The Diplomacy of the Jaguar French Airpower in Postcolonial African Conflicts

Geraud J. Laborie Lieutenant Colonel, French Air Force

Air Command and Staff College Wright Flyer Paper No. 39

Report Documentation Page Form ApprovedOMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering andmaintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information,including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, ArlingtonVA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if itdoes not display a currently valid OMB control number.

1. REPORT DATE MAR 2009 2. REPORT TYPE

3. DATES COVERED 00-00-2009 to 00-00-2009

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE The Diplomacy of the Jaguar: French Airpower in Postcolonial African Conflicts

5a. CONTRACT NUMBER

5b. GRANT NUMBER

5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER

6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER

5e. TASK NUMBER

5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Air University,Air Command and Staff College,Maxwell AFB,AL,36112

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATIONREPORT NUMBER

9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S)

11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S)

12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

14. ABSTRACT The legacy of its former status as a colonial power has left France with a strong commitment in Africa. Tosecure its interests and aspire to a great foreign policy, France has used the cooperation agreements withits former colonies to maintain its influence on the continent, leading the French military to intervene inmultiple African crises since decolonization in 1960. This paper addresses the use of airpower during theFrench military operations in Africa since 1960. Using case study methodology, it emphasizes theoperational level of war and analyzes the use of the different French army, air force, and naval aviationoperational roles; the adaptation of equipment to conditions in Africa; and the changes in the French-African policy that have influenced the use of airpower. The study argues that successes in Mauritania andChad in the 1970s and 1980s convinced the French military to increase its reliance on airpower. Thechange in policy following the Rwandan crisis in 1994 did not alter this trend. On the contrary, the synergybetween French airpower and special forces was critical in securing France?s objectives during operationsin the former Zaire in 2003 and the Central African Republic in 2007. However, the ongoing interventionin the Ivory Coast proved that a lack of airpower integration planning can lead to numerous challenges forthe French military. To address that issue, the French air force needs to develop an operational doctrinethat the joint force commanders can rely on to better integrate the use of airpower with the early stages ofjoint planning and get the full benefit of its flexibility, responsiveness, and firepower during the operation.

15. SUBJECT TERMS

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT Same as

Report (SAR)

18. NUMBEROF PAGES

54

19a. NAME OFRESPONSIBLE PERSON

a. REPORT unclassified

b. ABSTRACT unclassified

c. THIS PAGE unclassified

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18

Air UniversityAllen G. Peck, Lt Gen, Commander

Air Command and Staff CollegeJimmie C. Jackson, Jr., Brig Gen, Commandant

Zoë M. Hale, Col, PhD, DeanBrett E. Morris, Col, PhD, Director of Research

Brett E. Morris, Col, PhD, and John L. Mansuy, Maj, Series EditorsMichael P. Ivanovsky, PhD, Essay Advisor

Air University PressJohn A. Shaud, General, USAF, Retired, PhD

Director, Air Force Research InstituteBessie E. Varner, Deputy Director

Richard Bailey, PhD, Content EditorTammi K. Long, Copy Editor

Ann Bailey, Prepress ProductionDaniel Armstrong, Cover Design

Please send inquiries or comments toEditor

The Wright Flyer PapersAir Command and Staff College (ACSC/DEI)

225 Chennault Circle, Bldg. 1402Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6426

Tel: (334) 953-6810Fax: (334) 953-2269

E-mail: ACSC@maxwell.af.mil

AIR UNIVERSITY AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

The Diplomacy of the Jaguar

French Airpower in Postcolonial African Conflicts

Geraud J. LaborieLieutenant Colonel, French Air Force

Air Command and Staff College Wright Flyer Paper No. 39

Air University Press Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

March 2009

ii

This Wright Flyer Paper and others in the series are available electronically at the Air University Research Web site http://research.maxwell.af.mil and the AU Press Web site http://aupress.au.af.mil.

Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Air Univer-sity, the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency. Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited.

In memory of Sgt Gilles Polin (French Army, 1st RPIMa [Naval Infantry Paratrooper Regiment]), killed in action at

the Chadian-Sudanese border on 3 March 2008.

�

Foreword

It is my great pleasure to present another of the Wright Flyer Papers series. In this series, the Air Command and Staff College (ACSC) recognizes and publishes our best stu-dent research projects from the prior academic year. The ACSC research program encourages our students to move beyond the school’s core curriculum in their own profes-sional development and in “advancing air and space power.” The series title reflects our desire to perpetuate the pioneer-ing spirit embodied in earlier generations of Airmen. Proj-ects selected for publication combine solid research, inno-vative thought, and lucid presentation in exploring war at the operational level. With this broad perspective, the Wright Flyer Papers engage an eclectic range of doctrinal, techno-logical, organizational, and operational questions. Some of these studies provide new solutions to familiar problems. Others encourage us to leave the familiar behind in pursu-ing new possibilities. By making these research studies available in the Wright Flyer Papers, ACSC hopes to encour-age critical examination of the findings and to stimulate further research in these areas.

JIMMIE C. JACKSON, JR. Brigadier General, USAF Commandant

�ii�ii

Abstract

The legacy of its former status as a colonial power has left France with a strong commitment in Africa. To secure its interests and aspire to a great foreign policy, France has used the cooperation agreements with its former colonies to maintain its influence on the continent, leading the French military to intervene in multiple African crises since decolo-nization in 1960.

This paper addresses the use of airpower during the French military operations in Africa since 1960. Using case study methodology, it emphasizes the operational level of war and analyzes the use of the different French army, air force, and naval aviation operational roles; the adaptation of equip-ment to conditions in Africa; and the changes in the French-African policy that have influenced the use of airpower.

The study argues that successes in Mauritania and Chad in the 1970s and 1980s convinced the French military to increase its reliance on airpower. The change in policy fol-lowing the Rwandan crisis in 1994 did not alter this trend. On the contrary, the synergy between French airpower and special forces was critical in securing France’s objectives during operations in the former Zaire in 2003 and the Cen-tral African Republic in 2007. However, the ongoing inter-vention in the Ivory Coast proved that a lack of airpower integration planning can lead to numerous challenges for the French military. To address that issue, the French air force needs to develop an operational doctrine that the joint force commanders can rely on to better integrate the use of airpower with the early stages of joint planning and get the full benefit of its flexibility, responsiveness, and firepower during the operation.

ix

Acknowledgments

I would like to express my gratitude to two individuals at the Air Command and Staff College who were instrumental in the completion of this study. Lt Col Robert Munson pro-vided the initial momentum and guided the first steps of my research. Dr. William Dean supported me with his profes-sional guidance and his knowledge of French military af-fairs that challenged my French-centric view of the topic.

�

Introduction

To be tolerable, any use of force in Africa must have an indisputable motive and be strictly limited in time and space, that is, brief and punctual.

—French prime minister Pierre Messmer (�972–74)

Since the end of its colonial empire in the �960s, France has intervened in many crises in Africa and has maintained a steady number of deployed troops in the countries of its former empire. Public opinion in France and abroad has often identified the French operations with three key and highly publicized figures: the paratrooper from marine in-fantry or Foreign Legion regiments, the enduring C-�60 Transall transport aircraft, and the Jaguar fighter-bomber. These three actors have traditionally drawn most of the me-dia coverage of the operations. The last two are FAF assets and seem to confirm the strong involvement of French air-power in Africa. However, the reality may not be as clear-cut. To support the French-African policy, the military has used airpower in different roles and at different levels of commitment throughout the history of French postcolonial intervention on the continent.

This research paper precisely analyzes how the French military has used airpower during its operations in post-colonial Africa, concentrating on the operational level of war. Drawing from the history of early interventions from the late �960s to the crisis in Chad in the �980s and the recent operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Ivory Coast, the study examines the role of airpower in these conflicts. Was airpower a preferred option or did it have only a marginal role? Was its employment successful? What were the challenges it faced? Did the use of airpower help France achieve its strategic goals?

Building on the legacy of successes in Chad in the �980s and the Congo in 2003, this study argues that French air-power in a joint fight has proven to have a flexible, respon-sive, and efficient capability to address African crises. Until the recent conflict in the Ivory Coast, the French military had increased its reliance on airpower to reduce its mark on the continent and to act as a force multiplier to support

2

African military forces. While success in Africa cannot rely solely on airpower, the conflict in the Ivory Coast has shown the necessity of better airpower integration in all its roles to face the unrelenting military challenges on the continent.

This study begins by recalling the historical basis of the French involvement in Africa and the different policies and military strategies that formed airpower employment. It pro-ceeds to address the different French interventions in post-colonial Africa and how airpower rose from a limited role to the preferred option in the showdown with Libya in Chad in the �980s. The study continues with a discussion about the change in the French-African policy after the Rwandan crisis that led to the successful use of a French equivalent of the Afghan Model. It ends with the challenges faced in the ongoing operation in the Ivory Coast and also with les-sons learned and recommendations.

France in Africa: An Aspiration to Grandeur

Stemming from the legacy of its former colonial empire (see appendix A), French involvement in Africa has played a leading role in France’s foreign policy since the end of the decolonization in the early �960s. The special status of the French-African policy is twofold. There is the need to pro-tect French economic interests in its former colonies. While highly preponderant in the early years of the postcolonial era, this motivation has lost most of its importance today.� The other motivation has not lost any relevance. France has maintained a strong influence in Africa to secure its status as a medium power with an important role in the interna-tional community. This aspiration to grandeur (greatness) is key to understanding the French-African policy. As John Chipman points out, “The fact that Africa provides a ‘field of action’ for French power is fundamental to French military and therefore political confidence.”2

To keep its influence in Africa, France has relied on the agreements secured by Gen Charles de Gaulle when France granted the colonies their independence in �960.3 Regard-ing military affairs, the agreements involve two different kinds of relationship with the former colonial power. The defense agreements give African states the possibility to call

3

on France for direct security assistance, which, for all coun-tries except Togo and Benin, includes the protection of France against internal and external threat. Twelve African states signed them in �960 and �96�: the Central African Repub-lic (CAR), Chad, Congo, Gabon, Senegal, Madagascar, the Ivory Coast, Benin, Niger, Mauritania, Togo, and Cameroon. The military cooperation agreements involve instructing and training the African military. These agreements comprise “one of the most efficient ways of guaranteeing the mainte-nance of [French] influence in the new armies.”4 Under these agreements, France provides the newly formed African states’ military with free equipment, advising, and training. All former colonies signed them except for Guinea.5

French-African Policy: From Direct Interventionism to

Renforcement des Capacités Africaines de Maintien de la Paix (RECAMP)

Having secured guarantees regarding its interests and strong ties with the newborn African states, France started its military withdrawal from the continent as early as �96�. By �970 the number of troops on the continent had decreased from 58,500 to 6,400.6 Until �974 this disengagement was only interrupted by a few spectacular interventions, as in �964 to support the Gabonese president Leon M’ba against an uprising led by the leader of the opposition party and in �968 to suppress a revolt in northern Chad. Several revisions of the defense agreements further reduced the size of the French military presence, with the withdrawal of French forces from Madagascar.7 When Pres. Valéry Giscard d’Estaing took office in �974, he changed French-African policy to a more interventionist policy targeting a perceived growth in Soviet influence in Africa.8 An era of renewed French mili-tary interventionism began and remained with some ad-justments when François Mitterrand and the Socialist Party came to power in �98�. France kept honoring its defense agreements but put self-imposed restraints regarding mili-tary intervention destined to solve purely internal disputes. Still, difficulties started to arise at the beginning of the �990s regarding such a policy. These difficulties assumed

4

three aspects: the need to maintain large permanent bases in Africa in a shrinking defense budget environment at the end of the Cold War, the lukewarm support of national pub-lic opinion concerning the government’s stance on crises in Africa, and the lack of an efficient response to the genocide in Rwanda in �994. These issues came at a time when Afri-can states grew increasingly eager to handle security prob-lems by themselves and caused a major shift in focus of the French military cooperation in Africa. The new French policy that was presented in �998 during the Africa-France sum-mit at the Louvre in Paris established the Renforcement des Capacités Africaines de Maintien de la Paix (RECAMP) pro-gram.9 This program centers defense cooperation on rein-forcing the African states’ peacekeeping capacity. Instead of direct interventionism, France would promote regional solu-tions through such multinational organizations as the United Nations, the African Union, and the European Union (EU) by providing training and support for African nations willing to participate in peacekeeping operations. The ongoing opera-tion in Darfur offers an aspect of this risk-sharing policy.

The Three Pillars of the French Military Strategy

To support the French-African policy, the French mili-tary strategy in Africa has evolved around three pillars. De-pending on the policy of the time and the state of its rela-tionships with various key African states, the preponderance of each pillar has varied accordingly.

The first pillar of the French strategy supports the mili-tary of its African partners. The initial defense of an African state rests on its own military, equipped, developed, and trained by France. A modified version of this pillar has pre-eminence today with the RECAMP concept that favors an African response to an African regional crisis. French air-power has adapted to the new policy by supporting African forces with airlift; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnais-sance (ISR); and combat aircraft in conjunction with special forces on the ground. Operation in the CAR in spring 2007 provides a good example of this evolution: Special forces provided targeting information for Mirage F-�s flying from N’Djamena to support CAR forces trying to repel Chadian

5

rebel columns. Throughout the operation, Atlantic mari-time patrol aircraft from the French Navy provided ISR.

The second pillar of the French strategy supports French military forces stationed in Africa. These Forces d’Outre-Mer (French overseas forces) initially came from the seven prin-cipal bases secured by the defense agreements (Dakar, Abi-djan, Libreville, N’Djamena, Bangui, Djibouti, and Diego Suarez). Their purpose is to provide a permanent French military presence that can deter and serve as a crisis moni-tor and a rapid-reaction capability. Renegotiations of the defense agreements, financial cost, and political issues have led to a constant reduction of the number of overseas bases and permanently deployed troops. Today, only Da-kar, Abidjan, Libreville, and Djibouti remain. The French strategy rested heavily on this pillar during the first decade following decolonization, when French overseas forces and bases in Africa were still numerous. Since that time this pillar has been more and more buttressed by the third pil-lar, which has borne the brunt of major operations from the �970s onward.

This third pillar is the French-based, quick-reaction force that would reinforce pre-positioned forces in case of a seri-ous crisis. Created in �96�, the 23,000-personnel Force d’Intervention Interarmées (Joint Intervention Force [JIF]) had a dual purpose. It could provide an effective and deter-rent force to face the instability on the continent while allow-ing the downsizing of French forces permanently stationed there to make them more acceptable to public opinion both at home and abroad. A reorganization of the French mili-tary in �983 led to the creation of the Force d’Action Rapide, a quick-reaction unit that absorbed the Force d’Intervention Interarmées in a far more lethal force twice its size and ca-pable of action both in central Europe in support of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or in Africa.

Airpower in the Background: The Early Years of French

Involvement, 1960–75

In the years after decolonization, France implemented its military strategy in Africa by relying principally on its

6

ground forces stationed in France and overseas. The role of the French Air Force (FAF) was modest, consisting primarily of supporting the JIF using intertheater airlift to deploy it from France and intratheater airlift to resupply it from French overseas bases. Reconnaissance, air defense, and close air support (CAS) had a far lower priority because the French military did not expect a high level of threat.�0

The capacity to project troops was critical to successfully achieve the French strategy. Unfortunately, the FAF airlift capability proved to be limited. Qualitatively, its most ca-pable asset was the Nord N-250� Noratlas medium trans-port aircraft, similar to the United States’ C-��9. Unpres-surized and powered by two piston-driven engines, it lacked the payload and the range to quickly and effectively deploy the JIF. Quantitatively, the Air Staff acknowledged that the entire airlift fleet could deploy no more than 400 tons in 48 hours to support an operation 5,000 kilometers (km) from France. Exercise Alligator III in September �967 proved the point: The deployment of the JIF exercise in the Ivory Coast had to rely heavily on sealift for combat and support equip-ment due to airlift limitations.�� The acquisition of 50 C-�60 Transalls to replace the N-250�s that began in �968, sup-plemented by three long-range DC-8Fs, significantly boosted the FAF airlift capability, but it still fell short of its require-ment to project the JIF.

The FAF implemented the French military strategy using both forward-deployed assets in the French overseas bases and French-based units dedicated to supporting the JIF when it deployed. The number and type of FAF combat air-craft based in Africa reflected the assessment of the threat. The FAF initially deployed two squadrons of seven to eight AD-4 Skyraiders previously used for counterinsurgency (COIN) operations during the Algerian conflict (�954–62). The force shrank to only one attack squadron that was based in Djibouti in �975 and received North American F-�00D/F Super Sabres in replacement for its aging AD-4s. At the same time, the FAF designated only two French-based squadrons to support the JIF, each equipped with aging Sud-Ouest Vautour II medium bombers.�2

Operations during that period confirmed the threat as-sessment made by the Air Staff. Relying heavily on ground troops and encountering only guerilla units, the French mili-

7

tary seldom used its few attack assets. In fact, most of these operations were typical of the early days of independence. They called for a limited show of force and police action against civilian riots or small guerilla groups. An example is the rescue of the Gabonese president M’ba in �962. Muti-neers from the Gabonese army had taken him prisoner, and the FAF airlifted French paratroopers from Brazzaville and Dakar to Libreville to free the president and squash the re-bellion.�3 The only notable exception was the operation against the Front de Libération Nationale (FROLINAT) in Chad from �968 to �975. The 2,600-strong French land component faced highly mobile and better armed rebels. Using lightly armored columns and helicopters to search and destroy the enemy, the French joint task force (JTF) also relied on four Skyraiders detached to N’Djamena in �968 to support its COIN operations. Still, despite some bouts of heavy fighting, the JFC did not call for a stronger air component, and the FAF only had a secondary role in a mostly land-centric operation.�4

The Rise of the Jaguar: Giscard d’Estaing, Mauritania,

and Chad, 1975–81

President Giscard d’Estaing’s interventionist policy came when the French military faced a growing threat in Africa. Soviet-backed Libya, Somalia, and Angola had access to Soviet armaments and built strong conventional forces equipped with the latest ground-to-air missiles and combat aircraft. They provided guerilla formations with modern weaponry that threatened FAF assets. For example, in April �978 FROLINAT launched a major offensive against the Chadian government and destroyed a French-piloted AD-4 Skyraider with an SA-7 missile.�5 At the same time, the shortfalls of strategic and tactical airlift became more and more apparent. Without the capability to quickly deploy troops, the French military strategy that relied mainly on ground forces became unrealistic. Only airpower through the use of modern, air-refueled fighter-bombers could pro-vide the survivability, flexibility, and rapid-response capa-bility to counter the growing threats.

8

Airlift limitations plagued the ambitious French opera-tion during the crisis affecting the Shaba province of Zaire in the spring of �978. On �2 May 4,000 rebels coming from Angola captured the mining center of Kolwezi (Zaire), where 2,500 Europeans (mostly French and Belgian) resided, and started to massacre them. The rebels also threatened Zair-ian president Joseph-Desire Mobutu, a key ally against the Soviet influence in the region. It was necessary to act quickly and forcefully; so, on �7 May President Giscard d’Estaing authorized Operation Léopard to retake the city. Unfortu-nately, the FAF had already committed its airlift assets in Mauritania and Chad in support of ongoing operations. To deploy troops to Zaire, the FAF had to rely on five long-range French commercial transport aircraft (four DC-8s and one B-707) under the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) program to fly the 2d Foreign Legion Parachute Regiment (2d REP) to Kinshasa. Simultaneously, USAF C-5As and C-�4�s provided the necessary logistics support, with 3� sor-ties that transported 93� tons of cargo and �24 passengers. On �9 May three French C-�60s, followed by four Zairian C-�30s, dropped 400 paratroopers from the 2d REP for the first large French airborne assault since the Suez crisis in �956. The French legionnaires secured the city and its air-port at a cost of four killed and �4 wounded.

Even if the operation had been a tactical success, it showed how limited the FAF airlift capabilities had been. In any crisis involving more than a few hundred enemy rebels, it became unlikely that France could project the necessary quantity of ground troops to help its pre-positioned forces defeat them. Besides, the solution to enlarge French pres-ence overseas was impossible financially and politically. Airpower could then provide an alternative answer by using modern combat aircraft based in France and quickly de-ployable to overseas bases in time of conflict.

The FAF had already started to acquire the right tool to implement the new strategy: the Jaguar fighter-bomber. Developed with the British, the French version of the air-craft had incorporated modifications to tailor it to overseas operations. A simple and rugged navigation system had re-placed the much more complex avionics of the Royal Air Force Jaguars designed for operations in Europe. The air-craft also featured an air-to-air refueling (AAR) capability

9

and could operate in an austere environment. To support President Giscard d’Estaing’s interventionist policy, the FAF dedicated the entire ��th Wing to rapid overseas de-ployment, with a strong emphasis on overseas training and at least one squadron on permanent alert. Other Jaguar squadrons of the 7th Wing focused on suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) and nuclear strike but trained for over-seas deployment as a secondary mission.�6

In conjunction with the Jaguar, the FAF modernized its in-terceptor fleet with an air-to-air capability to face the threat posed by the modern Soviet fighters available to some African countries. By the end of the �970s, the 5th and 30th Wings had received the AAR-capable Mirage F-�C-200 interceptors and were ready to deploy with the ��th and 7th Wings. The �� C-�35F aerial tankers that were initially dedicated to the support of strategic operations would provide the necessary aerial refueling. Despite budget limitations, the Giscard d’Estaing administration also tried to ease the airlift shortage by acquiring two additional DC-8Fs and 29 new AAR-capable C-�60NGs (new generation).�7 All the Transall NGs could ac-commodate a kit that converted them into aerial tankers, ca-pable of refueling both the Mirage F-�C-200s and the Jaguars. Finally, the FAF tried to develop its early warning and com-mand and control (C2) capability of overseas operations. With-out any E-3s—France did not participate in the NATO E-3A program—the FAF had to rely on the French Navy Atlantic, a maritime patrol aircraft designed for antisubmarine warfare but that could also act as an airborne C2 and electronic intel-ligence (ELINT) platform and communications relay station. Eventually, in �977 a modernized version of the Atlantic (called the Atlantic 2) brought a significant improvement in ELINT and surface targets detection in conjunction with a limited aerial early warning capability.

The first test for the modernized FAF happened in Mau-ritania. Since �973 the Algerian- and Libya-backed Polisa-rio Front had been fighting for the self-determination of the Western Sahara province against the Mauritanian govern-ment. Its primary targets were Mauritanian and French in-terests in the region. Using guerilla tactics, the Polisario had even launched a raid against the Mauritanian capital, Nouakchott, which had prompted the government to sign new military agreements with France in �976. Shortly there-

�0

after, the abduction of eight French technicians during a Polisario raid on the ore mining center of Zouérat started Operation Lamentin. Besides rescuing the hostages, the operation significantly reduced the Polisario’s ability to con-duct large raids against economic targets. It was a com-bined effort with the Mauritanian and Moroccan military, with France playing a supporting role. For that reason, France did not base any fighters on Mauritanian soil but provided guidance for Moroccan companies to expand the airfields at Nouakchott and Atar so the Moroccan Air Force could deploy its Northrop F-5s and Mirage F-�s there.

For the FAF, it was the first operational test for the Jag-uars and the first air-centric joint operation commanded by an FAF two-star general.�8 Ten Jaguars deployed in Dakar and Cape Verte in Senegal, supported by two C-�35Fs, would provide the firepower against Polisario columns. Command and control involved French Navy Atlantic maritime patrol aircraft and the set up of relay stations inside Mauritania, all linked to the French embassy in Nouakchott that would act as a rudimentary combined air operations center.�9

Initially, the Jaguars and the Atlantics conducted recon-naissance missions and were aided by Mirage 4-A strategic bombers conducting high-altitude reconnaissance missions. They provided intelligence and targeting information that proved critical in the success of the air raids that started in December �977. The destruction of a 200-vehicle Polisario column between �0 and �2 December �977 is a typical ex-ample of the joint and combined modus operandi. On �0 December �977, two Atlantics from the French navy 2�F Flotille detected the column heading towards the Zouérat-Nouadhibou rail line. Two days later, they guided a first raid of Moroccan F-5s and T-6s, followed by Jaguars flying from Dakar and striking the rebels with their two 30-millimeter (mm) cannons and rockets. The Jaguars attacked again on �3 December, and the column was totally annihilated, with-out any loss on the French side.20 The FAF would repeat this kind of mission on �8 December �977 and on 3 May �978, when six Jaguars flying from Senegal engaged an enemy’s column in the open desert and systematically destroyed it. Unable to achieve military success, the Polisario decided to negotiate with the Mauritanian government. After both par-

��

ties started discussions at the end of �978, FAF operations in Mauritania ended.2�

While diplomats took over in Mauritania in �978, another crisis erupted in Chad. The FROLINAT had taken the offen-sive again—this time with modern Soviet weaponry sup-plied by Libya—and scored numerous victories against the Armée Nationale du Tchad (ANT). As the situation further deteriorated in April �978, the Giscard d’Estaing adminis-tration ordered the deployment of a �,700-man joint task force composed of Foreign Legion troops to block the rebel advance towards the capital. Still, because of the concur-rent crisis in Kolwezi, the French military had to divert much of its airlift and the 2d REP from Chad to Zaire. Draw-ing from the lessons of the conflict in Mauritania, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) decided to compensate for the loss in combat capabilities in Chad by using offensive airpower to stop the FROLINAT.

Deploying from France and the French base in Abidjan (the Ivory Coast), �2 Jaguars arrived in N’Djamena in May �978, supported by two C-�35Fs and one Atlantic.22 Their mere presence on Chadian territory was designed to deter further FROLINAT offensives. This did not succeed, partly because the FROLINAT assumed France would be too busy in Zaire to effectively support the ANT. The FROLINAT launched its main offensive against the ANT defensive lines on �8 May, with N’Djamena as the ultimate target. In two decisive engagements in late May and early June around the key positions of Ati and Djadda in Central Chad, For-eign Legion cavalry and marine infantry supported by light helicopters and Jaguars defeated the rebels. The firepower of the Jaguars was a key factor: in one single attack near Djadda, the fighter-bombers killed more than 200 rebels.23

The seven years of the Giscard d’Estaing presidency (�974–8�) provided the foundations for the use of airpower in Africa. To implement its policy of increased interventionism, the Giscard administration shifted from the previous reliance on ground troops to a much heavier use of airpower. The move was the only effective way to address the limitations in airlift that continued to plague the French military. Operations in Mauritania and Chad were the landmark cases that proved that modern and robust fighter-bombers like the Jaguars could be effective in desert warfare against irregular troops.

�2

From then on, the FAF would be one of the key components of any joint task force sent to address an African crisis.

Operation Manta (1983–84): New Challenges for French Airpower

In May �98� Giscard d’Estaing lost the presidential elec-tion to the French Socialist Party (PSF) leader François Mit-terrand. The PSF had been a strong critic of the previous administration’s interventionist policy, arguing that it be-haved like a “pyromaniac fireman” in Africa.24 As part of its preelection program, the new socialist government decided to favor negotiations over military intervention, the latter taking place only “at the express desire of an African leader and preferably only in conjunction with African forces.”25 It was with this mind-set that the Mitterrand administration faced its first serious crisis in Chad. This time the FAF would face the bulk of the modern Libyan air force (LAF) supporting Chadian rebels. Due to President Mitterrand’s emphasis on a diplomatic solution, the French military would commit its assets in Chad on a strict defensive mis-sion to try to separate warring parties. Rules of engagement (ROE) became restrictive: unless for self-defense, the use of firepower required approval by the highest political authori-ties in Paris. With all these limitations, Operation Manta succeeded only in reaching a politically and economically costly stalemate, which forced the Mitterrand administra-tion to reconsider its African policy.

When civil war broke out again in �980, the opponents to Chadian president Hissene Habre, led by Goukouni Oueddei and his Armée de Libération Nationale (ALN), sought the help of Libya, which intervened in force to back its allies. From �980 to �983, heavy armored forces of the Libyan regular army, equipped with T-54s and artillery and protected by mobile air defense systems (ZSU-23/4, SA-9), supported the rebels each time they suffered setbacks at the hands of the renamed Forces Armées Nationales Tchadiennes (FANT). The LAF provided effective firepower and spearheaded at-tacks against major objectives like Faya-Largeau, launching �5 raids in three days in July �983 using MiG-23s, Su-22s, and Mirage 5s.26 This prompted President Habre to ask for direct French military assistance against Libyan airpower.

�3

President Mitterrand reluctantly agreed to the Chadian demand but requested from the French JCS a course of ac-tion that would avoid a direct confrontation between French and Libyan forces. The purpose was to deploy ground troops north of N’Djamena to act as a peacekeeping force between both parties. Operation Manta started on �� August �983, with strict ROEs: French forces could open fire only if di-rectly threatened.27

Two issues quickly arose. The first one was the recurrent problem of a lack of airlift capabilities, this time further emphasized by the concurrent deployment of 2,000 troops in Lebanon as part of the Beirut Multinational Force. Be-cause of the urgency of the situation in Chad, air was the fastest way to reinforce the small contingent of French ground troops that had deployed by land from the CAR. Dif-ficulties arose when Algeria denied overflight rights, which forced FAF crews to fly either west via Casablanca, Dakar, and Abidjan or east via Tunis and Khartoum. The new AAR-capable Transalls and the FAF DC-8s could not fully ad-dress the issue, so the FAF had to lease 30 Boeing B-747s and DC-�0s under the CRAF program. This development created other problems as well, since the heavy airlifters could not land in N’Djamena due to the short runway. The airlifters had to fly first to Bangui in the CAR, where mul-tiple Transall rotations would carry men and equipment to the Chadian capital. There, a shortage of aviation fuel forced the C-�60s to depart from Bangui with enough fuel for the round-trip, which severely decreased their maximum payload capability: it took an average of eight to �0 Transall rota-tions to fly an entire DC-8 load (30 tons) to N’Djamena. By the end of the first week of the operation, the FAF had been able to project to Chad only 900 troops equipped with a few AML-90 wheeled armored vehicles and �20 mm mortars.28

The second major issue facing the French military was the threat posed by the LAF during the deployment of the French forces. Air strikes targeting the N’Djamena airport and French units were most likely to occur. The FAF alone could not work this issue, and France requested the help of the United States. At the start of the operation, the US Air Force deployed two E-3A (airborne warning and control sys-tem) and eight F-�5s with two KC-�0s to Khartoum, while the US Navy Sixth Fleet intensified its operations in the Gulf of

�4

Sirte.29 This show of force was enough to deter the LAF and to guarantee the safe deployment of French troops.

By the end of August, �,750 French troops, supported by SA-34� Gazelle antitank helicopters, had built three key defensive positions in Moussoro, Abéché/Biltine, and Ati to protect N’Djamena. During that time, the FAF had started to reduce its dependency on American air superiority and to deploy its own fighters. Due to the same shortage of avia-tion fuel that plagued the airlift effort, any attempt to use N’Djamena as a forward operating base was initially out of the question. The FAF already had four Jaguars based in Libreville (Gabon) and deployed four others and three C-�35Fs in Bangui, where the French navy provided two At-lantics. These aircraft provided a detection of ground tar-gets and airborne radio relays. The FAF also worked the fuel issue. It created a petroleum, oils, and lubricants sup-ply chain using between 350 and 400 tanker trucks leased by French oil companies that followed a �,000-mile route from western Africa through Cameroon and Nigeria. It also contracted commercial airlines to fly some fuel to N’Djamena. This logistics effort provided enough fuel to deploy four Jag-uars, four Mirage F-�C-200s, and one C-�35F to N’Djamena on 2� August.

The Mirages were critical to address the threat posed by the LAF. They reinforced the air defense assets already in the theater (one Crotale battery). Also, the FAF installed several surveillance radars along the defensive line protect-ing the capital to detect any intrusion at medium or high altitude. Still, the radar coverage provided only a �5-minute warning against a strike targeting the N’Djamena airport and its high concentration of aircraft, further increased by the lack of parking space. Throughout the operation, the Mirages flew at a high tempo, providing combat air patrol for the Jaguars and escorting the Atlantics during ELINT missions.

After a welcome lull in the summer, major combat opera-tions resumed in September, with an ALN offensive towards Oum-Chalouba. By that time it was obvious to the rebels that the French would not use their airpower in offensive operations as they had in �978. Still, the French presence had achieved a certain level of deterrence, and the Libyans did not back the attack with their own air force. Also, mul-

�5

tiple overflights of rebel columns were sometimes enough to intimidate them, as happened during the attempted attack against Koro-Toro on �� September.30 However, the strict ROEs quickly showed their limitations and were a contribu-tory cause to the loss of a Jaguar and its pilot. The French fighters could use only cannon fire against the enemy, and several times during the operation, they had taken too much time to get the authorization to open fire.3� History repeated itself on 24 January �984. In the morning, Jaguars and Mirages detected an ALN column protected by ZSU-23s, which had previously attacked a FANT position and taken two Belgian doctors as hostages. The column fired at the aircraft using SA-7s, and the Jaguars returned cannon fire. They kept following the column until �700 (military time), when they finally got permission to launch a full-scale at-tack. Two Jaguars supported by two Mirage F-�Cs strafed the rebels, who were ready for them. ZSU-23s badly dam-aged one of the Mirages and shot down one Jaguar, killing its pilot.32

The loss provoked a strong reaction from the French gov-ernment. It sent additional troops and Mirages to Chad, boosting the force to 3,500 men, and created a free-fire zone along the �6th parallel. Still, Operation Manta was draining French financial resources, and France appeared increas-ingly bogged down in Chad. President Mitterrand was eager to negotiate a settlement and started negotiations with Col Mu’ammar Gadhafi, despite the strong opposition of the Chadian government. In September �984 negotiating par-ties reached an agreement, and both the French and the Libyan governments agreed to withdraw their troops. On 7 November Operation Manta was over.

The operation revealed numerous lessons. At the strategic level, it had drained a lot of financial resources but had solved nothing. The Chadian government quickly pointed out the evidence of Libyan activities in northern Chad, contrary to the negotiated agreement with France. In fact, the LAF was even building a large airfield in Ouadi Doum and had deployed five Mirage F-�s (purchased from France during the �970s) and nine Su-22s in Aouzou. These violations of the agreement be-came embarrassing for the French government.33

At the operational level, the government had imposed considerable restraint on the use of military force, which

�6

had prevented the FAF from mounting an effective air- interdiction campaign against the ALN and had contributed to strengthening Libyan military capabilities in Chad. Also, the ineffective airlift bridge had shown the considerable dif-ficulties in projecting a large number of ground forces.34 This convinced the French JCS that relying primarily on airpower was the only way to project power in Africa. It also meant that to be effective, future air operations had to be more massive and, in the case of Chad, had to address the threat posed by the LAF through a robust offensive counter-air campaign.35 Finally, the lack of adequate radar coverage forced the FAF to rely on USAF E-3s to provide a better warning about an impending LAF attack.36

One of the few positive aspects of Operation Manta was the renovation of the N’Djamena airport. France had up-graded the runway so that it could accommodate large cargo aircraft and more parking spaces.37 This would be necessary for future developments of the Chadian crisis.

Operation Epervier (1986–87): Jaguars and Mirages against

the Libyan Air Force

On �0 February �986, the ALN broke the truce with the Chadian government and took the offensive south. Libya provided troops from its Islamic Legion as well as armor and artillery. France found itself in a situation similar to �983, except that this time the forward operating bases the LAF had built in Faya-Largeau and Ouadi Doum posed a more serious threat to any French airlift effort in support of the Chadian government. Still, France could not ignore the flagrant violation of the �984 agreement and decided to in-tervene. Learning from the lessons of Operation Manta, the French government approved a much more air-centric mili-tary intervention, which would target the LAF in northern Chad through an aggressive offensive counterair campaign. Operation Epervier (Sparrowhawk), as it would be named, contributed to the complete stoppage of the Libyan infiltra-tion in the Chadian civil war.

After the first week of combat, the FANT had been able to hold its ground against the ALN and the Libyans, but the

�7

probability of renewed offensives asked for a French inter-vention to stabilize the situation in Chad. The strategic ob-jective was to compel Libya to stop its present involvement in the internal political situation in Chad and to deter it from further implication. At the operational level of war, the French military decided to limit French ground forces’ in-volvement to providing training and logistics support for the Chadians.38 The bulk of the combat operations would rely on the FAF with a clear mission: to stop LAF operations in northern Chad and protect the N’Djamena airport. The command of the JTF reflected the air-centric aspect of the operation, with an FAF officer acting as the JFC.

Operation Epervier started on �6 February �986, with a strike against the LAF facilities at Ouadi Doum. To main-tain an element of surprise, the FAF used its assets already deployed in Africa. Twelve Jaguars, four Mirage F-�s, three C-�35Fs, six C-�60s, and two Atlantics, most of them based in Bangui, constituted the air component of the JTF.39 Armed with BAP-�00 antirunway bombs and supported by the C-�35Fs for the five-hour, 2,400-nautical-mile round- trip from Bangui, the strike package included �0 Jaguars. Mirage F-�s provided air cover, while the Atlantics sup-ported the raid with their ISR and communications relay capability. The surprise raid was a success. Concentrating on the runway, the strike scored several direct hits that rendered it temporarily unusable.

Unable to deploy its fighters to its main forward operating base, the LAF could not stop the massive FAF airlift bridge that started right after the raid from Bangui to N’Djamena and flew badly needed supplies to the FANT. Still, the Liby-ans attempted a strike at the N’Djamena airport on �7 Feb-ruary with a single Tu-22 that scored a hit on the runway but did not prevent the airlift bridge from proceeding as planned. The strike came undetected from southern Libya, confirming the weakness of the FAF radar coverage and the need to boost air defenses around the Chadian capital.40 In early March, USAF C-5s flew in a French Army Hawk long-range battery. The radar coverage and early warning capa-bility also received a boost with the deployment of a radar station in Moussoro, 200 km northeast of the capital, and the arrival of one DC-8 Sarigue ELINT platform and one C-�60 Gabriel signals intelligence platform in the theater.4�

�8

The raid on Ouadi Doum succeeded in deterring Tripoli from further deployment of the LAF in Chad. The situation on the ground reached a stalemate that lasted for six months. France tried to use that time to find a settlement with all parties involved and did not take part in direct com-bat operations as long as the Libyans did not operate south of the �6th parallel.42 However, when the FANT launched a successful offensive against the enemy at the end of �986, the retreating Libyan military retaliated by sending the LAF on a raid south of the �6th parallel, thus directly challeng-ing France. Responding to the Libyan aggression, the FAF came back at Ouadi Doum on 7 January �987, this time on a SEAD mission targeting the Libyan SA-6 radars. Striking the airfield had become far more dangerous than in Febru-ary �986. The Libyans had built a strong air defense around the base, with five SA-6 batteries and numerous antiaircraft artillery. For the raid, two Mirage F-�CRs acted as baits for the SA-6 radars, while eight Mirage F-�Cs supported two Jaguars armed with AS-37 Martel antiradiation missiles. The raid successfully destroyed the main observation radar of an SA-6 battery.43

The Libyan ground forces kept suffering numerous de-feats at the hands of the FANT throughout the spring of �987, which included a daring surprise attack against a LAF air base in southern Libya. Blaming the French, Gad-hafi used two Tu-22s to launch another attempted strike at the N’Djamena airport on 8 September �987. To avoid de-tection, the bombers flew along the western border of the country and tried to mix with civilian air traffic. Still, this time the French air defense system worked, and the Hawk battery destroyed a Tu-22, while the other turned back.44

This would be the last encounter between the LAF and the French military. On �� September �987 Libya and Chad agreed on a cease-fire, and at the next Organization of Afri-can Unity summit, Libya agreed to settle the dispute by going to the International Court of Justice.45 Subsequently, France dramatically reduced its military posture in Chad but never terminated Operation Epervier. Since �986 the FAF has maintained a strong presence in Chad to protect Chad against any external aggression. This has enabled the French government to maintain some control over the tu-multuous Chadian internal politics.

�9

Compared to Operation Manta, Operation Epervier proved far more successful. When used with determination, French airpower stopped the LAF from expanding its facilities in northern Chad and successfully deterred any escalation of the Libyan involvement. At the same time, French ISR as-sets provided critical information for the FANT to mount a series of inspired offensives that repelled Gadhafi’s forces back to Libya. For the French, the success came at a far lesser human and financial cost than Operation Manta. It also relied on a successful partnership with the FANT and its leader, Idriss Déby, who proved to be a gifted commander.

Still, the operation highlighted some limitations of the FAF and involved a high level of risk. When conducting the raid on Ouadi Doum, the French hoped to send a clear mes-sage to Gadhafi but at the same time tried to prevent an open conflict with Libya. They were successful in reading the Libyan leader’s mind correctly. However, if Tripoli had ordered the LAF to react more forcefully in the first weeks of the operation, it is likely that it would have been able to stop the French airlift effort. At that time the FAF did not have the capability to establish air superiority over south-ern Chad. To establish it, the FAF had to rely on USAF air-lift to fly the Hawk batteries and the surveillance radars that proved critical during the 8 September �987 raid. Also, the AS-37 Martel antiradiation missiles used on 7 January �987 against SA-6s did not prove very reliable.46 Without an effective SEAD capability, any escalation of the conflict with Libya would have become problematic for an FAF un-able to strike Libya’s forward air bases.

French Airpower in the Post–Cold War Environment: From One NEO to the Other

In Africa, the end of the Cold War sent a wave of destabi-lization that triggered numerous conflicts into the �990s. Countries that had received financial and military support from one superpower or the other suddenly found them-selves abandoned by their patron. In the case of Zaire, the corrupt and authoritarian regime of President Mobutu stopped being the West’s best ally in central Africa and be-came one of the more embarrassing.47 Its demise had mul-

20

tiple ripple effects that caused civil wars in Zaire, Congo, Rwanda, Burundi, and the CAR.

Facing this uncertain environment, the French military had to conduct numerous noncombatant evacuation opera-tions (NEO) in the �990s. These NEOs shared several com-mon characteristics. They all involved an initial deployment of French overseas forces using the pre-positioned airlift assets of the FAF. C-�60s or C-�30s stationed in Libreville, Bangui, or N’Djamena, together with French army troops, formed a quick-reaction force deemed to be critical to the success of the operation, as exemplified by the NEO in Zaire in �99�.48 By contrast, without any forward basing of its C-�30s, the Belgian Air Force suffered delays and had to rely on USAF airlift support to fly troops from Europe during the �993 NEO in Zaire.49 Also, these operations were conducted amid a raging civil war where the different factions did not target French assets and personnel directly. Consequently, the level of threat remained acceptable for the employment of tactical transport aircraft, and the FAF did not need to deploy combat aircraft to provide a deterrent presence or to conduct supporting combat operations. These operations used an intermediate staging base (ISB) from which the FAF would operate and fly the evacuees. In all cases the ISB was the French base where the transport aircraft were sta-tioned, which further stressed the importance of forward basing for the FAF.

Operations after the Rwandan Trauma: RECAMP, Special Forces, and Airpower

The year �994 marked a watershed in French involvement in Africa. Two distinct events occurred during that year. The first one was the publication of the �994 white paper on defense that paved the way for France’s defense policy in the post–Cold War environment. The white paper would have a strong impact on the French military and led to a reduction in format and the end of conscription. The sec-ond one was the genocide in Rwanda and the French con-troversial intervention there, called Operation Turquoise.

Operation Turquoise did not involve a significant use of airpower apart from the traditional reliance on FAF C-�60s and C-�30s to deploy ground forces and perform some hu-

2�

manitarian airdrops in May �994. However, at the strategic level, Rwanda marked the end of France’s direct interven-tion policy. Critics accused the operation of being ineffec-tive in preventing the genocide of the Tutsi population while having facilitated the escape of key Rwandan personalities involved in the genocide.50 The French government also faced a parliamentary inquiry that stressed the lack of transparency and coherence of the African policy.

The RECAMP policy that followed has emphasized multi-lateralism and African states’ military capabilities so that they can take the matter of regional instability and peace-keeping operations into their own hands. The French mili-tary has adapted to the new policy by shifting from a tradi-tional reliance on the third pillar to the first one, the African states’ military, supplemented by the use of French Special Forces and airpower to boost maneuverability and fire-power.5� This French version of the Afghan model has found its place in the FAF doctrine regarding combat airpower re-lated to special operations.52 This document defines two concepts of use: intelligence support and fire support.53 The first one uses such traditional ISR assets as the Atlantic 2 or the Mirage F-�CR (reconaissance version) and also such combat aircraft as the Mirage 2000D with its targeting pod in a nontraditional ISR role. The second one emphasizes the synergy between the combat aircraft and the joint tacti-cal air controller, which allows CAS to be the most effective. The FAF �0th Air Commando Group has specialized in la-ser designation of targets for the combat aircraft and has received considerable combat experience working with Mi-rage 2000Ds armed with GBU-�2 laser-guided bombs (LGB) in Afghanistan.54

Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 2003 typifies the implementation of the new French policy in Africa and the key role played by French Special Forces and airpower. To support the United Nations Mis-sion (MONUC) in the DRC and to protect populations flee-ing the ethnic strife in the Ituri province of northeastern DRC, the new foreign policy branch of the EU launched the operation under United Nations Security Council Resolu-tion �484. France provided most of the troops (�,785 out of 2,200), as well as the command and control structure. Uganda agreed to host the force in Entebbe, and its deploy-

22

ment began on 7 June 2003, with strategic airlift provided by chartered AN-�24s. To achieve its objectives, the JFC tasked the air component to provide a day-and-night deter-rent presence over the Ituri province, an ISR capability, and ultimately CAS, if needed. These tasks posed+ significant challenges for the air component commander. At this time of the year, low ceilings and moisture negatively affect the Ituri province, which compelled the FAF to deploy all-weather-capable assets. On 5 June five Mirage 2000Ds equipped with terrain-following radars, LGBs, and target-ing pods deployed from France to N’Djamena to provide that all-weather capability. Later in June the FAF relocated its five Mirage F-�CTs and CRs already in Chad to Entebbe. Also, due to the long distance from the Ituri province, two C-�35FRs flew to Libreville to reinforce the air-to-air refuel-ing capability provided by the lone C-�35FR already in N’Djamena. The FAF then put two Mirage 2000Ds on a 3.5-hour alert notice (5.5-hour at night). A typical mission would involve multiple air refuelings and last up to seven hours, with two hours on station over Ituri. Another chal-lenge was the setting up of an adequate combat search and rescue capability. The two SA-330 Puma helicopters deployed in Entebbe could provide a quick extraction of a downed crew in Ituri. However, the long transit from N’Djamena to the theater over Chad, the CAR, and the DRC meant that any rescue operation over these remote and sometimes hostile areas would involve significant time and complexity. The FAF came up with a plan that used French army Cou-gar helicopters based in Gabon and Cameroon and several pre-positioned stocks of fuel in the DRC. Still, providing an adequate response to any flight emergency remained an im-portant issue for the air component commander.

On 6 June 2003, C-�60s and C-�30s infiltrated special forces into Bunia, the capital of the Ituri province, to se-cure the airport and start the deployment of the main force. Mirage F-�s protected the safe infiltration of these forces. The next day 2000Ds flew their first CAS mission using LGBs. The effect on the aggressiveness of enemy mi-litias was significant. Later in the month, high-speed, low-level passes by the Mirage 2000Ds using their all-weather, terrain-following capability proved sufficient to deter fur-ther attacks on European forces. The JTF completed its

23

mission by the end of August, and the transfer of authority between the European force and the MONUC became ef-fective on � September 2003. At that time the FAF combat assets had flown 730 hours in 220 missions supported by ��5 air refueling sorties.55

Operation Artemis provided satisfaction for the FAF. The synergy between its tactical transport aircraft and special forces had proved decisive in securing the airport in Bunia. Also, airpower had demonstrated the multiple options it brought to the JFC because of the progressive use of force it could provide. What could start as a dedicated ISR sortie could evolve into a show of force using such nonkinetic means as a high-speed pass and possibly culminate in a strike ranging from gun strafing to using LGBs. This flexi-bility derived from the partnership between special forces and the FAF that had started in 2000 and proved its opera-tional soundness in Afghanistan. The French version of the Afghan model had demonstrated that its force-multiplying effects could apply to several situations, from increasing the firepower of African forces like in the CAR in 2007 to supporting endangered peacekeeping forces like in the DRC in 2003.56 It could provide these effects at the cost of a small footprint on the ground and little collateral damage.

The Ivory Coast: Back to a Ground-Centric Strategy?

Despite the growing success of the partnership between airpower and special forces, the French military responded to the crisis that erupted in the Ivory Coast in October 2002 with a predominately land-centric operation.57 When Pres. Laurent Koudou Gbagbo requested French support against rebels that had seized the northern part of the country and attempted to march to Abidjan, France decided to launch a dual-purpose military intervention called Operation Licorne (Unicorn).58 Its primary mission was to protect French na-tionals against the growing violence. The second part of the mission was far more challenging. Its objective was to force a military status quo between the rebels and the Forces Armées Nationales de Côte d’Ivoire (FANCI) that would com-pel both parties to negotiate and avoid a definitive partition of the country.

24

Operation Licorne started as a heavy land-centric inter-vention that relied on the marine infantry battalion in Abidjan, reinforced by the paratroop companies stationed in Gabon and elements of the French Foreign Legion flown from France. The FAF used its tactical airlift to support the op-eration but initially did not deploy any combat aircraft. The only offensive airpower capability in the theater was pro-vided by four Gazelle light-attack helicopters from the French army. French forces succeeded in stopping the rebel advance on the capital in October 2002, and it seemed at first glance that they had achieved their mission of forcing both parties to negotiate during the Marcoussis peace talks held from �5 to 23 January 2003. In fact both the rebels and the FANCI were using the cease-fire to strengthen their military capabilities. By late 2002 and early 2003, the FANCI acquired four Mi-24 attack helicopters and two MiG-23MLDs from Bulgaria, four Su-25s from Belarus, and Israeli-made unmanned air vehicles. Mercenaries from South Africa and Eastern Europe provided the crews.

At the same time, relations between Paris and Abidjan became tenser because President Gbagbo’s partisans ac-cused France of not providing the necessary support to to-tally defeat the rebels. In December 2003 anti-French riots started in the Ivorian capital. These riots would continue during the spring of 2004, as the FANCI were preparing for a major offensive against the rebels. Breaking the cease-fire on 4 November 2004, the FANCI launched an air strike against rebel positions using two Su-25s. The FAF decided to deploy three Mirage F-�CTs with air-to-air armament to the theater, but political constraints prevented their basing in Abidjan. Stationed in Libreville, they could not provide the visible presence that could deter an escalation of the con-flict. On 6 November 2004 two Su-25s using 57 mm rockets deliberately targeted a French forward base in Bouake, kill-ing nine French soldiers and an American citizen. The French reaction was forceful. Using antitank missiles, French forces destroyed all FANCI offensive air assets on the ground, while they were refueling after the attack.59 The widespread anti-European violence that followed in Abidjan forced France to conduct an NEO on 7 November 2004. Gazelle helicopters protected the evacuation by keeping vital lines of communication open to French columns targeted

25

by rioters and elements of the FANCI. Also French troops had to secure the Abidjan airport after an FAF C-�60 suf-fered damage on the ground from an RPG-7 rocket.60

Despite this outburst of violence, both France and the Ivorian president were eager to avoid an escalation of the conflict. The latter was afraid that France would punish him by withdrawing the Licorne forces from the cease-fire line and letting the rebels capture the capital.6� By January 2005 all the parties involved were back to the negotiating table and agreed to respect the terms of the Marcoussis treaty.62 Since 2005 France has maintained a 3,000-man strong military presence in the Ivory Coast that provides a quick-reaction capability to the United Nations Operation in the Côte d’Ivoire set up to monitor the cease-fire.

Operation Licorne is still France’s largest and most con-troversial military intervention in Africa.63 At the operational level, the most striking aspect of the crisis, compared to other French operations in Africa, was the absence of any FAF combat aircraft deployed in the theater. Three main factors explain the lack of a stronger FAF presence. Ini-tially, the availability of a robust French army force was deemed sufficient to address the crisis. However, 2002 and 2003 saw periods of heavy fighting with determined and well-armed rebels. A preliminary French army assessment of the operation published in July 2004 stressed the need to provide the Licorne forces with more firepower and the need to address the threat posed by the combat aircraft acquired by the FANCI, which were already operating against rebel positions in violation of the cease-fire agree-ments.64 If airpower had been integrated in the planning of Licorne from the start of the operation, it would have ad-dressed the French army concerns and provided the fire-power and deterrent effect it had during Artemis. That it was not has enabled Mi-24s and Su-25s to violate the cease-fire in total impunity and ultimately attack French troops. In fact, in 2004 it was probably too late to deploy Mirage F-�s to Abidjan. Due to the growing anti-French feeling in the city and within the Ivorian government, the French JTF was not able to rely on Abidjan as a secure forward-operating base. The rocket strike against an FAF C-�60 is a case in point. This forced the FAF to base its airlift assets in Togo and deploy Mirage F-�s in Gabon, too far from the Ivory

26

Coast to provide any deterrent effect during the November 2004 crisis. The third factor concerns the French strategy and the political constraints it faced. After the Marcoussis treaty in January 2003, French authorities emphasized the peacekeeping status of Operation Licorne. It was hardly time to deploy highly visible combat aircraft even in Togo, despite the growing tension between France and the Ivorian government and the threat posed by the Ivorian air force.65

Conclusion

French airpower in postcolonial Africa has evolved from a limited supporting role in the early postcolonial era to bear-ing the brunt of the fight in Chad in �986–87. Its flexibility has permitted its adaptation to the RECAMP policy favored by the French political authorities after the Rwandan con-flict in �994, through the effective partnership with special forces. At the operational level, the French military has learned four principal lessons from its involvement in Africa. The first lesson learned is that the availability of secure forward operating bases is essential. Without them, deploy-ing forces is a long and painstaking process involving nego-tiations with potential host nations—hardly the ideal solu-tion when the crisis calls for a rapid response. This lesson tends to be forgotten by the political authorities, due to the cost associated with maintaining permanent bases in Africa. Accordingly, since �960 their number has declined steadily. Still, as former Licorne JFC, French army general Emman-uel Beth pointed out, “The cost to effectiveness ratio is in reality in favor of pre-positioning. When all is well, one con-siders it is expensive.”66

The second lesson learned concerns airlift support. The lack of a strategic airlift capability has plagued French op-erations since �960. The situation is even worse today, with the gradual phasing out of the C-�60 and the delays in its replacement program, the Airbus A-400M.67 The French air force has never truly addressed the issue, and French op-erations have strongly relied on external support, either from allies or through contracting with private air cargo companies.

A third lesson learned that has never been contradicted is the need for a robust ISR capability. In this domain

27

French airpower has fared better. Mirage F-�CRs and At-lantics have earned a well-deserved reputation as effective and complementary ISR platforms. They were instrumental in detecting enemy offensives in Mauritania and Chad.

The fourth lesson taught by the French operations high-lights a need to systematically integrate airpower into the planning of an operation. So far, successes and failures in this domain have alternated: Operation Artemis showed the efficiency of a truly joint planning process, whereas Licorne failed to include airpower in the initial planning when it was probably still possible to deploy fighters in the Ivory Coast. With the growing level of threat faced by French forces in Africa, it is all the more important for JFCs to sys-tematically include airpower in the joint campaign plan-ning. To effectively do so, they need a French airpower doc-trine at the operational level of war, a document that the FAF has not produced. Recent studies have pointed out the lack of doctrinal thinking other than at the tactical level in the FAF. The time has come to deliberate in a country where the administration budgetary process has recently con-verted to a “no concept, no money” approach!68

Notes

�. Initially, the reason for France’s involvement in its former colonies was economic because France wanted to protect its economic interests in young and potentially unstable countries. As part of the cooperation agreements signed in the �960s, France secured a monopoly on the procurement of such African agricultural products as bananas, peanuts, palm oil, and cocoa and of such strategic minerals as uranium. In the �980s uranium needed for the vast network of French nuclear reactors producing most of its electricity came almost exclusively from Africa (Niger, Gabon, and South Africa). French companies and large corporations maintained a strong presence in the former colonies, concentrated mostly in four countries: Senegal, the Ivory Coast, Cameroon, and Gabon. In these countries, French nationals managed plantations, oil extraction, and forest exploitation. In �989 French expatriates in Gabon numbered 27,000, which was the highest proportion of whites in any African country except South Africa. Still, the economic importance of former French colonies has gradually diminished since the �960s. The rise of the European Economic Community (EEC), promoting open markets, forced France to review its closed-market policy in Africa during the Yaounde and Lome conventions from �98� to �985. As more and more competitors gained access to Africa’s markets, France lost its monopolistic position, and its large corporations started diverting their investments to other continents. In 2007 trade with all African countries accounted for only �6

28

percent of French exports and �2 percent of its imports. When detailed per country, the level of trade with sub-Saharan Francophone countries has remained low compared to other parts of Africa. In �999 the total amount of exports to the four main economic partners of France in sub-Saharan Africa—Senegal, the Ivory Coast, Cameroon, and Gabon—totaled �2.� billion French francs, the same amount as the exports to Algeria alone. These figures show that the economic impact of Franco-African relations cannot explain the amount of French political and military involvement anymore. Ministère de l’économie, des finances et de l’industrie, “Aperçu du commerce extérieur de la France en 2007,” http://lekiosque.finances .gouv.fr/APPCHIFFRE/Etudes/tableaux/apercu.pdf.

2. Chipman, French Military Policy and African Security, 2.3. Facing an ongoing colonial war in Algeria, Charles de Gaulle attempted

to satisfy the calls for independence of the other French colonies in a more peaceful manner. His first step was the creation of the French community by the ordinance of 7 January �959. The aim was to provide the colonies with a certain degree of autonomy while preserving their unity under the French state, which would manage defense, security, and economic affairs on behalf of the community. The attempt was a failure due to the colonies’ stronger aspiration for independence. Fearing that further delays in the decolonization process would increase tensions, France granted independence to the colonies of the Afrique Occidentale Française and Afrique Equatoriale Française in �960. Pierre Bezbakh, Petit Larousse de l’Histoire de France, 73�.

4. Chipman, French Military Policy and African Security, 7.5. These two types of agreements guarantee France’s monopoly on

military matters in its former colonies. For example, Article 2 of the second annex of the defense agreement between France and Gabon states that “the Gabonese Republic, in consideration of the help granted by the French Republic, and in order to secure the standardization of armaments, contracts to call exclusively on the French Republic for the maintenance and renewal of its materials.” Chipman, French Military Policy and African Security, 6.

6. Ibid., 7.7. Ibid., ��.8. With Angola, Mozambique, Libya, and Somalia getting military

support from the Soviet Union, France was facing better-armed guerilla movements and states equipped with modern conventional forces that included combat aircraft. Lorell, Airpower in Peripheral Conflict, �2.

9. Publication Interarmées Instruction 03.�2�, Concept de renforcement des capacités africaines au maintien de la paix.

�0. Lorell, Airpower in Peripheral Conflict, 7.��. Ibid., �0.�2. Each squadron belonged to the 92d Bomber Wing of the 2d Tactical

Air Command (2 CATAC: Commandement Aérien Tactique) that would form the air component of the Joint Intervention Force. Lorell, Airpower in Peripheral Conflict, 9.

�3. McNamara, France in Black Africa, �65.�4. Lorell, Airpower in Peripheral Conflict, 67.�5. Ibid., 34.

29

�6. Ibid., �6.�7. Ibid., �9.�8. Facon et al., Abrégé d’histoire de l’aéronautique militaire et de l’Armée

de l’air, 5�.�9. Lorell, Airpower in Peripheral Conflict, 30.20. Ibid.2�. Facon et al., Abrégé d’histoire de l’aéronautique militaire et de l’Armée

de l’air, 5�.22. Lorell, Airpower in Peripheral Conflict, 34.23. Ibid., 35.24. Chipman, French Military Policy and African Security, �4.25. Ibid.26. Lorell, Airpower in Peripheral Conflict, 4�.27. Ibid., 43.28. Ibid., 45.29. Cooper, “Libyan Wars, �980–�989.”30. Lorell, Airpower in Peripheral Conflict, 46.3�. The process was cumbersome: if a fighter aircraft requested

permission to open fire, it had first to contact the Atlantic on patrol, which would forward the request to the French JTF headquarters (HQ) in N’Djamena. The JFC had then to contact the French JCS HQ in Paris, which would forward the request to the highest political level. The pilot on station would get an answer through the same channel. For example when the ALN closed down on French positions on 6 September �983, the French JFC launched two Jaguars and requested permission from Paris to open fire. It took more than one hour for the request to be processed, and by the time the JFC received an answer, the Jaguars had already turned back. Lorell, Airpower in Peripheral Conflict, 46.

32. Ibid., 48.33. Ibid., 49.34. Martel, Histoire Militaire de la France, 563.35. Lorell, Airpower in Peripheral Conflict, 50.36. Martel, Histoire Militaire de la France, 563.37. Chipman, French Military Policy and African Security, �9.38. The main reason was France’s unwillingness to provide direct

combat support to the FANT in its fight against the ALN, perceived as a purely internal conflict. The FANT would have to address the threat posed by the ALN on its own. Lorell, Airpower in Peripheral Conflict, 56.

39. Rouvez, Disconsolate Empires, �60.40. Lorell, Airpower in Peripheral Conflict, 55.4�. Rouvez, Disconsolate Empires, �60.42. Lorell, Airpower in Peripheral Conflict, 57.43. Cooper, “Libyan Wars, �980–�989.” 44. Dessornes, “The Chadian Affair: A French Hawk Battery Engaged a

Tupolev 22 Bomber.”45. Rouvez, Disconsolate Empires, �62.46. Cooper, “Libyan Wars, �980–�989.”47. Rouvez, Disconsolate Empires, 348.48. Ibid., 346.49. Ibid., 352.

30

50. Hansen, “The French Military in Africa.”5�. The French Special Operations Command (SOC) is one of the

youngest major commands of the French military. Created in �992 as a result of lessons learned during Operation Desert Storm, it is a joint organization whose air component includes an FAF transport squadron equipped with both C-�60s and C-�30s and an FAF helicopter squadron with the new long-range EC-725 Caracal. The FAF also provides the �0th Air Commando Group for the land component.

52. Andres, Willis, and Griffith, Jr., “Winning with Allies.” 53. Publication Armée de l’air 03.��0, Coopération équipages-forces

spéciales dans le cadre des missions d’appui aérien. Concept d’emploi air.54. Le Saint, “Coopération équipages–forces spéciales dans le cadre

des missions d’appui aérien–concept d’emploi air.”55. Wodka-Gallien, “The Tricolor Aloft: French Air Force Operations in

2003,” 58.56. In the Central African Republic (CAR) in the spring of 2007, French

special forces provided targeting information to Mirage F-�s flying from N’Djamena to support CAR forces trying to repel rebel columns at the Chadian border.

57. From its independence until the death of its first president, Felix Houphouët-Boigny, in �995, the Ivory Coast served as a model of development and economic growth for African countries. France maintained a strong economic presence in the country where 25,000 French nationals were living in 2002, coupled with a permanent military base in Abidjan hosting a marine infantry battalion and two FAF light helicopters. After the death of its emblematic ruler, the Ivory Coast experienced a slow process of economic recession and political destabilization, which culminated in the 2002 coup against Pres. Laurent Gbagbo. The rebels failed to oust the ruling president but succeeded in conquering the north part of the country where they had widespread support. From there, they attempted to launch an offensive against the capital. Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, L’Afrique subsaharienne d’une crise à l’autre, ��–�2.

58. Initially President Gbagbo called for the implementation of the defense agreement with France in case of a foreign aggression. The French government refused because the crisis was an internal issue that involved no foreign aggressor. Indeed, more than 90 percent of the rebels were Ivorian, the rest being immigrants from neighboring countries that came into the Ivory Coast when its economy was booming. Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, L’Afrique subsaharienne d’une crise à l’autre, 23.

59. French forces also arrested the Eastern European mercenaries who had formed the bulk of the FANCI air arm and turned them over to their respective countries’ ambassadors.

60. Cooper and Mladenov, “Cote d’Ivoire, since 2002.”6�. Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, L’Afrique subsaharienne

d’une crise à l’autre, �6.62. Ibid., �4.63. A French observer even called it “France’s little Iraq.” See Hansen,

“The French Military in Africa.” Still, proponents of the French intervention have stressed its success in preventing large-scale massacres like those in

3�

neighboring Sierra Leone and Liberia. Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, L’Afrique subsaharienne d’une crise à l’autre, �7.

64. Division Recherche et Retour d’Expérience, Enseignements de l’opération LICORNE (Septembre 2002–Juillet 2004).

65. Ibid., 42.66. Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, L’Afrique subsaharienne

d’une crise à l’autre, 27.67. “Long-term Consequences,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, �2

November 2007, 52–53.68. Verstappen, “Regards croises sur les stratégies aériennes américaine,

britannique et française.”

33

Appendix A

Background on the History of the French Colonial Empire in Africa

Except Algeria, where the French presence began in 1830, most of the French colonial empire in Africa is a legacy of the Third Republic and such visionaries as Jules Ferry and Leon Gambetta, who started an aggressive expansion policy in the 1880s. On the eve of the First World War, France had established its colonial administration over most of western Africa. Its possessions further expanded when it took con-trol of German colonies—Togo and Cameroon in 1918, and the administration remained unchanged until decoloniza-tion started in 1960.

The French administration assumed three different forms in Africa. Algeria received special treatment due to the Eu-ropeans who had settled there and accounted for a third of the population in 1960. No longer considered a colony, it became an integral part of France in 1848. Still, the native population had almost no political rights and thus no influ-ence on the local political life, which was entirely in the hands of the Europeans. Tunisia and Morocco were protec-torates; that is, the French ruled by controlling the local monarchy. Finally, the administration of the vast expanses of sub-Saharan Africa in western and central Africa and in Madagascar relied entirely on French colonial agency offi-cials assigned there on a dual-purpose mission: first deal-ing with economics and the exploitation of Africa’s raw ma-terial resources and agricultural products and also fulfilling a moral obligation to bring the benefits of civilization to the natives. This mission civilisatrice (civilizing mission) spread the French culture and language to make assimilation pos-sible. As Francis Terry McNamara points out, “French lin-guistic and cultural proselytizing has been coupled with a willingness to accept as equals people who have acquired a good knowledge of French. This missionary zeal has had a subtle but substantial influence on wider French national influence and power.”1 This point would have a strong im-pact on the decolonization process. By having promoted a francophone elite, France was able to achieve a peaceful

34

transfer of power to new heads of state who were friendly to the French cause and in most cases were eager to keep strong ties with their former colonial power. These ties would assume the form of cooperation agreements with im-portant defense-related clauses. In these countries that had composed the Afrique Occidentale Française (AOF: French Occidental Africa) and the Afrique Equatoriale Française (AEF: French Equatorial Africa) France would exert the strongest postcolonial political and military influence.

Note

1. McNamara, France in Black Africa, 127.

35

Abbreviations

AAR air-to-airrefuelingACSC AirCommandandStaffCollegeALN ArméedeLibérationNationaleANT ArméeNationaleduTchadC2 commandandcontrolCAR CentralAfricanRepublicCAS closeairsupportCOIN counterinsurgencyCRAF CivilReserveAirFleetDCA defensivecounterairDRC DemocraticRepublicofCongoECOWAS EconomicCommunityofWesternAfrican

StatesEEC EuropeanEconomicCommunityELINT electronicintelligenceEU EuropeanUnionFAF FrenchAirForceFANCI ForcesArméesNationalesdeCôted’IvoireFANT ForcesArméesNationalesTchadiennesFROLINAT FrontdeLibérationNationaleGUNT Gouvernementd’UnitéNationaledeTransitionHQ headquartersISB intermediatestagingbaseISR intelligence,surveillance,andreconnaissanceJCS JointChiefsofStaffJIF JointInterventionForceJFC jointforcecommanderJTF jointtaskforceKM kilometerLAF LibyanairforceLGB laser-guidedbombMM millimeterMONUC UnitedNationsMissioninDRCNATO NorthAtlanticTreatyOrganizationNEO noncombatantevacuationoperationOCA offensivecounterairOEF OperationEnduringFreedomPSF FrenchSocialistParty

36

RECAMP RenforcementdesCapacitésAfricainesdeMaintiendelaPaix

REP RégimentEtrangerParachutisteROE rulesofengagementRPIMA RégimentParachutisted’InfanteriedeMarineSEAD suppressionofenemyairdefenseSOC SpecialOperationsCommand

37

Bibliography

Andres, Richard B., Craig Willis, and Thomas E. Griffith, Jr. “Winning with Allies: The Strategic Value of the Af-ghan Model.” In Applied Warfare Course Academic Year 2008 Coursebook, edited by Sharon McBride. Maxwell AFB, AL, 2007.

Arnold, Guy. Wars in the Third World since 1945. London, UK: Cassell Villiers House, 1995.

Bezbakh, Pierre. Petit Larousse de l’Histoire de France. Paris, France: Editions Larousse, March 2004.

Blake, David. “The French Connection in Africa.” Military Peri-scope, 13 March 2007. http://www.militaryperiscope .com/special/special-200703131112.shtml (accessed 14 November 2007).

Boré, Col Henri. “French Army Experience in Africa.” Military Review, July–August 2006, 108–11.

Chipman, John S. French Military Policy and African Se-curity. Adelphi Papers no. 201. London, UK: Interna-tional Institute for Strategic Studies, 1985.

Cooper, Tom. “Libyan Wars, 1980–1989.” Air Combat Infor-mation Group. 13 November 2003. http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article_357.shtml (accessed 26 Feb-ruary 2008).

Cooper, Tom, and Alexander Mladenov. “Cote d’Ivoire, since 2002.” Air Combat Information Group, 5 August 2004. http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/printer_463 .shtml (accessed 22 October 2007).

Dallaire, Roméo, and Brent Beardsley. Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda. Toronto, Canada: Random House Canada, 2003.

Dessornes, Gaston J. “The Chadian Affair: A French Hawk Battery Engaged a Tupolev 22 Bomber.” Air Defense Artillery Online, 22 September 2007.

Devlin, Larry. Chief of Station, Congo: Fighting the Cold War in a Hot Zone. Cambridge, MA: Public Affairs, 2007.

Division Recherche et Retour d’Expérience. Enseignements de l’opération LICORNE (Septembre 2002–Juillet 2004). Paris, France: Centre de doctrine et d’emploi des forces, 1 July 2004.

38

———. Répertoire typologique des opérations-Tome 2 (Afrique). Paris, France: Centre de doctrine et d’emploi des forces, February 2006.

Facon, Patrick, Claude d’Abzac, Marie-Catherine Dubreil, and François Pernot. Abrégé d’histoire de l’aéronautique militaire et de l’Armée de l’air. Paris, France: Centre d’enseignement supérieur aérien, June 1998.

Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique. L’Afrique subsa-harienne d’une crise à l’autre. Reports of the sympo-sium, 5 February 2007.

Gaulme, François. “La politique française d’intervention dans les conflits limités en Afrique.” Penser les Ailes Françaises 13 (April 2007): 6–11.

Gaussères, Gen Rémy. “Les enseignements de Kolwezi.” Les Cahiers du Retex 12 (28 April 2005): 27–36.

Gordon, April A., and Donald L. Gordon, eds. Understanding Contemporary Africa. Boulder, CO: Lynn Rienner, 2007.

Gregoire, Joseph Philippe. The Bases of French Peace Op-erations Doctrine: Problematical Scope of France’s Mili-tary Engagements within the UN or NATO Framework. Strategy Research Project. Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, 9 April 2002.

Hansen, Andrew. “The French Military in Africa.” Council on Foreign Relations, 22 March 2007. http://www.cfr.org/publication/12578/ (accessed 14 November 2007).

Kuperman, Alan J. Limits of Humanitarian Intervention: Genocide in Rwanda. Washington, DC: Brookings In-stitution Press, 2001.

Kwiatkowski, Lt Col Karen U. Expeditionary Air Operations in Africa–Challenges and Solutions. Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 2001.

Le Saint, Maj Jean-Patrice. “Coopération équipages–forces spéciales dans le cadre des missions d’appui aérien–concept d’emploi air.” Penser les Ailes Françaises 13 (April 2007): 110–18.

Lorell, Mark A. Airpower in Peripheral Conflict: The French Ex-perience in Africa. Project Air Force report no. R-3660-AF. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, January 1989.

Magyar, Karl P., and Constantine P. Danopoulos, eds. Pro-longed Wars: A Post-Nuclear Challenge. Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, March 2005.

39

Martel, André, ed. Histoire Militaire de la France 4 (De 1940 à nos jours). Paris, France: Presses Universitaires de France, 1994.

McNamara, Francis Terry. France in Black Africa. Washing-ton, DC: National Defense University, 1989.

Odom, Lt Col Thomas P. Shaba II: The French and Belgian Intervention in Zaire in 1978. Combat Studies Insti-tute. Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, 1992.

Publication Armée de l’air 03.110. Coopération équipages-forces spéciales dans le cadre des missions d’appui aé-rien. Concept d’emploi air, April 2007.

Publication Interarmées Instruction 03.121. Concept de renforcement des capacités africaines au maintien de la paix, 21 September 2004.

Publication Interarmées Instruction 1000. Doctrine interar-mées d’emploi des forces en opération, September 2001.

Publication Interarmées Instruction 2000. Doctrine interar-mées du commandement en opération, July 2001.

Rouvez, Alain. Disconsolate Empires: French, British and Bel-gian Military Involvement in Post-Colonial Sub-Saharan Africa. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1994.

Smith, Dan. Penguin Atlas of War and Peace. 4th edition. New York: Penguin, 2003.

Somerville, Keith. Foreign Military Intervention in Africa. London, UK: Pinter Publishers, 1990.

Touchet, Valérie de, and Claude d’Absac-Epezy. “L’aviation militaire française au Tchad, des origines à nos jours.” Revue historique des armées 225 (2001).

Verstappen, Caroline. “Regards croises sur les stratégies aéri-ennes américaine, britannique et française.” http://www.c2sd.sga.defense.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/c2sd_synth _dedurand.pdf (accessed 12 March 2009).

Wodka-Gallien, Philippe. “The Tricolor Aloft: French Air Force Operations in 2003.” Journal of Electronic De-fense, March 2004, 56–61.