existaroundefforts atpolitical reform—and thenbeflex-ible enough to exploit them. Second, focusing onparliaments and parties is only part of the analy-sis. The performance of parties and parliament willlargelydependonthewayinwhichotherpartsofthepoliticalsystemareworking.Thisisnotanargumentfor ignoring them—they should provide part of thebasic analysis. The fact that parties and parliamentsare so closely intertwined means they present anobviousstartingpoint,offeringpotentialgains.How-ever, the rationale behind the deepening democracyprogrammesistheinterdependenceofthegovernancesystemasawhole.Programmeswhichgenuinelyseekto engage with and shape the structures of politicalincentiveswillhaveonlyalimitedimpactiftheyseektoaddressoneinstitutionorareaatatime.Therefore,the principles for the development of political pro-gramming(seebelow)arepremisedontheassumptionof integrating donor assistance to both parties andparliaments.

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Itshouldalsobestressedthatagenciesandinstitutionsworkinginthisfielddifferintheirapproachandinthechallengestheyface.Although,asismentionedabove,theuseofvarious formsofpoliticalanalysis, suchasSida’s ‘power analysis’ orDFID’s ‘driversof change’,haveaddedanewdimensiontodonoragencies’under-standingofgovernanceproblems,theirabilitytodeploytheseinsightsvariesaccordingtoanumberoffactors.Forinstancebilateralsupportprogrammessometimespresentproblems for thedonorcountrywhen its aidagency’sdemocracystrengtheningworkconflictswithitsforeignministry’sdiplomaticobjectives.Theformerisoftenaboutstrengtheningtheopposition,whilethelatter sometimes involves working almost exclusivelywiththeexecutive.Multilateralagencies, suchas theUNDPortheEU,mightbeinabetterpositiontodealwithsuchdifficulties,butareoftenevenmorecautiousaboutpreservingtheirneutralityandlimitedbycom-plicatedmanagementstructures.Intermediarybodiesfunded by donor agencies often have a more overtlypoliticalrole,suchastheNDIortheWFD,andarein-stinctivelymorecomfortableoperatinginthisterrain.Theyalsoseemmoreabletointegratetheparliamenta-ryandpartyaspectsoftheirwork.However,evenhereorganizational structure distinguishes between partyassistance and parliamentary programming. There isundoubtedlyoverlapbetweenthem,especiallywhenitcomestoimplementationofcountryprogrammes,butanumberofstaffacrossarangeofagenciessuggestedthatagapcontinuestoexistbetweenthestrategythatinformsmostinternationalsupporttoparliamentsandparties,andtherealityofhowthatworkisimplement-edontheground.

The country case studies, our interviews with stafffrom the headquarters of donor agencies and inter-nationaldemocracy supportorganizations,aswellasthe local staff, consultants and stakeholders involvedin party and parliamentary support work suggestedtwo broad areas which should inform how such po-liticalprogrammingshouldevolve.Thefirstisaroundproject flexibility, and the second is about matchingpoliticalprogrammestotherealityofpolitics.

Project flexibility

i) Programme designAnumberofpeopleweinterviewedsuggestedthatthefundamental problem with an unsuccessful projectwasfrequentlythewayinwhichithadoriginallybeendesigned.Thefactthatwespoketoanumberof‘sea-sonedexperts’inthefieldmayreflectaparticularbias,but therewas a common sense thatmany suchpro-

grammesweresimplydesignedbadly,drivenmorebyadesiretocarryoutparticularactivitiesthanachievecertain outcomes. In both parliamentary and partysupport,programmeshadbeendesignedbyagencyorembassystaffafterdiscussionswithlocalstakeholders,but often ended up addressing the symptoms ratherthanthecausesoftheproblem

Forexample,parliamentarystrengtheningprojectsstilltrytotrainparliamentariansin‘oversight’or‘legisla-tivescrutiny’ratherthanaddressingwhytheseissuesaregivensuchalowprioritybyparliamentariansinthefirstplace.Similarly,partyassistanceprojectsencour-age models of good party organization, ideologicalcoherenceandmassmembership,butfailtoconvincethepartypartnersthatsuchthingsmatter,orhowtheymighthelpthem.Manystilltreattheproblemsofpar-tiesandparliamentsinisolation,ratherthanidentify-ingthecommonrootcausesofboth.

These tendencies again seem to reflect the gap be-tweenthepoliticalanalysiswhichisnowcommonatthestrategic level,andtheway inwhichprojectsaredesignedlocally.Thissituationisundoubtedlychang-ing,aspoliticalanalysisisdeployedmorewidely,butitremainsalegitimateconcernformanyworkingonsuchprojects.

ii) Implementation and delivery

A linked issue is related to the way in which theoriginalplanningdocumentswerethenimplemented.Acommentmadebyone intervieweeresonatedwitheveryotherpersonwespoketo:thatthebestprojectswere those that diverged significantly from theoriginalprogrammeplans.Thishighlightstwocontin-uingissuesforthewayinwhichpoliticalprogrammesareimplemented.First,evenwhereaprojectisbasedonahighlysophisticatedpoliticalanalysis,itassumesthat, first, an initial scoping exercise can capture allthe political dynamics affecting parties and parlia-ments and, second, that politics will remain staticover the course of a two-, three- or even five-yearprogramme.Thechancesofcapturingall the impor-tant factors in the first analysis are small but, moreimportantly,aprogrammedocumentneedstobeableto respond to the context in which the programmeis operating. Political programming should be seenas an iterative process, which is constantly evolvingandadaptingtochangingpoliticaldynamics.Yet,toooftenprogrammedocumentsareregardedasrigidin-structions,towhichthewholeoftheprogrammemustthenconform.

52

Second, as one senior figure from an implementingorganization told us, ‘we understand how politicsworksinourowncountries,butthenweseemtowanttoemployatotallydifferentsetofmethodsindevel-opingdemocracies’.Politicalcampaignsarebasedonbroadstrategieswithtacticsoftenchangingfromdaytoday,allowingpoliticiansandstafferstorespondtoopportunities as they arise. In thefieldofparty andparliamentary assistance, this is dismissed as being‘too ad hoc’, and programme documents concernthemselveswithnotjustthestrategy,butthedailytac-ticsovertheproject’slifespan.

The result of both factors is to undermine projecteffectiveness. If the originally envisaged projectactivities are not progressing towards the desiredoutcomes, they need to be changed. Instead, whatfrequently occurs is that the activities remain thesame, but the project ambitions are scaled-down oraltered.

iii) Measuring political impactAscanbeseenfromthecasestudies,flexibilityofim-plementation characterized the projects that workedwell. However, the case studies also highlighted thedifficultyinfindingindicatorswhichcapturepoliticalchange.Asone intervieweeworking inUganda sug-gested, political change rarely occurs in significantshiftsofbehaviouroraperceptiblechangeinthepo-liticalculture,butinsteadistheresultofawholehostof small, incrementalmovementswhich then informthe way in which political parties engage with eachotherorthetoneofdebateinparliament.Itmaybe,astheconclusiontotheUgandacasestudynotes,thatpoliticalchangeisoftenbettersensedthanmeasured.

However, this does not resolve the problem forprojects. As we pointed out in a previous report forInternational IDEA,119 flexibility cannot be used asasubstitute forstrategy.Ifprogrammesarebasedontheirabilitytorespondtolocaldevelopments,itisthendifficult to identify whether a project has succeededor failed.This alsohighlights the tension that existsineveryorganizationbetweentheheadoffice,whichwants to ensure consistencyandquality, aswell as asense of progress in line with strategy, and the fieldoffices, which understandably know more about thelocal political environment and want the latitude torespondtoit.

Most of the donor agencies are wrestling with thisproblem,withUSAIDperhapsmakingthemostcom-prehensiveattempttocapturepoliticalchangethrough

theworkoftheUniversityofPittsburgh.120However,all such exercises are generally regarded as ‘works inprogress’with fewsettledconclusions.Thechallengeforprogrammesisnottoresortsimplytoquantitativeresults,astheseareoftenmisleadingand,asispointedoutabove,ifyouusethewrongindicatorsyouendupdoingthewrongthings.Theprojectsthatseemmosteffectivearetheonesthathaveaflexibleapproachtomeasurement,andwhilethismaynot,forthetimebe-ing,providehardfacts,itseemsworthpreservingthisflexibility.

Political realism

i) Supporting the process of political changeAt the heart of the problem of project design setout above is the fact that political change is oftenmessy, haphazard and unpredictable. It does notoccurinalinearfashion.Yetthepresumptionunder-lyingmostprogrammes is that isolated interventions(training, capacity building, seminars, etc.) with in-dividual institutions may have an effect on capacityor behaviour. What characterizes these programmesis that there is little theory of how political changehappens, and no strategy for managing that processof change. Contrast this with the business world,where there is an entire sub-industry built around‘change management’. Yet most businesses have abroadly hierarchical structure that looks relativelystraightforward compared with the complexities andcompetingintereststhatexistwithinaparliamentorapoliticalparty.

Politicalprogrammingisstill,toalargeextent,basedona‘hitandhope’strategy.Thereis,atbest,atenu-ouslinkbetweensomeofthetechniquesusedandthehoped-foroutcomes,andlittleevidenceofstrategyformanagingtheseactivitiestowardsparticularoutcomes.Thereareeffortstoapplypoliticalanalysistostrategiesforchangeinparliamentsandparties,121buttheshiftwillinvolvenotjusttheapplicationofpoliticalinsightsbutalsoachangeinthewaythatprojectsareconceivedandtherolethatdonoragenciesplayinthatprocessofchange—apointpickedupinthesectionsbelow.Thekey, however, is to have political programmes basednot just on an integrated analysis, but an integratedstrategytoachievechangewhichtakesaccountoftheimpactofpartiesonparliaments(andviceversa)butalsothewayinwhichparliamentsandpartiesrelatetotherestofthepoliticalsystem.

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ii) The challenge of local ownershipPoliticalchangerestsontheparliamentandpoliticalparty recognizing the benefits of adopting new pat-ternsofbehaviourandembeddingthemintheinsti-tutions,perhapsthroughrulechangesorinstitutionalreforms, so that they eventually become part of theaccepted political culture. When conceived in theseterms, the ability of donor agencies or implement-ers to impose such change is obviously constrained.Ultimately,theycanencourage,adviseandcajolepoli-ticiansintodifferentformsofbehaviour,butthesehaveto be implemented by the local partners themselves.Programmesthusprovidetheconditionsconducivetochangeandplaytotheincentivesofthosepartners—inotherwords,theyleadthehorsetothewaterbutthehorsehastodecideitwantstodrink.

Thisreinforcestheextenttowhichpoliticalprojectsaredependentonthegoodwillandbuy-inoflocalstake-holders. As the WFD case study shows, this makesprogrammesvulnerableif,ashappened,thepoliticianssuddenlydecide theydonotwant to continue tobeinvolved. This will often occur when local partnersfeel theproject is starting toworkagainst theirownpoliticalinterests,andperhapstofavourtheinterestsofothersinstead.

A number of programmes are using a better under-standingof incentives toplace conditionson the in-volvementofpartners.Twotacticsseemtobeemerg-ing.First,thebenefitstothelocalpartnersneedtobesequenced, so that they are only delivered once par-ticularmilestonesorindicatorsofprogresshavebeenmet. Second, programmes need to be built arounda package of reforms rather than single issues. Thismeansthattrade-offscanbebuiltintothatpackage,sothatpartnershavetoacceptthethingstheydonotlikeinordertogetthethingstheydo.Underpinningbothistheintentionofmakinglocalpartnersultimatelyre-sponsiblefortheproject’ssuccess,withoutwhichtheydonotreceivethebenefitsestablishedattheoutsetoftheprogramme.

iii) Assessing the scope for meaningful changeGiventheemphasisplacedontheinterdependenceofthe constituent parts of the political system in mostpoliticalanalyses,itistemptingfordonoragenciestodesign wide-ranging projects which affect every as-pect of the polity: in short, to attempt to try to fixeverything.Ouranalysis and interviews suggest thatsuchprogrammesinvariablyfallfarshortoftheirlofty

ambitions.AstheexamplesofUgandaandTanzaniashow,suchprojectsbringwiththemspecificchallengesofintegrationandmanagement.

However,theUgandaprojectisnotablebecauseofthewayitsetitsobjectivesinrelationtoparliamentsandparties.Although theproject hadquite broadobjec-tives in improvingoversight and tackling the imbal-anceofpower,themethodsusedtoachievethisweretightlyfocused.Theemphasisonresearchsupportinparliament,forexample,doesnotappeartobeahuge-lysignificantactivity.However,thiswasbasedonanunderstandingofsomeoftherootcausesofoppositionweakness,aswellastheincentivesatwork.Theinten-tion to improve scrutinywasnot achievedby tellingparliamentarianshowtodoit,butbygivingthemtheresources. It reflected a recognition of their interestsandfindingwaysofaligningthatrecognitionwiththewidersystemicproblem.

Thissortofexamplemayofferwiderlessonsforpartyandparliamentaryassistance,anditappearstobeanimplicittenetofsuchworkformostofthosewhoworkin thefield,best summedby a consultant in Iraq as‘thinkbig,actsmall’.Inotherwords,identifytargetsthatyoucanhaveanimpacton,butwhicharelikelytohaveamuchwiderrippleeffectontheinstitutionandthepoliticalculture.

Conclusion: Rethinking the approach to party and parliamentary support

As is suggested above, greater effectiveness and inte-gration in party and parliamentary support dependson donors changing their role. This means alteringthewayinwhichprojectsaredelivered,withabettertranslationofpoliticalanalysisintoprojectdesignandgreaterflexibilityinthewayprojectsareimplemented.However, the prospects for this sort of change lookparticularlybleak.

In the first place, the logic of programmes seekingpolitical change must reflect the fact that this is aninternally driven process. In such circumstances,the role of the donor agency or institute becomesless about ‘implementation’ than aboutbeing a con-sultant or facilitator to the process of change, pro-viding advice and guidance. Some of the institutesworking in the field are playing this role effectively,shaping the process of reform but recognizing thelimits of their own ability to ‘implement’ change.This role has two distinct implications for donoragencies. First, as one senior governance adviser

54

fromadonoragency toldus, it challenges the tradi-tional conception of the agency, which was alwaysthereas the ‘expert’.Donoragencies rightlydrawonthe expertise of staff across a range of policy issues,suchasagricultureorwater,whosejobistodevelop,designandimplementprogrammesinothercountries.This model is likely to work less well in the field ofgovernance. Donor agencies need governance ex-perts,butthatexpertiseneedstobeusedindifferentways, perhaps reflecting a shift from hands-on im-plementationtoarms-lengthadviceandconsultancy.However,thestructuresanddeliverymechanismsfordonor agencies are based on the conception of im-plementationandareunlikely to change in thenearfuture.

Second, it also challenges the way such projects arefunded by donor agencies. In this respect the aideffectiveness agenda appears to be pulling in twodifferent directions. On the one hand, there isthe emphasis on local ownership and mutual ac-countability. On the other, there is the desire forresults. This latter emphasis is generally being inter-preted by donor agencies as the need for a ‘returnon investment’ with tangible signs of change. As isdiscussed above, this is particularly difficult in thefield of party and parliamentary assistance, and isdistorting the way in which such projects are beingdelivered. For example, one interviewee working onan international institute’sparliamentary strengthen-ingprogrammesuggestedthattherewasadistinctgapbetween their funding applications and what hap-pened on the ground. Whereas 80 per cent of theirprojectplanwouldinvolve‘box-ticking’activitiesthatthedonorneededtosee,inpracticetheywouldonlyspend60percentoftheirtimeonsuchwork.There-maining40percentwouldbe spentonmore intan-giblepoliticalactivitieswhichwere likelytogeneratemeaningfulpoliticalprogress.

This has been described, as is mentioned above, byThomasCarothers as a ‘projectization’of suchwork,whichplacesgreateremphasisonfittingworkintothestructureofbureaucraticformsrequiredbydonors.122Asanotherseniorfigurefromadonoragency,withex-perienceinthefieldandatheadquarters,stated: ‘ourgovernmentisnowmoreinterestedindoingthingstheright way, than in doing the right things’. She wentontosuggestthatbecauseoftheemphasisonresults,projectswerebecomingincreasinglyrisk-averse,astheytended to fund projects that had previously worked,reducingexperimentationandlimitingtheopportuni-tiesforeffectiveness.Inthefieldofparliamentaryand

party support, as in the financial markets, past per-formanceisnoguaranteeoffuturesuccess.

Agreaterrealismaboutthelimitsofdonors’abilitytoeffectpoliticalchangeisatoddswiththecurrentinter-pretationofaideffectiveness.Theemphasison‘results’runstheriskofreducingtheeffectivenessofsuchpo-liticalprogrammes,asthedesireforquantitativedatameansthatprojectsendupwiththewrongindicators,whichinturnmeansthattheyendupdoingthewrongthings.Inshort‘success’willbejudgedmorebyproc-essratherthanbyoutcome.

Amoreeffectiveapproachtopartiesandparliamentsrequiresflexibilityinthedesignandimplementationofprogrammes,sothattheyevolveandadapttochang-ingpoliticalcircumstances.Itmeansthatprojectim-plementers need to be astute enough to identify thesynergies between party and parliamentary support,andableintegratethemaroundthedesireforspecificpoliticaloutcomes.Aflexibleandgenuinelyoutcome-orientedformofprogrammingwouldmeanthatdo-norstakegreaterresponsibilityfortheresultsoftheirinterventions,butultimatelyexerciselesscontroloverthe way they are implemented. At present, however,suchdevelopmentsseemhighlyunlikely.

55

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Notes

1 Huntington(1993).2 Forexample,theEuropeanCommissionbudgetforelectoral

assistancein1992–2007wasEUR 612,073,304,http://www.ec-undp-electoralassistance.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=15&Itemid=30.

3 Forexample,in2005,parliamentarysupportcomprisedonly2percentoftheoverallUNDPbudget.UNDP(2009b),p. 4.

4 Carothers(2006,1999).5 Sida(2005),p.5.6 DFID(2009a),p.4.7 DFID(2009b),p.73.8 DanishMinistryofForeignAffairs(2009),p.22.9 UNDP(2009b).10 Carothers(1999),p.181.11 HubliandSchmidt(2005).12 Doherty(2001),p.26.13 SeeNIMD(2004);WFD(2009c);UNDP(2006);

InternationalIDEA(2007);Lipset(2000);ReillyandNorland(2008).

14 SeeCarothers(2006).15 Carothers(2004),p.10.16 Ohmanetal.(2004),p.8.17 SeeErdman(2005).18 Hudson(2007);HubliandSchmidt(2005);Murphy

andAlhada(2007).19 See,forexample,Gonzalez(2009);NDI(2004);NDI(2005).20 All-PartyParliamentaryGrouponAfrica(2008),p.44.21 Carothers(2004),p.13.22 Availableathttp://www.danidadevforum.um.dk/en/menu/

Topics/Publications.htm.23 HooveandSholtbach(2008),p.20.24 Sida(2002),p.38.25 DFID(2007);DFID(2006).26 UNDP(2009b),p.3.27 UNDP(n.n.),p.1.28 Berg,RottenbergandO’Gorman(2009),p.6.

29 Inter-ParliamentaryUnion(2006);CommonwealthParliamentaryAssociation(2006).

30 http://www.parlcent.ca/indicators/index_e.php.31 VonTrapp(2010),p.23.32 NationalDemocraticInstitute(2008),p.iii.33 Ibid.34 NIMD(2004),p.8.35 UNDP(2009b)p.16.36 DFID(2009a),p.18.37 UNDP(2009b),p.18.38 Domingo(2010),p.18.39 HudsonandWren(2007),p.30.40 Ibid.,p.21.41 ForexampleseeInternationalIDEA(2007).42 Burnell(2004),p.464.43 HubliandSchmidt(2005),p.5.44 DFID(2007),p.20.45 TostensenandAmundsen(2010),p.26.46 Carothers(2010),p.16.47 TostensenandAmundsen(2010),p.26.48 SADEV(2010),p.viii.49 Forestietal.(2010),p.13.50 UNDPandGovernmentofTanzania(2007),p.2.51 UNDP(2009a),p.6.52 Goran(1999),p.143.53 Ibid.,p.144.54 Ibid.55 UNDPandGovernmentofTanzania(2007),p.1.56 Cooketal.(2010).57 UNDPandGovernmentofTanzania(2007),p.9.58 Ibid.59 Cooketal.(2010),p.35.60 UNDP(2009a),p.26.61 Cooketal.(2010),p.35.

60

62 UNDPandGovernmentofTanzania(2007),p.9.63 ElectoralInstitutefortheSustainabilityofDemocracyin

Africa(EISA)athttp://www.eisa.org.za/WEP/tan1995results2.htm.

64 Cooketal.(2010),p.53.65 Cooketal.(2010),p.55.66 Ibid.67 Ibid.,p.56.68 Ibid.,p.38.69 Ibid.,p.57.70 Ibid.,p.57.71 SixmembersofthePDGarefundingtheDDP:Ireland;

Denmark;Sweden;theUK;Norway;andtheNetherlands.72 Thecontentofthispaperwasfinalisedbeforethe2011

electionsinUganda.Therefore,newdevelopmentsinUganda’spoliticalcontextmighthavesincealsoimpactedontheDeepeningDemocracyProgramme.

73 DDPProgrammeManagementUnit(2008),p.3.74 Ibid.75 EUElectionObserversMissionReport(2006),p.1.76 DDPBriefingPaper,13October2009,p.1.77 DDPProgrammeManagementUnitandPDCO(2008),p.7.78 Ibid.,p.3.79 Ibid.,pp.9–10.80 Ibid.,p.9.81 Ibid.,p7.82 Ibid.,p.7.83 ArfobarometerRound3Survey,May2005,quotedinibid,

p.7.84 Ibid.,p.8.85 Theseare:theNewPatrioticParty(NPP);theNational

DemocraticCongress(NDC);thePeople’sNationalConvention(PNC);andtheConventionPeople’sParty(CPP).

86 DijkstraandKumado(2004),p.8.87 Ibid.88 Ibid.89 Ibid.90 Ibid.91 Ibid.92 Boadi-Gyimah(1994),p.78.93 Ibid.94 Ibid.95 Ibid.96 Ibid.,p.146.97 Ibid.,p.147.98 Boadi-Gyimah(2009),p.138.99 Afrobarometer(2008).

100DijkstraandKumado(2004),p.17.101Ibid.,p.10.102IEA(August2008),p.11.103Ibid.104DijkstraandKumado(2004),p.18.105Ibid.106Ibid.,p.12.107Ibid.,p.86.108IEA(2008),p.10.109Ibid.,p.9.110Ibid.,p.30.111Ibid.,p.79.112TheseincludetheHouseofCommonsOverseasOffice,the

NationalAuditOffice,theCommonwealthParliamentaryAssociation,theUniversityofEssexandtheElectoralCommission.

113AccessionPartnershipwiththeFormerYugoslavRepublicofMacedonia,availableathttp://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/enlargement/ongoing_enlargement/r18013_en.htm.

114EuropeanCommission(2008),p. 8.115WFD(2009d).116QuarterlyProjectProgressReportJuly–September2009p12.117QuarterlyProjectProgressReportOctober–December2008

pp.7–9.118Ibid.,p.6.119 GlobalPartnersandAssociates(July2009).120Finkeletal.(2006).121 See,forexample,Power(2010).122Carothers(2010),p.16.

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International IDEA at a glance

What is International IDEA?

TheInternationalInstituteforDemocracyandElectoralAssistance(InternationalIDEA)isanintergovernmentalorganizationthatsupportssustainabledemocracyworldwide.InternationalIDEA’smissionistosupportsustainabledemocraticchangebyprovidingcomparativeknowledge,andassistingindemocraticreform,andinfluencingpoliciesandpolitics.

What does International IDEA do?

Inthefieldofelections,constitutionbuilding,politicalparties,genderindemocracyandwomen’spoliticalempowerment,democracyself-assessments,anddemocracyanddevelopment,IDEAundertakesitsworkthroughthreeactivityareas:

• providingcomparativeknowledgederivedfrompracticalexperienceondemocracy-buildingprocessesfromdiversecontextsaroundtheworld;

• assistingpoliticalactorsinreformingdemocraticinstitutionsandprocesses,andengaginginpoliticalprocesseswheninvitedtodoso;and

• influencingdemocracy-buildingpoliciesthroughtheprovisionofourcomparativeknowledgeresourcesandassistancetopoliticalactors.

Where does International IDEA work?

InternationalIDEAworksworldwide.BasedinStockholm,Sweden,ithasofficesinAfrica,AsiaandthePacific,LatinAmerica,andWestAsiaandNorthAfrica.

international idea

SE -103 34 StockholmSwedenPhone + 46 8 698 37 00Fax + 46 8 20 24 22E-mail: [email protected]: http://www.idea.int