the emergence of the state in 16th century japan from oda to tokugawa

The Society for Japanese Studies

The Emergence of the State in Sixteenth-Century Japan: From Oda to TokugawaAuthor(s): Wakita OsamuSource: Journal of Japanese Studies, Vol. 8, No. 2 (Summer, 1982), pp. 343-367Published by: The Society for Japanese StudiesStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/132343 .Accessed: 10/03/2014 06:50

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THE WORLD SEEN FROM JAPAN

WAKITA OSAMU

The Emergence of the State in Sixteenth-Century Japan: From Oda to Tokugawa

From the -beginning of the Sengoku turmoil to the establishment of the Tokugawa Bakufu, Japan underwent a century and a half of fundamental transformation. Our knowledge of these turbulent centuries increased significantly during the 1970s because of the continuing efforts of many historians. One of the important accom- plishments of the decade was the binational Sengoku conference held in 1977 which provided an active forum for discussion among Japanese and American scholars.'

The principal intent of this brief essay is to analyze the transformation that occurred in the structure of political power during the two centuries that culminated in the establishment of the Tokugawa Bakufu. I have chosen this topic for the following reasons: This is the topic that emerged as one of the central foci of the analyses of these centuries undertaken by Japanese specialists during the past decade, and it was also an important question raised in the binational conference. Perhaps most importantly, this is the topic on which I have completed two studies in the past decade,2 and I have some

1. J. W. Hall, K. Nagahara, and K. Yamamura eds., Sengoku-jidai (Yoshikawa Kobunkan, 1978). An English edition of this book entitled Japan Before Tokugawa: Political Consolidation and Economic Growth, 1500-1650 (Princeton: Princeton Uni- versity Press, 1981). Of the books published by Japanese scholars during the past several years, the following two, which indicate the new directions in research, are worthy of special attention by Western specialists: Katsumata Shizuo, Sengoku-h& seiritsu-shi-ron (A study of the history of the development of the Sengoku laws) (Tokyo University Press, 1979); and Nagahara Keiji, ed., Sengoku-ki no kenryoku to shakai (Political power and society in the Sengoku period) (Tokyo University Press, 1976).

2. Wakita Osamu, Oda-seiken no kiso-kozo (The basic structure of the Oda rule) (University of Tokyo Press, 1975), and Kinsei hokensei seiritsu-shi-ron (A study of the history of the emergence of the kinsei feudalism) (Tokyo University Press, 1977).

Journal of Japanese Studies, 8:2 ) 1982 Society for Japanese Studies


344 Journal of Japanese Studies

reflections that I would like to present to American specialists of this period. I have already published in English my analyses of the kokudaka system and the growth of the urban commerce of the period,3 but this is the first opportunity I have had to present my analysis of the topic of this essay to Western readers. I shall be most gratified if this modest effort can contribute toward encouraging the study of this period by Western scholars.

Since this paper is based on my -views of the period we call kinsei, let me add here a brief note to indicate the basic points of my view. Heretofore, the predominant view of Japanese scholars has been that the kinsei period was feudal in its purest and typical form. I too have no doubt that the social organization called the bakuhan system was feudal. However, whether we compare the kinsei period generally with Western European feudalism or with the Japanese medieval period, investigation of the substance of this period reveals many special characteristics-such as the dominance of the power possessed by the emerging central government, the separation of the military and peasant classes, the kokudaka system, and the like- that seem to be unique to the kinsei period. For this reason, I maintain that the kinsei period was a period of "transfigured" feudalism. The dominant view, long held by many, argues that the kinsei was a period that emerged as a result of the development and progress of a feudal system. However, I believe that the kinsei system evolved at the end of the medieval period because the feudal system as it then existed had lost its stability, because various non-feudal developments grew visible, and because the military rulers (buke-ryoshu) had to cope with these socio-political changes.

In this paper I shall examine the emergence of the kinsei period, focusing on the process of consolidation of the central power in order to better understand the position which the central power attained over the nation, the feudal relationships that developed, and the qualitative differences in the political power established by the three unifiers of Japan.4

I. Acquisition of the Power of the State

According to the works of many earlier Japanese historians, the emergence of a central power occurred as a result of the evolution of

3. Wakita Osamu, "The Kokudaka System: A Device for Unification," The Journal of Japanese Studies, Vol. 1, No. 2 (Spring 1975), and "Oda Nobunaga's Policies Towards Commerce and Cities" in Sengoku-jidai, cited in footnote 1.

4. Because of the page limitations of this article, I am unable to discuss problems relating to the daimyo domains.


Wakita: From Oda to Tokugawa 345

the feudal power structure which was based primarily on local powers (the zaichi ryoshu system). But the recent focus of analysis of most scholars has shifted, and the central question now asked is not how the creation of central power evolved from a medieval base, but how the central powers that emerged came to possess what we can regard as the powers of state. Given this new focus of analysis, one of the most important questions to be analyzed is how the unifiers of Japan-Nobunaga, Hideyoshi, and-Ieyasu-came either to supplant the powers of state that had existed or to create the power structure that became a nation-state. This is the reason why Japanese historians have begun to show interest, for example, in Sengoku daimyo Imagawa Yoshimoto's declaration to "promulgate the rules of the domain on the strength of my own power" -not as a shugo appointed by the Muromachi Bakufu-and in the frequent references of the Sengoku daimyo to their "public" authority (kagi) in order to legitimatize power that they claimed they possessed.5 Hence, more scholars have begun to view the holders of political power in this period as increasingly claiming that they possessed legitimate "public" power, that is, they were not inclined to admit that they were supplanting the established power of state, either the Muromachi Bakufu or the Emperor.6

There is little doubt that the Sengoku daimyo represented the zenith of the feudal power structure that was based on the strength of local powers. Nor would many question that the foundation of the political power of the unifiers was the same feudal power structure. However, we should note that the process of the consolidation of the power pursued by the unifiers could not have occurred without their being fully cognizant of the power of the state that existed. That is,

5. An excellent and handy article on kogi is Fukaya Katsumi, "K6gi to mibunsei" (Kogi and the status system), Taikei Nihon Kokkashi 3: Kinsei (Tokyo University Press, 1975). Note, however, that the historical questions that we can analyze through an examination of kogi and related concepts are limited. This is the reason why my analysis is focused upon the structure and uses of power.

6. Asao Naohiro, "Shogun kenryoku no soshitsu" (1.2) (Creation of shogunal power) Rekishi Hy5ron, No. 241 (August, 1970) No. 266 (August 1972) represents such a view. Also see, by the same author, "Bakuhan-sei to tenno" (The bakufu- domain system and the Emperor), Taikei Nihon Kokkashi cited in the preceding footnote. In the latter, Asao examines the emergence of the shogunal power as a process of creating a central political structure. I too believe that the central power structure of this period emerged by overcoming and supplanting the existing structure, but I differ from Asao and others on the process by which this was accomplished. As I stress in the text, I believe the emerging power had to make use of the existing power structure, one way or another, in the process of creating its own central power structure.



the unifiers, in their respective efforts to gain central power, had to grapple with the same problems that the warrior rulers of the Kamakura and Muromachi Bakufu had faced in claiming the power to rule. We must examine, therefore, what these unifiers retained as the legacies of the earlier warrior rulers and what they created anew in consolidating their power.

The central political power of the medieval period was maintained by and shared among the nobles, religious entities, and warriors, and the entire power structure was built around the Emperor. This characterizes the power structure of the Kamakura Bakufu. However, by the time of Yoshimitsu, the Muromachi Bakufu itself had come to possess power analogous to the power of state. As is well-known, Yoshimitsu was a "de facto king."7 He was, as the seii-taisho6gun, the leader of the warrior class, and at the same time he was able to exercise the powers of state, i.e., the rights of diplomacy to the extent that he could refer to himself as "the King of Japan" in documents transmitted to Ming China. Indicative of the position Yoshimitsu came to possess vis-a-vis the Emperor's, the latter was willing to posthumously grant Yoshimitsu the title of Emperor Daijd. Though this offer was declined by Yoshimitsu's son, it is known that Yoshimitsu, late in his life, was accorded all the honors usually reserved for a retired Emperor and that he frequently received "imperial visits."8 This practice was continued to the Tokugawa period, and Iemitsu too was accorded honors similar to those given a retired Emperor.9

Even Yoshiaki, the last of the Ashikaga Shoguns, continued to exercise power similar to that which Yoshimitsu had possessed. When the Regent (kanpaku), Konoe Sakihisa, left his position against Yoshiaki's wishes, Yoshiaki deprived the offending noble of his title. In this instance, Yoshiaki was clearly punishing a noble for disobeying a shogunal order. Under the established procedures of the Court, a Shogun could not deal with a noble in this fashion. Most likely, Yoshiaki meted out punishment in the name of the Emperor, but no one, seeing what occurred, could doubt that the real power of the state was now in the hands of the Shogun.10 The reason why

7. Satd Shin'ichi, Nanbokuch5 no d5ran (The turmoil of the Nanbokuchd [period]) (ChfJ6 Kironsha, 1965).

8. I am indebted to Professor Nagahara Keiji for bringing this fact to my attention. 9. Shimohashi Yukiosa, Bakumatsu no kyutei (The imperial court during the

Bakumatsu [period]), (Heibonsha, -1979), p. 219. Iemitsu was accorded respect similar to that given to the father of an Emperor.

10. In "the appointments of the kugy&" (kugy5 bunin) made by Yoshiaki, five



Nobunaga and other Sengoku daimyo came to Kyoto in their efforts to demonstrate that they possessed the power to rule the nation was the existence of this shogunal power, which had been held by the Shogun in the Muromachi Bakufu. In Nobunaga's case, he came to Kyoto after the fall of the Bakufu to attempt to claim this power. The questions we must ask are: Did Nobunaga attempt to gain this power as the head of the warrior class? What was his relationship to the Emperor, to the nobles, and to the religious powers?

Nobunaga's attitude towards imperial titles and ranks was complex. While the Muromachi Bakufu continued to exist (even if in name only), he declined all ranks above that of Danj6chi, and only after the fall of the Bakufu in 1573 did he choose to become a kugyo-the highest rank in the court. By becoming a kugyo, he was now formally able to participate in the affairs of state. Before Nobunaga, only warriors who attained the rank of Shogun had been given kugyo rank. Subsequently, Nobunaga became Gondainagon and Ukon'etaisho in 1574 and Udaijin in 1576. During these years, he relinquished the headship of the Oda house to his son Nobutada and moved into Azuchi castle to enjoy the life of a tenkajin, an undisputed leader of the preeminent warrior house that exerted real military power over the nation.

In 1577, Nobunaga resigned from the positions of Udaijin (the Minister of the Right) and Ukon'etaishd (the Right general of the imperial guard) and thereafter refused to accept any title offered him. He met his sudden demise in 1582 before he was able to respond to the Court inquiry as to which title he would prefer: kanpaku, dajd-daijin, or Shogun. Noting this fact, some scholars have entertained the possibility that Nobunaga was thinking of establishing a central political power that was free of any formal aid from, thus totally independent of, the existing power structure of the state. In support of this view, some have even speculated that Nobunaga demanded that the Emperor Ogimachi abdicate, even at the cost of seriously offending the court, especially the Emperor. I '

My own view, judging from Nobunaga's overall conduct, is that he intended to establish a political structure of his own, making use of the powers of the Shogun, which were well established by prece-

kugya are listed who displeased him by disobeying "the commands of the warrior." See Kokushi taikei (Yoshikawa Kobunkan, 1965).

11. This interpretation made by Asao in his "Bakuhan-se to tenno," p. 199, and by Fujiki Hisashi, who agrees with Asao in his "The Politics of Oda Nobunaga," in Sengoku Jidai, cited in footnote 1, is in error. See my Kinsei hokensei seiritsu shiron, p. 268.



dent. He chose to become a kugyo and thus formally became part of the existing political structure.'2 He then was given the title of Ukon'etaisho, which formally made him the leader of the warrior class, as was Minamoto Yoritomo who had received the same title several centuries earlier.

The tradition that only a Minamoto could be Shogun prevented Nobunaga from becoming the seii-taisho-gun, both because he was a descendant of the Taira lineage and because Ashikaga Yoshiaki was still alive in a domain controlled by the Mdri. That the imperial court took such a tradition seriously is demonstrated in the case of Hideyoshi -(as described below). Nobunaga, familiar with these tra- ditions and the attitude of the court, chose not to challenge the court on this matter. Perhaps this was because the title of seii-taishogun was of limited importance to Nobunaga, who had already held and resigned from a court rank that was sufficiently high for his purposes. We should be aware here that the custom of the court was to respect the highest rank a person had ever held. In any case, as Nobunaga intimated in his letter of resignation from these ranks, he was fully intending to accept the highest positions that the court was able to offer when he had established undisputed power over the nation.

I do not deny the possibility that a man such as Nobunaga, who rose to power from lowly origins, might have been resentful of the Emperor and the court. However, it is an error to infer that Nobunaga chose to confront the court to the extent of demanding the abdication of an Emperor. In any event, it is difficult to believe that the court would have resisted demands made by Nobunaga. After all, he possessed the power once held by an Ashikaga Shogun who was a "de facto king." In 1576, Nobunaga intervened in the selection of the head abbot for the Kifuku-ji and placed the kuge who opposed his decision under temporary house arrest. In doing so, he was exercising his power over the nobles and temples. He went even further and exerted his power to assure the rights to, or to make restitution of, landholdings of the kuge, the temples, and even of the imperial household. It is also known that Nobunaga granted some land to the kuge and ordered that all the land that had belonged

12. The fact that it was necessary for Nobunaga to hold this position despite the weakening of the Shogun, the Emperor, and the kuge, may be thought strange. However, even in the Sengoku period, during which position was determined by ability, it was necessary to occupy a position established within the power structure in order to acquire a stable position of authority.



to the kuge 3 residing in Kyoto during the previous hundred years be returned to them. 14 In these instances, Nobunaga was indicating that he was willing to use his power for the benefit of the court and its members if they would help establish his dominance over the Em- peror and the court.

To the same end, Nobunaga in 1579 adopted a prince, a son of the Emperor Ogimachi, and also hosted a ceremony to inspect mounted warriors for the Emperor. The adoption of an imperial prince meant that Nobunaga would become the father-in-law of the next Emperor, thus assuring him of a position analogous to that held by a retired Emperor. Also, the fact that he set aside in the Azuchi castle a special room for imperial visits clearly indicated his anticipation that the adopted prince, after ascending the throne, would make frequent imperial visits to his father-in-law. By all of these means, Nobunaga was strengthening his power within the existing political structure and was attempting to build a political foundation for Oda rule. His strategy apparently was to inherit the power once held by the Ashikaga Shogun.

Hideyoshi followed Nobunaga as the ruler of the nation. Hideyoshi's attitude towards court titles and ranks was straight- forward. After being denied his wish to be made seii-taishogun because of his humble birth, he asked to be "adopted" by Ashikaga Yoshiaki. Yoshiaki refused the request. Thereupon, Hideyoshi, still eager to obtain the title, succeeded in being "adopted" by Konoe Sakihisa, who could provide Hideyoshi with a fictive but essential "lineage" to the Fujiwara. This proved sufficient for his purposes, and he was, as is well-known, named kanpaku.

What is the significance of the new power structure that was presided over by a kanpaku? In substance, the kanpaku in this case differed little from a Shogun. In everyone's mind, these terms were virtually synonymous. However, in form, which is meaningful in

13. In his "Oda seiken no kihon rosen" (The basic course of the Oda rule), Kokushigaku, No. 100 (1976), p. 33, Okuno Takahiro stated that this was analogous to giving a formal fief under the vermilion seal of Hideyoshi. However, the kinsei kokudaka system had not yet been established. Okuno wrote that the shoen system had been abolished by Nobunaga by that time, but he provided no evidence to support his argument. I fear that he failed to understand my analysis.

14. In the medieval period, statutes of limitation ordinarily became effective after 20 years. In the case of Tokugawa decrees, the same statutes of limitation were in effect and land did not need to be returned to the original owner if the transaction had occurred 20 or more years previously. Nobunaga ignored established custom and extended the limit to 100 years.


350 S Journal of Japanese Studies

analyzing the structure of political power, rule by a kanpaku was distinctive and deserves careful analysis.

The kanpaku was the highest position that a kuge, a member of the nobility, could attain. This meant that Hideyoshi, the leader of the warriors, occupied the highest position among the kuge. Thus, unlike a Shogun whose formal power extended only over the warriors, Hideyoshi as kanpaku had authority over the kuge, temples, and shrines, as well as over the warriors. In this sense, by becoming kanpaku, Hideyoshi succeeded in establishing political power that encompassed both the court authority and that of a military ruler. For us, looking back at this period, the establishment of a unified authority may mean only that the civil wars had ended and a central national authority had emerged. But, for the people of the time, the unification of the two powers was extremely significant.

The role of a kanpaku was to counsel and to act on behalf of the Emperor in all aspects of national governance. Thus, the power of Hideyoshi as kanpaku was inseparable from that of the throne. He was even able to rule on matters directly relating to the court, and he is known to have ruled on the seating order in the court of the princes and others who enjoyed status approximating that of the Empress and the former Empresses. Such all-inclusive power made Hideyoshi the supreme power in the nation and transformed the significance of the office of kanpaku.15

The unprecedented character of the Toyotomi rule was not limited to the transformation of the power of the kanpaku. Another important change under Hideyoshi was to make many of the powerful Sengoku daimyo kugyo. Though only Yoshiaki and Nobunaga as the heads of the warrior class had been made kugyo before this time, Hideyoshi's adopted son, Hidetsugu, and his brother, Hidenaga, as well as several other daimyo, were made kugyo by Hideyoshi. The daimyo who became kugyo included Tokugawa Ieyasu, Tokugawa Hidetada, Ukita Hideie, Uesugi Kagekatsu, Mori Terumoto, Maeda Toshiie, Maeda Toshinaga, and Kobayakawa Takakage. It was clear that in elevating these daimyo to the kugyo ranks, Hideyoshi succeeded in placing them within the formal structure of the central political authority and, at the same time, he strengthened the lord- vassal ties between Hideyoshi and these kugy6-daimyo.

That these daimyo were made kugyo for other practical reasons soon became evident. When Hidetsugu, who became kanpaku fol-

15. Hideyoshi was a kanpaku but was also referred to as Shogun, and he himself believed he was a kanpaku who was unlike all other kanpaku who preceded him.



lowing Hideyoshi, died in 1595, six daimyo-Jeyasu, Hideie, Kagekatsu, Toshiie, Terumoto, and Takakage-drafted and cosigned a document. It was a simple document, but it contained rules concerning the duties that must be performed by these daimyo (who also were kuge) and the religious bodies. What occurred was that by means of this document a small group of daimyo-kugyo was issuing rules of conduct and duties to be obeyed by the nobles and the temples.

Five of these daimyo (the six cosigners minus Takakage, who died subsequently) became Senior councillors (tairb), and, as noted in the Kobayakawa Keizu, they were charged in their formal capacity as kugyo with the task of "governing the nation." In appearance, they were only following a long-established tradition. But we must not forget that five other daimyo were bugyo (magistrates) who acted on behalf of the Toyotomi house. The five tairo constituted a political body that exercised supreme power within the nation from the death of Hideyoshi until the battle of Sekigahara. It was this body that ordered the withdrawal of the expeditionary force from Korea and issued documents allocating or recognizing the fiefs of the warriors. In short, this body acted as a national authority, not because it drew its power from the principle of lord-vassal relationships, but because it was a formal part of the central government. This fact is significant in explaining why, following the death of Hideyoshi, Tokugawa Ieyasu, who was Naidaijin and the leader of the five senior councillors, had an important basis from which to demand undisputed political power.'6

The power of the Tokugawa government was that of a Shogun, i.e., the power of the warrior class. But in governing the nation, the Tokugawa government followed the precedent of Toyotomi rule which had effectively merged the power of the head of the warrior class with that of the throne and the court. However, one can readily imagine that the Tokugawa government must have faced a problem in emulating the political framework of its predecessor. Though Hideyoshi's government was a k6bu government, i.e., a unified civil (or court) and military government by virtue of the fact that Hideyoshi was a kanpaku, the Tokugawa government was not.

16. Strictly speaking, the Toyotomi house was the liege lord of Tokugawa Ieyasu. However, after the death of Hideyoshi, Ieyasu, holding the court rank of naidaijin, became the head of the warrior class. Since only the Shogun became kuge in the Ashikaga Bakufu, the Toyotomi rule, which established its power within the framework of the Bakufu, could be considered in a formal sense to have relied more on the formal power of the Court than did Ieyasu.



Ieyasu was never made kanpaku. For Ieyasu, there was the question of whether he should be made kanpaku, but he considered a government headed by a kanpaku to have a fundamental weakness: the very title of kanpaku signified too close a relationship to the Em- peror. This was not acceptable to Ieyasu, who had no wish to maintain a close relationship with the Emperor whose authority he hoped to weaken- even further.

However, if he was to be only a Shogun, it meant that a noble would become kanpaku and enjoy the powers given him by the established tradition of the time. How could he prevent the appearance of a powerful kanpaku? Though Ieyasu took no action until after he had destroyed the Toyotomi house, upon his victory at Osaka he issued various regulations (hatto) that specified and limited the rights of the court, the nobles, and the religious bodies. And he declared that the kuge rank held by warriors should have "no significance." By these laws and decrees, Ieyasu was, in effect, declaring that the supreme political power of the nation resided with the Shogun, and that his political power was totally independent of the civil political structure. The Tokugawa rule was thus based on the supreme power of the Shogun and was carried out exclusively by the Bakufu, the Shogun's administration.

II. Development of the Feudal System in the Sixteenth Century

We have seen how the head of the warrior class first defined his position within the existing political structure and then deprived that structure of its political power in order to create a new central political structure of his own. This was not just a political maneuver which affected only the capital. Rather, it must be seen as part of the development of the feudal system, a development that reflected the broad transformation of society during the sixteenth century.

What were the most important developments that characterized the feudalism of this century? The separation of the warrior and the peasant classes (heinof-bunri) and the creation of the kokudaka system undoubtedly were the two most important. Thus, we must ask what specific characteristics of the emerging feudal system brought about these developments. We must also ask in what ways the process by which the new political power established itself impinged upon these developments.

The principal reason why hein6-bunri was important was not because it formalized the class distinctions between warriors and peasants, but because it caused the warriors to live in the cities,



leaving their land, the basis of their power and upon which they had built their medieval world. To establish a central military power structure that could more effectively dominate the peasants, the warriors' power had to be concentrated in the cities. And, for the same reason, the peasants were deprived of their arms by the sword-hunt (katana-gari). In short, because of these developments, the warriors were removed from their private landholdings which served as their power base; they were integrated into the feudal lord-vassal system in which the dominance of lords became better established; the collective strength of the warriors was enhanced; and both residence and occupation of warrior and peasant came to be fixed, all of which created a new system of social status.

There was a pressing reason for the separation of warrior and peasant during the Sengoku period. Peasant uprisings (do-ikki) occurred mostly in the regions in which landholdings-thus political power-of the powerful temples were extensive. The warriors had to be called upon to suppress these uprisings. In a do-ikki of 1465, the Muromachi Bakufu had to warn the Nishioka warriors of Yamashiro, vassals of the Shogun and themselves members of the shogunal guard, that those joining the ikki would be punished by the Bakufu, and that they should remain in Kyoto for the duration of the ikki.17

Such facts clearly demonstrated a need for a new political structure capable of coping with these developments. In the medieval period, even a strong military power often faced difficulty in dealing with the weakened but yet troublesome kuge and temples. Also, it was necessary to force the warriors to reside within easy reach of the dominant military powers. The warriors who did not live in their local power base and who did not mingle daily with the peasants would be less likely to join the ikki and, if need be, they could be used to suppress any uprisings.

Separation of the warriors from the peasants became all the more urgent during the period when province-wide uprisings (kuni-ikki) and the uprisings of the Ikkd sect were occurring. These uprisings were often led by local powers against the authority of the Sengoku daimyo. If the feudal system of the Sengoku daimyo was to sustain itself, the daimyo had to remove the local powers from their power bases and gather them into the cities. That is, by having the local powers in the cities, the daimyo could more effectively control them

17. A November 12th, 1465, entry in Ninagawa Chikamoto Nikki 2, Zoku-shiry3 taisei Vol. 11 (Rinsen Shoten, 1978).



as well as use their collective military strength against any uprisings or against other daimyo. This was the reason for the adoption of the heinoi-bunri policy.

But, wouldn't local powers resist a policy that forced them to abandon their local power bases? In fact, we can cite an example of the more powerful among the vassals to Asakura in Echizen; the local powers, after they were forced by Asakura to live in the castle town, continued to retain their power bases in the regions in which their clans (ichizoku) and their own followers had lived since the medieval period. It was just because of this potential for resistance that the policy could not be carried out until Hideyoshi had succeeded in obtaining unquestioned power to command.18 Nobunaga, Maeda Toshiie, and a few other major daimyo were able to give new domains to their respective followers in exchange for their followers relinquishing their regional power bases. But most Sengoku daimyo were unable to carry out this kind of measure. The final and fundamental solution to the problem that plagued the Sengoku daimyo had to wait for Hideyoshi who, with his overpowering military strength, was able to undertake the Taiko cadastral survey (Taiko kenchi) that deprived all the warriors of their local power bases.

The kokudaka system became one foundation of the feudal system established by the unifiers of sixteenth-century Japan. How did this system come into being? Many earlier scholars noted that the accumulation of land, either by purchase or by force, laid the basis for the appearance of the kokudaka system. But it is not realistic to think that accumulation per se led to the establishment of the kokudaka system. Each strip of land had its proprietor, jito, myoshu, and cultivator (sakunin); and the rights possessed by each constituted a complex web of rights that were in the process of transition, both in terms of their nature and their extent. Such strips of land, however many were accumulated, could not begin of themselves to evolve into the kokudaka system.19

18. Historians have long considered that the development of the zaichi rydshu system culminated, as matter of due course, in kinsei feudalism. Thus they have not been able to offer adequate reasons for the heinJ-bunri, except to argue that the zaichi ryoshu had no choice but to abandon their land base. My view, of course, is that the heinW-bunri, occurred as the result of the desire of leading members of the warrior class to reorganize the social structure. This was the reason, I believe, why many warriors were critical of the Taiko cadastral surveys.

19. This interpretation was shared by most scholars and the most representative work expressing this view is found in Araki Moriaki, Bakuhan taisei shakai no seiritsu to kdz5 (The establishment and structure of the Bakufu-han system society)



My view is that the necessary premise for the system was the comprehensive power exerted over land by the Sengoku daimyo who inherited the power of the shugo. During Oda rule, the land system was reorganized using the rights of isshiki shihai, i.e., the rights to rule a domain. But the rights to the land each peasant worked remained unaffected, and the rights to collect dues (naitoku) from land by local powers and by the myoshu continued to be respected.

Under Toyotomi rule, such rights to dues were disallowed. Every strip of land was now made liable for taxation by the central government, and each peasant, whose rights to own land were now recognized, became responsible for meeting tax obligations. The adoption of the kokudaka system was accomplished, like the cutting of the Gordian knot, in one decisive motion. But the principal level which made this possible was the control over land by the undisputed central power Hideyoshi now held. In other words, neither the heinou-bunri nor the kokudaka system evolved directly out of the medieval political system, but rather were brought about by Hideyoshi, who held sway over the central political structure he created. Under Hideyoshi's political system, basically feudal relationships were often maintained and strengthened within the broader political structure of the state. Several examples follow.

In 1587, in issuing an order to banish the Jesuits from Japan, Hideyoshi added the following words: "Land given to each vassal belongs to the provinces and the districts, and each vassal holds the land for the present. Each is expected to obey the laws of the nation (tenka). Each must be aware of this duty in performing all of his tasks." What this stresses is that the fief of each vassal was not a private holding, but instead belonged to the state; each vassal merely held it for the time being. And unless vassals obeyed all the laws of the nation, the state would immediately repossess the land. That is, even the fiefs, the fundamental vehicle of the feudal relationship, were placed within the framework of the national political structure. We should recall here that even the Muromachi Bakufu appointed shugo as officers serving the shogunal power, and during the early Muromachi period they could, in principle, be dismissed.20

(Ochanomizu Shobi, 1959). Even among the specialists of the medieval period, most scholars until the mid-1970s held the view that this accumulation of land by "landowners led to the kokudaka system.

20. Sato Shin'ichi, "Muromachi bakufu-ron"' (A study of the Muromachi Bakufu), Nihon rekishi (Iwanami Shoten, 1963).



Under Oda rule, when Nobunaga gave Echizen province to Shibata Katsuie, the former used the word "azukeru," i.e., Shibata was "to hold the province for" Nobunaga. The use of this word is readily understood when we realize that, in this case too, Nobunaga was entrusting to a vassal a part of his power to rule by granting him a fief.

Cadastral surveys and censuses (ninbetsu aratame), carried out to secure the political power of the unifiers, were also undertaken within the political framework of the state that was in the process of being established. The Taikd kenchi was conducted by province and by district, and it established basic cadastral values for each province and district on the basis of the productivity of the land sur- veyed. Unlike the survey made by Nobunaga, which was intended only to identify and establish ownership over land, the Taikd's surveys were concerned with quality and type of land, size, the tax base (reflecting the productivity of paddies), and ownership. In carrying out the ninbetsu aratame, Kanpaku Hidetsugu ordered a thorough census-taking in all 66 provinces. The information gathered in the census included number of persons, specific composition of each family, and occupation.21 That is, both the cadastral surveys and the censuses were much more thorough, befitting the fact that they were made by the central political power of the state.

Because of this, each holder of a fief was subjected to a close scrutiny of his administrative conduct. The basic nengu rate was set for "all the land of tenka (state)" at two-thirds of the total output, i.e., two-thirds to the fief-holder and one-third to remain in the hands of the peasants. Rates were also set for various dues levied on many agricultural products other than rice in order to yield specified amounts of "dues to the state." This was the same for the mines, all of which were considered to belong to the state. Dues were levied on winter wheat at the rate of one-third of the total yield, as a result of the effort by the Toyotomi regime to levy an additional tax on winter crops that were already being taxed by the holders of the fiefs.22

The status of persons, including residence and occupation, within this central political structure became fixed by the cadastral

21. Miki Seiichiro, "Hitobarai-rei o megutte" (On the decree to survey the population), Nagoya Daigaku Nihonshi Ronshui, Vol. II (Yoshikawa Kobunkan, 1975), pp. 103-110.

22. Miki Seiichir6, "Tamugi nengu sanbun-no-ichi choshu to k6den taisaku" (Levying one-third of the total yield on winter crops [on paddies] and policies toward deteriorated paddies), Nagoya Daigaku Bungakubu Kenkyfi Ronshfi, Shigaku, no. 18 (March, 1971).



surveys and the census, and the status of the peasant (hyakush6) was now formally recognized by the state. This was a change from the medieval period when hyakush6 was an informal status differ- entiating cultivators who were not economically dependent, such as genin, etc., from those who were.23

III. Characteristics of the Sixteenth Century

In the preceding section, I emphasized the emergence of the power of the state that was beginning to affect many aspects of society. But what kind of society was there in the period called kinsei? It was not one closely administered by the bureaucracy of a state that possessed strong central power, as can be found in some periods of Chinese history. Sixteenth-century Japan had a daimyo- domain system based on the lord-vassal system, and this meant that society was still basically feudal. Or, if we compare the Japan of this period with Europe with its absolute monarchs, we do not find the increasingly dominating power of the central authority as we do in Europe. Rather, there was what can best be called a fusion of the daimyo-domain system with the central power of state. In essence, we found Sengoku daimyo-the regional powers-who rose as a result of the development of the feudal system of daimyo domains, followed by the emergence of a supreme power-a power of state able to transform the existing central political framework-made possible by these regional powers themselves.

A critical question therefore is: what was the relationship between the feudal system and the state? Simply put, my view is that the power of state was characterized and defined by the transformation during this period of the feudal domainal system itself and the supreme military power that evolved out of the system. Let me be more specific with the aid of the following examples. In 1591 Hideyoshi transferred his position of kanpaku to his adopted son, Hidetsugu, and Hideyoshi himself became Taiki. Because of this, the power of kanpaku and that of Taiki came to coexist within the Toyotomi government. However, Hideyoshi retained the power to command military forces and to enfeoff vassals. Also, the cadastral surveys were conducted by order of Hideyoshi who in addition retained the power of diplomacy (as was demonstrated by the invasion of Korea). In contrast, Hidetsugu's power as kanpaku was

23. My thanks to my colleague Kuroda Toshio for bringing this point to my attention.



exerted over the nobles and religious bodies, in the carrying out of the census, and on matters pertaining to the civil regulations concerning the Korean invasion.

The death of Hidetsugu brought the end to this dual structure of power. But the fact was that this duality of power existed in the Toyotomi government. One could argue that this was the result of the coexistence of two principles, i.e., one dictated by the necessity of governing a nation and the other born of the lord-vassal relationship. But one cannot fail to note that this division of power occurred after the establishment of a unified political structure, which included both the civil and the military powers, and that Hidetsugu remained a warrior. Thus, in the final analysis, I believe it is accu- rate to say that the power which Hideyoshi possessed as a warrior enabled him to define and delimit the basic character of the powers of state.24

Let us now look at this subject within the more familiar framework usually used in discussing the feudalism of this period. My view has long been that the kinsei feudalism was a "transfigured" (iso-na) feudalism. There was a lord-vassal system, which meant that fiefs were granted by a lord to his vassals. (The rights to land differed by status, i.e., lord and peasants, and lord and merchants had different rights to the same land.) But given what we have already described of the period, one may not wish to characterize the period as having been typically or purely feudal. Nevertheless, what we observe, I believe, was feudalism, even if its appearance was somewhat out of the ordinary.

This kinsei feudalism emerged as a result of fundamental social and political transformations that occurred during the sixteenth century. As analyzed above, kinsei feudalism differed in many ways from that found in medieval and Sengoku Japan.25 Accompanying

24. See: Asao Naohiro, "Toyotomi seiken-ron' (A study of the political power of Toyotomi), Nihon rekishi, Vol. 9, Iwanami Shoten, 1963; Miki Seiichiro, "Taik6 kenchi to Chosen shuppei" (The Taiko cadastral survey and the military expedition to Korea), Nihon rekishi, Vol. 9. Iwanami Shoten, 1975; and Miki's article cited in footnote 21.

25. I once was a supporter of the so-called "refeudalization' thesis with which I am sure all American specialists of this period of Japanese history are familiar. But, even then, it was obvious to me that kinsei feudalism was only a reinforced version of medieval feudalism. It is, of course, incorrect to interpret kinsei feudalism as having emerged de novo. My works, cited in footnote 2, are attempts to answer difficult questions concerning the nature and emergence of the kinsei feudalism. Similar efforts to evaluate the characteristics of the sixteenth century were made by John W. Hall many years ago, and I believe his essay is still valuable as an important milestone



the political and social transformation of the century, the Japanese achieved a visible increase in their productive capabilities.26 Also, the kinsei feudal authorities succeeded in organizing these capabilities to maintain and strengthen the political and social systems they created. Let me clarify the above by adding the following observations of the fundamental socio-political transformation and economic change.

Within kinsei feudalism, the nature of the lord-vassal relationship changed from what it had been in the Sengoku period: it became less " contractual" in nature. While it retained some contractual aspects-military obligations were determined basically by kokudaka-it became a relationship between a supreme and overpowering central power and those who owed military service to that power within a unified and more cohesive national political structure. And this new relationship was conducive to nurturing a new morality among warriors to the point of giving rise to the "hagakure" bushido or the unquestioning, faithful, and devoted service rendered by vassals to their lords.27 Naturally a ruling class, strongly united and armed with guns, could effectively and easily rule peasants who had been disarmed and were no longer capable of mounting do-ikki.

As I have stressed elsewhere,28 the role that the kokudaka system played in this period must be clearly understood if we are to gain a fuller appreciation of the nature of kinsei feudalism. The system served both as a measure of the productive capabilities of society and, as emphasized in recent studies, as a basis for determining the

by an American scholar who was grappling with the same issues with which I have long been concerned. John W. Hall, "Feudalism in Japan-A Reassessment" in J. W. Hall and M. B. Jansen, eds., Studies in the Institutional History of Early Modern Japan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968).

26. Kozo Yamamura discusses these issues in his "Returns to Unification: Eco- nomic Growth in Japan, 1550-1650" in Japan Before Tokugawiua. My disagreement with him is on the economic burdens imposed on the peasants by the ruling class during the period. Contrary to his view, I believe that the burden was heavy because of dues collected in rice (two-thirds of the output), and in corvee for the purposes of meeting the expenses and needs of waging civil wars, invading Korea, and for major construction and riparian works. I, however, have no disagreement with Yamamura's general assessment that economic growth occurred during the century.

27. The bushid5 began to take definite form from the late seventeenth to the early eighteenth century. But the central concern in this period was how to best perform the duties assigned in peacetime. Hagakure too was a codification of bushid6. It is an error to think that the glorification of death was an integral part of bushid5.

28. See Wakita, "The Kokudaka System,' and Chapter One of Kinsei hikensei seiritsu shiron.



status of the daimyo (kakaku) and the extent of their military obligations.29 The kokudaka system, however, accomplished much more. It defined the relationship each holder of a fief was to have with his fief, and it also defined the peasants' and merchants' rights to land. Because the direct authority over a fief was subdivided among the daimyo and his retainers, and no part of a fief could be sold or otherwise transferred to others, land was not the private possession of the warriors. Though the rights which peasants had in land came to be severely circumscribed during the early Tokugawa period by newly imposed prohibitions against the sale of land and by restric- tions concerning the crops to be planted, none of these limitations existed during the late sixteenth century. And these Tokugawa re- strictions remained effective only during the first fifty years or so of the period.30 It is, therefore, not inaccurate to say that the peasants, generally speaking, did not have "de facto landownership."

One more point on the kokudaka system merits a brief note. The system, which provided a quantitative indicator of productive capacity, functioned more effectively as a basis for tax collection in rice.3 1 In assessing the yield, kokudaka was used, and not kandaka which expresses the tax base in monetary terms and was used in the Sengoku period. This was because of the yet inadequate degree of monetization of the economy and, more importantly, because the ruling class wanted to collect taxes in rice in order to prevent further involvement of the peasants in the market economy, which might increase the peasants' economic position to the point of their being able to challenge the economic dominance enjoyed by the warrior class. Taxes were collected in rice not for the consumption of the ruling class, but for the purpose of retarding the arrival of the cash-tax system which would further involve peasants in a monetized economy.

The peasants, who now worked the land either in small family units or in larger units (employingfudai, genin, etc.), were forced to concentrate their efforts into producing rice, the principal medium of tax payment. They were also subjected to other dues levied by the ruling class, which was able to determine through its censuses the

29. Nakamura Kichiji, Bakuhan-taisei-ron (A study of the Bakufu-han system), (Yamakawa Shuppansha, 1973). Also see Matsushita Shir6, Kokudakasei shakai no kenkyuf (A study of a society based on the kokudaka system) (Hanawa Shob6, 1982).

30. This was in fact recognized in 1695. 31. My view of the adoption of the kokudaka system is a new interpretation that

reflects my analysis of commerce and use of money in the period. See my Kinsei hokensei seiritsu shiron.



number in and the composition of each household. However, in contrast to the medieval period, peasants were no longer subjected to serf-like control imposed by the local powers and the village leaders (i.e., myoshu). They were now cultivators whose status was fully recognized by the central political power and they benefited from the protection of laws issued by that power.32

We must also note that, in kinsei feudalism, commerce developed rapidly in the urban centers. Contributing greatly to this development was the heino-bunri, which caused the warriors to live in the cities. In addition, the rakuza decrees abolished the guilds, destroy- ing the restrictive controls the nobles and the temples once exerted over commerce. But some specific groups of merchants and craftsmen, necessary to the warrior class, were newly organized and brought to the urban centers. To facilitate the relocation of these merchants and craftsmen, rents were waived and monopolies were allowed in some cases.33 One result of these policies to aid the growth of cities was to encourage an inflow of peasants who were being taxed heavily in the villages. This was the reason for Hideyoshi's decree prohibiting peasants from moving to cities and becoming merchants.34

Kinsei feudalism was also noteworthy in several other significant respects. In addition to establishing the kokudaka system that became the basis for a new system of taxation and for the assessment of military obligations, the kinsei authority was able to create a nationwide market for rice, and it had no hesitation about manipulat- ing the price of rice.35 Indeed, all aspects of market activities were vigorously controlled.36 The kinsei authority resorted to alloof these measures in order to exert a tight control over the results of the economic growth achieved during the fifteenth and sixteenth cen-

32. I also agree with J. W. Hall's view, as expressed in an exchange of opinions with me, that the nature of the kinsei peasant can be contrasted with the copyholders of England.

33. Oda Nobunaga imposed corvee on the craftsmen of Omi who specialized in various aspects of construction. This corvee was called kuniyaku, or corvee for the state, was continued under the Tokugawa Bakufu.

34. The division of merchants and peasants is known as an official policy that was intended to establish a class system, but I think this division should also be understood 'is-a-vis the conditions that prevailed during this period.

35. See, for example, my Kinsei hoken shakai no keizai kvz5 (The economic structure of the kinsei feudal society) (Ochanomizu Shobo, 1963).

36. Basically, by means of collecting dues in the form of rice and specialty products from each region, the ruling class obtained major marketable products, thus assuring their ability to control market activities.



turies, growth that was due principally to the continuing trend toward more productive small-scale agriculture and the growth of commerce.

IV. The Roles of Oda, Toyotomi, and Tokugawa in the Emergence of Kinsei Feudalism

Let us now turn to a more explicit discussion of the various stages in the emergence of kinsei feudalism. In doing so, we must first ask a crucial and often debated question: should the Oda rule be considered a kinsei type or not? My view for some years has been that the Oda rule was that of a Sengoku daimyo who had succeeded in gaining central political power, but not everyone agrees with my interpretation 3 7

From the perspective of cultural history, Nobunaga certainly belonged to the kinsei period. The innovativeness of his Azuchi castle and his religious beliefs are sufficient to indicate this. Similar observations cannot be made for Hideyoshi or Ieyasu. But here we are not discussing the cultural aspects of the period.

Let us examine something more directly useful to our analysis: Nobunaga's attack on Mt. Hiei. This attack established, in the minds of many of his contemporaries, an image of Nobunaga as a destroyer of traditional (i.e., religious) authority, and he was accused by Takeda Shingen, a Sengoku daimyo from Kai, of committing "most heinous and sacrilegious crimes." But Matsunaga Hisahide of Kinai obviously did not share Shingen's feelings, as Matsunaga burned the Daibutsuden of the Todaiji. We also know that for Araki Murashige, the stone statues of Buddha were no more than construction mate- rials for his Arioka castle. In short, there were in the Kinai other Sengoku daimyo who were no less willing than Nobunaga to commit "heinous crimes" against traditional authority.

When we review the policies of Nobunaga in a broader perspective, we find that he recognized and assured the landholdings of such temples as the Kofukuji, Todaiji, and Koyasan Kongd-buji. Of course, unlike Enryakuji on Mt. Hiei, these temples did not challenge Nobunaga's power. No one can deny that Nobunaga aggran- dized the landholdings of the nobles and temples, as warriors had done since the Kamakura period. However, this did not prevent him from adopting a formal policy to respect and preserve the landholdings of the nobles and the temples who occupied important positions

37. See Okuno's article cited in footnote 11.



in the political structure of the period. The point here is simply that Nobunaga's place in history must be evaluated on the basis of his policies in general, and not by a small number of his actions, however well known they may be.

We can go even further and argue, as several scholars have begun to do in support of my view, that the Sengoku daimyo succeeded in establishing a more "mature" feudal power structure which became the foundation for the kinsei power structure.38 This argument, of course, is an integral part of my analysis that the Oda government was the central political power that came into being in the Sengoku period.

Another important question in discussing the stages in the emergence of the kinsei period is: what precisely were the differences between Oda and Toyotomi rule? The first difference is that Nobunaga, as a central political power, attained supreme national power by inheriting the position once occupied by the Ashikaga Shogun. It was not the unified central power of a kanpaku resting on both civil and military powers. Nobunaga continued to respect the nobles and temples as independent entities and was willing to recognize their landholdings and make contributions of additional land for their benefit. On the other hand, Hideyoshi was far from respectful of their existence as independent entities, or of their landholdings. He freely ignored their traditional rights to bar entry into their lands (funyfi-ken) and constantly attempted to convert their holdings into fiefs that he could distribute at his discretion.

As for the lord-vassal relationship, Nobunaga obviously regarded the feudal tie to be a contract between the lord, who provided protection and benefice, and the vassals who served in return. For example, in a note of admonition which Nobunaga wrote to Sakuma Nobumori, his vassal (fudai), he included no specific requirement concerning Sakuma's military obligations except to say that Sakuma was to discharge his military obligations to Nobunaga according to what Sakuma deemed proper based on bushido. In a similar vein, Nobunaga is known to have counseled Shibata Katsuie on the vir- tues of being a samurai and on the importance of Shibata' s service to Nobunaga.39 But for Hideyoshi, the contractual aspect of the lord-

38. Since the publication of Nagahara, ed., Sengoku-ki no kenryoku to shakai, scholarly interpretation of this has undergone a visible change. For a long time, the dominant view was that feudalism under the Sengoku daimyo was somehow 'imma- ture" in comparison to that under the kinsei powers.

39. The standard interpretation of this counsel given by Nobunaga to Shibata has long been that Nobunaga was, in giving such a warning, expressing total dominance



vassal relationship was secondary; what was essential in the relationship was his dominance over his vassals. The obligations to Hideyoshi of his vassals were specified quantitatively within the framework of the kokudaka system.

Finally, other important policies adopted by Nobunaga also differed from those of Hideyoshi. Nobunaga allowed self-governed cities, such as the jinai-machi (towns on temple grounds) to con- tinue to exist, and he permitted and made use of the existing za, except for the za in the castle town of Azuchi.40 In contrast, Hideyoshi tolerated no self-governed cities, strictly disallowed all za, and vigorously sought and gained rigid control over merchants and artisans.

For all these reasons, substantive differences can be found between Oda and Toyotomi rule. But if we are to say that Nobunaga began the kinsei period and Hideyoshi and Ieyasu followed closely behind to complete what he had begun, we must add some carefully stated qualifications. Nobunaga built a central government to the extent possible within the limits placed on him by the realities of the Sengoku period. Nobunaga could go so far, but no farther. Hideyoshi, on the other hand, was able to cross the barriers that Nobunaga had been unable to overcome. To by sure, Hideyoshi benefited from the path-breaking efforts of Nobunaga, but it was Hideyoshi who truly opened the new historical stage we call kinsei. This is most clearly demonstrated in the nationwide, unified system of military obligations that Hideyoshi succeeded in establishing.

The differences between the Toyotomi and the Tokugawa governments need to be further researched. However, one thing is certain: both were kinsei governments built upon the basic kinsei type of political and social structure. The major difference, however, can be stated briefly. Beyond the fact that the Toyotomi rule had a kanpaku at its apex and the Tokugawa Bakufu a Shogun, there is no doubt that the Bakufu in many ways differed visibly from the

over Shibata. This, however, is clearly in error in that such an interpretation is not based on a more general analysis of the lord-vassal relationship that prevailed under the Oda rule. Nobunaga was, in this instance, merely issuing a warning to Shibata who had in the past betrayed his lord. See: Wakita, Kinsei hokensei seitritsu shiron, pp. 218-21.

40. Toyoda Takeshi's view that Nobunaga adopted a policy to prohibit guilds in general needs to be revised. Under Nobunaga, the za remained active in Kyoto, Yamato, and elsewhere, and we even know that Nobunaga himself issued decrees (ando-jo) recognizing the special privileges that were being enjoyed by some za. See: Toyoda Takeshi, Zotei chuisei Nihon shogyoshi no kenkyu (Iwanami Shoten, 1952).



previous political power structure. Under both the Toyotomi and the Tokugawa governments, the daimyo were delegated power to gov- ern by the central government.

The Toyotomi government, however, exerted more direct control over each daimyo than did the Tokugawa. It more closely determined how each of the domains was to be governed, and it issued more detailed directives concerning the use of the income generated from each domain. The supervision of the government also extended into such matters as daimyo expenditures in Kyoto, the specific distribution of fiefs to the daimyo vassals within each domain, and the designation of land that owed military obligations and land that did not. Also, the direct landholdings of the Toyotomi house were strategically interspersed among the daimyo domains, thus preventing the daimyo from creating closed economic units which could be better controlled for the benefit of each daimyo. In an extreme example, Ishida Mitsunari, a bugy&, determined the expenditures that Shimazu was to make during his residence in Kyoto. In short, the Toyotomi government intervened more exten- sively and directly in the management of the domains than did the Tokugawa Bakufu which, though it too exerted some control over the daimyo, basically recognized the relative independence of each.41

Concluding Note

This brief essay is an abbreviated description of the process of the transformation of the nature and characteristics of central political power during the sixteenth century. The major question that I have analyzed was how and why the central political structure of the power of state was transformed from what had existed in the Ashikaga period to what emerged as the Tokugawa Bakufu. In attempting to answer this question and in analyzing the process of the transformation, I have tried also to answer the important historical question: what were the characteristics of kinsei government and how did this type of government evolve?

Neither the significance of this question nor the extensive debate

41. Though it is difficult to measure whether Toyotomi's or Tokugawa's political power was better established, I believe that the latter's power was. This explains why the Tokugawa Bakufu was able to recognize the independence of each daimyo formally, and also why the daimyo had to ask for the Bakufu's views on important political matters before making their decisions. The power of the Tokugawa over the daimyo was far-reaching.



among the Japanese specialists may be apparent to Western readers. I should, therefore, add a brief note of explanation. Instead of getting involved in an extended methodological discussion, let me simply say that an understanding of the political characteristics of the kinsei period are essential if we are to be able to analyze how modern (kindai) Japan emerged. I am aware that some American scholars, in the 1960s in particular, have addressed the same question, using a framework of analysis that came to be known as the modernization thesis. I disagree with this thesis for a variety of reasons, especially on the grounds that those who rely on this thesis are often forced to look for their "modernizing" characteristics in already modernized societies, i.e., Western societies that modernized before Japan began to do so. I believe this approach unneces- sarily limits an historian. My own view is that in analyzing the process of historical change one must begin with the analysis of the characteristics of the preceding period based upon as complete a knowledge of it as possible. That is, the kindai period can be better understood if the characteristics of the kinsei period are fully understood and appreciated.42

Let me indicate here only what I consider the most important points. In the kinsei period, the landholding of the ruling class was defined within the framework of the central political structure, thus preventing alienation of land by those who administered and benefited from the land. In the medieval period, as in the Kamakura period, ownership of land could be and was transferred to others. In the kinsei period, however, land could not be freely alienated even when warriors were financially hard pressed, and their future tax rice had to be, in effect, mortgaged in order for them to remain solvent. This was the reason why the new Meiji government had to, and was able to, deprive the former ruling class of their land-their fiefs.

When this occurred, the power of the Emperor resurfaced to replace the political structure that had just been destroyed. Under

42. A recent article by Jansen, one of the leading proponents of the modernization thesis, presented an illuminating discussion on the modernization thesis and a description of recent works made by others in order to reevaluate the thesis. I found the observations and views advanced in this essay extremely interesting. While I remain unconvinced of the basic validity of the thesis, I believe it will be useful for some scholars to undertake a reexamination of the process of the emergence of modern (kindai) Japan adapting the insightful suggestions made in this article. See: Marius B. Jansen, " 'Kindaika'-ron to higashi Ajiya" (The 'modernization" thesis and East Asia), Shiso, No. 646 (April, 1978).



the circumstances, for the Meiji government to have the power of state, it had to make use of the titular authority (ken'i) which the Emperor continued to retain. The Tokugawa Bakufu, though it possessed the central power, had a different relationship with the nobles and the temples than it did with the warrior class. While the Bakufu had the power of a lord over his vassals, it had no such power over the nobles and temples. Despite the fact that the nobles remained the servants of the Emperor, the Shogun exerted his power over the nobles as described earlier. In fact, throughout the kinsei period, the Emperors survived as titular authority, and for this reason, the three main lines of the Tokugawa house chose to accept and use court ranks. Had this not been the situation, the Emperor would not have had the power to assume the position he did in the Meiji Restoration.

All these legacies of the kinsei period profoundly affected the course of the development of capitalism in Japan. Because the kinsei warriors did not own land, but rather held it in their capacity as the ruling class, they could not sell or otherwise lose land. This meant that they could be compensated for the land that they still held. The compensation, as is well known, was in the form of income-yielding government bonds. This fact is not unrelated to the emergence of many of these members of the former ruling class as providers of capital to nascent industrial ventures and banks.

On the other hand, the peasants held what was virtual private ownership over their land. Their ownership was readily transformed into private, exclusive, and legal ownership in the modern sense of the term. This private ownership of land by the Meiji cultivators became an important cornerstone of the development of Japanese capitalism because increased land productivity provided the new government and the emerging industries with the fiscal resources and the labor that they needed. Unlike in industrial England where the peasants were dispossessed of their land and forced to become industrial workers, the peasants in Meiji Japan were divided into landowners and tenant cultivators, with the latter providing a large number of dekasegi (industrial workers). And the living standard in villages differed significantly from that in cities. In these and in many other respects, the legacies of the kinsei period continued to linger, forming and molding the political, social, and economic histories of the decades that we call kindai Japan.

OSAKA UNIVERSITY

Translated from the Japanese by Kozo Yamamura


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Issue Table of ContentsJournal of Japanese Studies, Vol. 8, No. 2 (Summer, 1982), pp. 223-428Front MatterThe Future of Japanese Nationality: An Essay in Contemporary History [pp. 223-263]Sheathing the Sword of Justice in Japan: An Essay on Law without Sanctions [pp. 265-281]Foreign Relations during the Edo Period: Sakoku Reexamined [pp. 283-306]The Emulation of Western Organizations in Meiji Japan: The Case of the Paris Prefecture of Police and the Keishi-Ch [pp. 307-342]The World Seen from JapanThe Emergence of the State in Sixteenth-Century Japan: From Oda to Tokugawa [pp. 343-367]

Review SectionReview: Of Cabbages and Kings [pp. 369-382]Review: untitled [pp. 382-388]Review: untitled [pp. 388-391]Review: untitled [pp. 391-399]Review: untitled [pp. 399-405]Review: untitled [pp. 405-410]Review: untitled [pp. 410-414]Review: untitled [pp. 414-418]Review: untitled [pp. 418-420]Review: untitled [pp. 421-426]

Erratum: Explaining and Predicting Japanese General Elections, 1960-1980: A Minor Revision [p. 427]Opinion and CommentOpinion and Comment in the Journal of Japanese Studies [p. 428]

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the emergence of the state in 16th century japan from oda to tokugawa

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