Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Fall 2015) 41

THE IMPACT OF THE ARAB SPRING ON THE POLITICAL FUTURE OF THE

MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD IN THE MIDDLE EAST: JORDAN AS A CASE STUDY

By Abdelmahdi Alsoudi*

The events of the Arab Spring have led to new political realities in the Arab world and paved the way

for the Muslim Brotherhood to form short-lived governments in Tunisia and Egypt. Encouraged by

these developments, the Brotherhood in Jordan played a leading role in the uprising there, adopted

extreme positions, and boycotted the 2010 and 2013 parliamentary elections. The movement today is

in open confrontation with the Jordanian regime and suffers from internal division and conflict. The

disastrous outcome of the Arab Spring for Syria, Libya, and Yemen, as well as the banning of the

Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE has weakened the movement’s political

influence in the region, especially in Jordan. Its political future in Jordan now depends on

government policy and the unfolding of internal crisis within the movement. This article argues that

the Arab Spring has had a serious negative impact on the Brotherhood both in Jordan and in the

region and that serious efforts would be required to restore its previous political role and influence.

INTRODUCTION

Beginning in 2011, the Arab world faced a

wave of uprisings leading to the overthrow of

four Arab regimes, in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya,

and Yemen; and creating conflict and civil

wars in Syria, Libya, Yemen, and Iraq--with

less impact on Jordan, Morocco, the Gulf

Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, and

other Arab countries. The Arab Spring has

paved the way for some more moderate

Islamists to establish political parties, run in

and win parliamentary elections, and even

form governments in Tunisia and Egypt. It has

also led to the appearance of new radical

Islamist groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra and

the Islamic State (IS, formerly called ISIS) in

Syria, Iraq, and Libya, and Ansar Allah (the

Houthis) in Yemen.

In Jordan, however, the impact of the Arab

Spring was less dramatic, as the Jordanian

leadership took several political steps to meet

the people’s demands and used soft power to

manage and control the uprising. Yet the

Islamist movement in Jordan--inspired by the

empowerment of the Muslim Brotherhood in

Tunisia and Egypt--rejected all of the

government’s efforts, including its proposal to

participate in the political process. Instead, it

chose to boycott the 2010 and 2013

parliamentary elections. In mid-2014, the

fortunes of the Muslim Brotherhood in both

Egypt and Tunisia were reversed, with both

movements losing political power. The

Brotherhood was banned in Egypt and

declared a terrorist organization in Egypt,

Saudi Arabia, and the UAE.

The chaos and civil wars in Syria, Yemen,

and Libya; the appearance of the Islamic State

in Syria and Iraq; and the burning of the

Jordanian pilot by IS in February 2015 has

changed Jordanians’ attitudes toward the

Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist

groups. The Muslim Brothers’

uncompromising position toward political

participation, insisting on their extreme

demands of fixing the political system and

boycotting the parliamentary elections, has

created serious internal conflict among its

leadership and damaged its relationship with

the regime. The Brotherhood first witnessed

the appearance of the Zamzam Initiative and

later the establishment of the Society of

Muslim Brothers in Jordan, which was

immediately licensed by the government in

April 2015. This was in addition to rivalries

Abdelmahdi Alsoudi

42 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Fall 2015)

from other Islamic political parties and groups

such as al-Wasat Party and other Salafi and

jihadi groups. These internal and external

factors raised serious questions about the

political future of the Muslim Brotherhood.

This article’s focus is the impact of the Arab

Spring on the political future of the Jordanian

Muslim Brotherhood (JMB). It also analyzes

the extent to which the JMB’s position and

actions have weakened its support among the

Jordanian people and how this has affected

their relationship with the regime. The impact

of Arab Spring on Islamists in Jordan provides

an excellent case study to explore the future

role of Islamist politics in Jordan and beyond.

IMPORTANCE OF THE STUDY AND

OBJECTIVES

The Muslim Brotherhood’s radical stance

during the Arab Spring, especially its refusal

to all of the Jordanian government’s proposals

to participate in the political process, has

damaged its traditionally good relationship

with the regime in Jordan and created internal

conflict among the Brotherhood leadership,

which resulted in the movement’s split into

two rival groups--the old Muslim Brotherhood

and the Society of Muslim Brothers in Jordan.

The government’s proposal was interpreted by

the old Muslim Brotherhood as an attempt to

weaken the Brotherhood’s political and

societal role. Today, it faces serious

challenges not only to its legal existence but

also to its political future. This article thus

deals with the very important issue of Arab

Spring’s impact on the political future of the

Muslim Brothers, which has far-reaching

consequences not only for the security and

stability of Jordan but also for the entire

region. The article addresses the dynamics of

the Arab Spring and its impact on the Middle

East, the Jordanian regime’s responses to the

Arab Spring; how the Arab Spring has

affected the Muslim Brotherhood; the

relationship between the regime and Muslim

Brotherhood; and the impact of the Arab

Spring on the Muslim Brotherhood’s political

future in Jordan.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND

DESIGN

This article aims to analyze the impact of

Arab spring on the political future of the

Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan and the region.

It does so through a combination of

comparative and qualitative research methods,

with Jordan as a case study. It draws on a

range of primary and secondary sources,

including declarations, interviews, documents,

reports, books, and articles about the impact of

Arab Spring on the Muslim Brothers from

2011 to 2015. Numerous documents,

decisions, laws, and statements issued by the

governments of the region and the Muslim

Brotherhood were analyzed. In order to

understand the different outcomes and impact

of the Arab Spring on the Muslim

Brotherhood in Jordan and the region, the

article compared the experiences of the

Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan and other Arab

countries. It used eight variables to examine

their effects on the success or failure of the

uprisings in both Jordan and Egypt. These are:

1. Elite unity; 2. Scale of protest; 3. Use of

force; 4. Occupation of public places; 5.

Responses to uprising demands; 6. Army

intervention; 7. Population unity; 8. Uprising

unity. This article assumes that the presence of

these variables indicates success while their

absence indicates the regime’s failure in

handling the uprising. With regards to the first

variable, elite unity, if the elite broke away

from the regime this was measured as negative

while the elite’s unity and support for the

regime was measured as positive. The scale of

protest, the second variable, was measured by

considering massive protests as positive and

smaller-scale protests as negative. With the

third variable, use of force, if force was used

this was regarded negative and no force was

considered positive. Occupation of public

places, the fourth variable, was positive if

occupation of a public place occurred and

negative if this did not happen. The fifth

variable, regime responses to the uprising

demands, was viewed as positive if the regime

met some of the protesters’ demands and

negative if it did not. Army intervention, the

The Impact of the Arab Spring on the Political Future of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Middle East

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Fall 2015) 43

sixth variable, was considered positive if the

army refused to intervene and negative if it did

intervene. The seventh variable, population

unity, was positive if the people fully

supported the uprising whereas division

among the people or their lack of support was

considered negative. The eighth and final

variable, uprising unity, was positive if unity

existed and negative if there was division.

Review of Literature

There have been many social movements

throughout history that have dramatically

changed societies, such as the revolutions in

Russia, France, the United States, China,

Europe, South America, and the Middle East.

They varied widely in their impact and

ideologies, with some bringing changes to the

socioeconomic and political structures and

others working to reform the existing

sociopolitical system. Despite the many

differences among social movements,

sociologists have identified many important

similarities with regard to their causes and

outcomes.1

Sociologists and experts on social

movements’ have introduced several theories

to explain the causes and dynamics of social

movements, among them the Resource

Mobilization Theory, which seeks to explain

the emergence of social movements through

the availability of resources, such as

knowledge, money, media, solidarity, and

internal and external support. The theory

argues that social movements develop when

individuals with grievances are able to

mobilize sufficient resources to take action. It

assumes a link between the availability of

resources and the success or failure of a social

movement.2

However, the resource theory was later

replaced by the Political Process Theory,

which emphasizes the role of political

opportunities, mobilizing structures, and

framing processes, along with protest cycles.

Charles Tilly asserts that the interaction

between interests, organization, and

opportunity, explains the level of mobilization

and collective action. He argues that social

movements are rational attempts by

disadvantaged people to mobilize collective

political power to achieve their common goal

or interest.3

Doug McAdam argues that in

order for individuals to participate in a

movement, they must feel the current political

system lacks legitimacy and that their

participation could bring about meaningful

change in the society.4 This is very useful in

analyzing the Arab Spring, as the success of

the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt encouraged

the formation of similar movements

throughout the Arab World. The contentious

politics theory--which was developed during

the 1990s and the beginning of the twenty-first

century by Sidney Tarrow, Charles Tilly, and

Doug McAdam--deals with the use of revolt,

demonstrations, and even revolution to

express grievances or to change government

policy.5

However, Fawaz Gerges used the

contentious politics theory to analyze the

complexities of the Arab uprisings without

neglecting the connections between the people

and other structural factors.6 The four-stage

social movement theory argues that social

movements go through four stages of

development: emergence, coalescence,

bureaucratization, and decline.7

This theory

does not, however, apply to the Arab

uprisings, as they have erupted and declined in

a very short period of time.

The other relevant theory is the Marxist

theory of class relations, which argues that

social movements grow out of basic social and

economic relations, people’s participation in

social movements is a rational activity, and

“revolutions are connected to the larger

society.”8However, because of its main focus

on class conflict, it offers limited explanatory

power in traditional and classless societies like

Arab societies, where other political and

religious factors play a significant role.

The Social Movement Theory was used

recently by Sean Lynch to compare successful

and unsuccessful Arab uprisings by using

seven variables.9 He examined and compared

two successful uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia

and three unsuccessful uprisings in Jordan,

Morocco, and Bahrain, where success was

defined as the overthrow of the previous

Abdelmahdi Alsoudi

44 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Fall 2015)

regime. He concluded that the three important

variables to the success or failure of these

uprisings were elite unity, organizational

diffusion, and the level of democratization

achieved in the country prior to the uprising.

He concluded that the uprisings in Tunisia and

Egypt were successful as they received six and

seven variables out of seven while the

uprisings in Jordan, Morocco and Bahrain

were unsuccessful because they received less

than four variables.10

This study, however, is framed on both the

theory of social movement and the theory of

political Islam, as the latter is more applicable

to the Arab uprising, especially its political

and religious dimensions. The role of political

Islam was and still is a central concern for

many Arab as well as foreign academics and

politicians. One of the main questions that

have occupied political sociologists,

politicians, and political scientists is whether

Islam is a peaceful or evil religion and more

importantly whether Islam is compatible with

democracy or not. Indeed, this subject has

become increasingly significant in the

political, social, and security realms among

many Arab and Western scholars and

influenced the agenda of Islamic movement

even before the Arab Spring.11

Analyses of

this issue are sometimes marked by prejudice

and misunderstanding, as for many Western

analysts political Islam is not combatable with

democracy. They argue that political Islam is

not only against democracy but also prevents

many Muslim countries from moving toward

modernization and democracy.12

Huntington claimed that the traditional

conflict between the old ideologies was

replaced by conflict between civilizations. He

especially singled out Islam to be the major

source of future conflict with Western

civilization.13

The second view argues that

political Islam is not against democratic

principles; rather the ideologies of moderate

political Islamists are compatible with the

main principles of Western democracy, and

Islam calls for Shura--justice and respect for

other religions.14

Some have argued that it is

too simplistic to say that Islam is against

democracy or intolerant towards others and

have considered such views as far from the

truth.15

Others argue that Islamists’ calls for

democracy are not genuine, but they do so

because they have learned that political

participation is the easiest way to gain political

power.16

As for the relationship between political

Islam and democracy, Islamic rule was not

among protesters’ main demands. Indeed, the

uprisings began with no political leadership,

religious motivation, or left-right ideology;

and for the first time, the protests and rallies

were directed against the undemocratic

governments and their failed socioeconomic

and political policies. The majority of

protesters were not Islamists; rather they were

from all walks of life--youth, adults, men,

women, Muslims, Christians, secular, and

religious--and demanded freedom, dignity,

and improved living conditions, later calling

for political reform and the overthrow of the

autocratic rulers. As for the causes of the Arab

Spring, many factors played a significant role

in the uprising and its spread to other

countries, including inequality, poverty,

unemployment, unjust distribution of wealth,

corruption, and repression.17

Democracy and political reform were

among protester demands, but were not major

factors behind the uprising; Arab societies

remain traditional and adhere to Islamic

values, whereas democratization requires

modernization and major shifts in peoples’

social values.18

Accordingly, if such theories

were used to explain the Arab Spring, one

would expect the participants in the uprising to

be the youth and the educated--who are the

strongest supporters of democracy and are less

religious, in contrast to the illiterate and

elderly.19

Indeed, UNDP reports (2012)

confirmed such views, revealing that the

majority of participants in the uprising were

mostly young and educated.20

Literature on

social movements has also asserted the

importance of the role of NGOs, political

parties, and other organized groups in

providing coordination and organizational

capabilities for large-scale uprisings and

revolts.21

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Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Fall 2015) 45

Prior to the 2011 Arab Spring, the Middle

East was often seen from the Western

perspective as a uniquely undemocratic region

with few organized groups or civil society

activities. However, the Arab Spring has

challenged social movement theory’s classical

concepts of political opportunity, collective

action, and mobilization structures. Evidence

on the Arab uprisings show that NGOs,

professional associations, civil society

organizations, political parties, and mosques in

the Arab World played a significant role in the

uprisings.22

THE DYNAMICS OF THE ARAB

SPRING AND THE IMPACT ON THE

MIDDLE EAST

The Arab Spring started in Tunisia on

December 17, 2010, when Mohamed Bouazizi

set himself on fire in an act of protest due to

humiliation and injustice at the hands of a

local municipality official. The incident

sparked a wave of protest across Tunisia and

led to the overthrow of President Zayn al-

Abidin bin Ali. Similar unprecedented

demonstrations, rallies, and massive protests--

in terms of their massive numbers, demands,

and social composition--erupted in many other

Arab countries, including Bahrain, Yemen,

Jordan, and Syria.23

The Arab Spring was in

fact a spontaneous movement that came about

as a result of the accumulation of numerous

socioeconomic and political problems since

the early 1990s.24

Initially, protesters came out

in small numbers, calling upon their

governments to improve socioeconomic

conditions, freedom, and employment; to

respect citizen rights; and to provide dignity,

equality, human rights, and democracy.25

Initially they were without political

leadership, religious motivation, or left/right

ideology. In addition, for the first time, the

protests and rallies were directed against their

own governments and not against external

enemies such as the United States or Israel.26

Within a few months, the Arab social

uprisings had attracted huge numbers of

protesters, and two presidents were

overthrown--President bin Ali of Tunisia on

January 14, 2011, and Egyptian President

Husni Mubarak on February 11, 2011. These

dramatic developments were not expected or

even thinkable in the Arab world, which had

been ruled by autocratic regimes for decades.

Many observers expected other Arab regimes

to fall one after the other, but such this did not

materialize, and only 4 of 22 have fallen as of

the writing of this article.

The success or failure of social movements

can be explained by several different factors,

such as the support of new political actors,

elite unity, scale shift (a movement’s

geographic expansion or contraction), external

support, organizational diffusion, and the level

of democratization.27

Many Arab regimes

have adopted new measures to manage and

control the uprisings, including partially

meeting demonstrators’ demands, replacing

unpopular governments, issuing new laws, and

conducting or promising political and

economic reform.28

The response of both the

Jordanian and GCC regimes was a

combination of security and economic

measures to calm the protesters.29

The Islamic groups that initially benefited

from the Arab Spring were the moderate

Islamists, such as the Muslim Brotherhood in

Tunisia, Egypt, and Morocco.30

The Muslim

Brotherhood in Jordan, however, refused all of

the government’s efforts and proposals to

participate in the political process and instead

boycotted the two parliamentary elections that

took place in 2010 and 2013. This radical

position put them on a collision course with

the regime and sparked internal conflict

among its leadership.

In the final analysis, the Arab Spring was

not about Islam, Islamic or democratic rule;

rather, it was about improving socioeconomic

conditions, bringing about political reform,

dignity, freedom, and fighting corruption. In

the two cases in which the Muslim

Brotherhood gained power and formed

governments in Egypt and Tunisia, none of

them advocated Islamic rule. Instead, they

followed the old system of government, which

was yet again rejected by the people in both

countries. The other important feature of the

Arab uprisings was the broad solidarity among

Abdelmahdi Alsoudi

46 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Fall 2015)

the different societal components, the massive

scale of protesters, and more importantly that

the protesters had become unintimidated by

the regime’s oppression.31

However, by mid-2013, the initial success

of the uprisings and the Muslim Brotherhood’s

rise to power came to an end. New radical

Islamist groups emerged to dominate the

political and military scene in the Middle East.

The Brothers’ rule was replaced by military or

old elites in Egypt and Tunisia. The other

important impact the Arab Spring has had is

the emergence of many radical Islamist

groups, such as the Islamic State, Jabhat al-

Nusra, Ahrar al-Sham in Syria and Iraq; the

Houthis in Yemen; and numerous other groups

in Egypt, Libya, and the GCC countries.

Moreover, many Arab countries are in a state

of chaos and civil war, which has required the

intervention of the international community

and their regional allies in order to fight these

radical groups in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and

Libya. The violence and terrorism committed

by some members of the Brotherhood and

other radical Islamist groups in Egypt since

the 2013 military coup supports the notion that

exclusion may lead to radicalization, while the

behavior of the Islamists in Tunisia supports

the notion that inclusion may lead to

moderation. The appearance of these radical

groups has affected the image of all Islamist

groups, with people fearing Islamist rule--

especially in light of the beheadings, torture,

and other atrocities committed by the Islamic

State and other radical Islamist groups.

The Effects of the Arab Spring on Islamists

in the Middle East

The Arab Spring has affected the Islamists

in each Arab country differently. Initially, the

Muslim Brotherhood in Tunisia, Egypt, and

Morocco benefited from the events, as the

movements succeeded to win a majority of

seats in the parliamentary elections and

formed governments in each of the three

countries. The outcome, however, has been

less positive for the Islamists in Jordan, the

GCC, and other Arab countries. The other

significant result of the Arab Spring was the

emergence of several radical Islamist groups,

including the Islamic State and Jabhat al-

Nusra in Syria and Iraq, the Islamic

Movement in Libya, the Shi’i movement in

Bahrain, and the Houthis and al-Qa’ida in

Yemen.

The declaration of the Islamic Caliphate in

large parts of Syria and Iraq as well as the

chaos and civil wars in Syria, Iraq, Libya, and

Yemen have opened the door to the emergence

of additional radical Islamist groups

throughout the Middle East. Indeed, many

Arab countries today face serious challenges

to their security and stability (both direct and

indirect) by some of these radical Islamist

groups, which continue to shift alliances and

to change names and ideologies. The Arab

Spring has thus had a disastrous impact on the

so-called “moderate” Islamists, while boosting

the power and influence of the radical

Islamists in the region. Today, many Arab

countries face internal conflict, civil wars, and

terrorism, which are expected to continue for

years.

ARAB SPRING INSPIRATION TO THE

MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD IN JORDAN

With the start of the Arab Spring in Jordan,

several Muslim Brotherhood leaders made no

secret their view that the uprising had shifted

the internal balance of political power in their

favor. Indeed, the empowerment of Muslim

Brotherhood parties in Tunisia, Egypt, and

Morocco as well as the sight of successive

Arab regimes falling one after the other due to

the pressure from the uprisings raised the

morale of the Brotherhood in Jordan, which

hoped to gain political power like their sister

movements in Egypt and Tunisia. Ghaith al-

Qudah, head of the Islamic Action Front (IAF,

the political wing of the Brotherhood in

Jordan) Youth Sector, declared, “What’s

happening now in the Arab world is giving us

a clear message that we can make changes and

that all Arab regimes should understand this

reality."32

Another Brotherhood member asserted,

“We use the parliamentary election results in

other Arab countries to say to our government

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Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Fall 2015) 47

look, when the elections are fair, the Islamists

will win.”33

Dima Tahboub of the IAF Shura

Council noted, “The Arab people are religious

by nature, and regardless of Westernization

and Globalization, when they are given a free

choice they choose Islamists to rule.34

Another

member of the Shura Council and Head of the

Women’s Sector Eyda Mutlaq stated, “The

Arab Spring today uncovered the real power

of the people; look at al-Nahda in Tunis, after

years of exile, they came back and the people

elected them.”35

Shura Council member and

Head of the IAF Political Office Ruhayil

Gharaibeh, despite his knowledge that the

Arab Spring was originally initiated by non-

Islamist youth, claimed, “The Arab Spring is

one of the fruits of Islamic movement’s

activities and work. This is precisely what the

Muslim Brotherhood has been working to

achieve during the last eighty years.”36

As for the Brotherhood in Jordan, it called

for similar demands introduced by other

Islamic movements but stopped short of

calling for regime change. It organized regular

demonstrations, rallies, and public meetings in

major cities, and at the end of each event

repeated its demands to amend major

constitution articles--especially those related

to the king’s power to dissolve the parliament

(Article 34), appoint the prime minister

(Article 35), and to appoint members of the

Upper House (Article 36). Muslim

Brotherhood leaders argued that the

constitution should empower the people to be

the source of authority (Articles 1, 24), that

the political party that wins the majority

should be entitled to appoint the prime

minister, the Upper House should either be

abolished or elected by the people, and there

should be safeguards against arbitrary

dissolution of the parliament by the king. They

repeated these demands in all of the media

outlets and published them on their official

web pages.37

These demands represented a

bold departure from their traditional demands

of modern election laws, and indeed were

inspired by the empowerment of the

Brotherhood in Tunisia and Egypt.

Questioning king’s power had been

unthinkable before the Arab Spring, even in

moments of political crisis.38

In addition, many Brotherhood leaders

referred to the Moroccan experience as an

example the Jordanian regime should follow,

especially appointing the leader of the

majority party as prime minister.39

Some

considered the Moroccan model the “least

costly solution for solving the current crisis in

Jordan and to reach a compromise between the

desires of regime and the people.”40

Others

even went as far as suggesting a ceremonial

role for the king. Gharaibeh noted, “As we

can’t continue living under a form of rule that

goes back to the Middle Ages, whereby one

person exercises all the power without

accountability.”41

He continued, “I believe all

Arab regimes will change and the only

difference between countries will be the time

and scale of change; that all corrupt oppressive

regimes will be removed; that there will be a

democratic system based on freedom and

political participation and that Jordan will

definitely be part of this process.”42

Similarly,

IAF Deputy Secretary General Nimr al-Assaf

stated, “We are in the 21st century, and

nobody accepts absolute power to be in the

hands of one single person; no way.”43

However, the JMB leadership understood

the consequences of crossing the red lines

regarding the king’s status and power, and

therefore stopped short of calling for regime

change as was the case in other countries.

Indeed, no senior leader of the IAF or the JMB

has called for changing the Hashemite rule.

On the contrary, most of these leaders have

affirmed the importance of the monarchy to

Jordan’s stability and national unity.

However, there was not agreement among

all members of the Muslim brotherhood

leaders about these radical demands and

statements nor, and more importantly,

regarding the decision to boycotting the 2010

and 2013 parliamentary elections. Indeed

some among the JMB leadership publically

announced their disagreement. They feared

major constitutional changes would give the

Jordanians of Palestinian origin a greater role

in country’s political future at the expense of

the Jordanian people. This internal discord led

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48 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Fall 2015)

to the creation of the unlicensed Zamzam

Movement and later to the establishment of

the licensed Muslim Brotherhood Society in

Jordan, which was immediately recognized by

the Jordanian government.

The Muslim Brotherhood’s Role in the

Uprising in Jordan

The uprising in Jordan was initiated in

2010 by group of youth in Dhiban, a small

village near Amman and spread to other parts

of the country. On November 7, 2011, the IAF

and the JMB promptly joined the uprising

(Herrak) along with other groups and political

parties in the opposition.44

The JMB did not

participate in the initial phase of the uprising

in Jordan, which was dominated largely by

several groups of youth protesters. However,

after seeing the success of the uprisings in

neighboring Arab countries, the Brotherhood

not only began to participate but also took

over the leadership of the uprising movement,

which became known locally as “the

mobilization” or (al-Herrak).

The IAF and JMB began to organize and

mobilize regular demonstrations and rallies in

Amman and other major cities on a larger

scale than ever before. As the Arab uprisings

expanded across the region, the JMB increased

its mobilization activities and conducted

substantial popular demonstrations in Amman,

Irbed, and Zarqa, demanding from the regime

major sociopolitical reforms, including fixing

the whole political system.45

There is no dispute that the JMB is the

main opposition group in Jordan with political

experience, organizational skills, financial

resources, and popular support. It is true that

there are the so-called the national movement,

leftists, and other Islamic political parties, but

none are able to compete with the Islamic

movement. The JMB has vast numbers of

members and supporters in addition to a long

history of providing social, educational, and

medical services and organizing public events

that have enabled them to control the street.46

One IAF member claimed that 90 percent of

demonstrators were from the Islamic

movement and without them there would be

few demonstrators.47

However, in a move to

show its leadership of the national uprising,

the JMB coordinated and cooperated with

other established political opposition parties

and newly fragmented regional Herrak

committees. Thus, the main logic behind the

JMB strategy in cooperating with other

political parties and groups was to not only to

increase overall pressure on the regime but

also to show the regime and the public that the

JMB constituted the main political opposition

in the country.

The JMB organized meetings in the

mosques, knowing that the government would

not dare to prevent people from going to pray.

It thus took advantage of Friday prayers to

organize regular rallies and demonstrations. At

the end of each rally, Brotherhood and other

prominent opposition leaders gave speeches--

broadcast live on television, social, and other

media outlets--outlining their demands. The

main weekly event was a regular rally led by

JMB leaders marching arm-in-arm with other

opposition leaders from al-Husayni Mosque to

al-Nakheel Square in downtown Amman.

Their demands were usually a reflection of the

IAF and JMB written statement, which

included real political reform; changing the

election law; amending the constitution;

empowering the people to be the real source of

power; limiting the king’s authority to

dissolve the parliament; and rejecting

government’s superficial, illusory, and

cosmetic reforms.48

While most demonstrations concluded

peacefully, on March 24, 2011, a youth

activist group seized the Jamal Abd al-Nasir

roundabout in Amman and declared an open

sit-in. Although this move was not officially

led by the JMB leaders, the majority of

protesters were Muslim Brotherhood and IAF

members.49

Some IAF leaders alleged that the

intelligence department was in fact behind

them, as quoted in an interview with Jacob

Amis; “We have two governments--one

formed by the king and the other is formed by

the intelligence department. The regime wants

to control the Muslim Brotherhood, but that is

not going to happen.”50

Another JMB member

expressed the movement’s resolve to continue

The Impact of the Arab Spring on the Political Future of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Middle East

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Fall 2015) 49

its political activities and demands.51

The

Brotherhood leadership rejected all

government efforts and proposals for political

reform and continued its weekly rallies in

hopes of getting a better deal.52

As quoted in

another interview by Jacob Amis, “Now our

movement is irreversible, and I pray to God to

help our king make the right and brave

decision to prevent Jordan from having the

same fate as Syria and Yemen.’’53

By

adopting such a radical position, the group

placed itself on a collision course with the

regime.

Regime Response to the Arab Spring in

Jordan

In January 2011, Jordan, like other

countries in the Arab world, was hit by a

continuous wave of protests, rallies, and

demonstrations calling for socioeconomic and

political reform. The demands included

dismissing the government, dissolving the

parliament, amending the electoral law, and

conducting fair and free elections.54

The king

responded positively to some of the protesters’

demands by dismissing five governments in

two years and taking several other steps,

including the establishment of an independent

commission to oversee elections, a

constitutional court to monitor legislation, and

other independent bodies to oversee the

elections and to fight corruption; he amended

the election law to include 27 seats for the

nationalist list and continued its top-down

political and economic reform policies. The

king, however, stopped short of limiting any

of his executive powers.55

Despite positive responses from the general

public and the national media for these steps,

Brotherhood General Supervisor Hamam

Sa’id declared that these measures and

proposals “did not make the people the source

of political power.”56

The JMB and the

Islamic Action Front issued a joint statement

rejecting these proposals, asserting, “The

government wasted an opportunity to make

substantial amendments to the structure of the

political system, to render to the people their

right as the source of power, to respond to the

peoples’ demands for real reform, and to meet

the challenges that the country faces.”57

The Jordanian regime’s response to the

Arab Spring was different from that of most

other Arab countries, particularly Egypt,

especially in dealing with the Muslim

Brotherhood. Unlike Egypt, the Jordanian

government has not, as of the writing of this

article, banned the movement but has

encouraged internal conflict. At the same time,

it has permitted the establishment of other

Islamist political parties, such as al-Wasat, and

granted a license to the new Society of

Muslim Brothers. It has dealt with the JMB as

a non-licensed organization with the

possibility of allowing the Society of Muslim

Brothers to take over all of the JMB’s assets,

without officially banning the old movement.

The Failure of the Uprising in Jordan

Many scholars have attempted to

understand why the uprisings in Egypt and

Tunisia were successful but not so in Jordan

other Arab countries. They have used different

approaches to answer this question, including

Marxist theory, social movement, and political

Islam theories. Sean Lynch has used social

movement theory to compare the outcomes of

the Arab Spring in five Arab countries:

Tunisia, Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, and Bahrain.

According to Lynch, a successful uprising is

defined as one that overthrows the existing

regime. The study concluded that elite unity

with the regime in power, the existence of

mobilizing organizations in the country, and

the level of democratization in each country

before the uprising were the most important

factors in the success or failure of the

uprising.58

However, this study sought to

determine the difference between the outcome

of uprisings in Jordan and Egypt by using both

social movement and political Islam theories

to test the effects of eight variables (Table 1).

These are: elite unity and support for the

regime; size and scale of protest; use of force;

uprising occupation of public places; regime

responses to protesters’ demands; army

intervention; population unity and support for

the uprising; and, finally, the unity of the

Abdelmahdi Alsoudi

50 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Fall 2015)

uprising. It examines the impact of eight

variables on the different outcomes of the

uprisings in Jordan and Egypt (Table 1).

Regarding the third variable, the use of

force against protesters, the regime in Jordan

used soft power to deal with protesters and

there were no deaths or serious causalities

among protesters. While the Jordanian

government gave some space to demonstrators

to express their views and demands, at the

same time, it established certain red lines--

specifically against direct criticism of the king

and demonstrations inside the Palestinian

refugee camps and tribal areas, as such

activities could endanger stability and national

unity.59

The regime in Egypt, on the other

hand, used excessive force to disperse

protesters, which led to thousands of deaths

and casualties among demonstrators and the

police. In the case of Egypt, this use of force

in fact provoked the protesters and drove more

people to join the uprising.

The main factors appearing to determine the

success or failure of the Arab uprisings in

Jordan and Egypt included elite unity and

support for the regime, army intervention,

unity of the people behind the uprising, the

size and scale of the uprising, and the ability

of those involved in the uprising to occupy

public squares and places. Egypt scored five

out of eight variables while Jordan scored only

two out of eight. Thus, the uprising in Egypt

was successful in overthrowing the regime

because it enjoyed the support of the people;

the elite broke its unity with the regime; it was

a massive movement; it succeeded in

occupying public places; the army refused to

support the regime; the regime did not respond

positively to the protesters’ demands; and the

regime used excessive force against protesters,

leading to many deaths and casualties among

the population. The uprising in Jordan, on the

other hand, was not successful because the

elite maintained unity with the regime,

protests were small scale, the regime used soft

power instead of force, the regime did not

allow protesters to occupy public places, the

regime responded positively to protesters’

demands, there was no public unity behind the

uprising, and the uprising was not united but

fragmented.60

Table 1: Uprising and Regimes Variables

Variables Egypt Jordan

Elite unity & support for the

regime

United Divided

Size & scale of protest Massive protest Limited & fragmented protest

Use of force against protesters Excessive force Soft power

Occupation of public places On a large scale Not allowed

Regime responses to uprising

demands

No Yes

Army intervention Refused to intervene Effectively quelled the

uprising in Ma’an and was

ready to intervene

Population unity & support for

the uprising

United society Divided society

Unity of the uprising Regime change/ overthrow No regime change

The Impact of the Arab Spring on the Political Future of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Middle East

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Fall 2015) 51

The Arab Spring and the Jordanian Muslim

Brotherhood’s Political Future

By November 2011, the uprising in Jordan

which was started by small youth groups

across the countryside, developed into a

popular movement that spread to the major

cities. Friday protests soon became regular

event in Jordan. The protesters were divided

into three groups: the Islamists, which

consisted mainly of the Muslim Brotherhood

and the IAF; al-Herrak, which was made up of

independent youth; and the nationalist and

leftist groups and political parties. Initially, the

Muslim Brotherhood was hesitant and

reluctant to join the uprising, but since late

2011, it has dominated the uprising and helped

it spread to the major urban centers. The

Brotherhood has also coordinated some of its

activities with the nationalist and leftist groups

especially after Friday’s prayers.

The Brotherhood and the nationalist groups

wanted political change. They therefore called

for fixing the political system and limiting the

king’s powers. Al-Herrak, on the other hand,

worked in smaller numbers and isolated

groups in smaller towns and villages and was

more interested in improving socioeconomic

conditions, solving poverty and

unemployment, and fighting corruption. The

JMB leaders, inspired by the success of other

Islamists, felt they were in a strong position

and therefore refused to participate in the

political process unless the regime met all

their demands. They thus rejected all of the

government’s proposals for political and

economic reforms and boycotted the 2010 and

2013 general elections.

During 2014 and 2015, however, the

situation changed dramatically: The Muslim

Brotherhood both in Egypt and Tunisia lost

political power and the Brotherhood in Egypt

was banned and labeled a terrorist

organization in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and

United Arab Emirates. Moreover, several new

extreme Islamists groups have emerged,

including the Islamic State (IS), Jabhat al-

Nusra, and the Houthis. These groups have

caused chaos and civil wars in Syria, Iraq,

Yemen, and Libya and other Arab countries.

IS rule in Syria and Iraq, Muslim Brotherhood

rule in Egypt and Tunisia, and Houthi rule in

Yemen have changed the attitudes of the

people toward Islamists in the Arab world.

The appearance of numerous radical

Islamists groups and the civil wars in the

region as well as the JMB’s refusal to

participate in the Jordanian parliamentary

elections has weakened its position in the

public eye and created serious internal conflict

among the JMB leadership. In Jordan, the first

sign of this internal conflict was the

establishment of the Zamzam Movement,

which was followed by the establishment of

the Society of Muslim Brothers in Jordan.

This government move has practically split the

Muslim Brotherhood into two rival groups--

one dominated by Palestinian extreme

leadership and the second led by moderate

Jordanian leadership. This is in addition to the

existence of other Islamist Salafi, jihadi

groups, and other political parties, such as the

Wasat Party (which has participated in the

political process since 1993 and won 15 seats

in 2013 elections). Indeed, the Muslim

Brotherhood movement in Jordan today is far

weaker than before. The government has

succeeded in weakening the uprising by

playing the protesters-- the Islamists, political

parties, and al-Herrak--against so that the

uprising no longer poses any real danger to the

regime and the country.

CONCLUSION

The Arab Spring has brought about new

realities, which could be explained using a

variety of sociological theories. This article

employs both social movement and political

Islam theories to explain the dynamics of the

Arab Spring and its impact on the political

future of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan

and the Middle East. The Arab Spring was a

spontaneous social movement that started in

Tunisia and spread throughout the Arab world.

The majority of protesters were young, came

from all walks of life, and had no specific

religious or political ideologies. They did not

call for Arab unity, Arab nationalism, or

Islamic rule.

Abdelmahdi Alsoudi

52 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Fall 2015)

They were later joined by Islamists and

members of other leftist and opposition

political parties and groups. Their main

demands were improving socioeconomic

conditions, employment opportunities,

fighting corruption, freedom, and respect of

dignity and human rights. The uprisings in

Egypt and Tunisia began peacefully but faced

brutal responses from both regimes. The death

and injuries of thousands of protesters in both

countries has changed the dynamics of the

uprisings and attracted millions of protesters.

The rise of Muslim Brotherhood to political

power in Egypt inspired many MB and other

Islamist groups and parties in Jordan and other

Arab countries, motivating them to join the

uprisings in their own countries. However, in

2013 and 2014, the Brotherhood in Egypt and

Tunisia not only lost political power but

Brotherhood in Egypt was also declared a

terrorist organization and banned in Egypt,

Saudi Arabia, and the UAE.

The main conclusion of this article,

therefore, is that the Arab Spring has had a

disastrous impact on the political future of the

so-called moderate Islamists, namely the

Muslim Brotherhood, in the Arab world in

general, and especially in Egypt and Jordan.

The second important result of the Arab

Spring is that it opened the door for the

appearance of many new radical Islamist

groups in Syria, Iraq, Libya, Sinai in Egypt,

and Yemen. These groups, including the

Islamic State, Jabhat al-Nusra, the Houthis,

and others have spread radicalism and terror

throughout the region. The United States and

many other European countries intervened in

Libya, Syria, and Iraq, while Saudi Arabia and

other Arab countries intervened in Bahrain

and Yemen. This intervention, however, and

the support for the uprisings resulted in

continuous chaos and civil wars in these

countries.

The Arab Spring has thus deeply changed

the sociopolitical landscape and created

internal conflict in several Arab countries--

including Tunisia, Libya, Syria, Iraq, and

Yemen--with a lesser effect on Jordan,

Morocco, and the GCC countries. The

appearance of the Islamic State and other

radical groups and their brutal crimes against

civilians have contributed to the negative

image of Islamists in general and frightened

people from any form of Islamic rule. The

Brotherhood in Jordan was inspired by the

success of its sister movements in Egypt and

Tunisia and in a miscalculated move, it

rejected all the government’s efforts and

proposals to participate in the political

process, boycotting the 2010 and 2013

parliamentary elections. The group continued

its protest activities and cosponsored

thousands of demonstrations and rallies across

the country, particularly in Amman and other

major cities after Friday prayers.

The uprising in Jordan, however, failed due

to the government’s strategy: partially giving

in to protester demands, dividing the uprising

by playing the participating groups against

each other; preventing sit-ins in public places,

and using soft power to control and manage

the protest. The regime followed the old

“divide and rule” policy as it encouraged

internal conflict and practically split the

movement into two rival groups. It succeeded

in dividing the uprising into several groups

such Jordanians against Palestinians, Islamists

versus non-Islamists, and different Herrak, for

example, north Herrak against south or cities

versus countryside. This practically brought

the uprising to a complete halt.

Moreover, the July 2013 military coup in

Egypt, the spread of chaos and civil wars in

neighboring Arab countries, the arrival of

more than 600,000 Syrian refugees to Jordan,

the appearance of many radical Islamists

groups, and the civil wars in neighboring

countries has weakened the JMB position in

the eyes of the public and created serious

internal conflict among its leadership. Today,

the JMB is split into two rival groups--one

dominated by Palestinian extreme leadership

and the second led by moderate Jordanian

leadership. However, it is too early to

determine the impact of this split on the

JMB’s political future. This divide is only one

problem facing the JMB. In addition, there are

other rival political Islamist groups, including

Salafi, jihadi, and other political parties like

the Wasat Party (which has participated in the

The Impact of the Arab Spring on the Political Future of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Middle East

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Fall 2015) 53

political process since 1993 and won 15 seats

in 2013 elections).

Regarding the political future of the

Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan, the regime’s

position and policy toward its political future

and legal existence remain vague. In

September 2015, the government introduced a

new parliamentary election law, abrogating

the one-man, one-vote system and adopting a

multi-vote system in its place. The new law

was received positively among many political

circles and the press, though the old JMB’s

position is on the upcoming parliamentary

elections is not clear. It is unlikely, however,

that the government will ban the JMB before

the elections.

*This research was conducted during the

author’s sabbatical leave from the University

of Jordan during the 2014-2015 academic

year at the Religious Department, University

of North Carolina at Charlotte, USA.

*Prof. Abdelmahdi Alsoudi (Ph.D. 1986,

Keele University (U.K. ) is currently a

professor of political sociology and Middle

East studies at the Department of Sociology at

Jordan University. He joined the Center for

Strategic Studies at Jordan University as a

senior researcher in 1986 and has been a

lecturer and conducted research in many Arab

and Western universities, including the

Graduate School of International Studies

(GSIS), Denver University 2007-2008; United

Arab Emirates University (2000-2002);

Princess Rahmeh University College, 2002-

2003; Visiting Scholar (DAAD grant) at Bonn

University, 2004; Visiting Professor

(International Policy Fellowship),

Georgetown University, 2005; and Visiting

Scholar at the Department of Religious

Studies at North Carolina University at

Charlotte (2014-2015). He has participated in

numerous regional and international

conferences and has published several articles

on socio-political issues, such as Islam and

democracy, anti-Americanism in the Arab

World, and democracy and political reform in

the Arab World.

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The Impact of the Arab Spring on the Political Future of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Middle East

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Fall 2015) 55

19

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24

Philip N. Howard and Hussain M.

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Lynch, “The Arab Spring.” 28

Paul Silverstein, “Weighing Morocco’s

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Patrick McCurdy, “Social Movements, Protest

and Mainstream Media,” Sociology Compass,

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Danya Greenfield, “Jordan King Launches

‘White Revolution,’” al-Monitor, February 14,

2013, http://www.al-

monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/02/jordan-

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hold-parliamentary-elections-in-2013-

1.921954; Peter Salisbury, “Insulting the

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analysis/view/the-muslim-brotherhood-on-

trial-in-the-uae. 30

Rosiny, “The Arab Spring.” 31

Ibid.

Abdelmahdi Alsoudi

56 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Fall 2015)

32

Ghaith al-Qudah, Head of IAF Youth

Sector, Interview by Jacob Amis, August 25,

2011, Amman, Jordan. 33

Hayat al-Missaymi, IAF Shura Council,

Quoted by Jacob Amis, December 18, 2011,

Amman, Jordan. 34

Dima Tahboub, IAF Shura Council,

Interview by Jacob Amis, December 11, 2011,

Amman, Jordan. 35

Eyda Mutlaq, IAF Shura Council and Head

of Women’s Sector, Quoted by Jacob Amis,

December 15, 2011, Amman, Jordan.

36 Ruhayil Gharaibeh, Muslim Brotherhood

Shura Council and Head of IAF Political

Office, Interview by Lynch, October 3, 2011,

Amman, Jordan. 37

Islamic Action Front Website, 2011,

http://www.jabha.net/. 38

Shadi Hamid, “Jordan: The Myth of the

Democratizing Monarchy,” in Nathan Brown

and Emad El-Din Shahin (eds.), The Struggle

over Democracy in the Middle East (New

York: Routledge, 2010), p. 128. 39

Marina Ottoway and Marwan Muasher,

“Arab Monarchies: Chance for Reform, Yet

Unmet,” Carnegie Endowment for

International Peace, December 2011,

http://carnegieendowment.org/files/arab_mona

rchies1.pdf. 40

Zaki Bani Irsheid, Muslim Brotherhood

Deputy General Supervisor, Interview by

Jacob Amis, December 20, 2011, Amman,

Jordan. 41

Gharaibeh, Interview by Lynch, 2011. 42

Ibid. 43

Nimr al-Assaf, IAF Deputy Secretary

General, Interview by Jacob Amis, December

12, 2011, Amman, Jordan. 44

Jacob Amis, “The Jordanian Brotherhood in

the Arab Spring,” Current Trends in Islamist

Ideology, Vol. 14 (2013),

http://www.hudson.org/research/9876-the-

jordanian-brotherhood-in-the-arab-spring, pp.

38-57. 45

Islamic Action Front Website,

http://www.jabha.net/. 46

Muhammad Abu Rumman, “The Muslim

Brotherhood After the Boycott of

Parliamentary Elections of 2010” [in Arabic],

Center for Strategic Studies Papers. 47

Hayat al-Missaymi, IAF Shura Council,

Quoted by Jacob Amis, December 18, 2011,

Amman, Jordan. 48

Hamam Sa’id, Jordan Muslim Brotherhood

Website, August 21, 2011,

http://www.ikhwan-jor.com/. 49

Ghaith al-Qudah, Interview by Jacob Amis,

2011; Taylor Luck, “Mafraq Clashes Place

Islamists, Gov’t at Crossroads,” Jordan Times,

December 27, 2011. 50

Ghaith al-Qudah, Interview by Jacob Amis,

2011. 51

Gharaibeh, Interview by Lynch, 2011. 52

Cory Eldridge and Nicholas Seely, ‘‘Taher

Masri: The Struggle for Reform,’’ Jo

Magazine, April 17, 2011. 53

Ghaith al-Qudah, Interview by Jacob Amis,

2011. 54

Roxana Apalaghie, “Plausible and

Implausible Aspects of Jordan’s Protests,”

Middle East Political and Economic Institute,

September 30, 2011, http://mepei.com/in-

focus/5397-plausible-and-implausible-aspects-

of-jordans-protests. 55

Marwan Muasher, “Jordan’s Proposed

Constitutional Amendments--A First Step in

the Right Direction,” Carnegie Endowment for

International Peace, August 17, 2011,

http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/08/17/jord

an-s-proposed-constitutional-amendments-

first-step-in-right-direction. 56

Al-Jazeera News, August 20, 2011,

http://www.aljazeera.net/home/print/f6451603

-4dff-4ca1-9c10-122741d17432/e887a1df-

75cd-465a-9a25-96efdd7d7662. 57

Ibid. 58

Lynch, “The Arab Spring.” 59

Samuel Helfont and Tally Helfont, "Jordan:

Between the Arab Spring and the Gulf

Cooperation Council," Orbis, Vol. 56, (Winter

2012), pp. 82-95. 60

Ibid; Shadi Hamid and Courtney Freer,

“How Stable Is Jordan? King Abdullah’s Half-

Hearted Reforms and the Challenge of the

Arab Spring,” Brookings Doha Center

Publications, No. 8 of 47, November 2011,

The Impact of the Arab Spring on the Political Future of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Middle East

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Fall 2015) 57

http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/201

1/11/jordan-hamid-freer; Taylor Dewey,

Juliane Kaden, Miriam Marks, Shun

Matsushima, and Beijing Zhu, “The Impact of

Social Media on Social Unrest in the Arab

Spring," Defense Intelligence Agency Final

Report, March 20, 2012,

https://publicpolicy.stanford.edu/publications/i

mpact-social-media-social-unrest-arab-spring.