the demographic consequences of immigration to the uk david coleman, university of oxford...
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The Demographic Consequences of Immigration to the UK
David Coleman, University of [email protected]
http://www.apsoc.ox.ac.uk/oxpop
Major topics
• Recent immigration situation and trend.
• Effects upon total and working age population size and household numbers.
• Effects upon population age-structure
• Immigration as demographic salvation?
• Effects upon population composition.
Current UK migration situation• Some (two-way) migration normal in advanced societies.• Work - related migration for highly skilled since 1920, not
controversial until recent expansion. • Net inflow 2002 153,000; foreign +245k, UK -91k. Net
inflow since late 1990s historically high.. • Most net immigration not work related.• New policy: easier entry for labour and non-labour
migration, expansion of low-skill work entry.• Two revisions of ONS migration estimates since 2001
census complicate the story.• Not to mention three revisions of GAD population
projections since 2001 census.
Net Immigration to UK 1963 – 2003
(1000s). spliced series. Source: data from ONS.
y = 0.0008x4 - 0.062x3 + 1.6889x2 - 12.798x - 45.162
R2 = 0.8139
y = 5.8376x - 107.74
R2 = 0.7633
-100
-50
0
50
100
150
200
1963
1965
1967
1969
1971
1973
1975
1977
1979
1981
1983
1985
1987
1989
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
Net migration spliced series Poly. (Net migration spliced series) Linear trendline
Net Immigration to UK (2 definitions) 1981-2002 (thousands)
-100
-50
0
50
100
150
200
25019
81
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
thou
san
ds
Net balance corrected 2001 census-based (re-revised)
Net migration to UK by citizenship
Net migration by citizenship, UK 1984-2002 (thousands). Source ONS.
-100
-50
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
British
non-British
Work permit migration from outside EU (gross inflow)
(some labour migration categories not included)
Work permits holders and dependants admitted, UK 1973-2003. Source: Home Office
0
20000
40000
60000
80000
100000
120000
140000
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
≥12 months <12 months dependants total
Net migration for purposes of work, UK
1991-2002 (thousands). Source: International Passenger Survey data from ONS
-40
-20
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
Inflow Outflow Balance
Spouse migration to the UK 1973 - 2001 (gross inflow).
Spouse migration by sex and NC origin, UK 1973-2003. Source: Home Office acceptances for settlement.
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
35000
40000
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
All husbands All wives NC wives NC husbands
Current unions outside own group, Great Britain 1991-96, 1997-02 (percent).
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
Black-Caribbean
Black-African Indian Pakistani Bangladeshi Chinese
perc
ent
Women 1991-1996 Women 1997-2002 Men 1991-1996 Men 1997-2002
Growth of male South Asian ethnic minority populations of marriageable age, and entry-clearance
applications for wives/fiancees 1981-2001.Trends in age-group size and spouse entry applications from Indian sub-
Continent, Great Britain 1981-2001. Source: LFS, Census, Home Office.
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
1981 1986 1991 1996 2001
Wives/fiancees entry clearance applications, ISC South Asian Males 15-24 / 10
Asylum claims in UK, including dependants
1983-2003 (thousands). Source of data: Home Office.
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
Migration drives population growth. United Kingdom, 2002-2031.
Thousands. Source: GAD 2004. 2002-based projections.High migration
variantPrincipal projection
Low migration
variant
Total population increase 2002 - 2031 (thousands) 7,822 5,606 3,389
Assumed net migration 5,500 3,790 2,080
Natural change with no migration 966 966 966Additional natural change from
net migration 2,139 1,633 1,126Other changes (UDC) -783 -783 -783
Migration effect (%) 97.7 96.7 94.6Migration effect without UDC 88.8 84.9 76.8
Resulting from:
UK population - no decline imminentUK population projections 2002-2071, 2002-based (millions). source: GAD
50
55
60
65
70
75
2002
2006
2011
2016
2021
2026
2031
2036
2041
2046
2051
2056
2061
2066
2071
2002 Principal projection
2002 'High' migration(163k)2002 Natural change
2003 Principal projection
Population projections, Sweden, 2004 - 2050,
(millions); standard and zero-migration. Source: Statistics Sweden
Population projections, Sweden 2004-2050, standard and zero migration. Source: Statistics Sweden.
8.0
8.5
9.0
9.5
10.0
10.5
11.0
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
2016
2018
2020
2022
2024
2026
2028
2030
2032
2034
2036
2038
2040
2042
2044
2046
2048
2050
Zero-migration projection (millions)
Standard projection (millions)
Projected effect of immigration on US population growth 1999 - 2100 .
Source: US Bureau of the Census.
US Population Projections 1999 - 2100. Middle Series and Zero Migration (millions)
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
550
600
1999
2003
2007
2011
2015
2019
2023
2027
2031
2035
2039
2043
2047
2051
2055
2059
2063
2067
2071
2075
2079
2083
2087
2091
2095
2099
Middle
Zero migration
Projection of UK population aged 15-64UK population aged 15-64, 2002/6-2051. Source: GAD 2002, 2003 Principal projections
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
2002
2006
2011
2016
2021
2026
2031
2036
2041
2046
2051
UK population 15-64 2002 PP UK population 15-64, 2003-based
UK population 15-64, 2002-based natural change
Entry to working age populationPopulation aged 20-24, selected European countries 2000 -
2050 (2000 = 100). Source: United Nations, GAD.
35404550556065707580859095
100105110115120
2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Norway France GermanyItaly Spain UK (UN)UK (GAD 2002 PP)
Effects of different migration assumptions on household formation, 1996 - 2021.
Assumes each extra 40k immigration yields 450k households by 2021.
A B C D E F0 -731 3069 0 0 -19 Zero migration
65 0 3800 731 24 0 1996 projected level103 428 4228 1159 38 11 2002 projected level154 1001 4801 1733 56 26 2001 actual level
A Net immigration assumptionB Additional dwellings by 2021C Total projected dwellingsD Projected dwellings due to immigration above zero levelE % projected dwellings due to immigration above zero levelF % projected dwellings due to immigration over 1996 assumption
The case for more immigration - positive and negative, theoretical
and empirical• Demographic benefits - workforce, ageing.• Essential for economic growth.• Entrepreneurial benefits.• Fiscal benefits.• Fill skills shortages, keeps NHS going, IT needs.• Perform ‘dirty jobs’.• ‘London / UK would collapse without them’.• Cultural, social benefits of ‘diversity’.• All with no damage to ‘native’ interests.
Three related demographic problems behind argument for
more immigrants.• End of growth of population, possible
decline• End of growth and possible decline in
labour force and of young labour force entrants; failure of economic growth.
• Population ageing leads to crises in pensions and old-age care.
Immigration can solve all that:
• Immigration cannot be stopped anyway.
• Will sustain or expand population size.
• Rejuvenated and expand workforce.
• Rectify ageing population while saving natives from trouble of reproduction.
• Everyone gets what they want and lives happily ever after.
Immigration as demographic salvation?
• Do we need to be saved? Why should ‘no decline’ targets be met (UN 2000)? Is zero growth or decline axiomatically undesirable?
• UK has relatively benign workforce, population projections.• Immigration can keep population, or workforce size,
approximately constant.• But that can require very large inflows; and adjustment difficult.• Immigration can only 'solve' population ageing with large and
infinitely increasing population increases.• Given sub-replacement fertility, migration to maintain constant
size must eventually replace original population with immigrant population. Does a society ‘save’ itself that way?
Annual net migration 'required' to preserve 1998 population and workforce, UK 1998 - 2100
-150
-100
-50
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
19
98
-00
20
00
-4
20
05
-9
20
10
-14
20
15
-9
20
20
-4
20
25
-9
20
30
-9
20
40
-9
20
50
-9
20
60
-9
20
70
-9
20
80
-9
20
90
-9
an
nu
al n
et
mig
rati
on
(1
00
0s)
15-64 as in 1998 1998 pop
Population ageing: an unavoidable destiny
• Population ageing here to stay – an irrevocable feature of mature society.
• Birth and death rates for a younger population gone for good.
• With constant vital rates, population age-structure will eventually stabilize.
• Longer life means even older populations, but changes meaning of ‘old age’.
Potential Support Ratio, UK 1980-2100 GAD PP 1998-based. Population Trends 103
Figure 7 Ratio of persons aged 15-64 to those aged 65 and over, United Kingdom, 1980-2100
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
1980 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100
Year
Rat
io
HF - HM
PP
HF - PMHF - LMPF - HM
LF - HMPF - LM
LF - PMLF - LM
See Box 4 for key
Projected
No limits to migration? Immigration and the PSR
Population Trends 103
Figure 8 Support ratio under alternative assumptions, United Kingdom, 1980-2100(a) alternative migration assumptions
(b) alternative fertility assumptions
(c) alternative upper boundaries for working age
0.00.51.01.52.02.53.03.54.04.55.05.5
1980 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100Year
Rat
io
Zero95,000 (principal)
500,000250,000
Long-term TFR: 1.8Long-term annual net inward migration: as shown
1,000,000
Projected
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
5.0
5.5
1980 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100Year
Rat
io
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
7.0
1980 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100Year
Rat
io
Net Annual Immigration required to maintain UK Potential Support Ratio, 2000 -
2100 (millions)
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
1998
2000
2010
2020
2025
2030
2040
2050
2060
2070
2080
2100
mil
lion
s
UK population size required to maintain given PSRs by immigration, 2000 - 2100 (millions)
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
35020
00
2010
2020
2025
2030
2050
2060
2080
2100
PSR 3.0 PSR 3.5 PSR 4.22
Immigrants and their descendants in the British labour market
• Lower workforce participation rates
• Higher unemployment
• A similar story elsewhere in Europe
Workforce participation and unemployment by birthplace, UK 2000
British All foreign
EU/EFTA Other
% % % %Economically Activeall ages over 16 63.6 58.6 57.7 60.0ages 15-59/64 79.6 69.4 74.4 67.6
Unemployed 5.5 8.5 5.9 9.5
Source: Dobson et al (2002, table 13.1, 13.2, Fig 13.1)
Country of birth
United Kingdom 2002. Economic activity by ethnic minority status
all birthplaces
Economic Employment Unemployment Worklessactivity (%) rate % rate % households %age 16-59/64 age 16-59/64 age 16+ by ethnic group of ref. person
White 80 76 5 16British 81 77 5Other white 77 72 6
All ethnic minority 66 58 12Mixed 71 58 18 35Black Caribbean 77 66 14 25Black African 64 56 13 35Indian 75 69 8Pakistani 54 45 15 27*Bangladeshi 47 41 14Chinese 65 60 - 25
Source: Labour Market Trends March 2003 p.113 ; April 2003 p.167 (Labour Force Survey)Note: Not all groups are shown. See source. * = Pakistani, Bangladeshi together.
Why migration trends may continue upwards.
• Government policy to expand migration e.g. increase work permits: aim 200,000, actual 129,000 in 2002.
• New channels for migration• Open doors to Eastern Europe• Amnesties (see Demography 2003)
• Growth of marriage migration with growth of ethnic minority populations, if arranged marriage persists.
• UK reputation for ease of entry /overstaying.• Long timetable for register, identity cards (if any).• But asylum may be trending downwards..
GAD Net immigration assumptions, and reality, 1996 - 2002 (thousands).
-100
-50
0
50
100
150
200
1980
1983
1986
1989
1992
1995
1998
2001
2004
2007
2010
2013
2016
2019
2022
2025
2028
2031
2034
2037
2040
2043
2046
2049
GAD PP 1996
GAD PP 1998
GAD PP 2000
Actual (pre-2001 census)
Actual (post-2001 census)
GAD 2002-based
GAD Net immigration assumptions, and reality, 1996 - 2002
-100
-50
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
1980
1983
1986
1989
1992
1995
1998
2001
2004
2007
2010
2013
2016
2019
2022
2025
2028
2031
2034
2037
2040
2043
2046
2049
GAD PP 1996
GAD PP 1998
GAD PP 2000
Actual (pre-2001 census)
Actual (post-2001 census)
GAD 2002-based
Fitted logarithmic curve to actual post-census data (r2=0.83)
‘Unattributable Demographic Change’: The New ONS Miracle Ingredient! or ‘Honey, I shrunk the migration
estimates’.• Amaze your audiences!• Lose 290,000 people per decade!• Shrink your migration estimates overnight!• Banish that annoying population growth!• Remove those awkward inconsistencies!• Keep the 2001 Census (nearly) infallible!•
http://www.statistics.gov.uk/about/methodology_by_theme/revisions_to_population_estimates/implications.asp
Another (semi) official view (Home Office RDS Occasional Paper no 67).
Immigration and changes in population composition: UK and abroad.
• Some countries make official projections of population by immigrant / foreign / ethnic minority origin (US, Denmark, Sweden, Netherlands etc.)
• None official in UK since 1979• Despite higher (average) immigrant
fertility, immigration level is the more important variable in all cases.
Total Fertility Rates by Ethnic Group, UK, 1965-2001, from LFS (own-child)
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
7.0
1965 1968 1971 1974 1977 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001
TF
R
WhitesCaribbeansIndiansPakistanisBangladeshisBlack-AfricansChinese
Source: Labour Force Survey, 1979-1991; Quarterly Labour Force Survey, 1992-2001 (Autumn)
British Pakistani population projections 2001-2051 (thousands)
700
900
1100
1300
1500
1700
1900
2100
2300
2001 2006 2011 2016 2021 2026 2031 2036 2041 2046 2051
S 6 No mig, TFR 1.75 2016 S 8 Mig 12k, TFR 1.75 2016
S 9 No mig, TFR 2.05 2046-51 S 10 Mig 12k, TFR 2.05 2046-51
African population in Britain 1971-2001 (thousands)
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
1971 1981 1991 2001
'Black African' TFR trend 1965 - 2001, with fitted logarithmic curve. LFS own-child data
y = 0.2186Ln(x) + 1.5839
R2 = 0.0944
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
5.0
1965
1968
1971
1974
1977
1980
1983
1986
1989
1992
1995
1998
2001
2004
2007
2010
2013
2016
2019
2022
2025
Projections of UK 'Black African' population, 2001-51 (thousands)
400
800
1200
1600
2000
2400
2001 2006 2011 2016 2021 2026 2031 2036 2041 2046 2051
S1 Low fert, no migration S2 Low fert, migration S3 Constant fert, no migration S4 constant fert, migration
Ethnic change in the USA, projected 1999 - 2100
US population 1999 - 2100 Middle Series, ethnic group. Source; US Bureau of the Census 2000.
0.000
50.000
100.000
150.000
200.000
250.000
1999
2002
2005
2008
2011
2014
2017
2020
2023
2026
2029
2032
2035
2038
2041
2044
2047
2050
2053
2056
2059
2062
2065
2068
2071
2074
2077
2080
2083
2086
2089
2092
2095
2098
Hispanic White non-Hispanic Black NH American Indian NH Asian and Pacific NH
US 1999 - 2100: projected proportion of immigrant-origin minorities onlyUS population 1999-2100 Immigrant minorities only.
Source: US Bureau of the Census 2000 NP-T6-A
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
550
600
1999
2004
2009
2014
2019
2024
2029
2034
2039
2044
2049
2054
2059
2064
2069
2074
2079
2084
2089
2094
2099
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
Total population
Immigrant minoritypercent (excludingBlack and AmericanIndian)
Percent of population foreign, Netherlands 2003 – 2050; medium variant and zero-
migration projections. Source: Statistics Netherlands.
Netherlands 2003-2050. Percent of population foreign, medium variant and zero-migration projections. Source: Statistics Netherlands.
10
15
20
25
30
35
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Percent population foreign - medium variant percent population foreign - zero migration
Foreign -born and foreign origin population in Sweden, 1980 - 2002, percent of total population. Source: Statistics Sweden 2003
5
7
9
11
13
15
17
19
21
23
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020
Foreign birthplace
Foreign background
Projected growth of population of foreign origin 2000-2050, selected countries, as % of total
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
perc
ent
Germany medium variant
USA medium variant (excludes black population)
Netherlands base scenario
Denmark 2002- based medium variant
Austria: Restricted immigration: percent foreign origin with no naturalisation.
Sweden percent population of foreign background 2004 based
Sample trial projection, ethnic composition trends , England and Wales 2001- 2051 (millions)
0
10000
20000
30000
40000
50000
60000
70000
2001 2006 2011 2016 2021 2026 2031 2036 2041 2046 2051
Non-white population British and Irish pop
White non-British population Total England and Wales pop
Trial projection of UK non-white population to 2051 (1000s)
mortality constant EW 1998, TFR declining from 2.14 - 1.90
Trial projection of UK non-white population to 2051 (1000s)mortality constant EW 1998, TFR declining from 2.14 - 1.90
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
16000
18000
2001 2006 2011 2016 2021 2026 2031 2036 2041 2046 2051
Zero migration
High migration 108k/yr
Medium migration 70k/yr
Growth of foreign-origin population in Denmark, three projections, showing projected consequences
of recent restrictions (green line). Source: Statistics Denmark
Denmark - percent population foreign origin ; three projections. Source: Statistics Denmark
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
2002-based 16 - 12k migration 2004 based 1997-based zero migration 1997 - based 13.2k migration
Projected growth of population of immigrant or foreign origin 2000 - 2050 as percent of total population, with zero net
migration
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
2025
2030
2035
2040
2045
2050
perc
ent
Germany medium variant USA medium variant Denmark base scenario
Germany zero mig US zero mig Denmark zero mig
Conclusions• Positive immigration effect on working age
population (less effective on actual workforce).• UK population, numbers of working age not
declining even without migration.• Instead, renewed population and household
growth medium term problem, mostly immigration-driven.
• ‘Replacement’ migration for working-age population difficult, for age-structure impossible.
• Current migration projections seem conservative.• Continuation even of current level will promote
substantial and progressive ethnic transformation.