the enemy at his back-elizabeth churchill brown-1956-263pgs-pol

7/27/2019 The Enemy at His Back-Elizabeth Churchill Brown-1956-263pgs-POL

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/the-enemy-at-his-back-elizabeth-churchill-brown-1956-263pgs-pol 1/263

T h e

E n e m y a t H i s Back



Copyright 1956

By Elizab eth Churchill Brown

P r i n t e d in the United States of America



T h e E n e m y a t H i s B a c k



CONTENTS

C h a p t e r I E a r l y b a t t l e s o f t h e P a c i f i c - F i r s t p e a c e



ABOUT THE AUTHOR



FOREWORDON t h e N a t i o n a l A r c h i v e s B u i l d i n g i n t h e N a t i o n ' s

C a p i t a l , i s e t c h e d t h e i n s c r i p t i o n , " W h a t i s p a s t i s

p r o l o g u e . "

I n t h e A t o m i c A g e i n w h i c h w e n o w l i v e , i t i s i m -



THIS IS WHAT YOU CALLAcknowledgments

I MUST s a y " t h a n k s a m i l l i o n " t o a n u m b e r o f p e o p l e .

F i r s t , E d n a F l u e g e l w h o n o t o n l y c h a l l e n g e d e v e r y

w o r d I w r o t e a n d c h e c k e d a n d t r i p l e c h e c k e d , b u t a l s o

t a u g h t m e a f e w p r o f e s s i o n a l t r i c k s . I h a v e c o m e t o

t h i n k o f h e r a s " g o o d o l d E d n a " e v e n t h o u g h s h e i s n ' t

o l d a t a l l bu t a p r e t t y p r o f e s s o r o f p ol i t i c a l s c i e n c e a t

T r i n i t y C o l l e g e i n W a s h i n g t o n . F o r m a ll y s pe a k i n g , s h e



x This Is W hat You Call Acknowledgments

b o o k ! " T h a t w a s a t 2 : 3 0 i n t h e a f t e r n o o n . H e r e p ea t e d

t h e s t a t e m e n t a t 4 : 3 2 , a n d i t w a s t h e n t h a t I f e l t t h a t

maybe my two and a half years of work had borne

s o m e f r u i t .

I m u s t n ' t f o r ge t t o s a y " t h a n k s a m i l l i o n " t o M a u d e

Wood . M a u d e i s o u r m a i d w h o s e l i n e a g e i s o f t h e m o s t

d i s t i n g u i s h e d A f ri c a n a n c e s t r y . I ' m s u r e t h e y w e r e d i s -

t i n g u i s h e d be c a u s e m y M a u d e i s a n a r i s t o c r a t a n d a

b i t o f V i c t o r i a n a s w e ll . S h e f u s s e d a n d f u m e d a t w h a t

E d n a a n d I d i d t o h e r d i n i n g r o o m a n d p a r l o r . (We

m a d e t h e " s n o r e r o o m " o u t - o f - b o u n d s s o m y h u s b a n d

c o u l d h a v e s o m e p l a c e t o e s c a p e .) Bu t Maude took

p i t y o n u s h a r d w o r k i n g g i r l s a n d p r o v i d e d d e l e c t a b l e

t r a y s o f g o o d i e s i n o u r h o u r s o f d r u d g e r y . I f c o m p a n y

was expected, Maude was outraged at my unhouse-



This Is What You Call Acknowledgments x i

search that makes the Library of Congress the mos t

w o n d e r f u l l i b r a r y i n t h e w o r ld .

A n d l a s t , b u t m o s t i m p o r t a n t , a r e t h e p u b li s h e r s a n d

authors of the books f rom which I have gleaned s o

much inf ormation . T h e p o l i t i c a l m e m o i r w r i t e r s a r e by

f a r t h e g r e a t e s t c o n t r i b u t o r s t o h i s t o r y . Let us have

more and more of them .

F o r p e r m i s s i o n t o q u o t e , a " m i l l i o n " t h a n k s t o t h e

p u b l i s h e r s a n d a u t h o r s l i s t e d i n t h e b i b l i o g ra p h y .



INTRODUCTION

THIS b o o k i s t h e r es u l t o f a w o m a n ' s c u r i o s i t y . I t i s n o t

t h e w o r k o f a s t u d e n t o f h i s t o r y n o r e v e n t h e w o r k o f

a s t u d e n t . N e i t h e r i s i t w r i t t e n f o r s t u d e n t s b u t r a t h e r

f o r o r d i n a r y p e o p l e li k e m y s e l f w h o w o u l d li k e t o k n o w

" w h o k i l l e d C o c k R o b i n ? "

A l l o f t h o s e c l o s e l y a c q u a i n t e d w i t h m y s t o r y w h o

h a v e s o g e n e r o u s l y g i v e n t h e i r t i m e t o r e a d m y m a n u -

s c r i pt h a v e s a i d : " B u t y o u l e f t t h i s o u t " o r " y ou l e f t

t h a t o u t . " I h a v e h a d t o re s i s t a l m o s t a l l o f t h e m , a n d



x i v I n t r o d u c t i o n

A n d t h e n I r e a d t h e W a s h i n g t o n P o s t w i t h i t s c a l m

a n d p e r s u a s i v e e d i t o ri a l s . T h e p a p er a s s u m e d a " c o n -

s e r v a t i v e " t o n e , a n d i t s r e p o r t i n g s e e m e d , o n t h e s u r -

f a c e a t l e a s t , f a c t u a l . S t i l l I f e lt t h e r e wa s s o m e t h i n g

w r o n g t h e r e t o o .

I w a s e q u a l l y c o n f u s e d b y t h e v a r i o u s r a d i o c o m -

m e n t a t o r s . F o r i n s t a n c e , s h o u l d I b el i e v e F u l t o n L e w i s ,

J r . w h o s o u n d e d m a d a l l t h e t i m e , o r s h o u l d I f o l l o w

the honeyed words of Raymond Gram Swing ?

B u t o n e t h i n g I n e v e r c o u l d re c o n c i l e . W h y d i d t h e

U n i t e d S t a t e s h a v e t o b e S O f r i e n d l y t o S o v i e t R u s s i a ?

" W h y d o w e h a v e t o k i s s t h e m o n t h e m o u t h ? " , I u s e d

t o a s k . I t s e e m e d t o m e t h a t , s i n c e c i r c u m s t a n c e s h a d

f o r c e d u s t o a c c e p t s u c h a n a l l y , w e n a t u r a l l y w o u l d

t r e a t t h a t m u r d e ro u s n a t i o n w i t h c o l d r e a l i t y .



Introd ucti on xv

f o r e s o m a n y h a d l o s t t h e i r m e n i n t h e f u r y o f m o d e r n

w a r s , h a d f o u n d o f l i t t l e c o n c e r n .

O n e d a y h e t o l d m e a n i n t e r e s t i n g s t o r y a b o u t t h e

mysterious " They ." The firs t time he heard about

"They" was in 1939 o n t h e e v e o f W o r l d W a r I I , w h e n

a F r e n c h m a n r e c e n t l y a r r i v e d i n t h i s c o u n t r y p a i d h i m

a v i s i t . T h e F r e n c h m a n e x p l a i n e d t h a t h e h a d d e c i d e d

t o b e c o m e a n A m e r i c a n c i t i z e n , a n d h a d b r o u g h t w i t h

h i m h i s f a m i l y a n d h i s f o r t u n e . They had bid adieu

t o F r a n c e f o r a l l t i m e . T h e r e a s o n , h e s a i d , w a s t h a t

h e h a d d i s c o v e r e d t h a t a g r e a t w a r w a s t o b e l a u n c h e d

in Europe, and that "They" would maneuver France

i n t o l o s i n g i t . H i s c o n v e r s a t i o n w a s s o w e l l s e a s o n e d

with references to "They" that my husband asked

him who "They" were . T h e F r e n c h m a n r e p l i e d t h a t h e



x v i I n t r o d u c t i o n

w h e r e t h e m y s t e r y o f ` w h y ' m a y l e a d t o f u r t h e r i d e n t i -

f i c a t i o n o f t h e m y s t e r i o u s ` t h e y ' . . . "

General Mark Clark, al so a wi tness before the Su b-

comm ittee, wrote a book called "From the Danube to

the Yalu" in which he express ed a fearful sus pici on,

P t . 2 1 settin g a precedent for American generals :

1 6 5 4

"The nagging fear was that perhaps Communists had

w o r m e d t h e i r w a y s o d e e p l y i n t o o u r G o v e r n m e n t o n b o t h

t h e w o r k i n g a n d p l a n n i n g l e v e l s t h a t t h e y w e r e a b l e t o

e x e r c i s e a n i n o r d i n a t e d e g r e e of p o w e r i n s h a p i n g t h e c o u r s e

o f A m e r i c a i n t h e d a n g e r o u s p o s t - w a r e r a .

" I c o u l d n o t h e l p w o n d e r i n g a n d w o r r y i n g w h e t h e r w e w e r e

f a c e d w i t h o p e n e n e m i e s a c r o s s t h e c o n f e r e n c e t a b l e a n d

h i d d en e n e m i e s w h o s a t w i t h u s i n o u r m o s t s e c r e t c o u n c i l s . "



I n t r o d u c t i o n x v i i

a n d m a d e i n t o a n i n d e p e n d e n t r e pu b l i c w i t h a g o v e r n m e n t

, f r i e n d l y t o t h e U . S . S . R .

" T h e s a m e r e q u e s t i s e x p e c t e d t o b e m a d e i n r e g a r d t o

K o r e a , w i t h P o r t A r t h u r . . . r e s t o r e d t o Ru s s i a n c o n t r o l . "

Although Korea was not a part of the Yalta agree-

ment, it s n orthern half d id become a "gov ernment

f r i e n d l y t o t h e U . S . S .R . " B u t t h e m a n n e r i n w h i c h t h i s

c a m e a b o u t p r o v i d e s p r o o f o f t h e e x i s t e n c e o f " T h e y "

-men without f aces or names .

Shortly after VJ-day a round-robin telephone con-

versation took place between the War Department and

the White n- H o u s e e n o f t h e c i a n t s i n t h i s u n -

u s u a l " c o n f e r e n c e " t o l d m e t h a t t h o s e i n t h e en agon

did not know to whom they were talking in the White



x v i i i I n t r o d u c t i o n

" . . . the Japanese believe the American people woul d

not be oppos ed to the mai ntenance of the dynas ty . The

Emperor of Japan would f orm a government, choosing as

his advisers those remaining liberals who have not been

purged bu t have gone underground since the outbreak of

the war. Such a government would agree to a withdrawal

from the ill gai ned possessions in China and the South

P a c i f i c , a g r e e t o w h a t e v e r m i l i t a r y t e r m s m i g h t b e e x a c t e d

b y t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a n d t h r o w J a p a n a t t h e m e r c y o f t h i s

country .

"Little has been revealed about the devious approaches

o f s o m e o f t h e J a p a n e s e ` l i b e r a l s ' w h o h a v e s u g g e s t e d t h a t

A m e r i c a ' s o w n f u t u r e d e f e n s e i n t h e F a r E a s t w i l l h a v e t o

depend on a f riendly Japan i n the sam e way Russia' s

s e c u r i t y a n d p o w e r i n E u r o pe d e p e n d s o n ` f r i e n d l y ' b o r d e r

g o v e r n m e n t s i n P o l a n d , t h e B a l k a n s a n d , i n a l l l i k e l i h o o d ,



I n t r o d u c t i o n x i x

t h e Free Korean and Manchurian governments will be

equally d ominated by indiv idu als who have been coached

r e c e n t l y i n M o s c o w a n d w i l l d i r e c t t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s t o w a r d a

f u l l p o l i t i c a l c o - o p e r a t i o n w i t h t h e U . S . S .R . T h e y a d m i t t h a t

under such circumstances Japan will perish . . . T h i s w i l l

b e s t i l l e a s i e r , i f R u s s i a , a f t e r t h e c o l l a p s e o f J a p a n , i s s u c -

cessful in forming `friendly' governments in Korea, Man-

c h u r i a a n d n o r t h w e s t e r n C h i n e s e p r o v i n c e s .

"Does America want to see totalitarian governments in

Asia as well as Europe? . . . They admi t that Japan can

b e c r u s h e d f o r e v e r . But, they ask, how will the American

p e o p l e w h o m u s t t h i n k i n l o n g r a n g e p o l i t i c a l t e r m s b e n e f i t

by the total destruction of the Japanese Empire . . . The

C h i n e s e w i l l c e r t a i n l y a c c e p t t h e o u t s t r e t c h e d h a n d o f t h e

United States . But will America have a free hand to help

C h i n a i n t h e m a n n e r s h e d e s i r e s i f C h i a n g K a i - s h e k i s c o m -



x x I n t r o d u c t i o n

g o v e r n m e n t , a n d t h e A m e r i c a n o f f i c i a l s t h e m s e l v e s a r e u r g i n g

C h i a n g t o r e a c h a c o m p r o m i s e . T h e G e n e ra l i s s i m o k n o w s a s

well as any on e else that a comprom ise with the Com-

m u n i s t s , e v e n i f t h e y h a v e n o d i r e c t t i e s w i t h Ru s s i a , w i l l

m e a n h i s e v e n t u a l d i s a p p e a r a n c e f r o m C h i n a ' s p o l i t i c a l l i f e .

Any compromi se with the Moscow- trained Com mun ist s

m u s t e n d i n t h ei r do m i n a t i n g t he p ol i t i c a l s c e n e . H e n c e t h e

U n i t e d S t a t e s w h i c h i s n o w g e n t l y p r e s s i n g t h e G e n e r a l -

iss imo to cooperate with the Chinese Communi sts , m ust

k n o w t h a t s o o n e r o r l a t e r i t i s t h i s g r o u p wh i c h w i l l t a k e

o v e r t h e g o v e r n m e n t o f C h i n a . "

I found a war calendar an d l ooked at the war's

events i n the Paci fic f rom November 1944 o n , t h e t i m e

when the Japanese desired to surrender . I t r e a d s l i k e

t h i s



I n t rod u c t i o n x x i

I d e t e r m i n e d t o d i s c o v e r w h a t i n f l u e n c e s i n h i g h

p l a c e s h a d p e r h a p s " i n s p i r e d " t h e d e c i s i o n s m a d e b y

o u r l e a d e r s , a n d a l s o t o c h e c k o u r p o l i c i e s w i t h t h o s e

o f t h e C om m u n i s t s a s s e t f o r t h i n t h e i r p u b li c a t i o n s .

T h e s i m i l a r i t y o f t h e s e p o l i c i e s a n d t h e C o m m u n i s t

a i m s w a s s t a r t l i n g .

I h a d a l r e a d y b e c o m e a c q u a i n t e d , t o a d e g r e e , w i t h

t h e C o m m u n i s t c o n s p i r a c y i n A m e r i c a b y c l o s e l y f o l -

l o wi n g t h e h e a r i n g s o f t h e C o n g re s s i o n a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n s

a n d a v i d l y r e a d i n g t h e p u b l i s h e d t r a n s c r i p t s - f a r m o r e

f r i g h t e n i n g t h a n t h e " w h o - d u n n i t s " t h a t h a d " l u l l e d "

m e t o s le e p i n t h e pa s t . S o i t w a s t h a t I l e a r n e d h o w

S o v i e t R u s s i a h a d p l a c e d h e r a g e n t s i n h i g h p l a c e s i n

o u r g o v e r n m e n t - a g e n t s w h o n o t o n l y s t o l e t o p s e c r e t s ,

b u t , m o s t i m p o r t a n t o f a l l , i n f l u e n c e d t h e p o li c y m a k e r s



x x i i I n t r o d u c t i o n

o v e r t h e m e e t i n g s . Although the recommendations o f

t h e j o i n t C h i e f s w e r e a l w a y s u n a n i m o u s , , m o r e o f t e n

than not the two ad mirals d isagreedwith n e r a l

Arnold s o t M a r s h a l l i n p r i v a t e . A n d G e n e r a l A r n o l d , a c c o r d i n g o

h i s m e m o i r s , a l s o q u i t e o f t e n d i d n o t g o a l o n g w i t h

G e n e r a l M a r s h a l l ' s v i e w s . Secretary of W ar Henry

S t i m s o n w a s s o s e l do m c o n s u l t e d t h a t h e , t o o , m u s t b e

e l i m i n a t e d . F i n a l l y I d i s c o v e r e d a p a s s a g e i n G e n e r a l

Arnold' s book, " Global Mission" which sum med up

t h e pi c t u r e . He wrote-"U sually, he (Marshall) was

spokesman at our conferences . " A r n o l d r e f e r r e d t o

A d m i r a l L e a h y a s t h e C h a i r m a n o f t h e J o i n t C h i e f s ,

b u t t o M a r s h a l l a s t h e s p o k e s m a n . I t h e r e f o r e c a m e

t o t h e i n e s c a p a b l e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t , w h e n I r e a d t h a t

" t h e A r m y " o r " t h e j o i n t C h i e f s " h a d d e c i d e d u p o n



Chapter 1

EARLY BATTLES OF THE PACIFIC ;FIRST PEACE FEELERS

U . S . N a v y w i n s i n i t i a t i v e f r o m J a p a n 6 m o n t h s a f t e r

P e a r l H a r b o r .U. S . A i r F o r c e wi n s s u p e r i o r i t y o v e r J a p a n e s e i n 19 4 3 .

L o s s o f S a i p a n i s l o s s o f w a r f o r J a p a n e s e .

" P e a c e P a r t y " c o m e s t o l i f e a n d m a n e u v e r s t h e f a l l o f

T o j o c a b i n e t .

P e a c e f e e l e r s a r e s e n t t o C h i n a .

B a t t l e o f L e y t e G u l f , O c t o b e r 1 9 4 4 , d o o m s J a p a n .



2 The Enemy at His Back

Leahy io8 " T h e N a v y g e n e r a l l y a n d t h e A r m y i n t h e F a r E a s t u n d e r

D o u g l a s M a c A r t h u r w o u l d h a v e p r e f e rr e d t o e m p l o y s u f -

f i c i e n t f o r c e s i n t h e P a c i f i c t o m o v e m o r e a gg r e s s i v e l y a g a i n s t

J a p a n , b u t t h e y l o y a l l y a d h e r e d t o t h e g e n e r a l s t r a t e g y

p r e s c r i b e d b y P r e s i d e n t R o o s e v e l t . "

By the Adm iral's precise statement, " the Army in

the Far East un der Dougl as MacArthur," I ass um ed

t h a t t h e A r m y C h i e f o f S t a f f i n W a s h i n g t o n , G e o r ge C .

Marshall, must have concurred with President Roose-

v e l t a g a i n s t t h e a d v i c e o f t h e n a v a l o f f i c e r s . A d m i r a l

Leahy conf irmed this to me .

It was als o known that Harry Hopkins " som etim es

Lea an d h a d t h e l a s t w o r d i n m i l i t a r y m a t t e r s , " w h j c h l e a d s us

Henschel 11 48t o b e l i e v e t u . r hall an d Ho kins were t h e _ . . t a r o



B a t t l e s o f t h e P a c i f i c ; F i r s t P e a c e F e e l e r s 3

h e l p d o wn t h e S o v i e t c o m r a d e s ' t h r o a t s . T h e R u s s i a n s

w e r e i n s u l t i n g , e v a s i v e , a n d h a r d - t o - gi v e - t o . G e n e r a l D e a n e 9 7

D e a n e i n t h e s a m e b o o k c a n d i d l y e x p r e s s e d h i s f e e l i n g

a b o u t t h i s o u t r a g e o u s s i t u a t i o n . " W h e n i t w a s ' K i c k -

A m e r i c a n s - i n - t h e - p a n t s ' w e e k , " h e w r o t e , " e v e n t h e

(Russ ian) charwomen would be sour . "

B y W a s h i n g t o n ' s d e c i s i o n t o g i v e a i d t o R u s s i a f i r s t ,

General MacArthur was given only 20 p e r c e n t o f t h e

men and supplies which were sent to Europe . T hi s ,

t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e f a c t t h a t o u r N a v a l c o m m a n d e r s i n

t h e P a c i f i c h a d t o w a g e w a r w i t h a s e r i o u s l y d a m a g e d

f l e et m a k e s i t a l m o s t a m i r a c l e t h a t v i c t o r i e s c a m e s o

q u i c k l y i n t h e e a r l y s t a g e s .

Yet on May 8, 1 9 4 2 , e x a c t l y f i v e m o n t h s a n d o n e



The Japanese

Story of the

B a t t l e o f

Midway .U . S . o f f i c e o f

N a v a l I n t e l -

4 The Enem y at His Back

Once they met in serious b attle with the American

f l e e t , t h e J a p a n e s e f e l l a p a r t l i k e a h o u s e o f c a r d s .

H e r e i s a t r a n s l a t e d e x c e r pt f r o m a c a p t u r e d J a p a n e s e

r e p o r t w ri t t e n b y t h e C o m m a n d e r - i n - C h i e f o f t h e F i r s t

Air Fleet, Admi ral Nagu mo . I t i s c o n t a i n e d i n " T h e

J a p a n e s e S t o r y o f t h e B a t t l e o f M i d w a y , " p u b l i s h ed b y

the U . S . O f f i c e o f N a v a l I n t e ll i g e n c e . Y o u w i l l s e e t h a t

t h e J a p a n e s e N a v y w a s h a v i n g r e a l t r o u b l e a s e a r l y a s

May and June 1942 .

" A l t h ou g h t h e f l i g h t t r a i n i n g p r o g ra m ( i n p r e p a r a t i o n f o r

t h e b a t t l e ) w a s c o n d u c t e d w i t h o u t a n y m a j o r i n c i d e n t . . .

p r a c t i c a l l y n o o n e g o t b e y o n d t h e p o i n t o f b a s i c t r a i n i n g .

I n e x p e r i e n c e d f l i e r s b a r e l y g o t t o t h e p o i n t w h e r e t h ey

c o u l d m a k e d a y t i m e l a n d i n g s o n c a r r i e rs . I t w a s f o u n d t h a t



B a t t l e s o f t h e P a c i f i c ; F i r s t P e a c e F e e l e r s 5

" I n g e n e r a l , i t w o u l d s e e m t o a p p e a r t h a t o u r e f f o r t i n G u a d a l c a n a l

t h e S o u t h w e s t P a c i f i c m u s t f o r s e v e ra l r e a s o n s b e l i m i t e d t o 4

t h e s t r a t e g i c d e f e n s i v e f o r a i r a n d g r o u n d t r o op s . "

H e r e w e s e e t h a t M a r s h a l l w a s s t r i c t l y a d h e r i n g t o

t h e p o l i c y o f " d e f e n s i v e " w a r f a r e i n t h e Pa c i f i c . B u t

A d m i r a l K i n g , a t o u g h " s a l t , " i m m e d i a t e l y c h a l l e n g e d

M a r s h a l l ' s l e t t e r a n d w r o t e b a c k t h a t d e f e n s e w a s n o t

e n o u g h - t h a t w e s h o u l d s e t u p s t r o n g p o i n t s i n p r e p -

a r a t i o n f o r a n o f f e n s i v e .

T h e A d m i r a l w on h i s f i r s t c r u c i a l s k i r m i s h i n W a s h -

i n g t o n . H e g ot h i s t r oo ps . And by February 1 9 4 3 t h e

A m e r i c a n s w e r e s e c u r e l y e s t a b l i s h e d i n G u a d a l c a n a l

and the Buna area . " . . . i t g a i n e d f o r t h e U n i t e d

S t a t e s a s t r a t e g i c i n i t i a t i v e w h i c h w a s n e v e r r e l i n - G u a d a l c a n a l



K a s e 1 8 3


Unit ed Nations . In "Journey to the Miss ouri, " Mr

Kase penned an as toni shing paragraph . He and the

British Ambas sador to Tokyo were good f riends and ,

after the war had st arted, t he Japanese dipl omat

secretly visited the interned Sir Robert Craigi on

s e v e r a l o c c a s i o n s . Mr . Kase wrote that in Jul y 1942-" . . . O n m y l a s t v i s i t t o t h e B r i t i s h e m b a s s y , h o w e v e r , I

was entrus ted by Foreign Minis ter Togo wi th a highly

c o n f i de n t i a l m e s s a ge . I w a s i n s t r u c t e d t o g i v e S i r R o be r t

a d i s c r e e t h i n t r e g a rd i n g t h e e v e n t u a l r e s t o r a t i o n o f p e a c e

A f t e r a f r i e n d l y c h a t I i n t r o d u c e d t h e s u b j e c t w i t h a l l t h e

tact at my command and said, `Should it happen that

t h e B r i t i s h G o v e r n m e n t b e c a m e d e s i r o u s o f d i s c u s s i n g o r

n e g o t i a t i n g p e a c e t h e y w o u l d f i n d t h e J a p a n e s e G o v e r n m e n t

r e a d y t o b e h e l p f u l . . . '



B a t t l es o f t h e Pa c i f i c ; F i r s t P e a c e F e e l e r s7

" B e g i n n i n g i n t h e e a r l y p a r t o f 1 9 4 4 t h e A l l i e s p os s e s s e d

a n e v e r i n c r e a s i n g n u m e r i c a l s u p e r i o r i t y i n a l l t y p e s o f

weapons . . .

. . . W h i l e t h e A l l i e d a i r s o r t i e s w e r e n u m b e r e d i n t h e

t h o u s a n d s t h o s e o f t h e J a p a n e s e w e r e n u m b e re d i n t e n s , a n d

w h i l e t h e A l li e s r o a m e d t h e s e a a r e a s o f f t h e c o a s t o f N e w

G u i n e a w i t h l a r g e f o rc e s o f c a r r i e r s , c r u i s e r s , d e s t r o y e r s

a n d m e r c h a n t s h i p s t h e J a p a n e s e h a d n o n e . "

USSBS Cam-

p a i g n s o f t h e

P a c i f i c W a r

1 8 6

The year 1944 brought more of the same .

Jan .3 ' , 1 9 4 4 A m e r i c a n s l a n d i n t h e M a r s h a l l I s l a n d s

A p r i l 2 2 , 1 9 4 4 A m e r i c a n s l a n d a t H o l l a n d i a i n D u t c h

New Gu ineaMay 1 7 , 1 9 4 4 M y i t k y i n a a i r s t r i p c a p t u r e d

J u n e1 5 , 1 9 4 4 A m e r i c a n s l a n d o n . S a i p a n i n t h e M a r i a n a




l o we d d i s a s t e r , t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n t h e t w o s e r v -

i c e s b e c a m e i n c r e a s i n g ly h o s t i l e .

W h i l e t h e b a t t l e o f S a i p a n w a s s t i l l i n p r o gr e s s , e v e n

s o m e o f t h e J a p a n e s e c a b i n e t r e a l i z e d t h a t t h e i r n a t i o n

had l ost and were eager to j oin the "peace party . "

K a s e7 3 Mr . K a s e w r i t e s t h a t o n J u n e 2 6 t h , 1 9 4 4 , Baron Kido,

a c l o s e a d v i s e r t o t h e E m p e r o r a n d L o r d K e e p e r of t h e

P r i v y S e a l , " s e n t f o r F o re i g n M i n i s t e r S h i g e m i t s u a n d

asked him if he would work out som e plan l ooking

. t o w a r d a n e v e n t u a l d i p l om a t i c s e t t l e m e n t o f t h e w a r . "

These two statesmen, Shigemitsu and Kido, pledged

t h e m s e l v e s a t t h i s m e e t i n g t o w o r k t o w a r d t h e r e s t o -

r a t i on o f pe a c e . O n J u n e 2 9 , 1 9 4 4 , a n o t h e r s e c r e t a n d

i m p o r t a n t m e e t i n g t o o k p l a c e . P r e s e n t w e r e M r . K a s e ,

P r i n c e T a k a m a t s u , t h e y o u n g e r b r o t h e r o f t h e E m p e r o r,



B a t t l es o f t h e Pa c i f i c ; F i r s t P e a c e F e e l e r s 9

P a c i f i c (in July 1944) where he met with General

MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz . Nimitz and Mac-

A r t h u r b r i e f e d t h e P r es i d e n t o n t h e u n t e n a b l e s i t u a t i o n

t h e J a p a n e s e f o u n d t h e m s e l v e s i n , a n d c o n v i n c e d h i m

t h a t J a p a n c o u l d b e f o r c e d t o s u r r e n d e r w i t h o u t a n

i n v a s i o n o f h e r h om e i s l a n d s . L e a a n d H e n s c h e l w r o t e

t h a t M a c A r t h u r " p o i n t e d o u t p r o u d l y t h a t i n t w o y e a r s

of fighting in his area, fewer Americans had been

k i l l e d t h a n i n t h e s i n g l e ba t t l e o f A n z i o . H e i n s i s t e d

t h e P h i l i p p i n e s w e r e t h e k e y t o t h e s t o l e n c o n q u e r e d

J a p a n e s e e m p i r e . . . O n c e d e f e a t e d ( t h e r e ) t h e y w o u l d

s o o n b e f o r c e d t o s u r r e n d e r w i t h o u t t h e n e c e s s i t y o f

a n i n v a s i o n b y l a n d f o rc e s ; a i r a n d n a v a l p o we r a l o n e

w o u l d b r i n g h e r t o h e r k n e e s . " A d m i r a l L e a h y , a l w a y s

a t t h e P r e s i d e n t ' s s i d e a t s u c h b r i e f i n g s , t o l d t h i s w r i t e r

Lea an d

Henschel

170-1



ro The Enemy at His Back

a n d C h u n g k i n g a n d , a n d h i s l a s t t r i p i n M a r c h o f1 9 4 5 ,

his arguments to the Chinese were t h a t t h e U n i t e d

S t a t e s was o f f e r i n g S o v i e t R u s s i a a p a r t o f M a n c h u r i a

in return for Russian entry into the war a ainst

J pang t h a t i n o r de r t o p r ev e n t s u c h a n o c c u r r e n c e , t h e

E m p e r o r w i s h e d t o o f f e r a n u n c o n d i t i o n a l s u r r e n d e r

t o C h i n a , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a n d G r e a t B r i t a i n . I t i s

s t r a n g e t h a t t h e J a p a n e s e t h e m s eo t w i n d o f t h e

t e r m s o f t h e Y a l t a a g r e e m e n t w h e n i t was a c a r e f u l l y

k e p t s e c r e t rom e v e n American o f f i c i a l s. But what

P r i n c e M i y a a w a t o l d f h e C h i n e s e inMarch 1945 was

p a r t o f t h e Y a l t a a g r e e m e n t w h i c h h a d n o t b e e n c o m -

m u n i c a t e d b y u s t o t h e C h i n e s e G o v e r n m e n t , a l l e g e d l y

f o r f e a r of a l e a k t o J a p a n !

T h e t r a n s m i s s i o n o f t h e s e h i g h l y s e c r e t m e s s a g e s



B a t t l e s o f t h e P a c i f i c ; First Peace Feelers i 1

effect to Was hing ton, an d to whom . He repl ied that

all of his reports were sent to the OPD (Operations

Plans Div ision, sometimes called War Plans Div ision)

in t he Pentago n . He said i f his reports concerned

policy, and these did , they were giv en to Gen . John

Ed w i n Hul l a n d Gen . Tho m a s T . Handy who pass ed

t h e m o n t o t h e c h i e f o f s t a f f , G e n e r a l M a r s h a l l .

The loss of Saipan in July 1944 gav e the "peace

party" their firs t st rong foothold . W ith the fall of

the Tojo cab inet, the "war part y" steadily lost power .

T h e r e w a s n o p o s s i b l e c o v e r - u p o f t h e f a c t t h a t J a p a n ' s K a s e 9 8

los ses had been s o severe that she was n o lon ger able

to brin g raw materials to the home island s for m anu-

f a c t u r e .



1 2 The Enemy at His Back

f l e e t e v e ry d a y , t h e J a p a n e s e l a c k e d t h e n e c e s s a r y r a w

m a t e r i a l s t o e v e n b u i l d r e p l a c e m e n t s f o r t h e i r l o s s e s .

L e a h y 2 7 4 F i v e d a y s a f t e r M a c A r t h u r l a n d e d f o u r d i v i s i o n s o n

the island of Leyte, Admiral Halsey cabled Washing-

ton : "It can be annou nced with ass urance that the

Japanese Navy has been beaten, routed, and broken

b y t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s F l e e t s . "

K e n n e y i 7 7 T h e la s t d e s p e r a t e J a p a n e s e e f f o r t t o s t a v e o f f t h e

i n e v i t a b l e t h r o u g h t h e u s e o f s u i c i d e K a m i k a s e s , w a s

d r a m a t i c , c o s t l y a n d f u t i l e .

It was imm ediately f ollowin g the Battle of Leyte

G u l f t h a t H i r o h i t o a n d t h e J a p a n e s e p e a c e p a r t y m a d e

contact with a group of S iamese who relayed another

W a s h i n g t o n u n c o n d i t i o n a l s u r r e n d er ( w i t h t h e e x c e p t i o n o f r e t a i n -

E v e n i n g ing their Emperor) to Washington, again warnin g



C h a p t e r I I

HOW COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA AFFECTSOUR FOREIGN POLICY

How Commun ist propagand a works .

Sum ner Welles is maneuvered in to carrying out Di-

m i t r o v ' s e d i c t .

Commun ist poli cy for China and Japan .

U n c o n d i t i o n a l S u r r e n d e r i s t h e k e y .

T h e p a r t p l a y e d b y R o t h , L a t t i m o r e a n d B i s s o n .Mr. G r e w ge t s i n t o t r o u b le .

R u s s i a w a s d e t e r m i n e d t h a t t h e w a r i n t h e P a c i f i c

w o u l d n o t e n d u n t i l s h e h a d g a t h e r e d a l l h e r c h i c k e n s



Sherwood

6 4 3

Daily Worker

J u l y 1 9 , 1 9 5 5sC

14 The Enemy a t H i s B a c k

a n d l e c t u r e r s , a r e n o t C o m m u n i s t s . F e w a r e e v e n p r o -

Communists . B u t a l l t o o o f t e n t h e y d o t h e K r e m l i n ' s

w o r k b y f o l l o w i n g t h e p ol i c y t h a t " w e m u s t b e s o h e l p-

f u l a n d f r i e n d l y " t o R u s s i a t h a t s h e w i l l " w i l l i n g l y

j o i n w i t h u s i n e s t a b l i s h i n g a s o u n d p e a c e . "

T h i s w a s t h e p o l i c y w h i c h w a s f o l l o w e d i n o u r " R E -

recognition" of the Soviets at the Geneva " sum mit "

c o n f e r e n c e i n J u l y 1955 . And it was on the basis of

such thinkin g that President Eisenhower opened the

Geneva Con ference with the statement : " I t i s t i m e

t h a t a l l c u r t a i n s , w h e t h e r o f g u n s , o r l a w s o r r e g u -

lations , should begin to come down ." And to prove

that the Uni ted States would f ollow "word s" wi th

" d e e d s " w e c o n c u r r e d w i t h t h e D e c l a r a t i o n o f t h e S u -

p r e m e S o v i e t o f t h e U . S . S .R . ( t h e R u s s i a n " c o n g r es s " )



C o m m u n i s t P r o pa g a n d a A f f e c t s F o r e i g n P o li c y1 5

i m p l i c a t i o n that "this is goo d for America ." Then,

t h r o u g h t h e i r a g e n t s i n s t r a t e g i c p l a c e s , t h e y " s e l l "

t h e i r b r om i d e s t o t h e m e n w h o p u t o u t t h e i n f o r m a t i o n ,

m o r e o f t e n t h a n n o t , u n w i t t i n g t o o l s .

For example : I t i s p r e t t y w e l l u n d e r s t o o d i n t h e

l i g h t o f re c e n t h i s t o r y t h a t , w h e n w e ll - i n t e n t i o n e d a n d

patrioti c commentators and column ist s urged that

Chiang Kai-s hek cooperate with the Comm uni st Chi-

n e s e , t h e y w e r e h e l p i n g t o l a y t h e g r ou n d f o r t h e R e d

conquest of China . L i k e w i s e , i f t h e s e s a m e n e w s c a s t e r s

had not helped to build up an unprecedented fear of

Russ ia, our forces in Korea would have won a qu ick

a n d d e c i s i v e v i c t o r y r a t h e r t h a n a " s u b s t i t u t e . "

Louis F . Bu denz' book, "The Techniq ues of C om-

mun ism ," j ust abou t covers the water front f or the



i 6 The Enemy at His Back

T h e C o m m u n i s t s h a v e a n e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t m e a n i n g

f o r c e r t a i n w o r d s a n d p h r a s e s t h a n t h e a v e r a g e A m e ri -

c a n d o e s . I t i s a n i n s t i n c t i v e t r a i t o f o u r p e o p le t o " h e lp

t h e p o o r . " T h e re i s n o c o u n t r y i n t h e w o rl d w h er e t h e

c i t i z e n r y , f r o m t h e m u l t i - m i l l i o n a i r e t o t h e f a m i l y

e a r n i n g a m e r e l i v i n g , c o n t r i b u t e s s o w h o l e - h e a r t e d l y

f o r c h a r i t a b l e p u r p o s e s . Nowhere in the world, for

i n s t a n c e , i s t h e r e t h e e q u i v a l e n t o f o u r C o m m u n i t y

C h e s t . B u t i n C o m m u n i s t l a n g u a g e , t o " h e l p t h e p o o r"

i s a n o t h e r w a y o f s a y i n g " d i v i d e t h e w e a l t h . " T o a t -

t a i n t h i s t h e y a d v o c a t e l a v i s h e x p e n di t u r e s o f t h e t a x -

p a y e r s ' m o n e y o n s t a t e o w n e r s h i p , a h u g e b u r e a u c r a c y ,

a n d " f r o m c r a d l e t o g r a v e " p l a n s . T h r o u g h o u t A m e r i -

c a n h i s t o r y t h e r e h a s b e en a c o n t i n u a l a n d s u c c e s s f u l

e f f o r t t o r a i s e o u r s t a n d a r d o f li v i n g . B u t i n e x a g g er a t e d



C o m m u n i s t P ro p a g a n d a A f f e c t s F o r e i g n P o l i c y1 7

t h e b a i t - t a k e r s , t h e C o m m u n i s t s c o u l d m a k e n o h e a d -

w a y i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s o f A m e r i c a .

T h e r e i s o n e o t h e r w a y o f i n f l u e n c i n g p u b l i c o p i n i o n

not mentioned by Louis Budenz . A single Communis t

i n o n e o f o u r g o v e r n m e n t a g e n c i e s c a n w o r k wonders

with men who not think for themselves . I n t h e e a r l y

t h i r t i e s a m e t h o d - w a s s e t u p , whereby t he p u bl i c was

" c o n d i t i o n e d " t o a c c e p t a p o l i c y w h i c h w a s a b o u t t b

b e l a u n c h ed _ A l o n g t i m e c a r e e r d i p l o m a t i n o u r S t a t e

Department, John H i c k e r s o n , e x p l a i n s t h i s m e t h o d Y a l t a P a p e r s

v e r y c l e a r l y . 9 4

On Jan . 8 , 1 9 4 5 , Mr. Hickerson wrote a memo-r a n d u m t o t h e S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e w i t h r e c o m m e n d a -

t i o n s f o r t h e c o m i n g Y a l t a C o n f e r e n c e . H e s p e c i f i e d




becomes law . T h e of f i c i a l l i n e i s p u b li s h e d i n M o s c o w .

C u r r e n t l y t h e i r m a i n v e h i c l e o n f o r e i g n a f f a i r s i s t h e

periodical New Times, and it i s p ublis hed in many

l a n g u a g e s a n d m a i l e d t o n o n - R e d c o u n t r i e s . F r o m t h i s

t h e l o c a l C o m m u n i s t p u b l i c a t i o n s p i c k u p t h e l i n e o n

f o r e i g n a f f a i r s . Not only active comrades but anyone

s o d e s i r i n g m a y s u b s c r i b e t o i t . S o m e t i m e s l o c a l , o r

urgent decisions are sent out in a form letter via

t h e " d r o p b o x , " o r m a y f i r s t a p p e a r i n o f f i c i a l C o m -

m u n i s t p u b l i c a t i o n s - i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , f o r e x a m p l e ,

the Daily Worker, Masses and Mains tream, P olitical

A f f a i r s , e t c . Und erground Comm unists pick up the

l i n e , p a s s i t a l o n g i n n o r m a l c o n v e r s a t i o n w i t h s y m p a -

t h i z e r s o r r e c e p t i v e d u p e s , k n o w i n g t h e y i n t u r n w i l l



Communist Propaganda Affects Foreign Policy 1 9

Nov . 1 2 ,

No v . 1 2 , 19 5 4

Nov .

Nov . 2 4 ,

Dec . 2 3 ,

March r ,

1 9 5 4

1 3 , 1 9 5 4

1 9 5 4

1 9 5 4

1 9 5 5

U N E S C O E x e c u t i v e B o a r d O K s P e a c e -

f u l Co e x i s t e n c e

C o e x i s t e n c e W i l l B e K ey n o t e a t S o v i e t

A m i t y R a l l y T u e s d a y

C o a s t M i s s i o n a r y , B a c k f r o m

U r g e s C o - e x i s t e n c e

" C o - E x i s t e n c e o r N o - E x i s t e n c e , " M r .MnvS t e v e n s o n U r ge s C o - E x i s t e n c e ~'C h i n a ,

J u s t i ce D ou gl a s A s k s C o - E x i s t e n c e i n

A s i a

T h i s i s t h e " n o r m a l " t r a n s m i s s i o n b e l t . T h e r e a r e

e x c e p t i o n s . When a matter of great importance and

u r g e n c y a r i s e s , a special agent is employed . For



China : T h e

March To-

w a r d U n i t y ,

' address "The

1 5 t h A n n i -

v e r s a r y o f

the Com -

t i u n i s t P a r t y

of-China" by1Geoi mm-xtrOh83- 87


munist Party o f C h i n a , l a y i n g d o w n t h e " l i n e " t o t h e

f o l l o w e r s . T h r e e s m a l l e x c e r pt s t e l l a b i g s t o r y :

" . a s a r e a l B o l s h e v i k _ . P a r t y , t h e C om m u n i s t P a r t y o

C h i n a r e a l i z e s that however g r e a t t h e s u c c e s s e s i t h a s

a c h i e v e d , t h e y a r e o n l y t h e f i r s t s e r i o u s s t e p s o n t h e r o a

t o t h e l i be ra t i o n of t h e Ch i n e se p e o p l e . . .

" T h e P a r t y . . . i s f a c e d w i t h t T h e t a s k o f c a r r y i n g o n a

s y s t e m a t i c s t r u g g l e t o e s t a b l i s h a u n i t e d n a t i o n a l f r o n

w i t h t h e K u o m i n t a n g . " ( T h i s i s t h e g o v e r n m e n t o f Ch i a n g

K a i - s h e k . ) ( E m p h a s i s m i n e . )

And-" I t i s n e c e s s a r y t h a t e n e r g e t i c m e a s u r e s b e t a k e n t o e x e r t



C o m m u n i s t P r o p a g a n d a Af f e c t s F o r e i g n P o l i c y 2 1

o France, Englan d and the Uni ted S tates s o t h a t

we R e d s w i l l h a v e t h e i r c o o p e r a t i o n i n a l l o u r p l a n s .

In i o Earl Browd er, f ormer head of the C o m -

m u n i s t P a r t y o f t e r o t ees , e s e• • e o r e t h e

so- called Tyding s comm ittee and explained j ust how

i m i t r o v s eman s were carried ou t . The lan guage

he used was e x t r a o r d i n a r i l y f rank .

" . . . t h e t e r m ` t r a n s m i s s i o n b e lt s " . . . s i m p l y m e a n s t h e T y d i n g s x -

u t i l i z a t

tiion_of every agency reaching the minds of the 6 7 2

m a s s e s

. 7 7 _ '_ I - u s e d i n f o r m a t i o n w h i c h I r e c e i v e d f r o m M a o T z e-z - 6 8 z

t u n g , t h e h ea d o f t h e C o m m u n i s t P a r t y i n C h i n a - o f C h i n a

- t o i n f o r m t h e P r es i d e n t o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a b o u t t h e

m i l i t a r y s i t u a t i o n i n s i d e o f C h i n a . . .



22

av i t a t i o n f r o m U n d e r s e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e S u m n e r W e l l e s

and L a u c h l i n C u r r i e t o c o m e t o W a s h i n g t o n f o r a c o n -

f e r e n c e .- -B r o w d e r ' s i n t e r v i e w w i t h W e l l e s w a s a l s o p u b l i s h e d

i n t h e D a i l y W o r k e r a n d r e p o r t e d i n t h e d a i l y p r e s s .

The Under Secretary was qu oted as sayi ng, "The

U n i t e d S t a t e s f a v o r s ` c o m p le t e u n i t y ' a m o n g t h e C h i -

n e s e p e o p l e a n d a l l g r ou p s o r o r g a n i z a t i o n s t h e r e o f . "

(Emphasis m ine . )

T y d i n g s s _ B r o w d er t o l d t h e T y d i n g s c o m m i t t e e , " T h i s c h a n g e

6 7 5

i n p o l i c y w a s g i v e n t o m e a s a m a t t e r o f i n f o r m a t i o n

by the Under Secretary of State . .. I s i m u l t a n e -

ously transmitted that statement of United S t a t e s

Government policy on China to Madam Sun Yat Sen,

in Chungking, by cable . " ( N o t e : Madam S un Yat-

The Enemy at His Back



C o m m u n i s t P r o pa g a n d a A f f e c t s F o r e i g n P o l i c y 2 3

d i d n o t w a n t t o d o a w a y w i t h t h e E m p e r o r u n t i l some

time a f t e r t h e w a r . The Comm unis ts expected then

t o b e a a b b e t ocTange public sentiment s o that the

J a p a n e s e " l i b e r a l s " ( m a i n l y C o m m u n i s t s ) w o u l d g e t

r i d o f h i m t h e m s e l v e s . I t w a s s o m e t h i n g l i k e t h e p l a n

u s e d i n I t a l y w h e n t h e K i n g w a s s u c c e s s f u l l y o u s t e d .

Stalin, in late May 1 9 4 5 , f e l t t h a t t h e J a p a n e s e S h e r w oo d

E m p e r o r w o u l d g u a r a n t e e a n o r d e r l y s u r r e n d e r a f t e r9 0 4

w h i c h t h e v i c t o r s c o u l d " g i v e t h e m t h e w o r k s , " o r s o

H a r r y H o p k i n s i n t e r p r e t e d S t a l i n ' s v i e w s . W h i l e t h e

L e f t i s t p r e s s i n t h e W e s t k e p t u p a s t e a d y b a r r a g e

a g a i n s t t h e E m p e r o r , w h i c h r e a c t e d o n t h e J a p a n e s e

p e o p le , t h e h i d d e n Co m m u n i s t s a n d t h e i r a l l i e s i n h i g h

g o v e r n m e n t c i r c l e s i n W a s h i n g t o n k e p t t h e i s s u e i n - I P R 4 - r o r 6




rison Forman correspondent f o r t h e New York Herald

Tribun e .

There were man y others who, whether con sci ous ly

o r n o t , p i c k e d u p t h e l i n e a n d s e n t i t h o m e i n t h e i r

w r i t t e n d i s p a t c h e s .

That the press reports and books wri tten by this

group were pleasing to the Comm uni sts can be as-

certained by the following item in the Daily Worker

o f J u n e 1 8 , 1947

I P R 2 - 4 6 o " W e h a v e h a d m a n y e x c e l l e n t b oo k s a b o u t C h i n a i n t h e

p a s t f e w y e a r s , b o o k s b y t o p f l i g h t r e p o rt e r s l i k e H a r r i s o n

F o r m a n , G u e n t h e r S t e i n A n e s S m e d l e , T h e o d or e ~ W h i t e ,

an A n n a e e a c o b y . A t t h e t o p o f t h i s l i s t b e l o n g s a b o o k

p u b li s h e d t o d a y , I s r a e l E p s t e i n ' s U n f i n i s h e d R e v o l u t i o n i n



C o m m u n i s t P r o p a g a n d a A f f e c t s F o r e i g n P o l i c y 2 5

a g r o u p o f r e p o r t e r s . F o r i n s t a n c e h e t o l d G u e n t h e r Roth 270

S t e i n t h a t " . . . a P r e s i d e n t e l e c t e d b y t h e p e o p l e "

o u gh t t o r e p l a c e t h e E m p e r o r . B u t t o H a r r i s o n F o r m a n

he said that "The Emperor is still too much of a

g o d l i k e f i g u r e " a n d s u g g e s t e d t h a t h e n o t b e a t t a c k e d

a t t h e m o m e n t b u t s h o u l d s u b s e q u e n t l y b e t r i e d a s a

w a r c r i m i n a l .

R i g h t a f t e r t h a t , i n O c t o b e r ( d u r i n g t h e b a t t l e o f

L e y t e G u l f ) W a t a r u K a j i , a " l e f t i s t w r i t e r , " w h o w a s N . Y . T i m e s

to be reported by the New York Times in 1952 asDec . i 8 , 1 9 5 2

being involved in a Communist spy ring in Tokyo,

g a v e t h e f o ll o w - u p t o O k a n o ' s t e n t a t i v e l i n e . H e g a v e

a l e c t u r e i n t h e N a t i o n a l i s t c a p i t a l o f Ch u n g k i n g , o f

a l l p l a c e s , u n d e r t h e a u s p i c e s o f a " f r o n t " o r ga n i z a t i o n FBIS Chung-

X944Oct .




Emancipat ion Daily at Yenan on May 29th, but its

d i s t r i b u t i o n i n A m e r i c a w a s w i t h h e l d u n t i l t h e " r i g h t

t i m e ." The "ri ght tim e" wo ul d be when Russ ia was

in the war agains t Japan and Japan had s urrendered .

The Sov iets declared war on Augu st 8, 1945, Japan

threw in the sponge on Augus t io, 1 9 4 5 , and the

e d i t o r s o f t h e D a i l y W o r k e r p u t t h e i r p r e p a r e d r e po r t

on the Okano speech "in the works " the same day .

I t a p p e a r e d i n that Red paper Augu s . r 94 5 . This

w a s t h e c a r e f u l t i m i n g e n d , i t h a d a s t r a n g e d a t e l i n e-Yenan, China, June io, ( d e l a y e d ) ." (Emphasis

mine . ) V -

T h e p er t i n e n t p a r t s o f O k a n o ' s d i c t a a r e t h e f o l lo w --ing :



C o m m u n i s t P r o pa g a n d a A f f e c t s F o r e i g n P o l i c y2 7

o n t h e s a m e p a g e a s t h e r e p o r t o f O k a n o ' s s p e e c h . I n

p a r t h e s a i d :

" I t i s u n d e r s t a n d a b l e , o f c o u r s e , t h a t p r o gr e s s i v e A m e r i -

c a n s a r e a l a r m e d a t a n y p o s s i b l e s p e c i a l p o s i t i o n f o r t h e

Emperor . . .

" O n c e J a p a n i s o c c u p i e d a n d o n c e t h e m a j o r i n du s t r i a l

c e n t e r s o f M a n c h u r i a a r e i n U n i t e d N a t i o n s h a n d s , i t w i l l

b e t h e a c t u a l e v o l u t i o n o f J a p a n e s e p o l i t i c s , u n d e r Al l i e d

c o n t r o l , t h a t w i l l c o u n t . "

The second and equ ally i mportant program the

Kremli n proposed f or Asia was also relayed to the

S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t b y o u r o f f i c i a l s . We learn by way

o f t h e s e r e p o rt s t h a t i n t h e F a l l o f 1 9 4 4 , Ch'in P o

Ku (Ch'in Pang-hsien), who was in charge of Chinese




r e c o m m e n d e d i n a r e p o r t t o t h e S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t t h a t

the civilian government of Japan be made up only

of Communis ts, since the Red group was the only

` d e m o c r a t i c ' f o r c e t h e r e " ; when yo u have Raym ond

L u d d e n r e p o r t i n g t h a t " t h e s o - c a l l e d C o m m u n i s t s ( i n

C h i n a ) a r e a g r a r i a n r e f o r m e r s o f a m i l d d e m o c r a t i c

s t r i p e , " y o u r e a l i z e w h a t s t r o n g A m e r i c a n c o n f e d e r a t e s

the Comm unis ts had .

B u t l e t u s s e e h ow t h e s e e m i n g l y c o n t r a d i c t o r y l i n e

concerning the Emperor applied to the war in the

P a c i f i c .

When Churchill and Roosevelt met at Casablanca

in January 1943, they made a joint announcement

t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t t h e A ll i e s w o u l d a c c e p t n o t h i n g l e s s

than " u n e n n r l i t i o n a l s u r r e n d e r . " T o t h o s e u n d e r s t a n d -

Budenz 17 7-8

They Cr y

Peace

C o n g . R e c o r d

June 5,

1951 page

6298




bed, they chatted about each day' s happenings . On

the eve of the press conf erence, General Marshall

d i n e d w i t h R o o s e v e l t a n d C h u r c h i l l . When he returned

t o t h e v i l l a , h e w e n t t o G e n e r a l W e d e m e y e r ' s r o o m a n d

s a t d o w n t o t e l l h i m o f t h e e v e n i n g ' s e v e n t s . H e t o l d

Wedemeyer that the President and the Prime Minister

had agreed to annou nce the fol lowin g d ay that un-

condi tion al sur render would be the only terms ac-

ceptable to the United Nations for the surrender of

their com mon enemies .

W h y t h e n , d i d b o t h C h u r c h i l l a n d R o o s e v e l t p u b l i c l y

s t a t e t h a t i t w a s N O T d i s c u s s e d b e f o r e t h e p r e s s c o n -

f e r e n c e ?

I t i s k n o w n t h a t t h e p h r a s e w a s d i s c u s s e d l on g b e f o r e



3 0T h e E n e m y a t H i s B a c k

g a v e t h e J a p a n e s e a f r i g h t en i n g b i r d ' s - e y e v i e w o f w h a t

t h e y c o u l d e x p e c t f r o m t h e A m e r i c a n c o n q u e r o r s .

T h e i m p l i c a t i o n s o f " u n c o n d i t i o n a l s u r r e n d e r " h a d

a d i f f e r e n t e f f e c t i n G e r m a n y a n d J a p a n . The German

p e o pl e , w h a t e v e r t h e i r l o y a l t y t o H i t l e r , n o u r i s h e d a

g r e a t l o v e f o r t h e i r f a t h e r l a n d . T h e y w o u l d f i g h t t o

t h e l a s t r a t h e r t h a n s e e t h e i r " H e i m a t " c o m p l e t e l y

d e s t r o y e d . T h e J a p a n e s e p e o p l e , o n t h e o t h e r h a n d ,

c e n t e r e d t h e i r l o v e o f c o u n t r y o n t h e p e r s o n o f t h e i r

Emp eror . I f u n c o n d i t i o n a l s u r r e n de r m e a n t a h u m i l i a t -

i n g d e s t r u c t i o n o f t h ei r n a t i o n a l s y m b o l , t h e r e wa s n o

d o u b t t h a t e v e r y p a t r i o t i c J a p a n e s e w o u l d b e w i l l i n g

t o d i e f i g h t i n g .

L e a h y 1 4 5 A d m i r a l L e a h y w h o w a s n o t a t C a s a b l a n c a r e g r e t -

f u l l y c o m m e n t e d i n h i s b o o k t h a t " B e f o r e t h e w a r w a s



Communist Propaganda Affects Foreign Policy 31

m e d i a t e l y t h e l e f t i s t p r e s s p r o t e s t e d i n a v i o l e n t

m ann er, an d f rom t h a t t i m e o n t h e f u t u r e o f t h e

J a p a n e s e Em peror becam e a h i g h l y c o n t r o v e r s i a l

s u b j e c t .

D e e p l y e m b r o i l e d i n t h e d r a m a w a s J o s e p h C . G r e w,

o u r a m b a s s a d o r t o J a p a n a t t h e t i m e o f P e a r l H a r b o r .

H e r e t u r n e d o n a n e x c h a n g e s h i p i n Augus t 1 9 4 2 , and

was as sig ned by the St ate Departm ent t o m ake a

s p e a k i n g t o u r o f t h e c o u n t r y t o e x p l a i n t h e w a r i n t h e

P a c i f i c t o t h e A m e r i c a n p e o p l e . Mr . G r e w h a d l i v e d

i n J a p a n f o r t e n y e a r s a n d k n e w h i s s u b j e c t w e l l . H e

t o u r e d t h e c o u n t r y f o r 1 8 months during which time

h e e m p h a s i z e d i n e v e r y s p e e c h t h e s a m e t h e m e . T h i s

i s i m p o r t a n t b e c a u s e i t w a s t h i s t h e m e w h i c h w a s t o

m a k e h i m t e m p o r a r i l y a c c e p t a b l e t o t h e C o m m u n i s t s .



R o t h 6 4


he poin ted out that Hirohito was a "peace-l ovi ng"

r u l e r , a n d o n c e h e g o t o u t f r o m u n d e r c o n t r o l o f t h e

m i l i t a r y , h e w o u l d b e " a n a s s e t a n d n o t a l i a b i l i t y "

after the war . T h i s s t a t e m e n t s e t o f f a c o n c e n t r a t e d

att ack on Mr . Grew by the press which was even

e c h o e d i n f a r o f f C h i n a . D r . S u n F o ( s o n o f t h e l a t e

Dr. S u n Y a t - s e n ) , w e l l - k n o w n a s a " l i b e r a l " f a v o r i n g

C h i n e s e f r i e n d s h i p w i t h R u s s i a , w r o t e a n a r t i c l e p r o-

t e s t i n g M r . G r e w ' s s t a t e m e n t .

I n t h e Un i t e d S t a t e s t h e a t t a c k w a s s o f o r c e f u l t h a t

in February 1 9 4 4 , Mr. G rew was compelled to giv e

an i nterview t o the New York Times, which had

s e v e r e l y c r i t i c i z e d hi m , i n w h i c h h e t r i e d t o e x t r i c a t e

h i m s e lf . H e t o l d t h e n e w s p a p e r c a t e g o r i c a l l y t h a t h e

h a d n e v e r " e i t h e r p u b l i c l y o r p r i v a t e l y " e x p r e s s e d a n



C o m m u n i s t P r o pa g a n d a A f f e c t s F o r e i g n P o l i c y 3 3

o b v i o u s l y s t a g g e r i n g . By the time Mr . Grew was to

a p p e a r b e f or e t h e S e n a t e F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s C o m m i t t e e ,

t h e i s s u e h a d b e c o m e s o h e a t e d t h a t t h e n o w f a m o u s

C a u c u s R o o m i n t h e S e n a t e O f f i c e B u i l d i n g w a s f i l l e d

t o c a p a c i t y .

J u s t p r i o r t o t h e h e a r i n g , t h e n o w d e f u n c t N e w Y o r k

P M s e e m e d t o a p p o i n t i t s e l f t h e l e a d e r o f t h e a t t a c k

on Mr . Grew and the Emperor . O n t h e s u c c e e d i n g

days of Dec . 3 , 4 , a n d 5 , o n e o f t h e i r b es t w r i t e r s ,

R a m o n L a v a l l e , d e v o t e d t h r e e l e a d a r t i c l e s t o t h e

s u b j e c t . And on Dec . 1 3 t h , J a m e s W e c h s l e r , t h e P M ' s

n a t i o n a l e d i t o r a n d n o w e d i t o r o f t h e N e w Y o r k P o s t ,

wrote an entire page in PM attacking Grew . Two

d a y s l a t e r , a n a r t i c l e b y I . F . S t o n e , a l s o o n P M ' s s t a f f ,

e n t i t l e d " A n A p p e a l t o t h e U . S . S e n a t e " b l a s t e d G r e w




Jthe country at an earlier date warning the American

people against a "com promis e peace . " Here is the

Field column :

" T h e t e l e p h o n e h a s j u s t r u n g a n d I h a v e h a d t h e f o l l o w i n g

c o n v e r s a t i o n w i t h a g o o d f r i e n d o f m i n e w h o m I s h a l l d es i g -

~~ nate as X . B e f o r e ge t t i n g t o t h e c o n v e r s a t i o n i t s e l f , l e t m e

a s s u r e y o u t h a t X i s a p e r s o n f o r w h om I h a v e g r e a t r e s pe c t

a n d a d m i r a t i o n , a p e r s o n w h o h a s d o n e m o r e f o r t h e p e o p l e

o f C h i n a t h a n I e v e r h o p e t o do i n m y l i f e .

A f t e r t h e p r e l i m i n a r y g r e e t i n g s o u r t a l k w a s s o m e t h i n g

J l i k e t hi s :X: "W hat do you think of the nomination of Grew as

U n d e r s e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e ? "

F : "I can think of several people who woul d have been

b e t t e r . W h a t d o y o u t h i n k ? "



Commun ist Propaganda Affects Foreign Policy 35

v e l t ' s p o l i c y o n C h i n a i s v e r y p r og r e s s i v e , i t m a y e v e n b e

t h e d e c i s i v e f o r c e t h a t w i l l r e b u i l d C h i n a . I d o u b t w h et h e r

G r e w or a n y b o d y e l s e i n t h e S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t i s g o i n g t o

r e v e r s e t h a t p o li c y . I t ' s b e e n d e v e l o p e d o v e r t h e b o di e s o f

mighty tough babies in the Department, some of whom

a r e n ' t t h e r e a n y m o r e . T h e P r e s i d e n t a n d p u b l i c o p i n i o n

a r e g o i n g t o s e e t h a t t h e r e i s n o c h a n g e t o w a r d C h i n a .

" T h e p o i n t w h e re y o u g o h a y w i r e , X , i s i n b e l i e v i n g t h a t

w e ' r e f i g h t i n g f o r s o m e k i n d o f s o c i a l i s m , a n d t h a t t h e r e f o r e

o n l y p r o gr e s s i v e l i b e r a l s c a n r u n t h e g o v e r n m e n t . T h i s i s a

c a p i t a l i s t c o u n t r y , a n d t h a t ' s t h e k i n d of c o u n t r y t h a t ' s

f i g h t i n g t h i s w a r . I t ' s n o t o n l y n a t u ra l , b u t i t ' s v i t a l t o h a v e

c o n s e r v a t i v e s a n d b u s i n e s s m e n i n t h e g o v e r n m e n t . W i t h -

o u t t h e m h o w c a n w e p os s i b l y h a v e n a t i o n a l u n i t y ?

" N o w i f i t h a d b e e n B e r l e o r L o n g ( n o t e : A d o l f B e r l e w h o

took Chambers' in format ion on Hiss to Roosevelt ; and



3 6 T h e Enemy a t H i s B a c k

b y t h e l e f t . T h e n e x t a t t a c k c a m e " u n o f f i c i a l l y " f r o m

a n o t h e r q u a r t e r , a n d i n t h e f o l l o w i n g m a n n e r .

T h e S e n a t e I n t e r n a l S e c u r i t y S u b c o m m i t t e e , h e a d e d

b y t h e l a t e S e n . P a t M c C a r r a n , D e m o c r a t f r o m N e v a d a ,

d e v o t e d m o re t h a n a y e a r ,1 9 5 1 - 1 9 5 2 , t o t h e i n v e s t i g a

t i o n o f t h e f a s c i n a t i n g o r g a n i z a t i o n c a l l ed t h e I n s t i t u t e

o f P a c i f i c R e l a t i o n s .

T h e In s t i t u t e w a s o r g a n i z e d i n i t i a l l y f o r t h e b en e f i t

o f s t u d e n t s , p r o f e s s i o n a l a n d o t h e r w i s e , w h o w a n t e d

t o i n c r e a s e t h e i r k n o w l e d g e o f t h e P a c i f i c a r e a . I t

a i m s w e r e t o p u b li s h t h e w r i t i n g s o f e x p e r t s o n t h e s

c o u n t r i e s , a n d m a n y w o r t h y a u t h o r i t i e s o n t h e F a r

E a s t j o i n e d a s c o n t r i b u t o r s . B u t s h o r t l y a f t e r t h e In -

s t i t u t e g o t a s t a r t i n 1 9 2 5 , t h e C o m m u n i s t s b e g a n t o




The mo ney f rom the foundations was contributed

t o t h e authors who made extensiv e trips to the Far

East an i n t o C o m m u n i s t c o n t r o l l e d t e r r i t o r y . From

these experiences an d co nt acts they were abl e to

w r i t e t h e i r b o o k s .

One of the two publications of the Inst itutes was

P a c i f i c A f f a i r s , a " f r o n t " p e r i o d i c a l f o r t h e u n s u s - IP R I4-

p e c t i n g . O n o c c a s i o n , a r i g h t w i n g a u t h o r w a s i n v i t e d5 5 o 6

t o c o n t r i b u t e a s w i n d o w - d r e s s i n g . B u t i n t h e f o ll o wi n g

i s s u e a c r i t i c i s m o f t h a t a r t i c l e w a s s u r e t o a p p e a r .

Pacif ic Affairs for December 1 9 4 4 , publi shed an

a r t i c l e b y T . A . B i s s o n . Bis son has been named under IPR 2- 535

o a t h a s a C o m m u n i s t , a n d h a s d e n i e d i t . A f t e r s e r v i n g

in the government duri ng Worl d War II he became a

p r o f e s s o r a t t h e U n i v e r s i t y o f C a l i f o r n i a .



3 8 The Enemy a t H i s B a c k

c a r e f u l s t u d y b y p r o f e s s o r s o f c o n t e m p o r a r y h i s t o r y ,

a n d b y n e w s p a p e r a n d m a g a z i n e w r i t e r s w h o s p e c i a l i z e

i n f o r e i g n a n d m i l i t a r y a f f a i r s . T h e y w e r e a l s o p l a c e d

o p p o r t u n e l y i n t h e h a n d s o f m e m b e r s o f C o n g r e s s , a n d

h i g h r a n k i n g o f f i c i a l s i n t h e W a r a n d S t a t e D e p a r t -

ments and the war-time agencies where so many of

the IPR members were employed .

T h e s e c o m b i n e d l i t e r a r y t r i c k l e s b e g a n l i k e a p -

p a r e n t l y i n n o c e n t s n o w , f a l l i n g o n re m o t e m o u n t a i n

t o p s , m e l t i n g i n t o m o u n t a i n s t r e a m s , a n d t u m b l i n g

s w i f t l y t o t h e v a l l e y w h e r e t h e y m e e t h u n d r e d s o f

o t h e r s t r e a m s , b e c o m i n g m i g h t y r i v e r s a n d r e s e r v o i r s

a f f e c t i n g t h e l i v e s o f t h o u s a n d s o f p e o pl e .

Two books published d uring 1945 merit special

a t t e n t i o n . T h e f i r s t w a s " S o l u t i o n i n A s i a " b y O w e n



C o m m u n i s t P r o p a ga n d a A f f e c t s F or e i gn P o l i c y 3 9

E m p e r o r a n d " a l l m a l e s e l i g i b l e t o t h e t h r o n e.

. . be

i n t e r n e d , p r e f e r a b l y i n C h i n a ." Could Mr . L a t t i m o r e

have had Red C hina in min d?

His book was of great interest to the Comm unis ts

i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a n d w a s a d v e r t i s e d i n C o m m u n i s t

newsp apers alongs ide a book by the head of the

Communist Party USA, W illiam Z . F o s t er . B o t h w e r eI P R 9 - 3 0 7 3

sold at the Communist International Book Store, and

what the International Book Store sells is " mus t"

r e a d i n g t o t h e c o m r a d e s .

Latti more's explanation of this was that he' had

n e v e r h e a rd o f t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l B o o k S t o r e a n d d i d n ' t

know anything about the Communists ' interest in his

book . I P R 9 - 3 o 7 i

On this , Mr . B u d e n z ' s t e s t i m o n y i s i n t e re s t i n g . T h e



4 0The Enemy at His Back

I P R 2 - 6 2 5 Mr . B u d e n z . . . . D i l e m m a i n J a p a n w a s n o t o n l y a d v a n c e d

b y t h e C o m m u n i s t s b u t i t w a s s u b m i t t e d t o t h e P o l i t b u r o

b e f o r e p u b l i c a t i o n . ( E m p h a s i s m i n e . )

Mr . M o r r i s . Was Andrew Roth a Comm uni st ?

Mr . B u d en z . Y e s , s i r , f r o m m a n y o f f i c i a l r e p or t s h e w a s a

Communist . .

Mr . M o r r i s . Mr. B u d e n z , i s i t y o u r t e s t i m o n y t h a t A n d r e w

R o t h ' s b o ok w a s u s e d t o s u p p l e m e n t t h i s C o m m u n i s t c a m -

p a i g n ?

Mr . B u d en z . M o s t d e c i d e d l y .

R o t h s e l e c t e d s e v e r a l s u b j e c t s w h i c h w e r e i m p o r t a n t

t o t h e " P a r t y l i n e ." On each he elaborated until he

had sq ueezed the lemon dry , try ing to im press the

reader with his v ast knowledge of Japan and her men

o f d e s t i n y . H e u s e d v e n o m a n d v i t r i o l wi t h e x t r a v a g a n t



C o m m u n i s t P r o pa g a n d a A f f e c t s F o r e i g n P o l i c y 41

you w i l l n o t i c e h o w u n u s u a l l y s i m i l a r t h e y a r e t o

O k a n o ' s t r i a l b a l l o o n i n t h e s u m m e r o f 1 9 4 4 a s w e l l

a s h i s a u t h o r i t a t i v e s t a t e m e n t o f p ol i c y i n M a y 1 9 4 5 .

T h e f i r s t " t h r u s t , " h e s a y s , s h o u l d b e t o w e a k e n t h e R o t h z x 8

s o u r c e s o f t h e E m p e r o r ' s s t r e n g t h ; t h e s e c o n d s h o u l d

d i s c r e d i t t h e E m p e r o r s y s t e m , a n d t h e t h i r d s h o u l d

s u p p o r t t h e " d e m o c r a t i c f o r c e s " i n J a p a n w h i c h e v e n -

t u a l l y w o u l d d o a w a y w i t h t h e E m p e r o r .

Then he warned ag ains t the wron g s trategy i n R o t h z z g - 6

g e t t i n g r i d o f t h e E m p e r or . H e w r o t e t h a t t h e r e i s r e a l

d a n g e r i n a " p r e m a t u r e , f r o n t a l a t t a c k " o n H i r o h i t o .

" THE DANG ER, " he em phas iz ed , " ARIS ES NOT

FROM THE OBJECTIVE BUT FROM THE IN-CORRECT STRATEGY FOR ACHIEVING THECORRECT OBJECTIVE. "




not to b elong to the Commun ist conspiracy. And it

was passed ou t to the second echelon comrades and

"progressive Americans" through a lieutenant in the

U n i t e d S t a t e s N a v a l I n t e l l i g e n c e . But it was passed

out in slow s tages . U ntil Russ ia entered the war,

articles like Field's "Appeasement of Japan" (New

M a s s e s , J u l y 3 r ,1 9 4 5 )

a n d e d i t o r i a l s l i k e " A V e r -

sailles f or Japan," (Daily Worker, July; 9 , 1 9 4 5 )

c o n t i n u e d t h e o l d " l i q u i d a t e t h e E m p e r o r " l i n e .

T h a t t h e C o m m u n i s t a i m o f i n s i n u a t i n g t h e i r p ro p a -

gand a agains t the Emperor in our press was highly

s u c c e s s f u l a n d h a d a t e l l i n g e f f e c t o n J a p a n , i s t o l d b y

Mr . K a s e i n h i s " J o u r n e y t o t h e M i s s o u r i . " H e w r o t e

t h a t s o m e n e w s p a p e r s i n t h e Un i t e d S t a t e s i m p l i e d t h a t

the Emperor was the source of the Japanese aim at



C h a p t e r I I I

YALTA AND THE ADVISERS

T h e Y a l t a C o n f e r e n c e .

H a r r y H o p k i n s a n d t h e a d v i s e r s .

R o o s e v e l t ' s v i e w o f S t a l i n a n d C h u r c h i l l .U . S . P o li c y t o w a r d R u s s i a s e t f o r t h b y G e n . B u r n s a n d

Hopkins .

T h e c o n t r o v e r s y o v e r R u s s i a n e n t r y i n t o t h e P a c i f i c

war .

T h e p re s s c o n t i n u e s i t s a t t a c k o n H i r o h i t o .

B o h l e n e x p la i n s t h e Y a l t a a g r e e m e n t s .




e x p l a n a t i o n o f t h e l a t e P r e s i d e n t ' s a t t i t u d e c o m e s f r o m

one who had access to m any of ficial documents in -

cludi ng Roosevelt's personal correspond ence with

C h u r c h i l l a n d S t a l i n . H i s c a r e f u l a n a l y s i s s t r o n g l y s u p -

p o r t s t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t , u n t i l 1 9 4 3 , R o o s e v e l t r e -

g a r d e d R u s s i a w i t h a p a t r o n i z i n g a t t i t u d e , a n d t h a t h e

assu med it would be the Uni ted S tates and Great

Britain who would settle the postwar problems . But

beginning with mid- 1943, American policy seemed to

change to "fear" of pos twar Russ ia . And the corre-

spondence ind icated that FDR's attitude changed to

o n e o f w i s h f u l t h i n k i n g - t h a t R o o s e v e l t t h e a r i s t o c r a t

could charm Stalin the peasant . The President pu t

great faith in his theory that if the United States



Y a l t a a n d t h e A d v i s e r s4 5

t h a t h e w a s a l s o a n i n t e l l e c t u a l d i l e t t a n t e , a c o l l e c t o r

o f n o v e l i d e a s , a n d e c c e n t r i c f r i e n d s w h o m h e f i r m l y

b e l i e v e d h e c o u l d c o n t r o l .

Many have attributed the actions and attitudes of

P r e s i d e n t R o o s e v e lt t o h i s a d v i s e r s . T h e re i s n o d o u b t

t h a t t h e p o l i t i c a l t h i n k i n g o f t h e o f f i c i a l f a m i l y o f a n y

P r e s i d e n t i s r e f l e c t e d i n h i s o f f i c i a l s t a t e m e n t s a n d

deeds . A l t h o u g h t h e i r n a m e s a r e n o t a l w a y s f a m i l i a r

t o t h e p u b l i c , t h e y a r e a r e a l p o we r i n t h e W h i t e H o u s e .

I t i s t h e s e p e o p l e w h o r e a d a l l i n c o m i n g r e p o r t s - a n d

o f t e n s u m m a r i z e t h e m f o r P r e s i d e n t i a l r e a d i n g . What

they omit or insert can mislead a President in many

m a t t e r s .

As I glance over the lis t of men who accompaniedMr . R o o s e v e l t t o Y a l t a , t h e y s e e m t o m e t o f a l l i n t o




a n i m b l e a n d a b l u n t d i p l o m a t . Both King an d Leahy

h a d t h e s i m p l e o p i n i o n t h a t h a v i n g R u s s i a a s a n a l l y

was tantamount to fighting s ide by side with an

octopu s, and that we'd better keep one eye on our

enemy and the other on our doubtf ul ally . B u t t h e y

were an is olated pair in the circle of Presidential

a d v i s e r s . Moreover, being military men, they obeyed

o r d e r s .

T h e l a r g e r o f t h e t w o g r o u p s i n c l u d e d s o m e o f t h e

m o s t i n f l u e n t i a l m e n i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . Harry Hop-

k i n s , t h e P r e s i d e n t ' s m o s t t r u s t e d a d v i s e r , w a s f o r a

long tim e a White House "boarder" and was in the

P r e s i d e n t ' s c o n f i d e n c e e v e n m o r e t h a n w a s h i s f a m i l y

A q u i c k p e r u s a l o f t h e p re s s r e p o r t s o f t h o s e d a y s w i l l

v i v i d l y r e c a l l t h e p ol i t i c a l h e a t t h i s s t r a n g e , u n t i d y a n d




C o u n c i l . T h o s e a g e n c i e s o f w h i c h h e w a s o n l y a m e m -

b e r w e r e h e a d e d b y h i s c h i e f a i d e s .

T h e r e a r e m a n y r e f e r e n c e s c o n c e r n i n g H o p k i n s ' i n -

f l u e n c e w i t h t he J o i n t C h i e f s o f S t a f f i n p l a n n i n g b a t t l e

s t r a t e g y i n b o t h t h e a t e r s o f w a r . A n d i n d i p l o m a c y ,

" H o p k i n s w a s n o w m o r e t h a n e v e r ` R o o s e v e l t ' s o w n ,

p e r s o n a l F o r e i g n O f f i c e , ' " b y - p a s s i n g S e c r e t a r y o f S h e r w o o d

S t a t e H u l l , a n d h i s s u c c es s o r, S t e t t i n i u s . A dd ed t o t h i s :6 4 0

i t w a s o n h i s i n i t i a t i v e a n d u n d e r h i s s p o n s o r s hi p t h a t

t h e p r o j e c t f o r t h e d e v e l o pm e n t o f t h e a t o m i c b o m b S h e r w o o d

g o t i t s s t a r t . H e w a s " a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h i s d e v e l o p - 9 ' 7

m e n t s i n c e t h e v e r y i n c e p t i o n o f t h e N a t i o n a l D e f e n s e

R e s e a r c h C o u n c i l . "

A d m i r a l L e a h y c o n f i r m s :




can be found in the vol umes of the hearings on the

I n s t i t u t e o f Pa c i f i c R e l a t i o n s , m a n y r e f e r e n c e s t o t h e

General in the correspo ndence of Edward C . C a r t e r,

who was nam ed un der oath a s a Communist . T h e l a t e

T y d i n g s 6 2 7 Mr . C a r t e r , a c c o r d i n g t o h i s l e t t e r s , s a w t o i t t h a t

I P R x - x 5 x Faymonvi lle made contact with many Russ ians and

R u s s i a n s y m p a t h i z e r s b e c a u s e , a s h e t e s t i f i e d , " H e w a s

eager to meet all sorts of Russ ians who could bring

h i m u p t o d a t e . "

O t h e r s o n H o p k i n s ' t e a m w e r e a l l f i r m b e l i e v e r s i n

t h e t h e o r y t h a t i f w e p la y e d m o r e t h a n f a i r w i t h R u s s i a

a n d o v e r l o o k e d b a d f a i t h o n t h e i r p a r t , a " p e r m a n e n t

p e a c e " w o u l d b e t h e u l t i m a t e r e s u l t .

I n r e a d i n g t h e m e m o i r s o f t h e m e n p r e s e n t a t Y a l t a



Y a l t a a n d t h e A d v i s e r s 4 9

O n a l a t e r p a g e, t h e S e c r e t a r y r e l a t e s h i s p r e s c r i b e d

r o u t i n e a t Y a l t a s a y i n g t h a t h e c o n f e r r e d w i t h " . . .

M a t t h e w s , B o h l e n a n d H i s s j u s t a f t e r I g o t u p i n t h e

morning ." After the usual d iplom atic di nners each

n i g h t , S t e t t i n i u s a g a i n c o n s u l t e d " w i t h M a t t h e w s , B o h -

l e n , a n d H i s s . . . o f t e n a s l a t e a s t w o i n t h e m o r n i n g . "

To amp lif y how closely the team worked with the

Presid ent, Adm iral Leahy wr ites i n " I Was There"

c o n c e r n i n g t h e f i r s t m e e t i n g o f t h e Ch i e f s o f S t a f f w i t h

R o o s e v e l t , S t e t t i n i u s , a n d H a r r i m a n :

S t e t t i n i u s 8 3

" T h e S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e o u t l i n e d t h e p o li t i c a l q u e s t i o n s L e a h y 2 9 8

. . . T h e n t w o o f h i s a s s i s t a n t s , H . F . Matthews an d

C h a r l e s E . B o h l en , e l a b o r a t e d o n s e v e r a l o f t h e m o r e a c u t e

o f t h e s e p r o bl e m s . "



5 0 T h e E n e m y a t H i s B a c k

A t t h i s w r i t i n g i n t h e f o u r t h y e a r o f t h e E i s e n h o w er

Adminis tration, Hiss has ended his pris on term ;

"Chip" Bohlen is our ambas sador to Russ ia after

h a v i n g h u r d l e d a f i e r c e f i g h t i n t h e S e n a t e w i t h t h e

conservat ive wing of the Repub licans, and Matthews

is our ambassador to Holland . Averell Harriman is

g o v e r n o r o f N e w Y o r k a n d h a s u n o f f i c i a l l y t h r o w n h i s

h a t i n t h e r i n g f o r p r e s i d e n t i a l n o m i n a t i o n , a n d G e n e r a l

M a r s h a l l , r e t i r e d i n V i r g i n i a , r e m a i n s t h e s e n i o r s t a t e s -

m a n a n d s o l d i e r w h os e a d v i c e i s s o u g h t b y b o t h P r e s i -

d e n t E i s e n h o w e r a n d h i s a d v i s e r s .

A n o t h e r p l a u s i b l e a r g u m e n t h e a r d f o r t h e " e rr o r s i n

j u d g m e n t " i s t h a t a t Y a l t a , i n 1 9 4 5 , R o os e v e l t w a s a l -

r e a d y a d y i n g m a n a n d t h a t t h e r e i n s h a d s l i p p e d f r om




" I ' m s u r e w e ' ll h i t i t o f f , S t a l i n a n d I , " F a t h e r s a i d . " A R o o s e v e l t

g r e a t d e a l o f t h e m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g s a n d t h e m i s t r u s t s o f 11 76- 7

t h e p a s t a r e g o i n g t o g e t c l e a r e d u p d u r i n g t h e n e x t f e w

days- I hope once and f or all . As for Uncle Joe and

W i n s t o n , w e ll . . . "

" N o t s o g o o d , e h ? "

" I ' l l h a v e m y w o r k c u t o u t f o r m e , i n b e t w ee n t h o s e t w o .

T h e y ' r e S O d i f f e r e n t . . . "

F a t h e r t o l d m e o f t h e d i n n e r . . . ( t h a t ) t h e d i a m e t r i -

c a l l y o p p os e d v i e w s o f S t a l i n a n d C h u r c h i l l ( w er e ) a g r e a t

b a r r i e r . "

At another Teheran meeting between Roosevelt,

S t a l i n a n d M o l o t o v , a t w h i c h E l l i o t t w a s p r e s e n t , t h e

a u t h o r r e c o u n t s s o m e o f t h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t c o n v e r s a -

t i o n s . I t l e a d s d i r e c t l y b a c k t o t h e t e s t i m o n y o f B r o w d e r



5 2 The Enem y at His Back

"Comm unis t China is growing in material and popular

s t r e n g t h ." The recommendati on was "that we assum e

t h e l e a d e rs h i p i n a s s i s t i n g C h i n a t o d e v e l op a s t r o n g ,

stab le and u n i f i e d government . . . " (Emphasis

mine . )

Many have said ou r Stat e Department was . a n d i s

riddl ed with Commu nist s . T h e f a c t s d o n o t b e a r t h i s

o u t . A f e w , p o we r f u l c o n s p i r a t o r s i n k e y p o s i t i o n s a r e

a l l t h a t i s n e e d e d t o s t e e r o u r p o l i c y i n t o R u s s i a n c h a n -

n e l s . T h e r e s t o f t h e p er s o n n e l c o n s i s t s o f l e f t w i n g e r s

e a s i l y l e d b y t h e i r C o m m u n i s t c o l l e a g u e s , a n d a l a r g e

group of good Americans who keep their mouths shut

f o r e x p ed i e n c y ' s s a k e . T o o m a n y h a v e l o s t t h e i r j o b s

w h e n t h e y o b je c t e d t o c e r t a i n p o l i c i e s , o r a t t e m p t e d t o

inf orm Con gression al comm ittees and the FBI about



Yalta and the Adv isers5 3

In the State Department we find that John Carter

V i n c e n t w a s C h i e f o f t h e O f f i c e o f C h i n e s e A f f a i r s f r o m

1944 to 1945 . The same IPR Report states :

V i n c e n t , J o h n C a r t e r . . . Identif ied as a member of the IPR R-1 59

Communis t Party by one or more duly sworn witnesses .

Denied .

We then come to what the Com mu nis ts call t he" f a s c i s t g r o u p

." And it goes without saying, the ad-

vi ce of these people was cons tant ly ignored . Their

presence was never requ ired at the big con ferences .

At that time Joseph Grew was Director of the Off ice

of Far Eastern Affairs an d then Un dersecretary o f




R o o s e v e l t . S t r a n g e l y enough he had never seen the

d a n g e r of C o m m u n i s t d o m i n a t i o n i n A s i a . One of my

h e l pf u l f r i e n d s w h o r e a d t h i s m a n u s c r i p t f o r m e , m a d e

a n o t e i n t h e m a r g i n w h i c h I w i l l i n c o r p o r a t e r i g h t

h e r e . He scribbled, "Churchill was an unmitigated

f o o l wh e n i t c a m e t o F a r E a s t p o l i c y - a n d c o n t i n u e s

t o b e ! "

B u t a U n i t e d S t a t e s p o l i c y w a s s e t a t T e he r a n w h i c h

h a s b e e n c a r e f u l l y w a t c h e d b y a l l o u r a l l i e s b o t h i n

A s i a a n d E u r o p e e v e r s i n c e . T h a t i s , w e " v i e w w i t h

g r a v e c o n c e r n " t h e p r o g r e s s o f R u s s i a i n t h e a c t o f

a b s o r b i n g t e r r i t o r i e s , a n d t h e n c a l l i t " p e a c e " a f t e r t h e

a c t i s d o n e !

B u t w h a t e v e r t h e P .M . ' s s h o r t s i gh t e d n es s i n A s i a , h i s

o n e u n d e n i e d v i r t u e r e m a i n s " B r i t a i n f i r s t ." Our own




b l o o d a n d t r e a s u r e w o u l d b e p o u r e d o u t . G r ea t B r i t a i n

w o u l d n o t p r e s s f o r a n y m i t i g a t i o n b u t w o u l d b e c o n -

t e n t t o a b i d e b y t h e j u d g m e n t o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . "

P r e s i d e n t R o o s e v e l t r e p l i e d t h a t h e t h o u g h t t h e

m a t t e r m i g h t b e t a k e n u p w i t h S t a l i n , b u t " H e d o u b t e d Yalta 826

w h e t h e r t h e u l t i m a t u m w o u l d h a v e m u c h e f f e c t o n t h e

J a p a n e s e . . . " And there the subject was dropped .

T h e r e i s n o r e c o r d t h a t i t e v e r w a s " m e n t i o n e d t o

M a r s h a l S t a l i n . "

The minutes of the Yalta conferences (and there

were two or three every day) make it obvious that

P r e s i d e n t R o o s e v e l t w a s t i r e d . T h i s c o m e s o u t i n h i s

i n a b i l i t y t o r e t a i n t h e m a n y v i t a l d e t a i l s w h i c h w e r e

d i s c u s s e d . F o r i n s t a n c e : At a meeting on February




a g r e e m e n t s , t h e a v e r a g e c i t i z e n s t i l l d i d n o t c o m p r e -

h e n d t h e i r a p p a l l i n g i n t e n t . Although Senators , Con-

gressm en and a handfu l of newsp apermen expl ained

the meaning of the agreements , it was only several

y e a r s l a t e r , w h e n t h e r e s u l t s b e c a m e t r a g i c a l l y c l e a r

t h a t t h e p u b l i c b e g a n t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e m . I remember

hearing many people protest in anger and outrage of

the "Y alta betray al" w ithout realiz in g what they

meant . I h a d n o i d e a w h er e Y a l t a w a s , n o r w h a t t o o k

place there other than a "Big Three" meeti ng .

M y h u s b a n d t e l l s t h e s t o ry t h a t i n l a t e 1 9 4 4 h e w a s

talki ng with Adm iral Leahy when t he Adm iral hap-

pened t o remark that no on e had com e up wit h any

l i k e l y s u g g e s t i o n s a s t o w h e r e t h e c o m i n g m e e t i n g o f

the Big Three shoul d t ake place . My husb and, who




is w rit ten, an d even more shocked than I expected to

be .

I checked with the State Department Yal ta Publi-

cation and f ound i t to be a true copy . L e t u s r e a d t h e

" p r i c e " t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s p a i d R u s s i a f o r h e r c o l l a b o -

ration in the Pacifi c War, a war that was already won .

AGREEMENT REGARDING JAPANT h e l e a d e rs o f t h e t h r e e G r e a t P o w e rs - t h e S o v i e t U n i o n ,

the United States of America and G reat Britain-have

agreed that in two or three mon ths aft er Germa ny has

su rrendered an d the war in Europ e has termin ated the

S o v i e t U n i o n s h a l l en t e r i n t o t h e w a r a g a i n s t J a p a n o n t h e

s i d e o f t h e A l l i e s o n c o n d i t i o n t h a t :

(r) The s t a t u s q u o in Outer-Mongoli a (The Mongol ian

P e o p le ' s R e p u b l i c ) s h a l l b e p r e s e r v e d ;

Y a l t a P a p e rs

8 2 6 - 7 , a l s o

D e c a d e o f

A m e r i c a n

F o r e i g n P o l -

i c y , S t a t e

D e p t. P . 3 3 - 4




F o r i t s p a r t t h e S o v i e t U n i o n e x p r es s e s i t s r e a d i n e s s t o

c o n c l u d e w i t h t h e N a t i o n a l G o v e r n m e n t o f C h i n a a p a c t o f

f r i e n d s h i p a n d a l l i a n c e b e t w e e n t h e U . S . S . R . a n d C h i n a i n

o r de r t o r e n d er a s s i s t a n c e t o C h i n a w i t h i t s a r m e d f o rc e s f o r

t h e p u r p o s e o f li b e r a t i n g C h i n a f r o m t h e J a p a n e s e y o k e .

J o s e p h V . S t a l i n

F r a n k l i n D . R o os e v e l t

W i n s t o n S . C h u rc h i l l

I f y o u b e l o n g t o t h a t v a s t n u m b e r o f c i t i z e n s w h o a r e

n o t i n t h e h a b i t o f r e a d i n g i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r e a t i e s , t h e n

t a k e a l i t t l e e x t r a t i m e t o w e i g h t h e a b o v e wo r d s a n d

follow them with the accompanying map .

T h e t h i r d pa r a g r a p h f r o m t h e b o t t o m i s p a r t i c u l a r l y

s i g n i f i c a n t :




T h e m e e t i n g s a t w h i c h t h i s a g r e e m e n t w a s d i s c u s s e d

r e v e a l v e r y c l e a r l y t h e s t r a t e g y o f " d e f l e c t i o n o f

t h o u g h t . " T h e r e w e r e v e r y m a n y i m p o r t a n t m a t t e r s o n

t h e m i n d o f t h e a i l i n g a n d w e a r y P r e s i d e n t , a n d i t w a s

e a s y e n o u g h t o " r u s h t h i n g s a l o n g . " A t a m e e t i n g h e l d

a t Y a l t a o n F e b r u a r y 4 t h a t w h i c h Ro o s e v e l t , t h e J o i n t Yalta Papers

C h i e f s a n d H a r r i m a n w e r e p r e s e n t , t h e t o p i c o f C h i n a5 o r - s

came up . " T h e P r e s i d e n t s a i d h e w i s h e d t o h a v e t h e

v i e w s o f G e n e r a l i s s i m o C h i a n g K a i - s h e k b e f o r e d i s -

cussing the STATUS QU O in Mongolia . . . " a n d t h e

s u b j e c t w a s p o s t p o n e d .

T h e r e w a s o b v i o u s l y n o t i m e f o r t h e P r e s i d e n t t o

d i s c u s s a n y t h i n g w i t h C h i a n g w h o w a s t h o u s a n d s o f

miles away .



6 o The Enemy at His Back

t o S t a l i n ' s f i n a l d r a f t o n p a g e 5 7 w h i c h b e c a m e t h e

a g r e em e n t a d o p t e d , y o u w i l l n o t i c e S t a l i n g o t e v e n

m o r e t h a n h e i n i t i a l l y a s k e d f o r .

FIRST DRAFT OF MARSHAL STALIN' S POLITICAL

CONDITIONS FOR RUS SIA'S ENTRY IN

THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

( T r a n s l a t i o n )

The leaders of t he three Great Powers-the S oviet Un ion ,

Y a l t a P a p e r s t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s o f A m e ri c a a n d G r e a t B r i t a i n h a v e

8 9 6 agreed tha t i n two or three mon ths a fter Germa n y ha s s ur-

rendered a nd the war i n E urope has ended the S oviet Un ion

shall en ter i n to the war aga i n s t J apa n on the s i de of the

A l l i e s o n c o n d i t i o n t h a t :



Yalta and the Advisers 6i

MR HARRIMAN'S SUGGESTED CHANGES INMARSHAL S TALIN' S D RAFT OF RUS S IA' S P OLITI-CAL CONDITIONS FOR RUSSIA'S ENTRY IN THEWAR AGAINST JAPANITEM z . b ) :

l e a s e o f t h e p o r t a r e a s o f P o r t A r t h u r a n d D a i r e n s h o u l d Y a l t a P a p e r s

b e r e s t o r e d , o r t h e s e a r e a s s h o u l d b e c o m e f r e e p o r t s u n d e r7 6 ,

i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n t r ol .

ITEM 2 . C) :

Add the fol lowin g after the word " Manchuria" ; a t t h e

e n d o f t h e p a r a g r a p h " o r t h e s e r a i l r o a d s s h o u l d b e p l a c e d

under the operational control of a Chinese-Soviet Com -

m i s s i o n . "

ITEM 3 . :

A d d f i n a l p a r a g r a p h :



62 T h e E n e m y at His Back

Yet, in the Yalt a Pap ers there appears a cablegram

from Acting S ecretary of S tate Grew in Was hingt on to

Yalta Papers Secretary of State Stettinius in Yalt a, dat ed Feb . 5 ,

952-31 945, which proves that Chiang was already aware of

the subj ects to be discuss ed at Yalta . The cablegram

concerned a message from Ambas sador Patrick Hurley

in China . Here is the pertinent part of G rew's cable :

"Chiang Kai-s hek and Soon g have informed Hurley

t h a t t h e S o v i e t G o v e r n m e n t h a s a g r e e d t o r e c e i v e S o o n g a s

a p e r s o n a l re p r e s e n t a t i v e o f t h e G e n e r a l i s s i m o . . . D i s -

c u s s i o n s w i l l c o v e r es t a b l i s h m e n t o f c l o s e r re l a t i o n s , S o v i e t

p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h e w a r a g a i n s t J a p a n , S o v i e t - C h i n e s e

relation in Korea and Manchuria, postwar economic

m a t t e r s a n d t h e S i n o - S o v i e t b o r d e r . H u r l e y i n v i t e s s u g -




matt ers ." "These matt ers," of cou rse, being the Chi-

nese territory Russi a was to get . S t a l i n s u g g e s t e d t h e

ti me for the meeti ng wi th Soong should be the end of

A p r i l . The implicat ion of these minu tes is t hat wit h

twenty-f ive formidable Russi an di visi ons on the Chi-

nese border, Chiang would "wholeheartedly" agree to

g i v i n g u p h i s t e r r i t o r y t o t h e R u s s i a n s .

Meanwhile, Ambass ador Hurley in China cabled that

Chiang wan ted a meetin g between himself , Roosevelt

a n d C h u r c h i l l a t D e l h i t o d i s c u s s t h e Y a l t a a g r e e m e n t s .

T h e r e i s n o r e c o r d i n t h e p u b l i s h e d d o c u m e n t s t h a t t h i s

cable was ever ans wered . Perhaps it was one of the

man y which were om it ted . But Chiang never got his

chance to have a meetin g wi th Churchill and Roose-

v e l t .

Y a l t a 9 6 0



64 The Enemy at His BackI n s t e a d o f p e r s u a d i n g J a p a n t o a c c e p t d e f e a t , h o w -

ever, Roosevelt was persuaded that he mus t buy Rus-

s i a n h e l p t o d ef e a t a n a l r e a d y d ef e a t e d f oe . T h e p ri c e

w a s h i g h i n b l o o d , t r e a s u r e , h o n o r a n d i n p e a c e i t s e l f .

P r e s i d e n t R o o s e v e l t d i e d t h e f o l l o w i n g A p r i l , b u t

President Truman carried out the word of his pred-

e c e s s o r . On Augus t 14, 1945, C h i a n g ' s F o r e i g n M i n i s -

t e r , W a n g S h i h - c h i e h , p u t h i s s i g n a t u r e t o a s e p a r a t e

treaty with Russia in Moscow, the news of which was

lost in the excitement of VJ-day . If China had n ot

s i g n e d , i t w a s a f o r e g o n e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t n o f u r t h e r a i d

would come from America in China's d esperate fight

agains t the Chinese Comm unists .

It must have been a very lonely day for the Gen-

e r a l i s s i m o , w h o , u n k n o w n t o t h e w o rl d , h a d a g r e e d t o




i n t h e P a c i f i c c a u s e d R o o s e v e l t t o a b a n d o n a n y " v i g o r -

o u s " a i d t o C h i n a . L a t e r , t h e s t o r y g oe s , c e r t a i n m e m -

bers of the State Department s taff came to refer

t o t h e m e e t i n g a t T e h e r a n a s " t h e c o r r e c t i v e c o n -

f e r e n c e , " p u t t i n g t h e i r s e a l o f a p p r o v a l o n t h e c h a n g e

i n p o l i c y t o w a r d C h i n a .

F r o m e a r l y i n t h e w a r F r a n k l i n R o o s e v e l t w a s d e -

termined to help Chiang as much as poss ible . He

l o o k e d u p o n t h e G e n e r a l i s s i m o a s o n e o f t h e U n i t e d

S t a t e s ' s t a n c h e s t a l l i es . B u t s t r a n g e l y , h e a b a n d o n e d

h i s f r i e n d o n t h e i n s t a l m e n t p l a n , f i n a l l y e n d i n g w i t h

h i s s i g n a t u r e t o t h e Y a l t a A g r ee m e n t .

A s a f o o t n o t e , R o b e r t S h e r w o o d w r i t e s t h a t " a s i d e

f r o m t h e d e c l a r a t i o n a s s u r i n g t h e f r e e d o m a n d i n d e -

S h e r w oo d

800




C h i a n g K a i - s h e k a n d h i s N a t i o n a l i s t G o v e r n m e n t , a n d

i t w a s s o c o n s i d e r e d b y h i m , i f y o u c a n j u d g e b y h i s

p u b l i c s t a t e m e n t s . "

T h i s w a s a s t r a n g e s t a t e m e n t t o b e m a d e b y a m a n

w h o l a t e r b e c a m e o u r a m b a s s a d o r t o R u s s i a a s w e l l a s

o n e o f t h e c h i e f a d v i s e r s o f P r e s i d e n t E i s e n h o w e r a n d

S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e D u l l e s a t t h e 1 9 5 5 c o n f e r e n c e s i n

Geneva . B o h l e n k n e w , a s w e l l a s a n y o n e , y o u c a n ' t

j u d g e b y p u b l i c s t a t e m e n t s ) C h i a n g s t i l l h o p e d w e

w o u l d k e e p t h e R e d W o lf f r o m h i s d o o r - a n d a l s o , h e

h a d t o m a i n t a i n t h e m o r a l e o f t h e C hi n e s e p e o p l e . How

c o u l d h e t e l l t h e m t h e r e w a s a g o o d c h a n c e t h e R e d

h o r d e s w o u l d t a k e o v e r ?

General Albert C . W edemeyer, who went with




C h i n e s e c o u l d b e g i n t h e i r b i g p u s h t o t a k e o v e r a l l o f

C h i n a , e v e n t u a l l y f o r c i n g C h i a n g a n d t h e N a t i o n a l i s t

t r o o p s t o s e e k r e f u g e o n F o r m o s a . R u s s i a w a i t e d f r o m

1 9 3 6 ( D i m i t r o v ' s s p e e c h ) t o 1 9 4 9 f o r t h i s v i t a l l y i m -

p o r t a n t t e r r i t o r i a l g a i n t o w a r d w o r l d d o m i n a t i o n . I n

F e b ru a r y 1 9 5 0 t h e S o v i e t s s i g n e d a " t h i r t y - y e a r f r i e n d -

ship and mutual defense pact" with Mao Tse-tung,

t h e R e d l e a d e r . W i t h t h e f a l l o f C h i n a a n d t h i s p a c t

t h e K o r e a n w a r w a s a l l s e t t o g o f o u r m o n t h s l a t e r .

T h e s t o r y o f Y a l t a h i s s t r a n g e a n d s h o c k i n g . F u t u r e

h i s t o r i a n s w i l l a l w a y s w o n d e r w h y P r es i d e n t R o o s e v e l t ,

s p e a k i n g b e f o r e a j o i n t s e s s i o n o f t h e C o n g r e s s o f t h e

U n i t e d S t a t e s , M a r c h 1 , 1 9 4 5 , s a i d , " Q u i t e n a t u r a l l y ,

t h i s c o n f e r e n c e c o n c e r n e d i t s e l f o n l y w i t h t h e E u r o p e a n

w a r a n d w i t h t h e p o l i t i c a l p r o b l e m s o f E u r o p e a n d



S h e r w o o d

6 4 1

S h e r w o o d

6 4 1 - 3


b o s s . The subject of the memo was the absolute need

t o h a v e R u s s i a a s a f r i e n d . I t w a s , i n f a c t , t h e ba s i s f o r

o u r w a r t i m e f o r e i g n p o l i c y , a n d h a s r e m a i n e d s o e v e n

today . I n d e e d , i t seems to have r e p l a c ed t he Decla-

r a t i o n of Ind ependence .

F o r a n o f f i c i a l m e m o i t s m a c k s o f f a n a t i c i s m . R o b er t

S h e r wo o d pu b l i s h e d i t i n i t s e n t i r e t y b e c a u s e h e s a i d ,

" . . . it was an excellent statement of Hopkins ' own

v i e w s . . . "

T h e f o l l o w i n g s e l e c t e d i t e m s e x p l a i n m a n y a c t i o n s

by our government heretofore unexplainable .

6 . WITH REFERENCE TO OUR NEED FOR RUS SIAAS A REAL FRIEND AND CU STOMER IN THE

POST-W AR PERIOD .



Yalta and the Advisers 69

were ̀ st ealin g' Lend-Lease material ass igned to them .

T h e r e w a s c o n s e q u e n t l y a n i n c r e a s i n g e f f o r t t o g e t t h e

ships through at whatever cost- and the cost was

awful . "

For a short time the Murm ansk run was aband oned .

Although Stalin was well inf ormed of our untenable

l o s s e s , n e i t h e r H o p k i n s n o r R o o s e v e l t c o u l d g e t u p h i s

nerve to tell him the las t con voy had been cancelled .

Finally on Oct . 5 , 1 9 4 2 , Roosevelt sent a cab le to

Churchill i n which he "in di cated he had reconsi dered

the question of cancelling the convoy PQ 19 ." He pro-

posed that the ships s ail in twos and threes " . . . a t

i n t e r v a l s o f t w e n t y - f o u r t o f o r t y - e i g h t h o u r s , s u p p o r t e d

b y t w o o r t h r e e e s c o r t s ." He emphasized to the Prime

Minister :

Sherwood

6 3 8 - 9



Y a l t a P a p e r s

3 9 6

70 The Enem y at His Ba ck

t a c t s t h a t a r e l o y a l t o t h i s c o n c e p t . ( E m p h a s i s

mine . )

T h i s e x t r a o r d i n a r y p a r a g r a p h i m p l i e s t h a t o n l y p r o -

Russ ian Americans in our gov ernment service were to

b e s e l e c t e d t o m a k e c o n t a c t s w i t h R u s s i a n o f f i c i a l s , t h e

l a t t e r , o f c o u r s e , b e i n g t r a i n e d s p i e s .

A curious foll ow-up on this is to be found in a

memorandum f rom the join t Chiefs of Staf f to the

P r e s i d e n t d a t e d 23 January 1945 . I t w a s s i g n e d , n o t b y

the Chairm an of the JCS, Adm iral Leahy, but by

General George C . M a r s h a l l . The su bj ect concerned

" t h e s t a t u s t o d a t e o f n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h t h e R u s s i a n s . "

T h e l a s t p a r a g r a p h e n u m e r a t e d t h e m a n y d e l a y s i n t h e

w a r e f f o r t c a u s e d b y t h e R u s s i a n s . M a r s h a l l s a i d t h e




l o w i n g s t o r y . Former G overnor George H . E a r l e o f

Pennsyl vani a was a Lieutenant Comm ander in the

Navy serving as assis tant naval attache in Turkey

w h e n h e s e n t f r a n t i c d i s p a t c h e s t o W a s h i n g t o n o f t h e

a l a r m i n g s i t u a t i o n i n t h a t c o u n t r y i n r e ga r d t o R u s s i a .

F r u s t r a t e d w h e n h e r ec e i v e d n o r e p l i e s , h e b e c a m e c o n -

v i n c e d t h a t h i s m e s s a g e s w e r e b e i n g p i g e o n h o l e d b y

l o w e r e c h e l o n o f f i c e r s . H e f l e w t o W a s h i n g t o n a n d h a d

a p e r s o n a l i n t e r v i e w w i t h P r e s i d e n t R o o s e v e l t . The

P r e s i d e n t a s s u m e d a f a t h e r ly a n d s y m p a t h e t i c a t t i t u d e ,

and noted that the strain of work in Turkey was

" t e l l i n g " o n t h e f o r m e r g o v e r n o r . H e s u g g e s t e d a n e w

p o s t w h e r e t h e w o r k w a s l i g h t a n d t h e w e a t h e r p l e a s -

a n t . With amaz ing speed, Comm ander Earle became

G o v e r n o r o f S a m o a , a r e m o t e i s l a n d i n t h e P a c i f i c .



7The Enemy at His Back

eastw ard fr om the European t heater where the war

against Germany was d rawing to a close . "

Again we remember that the only stated reason for

keepin g the Yalta agreement secret from Chiang was

t h a t , i f t h e C h i n e s e k n e w , t h e y m i g h t l e a k t h e n e w s o f

these troop m ovements to the Japanese . How such

large troop mov ements could NOT be detected by the

e n e m y a n d a l l i e d a g e n t s a n d o b s e r v e r s i s d i f f i c u l t t o

understand . A n d t h e J a p a n e s e d i d k n o w i t . Mr . A c h e-

s o n m a d e n o m e n t i o n o f t h i s f a c t i n h i s L e t t e r o f T r a n s -

m i t t a l i n t h e W h i t e P a p e r .

It was not to be expected that Philip Jessu p, in

charge of writing the 1949 White Paper for Acheson,

would make known the fact that a num ber of the

P r e s i d e n t ' s a d v i s e r s n o t o n l y d i d n o t b el i e v e i t w a s



Yalta and the Adv isers7 3

In comm enti ng on his own ad vice en route to Yalta,

Admi ral Leahy record ed :

" I w a s o f t h e f i r m o p i n i o n t h a t o u r w a r a g a i n s t J a p a n

h a d p r o g r e s s e d t o t h e p o i n t w h e r e h e r d e f e a t w a s o n l y a

m a t t e r of t i m e a n d a t t r i t i o n . T h e r e f o r e , w e d i d n o t n e e d

S t a l i n ' s h e l p t o d e f ea t o u r e n e m y i n t h e P a c i f i c . The Army

d i d n o t a g r e e w i t h m e . . . "

James F . Byrnes borrows Adm iral Leahy's "j aun-

diced" view in "Speaking Frankly"

" I m u s t f r a n k l y a d m i t t h a t i n v i e w o f w h a t w e k n o w o f

S o v i e t a c t i o n s i n e a s t e r n G e r m a n y a n d t h e v i o l a t i o n s o f

the Yalta agreements in Poland, Rumania and Bu lgaria,

L e a h y 2 9 3

B v r n e s 2 0 8



W i l l o u g h b y

2 8 5


s i o n a l h e a r i n g s c a n b e s e r i o u s l y m i s l e d b y t h e o f t e n

r e p ea t e d s t a t e m e n t s t h a t " s u c h - a n d - s u c h w a s t h e u n a n i -

m o u s o p i n i o n o f t h e j o i n t C h i e f s of S t a f f . " T h i s l e a v e s

t h e i m p l i c a t i o n t h a t " t h e r e f o re i f e v e r y o n e a g r e e d, i t

mu st have been the best opinion . "

General MacArthur, however, did not join his Army

c o l l ea g u e s i n W a s h i n g t o n i n t h e b e l i e f t h a t R u s s i a n a i d

i n t h e P a c i f i c w a s a n e c e s s i t y . John Chamberlain who

c o l l a b o r a t e d w i t h M a j . G e n . C h a r l e s A . W i l lo u g h b y i n

the book, "MacArthur," qu otes the General' s com -

ment :

"From the viewpoin t of m y Headq uarters, Rus sian

p a r t i c i p a t i o n w a s n o t re q u i r e d . I h a d u r g e d R u s s i a n i n t e r -

v e n t i o n b a c k i n 1 9 4 1 t o d r a w t h e J a p a n e s e f r o m t h e i r



Yalta and the Adv isers 75

a s s u r a n c e t o S t a l i n , a n d t h e n s e n t a m e s s a g e t o C h u r c h -

i l l s a y i n g " S t a l i n i s a t t h e p re s e n t t i m e s e n s i t i v e a b o u t

a n y d o u b t a s t o h i s i n t e n t i o n t o h e l p u s i n t h e O r i e n t . "

While the American public d id not have access to

t h i s i n s i d e i n f o r m a t i o n , t h e d a i l y p a p e r s h a d b e e n c o n -

s i s t e n t l y r e p or t i n g t h e s e r i e s o f d e f e a t s s u f f e r e d b y t h e

Japanese . Along with this was a sprinkli ng of propa-

gand a agains t the Emperor . The following are a few

i t e m s r e p o r t e d d i r e c t l y a f t e r Y a l t a :

N. Y . TIMES , FEB . 1 3 , 1945

London, Feb . 1 2 . - T h e C h i n e s e d e l e g a t i o n t o t h e W o r l d

T r a d e U n i o n c o n f e r e n c e d e m a n d e d t o d a y t h e E m p e r o r o f

J a p a n b e b r o u g h t t o t r i a l a s a w a r c r i m i n a l .



7 6T h e Enemy a t H i s B a c k

s o o n e r t h a n t h e y h a d e x p e c t e d . H e w a r n e d t h a t i n t h e

Roth z4 f i r s t m o n t h s o f 3 1 9 4 5 , t h a t i s , a t t h e t i m e o f Y a l t a , i t

was realized that Japan, being on the rocks for all

p r a c t i c a l r ea s o n s , m i g h t m a k e o f f e r s o f pe a c e . T h i s a c -

counts for the almost frantic propagand a the Com-

mun ist s began to manuf acture agains t the Emperor,

s t e p p i n g u p t h e " l i n e " i n a f a s t e r a c c e l e r a t i o n .

T o u n d e r s t a n d f u l l y t h e a t t i t u d e o f t h e c o n t r o l l i n g

p o w e rs i n W a s h i n g t o n , i t i s h e l p f u l t o r e a d t h e c o m -

ments of those authors who favored the policies at

Yalta . R o b e r t S h e r w o o d w a s a c l o s e a s s o c i a t e o f t h e

White House group and had intimate knowledge of

t h o s e w h o m a d e o u r p o l i c i e s . I n h i s b o o k h e r e v e a l s t h e

fact that MacArthur's reports to Washington d id not




" C o m m u n i s t s a n d B r i t i s h I m p e r i a l i s t s . " T h i s s t r a n g e m i s -

a p p r e h e n s i o n p r o du c e s a n o b v i o u s l y u n h e a l t h y s t a t e o f

m i n d , a n d a l s o t h e m o s t u n f o r t u n a t e p u b li c r e l a t i o n s p o l i c y

t h a t I h a v e s e e n i n a n y t h e a t e r o f w a r . . .

3 .. . . F o l l o wi n g i s a b r i e f s u m m a r y o f G e n e r a l M a c -

A rt h u r' s v i e ws o n t he f u t ure ha n dli n g o f J a p a n w h i c h h e

e x p r e s s e d t o m e a t c o n s i d e r a b l e l e n g t h a n d w i t h g r e a t p o s i -

t i v e n e s s a n d el o q u e n c e :

. . . T he t o t a l d e s t r u c t i on o f J a p a n e s e m i l i t a ry p ow er ,

t h er ef o re , c a n i n v ol v e ( f or t he J a pa n e se c i v il p o p u l a t i o n )

d e s t r u c t i o n o f t h e c o n c e p t o f H i r o h i t o ' s d i v i n i t y . T h i s w i l l

r e s u l t i n a s p i r i t u a l v a c u u m a n d a n o p p o r t u n i t y f or th e

i n t r o d u c t i o n o f n e w c o n c e p t s . . .

A note from General W i l l o u g h b y , General Mac-

A r t h u r ' s c h i e f of i n t e l li g e n c e , s t a t e s t h a t " MacArthur



page go

page 39


S e n a t o r F e r gu s o n . W a s i t n o t m o r e t h a n i n f l u e n c e ; w a s i t

n o t m e a n t t h a t m e a s u r e s w o u l d b e t a k e n ?

Mr . B o h l e n . I h a v e u n d e r s t o o d , s i r , t h a t t h e w o r d " m e a s -

u r e s " m e a n t t h a t y o u w e r e n o t g o i n g t o d o a n y t h i n g e x c e p t

t o u r g e u p o n t h e C h i n e s e a c c e p t a n c e o f t h i s .

* * *

S e n a t o r F e r g u s on . W e w e r e g oi n g t o f o r c e C h i n a t o d o t h i s .

Mr . B o h le n . T h i s i s t h e q u e s t i o n . T h e q u e s t i o n d i d n o t

a r i s e b e c a u s e i t w a s n o t n e c e s s a r y t o u s e a n y f o r c e or p r es -

s u r e o n t h e m . I n f a c t , q u i t e t h e c o n t r a ry .

S e n a t o r F e r g u s on . C h i a n g K a i - s h e k h a d t o h a v e h e l p f r o m

u s . T h e r e i s n ' t a n y d o u b t a b o u t i t , t o f i g h t R e d C h i n a .

* * *

S e n a t o r F e r gu s o n . D o y o u k n o w w h o s e w o r d s I r e a d t o y o u



Yalta and the Adv isers 79Mr. B o h le n . Y e s , a s I u n d e rs t a n d i t ; I a m n o t t o o f a m i l i a r

w i t h t h e t e x t o f i t .

S e n a t o r F e rg u s o n . D o y o u b e l i e v e t h a t w h a t w a s d o n e a t

Y a l t a b r e a c h e d a n d r e pu d i a t e d t h a t p a r t o f t h e N i n e P o w e r

P a c t t h a t I r e a d t o y o u ?Mr. B o h l e n . S e n a t o r , t h a t i s a m a t t e r of o p i n i o n . . . .

S e n a t o r F e r g u s o n . T h e n y o u c o m e t o t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t B o h l e n 2 3

t h e o n l y w r on g t h a t y o u c a n f i n d i n t h e s e a g r ee m e n t s a t

Y a l t a , T e h er a n , o r a n y o f t h e o t h er s t h a t w e m a d e w i t h

R u s s i a , w a s i n t h e i n t e r pr e t a t i o n ?Mr . B o h l en . N o , s i r ; I t h i n k t h a t t h e c h i e f t h i n g t h a t w a s

w r o n g w a s t h e v i o l a t i o n o f t h e m a f t e r w a r d . ( B y t h e Ru s -

s i a n s . ) ( E m p h a s i s m i n e . )

8o The Enemy at His Back



s a y i n g s o m e o f t h e s e p e o p l e " h a v e p r o f i t e d f r o m h i n d -

s i g h t . " ( A n d " h i n d s i g h t " i s t h e e x c u s e w e h a v e b e e n

h e a r i n g a l l a l o n g . ) " S t i l l o t h er s , " h e s a i d , " . . . have

d i s t o r t e d a n d p e r v e rt e d t h e f a c t s t o a p o i n t w h e re t h e i r

s t a t e m e n t s h a v e l i t t l e o r n o b a s i s i n r e a l i t y . "

B u t i f a n i n t e r e s t e d p a r t y s h o u l d a s k i f t h e r e h a d

b e e n a n y " f or e s i g h t " i n f o r m a t i o n b e f o r e Y a l t a , I wo u ld

unhesitatingly direct them to a memorandum found

Y a l t a P a p e r s i n t h e Y a l t a P a p e r s , w r i t t e n b y n o n e o t h e r t h a n A m -

4 5 0 - 5 bassad or to Russ ia W . Averell Harriman, Jan . i o ,

1 9 4 5 , a n d r e c e i v e d b y t h e S e c r et a r y o f S t a t e , S t e t t i n i u s ,

e x a c t l y o n e m o n t h b e f o r e t h e Y a l t a a g r e e m e n t s w e r e

s i g n e d ! I f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s d e l e g a t i o n t o t h e Y a l t a

C o n f e r e n c e h a d m a d e t h i s d o c u m e n t , w r i t t e n b y H a r r i -

m a n , t h e b a s i s f o r t h e i r p o l i c i e s , t h e w or l d wo u l d h a v e




w h os e t e r r i t o r y i s l i b e r a t e d ( f r o m t h e N a z i s ) b y S o v i e t

troops and ex-enemy countries which have been oc-

c u p i e d . . . T h e S o v i e t c o n c e p t i o n o f ` s e c u r i t y ' d o e s Y a l t a P a p e r s

n o t a p p e a r c o g n i z a n t o f t h e s i m i l a r n e e d s o r ri g h t s o f 4 5 1

o t h e r c o u n t r i e s . . . "

I have found in m y research a number of other

memos from Harriman warning that Russia's actions

m a k e h e r a n u n t r u s t w o r t h y a l l y . A n d b e c a u s e o f t h e s e

memos, Mr . H a r r i m a n m u s t h a v e b e e n a w a r e t h a t t h e

" A g r e e m e n t R e g a r d i n g J a p a n , " w h i c h S t a l i n d r e a m e d

up and Harriman and Molotov negotiated, was bound

t o t h r o w a l l o f A s i a i n t o t h e R e d o r bi t .

H o w i s i t p o s s i b l e f o r h i m t o s a y i n h i s 1 9 5 1 s t a t e -

m e n t t h a t , " T h e p o s t w a r p r o b l e m s h a v e r e s u l t e d n o t M a c A 5 - 3 3 z 8




documents . A n d , a l t h o u g h t h e R o o s e v e l t a n d H o p k i n s

papers kept in the Hyde Park Library were mad e

a v a i l a b l e on r e q u e s t , a f u l l s e a r c h o f t h o s e d o c u m e n t s

w a s n e v e r r e q u e s t e d . W h a t a r e t h es e h e a v y s e c r e t s s t i l l

s o c a r e f u l l y k e p t f r o m t h e A m e r i c a n p u b l i c ?

Yalta has become a new word with a new meaning

b e c a u s e i t w a s a t u r n i n g p o i n t i n w o r l d h i s t o r y. I t

p r o du c e d d e a t h i n s t e a d o f l i f e , w a r i n s t e a d o f p e a c e ,

h a t e i n s t e a d o f f r i e n d s h i p , l i e s i n s t e a d o f t r u t h .

Chapt er IV



OKINAWA-SUZUKI-EUGENE DOOMANTESTIFIES

O k i n a w a , A p r i l r t o J u n e 2 1 , 1945 .

H i r o h i t o s e n d s u p a " s m o k e s i g n a l . "

P r e s s r e p o r t s .

P e a c e f e e l e r s .

E u g e n e D o o m a n t e s t i f i e s .

ON April Fool's Day 1 945, a U nited States Army,

Na vy and Marine force und er Adm iral Raymond A .

Sp ruan ce, lau nched an other D-d ay which was t o be




Kase r o b

T r u m a n , i n h i s d e s i r e t o o b t a i n a i d f r o m R u s s i a i n t h e

P a c i f i c w a r .

T h a t O k i n a w a w a s a l o s t b a t t l e , a n d t h a t i t s l o s s

m e a n t u t t e r d i s a s t e r , w a s k n o w n t o t h e J a p a n e s e m i l i -

t a r y a n d r e c o g n i z e d b y t h e " m o d e r a t e s " a n d " l i b e r a l s "

o f t h e p e a c e p a r t y . T he s i t u a t i on c a l le d f o r d ra s t i c a n d

d e s p e r a t e s t e p s t o e n d t h e w a r . " O n A p r i l 4 t h , " M r .

K a s e w r i t e s , " t h e K o i s o c a b i n e t ( w h i c h f o l l o w e d t h e

T o j o c a b i n e t ) d i e d a n i g n o m i n i o u s d e a t h . " K o i s o w a s

a " s n o w m a n m e l t i n g a w a y i n t o w a t e r u n d e r t h e r a y s

o f t h e s u n , " M r . K a s e w e n t o n , a n d " T h e s u n w a s t h e

r i s i n g s e n t i m e n t o f t h e p e o p l e a t l a r g e f o r p e a c e -

p e a c e a t a n y p r i c e . "

I t w a s a t t h i s t i m e t h a t t h e E m p e r o r s e n t u p h i s

Okinawa- Suzuki-Eugene Dooman Testifies 8 5



c a n c e o f S u z u k i a n d w e c a n f i n d t e s t i m o n y t o t h i s i n

Roth's "Dilemma in Japan . " H e w r o t e t h a t a l l t h a t w a s

needed to m ake the Suzuki Cabi net a complete peace

c a b i n e t w a s f o r t h e m t o g e t r i d of t h e " m i l i t a r i s t s o r

Gu m bat s u . "

For several days the press in America emphasized

t h e p e a c e s i g n a l b u t , l i k e t h e s e e d s t h a t f e l l o n b a r r e n

g r o u n d i n s t e a d o f f e r t i l e s o i l , S u z u k i ' s a p p o i n t m e n t m e t

w i t h o f f i c i a l e y e s t h a t w e r e " b l i n d " a n d e a r s t h a t w e r e

"d eaf . "

An editorial i n the Washington Evening S tar on

A p r i l 6 n o t e s

T h i s m i g h t b e t h e f i r s t m o v e t o w a r d a b i d f o r a c o m p r o -

m i s e p e a c e w i t h t h e w e s t e r n p o w e r s b e f o r e R u s s i a e n t e r e d




a s s u c h ." These facts were all brought out by Mr .

H o o v e r i n t a l k i n g w i t h P r e s i d e n t T r u m a n . W h i l e t h e

l a t t e r l i s t e n e d w i t h a p p a r en t i n t e r e s t , h i s c l o s i n g r e -

m a r k , a s k i n g M r . H o o v e r t o m a k e a m e m o o n t h e s u b -

j e c t , t h r e w a w e t r a g o n M r . H o o v e r ' s h o p e s f o r p e a c e .

I t i s n o t o u t o f t h e w a y t o w o n d e r w h y M r . T r u m a n ' s

r e a c t i o n w a s s o n e g a t i v e . C o u l d i t b e p o s s i b l e t h a t , i n

p r e p a r a t i o n f o r t h e f o r m e r R ep u b l i c a n P r e s i d e n t ' s v i s i t

t o t h e W h i t e H o u s e , T r u m a n ' s a d v i s e r s h a d b r i e f e d

h i m i n a d v a n c e a n d c o n v i n c e d h i m t h a t t h e S u z u k i a p -

p o i n t m e n t w a s u n i m p o r t a n t ? W i t h a s e n s e o f f u t i l i t y ,Mr. Hoover went b ack to New York and sent them e m o .

W o r l d w i d e p o l i t i c a l e f f e c t s s o o f t e n d e p e n d o n

whether a man has a q uick m ind or a s low one ;

Okinawa- Suzuki-Eugene Dooman Testifies 8 7

it in any of the memoirs I have read . The JCS sai d

that " In no case to date in this war have organized

The Entry

of the

Soviet Union



Japanese units s urrendered . The concept of 'uncon-

d i t i o n a l s u r r e n d e r ' i s f o r e i g n t o t h e J a p a n e s e n a t u r e "

and that "Unless a definition of unconditional sur-

render can be giv en which is acceptable to the Jap-

a n e s e , t h e r e i s n o a l t e r n a t i v e t o a n n i h i l a t i o n a n d n o

p r o s pe c t t h a t t h e t h r e a t o f a b s o l u t e d e f e a t w i l l b r i n g

c a p i t u l a t i o n . "

" A n n i h i l a t i o n , " o f c o u r s e , w a s t h e d es i r e o f R u s s i a .

The JCS report went on to recommend that the def-

i n i t i o n o f u n c o n d i t i o n a l s u r r e n d e r b e m a d e o n a " g o v -

e r n m e n t a l l e v e l . " " . . . i t i s p o s s i b le t h a t a g o v e r n m e n t

could be formed in Japan that would s ign and could

e n f o r c e a s u r r e n d e r i n s t r u m e n t . "

W a s t h i s s u g g e s t i o n m a d e i n r o c o g n i t i o n o f A d m i r a l

Suz uki's new position as premier a couple of weeks

into the War

A g a i n s t

Japan : M i l i -

t a r y P l a n s ,

1 9 4 1 - 4 5

P . 6 3

8 8 The Enem y a t His Back



Uni ted Nations whose role as Soviet representative

on the Security Council during the Korean W ar needs

Kase 1 7 1 n o r e c a l l i n g . Hirota had two talks with Malik, the

Soviet playing "cat" to the Japanese's "mouse," and

w h e n H i r o t a a s k e d f o r a t h i r d m e e t i n g , M a l i k d e c l i n e d

" p l e a d i n g ` i n d i s p o s i t i o n . ' "

Back home, the American press gav e a clear in -

dication of Japan's ultimate defeat as catastrophe

struck day after day while Japan's enemies were

demandi ng the death of the Emperor, strikin g even

m o r e t e r r o r i n t h e i r s o u l s :

NEW YORK TIMES, MAY7 ,

1 9 4 5

C h u n g k i n g , C h i n a , M a y 6 , U P - D e a t h f o r E m p e r o r H i r o -

h i t o , t e r m e d t h e N o . i J a p a n e s e w a r c r i m i n a l , w a s a s k e d

Okinawa- Suzuki- Eugene Doom an Tes tif ies 89



AP- Japan s t i l l i s c a p a b l e o f w a g i n g a l o n g w a r d e s p i t e

d e s t ru c t i v e a i r a t t a c k s a n d n a v a l d e f e a t s w h i c h h a v e c u t

o f f a l m o s t e n t i r e l y h e r s t o l e n s o u r c e s o f r u b b e r, o i l a n d

t i n , t h e F o re i g n E c o n o m i c s A d m i n i s t r a t i o n s a i d l a s t n i g h t .

" A l a r g e p or t i o n o f t h e w a r i n d u s t r y s h e h a d a t P e a r l

H a r b or i s i n t a c t , " s a i d a r e po rt b y t h e E n e m y B r a n c h of

t h e a g e n c y . ( C h i e f o f t h e E n e m y B r a n c h was Henry N .

F o w l e r . )

During this time Harry Hopkins was in Moscow

h a v i n g a s e r i e s o f h i g h l y i m p o r t a n t m e e t i n g s w i t h

M a r s h a l S t a l i n , c a b l i n g h i s r e p o r t s t o W a s h i n g t o n

e v e r y d a y . And while Hopkins was in Moscow, t h e r e

began, among the policy makers, one of the mos t

strange and heated episodes . Und ersecretary Grew

g o The Enem y at His Back



S h e r w oo d i . B y A u g u s t 8 t h e S o v i e t A r m y w i l l b e p r o pe r l y d e pl o y e d

9O 2 on the Manchurian positions .

2 . The Marshal (Stalin) repeated his statement m ade at

Y a l t a t h a t t h e R u s s i a n p e o p le m u s t h a v e a g o o d r e a s o n f o r

going to war and that depended on China's willingness to

a g r e e t o t h e p r o p o s a l s m a d e a t Y a l t a .

3 . F o r t h e f i rs t t i m e h e s t a t e d t h a t h e w a s w i l l i n g t o t a k e

these proposal s up directly with Soong when he comes to

Mos cow . H e w a n t s t o s e e S o o n g n o t l a t e r t h a n J u l y i a n d

expects us to take the matter up at the same tim e with

Chiang Kai-shek. This procedure seems from our point of

v i e w m o s t d e s i r a b l e i n l i g h t o f S t a l i n ' s s t a t e m e n t s a b o u t t h e

Far East which follow .

4 . S t a l i n l e f t n o d o u b t i n o u r m i n d t h a t h e i n t e n d s t o a t -

tack during August . I t i s t h e r e f or e i m p o rt a n t t h a t S o o n g

c o m e h e r e n o t l a t e r t h a n J u l y i . S t a l i n i s r e a d y t o s e e h i m

Okinawa- Suz uki- -Eugene Dooman Testi fies 9 1



u n d e r t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , C h i n a , G r e a t B r i t a i n a n d t h e

S o v i e t U n i o n .

i o . W e w e r e v e r y e n c o u r a g e d b y t h e c o n f e r e n c e o n t h e F a r

E a s t .

I t i s m o r e t h a n l i k e l y t h a t t h i s r e p o r t w a s i n t h e

P r e s i d en t ' s hand s b y May 2 9 t h , t h e day of the

P e n t a g o n m e e t i n g . H a d G e n e r a l M a r s h a l l s e e n i t ? The

r e p o r t s t a t e s t h a t t h e R ed A r m y w o u l d n o t b e r e a d y t o

march into Manchuria b e f o r e A u g u s t 8 . A n d i t s a y s

a l s o t h a t t h e Y a l t a a g r e e m e n t s mus t be accepted by

Chiang Kai-shek a s R u s s i a ' s p r i c e . Again we ask,

w a s t h i s c a b l e d r e p o r t k e p t f r o m t h e o t h e r memb ers

of the Pentagon c o n f e r e n c e ? I n J a m e s F o r r e s t a l ' s

d i a r i e s h e s a y s t h a t McCloy had t old him a b o u t i t s




S t a l i n m a d e i t q u i t e c l e a r t h a t t h e S o v i e t U n i o n w a n t s t o

g o t h r o u g h w i t h u n c o n d i t i o n a l s u r r e n d e r a n d a l l t h a t i s

i m p l i e d i n i t .

B . H o w e v e r , h e f e e l s t h a t i f w e s t i c k t o u n c o n d i t i o n a l s u r -

r e n d e r t h e J a p s w i l l n o t g i v e u p a n d w e w i l l h a v e t o d e s t r o y

them as we did Germany .

C . T h e J a p a n e s e m a y o f f e r t o s u r r e n d e r a n d s e e k s o f t e r

t e r m s . W h i l e c o n s i d e ra t i o n o f t h i s h a s c e r t a i n d a n g e r s a s

compared with (A) it nevertheless can not be ruled out .

S h o u l d t h e A ll i e s d e p a r t f r o m t h e a n n o u n c e d p o l i c y o f u n -

c o n d i t i o n a l s u r r e n d e r a n d b e pr e p a r e d t o a c c e p t a m o d i f i e d

s u r r e n d e r , S t a l i n v i s u a l i z e s i m p o s i n g o u r w i l l t h ro u g h o u r

o c c u p y i n g f o r c es a n d t h e r eb y g a i n i n g s u b s t a n t i a l l y t h e s a m e

r e s u l t s a s u n d e r ( A ) . I n o t h e r w or d s , i t s e e m e d t o u s t h a t h e

p r o po s e s u n d e r t h i s h e a d i n g t o a g r e e t o m i l d e r p e a c e t e r m s

b u t o n c e w e g e t i n t o J a p a n t o g i v e t h e m t h e w o r k s .

Okinawa- Su zuki -Eugene Doom an Test if ies9 3



q u a i n t e d w i t h t h o s e p e o p l e working i n t h e S t a t e

Department, and t h e c o n s t a n t b a t t l e b e t w e e n t h e

" r e a c t i o n a r i e s " a n d t h e " L ef t i s t s . " T h i s t e s t i m o n y o fMr. Doom an's was perhaps the most s e n s a t i o n a l t o

h a v e c o m e f r o m t h e s o - c a l l e d M c C a r r a n C o m m i t t e e ' s

i n v e s t i ga t i on of t h e I n s t i t u t e o f Pa c i f i c R e la t i o n s i n

1 9 5 1 - 5 2 . And, although there weres o m e t h i r t y , o r

f o r t y r e p o r t e r s p re s e n t , v e r y l i t t l e a p p e a r e d i n m o s t

p a p e r s .

F r i d a y , S e p t e m b er 1 4 , 1 9 5 1 I P R 3

pages 703-

T h e s u b c o m m i t t e e m e t a t i o a . m . 7 5 4

P r es e n t : S e n a t o rs M c C a r ra n , E a s t l a n d , a n d S m i t h o f N o rt h

C a r o l i n a .




Mr . D o o m a n . A t t h a t t i m e , w h i c h m u s t h a v e b e e n e a r l y i n

1 9 4 5 , I w a s , a s I h a v e j u s t s a i d , a c t i n g a s C h a i rm a n o f t h i s

Far Eastern Subcommittee of S WINK . . . b u t o n e o f t h e

m e n i n t h e o f f i c e t o l d m e t h a t p a p e r s w e r e g oi n g t h r o u g h t h e

S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t c a l l i n g f o r t h e a p p o i n t m e n t o f D r . L a t t i -

m o r e a s a d v i s e r t o t h e C h i n a D i v i s i o n , t h e p a p e r s h a v i n g

b e e n i n i t i a t e d b y t h e Ch i e f o f t h e C h i n a D i v i s i o n .

Mr . M o r r i s . Who was that?

Mr . D o o m a n . That was Mr . J o h n Ca r t e r V i n c e n t .

I d i s c u s s e d t h e m a t t e r w i t h M r . B a l l a n t i n e , w h o w a s t h e n

D i r e c t o r o f t h e F a r E a s t e r n D i v i s i o n , a n d p o i n t e d o u t t h a t

L a t t i m o r e a t t h a t t i m e , a n d f o r s e v e r a l m o n t h s p re v i o u s l y ,

h a d b e e n u s i n g e v e r y o p p o r t u n i t y t o d i s c r e d i t t h e t h e n

A c t i n g S e c r e t a ry o f S t a t e , Mr . G r e w.

A n d I p oi n t e d o u t t h a t i t w o u l d b e i n c o n g r u o u s f o r a m a n

who had expressed himself s o freely on Mr . G rew to be

Okinaw a-S uzu ki- Eugene Doom an Test if ies 9 5



board of the Commun ist P olitical Association as ap-

proved on June 20, 1945 . The excerpts concern Japan ,

a n d i t w a s t h i s r e s o l u t i o n t h a t a l s o l a u n c h e d t h e s l o g a n

to remove the "reactionaries" and " fascist s" from

the St ate Depart ment . One important and s ignifi cant

p o i n t i s t h a t t h i s s l o g a n w a s a d o p t e d d i r e c t l y a f t e r t h e

"p rematu re" m eetin g in the Pentagon on May 29 th

at which time the "reactionary" Mr . Grew's surrender

paper to Japan had been d iscu ssed . These orders to

the comrades appeared i n t he July 1945 iss ue of

P o l i t i c a l A f a i r s , an official Communist magazine

T h i s g r o w i n g r e a c t i o n a r y o p p o s i t i o n t o a t r u l y d e m o -

c r a t i c a n d a n t i - F a s c i s t E u r o pe i n w h i c h t h e p e o pl e w i ll h a v e

t h e r i g h t t o f r e e l y c h o o s e t h e i r o w n f o r m s o f g o v e r n m e n t

9 6The Enemy at His Back



U n i v e r s i t y , c a m e t o s e e t h e P r e s i d e n t . . . . H e c a m e t o s e e

t h e P r e s i d e n t a n d a s k e d t h e P r e s i d e n t t o i n t e r v e n e o n b e h a l f

o f D r . L a t t i m o r e w i t h t h e S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t . A n d t he m a t t e r

w a s b r o u g ht t o t h e a t t e n t i o n t h e n o f t h e S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t

a n d n o f u r t h e r a c t i o n w a s t a k e n .

M a y I c o r r e c t i t a g a i n ? T h i s m u s t h a v e b e e n a b o u t A p r i l

of 1945.

Mr . M o r r i s . W h a t p o s i t i o n d i d J o h n C a r t e r V i n c e n t h o l d a t

that time, Mr . Dooman, at the time these papers f o r

employing Mr . L a t t i m o r e a s c o n s u l t a n t w e r e s u b m i t t e d ?

Mr . D o o m a n . H e w a s C h i e f o f t h e C h i n a D i v i s i o n .

Mr . M o r r i s . D i d h e h o l d a n y o t h e r p o s i t i o n i n t h e S t a t e

Department?

Mr . D o o m a n . N o t a t t h a t t i m e .

Mr . M o r r i s . W a s h e a s s o c i a t e d w i t h o n e of t h e a r e a c o m m i t -

t e e s ?

O k i n a w a - S u z u k i - E u g e n e D oo m a n T e s t i f i e s 9 ?



( a g a i n s t J u l i a n F r i e d m a n ) b e c a u s e t h a t i m p l i e d t h a t I ha d

c o m p l a i n e d t o s o m e h i g h e r a u t h o r i t y .

T h e f a c t w a s t h a t a v e r y s h or t t i m e a f t e r s t a t e m e n t s h a d

b e e n m a d e i n s e c r e t m e e t i n g s o f t h i s F a r E a s t A r e a C o m -

m i t t e e , t h e p ro c e e d i n g s a n d t h e s t a t e m e n t s m a d e b y v a r i o u s

i n d i v i d u a l s i m m e d i a t e l y w e r e q u o t e d i n v a r i o u s l e f t - w i n g

p e r i o d i c a l s a n d n e w s p a p e r s . T h e r e w e re l i t e r a l l y d o z e n s o f

s u c h o c c a s i o n s .

S e n a t o r E a s t l a n d . Such as PM?

Mr . D o o m a n . That would inclu de PM .

I t s o h a p p en s t h a t a m o n g a l l t h e s e i n s t a n c e s t h a t a c t u a l l y

occurred, I happened to keep one, and that was in The

N a t i o n o f F e b r u a r y 3 , 1 9 4 5 , w h e r e t h e r e a p pe a r s a n a r t i c l e

b y o n e P a c i f i c u s , e n t i t l e d " Da n g e r o u s E x p e r t s . "

Among other things here is the following paragraph

which I would l ike to read, if I may . I m i g h t s a y t h a t




7 1 5 - i 6 Mr . M o r r i s . Mr . D o o m a n , w o u l d y o u t e l l u s t o t h e b e s t o f

y o u r a b i l i t y t h e p o s i t i o n t h a t O w e n L a t t i m o r e t o o k a t t h a t

t i m e w i t h r e s p e c t t o J a p a n ? T h i s i s i n 1 9 4 5.Mr. Dooman . W e l l , t h e r e i s a w h o l e l i b r a r y t h a t c o u l d b e

made up of s tatements mad e by Mr . L a t t i m o r e d u r i n g t h a t

p e r i o d . I s u p p o s e t h e b e s t k n o w n , t h e o n e m o s t f r e q u e n t l y

quoted . . . is a book called Solution in Asia, which was

published, I think, in about February 1945, and was very

widely circulated during the spring and early summer, in

f a c t u n t i l t h e s u r r e n d e r o f J a p a n .

I n g e n e r a l , h e t o o k t h e p o s i t i o n t h a t t h e J a p a n e s e p e o p l e,

w h e n t h e y w e r e d ef e a t e d , w o u l d r i s e i n r e b e l l i o n a g a i n s t t h e

sys tem and overthrow the monarchy ; t h a t t h e r e w e r e el e -

ments in the State Department, the so-called reactionary

Fascist elements , who knew nothing whatever about Japan

. . . and that these elements were intended to use the

O k i n a w a - S u z u k i - E u g e n e D oo m a n T e s t i f i e s 9 9



J a p a n e s e w a n t e d t o d i s e s t a b l i s h t h e m o n a r c h y . T h a t i s n o t

t h e w h o l e s t o r y .

I n S o l u t i o n i n A s i a , h e m a k e s t h i s s t a t e m e n t , w h i c h I

c a n n o t q u o t e t e x t u a l l y , b u t i t r u n s s o m e w h a t a l o n g t h e s e

l i n e s . H e s a y s :

I w i l l v e n t u r e t h e p o li t i c a l p r o p h e c y t h a t t h e J a p a n e s e

p e o pl e w i l l t h e m s e l v e s r e v o l t a n d d i s e s t a b l i s h t h e m o n -

a r c h .

N o w , t h e s u g ge s t i o n a t t h e s a m e t i m e , a t t h a t t i m e - t h a t

i s , b e f o r e t h e s u r r e n d e r - t h a t p e o p l e l i k e M r . Grew and

m y s e l f w e r e i n t e n d i n g t o k e e p t h e E m p e r o r i n p o w e r i m -

p l i e d , t h e n , t h a t w e p ro p o s e d t o u s e t h e i n f l u e n c e a n d t h e

p o s i t i o n o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s t o p r e v e n t t h e e x e r c i s e b y t h e

J a p a n e s e p e o pl e o f t h e i r o w n w i l l .

W e l l, l e t m e s a y a t t h i s p o i n t t h a t t h i s w h o l e di s c u s s i o n

i o o The Enemy a t H i s B a c k



M Mr. Dooman begins here to tell an unusual s tory .

The SWINK subcom mi ttee had been workin g forabout 7 or 8 mon ths on a paper called "The Un ited

States Initial Post- Surrender Policy for Japan . " I t

s p e l l e d o u t e x a c t l y w h a t t h e U n i t e dd S t a t e s p r o p o s e d t o

do with our defeated enemy . On August 1 6 , 1 9 4 5 , MrGrew reti red an d w as repl aced b y Dean Acheson as

Und ersecretary of St ate . Mr . Do om an then ask ed

A s s i s t a n t S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e , J a m e s C . Dunn, chairman

of the ful l SW INK comm ittee, to cal l a meetin g of

the SW INK sub comm ittee on August 2 9, 1 945 f or

t h e p u r p o s e o f p a s s i n g o n t h i s p a p e r . T h i s t h e y d i d ,

and on that same day i t was cab led to General Mac-

A r t h u r a s " a f i r m U n i t e d S t a t e s p o li c y f o r J a p a n . "

Two days l ater, Augus t 31s t, Mr . Dooman retired

Okinawa- Su zuki -Eugene Doom an Test if ies iox



c i s e d c o n t r o l o f a l a r g e pa r t o f J a p a n ' s t r a d e a n d i n -

d u s t r y. "

I t i s o n t h e b a s i s o f t h e s e t w o c l a u s e s t h a t w o r k w a s

u n d e r t a k e n t o d e s t r o y , f i r s t o f a l l , t o e l i m i n a t e t h e c a p i t a l i s t

c l a s s i n J a p a n .

S e n a t o r E a s t l a n d . W h o a t t e m p t e d t o e l i m i n a t e i t ?

Mr. Dooman . T h e s e w e r e t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s s e n t f r o m W a s h -

i n g t o n .

S e n a t o r E a s t l a n d . That was the American St ate Depart-

ment?Mr. Dooman . Wi th the concurrence of the Navy Depart-

ment and the War Department .

T h e s e w e r e t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s s e n t t o G e n e r a l M a c A r t h u r

t h r o u g h t h e J o i n t C h i e f s o f S t a f f .

1 0 2 The Enemy at His Back

S e n a t o r E a s t l a n d . G o a h e a d a n d d e s c r i b e w h a t e l s e t h e r e



was .

Mr . D o om a n . T h e n a l l h o l d i n g s b y a n y o n e i n d i v i d u a l i n

a n y l a r g e c o r p o r a t i o n i n e x c e s s o f 3 p e r c e n t w e re c o n -

f i s c a t e d. T h e r e w e r e m o r e p ol i t e t e r m s u s e d . T h a t i s , t h e y

w e r e t r a n s f e r r e d t o a g o v e r n m e n t p o o l .

A n d t h e n t h e J a p a n e s e G o v e r n m e n t w a s o r d er e d t o s e l l

t h o s e s h a r e s i n a c e r t a i n o r d e r o f p ri o r i t y t o f a r m e r s ' c o -

o pe ra t i v es , l a bo r u n i on s , a n d s h op k e ep er s , a t w h a t e v e r

p r i c e m i g h t b e o f f e r e d .

A n d , f u r t h e r m o r e , t h e J a p a n e s e G o v e r n m e n t w a s o r d e r e d

t o d i s r e g a r d a n y r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n t h e p r i c e o f f e r e d a n d

t h e r e a l v a l u e ; a n d f u r t h e r m o r e , t h e J a p a n e s e G o v e r n m e n t

w a s o r d er e d t o f i n a n c e a n y b i d s f o r t h e s h a r e s b y f a r m e r s '

c o o p e r a t i v e s a n d l a b o r u n i o n s . . .

T h e n e t r e s u l t w a s t h e n t o r e p l a c e p e o p l e w h o had

Okinawa-S uzuki- Eugene Dooman Testi fies 103

MacArthur was not in Japan to make p o li c y , b u t t o



c a r r y o u t o r d er s ; p o l i c y f o r J a p a n w o u l d b e m a d e b y

t h e P r e s i d e n t a n d t h e S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t , h e s a i d . T h i s

" r e p u d i a t i o n " c o m i n g i n t h e f i r s t month of the oc-

cupation boomeranged b e c a u s e i t l e d t o t h e p u b l i c a -

tion of the SWINK directive . MacArthur could not,

t h e r e a f t e r , b e b l a m e d f o r e x e c u t i n g o r d er s !

I n c o n t i n u i n g h i s t e s t i m o n y o n t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p

between MacArthur a n d t h e S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t , Mr .

Dooman sharply pin points t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s p o l i c y

toward Russ ia and Communism . I t w o u l d b e i n t e r e s t -

i n g t o l e a r n o n e d a y w h a t t h e J a p a n e s e w e r e t h i n k i n g

when their American Su preme Com mand er was so

o f t e n r e p u d i a t e d by W ashington o f f i c i a l s , a n d o f t e n

i n f a v o r o f Ru s s i a . T h a t h e r e m a i n e d t h e i r i d o l under


Stat e Departm ent s o u r c e s s a i d n o d i r e c t i v e s h a d b e e n



s e n t t o G e n e r a l M a c A r t h u r i n d i c a t i n g a n y d e s i r e o n t h e

p a r t o f t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n h e r e t o r a i s e t h e c r y o f " c o m -

munism" in Japan . The source said they were taken

completely by surprise by com ments in the MacArthur

s t a t e m e n t , s u c h a s t h a t t h e J a p a n e s e i s l a n d s m i g h t b e c o m e

e i t h e r " a p o w e r f u l b u l w a r k f o r p e a c e o r a d a n g e r o u s s p r i n g -

b o a r d f o r w a r . "

T h e i n c i d e n t w a s c o n s i d e r e d h e r e a s p a r t i c u l a r l y i r r i t a t i n g

s i n c e i t c a m e i n t h e m i d s t o f d e l i c a t e A m e ri c a n - S o v i e t r e -

l a t i o n s e l s e w h e r e i n t h e w o r ld .

T h e a i m o f A m e r i c a n f o r e i g n p o l i c y i n t h e F a r E a s t i s

e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f a j u s t a n d d u r a b l e p e a c e , t h e S t a t e D e -

p a r t m e n t s o u r c e s s a i d . I t i s a i m e d a t " b u i l d i n g a b r i d g e o f

f r i e n d s h i p t o S o v i e t R u s s i a " a n d i s n o t i n t e n d e d t o s e t u p

" a b u l w a r k a g a i n s t c o m m u n i s m " o r t o i n s p i r e a n t i - S o v i e t

f e e l i n g , t h e s o u r c e s a d d e d .

O k i n a w a - - S u z u k i - E u g e n e D o om a n T e s t i f i e s 105

S e n a t o r E a s t l a n d . Was it not an attempt to destroy Japa-



n e s e c a p i t a l i s m ?

Mr . D o om a n . It was an attempt to destroy and eliminate

t h e b r a i n s o f J a p a n e s e b u s i n e s s .

* * *

S e n a t o r E a s t la n d . A l l r i g h t .

W h a t e l s e d i d t h e y a t t e m p t t o p u t o v e r ?

Mr . D o o m a n . J u s t f o l l o w i n g t h a t q u e s t i o n , f o l l o w i n g t h a t

p o i n t , I w a n t t o q u o t e f r o m t h i s r o u n d - t a b l e d i s c u s s i o n o f

the University of Chicago on July 8, this statement at-

tributed to Mr . L a t t i m o r e ( r e a d i n g )

T h a t i n c l u d e s a l o t o f e c o n o m i c a n d p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n a s

well because we cannot forget that the civi lian war-

m a k e r s , t h a t i s t h e b i g i n d u s t r i a l i s t s a n d f i n a n c i e r s o f

i o 6 The Enemy at His Back

o t h e r f i e l d , s h o u l d be reduced t o t h e s m a l l e s t p o s s i b l e



e l e m e n t .

T h e C h a i r m a n . H o w i s t h a t t i e d i n h e r e ? W h o i s t h e a r t i c l e

by?

Mr . D o om a n . W e l l , i t w a s a p a p e r . I t w a s i n t r o d u c e d a s

f o l l o w s : T o t h e F a r E a s t e r n C o m m i s s i o n b y t h e S e c r e t a r y

General, Mr . Nelson T . J o n a t h a n ( s i c l ) , und er a paper

w h i c h r e a d s a s f o l l o w s ( r e a d i n g ) :

T h e e n c l o s u r e , a s t a t e m e n t o f p r o p o s e d p o l i c y w i t h

r e s p e c t t o e x c e s s i v e c o n c e n t r a t i o n s o f e c o n o m i c p o w e r i n

Japan, subm itted by the Unit ed States, i s c i r c u l a t ed

herewith for the consi deration of the Far East Co m-

m i s s i o n a n d i s r e f e r r e d t o C o m m i t t e e N o . 2 , econom ic and

f i n a n c i a l a f f a i r s .

Okinawa- Su zuki -Eugene Doom an Test if ies 107

S e n a t o r E a s t l a n d . I t w a s s e n t b y o u r S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t ?



Mr. Dooman . S e n t b y w h o m , I d o n o t k n o w . B u t i t w a s s e n t

t o t h e o c c u p a t i o n a u t h o r i t i e s a n d t h e y a c t e d o n i t .

A n d w h e n t h e d i s c l o s u r e w a s m a d e b y m y f r i e n d , K a u f -

m a n , t h a t t h i s p a p e r h a d b e e n a c t e d o n , i t w a s t h e n d i s -

a v o w e d a s m e r e l y b e i n g a d r a f t a n d m e r e l y p r e s e n t e d t o t h e

F a r E a s t e r n C o m m i s s i o n f o r c o n s i d e r a t i o n .

B u t t h e p o i n t I w a n t t o e m p h a s i z e w a s t h a t i t w a s , f o r

a l l p ra c t i c a l p u r p o s e s , a n o f f i c i a l d o c u m e n t , b e c a u s e i t w a s

o n t h e ba s i s o f t h i s t h a t t h e v a r i o u s i n s t r u c t i o n s w e r e s e n t

t o t h e J a p a n e s e g o v e r n m e n t .

S e n a t o r E a s t l a n d . A s a m a t t e r o f f a c t , t o p u t i t v e r y m i l d l y ,

t h e r e i s a s t r i k i n g s i m i l a r i t y b e t w e e n t h e A m e r i c a n p o l i c y

t o w a r d J a p a n a n d t h e p o l i c i e s l a i d d o wn b y R u s s i a t o t h e

s a t e l l i t e s t a t e s i n E a s t e r n E u r o p e , i s t h e r e n o t ?Mr. Dooman . I t h i n k t h a t w o u l d b e a f a i r s t a t e m e n t t o

x o 8 The Enemy at His Back

S e n a t o r S m i t h . W h a t p o s i t i o n i s h e i n n o w ?



Mr. Dooman . Ib e l i e v e h e i s i n Y u g o s l a v i a a s c o u n s e l o r o f

t h e E m b a s s y , I b e l i e v e .Mr. M o rr i s . W h a t w a s h i s p o s i t i o n a t t h a t t i m e ?Mr. Dooman . H e h a d j u s t r e t u r n e d f r o m t h e F a r E a s t a n d

was assig ned as deputy to Mr . V i n c e n t i n t h e F a r E a s t

Subcomm ittee of S WINK .

N o w , s u b s e q u e n t l y - a n d t h i s i s h e a r s a y - t h e p e o p l e w h o

h a v e b e e n b u s y o n J a p a n e s e a f f a i r s , J a p a n e s e p o l i c i e s , i n

add iti on to those I have named would incl ude Mr . J o h n

A l l i s o n , a n d - w h a t i s h i s n a m e n o w - a n e c o n o m i s t , B a r n e t t .

I d on ' t k n o w w ha t h i s f i r s t n a m e i s . ( R o be r t ? ) B a r n e t t .

I t h i n k t h o s e a r e t h e p r i n c i p a l o n e s .

S e n a t o r S m i t h . W e l l , n o w, i s t h e r e a n y i n d i c a t i o n o f a n y a c -

t i v i t y b y t h e t o p t w o m e n y o u m e n t i o n e d i n t h e f u r t h e r a n c e

o f t h i s p o l i c y , M r . Byrnes or Mr . A c h e s o n ? I s t h e r e a n y

O k i n a w a - S u z u k i - E u g e n e D o o m a n T e s t i f i e s l o g



a d o z e n . A n d y o u c a n f i n d s o m e e x p e r t s w h i c h w i l l s u p -

p or t a n y p oi n t o f v i e w t h a t y o u c a re t o h a v e . A n d I , m y -

s e l f , d o n o t g o a l o n g w i t h w h a t w e h a v e j u s t h e a r d . I

p r e f e r t o b e g u i d e d b y e x p e r t s w h o t h i n k m o r e a l o n g m y

p o i n t o f v i e w . . .

This brings a thought to mind . Since Mr . Acheson,

according to this testim ony, preferred to be guided

b y e x p e r t s w h o t h o u g h t a s h e d i d , i t i s n o t s u r p r i s i n g

that du rin g the Korean War he rejected the adv ice

o f m i l i t a r y e x p e r t s w h o s a i d t h a t t h e s t r a t e g i c c i t y o f

Rashin could be bombed without hitting Red territory )

And it was not bomb ed u nti l G eneral MacArthur won

the argum ent a year or two lat er .

x i o The Enemy at His Back



Mr . M o r r i s . . . . I a l s o o f f e r y o u j u s t b y wa y o f a s s i s t a n c e

in con nection wi th that extract f rom Mr . L a t t i m o r e ' s

S o l u t i o n i n A s i a t h a t m a y a i d y o u i n a n s w e r i n g t h e q u e s t i o n

I h a v e j u s t p u t t o y o u .

Mr . Dooman . Here is a v ery remin iscent p hrase . . .

( r e a d i n g )

Washington is full of experts who will tell you that

the Japanese are mys terious, fanatical, and not to be

understood by any ordinary use of the intellect . The

same experts are also addicted to citing bits of lore

which, they tell you condescendingly, explain why the

J a p a n e s e a l w a y s d o t h i s o r n e v e r d o t h a t .

Here is an example of the attempts on the part of Dr .

Lattimore to put into rid icule people who did not agree

O k i n a w a - S u z u k i - E u g e n e D oo m a n T e s t i f i e s III



Perhaps t h a t i s a l i t t l e d u l l r e a d i n g , bu t what

Lattim ore's s ugg esti ons woul d have meant to Japan is

VERY clear in 1 956 1 American Korean W ar pri soners

held in Red China have been barbarically and shame-

f u l l y u s e d a s p o l i t i c a l h o s t a g e s t o g r e a t a d v a n t a g e t o

the Co mm un is ts . If the Japanese Emperor had been

held in Red China as a hostage, the demand s Russ ia

and the Chinese Reds could have made on Japan would

have been end less !Mr . Dooman now begins to tell of the important

part the status of Emperor Hirohito played, and then

goes into the extraord inary s tory of " premature"

r e f e r re d t o b r i e f l y i n t h i s c h a p t e r .




as Prime Minister and there was a reconstitution of the

Gov ernment at the head of which was Admiral Suz uki,

who was then Chamberlai n t o the Emperor and who had

been throughout his career a moderate . He (Col . J o h n s o n )

took that as a very clear signal that the Japanese were

r e a d y t o s u r r e n d e r, r e a d y t o t a l k a b o u t t h i s m a t t e r .

Furthermore, we had the advantage of reading messages

between the Japanese Governm ent an d their Ambas sad or

i n M o s c o w , a n d i t w a s c l e a r f r o m t h e s e a n d o t h e r i n d i c a t i o n s

t h a t t h e J a p a n e s e w e r e r e a d y t o s u r r e n d e r i f o n l y i t w e r e

made clear that this trend of opinion that had been de-

v e l o p e d b y t h e l e f t i s t p r e s s i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , n a m e l y ,

that the Emperor would be tried as a war crim inal and

the monarchial system disestablished, it was made clear

t h a t t h o s e w e r e n o t p o l i c i e s o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s .

O k i n a w a - S u z u k i - E u g e n e D o o m a n T e s t i f i e s 1 1 1 3



h a v e b e e n a c c o m p l i s h e d a n d t h e r e h a s b e e n e s t a b l i s h e d

b e y o n d d o u b t a p e a c e f u l l y i n c l i n e d , r e s p o n s i b l e g o v e r n -

m e n t o f a c h a r a c t e r r e p re s e n t a t i v e o f t h e J a p a n e s e p e o p l e .

T h i s m a y i n c l u d e a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l m o n a r c h y u n d e r t h e

p r e s e n t d y n a s t y i f t h e p e a c e - l o v i n g n a t i o n s c a n b e c o n -

v i n c e d o f t h e g e n u i n e d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f s u c h a g o v e r n -

ment to f ollow p olicies of peace which will render

i m p o s s i b l e t h e f u t u r e d e v e l o p m e n t o f a g g re s s i v e m i l i t a -

r i s m i n J a p a n .

(Note : P a r a g r a p h 1 2 w a s r e w r i t t e n a t P o t s d a m t o r e a d

a s f o l l o ws :

T h e o c c u p y i n g f o r c e s o f t h e A l l i e s s h a l l b e w i t h d r a w n

f r o m J a p a n a s s o o n a s t h e s e o b j e c t i v e s h a v e b e e n a c -

c o m p l i s h e d a n d t h e r e h a s b e e n e s t a b l i s h e d i n a c c o r d a n c e

w i t h t h e f r e e l y e x p r e s s e d w i l l o f t h e J a p a n e s e p e o p l e a

D e c a d e o f

A m e r i c a n

F o r e i g n

P o l i c y p . 5 0

114 The Enemy a t H i s B a c k

729 Mr . D o om a n . I was not present at the meetin g bu t the



w h o l e i d e a o f a l l o w i n g t h e m o n a r c h y t o r e m a i n w a s d i s -

t a s t e f u l .

Mr . M o r r i s . T o Mess rs . Acheson and MacLeish?

Mr . D o om a n . Yes .

Mr . S o u r w i n e . Mr . Dooman . i f y o u w e r e n o t p r e s e n t a t

t h e m e e t i n g , I t h i n k y o u o u g h t t o e x p l a i n h o w y o u k n e w

w h a t t o o k p l a c e .

Mr . D o o m a n . This was im mediately told to me by Mr

G r e w a f t e r t h e m e e t i n g .

Mr . S o u r w i n e . W h a t y o u a r e d e s c r i b i n g, t h e n , i s M r . G r e w ' s

d e s c r i p t i o n o f w h a t t o o k p l a c e a t t h e m e e t i n g ?

Mr . D o o m a n . T h a t i s c o r r e c t . Mr . G r e w s a i d t h a t t h i s

c o m m i t t e e w a s , a f t e r a l l , a d v i s o r y t o h i m , a n d t h a t h e

w a s u l t i m a t e l y r e s p o n s i b l e , a n d t h a t h e w o u l d t a k e t h e

O k i n a w a - S u z u k i - E u g e n e D oo m a n T e s t i f i e s 115

Mr. F o r r e s t a l r e a d i t o v e r a n d h e a g r e e d . Mr . McCloy



a g r e e d a l s o .

T h e C h a i r m a n . A g r e e d , o r a p p r o v e d ?

Mr . D o o m a n . Approved. Mr . Elmer Davis reacted very

v i o l e n t l y a n d w ou l d h a v e n o n e o f i t .

Mr . M o r r i s . W h a t p o s i t i o n d i d h e h o l d a t t h i s t i m e ?

Mr . D o om a n . H e w a s , a s I s a i d , D i r e c t o r of t h e O f f i c e o f

War Informat ion . V a r i o u s o t h e r o f f i c e rs a p p r ov e d o f i t , b u t

t h e r e w a s a f e e l i n g t h a t t h e p u b l i c a t i o n o f t h a t d o c u m e n t -

Mr . M o r r i s . V i n c e n t w a s n o t p r e s e n t ?

Mr . D o o m a n . No . A s a m a t t e r o f f a c t , i n f o r m a t i o n o n t h i s

was restricted to a very sm all nu mber of people, those

p e o pl e t h a t I h a v e j u s t i n d i c a t e d .

Mr . S o u r w i n e . Y o uw e r e pr e s e n t a t t h i s c o n f e r e n c e ?

Mr . D o o m a n . I w a s p r e s e n t .

Mr . S o u r wi n e . When yo u s peak of Mr

7 3 0


"premature" di d n o t c o n v i n c e t h e S e c r e t a r y of War



C u r r e n t

2 2 5

b e c a u s e h e i m m e d i a t e l y r e q u e s t e d t h e O p e r a t i o n s P l a n s

D i v i s i o n o f t h e W a r D e p a r t m e n t t o p r e p a r e t w o s t u d i e s

o n t h e s u b j e c t w h i c h t h e y d i d :

I n t h e f i r s t o f t h e s e t h e O P D c o n c l u d e d t h a t t h e e n e m y ' s

p r o t ra c t e d r e s i s t a n c e w a s b a s e d o n t h e h o p e o f o bt a i n i n g

a c o n d i t i o n a l s u r r en d e r , a n d i n t h e s e c o n d , t h a t a p u b l i c

d e c l a r a t i o n o f w a r a i m s , a m o u n t i n g t o a d e f i n i t i o n o f

u n c o n d i t i o n a l s u rr en de r, w o u ld b e ad v i s a bl e a s a m e a n s

o f " p o l i t i c a l a n d ps y c ho lo gi c a l p re s s u r e" s u p pl em e n t i n g

m i l i t a r y p r e p a r a t i o n s . A m o n t h o r s o l a t e r ( J u l y 1 2 ) t h e

OPD recomm end ed h o l di n g t o t h e i n v a s i o n pl a n s , b u t

a d d ed : " T h e r e i s m u c h t o b e ga i n e d by d e f i n i n g , a s c o m -

p l e t e l y a s p o s s i b l e , t h e d e t a i l e d U . S . w a r a i m s i n J a p a n . "

Okinawa- Su zuki -Eugene Doom an Test if ies 117

s t r o n g l y a g a i n s t any p o s i t i o n o r d e c i s i o n t a k e n b y t h i s



Gov ernment which woul d enable the mon archy to remain

i n Japan .

(Note : Lattim ore drew up a memorandum for President IPR 9- 3086

Truman dated June io, 1 9 4 5 , and a special memorandum I P R 1 0 - 3 3 8 7 -

f o r h i s i n t e r v i e w w i t h t h e P r e s i d en t d a t e d J u l y 3 , 1 9 4 5 . ) 9

Mr . S o u rw i n e . What do you mean "inf ormation was avail-

a b l e i n t h e S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t , " M r . Dooman? . . .

Mr . Dooman . It was Mr . G rew who told me

. . .

Now, 7 3 1Mr. Lattimore had been usi ng every opportun ity f o r a

p e r i o d o f a y e a r o r m o r e t o p r o p o u n d t h e d o c t r i n e t h a t

the Japanese people would overturn the monarchy and

t h a t t h e r e w e r e a g r ou p o f p e o p le i n t h e S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t ,

F a s c i s t s a n d r e a c t i o n a r i e s , w h o w e r e g o i n g t o k e e p t h e

E m p e r o r i n p o w e r a g a i n s t t h e w i l l o f t h e J a p a n e s e p e o p l e .

1 1 1 8 The Enemy at His Back

" W h y , " h e a s k s , " w a s t h e p r o c l a m a t i o n o f J u l y 2 6 t h



`prematu re' on May 29th? Upon what d i d M a r s h a l l

b a s e h i s d e c i s i o n ? "

G r e w 1 4 2 4 Mr. G r e w w r o t e t h a t t h e r e a s o n g i v e n w a s b e c a u s e

t h e b a t t l e f o r O k i n a w a w a s s t i l l g o i n g o n a n d i t might

a p p e a r t o t h e e n e m y a s a s h o w o f w e a k n e s s i f w e p r e -

s e n t e d t h e m w i t h a p e a c e o v e r t u r e . B u t , h e a ls o p o i n t s

o u t t h a t t h e A m e r i c a n s h a d a l r e a d y r e a c h e d t h e "mop-

p i n g u p " s t a g e s o n O k i n a w a b y t h a t t i m e .

I P R 7 4 6 W e n o w c o m e t o a p a s s a g e i n t h e t e s t i m o n y w h i c h

presents a good example of how American S t a t e D e -

p a r t m e n t o f f i c e r s w o r k e d c l o s e l y w i t h t h e C h i n e s e a n d

Japanese Commun ists , s ome of whom were employed

by our v ery "hush, hush" and "cloak and dagger"

O k i n a w a - S u z u k i - E u g e n e D oo m a n T e s t i f i e s 119

nam ed John K . E m m e r s o n , w h o , b e f o r e t h e w a r , h a d b e e n



one of my su bord inates at the American Embas sy i n

Tokyo . I understood that he had been sent to Yenan .

Yenan i n China then was the capital of the Chinese

Communists . There were present at that time in Yenan

a Nosaka, the leading Japanese Communist, and other

leading Communis ts .

Mr . M o r r i s . I s Nosaka the same as Susu mo Okano, head

o f t h e J a p a n e s e C o m m u n i s t P a r t y ?

Mr . D o o m a n . I b e li e v e t h e l a t t e r i s a p s e u d o n y m . I b e li e v e

that Emm erson had been sent to Yenan to st udy methods

u s e d b y t h e J a p a n e s e C o m m u n i s t s i n Y e n a n i n i n d o c t r i n a t -

i n g J a p a n e s e p r i s o n e r s o f w a r t a k e n b y t h e C h i n e s e . A s

I s a i d , h e r e t u r n e d t o W a s h i n g t o n i n a b o u t M a y o f 1 9 4 5.

T h e C h a i r m a n . Who did ?

Mr . D o o m a n . Emm erson . H e b r o u g ht b a c k a r e p o r t d e s c r i b-


before a Hous e committee investigating t h e Katy n



F o r e s t m a s s a c r e i n P o l a n d , h e b r u s h e d a s i d e a l l q u e r i e s

K a t y n 1 9 9 3concerning Polish Communi sts working for OWI in

the foll owing m anner : " I f I h a d t a k e n s e r i o u s l y a l l o f

the sto ries about agents of the Com mu nis ts in the

Office of War Inform ation I would have had nothing

e l s e t o d o b u t t o f i r e t h e w h o l e s t a f f . "

I p R 3 Mr . M o rr i s . Mr . C h a i r m a n , w e h a v e h a d J o h n K . F a i r ba n k ' s

P . 7 5 , a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h t h e I n s t i t u t e o f P a c i f i c R e l a t i o n s s e t f o r t h

i n t h e r e c o r d a t g r e a t d e t a i l .

W e h a v e a l s o h a d t e s t i m o n y o n t h e p a r t o f t h r e e w i t n e s s e s

i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h h i s a s s o c i a t i o n i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e

Communist Party .

I am asking Mr . D o o m a n i f h e h a d e n c o u n t e r e d a t a l l M r .

Okinawa-Suzuki-Eugene Dooman Testifies 121

penciled these items referring to the Emperor . However,

they would always appear either overtly or covertly in the



next program that would be presented .

There was, in other words, a persistent effort on the

part of the Office of War Information to get our approval

toward psychological warfare directed at the relationship

between the Japanese people and the Emperor .

Mr. Morris . Have we neglected anything that we should 754

know, Mr. Dooman? . . .

Mr. Dooman . Well, my purpose, Mr. Morris, has not been

to give you any evidence as to whether this, that, or the

other man was a Communist or not, because I am in noposition to give you any such evidence.

My purpose in testifying here was to indicate in general

Chapter V



THE "RESIGNATION" OF MR. GREW

THEspring of 1945 was the year and the season which

sealed the fate of Undersecretary of State Joseph C .

Grew and the group of "reactionaries" working under

him. On June loth, as you have read in Mr . Dooman's

testimony in the previous chapter, the CommunistPolitical Association transmitted the "Party directive"

to the CPA and to the readers of Political Affairs (July

1 945), that all people of Grew's stripe be eliminated

from the Department of State . This action was pro-

The "Resignation" of Mr. Grew 123

conspiracy going on around him . In his eyes, all men

were honest, if somewhat blind to facts. Being unable



to realize he had enemies, there was of course noprogram on his part to outwit them. And so, in thespring of

1945, he made a number of serious errorsin the view of his alert antagonists. In his book,"Turbulent Era" he naively writes of these "errors"

without any realization of their connection with his

"resignation" from State . The first was the incident of

May 19, 1 945 .

On that date he spent a restless and sleepless night,

his mind in a turmoil of deep concern for the nation

in the light of our "floundering" diplomacy . In des-

peration he arose at five in the morning, determined

that, if he put his worries on paper, it would calm his


The tragedy is that this analysis came in 1945 . I t

should have come as a commentary on the Burns'



estimate in 1942 and policy should have "stiffened"

thenl Even in 1945, however, much could still have

been done .

see Chap. I I Without error, Grew had predicted the outcome of

the war in Europe and the fate of China and Korea ;

as of this writing, Japan is beginning to slip down the

ways into "Russia's orbit." Mr. Grew gives us nohint that he had read the edict of Georgi Dimitrov

and the Communists' plans for Asia, but he saw and

read the signs. When he advocated that "We shalltherefore do well to keep up our fighting strength,"

Grew 1445 he was of course completely unaware that at that very

time, two weeks after the fall of Germany, the Com-

The "Resignation" o f Mr. Grew 125

said because his own thoughts had been following the Grew r43r



same line . "

Error No. 3 was perhaps the most "unforgivable"

of them all . He unknowingly urged the arrest of two

men important to the Communist Party, John S .

Service and Andrew Roth . Service, working in the

Far East Division, had recently returned from China

and had been suspected for some time for following

the Communist "line." In this event he had been

discovered giving secret documents to the editor of

the magazine, "Amerasia ." Roth was a lieutenant in

the Naval Intelligence Reserve who was guilty of the

same offense, and was at that very moment in theprocess of writing his book in which Mr . Grew came

Grew 1452-3


been held up allegedly by the White House . General



Holmes and Mr. Grew immediately went to see Presi-dent Truman to find out why. But the Chief Executive

knew nothing about it. In fact he was so outraged

that Mr. Grew writes, "I have seldom seen a man

more angry . . . The President had the telephone off

the hook while we were still with him and he told

Justice (Department) in no uncertain terms that he

wished nothing whatever to interfere with the prompt

and thorough prosecution of the cases . "

Mr. Grew later discovered that the "hold-up" wascaused by the same policy that exists even today .

It seems the President was having "current conversa-

tions with the Soviet Government," and the inevitable


to the United States as to preclude any attempt by the



United States Government to obtain Soviet agreement to

certain desirable political objectives in the Far East prior

to such entry?

2 . Should the Yalta decision in regard to Soviet political

desires in the Far East be reconsidered or carried into effect

in whole or in part?

3. Should a Soviet demand, if made, for participationin the military occupation of the Japanese home islands

be granted or would such occupation adversely affect our

long term policy for the future treatment of Japan?

In the opinion of the Department of State it would be

desirable politically to obtain from the Soviet Government

the following commitments and clarifications regarding

the Far East prior to any implementation on our part of

Grew 1456-7

Pentagon


The reply to this from the War Department con-



Papers 71

Grew 1458-9

curred in by Secretary Forrestal (Navy) was dated

May 21, 1945 and was over Stimson's name . It wasa sharp reply to the man who would suggest that

we obtain "certain desirable political objectives" from

Soviet Russia . And it is astonishing, to say the least,

in the light of American military tradition . The memo

is long, but every sentence is so provocative, I can't

feel justified in omitting any of them:

i . The War Department considers that Russian entryinto the war against- Japan will be decided by the Russian

on their own military and political basis with little regard

to any political action taken by the United States . The

The "Resignation" of Mr . G r e w 129

then seize the objectives they desire at a cost to them

relatively much less than would be occasioned by their entry



into the war at an early date.

From the foregoing, it appears we can bring little, if

any, military leverage to bear on the Russians in so far

as the Far East is concerned, unless we choose to use force.

From the military point of view it would be desirable to

have a complete understanding and agreement with theRussians concerning the Far East . If it is believed that

the reconsideration of the Yalta agreement will assist such

a complete understanding and agreement, then the WarDepartment would favor it, but it is not believed that

much good will come of a rediscussion at this time.

3. With regard to Soviet participation in the military

occupation of the Japanese homeland, the War Depart-

ment considers this to be a matter for political. decision .


must be found to persuade the Russians to give their agree-

ment to the four points listed in the State Department



Grew 1406-7

memorandum .

So you see, away back in 1945, the United States

policy was "fear" of Russian might . And at that time

we had the largest navy, and the greatest standing

army in the world

Our obstreperous "boy," Mr. Grew, got his feet in

even more hot water when, as Acting Secretary of

State, he dipped his fingers into the propaganda

machine and gummed up the works for a short minute

He emphasized in his memoirs that throughout the

war he took the position "that propaganda by any

branch of our Government against the Emperor of


To Samuel I . Rosenman, June 16, 1945 Grew 1438

The campaign in Okinawa is likely to be finished in the



not distant future and I am wondering whether, with the

announcement of its fall, a suitable opportunity would not

be presented for us to make some sort of public statement

again calling upon the Japanese to surrender . . . morelives of Americans may ultimately be saved .

But this, too, was to meet defeat. The President, on

June 18, 1945, said ". . that while he liked the Grew 1437

idea he had decided to hold this up until it could be

discussed at the Big Three meeting." That same day

Truman held a briefing session with Stimson, For-

restal, McCloy and his joint Chiefs in preparation for

the Potsdam Conference. The Pentagon papers pub-


passed along to their "friends" in the State Depart-

ment and in the White House, who knew how to



carry out the orders with great finesse .

The day after that, June 21, 1945, the battle fo

Okinawa ended. The total casualties were enormous andhorrible. But during the battle, in May and June, the

Japanese were trying to persuade the Russians to

USSBS help them negotiate for peace-first by way of theJapan's

Struggle toSoviet Ambassador to Japan, Malik, and then directl

End the War to Moscow. They were asking the Russians to tel7 the United States they wanted to surrender-an

certain of our officials knew this .

One might ask the question-why was Mr. Greallowed all this time to play "monkey wrench" wit


maneuver made easier by the advent of a new Presi-



dent . As has been the custom in the past all members

of the Cabinet submitted their resignations when

President Truman took office . However, Mr. Truman

did not immediately accept the resignations, asking

the Secretaries to stay on until he got his feet on the

ground .

It was on July 1st when James F . Byrnes was

appointed to be Secretary of State in place of Stet-

tinius. Grew immediately informed President Truman

that he was going to tell Byrnes that he could take

advantage of his resignation any time he wanted to,

but- " .. .

I would certainly not let anyone down,

and if Mr. Byrnes should wish me to stay at least for Grew rg21


This was the "writing on the wall" that even a stub-

born "blindness" should have seen .



The team of Grew, Ballantine and Dooman found

itself isolated from their usual contacts and con-

ferences, and the policies being "put forward" were

entirely against its views and better judgment . It

soon became apparent to them that their usefulness

to the government had come to an end . After Mr . Grew

left the Department on August 16th, the others,

Dooman and Ballantine, soon followed .

A number of people in Washington at that time

understood the true nature of this triple "resigning"

for what it was, but, of the three, only Mr . Dooman

realized he was, in fact, fired .


"myth" of August 1945 has been confirmed by events .

Mr. Grew had to be fired . Being instinctively and



automatically a loyal American and not understanding

our "New Look" toward Russia, he was messing things

up!

The story of Joseph Grew is important because it

explains a part of the reason why our foreign policies

since 1933 have consistently resulted in disaster, and

also, how the enemy maneuvers. That Mr. Grew did

not-fully sense the betrayal of himself and the United

States was a powerful weapon in the hands of the

leftists and Communists then working in our State

Department and White House. Strangely enough, Mr .

Churchill, in "Triumph and Tragedy" delicately hints


friendly appeasement in any form is regarded as a clear

sign of weakness and an invitation to further demands or



encroachments . "

But let us see how "blind" Mr . Grew himself was .

Did he not know that the American people wereblind because of the misinformation they were receiv-

ing from their leaders who "handled" the press and

radio channels? If he had stopped to analyse the ma-

nipulations of those "elements in government," wouldhe still believe that they were "woefully blind"?

Had Mr. Grew read further than the doctrines of

the Communist leaders, and delved into the vol-uminous hearings of the House Un-American Activities

Chapter VI



POTSDAM AND THE ADVISERS

The Potsdam Conference .

Forrestal makes a last desperate effort.

The Japanese are also desperate.

Military Intelligence makes a report on Red China.

Surrender is set for Nov. z5, z946 .

U . S . rejects aid in the Pacific from other allies.

The Potsdam Proclamation .


not even the shadow of a shadow for such excuses at

Potsdam in July 1945.



Why did the new President and his aides rush to

Potsdam to confirm the top-secret agreements made

at Yalta? The Soviets had already been breaking the

Yalta agreements concerning Poland and Rumania

with mass murder and the spread of terror . Stettinius

mentioned this when he wrote that " . . . the military

s t e t 97 leaders and I discussed the failure of the Soviet Union

to abide by the Yalta agreement on the Balkans . "

But this apparently did not break our faith in Russia

as our "real friend ." However, our officials had even

more evidence of Russia's contempt for commondecency . They were well acquainted with the inexcus-

Potsdam and the Advisers 139

Conference : Undersecretary of State Grew, Secretary

of the Navy James Forrestal, General of the Army



Douglas MacArthur, and Admiral of the Fleet Chester

Nimitz .

Grew was obviously in the dog house and had been

for some time . But his absence from Potsdam could

be rationalized by the fact that he was obliged to be

Acting Secretary of State while Byrnes was away at

the Conference . As for MacArthur and Nimitz, themajor conferences were only open to the "European

brass," although Wedemeyer, Chennault and Stilwell

did manage to rate the "bush league" Cairo Conference

in 1943, and Wedemeyer was at the Casablanca meet-

ing. Years later, MacArthur's startled "I?," when


But the day he arrived the conference came to an

end and the damage was done.



Forrestal was not alone in his attempt to bring the

Japanese cry for peace to official attention . Senator

Homer Capehart, Republican from Indiana, had come

across the information and publicly announced on

June 28th that the Japanese had made peace offers

"within recent weeks which would be acceptable to

me personally." The following day Mr. Grew madea short denial. But apparently the Senator's statement

to the press attracted public interest which the short

denial did not pacify. On July loth, Mr. Grew pre-

sented a long and detailed statement to the press

which, in view of his past actions and convictions


this view. "He insisted that she still had a great army

and was full of fight . Likewise, he made it clear that



he had little faith in the Japanese overtures for peace . "

(Emphasis mine .)

General Kenney later said he didn't give up hope

and made a bee-line to the White House to talk with

President Roosevelt . After he'd told his story he met talk with

with another exasperating stone wall . The President,Kenney

he said, merely grinned at him and replied, "That is

not what my Chiefs of Staff tell me ."

On July 12, 1945, five days before the Potsdam

Conference opened, the Emperor of Japan, frustrated

by the unproductive talks between Japanese Ambas-

sador to the Kremlin and the Soviet officials, ordered 189 a l s o


for the trial of the Emperor as a war criminal . Th

Daily Worker, which heretofore had made few men-



tions of Japan, and none of the Emperor, now went

"all out . "

Increasing alarm filled the minds of many-thos

who were trying to get Russia into the war before it

was too late, and those on the opposite side of th

fence who dreaded the consequences if this were to

occur. It was early in July when General of the Army,

Dwight D. Eisenhower, went to Antwerp to meetPresident Truman and his party on their arrival fo

the Potsdam Conference. In his book, "Crusade in

Europe," written some years later, General Eisenhower

wrote


his opinion, indispensable, and he did not think that we

should go so far as to beg them to come in . While the



cost of defeating Japan would be greater without Russian

aid, there was no question in King's mind but that we .

could handle it alone . He thought the realization of this ;

fact should greatly strengthen the President's hand irk

the forthcoming conference in Potsdam.

Also the politically naive Mr. Stettinius gave the

proposal an incredulous glance when he wrote

Even as late as the Potsdam Conference, after the first

atomic bomb had exploded at Los Alamos (Note : he means

Alamogordo) on July 16th, the military insisted that the

Soviet Union had to be brought into the Far Eastern war .

S t e t 9 8


This was a "dangerous" statement because, as we all

know, the policy of "certain elements" at that time



2315

2317

and up to the Korean war, was that the Red Chinese

were "agrarian reformers ." Also, it was in direct con-

tradiction to the following dispatch by an American

official in Chungking which was quoted in the intelli-

gence report "it is unfortunate that the present day

Communist Party (in China) bears that name ." But

the intelligence report goes on to quote Mao Tse-tung,

Chinese Communist leader, in his booklet, "New De-

mocracy" (Jan . 1 9 4 1 ) , who was more candid than the

American official when he said, "We (Chinese) cannot

separate ourselves from the assistance of the Soviet

Union. "


marked "secret." i i o copies of the summary were

made and were distributed in July to ig government



agencies and overseas military theaters-15 went to

the White House and three to the State Department,

Shortly after it was distributed, it was recalled .

The fat got thrown into the fire when on August 5,

1949, Secretary of State Acheson made public the

famous one-sided White Paper on China. Everyonewho had been following our "blunders" in China with

real anxiety, read the White Paper carefully, andCongressman Walter H. Judd, Republican of Minne-sota, one of the few who had knowledge of the intelli-

gence report, noticed it was never mentioned in the

White Paper. He gave out a press release in which he


cerning Japan. It's an easy guess that President Tru

man was never shown either the summary or threport of our Military Intelligence Service



. I was n

surprised either when Admiral Leahy told me that h

had never seen or heard of these documents until h

had read the manuscript of this book! The Admiral'

office was in the White House and 15 copies were sen

there .

I am curious to know what went on in HarrTruman's mind at that time. I wrote him a letter an

asked him, but he never replied . Neither do his "Mem

oirs" answer the question I put to him . He had beePresident only three months, a job for which he hahad no schooling whatever . Only a year before, he'


ship. The President was accompanied by his newSecretary of State, Jimmy Byrnes, who had been with

Roosevelt at Yalta even though he had played only a



small part in the negotiations. Mr. Byrnes gave agraphic picture of the importance of the advisers in

his book . He said that they had brought along memo-

randa covering almost every subject that might bebrought up. "We worked hard on board the Augusta. . . Every morning throughout the trip, Ben Cohen, Byrnes 67H. Freeman (Doc) Matthews, and Charles E . (Chip)

Bohlen would meet with me in my cabin to consider

these papers . Anew Secretary of State could not have

asked for a finer trio of advisers ."

Ben Cohen, Mr . Byrnes wrote, " . . . has had ahand in important issues ever since the early days of


Information, headed by Elmer Davis, backed up by a

certain element in the State Department were advising

him that the Japanese Emperor system should be



IPR 1o-3386 abolished. Owen Lattimore even paid a call on the

President to convince him of this view . General Mar-

shall insisted that it was necessary for Russia to enter

the war in order to "save millions of American lives ."

Surely the drafted paper, which Truman had dis-

cussed with Mr. Grew and others, must have pre-

sented a puzzle to him while the Army continued with

plans for the invasion of the Japanese home islands .

This was the question I asked him in my letter . I

wanted to know how he reconciled all this conflicting

information and advice .

Meanwhile, Russia had not waited until the fall of


And now we come to a very curious incident occurring

at Potsdam. A year before, at the Quebec meeting in



September 1944, it was decided that Russia would

enter the war against Japan (as Stalin had promised at

Moscow and Teheran) go days after the surrender of

Germany and that the target date for Japan's sur-

render should be 18 months, or a year and 6 months

from the fall of Germany . This was arrived at in the

following manner . "While the British Chiefs of Staff

proposed an estimate of two years after the defeat of

Germany, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who had been

using a one year period, recommended as a compro-

mise an 18-month period, `to be adjusted periodically

to conform to the course of the war .'"

Pentagon

papers 31


But other memoirs proved the typesetter not in error .

To some of those who witnessed it, this decision



must have seemed most unrealistic . But what was the

reaction of President Truman? One of those present at

Potsdam has told that, on the day Stalin arrived and

had his first meeting with the President, the former

told the President that he had received a message from

the Japanese Government expressing an intention to

send Prince Konoye to Moscow to negotiate for sur-

render. According to the story, Truman asked, "What

are you going to do about it?" And Stalin's reply was-

with a laugh and a shrug, "Nothing . "

Nowhere in the history book do I find any questions

from Truman on the logic of the target date for Nov .


July 26, 1945 Tokyo Radio Suggests Japan Would Accept

Easier Peace Terms



On August 4, 1945 a story appearing on page 4 of

the Washington Evening Star gave one of the most

important news reports of that day, two days before

the atomic bomb was dropped and ten days before the

actual surrender :

AP. with the US 3rd Army in Germany, Aug . 4-Herbert von Dircksen, former German ambassador to Tokyo

and London, said yesterday the German Government was

advised last January that Japan was forming a new govern-

ment, with Baron Kantaro Suzuki as Premier to try to


Perhaps no paper in the United States carries as

much influence as the New York Times . Its columnist,

Arthur Krock, had won the respect and confidence of



thousands of people across the country . And yet we find

the Times' editorials as well as Mr . Krock parroting

the Communist line. Mr. Krock wrote on July 5,1 945

"Unless the imperial Japanese power is removed-even

though it is wielded from behind the throne-no peace

with Japan will be more than an armistice . "

Perhaps Mr. Krock was only following the editorialpolicy of his employers, for a few days later, on July

14, 1945, the Times' editorial proposed that the Em-


From his office in Washington, Secretary of the

Navy Forrestal kept a close watch on both Potsdam

and the war in the Pacific . His diaries of those days



tell many unusual stories notwithstanding the fact that

they were carefully "edited" and much was deleted by

the Truman administration after Forrestal's death,

and, notwithstanding the fact that one of the compilers

of "The Forrestal Diaries" was Walter Millis. Millis'

political philosophy can be summed up by the fact that

the St. Louis Post Dispatch reviewed an article he

wrote for the Saturday Review in which he strongly

attacked the Loyalty Security program and called the

FBI "secret political police ." (For instance, in the

"Diaries" the "premature" meeting of May 29th in the

Pentagon was mentioned, but NOT the "premature"

St. Louis

Post Dis-

patch Sept .

20, 1955


USSBS the matter directly to the Vice Commissar for Foreig

Japan's Affairs in Moscow. Russia asked for more details conStruggle to

End the War cerning the mission and Sato was directed to explai



p•7 the mission as follows : . . . ( 2) to ask Russia to in

tercede with the United States in order to stop the war

The Soviets replied on 13 July that since Stalin an

Molotov were just leaving for Potsdam no answe

could be given until their return to Moscow . On 1

July meanwhile the Emperor had called in Konoye an

secretly instructed him to accept any terms he coul

get and to wire these terms direct to the Emperor

Konoye also testified that when Sato was sounding out

the Russians he reported the Russians would not con

sider a peace role unless the terms were unconditional

surrender, and that this reply had a great influence on


The elderly and trusting Mr . Stimson writes that he

was informed that the grand total of armed mightnecessary for the invasion would be 5,000,000 men, ex- stimson 619



clusive of those not directly concerned . They also in-

formed him that the casualties expected would be over

a million. These figures were presented to the Secre-

tary of War by the military and the Interim Committee

on the atom bomb .

This estimate was given by General Marshall, and

those who went along with him cited the awful toll

of dead and wounded at Okinawa as an example ofwhat could be expected in Japan . The figure of five

million men with one million casualties, or 20 percent,

in a battle with an already defeated enemy is hard to


be a major power in the Pacific-and they still weren't

in the Pacific war 1

So anxious were Russia's "real friends" in Wash-



ington to share with them "all that we have," ourfighting forces in the Pacific were beginning to feel

the pinch. Major General Courtney Whitney in his

Whitney 186 book, "MacArthur : His Rendezvous with History"

tells about a shocking incident . He wrote that when

the Japanese were putting up a desperate resistance on

Luzon and our boys were having a rough time of it,

General MacArthur received orders from Washingtonwhich "at this critical moment" upset MacArthur's

timetable . " . . . one hundred of his transport ships,"

General Whitney writes, "were to be withdrawn im-


Badger testified at the MacArthur hearings in 19951

that at the Cairo Conference in1943,

the British and

American Combined Chiefs of Staff discussed the sub-



ject of whether there was a need for Russia's help in

the Pacific. He reminded the committee before which

he was appearing that the Teheran Conference was to

follow the Cairo meeting within a few days and that

"an immediate decision was necessary in order that

they might advise Mr. Stalin accordingly . "

Admiral Badger went on to explain that the Allied

agencies, after careful study of their evidence and

statistics, concluded that the U . S .S.R. was "so weak

logistically in the Far East" that they were almost

completely dependent for their supplies coming from

MacA 4-2730


July 18th he had received a request from Japan to

mediate. He explained that the proposals had been

"too vague" for him to give an affirmative answer



He also added that on that very day, July 2 8th, he had

received another vague proposal and that he would

make the same reply .

Now we know from the United States StrategicBombing Survey reports that at the time of Potsdam

USSBS the Japanese were not at all "vague" but quite definite,

J t r u g g l epan's t oand definitely desperate in their "struggle to end the

End the War war." What is more, the United States was interceptingP. 7 all the Japanese messages between Moscow and Tokyo

Obviously Mr . Truman was not aware of this vitally

important information. Who kept this from him?But even without this information, what would the


sell the idea that its use would hasten the end of the

war. With a little pathos, Mr. Grew writes in his

memoirs that, when Byrnes became Secretary of State, Grew 1424



he tried to see him to tell him how important andurgent the paper was. But Mr. Byrnes was too busypreparing for the coming conference . It was not until

the day before Byrnes left for Europe that Mr . Grewwas finally able to hand him the draft of the Procla-

mation. However it was not Byrnes who acted upon

the paper. Perhaps his advisers on whom he "reliedheavily" advised him against it .

But, even Mr. Stimson was unable to hang on to the

famous Paragraph 12 which provided for the retention

of the Emperor. In its final draft, the paragraph wasrewritten in vague language, by whom we don't know,

16o The Enemy at His Back

mation raises some questions . It had been constantly

repeated-and Mr . Grew made the statement in Wash-

ington on July loth-that Japan had never made



Kase 2ro also

formal offers to surrender to our Government . So it was

ironic if not tragic that the Allies, not only knowing

Japan wanted to surrender but also what terms they

had been giving, never made an official offer to accept

surrender to their government. In view of our negoti-

ations and leniency with Italy, why didn't we do the

same with Japan? Neither the United States Govern-

ment nor the Allies jointly, ever sent a direct message

to a Japanese official saying in effect, "If you want to

surrender, here are our terms, among which you may

keep your Emperor." Mr. Kase reminds us that theProclamation sent to Japan by the United States, Great


to the surrender. Prime Minister Suzuki made a state- I a s e 2 1 1 ,

ment to the press that "it was the policy of the gov-

ernment to ignore the proclamation entirely." At least



this was the English translation which the Tokyo radio

flashed to America. It has since been argued that this

was a wrong interpretation of the announcement, but

no one in America asked for an explanation nor left

any margin for error . On August 5th, 1945, the atomic

bomb was dropped into history and destroyed the city

of Hiroshima.

Chapter VII

THE ATOMICBOMB AND SURRENDER



Why did we drop the atom bomb?Major Jordan opens a diplomatic suitcase.

Mr. Stimson is persuaded to change his mind.

Why we share the atom .

THE final acceptance of the Japanese surrender a

the dropping of the atom bombs were events so inte

twined that they must be told together . Of the tw

the atom bombs were of the greater consequenc

The Atomic Bomb and Surrender 163

in those final days listening to every word which re-

lated to the closing of the war .

But before we go into the great decision of those



responsible, a picture of the surrounding conditions

must first be drawn. Two items found in the 1954

World Almanac should be inserted here and borne in

mind throughout the rest of the chapter . These items

are proof that the Russians were getting atomic in-formation from the very beginning of the experiments .

Dr. Klaus J . E . Fuchs, German-born atomic research World

physicist at Harwell, Eng ., pleaded guilty March 1 (1950), Almanac

to violating the Official Secrets Act and received 14 years954 P. 149

in prison. He had communicated valuable atomic informa-


him "expediency." And so at Potsdam Mr. Truman felt

he was honor bound to inform Stalin of the successful

experiment with the A bomb . He discussed the ways



Churchill

T & T 669-70

and means with Mr. Churchill and finally decided to

break the news on July 24th, after a round table con-

ference. Winston Churchill in his last book, "Triumph

and Tragedy," relates this episode in great detail . I t i s

especially interesting because the P.M. appeared to

be highly puzzled by Stalin's reaction and, though his

book was published in 1953, after the trial of Klaus

Fuchs, he added no "hindsight" comment :

"Next day, July 24 . . . we all got up from the round table

. . . I saw the President go up to Stalin, and the two con-

versed alone with only their interpreters . . . What was


our security agents immediately or we are headed for

a sticky wicket indeed!"

But neither Mr . Churchill nor Mr. Truman caught



the dreadful significance of Stalin's indifference . (They

weren't even suspicious when Stalin arrived at Potsdam

a day late. The atomic bomb was tested at Alamogordo

July 16th, the same day the Conference was to have

begun. Did Stalin wait with his alleged "heart at-

tack" until he had learned if the test in New Mexico

was a success?) Had Churchill and Truman, on the

contrary, started an intensive investigation they would

have discovered not only Klaus Fuchs and the Rosen-

bergs, but perhaps it would have brought about the

removal of J . Robert Oppenheimer as a security risk


ment Board, and unofficial head of the atomic bomb

development, among others, was intent that Russia

should "share all that we have," regardless of our own

needs and those of our other allies . And at Fairbanks,



Arnold 471 writes General "Hap" Arnold, "We gave them every-

thing it was possible to give them, even turning over to

them the houses of our own officers and enlisted men

and their families . . . They never gave us anythanks . . . "

Hopkins explained to Stalin in Moscow that al-

though the Lend-Lease Act clearly stated that it ap-

plied only to materials "useful in the process of the war

Sherwood . . . The United States Government, however, had in-

896terpreted this in its broadest sense and had included

in addition to munitions of war foodstuff and other


To General Deane's dismay this proved to be true .

Although General Marshall cabled his approval of

Deane's stand, the order was immediately reversed in

a cable from Hopkins to Harriman "to attach no



strings to our aid to Russia." From then on every-

thing from aluminum, dress goods, house paint, frying

pans and lipstick went to Russia unchallenged . A care-

ful reading of the stories of World War II leaves no

doubt that Hopkins wooed Russia on the allegedground that Soviet "favor" must be assured for the

future, regardless of the cost in goods, prestige, or our

own security .

It was Major Jordan's job to expedite Lend-Lease

going to Russia from Alaska . This necessitated his

Jordan


relating to the Aberdeen Proving Grounds, and folders

with naval shipping intelligence . He writes :

I distinctly remember five or six State Department folders,



77-81

bound with stout rubber bands . Clipped to each was a tab.

The first read: "From Sayre." I took down the words be-cause it ran through my head that someone of that name had

recently been High Commissioner to the Philippines.

Then I copied the legend: "From Hiss." I had neverheard of Alger Hiss . . . A suitcase opened midway in the

search appeared to contain nothing but engineering and

scientific treatises . They bristled with formulae, calculations

and professional jargon. I was about to close the case and

pass on when my eye was caught by a specimen of station-

ery such as I had never before seen.


excerpt ran thus : "-had a hell of a time getting these away Jordan 79from Groves ." (Jordan didn't know if the name was "Oscar"

or "Carrie . " )



The name "Groves," Jordan explains, referred toMajor General Leslie R. Groves, commander of the

Manhattan Engineering District, later called the Man-

hattan Project. The Major rightly points out that Gen-

eral Groves was one of the few Washington high of-

ficials who thoroughly disliked the Russians .

Jordan continues :

. . . The first thing I had done, on finding the White House

note, was to flip over the page to look for a signature. I

penciled it on my envelope as "H.H." . . . It was to Jordan 8o


Although all of this was "Greek" to him, the Maj

felt it was of great importance to our war machine. T

awful realization came over him that what he h

found in the few "diplomatic" suitcases he had open



was only a drop in the bucket . Every plane leaving f

the U.S . S .R. was literally loaded with such informatio

Jordan was a simple American businessman who h

no ideas of politics, spies and subversion, and h

naively thought someone ought to stop Harry Hopki

from giving maps of our scientific plants and our sci

entific secrets to the Russians . In January 1944made a trip to Washington to report his unusual a

alarming findings . In the Capital he met with a stran

and formidable reception) The juggernaut of con


set out once again for Washington and Goliath . Heselected the Army Counter-Intelligence as one agency

which might listen . This time he struck pay dirt . They Jordan 194



made an intensive investigation of his charges, and

presented a report dated March 28, 1944 . The report

strongly recommended further investigation and that

the State Department be contacted in order that "cor-

rective measures be taken . "

Jordan writes that "When the report and indorse-

ment arrived at the State Department, it was neces- Jordan 195-6

sary to make at least a show of activity . The matter

was assigned to Charles E . Bohlen . . ." Bohlen

handled the matter in a correct if not enthusiastic man-

ner. He called a proper meeting of the chiefs of all in-


The bloodcurdling debut of the atom bomb onJapanese cities will be a subject for heated discussions

for a long time to come . President Truman's decision

had been based on reports and recommendations from



the scientists and the joint Chiefs of Staff . The resolve

could not have been his alone .

Those who defend the confirmation of the Yalta

agreements at Potsdam explain that the A bomb had

not been tested by dropping it from a plane and they

didn't know if it would be a dud or not . The scientists,

however, apparently were convinced it was a surething. Mr. Byrnes wrote that on July 1, 1945, just

Byrnes 261 before Truman went to Potsdam, " . . . the Interim

Committee unanimously recommended to the Presi-


sion with the Interim Committee it was " . . . feared Byrnes 26!

that, if the Japanese were told that the bomb would be

used on a given locality, they might bring our boys

who were prisoners of war to that area . "



Was there no one present to point out that for some

time the Americans had been dropping leaflets over

Japan warning them which cities were to be attacked

before devastating those cities with "conventional"bombs? If the Japanese wanted to bring our prisoners

to those cities, there is no doubt they would have .

According to Mr. Byrnes another excuse for notgiving a warning of the atom bomb was because at

Alamogordo the test was on the ground and that

". . . would not be conclusive proof that the bomb Byrnes 26!

Daniels 281


to the President's question-"how many American

casualties a landing on the Tokyo plain would in-

volve?" The General's reply, according to Mr. Truman,

was "It would take a million men for the landing and a



Leahy 441

million to hold it and that he thought such a landing

would involve half a million casualties . "

Mr. Truman told Mr. Daniels that "all at the con-ference urged using it." But let us see how history

books have recorded the opinions of some of Mr.

Truman's advisers. Admiral Leahy wrote :

It is my opinion that the use of this barbarous weapon

at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was of no material assistance in

our war against Japan. The Japanese were already de-. . .


troops would be killed in invading Japan, and in this he was

entirely correct; but King felt, as he had pointed out many

times, that the dilemma was an unnecessary one . . . TheArmy, however, with its underestimation of sea power, had



insisted upon a direct invasion and an occupational con-

quest of Japan proper. King still believes this was wrong.

General Eisenhower is reported to have been un-

enthusiastic about the bomb in Alden Hatch's book,

"General Ike." Hatch wrote that "Eisenhower begged Hatch 274

the Secretary (Stimson) to consider the consequences

carefully. "

General "Hap" Arnold, Chief of the Air Force, had

little to say about . the decision . He cautiously wrote


conditional surrender which did not specify its mean-

ing. A few days later, and notwithstanding Washing-

ton's knowledge of these talks in Moscow, the first

atom bomb was dropped on August 5th. With the



"wrath of the gods" raining obliteration on a dev-

astated Nippon, a desperate Sato again requested

an interview with Molotov. The answer was to beanother crushing blow . It was at this meeting, August

8, 1945, that Molotov announced Russia's declaration

of war against Japan effective the next day . The

Russians moved a few hours later .

The Soviets never did consider common courtes

as a part of their agenda . Although Stalin had tol

Hopkins in May that Russia would be at war with


Emperor once again brought delay because of the

whim of Secretary Byrnes . "Admiral Leahy urged

that the Japanese offer be accepted promptly," reports

Mr. Byrnes, but "I told the President I would likeByrnes 209



a little time to think about a reply to the message .

'I do not see why we should retreat from our demand

for unconditional surrender' I said ." And so the debate

over the Emperor went on for two days more .

The future Governor of South Carolina went off to

his private office to mull over his reply and to solicit

the help of his then trusted aide, Ben Cohen, whose

mind he believed to be "one of the best." Cohen,Counselor of the State Department, was one of the

so-called brilliant young lawyers brought to Washing-


that he thought he could be of some help. Byrne

rather grudgingly invited him in and also allowe

Grew to call in James Dunn, Eugene Dooman andJoseph Ballantine. When the draft was handed to th



newcomers for their perusals, they took exception to

the stipulation that the Emperor was to sign th

surrender terms. Mr. Grew said he was certain thathe British would object . Their exceptions were over

ruled by Byrnes and Cohen but, when the British ha

looked over the draft, they demanded that this stipula

tion be deleted and it was .

The American reply arrived in Tokyo August 13th

This, finally, was the end of the war-at leasofficially. Looking at official dates, the Soviets woul


ready to offer up her war leaders as hara-kiri victims and

retreat to her 1931 boundaries as conditions of peace, even

before the first atomic bomb fell and the Soviet Union en-

tered the Pacific war .



And so it was "the beginning of a new chapter"

as the history of the last ten years has proven . Since

that time eleven small nations who put their hopes in

the Atlantic Charter and their big brother the United

States, have been gobbled up in part or in whole by

Russia. The remaining free countries are gradually

turning towards the expedient : the exchange of free-

dom for "peaceful coexistence" and trade with Soviet

Russia. And it was Japan, we know, whose overtures

Truman 419


lished in 1956, added one of the recommendations

of the Interim Committee which is strangely similar to

my friend's conclusion. Truman wrote, "It was their

(the Interim Committee) conclusion that no technical



demonstration they might propose, such as over a

deserted island, would be likely to bring the war to

an end . It had to be used against an enemy target . "

(Emphasis mine.) An "enemy target," of course, isthe same as a "living city . "

Who were some of those who protested the use of

the bomb in June of 1945? The Metallurgical Labo-

ratory in Chicago appointed a seven man "Committee

on Social and Political Implications" for the purpose

of studying the proposed use of the new weapon. And


mittee in his book, nor for that matter do Byrnes,Forrestal or Leahy, or Truman. Yet, how could suchan important report and petition escape attention?

Apparently someone must have read the report



because the recommendation that the bomb be demon-

strated before the United Nations and an ultimatum to

Japan be made was presented for consideration inthe conferences in Washington. At this time Mr .

Byrnes warned that, if the demonstration proved to be

a "dud," it would damage our effort to bring the war Byrnes 261

to an end, while Henry Stimson had been apparently

sold on the idea of speed because he said "We hadno bombs to waste . It was vital that a sufficienteffect be quickly obtained with the few we had

. "Harper's Feb .


self, and him alone ; and that the order was sent from

aboard the Augusta which was taking the President

home from Potsdam. This would have been about

August 2 or 3 . One of the authors of the Air Force



Army AirForce in WW

I I , vol 5

i n s e rt , 9 1 2 - 3

book, Professor James Lea Cate, wrote to the former

President in 1953, pointing out that his statements

did not jibe with the Handy order . It would seem that

Harry Truman didn't catch the significance or the

facts as stated in the professor's letter . On January

12, 1953, he replied that-

"In your letter, you raise the fact that the directive to

General Spaatz to prepare for delivering the bomb is dated

July twenty-fifth. It was, of course, necessary to set the


merely surplus baggage . No records have been found

that it was ever sent . It didn't need to be 1

Although it was only two years (or more likely less)

between the time Mr . Truman had his correspondence



with Professor Cate and the writing of "Year of Deci-

sions," he seemed to have forgotten all about the

letters when he came to his chapter on the atomic

bomb. Not only that, but the story is different . The

former President inserted General Handy's orderto General Spaatz (which was not a photostat) and

it carries the dateline of "24 July 1945 . " The photostat

carries the dateline of July 25th . But, the story

Harry Truman tells would lead one to believe that

the order to Spaatz was the ONLY one he gave . He

Truman 420

421


a. Earliest date, r July 1 945

b. Date beyond which the war is unlikely to con-

tinue-31 December 1945"

This was a procedure which commanding generals



have been following for an eternity. Why was it not

done in regard to the war against Japan? The sur-

render time for Japan was first set at the second

Quebec Conference in 1944 on the premise that Russia

would enter the war 3 months after the fall of Ger-

many; and Japan would surrender 18 months afterthat event. This was discussed at Yalta in February

1945 and reaffirmed at Potsdam in the following July l

Let us look at the chronology

The Atomic Bomb and Surrender i85

That everything was delayed until after Potsdamdoes seem very strange .

Now we have noted that Secretary Byrnes' excuse

for not warning Japan of the A bomb was because "it



was a real possibility" it might be a dud . But that

this assumption was in error can be found in thehearings which were provoked by General MacArthur's

recall from Japan in 195 1 .

A member of the committee, Senator Bourke B .

Hickenlooper, Republican from Iowa, asked permission

to place in the record two telegrams "with regard to

the question of information on the possibility or the

probabilities of the success of the atomic bomb project

prior to the Yalta Conference ." The first telegram MacA 4-3x19


representing the Manhattan Project, and who had been

sent to Malta, just before the Yalta Conference, to

deliver papers to Secretary of State Stettinius . These

papers were to inform the Secretary of the probable



MacA 3-1985

success of the atomic bomb . Colonel Considine also

sent an affirmative telegram to the Senator .

Prior to this testimony, the then Secretary of State,

Dean Acheson, who had been Assistant Secretary at

the time of Yalta, was a witness . Senator AlexanderWiley, Republican from Wisconsin, interrogated him :

Senator Wiley . What was the significance of the bomb not

having been dropped at the time we negotiated at Yalta?

Mr. Acheson . Well, I pointed out in my statement, Senator,

that when we were discussing the question of bringing the


tary of War under Taft and Secretary of State under

Hoover. He had lived in a world already passed, and,coming from retirement again to take the position of

Secretary of War in 1941, he was not attuned to the

"New Deal Era." His appointment had been one of



political strategy-as a Republican, he was the symbol

of nonpartisanship in the fight against fascism . Andas devoted and loyal as he was to the cause, the old

gentleman was never fully accepted by the WhiteHouse elite corps . President Roosevelt "relegated him

to a distinctly subordinated role" in the high strategy Current 213

conferences, and "after Pearl Harbor he was included

in few ." Nearly all his communications to the White

House were made through "go-betweens." His memoirs


would be in a very embarrassing position . . ." Hedid get one of his rare interviews with Roosevelt a

day or so later, but it bore no results .

The "work plan" as set up for Mr . Stimson, seems

to have been devised to keep him busy with domestic



Stimson 342

affairs, and even then his four advisers took most

of those sticky problems from off his weary shoulders .

His chief advisers, in addition to "the Army," were

four in number : Robert Patterson, Undersecretary of

War; Robert A. Lovett, Assistant Secretary for Air ;

Harvey H. Bundy who "became the Secretary's

personal agent in dealing with scientists and educa-

tors," and John J . McCloy, Assistant Secretary, who

later became one of President Eisenhower's unofficial


pressed himself even more clearly and more pointedly

than he did in his first memo .

i . With each international conference that passes and, in Stimson 639-

fact, with each month that passes between conferences, it 40



becomes clearer that the great basic problem of the future

is the stability of the relations of the Western democracies

with Russia .

2 . With each such time that passes it also becomes clear

that that problem arises out of the fundamental differences

between a nation of free thought, free speech, free elections,

in fact a really free people (and), a nation which is not

basically free but which is systematically controlled from

above by secret police and in which free speech is not per-

mitted .

Igo The Enemy at His Back

with Russia we should consider carefully whether we can do

so safely under any system of control until Russia puts into

effective action the proposed constitution which I have men-

tioned . . . .



And now we come to the most remarkable part of

the story . No paraphrasing of mine could do justice to

Mr. Bundy's authorship. But it is here we see themethod of persuasion :

Stimson 641 "Returning from Potsdam, Stimson found himself

nearing the limits of his strength, and after two weeks

made crowded by the atomic attacks and their an-

nouncement followed by the surrender negotiations,

he retreated from Washington for three weeks of rest


petition-Stimson modified his earlier opinion and on

September i i he sent to the President a memorandum

urging immediate and direct negotiations with the

Russians looking toward a `covenant' for the control

of the atom . "



And indeed, Mr. Stimson did more than "modify"

his previous memo to the President for he completely

reversed himself. The following excerpt from his

memorandum to Truman dated i i September 1945

is the kernel of the nut :

. . . unless the Soviets are voluntarily invited into the part-

nership upon a basis of co-operation and trust, we are going

to maintain the Anglo-Saxon bloc over against the Soviet

in the possession of this weapon . Such a condition will al-

Stimson 643


p. 5 the Daily Worker an article written by William Z .

Foster, who had been recently made head of the Com-

munist Party in the United States . You can be sure

that whatever Foster wrote then and continues to write

now is considered by the comrades as the true line



coming from Moscow .

Atomic power, as scientists and engineers confidently

inform us, is capable not only of unparalleled destruction in

war, but also of far reaching consequences in industry . . .

I f . . . the new atomic power which is a product of inter-

national science, is to be directed to constructive uses, the

general military control o f it will have to be vested in the

Security Council of the United Nations . . . ( Emphasis

mine . )

The Atomic Bomb and Surrender193

of the American people ." In his "Diaries" we find the

report of a Cabinet meeting on September 21, 1 945,

ten days after Mr . Stimson's last memo to the Presi-

dent . Walter Millis who edited the Forrestal Diaries

after Forrestal's death wrote that "The idea of a sole



trusteeship (by the United States) (if that was what F o r r e s t a l 9 6

Forrestal had in mind) seems to have got no support,

but the idea of submitting the matter for adjustment

under the machinery of the United Nations, became

basic to subsequent American policy . " (Emphasismine. ) Forrestal ios

At another meeting held on Oct . 16, 1945, Secretary

Byrnes also strongly advised against giving informa-

tion to the Russians, but without results .


and ominously similar to the words of William Z

Foster written only three months before. Here wa

the kernel of the nut : " . . . at the earliest practicabl

date a Commission should be set up under the Unite

Nations Organization to prepare recommendation

Decade of

American

Foreign

Policy 1077



for submission to the Organization ." The Commissio

was set up Jan. 24, 1946 .

But there was more than just "control" of the ato

bomb and atomic energy. The next step was to trto persuade the United States to destroy every means

for making the bomb and also the bombs we alread

had! Six months after Foster's manifesto, Feb . 13

1946, Dr. Philip Jessup, then professor at Columbi

University, and later ambassador at large, and Dr


New York Times is punctuated by the fact that four

months later, on June 19, 1946, Andrei A. Gromyko,USSR Representative to the Atomic Energy Com-

mission of the United Nations, made a proposal for a

convention which is strangely similar . He said, "The



object of such a convention should be the prohibition

of the production and employment of atomic weapons,

the destruction of existing stocks of atomic weapons Decade of

and the condemnation of all activities undertaken in AmericanForeign

violation of this convention . " Policy 1088

The whole subject of atomic control is still pending,

but where did Jessup and Rabi get their bright idea

which stony-faced Gromyko liked so much?

Former Senator Claude Pepper, Democrat from 7

Florida, thought it was a good idea too, but he went


In major policies, you will notice, the Communists

always play "heads I win, tails you lose ." And so it

was in this case . The Communists didn't get everything

at once-the complete sell-out was stalled on the

question of inspection, as it still is in 1956 . But surely



these long discussions produced much information for

them. You can't talk about how to share your recipefor baking a cake without also sharing some of your

"trade secrets" I Furthermore, we know the Russianshad a great deal of information in 1945 . All they

needed was time, and while they kept us talking and

hoping, our program was slowing down .

The manifesto of William Z . Foster of August 13,

1945 had been successfully carried out. And theCommunists were assured of further success when in


inspiration to say, "Here youl-the United States is

the country that invented the atomic bomb . Where dowe come in on regional centers?"

On March 15, 1954, an Associated Press dispatchinformed us :



The United States plans soon to propose to Russia spe-

cific measures for organizing a world pool of atomic energy

for peaceful purposes . United States officials have consulted

with their British and French colleagues, it was reported

Sunday, and have decided to carry forward negotiations for

Soviet acceptance of President Eisenhower's atomic pool

project a while longer in secret, two-nation talks.

D C . Times

Herald

And this brings up another entry in Forrestal's


shima was held up to the world as a victim of American

brutality . The August 4, 1955 issue of Moscow's New

Times, carried a lead article called "The Spirit of

Geneva" advocating sweetness and light . However, the

last article in the magazine was entitled "Hiroshima"



in which the Communist author points his finger and

says, " . . . the atomic blow at the densely populated

peaceful city was totally unwarranted . "

Chapter VIII

THE MACARTHUR HEARINGS



The MacArthur hearings of 19p,

and the testimony of General MacArthur,

General Marshall,

Secretary Acheson,

Admiral Badger,

General Wedemeyer,

General O'Donnell,

and General Hurley .


win, an unprecedented policy in American fighting his-

tory .

Speeches were made on the Senate floor delving into

the immediate history of Korea, and a number ofpeople pointed out the significance of Dean Acheson's



speech before the Washington National Press Club in

February of 195o-four months before the start of the

war. As Secretary of State, Mr. Acheson told the mem-bers of the press (and thus Russia as well), that our

line of defense in the Pacific would not include Korea .

His statement was as good as a "go ahead" signal to

the Communists-an assurance that if North Koreainvaded South Korea no interference would come from

the United States .

The MacArthur Hearings 201

plain that what occurred at Yalta was the first in a

succession of steps, the omitting of any one of which

could have prevented the Korean debacle .

The dismissal of General MacArthur brought thematter to a head, and the result became the well-known



"MacArthur hearings ." The investigation by the Joint

Armed Services and Foreign Relations committees was

an "executive" or secret hearing which prevented the

press from direct reporting . And hereby hangs a little

stub tale l The decision was taken by the committee

members themselves, the majority of Democrats car-

rying the vote . The Republican senators felt that the

hearings should be completely open to the public and

proceeded to bring the issue to the floor of the Senate


When the Republican Administration came in in1 953,

those Republican members of Congress who had for

the past twenty years been fearless and persistent in

exposing wrong doing in government, were suddenlyand strangely silent. Former Secretary of State Dean

Acheson frankly told my husband that President Tru-



man was afraid to accept the Korean armistice terms

of the Reds for fear of impeachment talk . But the new

Republican President was able to accept those sameterms without fear of opposition from members of

Congress .

Senators in both parties vote to protect their ad-

ministration from embarrassment. I do not mean thatit is quite as simple as that, because politics in the

"dirty" sense of the word enters into it too


senators vastly important and pertinent questions . At

the same time, China experts all over the country sent

questions to the committee . And all the while, theRepublicans were boasting that they were going to put

Acheson and Marshall on the spot . Nothing of the sort



happened, and few of the volunteered questions were

used. Here was the golden time to ask questions of

people intimately acquainted with recent events while

they were still clear in their minds . But General Mac-

Arthur was never questioned about the Pacific War,

and General Marshall and Secretary Acheson were

challenged with only delicate respect .

Those who had hoped that the mysteries of the

Korean and Pacific wars would be cleared. up suffered


rogator attempted to put words in the mouths of the

witnesses in order to make his point . And the testimony

shows in bold relief the personal character of the wit-

nesses . Some gave straightforward answers, while

others were masters of evasion . Some clearly placed the

interest of their country first, even ahead of their per-



sonal and professional fortunes .

An attempt was made by some members of the com-mittee to discover who was responsible for the Yalta

agreements on China . Senator William F . Knowland,

Republican from California, asked General Marshall,

the only witness who had been present at Yalta, if,

while at the Conference he had been familiar with the

provisions regarding Manchuria . The General's answer


Another witness before the committee, General

Patrick Hurley, who was ambassador to China in 1945,

ripped into Secretary Acheson, and tore apart theagreements concerning Japan and China . He told the

committee that for the first time in American history



our nation had expressed fear of another nation . He

began by quoting from Secretary Acheson's "Letter of

Transmittal" to the President dated July 20 , 1949 . I t

was the foreword" to the State Department's infa-

mous White Paper on China .

General Hurley . (On) July 20 , 1949, Secretary MacA 4-x840

Acheson said :

AT YALTA, MARSHAL STALIN NOT ONLY


China, were given away in secret because our State De-

partment was convinced that Russia would not keep her

commitments and was in a position to seize all the properties

that we gave her in secret.



MacA 4-2839 . . . America was in a position at Yalta to speak the only

language the Communists understand, the language ofpower. The President of the United States at Yalta was incommand of the greatest land, Navy and Air Force everassembled on earth . . .

When a "hot" subject is before a Congressional hear-

ing, the questioning progresses much like a football

game. The "hot pigskin" in this case was passed, inter-


Manchuria capable of replacing much of this material as

it was used up?

Secretary Acheson . There were arsenals in Manchuria .

Secretary Acheson does not say that the arsenals

were practically out of commission because they lacked

materials for manufacture .



Senator Morse . As a result of the Yalta agreement were

not the Chinese deprived of the use of the two best ports

in Manchuria, Port Arthur, and Dairen?

Secretary Acheson . I don't think so, Senator.

Senator Morse now put a question to the Secretary

which would elicit a more definite answer-he has

made his speech and wants to get the pigskin clearly

over the goal posts :


Senator Morse continues to question Mr. Acheson,

and although the Secretary is essentially a diplomat

and not a military man, the Senator asks him questions

concerning military strategy . And perhaps that is cor-

rect, because some people say Acheson was in charge



MacA 3-1882

of the Korean War, and would have known muchabout the military problems in World War II .

Senator Morse. Now, in regard to the questioning as to

why the surrender of the Japanese troops in Manchuriawas not either to the Generalissimo or to the United State

forces, am I correct in my understanding that the very

physical aspects of the problem would have made that im

possible, first, because as far as Nationalist troops wer

concerned, they were down in the southwest of Asia


He wrote that "Less than five hundred airborne in- Kenney

fantry were on the ground when MacArthur and all his 18o-1

top generals of the South West Pacific landed. . ."

The Generals, he continues, were in the habit of carry-

ing pistols in their shoulder holsters . But before the

group left, MacArthur suggested that this time they



leave them behind. "If the Japs didn't really mean

what they had said about surrendering, those pistols

wouldn't do us much g9od . . ." With good reason-there were about fifteen, fully armed divisions within

a few miles of MacArthur and his "five hundred . "

"A number of Japs told me afterwards," General

Kenney went on, "that' the sight of all those generals

and officers of MacArthur's staff walking around un-

210 The Enemyat His Back

war to an early termination, we anticipated a very powerf

influence from the Kwantung Army (Japanese Army)

Manchuria and probably the portions that were in Kore

. . . it was the opinion of the Chiefs of Staff that it w

highly important that the Soviets carry out the campai

against Manchuria and against Korea .



Senator Knowland . Were the Chiefs unanimous in thaviewpoint?

General Marshall . I think they were unanimous. We caascertain that, but I am quite certain they were . . .

Both Acheson and Marshall kept talking about th

powerful Kwantung Army, yet intelligence makes i

clear that Marshall, at least, knew that this army ha

been greatly reduced .


back up the surrender with enforcement. Otherwise, i t

would have been an empty gesture, and the only forces

you had there to enforce the surrender were the Russian

forces.

General Wedemeyer. No, s i r . That is the part I did disagree

with you about because of my personal experience there,



Senator .

Senator Morse . That is what I wanted to clear up.

General Wedemeyer. The Japanese were completely co-operative as soon as they got their order to lay down their

arms. We had no trouble with them whatsoever, sir . It

wasn't necessary-one person could go and take chargeof thousands of them. There was no resistance whatsoever;

they became docile and cooperative.

General Wedemeyer's testimony clearly agrees with


perfectly capable of making arrangements to receive

the surrender of enemy troops anywheie in the Thea-

ter . We did accept the surrender of the Japanese in the

central part of China at Nanking although we were

located 8oo miles to the west in Chungking, the war-

time capital. Also we sent appropriate representatives



to receive the surrender in southeast China, more than

1,500 miles from Chungking . Actually the British sent

representatives from Ceylon and India, to receive the

surrender of the Japanese in Hongkong . "

I also asked General Wedemeyer to give his views on

the testimony of Secretary Acheson when he statedthat there were "several hundred thousand heavily

armed, very effective Japanese troops" in Manchuria


Japan at that time? Was there? We had command of the

sea .

Secretary Acheson . The general military situation at the

time of Yalta was that in Germany the Rhine had not yet



been crossed, and it was not crossed until some time in

March 1 945 .

In the Pacific, American troops had entered Manila on

the first day of the conference; the battles of Iwo Jima

and Okinawa still lay ahead; information as to the Japanese

Army showed an army of approximately 5 million .

Senator Wiley . We had command of the sea then, didn't we?

Secretary Acheson . The estimates were that these operations

would involve an American force of approximately 5 million


we must also believe that the final conquest of a broken

and beaten Japan would cost more in American casualties

than all the battles of the Pacific, all the battles of the

islands, all the battles of Burma and China, all the battles

of the Atlantic, all the battles of Africa, all the battles of

the Mediterranean, all the battles of Italy, all the battles



of England, all the battles of France, all the battles of

Holland, all the battles of Belgium, and all the battles of

Germany. America had less than i,ooo,ooo casualties in

all those battles .

(Note: The grand total of World War II casualties

according to the World Almanac was 1,078,674 .)

Vice Admiral Oscar Charles Badger, who had an a s -

signment in the Pacific during those days, was inter-


over with me at that time, and I thought . . . that that

Muroran thing was all the evidence that we needed that

they were right flat on their backs.

Major General Emmett O'Donnell, Jr. was ques-tioned by Sen. Bourke Hickenlooper concerning the



necessity for a land invasion of Japan scheduled for

November 1 , 1945

General O'Donnell . . . . once we were in the Marianas MacA 4-3111

(Saipan, July 1944) we were convinced it was over ; because

they were taking the most horrible pounding . . . I thought

-we all thought- I thought personally in a couple of

weeks it would be all over .


General Wedemeyer . Yes, sir ; that is true, Senator Connally,

and your military leaders must have advised the President

that it was necessary to bring the Russians in in order to

save American lives and to bring about an early victory .

The thing that disturbs me right now as an American is

the fact that the Japanese were trying so hard, as I under-

stand it, sir-you could check on this information-trying



hard to accomplish an armistice.

They wanted to use Moscow people as their intermediarie

and they couldn't get any response to their efforts to

stop the war, this before I think we dropped the atomic

weapon .

Senator Connally . And we did not know of that at thetime either, did we? We had no knowledge of it?

General Wedemeyer. Well, I think we did, sir, because we

had means of knowing what the Japanese were striving to


Secretary Acheson . . . . I do not believe that there was

any attempt by the Japanese to bring the war to an end

before the negotiations which finally led to its being brought

to an end .

There was considerable active correspondence between

Japanese in various capitals and Japanese in Tokyo as to

proposals which might be made to save for themselves



more than they were able to save at the time of thesurrender .

Earlier, Senator Knowland had asked the same questions

of General Marshall .

Senator Knowland . . . . Do you have any knowledge,directly or indirectly, that there had been preliminary

offers of surrender from Japan?

General Marshall. I

have no recollection of any that were

MacA z-561


signed by an interesting group of Republican senators

in view of more recent history . They were :

Styles Bridges of New Hampshire

Bourke B. Hickenlooper of IowaHarry P. Cain of Washington

William F. Knowland of California



H Alexander Smith of New Jersey

Alexander Wiley of Wisconsin

Ralph E. Flanders of Vermont

Owen Brewster of Maine

The Republicans who did not sign the report but

filed separate ones of their own were as follows :


the Korean War and had dismissed their commanderin 1951, this strange history continued . We then settled

down for two years of truce talks, while the Redsfeverishly built up their badly depleted forces and their

defenses on the China mainland .

On April 16, 1953, our new President, Dwight



Eisenhower, assured the American people that " . . .

an armistice in Korea that merely releases aggressive

armies to attack elsewhere would be a fraud ." Yet we

signed an armistice which prepared the ground for the

fall of Indo-China and released thousands of Red

troops which now are threatening Formosa . We have"viewed with grave concern" the many instances in

which the Reds have broken the signed armistice .


"proteges" of Harry Hopkins continue to play an im-

portant role in our destinies . Sitting by the side of

President Eisenhower as his adviser and interpreter at

Geneva in 1955 was a man who was "discovered" atCairo in 1943 by Harry Hopkins . For it was during

that Conference that Hopkins was so impressed with

this young career diplomat he persuaded President



Roosevelt to appoint him to a White House post . From

Sherwood then on, his "star was very much in the ascendent . "

775 This was Charles E . Bohlen .

I do not mean to imply that Charles Bohlen was the

chief and only adviser at Geneva . There were others .

One of the most important, according to the New York

Times' Arthur Krock, was Herman Phleger who Mr .

Krock describes as "one of the really strong men of


eral James H. Burns, author of the important 1942

memorandum . (See appendix.) Like Milton Eisenhower,

he has never lost his usefulness in government during

the last 20 years . An old friend of Milton, General

Burns is now retired . But his advice is still sought by

the official family of the Chief Executive .

There are many, many others of the New Dealfamily still in important positions in our government .

Whoever our President and Secretary of State may be,



now and in the future, Americans have a right to ask,

"Who are your advisers?"Until Soviet agents and their unwitting tools are re-

moved from our midst, the United States of America

can never win another war, hot or cold . Not until these

influences are removed will the American flag again

be the trusted protector of American fighting men .

To sum it all up THE ONLY ENEMY THE



APPENDIX

Memorandum for Harry Hopkins from Gen . James H . Sherwood

Burns, 1942 p a g e 642



6 . WITH REFERENCE TO OUR NEED FOR RUSSIAAS A REAL FRIEND AND CUSTOMER IN THEPOST-WAR PERIOD .

If the Allies are victorious, Russia will be one of the

three most powerful countries in the world . For the future

peace of the world, we should be real friends so that we

can help shape world events in such a way as to provide

s e c u r i t y a n d p r o s p e r i t y .

224 Appendix

way to kelp Russia by sending supplies to the limit of

shipping possibilities and by sending forces to Russia t

join with her in the fight against Germany.

* * *

(e) Send to Russia an ambassador of top rank as tonational standing, vision, ability and willingness to serv



the country first .

( f ) In general, treat Russia as one of the three foremos

powers in the world.

( g ) Establish the general policy throughout all U .S

departments and agencies that Russia must be considered a

a real friend and be treated accordingly and that personne

must be assigned to Russian contacts that are loyal to thi

concept .

* * *

Appendix 225

inheres no social values but which takes on such significance

only when it us used, is a gross misunderstanding of its

history . In the complexities of Japanese social development

the institution of the Emperor has inevitably given the

Japanese state structure a certain bias which has predis-

posed it_ to the side of reaction ! "

Before the occupation force leaves Japan, it should have



enforced the following measures: (i) Destruction of mili-

tary, naval, and air armaments . (2) Conversion of muni-

tions factories to civilian production, as far as possible;

otherwise destruction. (3) Payment of reparations to China

consisting of industrial equipment produced in Japan, with

raw materials supplied by China . (4) Establishment of

import controls to guarantee continued enforcement of steps

(2) and (3) . (5) Abolition of the army and navy, including

inter alia the conscription system. (6) Punishment of war

226 Appendix

either by government regulation or outright nationalizati

(18) Introduction of agrarian reforms.

No final peace agreement should be concluded when th

army of occupation withdraws . Relaxation of steps (3) a

(4) and (5),conclusion of a final peace agreement, an

readmission of Japan into the community of nationshould be made contingent on satisfactory progress towa



effectuation of the recommended measures, as well as ad

quate maintenance of those previously enforced.

The steps in this program are interrelated and interd

pendent. The crucial political reforms, included under step

(i3) and (14), may be safely postponed to the post

occupation period only if the provisionally establishe

democratic leadership gives promise of stability and ef

fectiveness. Otherwise, the occupation must either be pr

Appendix 997

advice concerning the immediate future of the Empire.

On 14 February 1945 Prince Konoye had such an interview page zz

with the Emperor. In advance of that, Prince Konoye pre-pared a memorandum of his views which were verballypresented to the Emperor. An English translation of thememorandum, prepared by T . Ushiba, Konoye's long-time

private secretary, is reproduced below. . .



Parts of the following translation are not literal rendi-

tions of the original Japanese but represent an accurate

summary of salient points . . . .

* * *

"I think that there is no longer any doubt about our

defeat. A defeat is, of course, a serious stain on ourhistory, but we can accept it, so long as we can maintain

our Tenno system. Public opinion in America and Britain on

228 Appendix

the Tenno system. I have now come to seriously doubt

whether the whole series of events from the ManchurianIncident to the present war have not been what they have

purposefully planned. It is a well-known fact that the

openly declared the aim of the Manchurian war was to

achieve drastic reforms in domestic affairs . A central figu

of theirs also declared that the longer the China Inciden

continues, the better, for otherwise, the intended reform



would not be accomplished . Of course, the "reform" aime

at by the military may not necessarily be a Communistrevolution, but the group of bureaucrats and civilians (bot

left and right) who are in a close collaboration with th

military are definitely intending to bring about such a

revolution . In the light of this conclusion, I now realiz

that I have, during the last ten years, come across man

events the meaning of which I did not then fully appreciate



BIBLIOGRAPHY



BIBLIOGRAPHY

Arnold, H. H . Global Mission, Harper & Brothers, New

York, 1949 .

Baldwin, HansonW, G r e a t M i s t a k es o f t h e W a r , Harper &



Brothers, New York, 1950 .

Budenz, Louis F. ,The Techniques of Communism, Henry

Regnery Company, Chicago, 1954 .

Budenz, Louis F . , The Cry Is Peace, Henry Regnery Com-

pany, Chicago, 1952 .

Byrnes, James F . , Speaking Frankly, Harper & Brothers,

New York, 1947.

Chambers, Whittaker, Witness, Random House, New York,

232 Bibliography

Kenney, General George C . , The MacArthur I Know, Duell,

Sloan and Pearce, New York, 1951 .

King, Ernest J . , Fleet Admiral King, W. W . Norton &Company, Inc., New York, 1952 .

Lattimore, Owen, Solution in Asia, Little, Brown and Com-

pany, Boston, 1945 .

Leahy, Fleet Admiral William D, I Was There, Whittlesley



House, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc ., New York,1950 .

Lea, Clark, and Henschel, Richard, Douglas MacArthur,Henry Holt and Company, New York, 1952 .

Marshall, General of the Army, George C . , Selected Speeches

and Statements, Edited by Major H. A. DeWeerd, The

Infantry Journal, Washington, 1945 .

Marshall, General of the Army, George C. , Biennial Report,

July 1943 to June 30, Infantry Journal Press,

STATE DEPARTMENT

"White Paper," United States Relations with China, with

Special Reference to the Period 1944- 1949.

Department of State Publication 3573



Far Eastern Series 30

Released August 1 949 .

"White Paper," A Decade of American Foreign Policy,Basic Documents, 1941 - 1949.

Prepared at the Request of the Senate Committee onForeign Relations by the staff of the committee and the

Department of State

May 3 to Aug. 17, 1951United States Government Printing Office, Washington

"Tydings Hearings" State Department Employee LoyaltyInvestigation

Hearings before a subcommittee of the Committee on

Foreign Relations,

United States Senate, 81st Congress, Second Session

pursuant to S. Res. 231



March 8 to June 28, 1950

2 volumesUnited States Government Printing Office, Washington

The Katyn Forest Massacre

Hearings before the Select Committee to conduct an

investigation of the facts, evidence, and circumstances

H i s t o r i c a l D i v i s i o n

Headquarters

U.S. Marine Corps, 1950

The Guadalcanal Campaign

Major John L. Zimmerman, USMCR

H i s t o r i c a l D i v i s i o n

Headquarters

U.S . Marine Corps, 1949



UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

The Campaigns of the Pacific War

USSBS (Pacific)

Naval Analysis Division

Rear Admiral, R . A . Ofstie, USN

"Pentagon Papers," The Entry of the Soviet Union into the

War Against Japan: Military Plans, z94z - 1945September 1955

Federal Broadcast Intelligence Service

Chungking 1944-5, Yenan 1945