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Since the inception of the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue in 2002, this unique experiment in multilateral defence diplomacy has involved, at one point or other, defence ministers, deputy ministers, chiefs of defence staff, national security advisers, permanent undersecretaries, intelligence chiefs and other national security and defence officials from: Australia, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Brunei, Cambodia, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, the European Union, Finland, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, Mexico, Mongolia, Myanmar, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, the Republic of Korea, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Tonga, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, the United States and Vietnam.

The result has been the growth of the Shangri-La Dialogue into the richest collection of defence professionals in the Asia-Pacific. The goal of the IISS is to ensure that the Shangri-La Dialogue will continue to serve as the best available vehicle in the Asia-Pacific for developing and channelling astute and effective public policy on defence and security.

The IISS, a registered charity with offices in London, Washington, Manama and Singapore, is the world’s leading authority on political–military conflict. It is the primary independent source of accurate, objective information on international strategic issues. Publications include The Military Balance, an annual reference work on each nation’s defence capabilities; Strategic Survey, an annual review of world affairs; Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, a bi-monthly journal on international affairs; Strategic Comments, offering online analysis of topical issues in international affairs; and the Adelphi book series, the Institute’s principal contribution to policy-relevant, original academic research.

The range of IISS publications, its convening power, and the Institute’s strong international policy perspective make the IISS a key actor in the global strategic and economic debate.

“Over its history, IISS has hosted invaluable conversations like the Shangri-La Dialogue and produced important scholarship, and through all of that you have made our world more secure.” Dr Ashton Carter, Secretary of Defense, United States

“This annual Dialogue has emerged as a premier forum for exchange of views from strategic thinkers, policymakers and practitioners interested in the Asia-Pacific defence and security issues.” Rao Inderjit Singh, Minister of State for Defence, India

“This very important conference, [a] conference at which the security of half of the global population is discussed.” Dr Ursula von der Leyen, Federal Minister of Defence, Germany

“The Shangri-La Dialogue is one of the region’s premier security fora, and importantly, in this context its focus is not limited to the Asia-Pacific.” Kevin Andrews, Minister for Defence, Australia

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The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

15TH ASIA SECURITY SUMMITSINGAPORE, 3–5 JUNE 2016

This publication is also available as an e-book at www.iiss.org.

The IISS wishes to

thank these sponsors

of the IISS Shangri-La

Dialogue 2016

LEAD SPONSORS

MAIN SPONSORS

5 Foreword

The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) con-vened its 15th annual Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore from 3–5 June 2016 and is pleased to present this report, which summarises the Dialogue’s open proceedings, including all plenary and special sessions. The full tran-scripts of all sessions, including questions and answers, are available on the IISS website.

As in previous years, the 2016 Shangri-La Dialogue, which commenced with an important keynote address by Thailand’s Prime Minister General (Retd) Prayut Chan-o-cha, gave participating defence ministers, top-ranking defence officials and armed forces chiefs of staff unparal-leled opportunities for frank exchanges on the current and emerging security challenges in the Asia-Pacific. This year, there was the largest-ever cohort of delegates at the Dialogue: more than 600 in total, approximately 45% of them from governments and armed forces. Twenty-six countries that regularly participate in the Shangri-La Dialogue sent government delegations, 15 of which were led by full ministers or their equivalents. Ten countries that were not regular participants were also represented, three of them by full ministers. The European Union and NATO also both sent delegations, and there was a strong US Congressional Delegation.

As well as the plenary sessions and special ses-sions, which involved non-government as well as official delegates and were covered extensively by the media, gov-ernment delegations participated in more than 100 private bilateral and trilateral meetings with their counterparts from other participating countries. The IISS hosted an opening reception for delegation leaders, and Singapore’s minister for defence hosted two ministerial luncheons. An innovation at the 2016 Shangri-La Dialogue was a Southeast Asian Young Leaders’ Programme, aimed at stimulating thinking and debate on security among a new generation of regional strategists and featuring a luncheon addressed by Singapore’s foreign minister and the commander of US Pacific Command, among others.

The latest IISS Shangri-La Dialogue met amid rising tension over security concerns in the Asia-Pacific region,

particularly in the South China Sea. One striking feature of the meeting was the consensus that emerged among many of the ministers that the rule of law is vital in international order and security in the region’s seas. However, wide rec-ognition of the importance of maritime security did not prevent thorough discussion of other important regional security challenges, including developments on the Korean Peninsula and the threat from connections between the Islamic State in the Middle East and jihadi groups in Southeast Asia.

We are grateful to the government of Singapore for its continuing generous support, logistical and otherwise, and for backing an expanded Shangri-La Dialogue process under the terms of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) agreed by the IISS and Singapore’s Ministry of Defence in 2012. As part of the expanded Shangri-La Dialogue process provided for in that MoU, the fourth IISS Fullerton Forum: Shangri-La Dialogue Sherpa Meeting was convened successfully in January 2016.

We also express our thanks to the following com-mercial, institutional and governmental benefactors for their additional, vital financial support for the Shangri-La Dialogue: Airbus Group, The Asahi Shimbun, BAE Systems, The Boeing Company, Lockheed Martin, Mitsubishi Corporation, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon and ST Engineering. As ever, the IISS looks forward to developing these partnerships in the interests of advancing regional security dialogue and cooperation. In addition, we are pleased to recognise the generous support of the following entities, which helped to make the inaugural Southeast Asian Young Leaders’ Programme such a suc-cess: Embassy of Norway, Jakarta; Embassy of the United States, Singapore; British High Commission, Singapore; Singapore’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and Overseas Union Enterprise Limited.

Dr John Chipman CMG,IISS Director-General and Chief Executive

Dr Tim Huxley,Executive Director, IISS–Asia

FOREWORD

7 Introduction

The first IISS Shangri-La Dialogue – originally known as the Asia Security Summit – convened in 2002 in response to the evident need for a forum where defence ministers from the broad Asia-Pacific region, as well as the US and other Western countries with impor-tant interests there, could engage in dialogue aimed at building mutual confidence and fostering practical cooperation. Today, the Shangri-La Dialogue remains the only annual meeting for Asia-Pacific defence min-isters. The Dialogue also brings together chiefs of defence staff, permanent heads of defence ministries and – in a parallel meeting – intelligence chiefs from the region. It has increasingly come to be seen interna-tionally as a vital element of the Asia-Pacific security architecture, and maintains its status as the most important and inclusive gathering of top-level defence professionals in the region. By providing every year an agenda that responds specifically to their concerns and interests, and by facilitating easy communication, the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue has helped to cultivate a sense of community among the security establish-ments of countries in the region and of those major powers with significant stakes in the Asia-Pacific. Increasingly, governments, the expert community and the media have seen the exchanges that take place at the Shangri-La Dialogue as important indications of the state of the region’s security, and this was certainly true of the 15th Dialogue in June 2016.

DEFENCE DIPLOMACY AMID RISING REGIONAL TENSIONSConsidering the far-reaching geographical scope that falls within the ambit of the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue, the diverse nature of the participant states, and the sheer diversity of the region’s security challenges,

the IISS has always ensured that the agenda for the Dialogue’s plenary and special sessions is wide- ranging. While there is no confected overarching ‘theme’ for each year’s Dialogue, the agenda has con-sistently reflected what the Institute sees as the most important contemporary and emerging security chal-lenges in the region.

At the 2016 Shangri-La Dialogue there was – as in the previous several years – a strong emphasis in the ministers’ addresses on the rising tensions among states in the region. As in 2015, there was a focus on the implications of China’s assertiveness in its mari-time littoral, and a special concern with developments in the South China Sea in light of China’s continuing reclamation, island-building and construction of mili-tary infrastructure there over the previous 12 months. These discussions were intensified by the immi-nent ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague, to be made public just weeks after the Dialogue on 12 July, on a submission by the Philippine government that challenged aspects of China’s claims and activities. In the plenary sessions, a series of del-egation leaders emphasised the need for all claimants in the South China Sea to adhere to international law and to resolve their disputes peacefully. Admiral Sun Jianguo, who led the Chinese delegation to the Dialogue and spoke in the fourth plenary session, pro-vided a steadfast defence of China’s position on the South China Sea and its activities there.

There was also a strong focus on the growing threat to regional security from North Korea’s provocative behaviour, and particularly its relentless programmes to develop nuclear-weapons and related missile-delivery systems of increasing range. For the first time since 2011, the Republic of Korea (ROK)’s Minister of National Defense spoke in a plenary session, naturally

INTRODUCTION

8 The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong and former senior minister Goh Chok Tong made speeches. In 2009, Kevin Rudd, then-prime minister of Australia, was the first leader of a country other than Singapore to address the opening dinner. He was followed in 2010 by then-president Lee Myung-bak of the ROK, in 2011 by Prime Minister Dato’ Sri Mohd Najib Tun Abdul Razak of Malaysia, in 2012 by then-president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono from Indonesia, in 2013 by then-prime minister Nguyen Tan Dung of Vietnam, and in 2014 by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan. In 2015, the 50th anniversary of Singapore’s independent state-hood, Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong delivered the keynote address.

This year, Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha of Thailand was the latest in this notable series of leaders to open the Dialogue. In his keynote address, Prime Minister Prayut emphasised the need to maintain equi-librium at both domestic and regional levels, and the need for states in the region to consider not just their own national-security requirements but also those of other states. In the course of his address, the Thai leader paid tribute to the ‘significant role’ of the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue in promoting regional security.

On the second day of the Dialogue, US Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter began the first plenary session on the topic of ‘Meeting Asia’s complex secu-rity challenges’ by highlighting the United States’

Jan Salestrand, State Secretary, Ministry of Defence, Sweden, John Brosnan, Managing Director, Southeast Asia and India, BAE Systems, and General Prayut Chan-o-cha (Ret.), Prime Minister of Thailand

focusing on his country’s overriding immediate con-cern with the North Korean threat. While there was much agreement on the seriousness of the problem, a special session devoted to the North Korean challenge made evident an important divergence in attitude between the United States, Japan and the ROK on one side, and China and Russia on the other, over the deployment of Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-missile defence systems.

Among non-state security challenges discussed at the Dialogue, the most prominent was the threat posed by the growing connections between the Islamic State, also known as ISIS or ISIL, in the Middle East, and jihadi individuals and groups in the Asia-Pacific region. As the plenary addresses by the defence min-isters of Malaysia and Singapore both made clear, this concern is felt particularly strongly in Southeast Asia, where a number of established violent jihadi organisations have already declared allegiance to ISIS. The global threat from terrorism was the main issue for discussion at the ministerial luncheon hosted by Singapore’s defence minister on Saturday 4 June.

Since the first Shangri-La Dialogue in 2002, it has been tradition that the conference begins with a key-note address by a political leader from a regional state at the opening dinner. At the inaugural Dialogue, Singapore’s then-senior minister Lee Kuan Yew deliv-ered the keynote address and, in subsequent years,

Dr Ashton Carter, US Secretary of Defense and Dr John Chipman, Director-General and Chief Executive, IISS

9 Introduction

efforts to encourage a ‘principled security network’ with the aim of creating a ‘principled future’ for the region. In the second plenary, Indian defence minis-ter Manohar Parrikar, Japan’s Minister of Defense Gen Nakatani, and Malaysian Minister of Defence Dato’ Seri Hishammuddin Tun Hussein spoke about the challenges of managing military competition in Asia. The third plenary session, looking at ‘Making defence policy in uncertain times’, brought together the Indonesian Minister of Defense General (Retd) Ryamizard Ryacudu, the ROK’s Minister of National Defense Han Minkoo, and Michael Fallon, the United Kingdom’s Secretary of State for Defence.

In the afternoon, six special sessions chaired by IISS directing and senior staff convened to discuss a wide range of more precise current and emerging security challenges: ‘Containing the North Korean threat’; ‘Military capability development: new technologies, limited budgets and hard choices’; ‘The security chal-lenges of irregular migration’; ‘Enhancing cooperation against jihadi terrorism in Asia’; ‘Managing South China Sea tensions’; and ‘Identifying common security interests in the cyber-domain’. A total of 24 panel-lists, including deputy and vice-ministers, defence chiefs, high-ranking officials, academic experts and a senior defence-industry representative, made opening remarks, which were followed by wide-ranging dis-cussions with participating delegates.

STRONG GOVERNMENT DELEGATIONSThe demands for the time and attention of defence min-isters, military chiefs and top-ranking national security officials in the Asia-Pacific region have increased, in part because the substantive challenges to national and regional security have become more complex, but also as a result of the establishment of numerous high-level regional defence forums. These include the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM), its offshoot the ADMM-Plus – involving ministers from eight ASEAN dialogue partners, as well as those of the ASEAN member states – and the growing number of secu-rity conferences in the Asia-Pacific that are intended to serve essentially national objectives, such as the Xiangshan Forum, which China’s People’s Liberation

Army (PLA) convened for the sixth time in October 2015. It is striking, though, that governments have maintained – and in many cases strengthened – their participation in the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue, which has become institutionalised as a recurrent fixture in the diaries of the region’s defence principals.

Such has been the regional and international appeal of the Shangri-La Dialogue that total delegate num-bers increased from around 160 in 2002, to 250 in 2006, 330 in 2010, 364 in 2013, 451 in 2014 and 490 in 2015. In 2016, the total number of delegates increased to a remarkable 602, approximately 45% of whom repre-sented national governments and armed forces. These growing figures are the result of sustained efforts by the IISS to expand participation by senior officials con-cerned with security matters in foreign ministries and national security secretariats, and to increase the num-bers of female, media and business delegates.

Even at the first Dialogue in 2002, the defence establishments of many Asia-Pacific countries ensured that they were represented at a high level. In that year, defence ministers, deputy ministers or close equivalents represented 14 countries. In 2016, of the 26 countries represented at the Dialogue which were regular participants, 15 sent delegations led by full ministers or their equivalents. Ten other countries also sent delegations at the invitation of the IISS, and three of these were led by full ministers. The 18 countries

Professor François Heisbourg, Chairman of the Council, IISS and Lee Hsien Loong, Prime Minister of Singapore


represented at full ministerial level or equivalent were: Brunei, Cambodia, Canada, France, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, Timor-Leste, Turkey, the UK and the US. As keynote speaker, Thailand’s prime minister led a strong delegation from his country including the minister of foreign affairs and the deputy minister of defence. Deputy ministers, high-ranking defence officials, or chiefs of defence led the delegations from Australia, Bangladesh, China, Germany, Laos, Myanmar, Pakistan, the Philippines, Russia and Vietnam. The European Union and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation also both sent delegations.

As in previous years, there was great interest among other participating governments, the expert community and the media regarding the level of participation by the PLA. Commensurate with China’s international status, General Liang Guanglie, then-minister of national defence, led a strong PLA delegation to the 2011 Shangri-La Dialogue, where he was the sole speaker in a plenary session. General Liang’s participation indicated China’s acknowl-edgement of both the permanence and the utility of the Dialogue as a platform for what might be called ‘strategic communication’ in the Asia-Pacific region. Regrettably, China was not represented at a senior level in 2012, apparently due to domestic concerns associated with the generational change of leadership of the Chinese Communist Party that year. But Chinese assurances that the PLA would subsequently be rep-resented at a higher level were borne out at the 2013 Dialogue, to which Lieutenant-General Qi Jianguo, who had been appointed as a deputy chief of the General Staff Department in 2012, led a notably strong delegation including two two-star and three one-star officers. This restored the level of Chinese participa-tion to that which had prevailed from 2007 to 2010. The PLA sent equally strong delegations to the 2014 and 2015 Shangri-La Dialogues, led by Deputy Chiefs Lieutenant-General Wang Guanzhong and Admiral Sun Jianguo respectively.

As has been the case each year during preparations for the Dialogue, the IISS engaged closely with the Ministry of National Defense in Beijing ahead of the 2016 ministerial summit, with the intention of secur-

ing the strongest-possible PLA representation. This included close engagement with the PLA delegation in January 2016 for The fourth IISS Fullerton Forum: Shangri-La Dialogue Sherpa Meeting in Singapore. While the PLA emphasised its continuing recogni-tion of the importance of the Shangri-La Dialogue and its wish to continue to benefit from the opportunity to explain China’s defence policy, in 2016 Beijing’s representation remained at the deputy-chief level, with Admiral Sun Jianguo again leading the PLA delegation.

Other key participant countries, including Australia, Indonesia, Japan, the ROK, Malaysia, New Zealand, the UK – and, of course, Singapore, the host nation – have since the Dialogue’s early years sent strong delegations usually led by full ministers or their equivalents. Other governments have strengthened their contingents over time. In 2016, it was notable that Brunei, Cambodia, Canada, France, India, Thailand, Timor-Leste and Vietnam, as well as China, also contributed particularly impressive government del-egations. The interest of European governments in the Dialogue has grown steadily, and in 2016 the defence ministers of Italy and Turkey both participated for the first time, as did strong ministerial-level delegations from France, Switzerland and the UK. Nevertheless, the IISS is not complacent with regard to governmental participation, and will continue to encourage govern-

Dr John Chipman, Director-General and Chief Executive, IISS, Pierre Jaffre, President, Asia-Pacific, Airbus Group, and Dirk Hoke, Chief Executive Officer, Airbus Defence and Space

11 Introduction

ments not represented at full ministerial level in 2016 to play a stronger role in future Shangri-La Dialogues.

The extent to which the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue has become an important annual event for the defence and security establishments of Asia-Pacific govern-ments and extra-regional powers has been evident in the continued participation of certain national delegations in spite of domestic political upheavals and occasional crises. In 2014, for example, despite the military coup in Thailand only eight days before the Dialogue opened, the country was represented by a strong delegation led by then-permanent secre-tary and acting minister of foreign affairs, Sihasak Phuangketkeow, who was accompanied by the defence ministry’s permanent secretary, the deputy chief of defence forces, and senior officials from his own min-istry. In 2015, the UK’s Secretary of State for Defence Michael Fallon spoke at the Dialogue although the new British government had only been formed less than three weeks earlier. In 2016, Michael Fallon again led the British delegation, despite the imminence of the UK’s crucial referendum on continued member-ship of the EU.

Over the years, the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue has provided a platform from which the defence principals of participant countries have clarified and elaborated their countries’ positions on the most important regional security topics of the day. However, the Dialogue is also a unique venue for pro-posing and advancing initiatives in spheres as diverse as maritime security cooperation against piracy in the Malacca Strait, the strategic and safety implications of regional states’ growing submarine capabilities, the regional proliferation of small arms and light weap-ons, the structure of the regional security architecture, and the idea of a ‘no first use of force’ agreement in the South China Sea. In 2015, US Secretary of Defense Carter launched a Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative, aimed particularly at expanding regional states’ surveillance and information-sharing capacities. Similarly, Japan’s Minister of Defense Gen Nakatani proposed what he called the ‘Shangri-La Dialogue Initiative’, involving the promotion of common rules and laws at sea and in the air; enhanced intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities to protect

international sea lanes; and the improvement of disas-ter-response capabilities. At the 2016 Dialogue, Carter provided a progress report on the Maritime Security Initiative which, he noted, was already helping to expand the maritime capacities of key Southeast Asian states’ armed forces. In his own 2016 plenary address, Nakatani called for the implementation of the initia-tive he had announced the previous year.

Government delegations have increasingly used the Shangri-La Dialogue as a venue for private bilat-eral and trilateral meetings. In 2016, the IISS was aware of almost 90 such meetings in the Shangri-La Hotel during the Dialogue weekend (compared with 67 in 2015). The detailed content of these meetings is, natu-rally, usually confidential. Nevertheless, governments have often divulged information about their substance in public statements. For example, in 2016 the Chinese media carried detailed reports on exchanges in bilat-eral meetings between the PLA delegation, led by Admiral Sun Jianguo, and counterparts from Russia, Singapore and Thailand. The Chinese delegation had a total of 17 bilateral meetings, a fact that Admiral Sun used to rebut US Secretary of Defense Carter’s allegation that China’s behaviour was leading to its ‘self-isolation’. Carter himself had numerous meetings with the leaders of allies’ and security partners’ del-egations, and with Singapore’s prime minister as well as its defence minister. The ROK’s Minister of National Defense met his opposite numbers from France and Switzerland as well as China, Japan and the US, with the threat posed by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK) nuclear and missile programmes reportedly dominating discussions.

DIVERSE NON-GOVERNMENTAL PARTICIPATIONThe IISS Shangri-La Dialogue has remained above all a ‘track one’ intergovernmental meeting. Nevertheless, non-governmental delegate participation has from the first Dialogue onwards served to animate and enrich the summit’s proceedings, particularly through the questions that such delegates pose to ministerial and other speakers in the plenary and special sessions. As has always been the case, in 2016 many of the non-


governmental delegates were leading academics and think-tank analysts at the forefront of debate on Asian regional security. For some years, the IISS has tried hard to increase the number of younger delegates in the Shangri-La Dialogue, and in 2016 inaugurated a Southeast Asian Young Leaders’ Programme to this end. Generous support from Singapore’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the US Embassy and British High Commission in Singapore, the Norwegian Embassy in Jakarta and OUE Limited enabled 43 young strate-gists – some from governments and others from think tanks, universities, business and the media – from ten Southeast Asian countries to participate in the newly launched programme. The highlight was a special Young Leaders’ lunch addressed by distinguished speakers including Singapore’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Dr Vivian Balakrishnan and Commander of US Pacific Command Admiral Harry Harris. The Young Leaders also had the opportunity to meet Secretary Carter from the US and British Defence Secretary Fallon. The aim of the programme is to bring younger Southeast Asian thinkers into the mainstream of the regional strategic debate by inviting them to be del-egates at the Shangri-La Dialogue and ultimately to strengthen their contribution to the formulation of effective security policy in their region.

At the 2016 Shangri-La Dialogue there was again a strong number of media delegates, including col-umnists and bloggers on regional security affairs, who helped to ensure the strongest-ever coverage of the Dialogue regionally and internationally. The cohort of private-sector delegates was also larger than in previous years, and the IISS again included a speaker from industry on one of the special session panels. By replenishing each year the ranks of non-governmental delegates, and by making relentless efforts to increase their diversity from across the Asia-Pacific region and more widely, awareness of the Shangri-La Dialogue has expanded continuously in the wider policy community.

Since the first Shangri-La Dialogue in 2002, to which then-senator Chuck Hagel led a strong, bipar-tisan US Congressional Delegation (CODEL), the IISS has encouraged participation in the summit by legislators with strong defence, security and foreign-

affairs interests and expertise. In 2016, Senator John McCain, Chairman of the US Senate’s Armed Services Committee, again led a strong CODEL that included five other senators (all members of the Armed Services or Foreign Relations Committees) and three senior staffers. Other legislators among the delegates were from Canada, Japan, Mongolia and the UK.

NEXT STEPSIn his closing comments at the 2016 IISS Shangri-La Dialogue, Director-General and Chief Executive Dr John Chipman noted that the hashtag related to the Dialogue was trending on Twitter in numerous locations worldwide and that this indicated ‘many millions of people’ had ‘had the opportunity to take note of our on-the-record discussions’. Chipman said that the IISS, in partnership with Singapore’s Ministry of Defence, would ‘work exhaustively’ to ensure that the Shangri-La Dialogue remained ‘the premier inter-governmental forum for the discussion of Asia-Pacific security’.

The 16th IISS Shangri-La Dialogue will be held in Singapore from 2–4 June 2017. In the meantime, the IISS will organise The fifth IISS Fullerton Forum: The Shangri-La Dialogue Sherpa Meeting from 22–24 January 2017, which will convene senior officials and officers from participant countries in advance of the next Dialogue.

Gen Nakatani, Minister of Defense, Japan, and Han Minkoo, Minister of National Defense, Republic of Korea



KEYNOTE ADDRESSFriday 3 June 2016, 20:00

SPEAKERGeneral (Retd) Prayut Chan-o-cha

Prime Minister of Thailand

CHAPTER 1


Introducing the keynote speaker, Thailand’s Prime Minister General (Retd) Prayut Chan-o-cha, IISS Director-General and Chief Executive Dr John Chipman noted that this leader – who ‘came to politics late in his career’ – and his government had pursued policies aimed at radically reforming their country’s political scene since they came to power in 2014. The audience at the Shangri-La Hotel was fortunate, said Chipman, to have had the chance to hear the prime minister, who had not previously spoken exten-sively either to international audiences or on regional and international themes, speak about ‘Thailand’s outlook on regional security at a time of great com-plexity and rising tension in the Asia-Pacific strategic environment’.

General Prayut began his address by saying that the Shangri-La Dialogue had ‘played a significant role in the promotion of cooperation in terms of regional security among all our countries’. He also noted not

only Singapore’s success in national development, but also its ‘significant role’ in promoting regional secu-rity. Prayut referred to Lee Kuan Yew’s observations on this theme when he delivered his own keynote address at the first Shangri-La Dialogue in 2002, par-ticularly highlighting Lee’s predictions that ‘more countries would play a role in our region’ and that ‘international terrorism would spread’.

The notion of ‘balance’ was central to Prayut’s address. He noted the lack of balance in the ‘regional architecture’. While China believed that its policies were ‘peaceful and constructive’, ‘many countries’ were concerned that its growing economic and security roles would ‘affect the balance of power and security in the Asia-Pacific’. In Prayut’s view, it was necessary for ASEAN to ‘be united and play a critical role in creat-ing a new strategic balance in the region’. The regional grouping had already created ‘an area of peace among members’ that had once been in conflict. The challenge

Keynote address

General (Retd) Prayut Chan-o-cha, Prime Minister of Thailand

15 Keynote address

now was to find an ‘appropriate balance’ for the wider region. The prime minister spoke about the types of cooperation necessary to create such a balance, and specifically about the need to promote trust between regional states, the importance of partnerships and assistance aimed at narrowing development gaps between states, strengthening relations with neigh-bouring countries in order to avoid the need to ‘choose sides’, promoting cooperation between major powers involved in the region, and re-evaluating notions of sovereignty promoting ‘development in tandem with security’. He also addressed the need to cooperate on specific security issues of regional and international concern: the South China Sea and East China Sea; the Korean Peninsula; terrorism and extremism; arms proliferation; irregular migration; cyber security; and environmental threats and natural disasters.

Regarding regional maritime tensions, Prayut emphasised the importance of not only ASEAN unity and the implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, but also the need for countries in the region to ‘change their perspectives on maritime territory issues to consider the mutual benefit of all parties. He said that Thailand proposed that claimant and non-claimant states should ‘carry out constructive activities … for mutual benefit’ on the basis of international law. The prime minister highlighted regional concern over North

Korea’s nuclear-weapons programme and argued for the ‘renewal’ of the Six-Party Talks and for considera-tion of increased humanitarian aid to North Korea’s population, all the while maintaining ‘a channel of engagement’ with Pyongyang ‘to facilitate negotia-tions and support a change in attitude’ there, ‘rather than simply leaving North Korea in isolation’.

In the final part of his Keynote Address, Prayut focused on Thailand’s domestic challenges, stress-ing that the country was ‘in a period of transition to a robust and sustainable democracy’ while confronting ‘complex and multidimensional security issues’. He explained that ‘the issue that affects us most is political conflict and a more divided population than has ever been seen before’, resulting in ‘a disorderly society’. If these issues were ignored, Thailand would ‘lose its balance, which may lead to conflict and civil war’. In these circumstances, Prayut believed he had no choice but ‘to use military force to re-stabilise the country’. The challenge for Thailand was how to resolve these issues, while making ‘the global community under-stand that we do not wish to violate the rights of the people’. The prime minister argued that reforms had so far been effective, and were being implemented ‘on the basis of the law’. The government was also taking action to improve the country’s economic competitive-ness. He asked Thailand’s allies ‘to stand with us’ as his government attempted to create ‘a new balance, a new

General (Retd) Prayut Chan-o-cha, Prime Minister of Thailand


understanding’. Thailand’s return to democracy, he said, would ‘help to maintain balance within ASEAN’, which in turn would help create a ‘new balance in the Asia-Pacific region’. Concluding, Prayut said that ‘since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defence of peace must begin’.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERSFollowing his opening address, the prime minis-ter responded to several questions from delegates in the audience. Major General Yao Yunzhu from the Chinese PLA asked if General Prayut saw ‘an expand-ing regional or even global role for ASEAN to play in security affairs’. Prayut replied that he thought ASEAN’s security role could be ‘significantly strength-ened in many respects’. However, he argued that when ‘parties have different opinions, we must take them into consideration’ in order to ‘find a better way’ in responding to the challenge of conflict resolution.

Dr Chung Min Lee, from Yonsei University in the Republic of Korea and Member of the IISS Council, expressed his ‘personal view’ that ‘the biggest threat to equilibrium in this region is China’s growing military footprint in the South China Sea’. He asked how Prayut viewed ‘your neighbours’ concern’ over China’s ‘growing, more assertive status’ and what ASEAN might do to ensure ‘strategic stability’ in the region. The prime minister responded that this was ‘an issue for ASEAN to resolve’. Singapore was

now coordinating ASEAN’s relations with China, as Thailand had done previously. He argued that the fact that there had ‘not yet been a significant escalation of violence’ indicated that progress had been made. To reach agreement, it might be necessary ‘to forfeit some things’ in the interests of ‘the happiness, safety and peace of our region’. However, at present ‘there are only extreme views’; it was important to find ‘a middle way … without involving anyone else too much’.

Dr Sophie Boisseau du Rocher from the French Institute for International Relations referred to the prime minister’s assertions that we were living in a globalised world and that sovereignty should be understood in less traditional terms. She asked how ‘nationalism can cooperate with a borderless world’. Prayut explained that he had not meant that sover-eignty and borders were not necessary. However, it was important for countries not to think only of their own interests, as this would make it impossible to ‘resolve any issues’. The main issue now was pervasive conflict. It was important to look for points of agree-ment and resolve problems ‘step by step’. He expressed hope that delegates to the Shangri-La Dialogue would be ‘able to find some answers’ over the following two days. In his view, ‘what happens next is up to us’.

Thanking the prime minister, Chipman concluded that he had ‘provided us with much straight talking, but also with a great deal of food for thought, particu-larly for how this Dialogue can help support our joint endeavours in more effective defence diplomacy’.

Dr Chung Min Lee, Professor of International Relations, Graduate School of International Studies, Yonsei University, Republic of Korea; Member of the Council, IISS

Dr Sophie Boisseau du Rocher, Senior Research Fellow, Asia Centre, French Institute for International Relations, France

Major General Yao Yunzhu, Senior Fellow, Academy of Military Science, People’s Liberation Army, China

FIRST PLENARY SESSIONSaturday 4 June 2016, 09:00

SPEAKERDr Ashton Carter

Secretary of Defense, United States

CHAPTER 2

Meeting Asia’s complex security challenges




In the Dialogue’s first plenary session, on the morning of 4 June, US Secretary of Defense Dr Ashton Carter spoke on the theme ‘Meeting Asia’s complex security challenges’. Carter noted the ‘historic change’ under-way in the Asia-Pacific, most of which was positive: ‘country after country is seeking to play a greater role in regional affairs, and that is for the good’. However, he also highlighted ‘tensions in the South China Sea, North Korea’s continued nuclear missile provocations and the dangers of violent extremism’ as challenges to the region’s ‘stability and prosperity’, and spoke of the need for ‘forward-thinking statesmen and leaders’ to come together to ‘ensure a positive and principled future … where everybody and every nation continues to have the opportunity and freedom to rise, to pros-per and to win’.

Secretary Carter used the word ‘principled’ repeat-edly during his plenary address, above all in the context of the ‘principled security network’ that the US is encouraging across the Asia-Pacific. Carter noted

that this growing network ‘includes, but is more than, some extension of existing alliances’. The US would remain ‘for decades’, ‘the primary provider of regional security and a leading contributor’ to this network. The defence department was deploying some its ‘most advanced capabilities’ to the region, including F-22 and F-35 combat aircraft, P-8 maritime patrol aircraft and ‘our newest surface-warfare ships’. Simultaneously, it was investing in new capabilities ‘critical to the rebal-ance’, including Virginia-class submarines and the B-21 long-range bomber. Carter emphasised that it would ‘take decades or more for anyone to build the kind of military capability the United States possesses’. Moreover, America’s ‘military edge is strengthened and honed in unrivalled and hard-earned operational experience’.

The Secretary of Defense stressed that ‘America’s defence relationships with allies and partners are the foundation of US engagement in the Asia-Pacific’. The US–Japan alliance ‘remains the cornerstone of

FIRST PLENARY SESSION

Meeting Asia’s complex security challenges

Dr Ashton Carter, Secretary of Defense, United States

19 First plenary session

Asia-Pacific security’, according to Carter, while the US–Australia alliance is ‘more and more a global one’. The alliance with the Philippines is ‘as close as it has been in decades’. At the same time, the ‘strategic hand-shake’ between the US and India was allowing them to exercise together ‘by air, land and sea’. US President Barack Obama’s ‘historic visit to Hanoi’ a week ear-lier demonstrated the ‘dramatically strengthened US–Vietnam partnership’, while the US and Singapore were ‘working together to build cooperation, provide security and respond to crises in Southeast Asia’.

Carter explained that through the Maritime Security Initiative that he had announced at the pre-vious year’s Shangri-La Dialogue, the US was helping Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam to develop their maritime surveillance, com-munications and information-processing capabilities, and to ‘develop a networked approach to regional challenges’. He said that throughout the region coun-tries were coming together in three ways: through trilateral mechanisms including the US (for exam-ple, the US–Japan–ROK partnership coordinating responses to North Korean provocations); bilateral and trilateral partnerships among Asian states (such as maritime exercises involving Japan and Vietnam); and through creating ‘a networked multilateral regional security architecture’ in the form of the ADMM-Plus.

The Secretary of Defense argued that ‘this prin-

cipled network’ was ‘not aimed at any particular country: it is open and excludes no one’. In particu-lar, the US ‘welcomes the emergence of a peaceful, stable and prosperous China that plays a responsible role’. He said the US was consistently encouraging China to uphold rather than undermine ‘the shared principles’ that have served the region ‘so well for so long’. Crucially, though, he also pointed to ‘growing anxiety in this region, and in this room, about China’s activities on the seas, in cyberspace and in the region’s airspace’, noting ‘expansive and unprecedented actions that have generated concerns about China’s strategic intentions’. In Carter’s view, ‘China’s actions in the South China Sea are isolating it’; if these actions continued, ‘China could end up erecting a Great Wall of self-isolation’.

The US, said Carter, would ‘stand with regional partners to uphold core principles, like freedom of nav-igation and overflight and the peaceful resolution of disputes through legal means and in accordance with international law’. America would ‘continue to fly, sail and operate wherever international law allows’. The US viewed the anticipated ruling on the South China Sea by the UN Permanent Court of Arbitration as ‘an opportunity for China and the rest of the region to recommit to a principled future’. Concluding, Carter spoke of the US commitment to ‘working with China to ensure a principled future’, including through

Dr Ashton Carter, Secretary of Defense, United States


expanded military-to-military engagement focused not only on ‘risk reduction’ but also practical cooperation. He argued that through a principled secu-rity network, the US, China and others in the region ‘can all meet the challenges we are facing together’.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERSFollowing his address, Secretary Carter responded to a wide range of questions. Dr Sanjaya Baru, Director of IISS–India, asked the secretary to elaborate on new partnership arrangements that the US and India might soon enter into. Carter answered that the two coun-tries’ defence establishments were collaborating on ‘a large number of projects … which we will be develop-ing’. Others would be launched in the coming months, he said. Important areas for collaboration included work on India’s new aircraft-carrier, ‘changing India’s status in the US export-control system’, and ‘a host of research and development projects’.

Bonnie Glaser from the Center for Strategic and International Studies in the US said that she was concerned that China ‘might begin dredging on Scarborough Shoal’. She asked what the US could do ‘in cooperation with the region’ to prevent this and what would be the challenges if China built an ‘outpost’ on the Shoal. Carter began his answer by noting the presence of Admiral John M. Richardson, US Chief of Naval Operations, among the delegates. He emphasised that the US would ‘continue to fly, sail

Yoichi Kato, Senior Researcher, Rebuild Japan Initiative Foundation

Josh Rogin, Columnist, Washington Post; Political Analyst, CNN

Bonnie Glaser, Senior Advisor and Director, China Power Project, Center for Strategic and International Studies

and operate where international law permits’. Many regional countries, he said, were ‘reacting’ in anticipa-tion of ‘provocative and destabilising’ developments in the South China Sea. Many of them were ‘coming to work more strongly with us’, which the US welcomed. If China did develop Scarborough Shoal, this would ‘result in actions being taken both by the United States and … by others in the region’, resulting in the isola-tion of China – something the US did not wish for.

Yoichi Kato from the Rebuild Japan Initiative Foundation asked how the US could change the ‘stra-tegic calculation’ by China that was leading to its ‘self-isolation’. Carter replied by saying that China – like other claimants – should adhere to the then-imminent Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling on the South China Sea. This would present an opportu-nity to show ‘respect for principle and international law’ and to ‘avoid self-isolation’.

Josh Rogin, an American journalist with the Washington Post and CNN, referred to a 2006 article co-written by Secretary Carter which advocated a pre-emptive strike on North Korea to prevent it from acquiring missiles with the range to hit the US. He asked Carter to ‘grade’ the success of policies intended to deter North Korea’s ‘nuclear progress’, and whether the time had come ‘for more intensive pressure, including pressure on China’. Carter declined to grade US allies, but said it was easy to assign North Korea ‘as low grade’ for its continuing provocative actions. But, he said, the deterrence provided by the US and

21 First plenary session

South Korea remained ‘extremely strong’. Moreover, the US, Japan and South Korea were taking measures ‘to protect our own people, our forces deployed there, and the region’ from ballistic-missile attack.

Professor Jia Qingguo from Peking University said that he thought ‘the dispute between China and the US over the South China Sea has been overblown’: it was just part of a ‘huge, vast and complicated’ bilat-eral relationship. He claimed other countries including Vietnam, the Philippines, Japan and South Korea had all created artificial islands. China as well as the US was committed to the principle of freedom of naviga-tion on the high seas. However, China believed this did not give countries the right to sail military ships and aircraft close to other countries’ coasts. He asked Carter why the US attached so much importance to maintaining such a right. Carter answered that the United States’ positions on freedom of navigation and the peaceful resolution of disputes were based on principle. However, China was ‘doing by far and away more of this kind of reclamation and militarisa-tion than any other party’ and this was why others in the region were focusing attention on China. The US ‘vision for security in the region’ was of an inclusive security network, but China’s actions ‘over the last couple of years’ had been ‘self-isolating’.

Professor François Heisbourg, Chairman of the IISS Council and Special Adviser at the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, asked Carter to comment on

former US secretary of state James Baker’s assertion, with regard to the prospect of Donald Trump becom-ing president, that presidents ‘can only do so much to the system of checks and balances’ and that the US is ‘a country of laws, limited by bureaucracy and the power structure in Washington’. Carter refused to comment, saying ‘practice and tradition’ meant he must ‘stand apart from the electoral process’.

In response to a question from Evan Laksmana of the Indonesian Centre for Strategic and International Studies about whether, in order to avoid ‘a G2 US–China regional order’, ASEAN could play a role in discussions about ‘what sort of principles we should abide by and how to enforce them’, Carter said that a G2 was ‘not the American approach’. The US envisaged an ‘inclusive and region-wide’ order. Ekaterina Koldunova from Moscow State Institute of International Relations asked what role Carter saw for Russia in the regional security network he envisaged – was Russia ‘self-isolating … like China’, or a threat, or a partner for cooperation. Carter said that the US had concerns about Russia’s conduct ‘both in Europe and to some extent … in the Middle East’. However, he said that Russia ‘could do a lot more’ in the Asia-Pacific, ‘and the United States would welcome that’. Russia had used its influence with North Korea ‘in a constructive way’. So Russia could indeed be part of the ‘principled security network of Asia’ and he hoped it would be.

Leanne Caret, Executive Vice President and President and CEO, Defense, Space & Security, The Boeing Company

Professor Jia Qingguo, Dean, School of International Studies, Peking University

SECOND PLENARY SESSIONSaturday 4 June 2016, 10:00

SPEAKERSManohar Parrikar

Minister of Defence, India Gen Nakatani

Minister of Defense, JapanDato’ Seri Hishammuddin Tun Hussein

Minister of Defence, Malaysia

CHAPTER 3

Managing military competition in Asia




Opening the second plenary session, India’s Minister of Defence, Manohar Parrikar, observed that Asia-Pacific countries were spending more on defence, and noted that some states were catching up after prolonged neglect of their defence budgets. In other countries, increased defence spending reflected new challenges and roles for the armed forces. Parrikar distinguished between low-probability, high-risk traditional security threats and continuous non-traditional threats that range in impact from the negligible to the dramatic. He outlined three main regional security challenges: first, traditional territorial disputes; second, terrorism; and third, a spectrum of threats in the maritime domain. According to Parrikar, shared prosperity and rapid growth were at risk from aggressive behaviour in the South China Sea. Noting that half of India’s trade passes through these waters, he underlined the importance of the right to freedom of navigation and overflight, as well as adherence to UNCLOS. Parrikar argued that collective action, for example on

humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, would improve trust and confidence, thereby reducing the potential for military competition. He noted that India had contributed to combatting piracy and to projects on navigation safety. The Indian Ocean Naval Symposium was a collective endeavour to strengthen maritime security, and India had participated in maritime security dialogues with Australia, China, France, Japan and the US, and was building economic cooperation with maritime neighbours to reap the benefits of the ‘blue economy’.

Japan’s Minister of Defense, Gen Nakatani, spoke of Japan’s determination to work closely with ASEAN and explained the development of Japan’s Security Legislation. He underlined the indispensable role of the US military presence in the region and Japan’s support for America’s rebalance to the Asia-Pacific. Nakatani expressed Japan’s appreciation for US President Barack Obama’s recent visit to Hiroshima and his appeal for a world free of nuclear weapons.

SECOND PLENARY SESSION

Managing military competition in Asia

Manohar Parrikar, Minister of Defence, India

25 Second plenary session

Nakatani described the region as being at a crossroads and facing a choice between ‘might makes right’ and the rule of law. Noting China’s large-scale and rapid land reclamation and military construction in the South China Sea, Nakatani expressed deep concern over unilateral attempts to alter the status quo and to challenge the maritime order. He was also concerned about China’s dangerous behaviour in the East China Sea and the potential for escalation there. Nakatani referred to Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s 2014 IISS Shangri-La Dialogue keynote address, which urged adherence to three basic principles: that states should base their claims on international law, that they should not use force or coercion, and that states should seek to settle disputes peacefully. Revisiting his 2015 announcement of a ‘Shangri-La Dialogue Initiative’, Nakatani called for the implementation of its three elements: the wider promotion of common rules and laws at sea in the region, discussions on maritime and aerospace security, and the enhancement of regional disaster-response capabilities.

Malaysia’s defence minister, Dato’ Seri Hishammuddin Tun Hussein, called for a tailored strategic approach to the ‘globalisation of security challenges’, not least in the fight against ISIS. He empha-sised the Islamic State’s control over territory and its force of more than 31,000 fighters, arguing that con-ventional counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency would never work against ISIS. Malaysia’s main plat-

form for trust-building, according to Hishammuddin, was ASEAN, including the ADMM, which he argued had been critical in addressing maritime security, counter-terrorism, peacekeeping operations, and disaster relief. Hishammuddin suggested that joint exercises on uncontentious concerns could be a pana-cea for military competition. Referring to Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong’s rejection in his key-note address to the 2015 Shangri-La Dialogue of the notion that ‘might is right’, Hishammuddin observed that some major states may not necessarily obey the rules of the international system. To conclude, Hishammuddin appealed for leadership and innova-tion in meeting regional security challenges, citing a recent agreement by the defence ministers of Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines to enhance cooperation on curbing threats in the Sulu Sea.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERSStrategic stability in the Indian Ocean and the increasing Chinese presence in the region featured prominently in the question and answer session. Answering Professor Rory Medcalf of the Australian National University, Parrikar expressed India’s inter-est in engaging with China on maritime security in the context of the nascent China–India dialogue. He rebut-ted Pakistani concerns expressed by Ali Sarwar Naqvi of Pakistan’s Centre for International Strategic Studies

Gen Nakatani, Minister of Defense, Japan


over the nuclearisation of the Indian Ocean in the wake of India’s deployment of a nuclear-armed submarine there. In response to a question from Tadashi Maeda from the Japan Bank for International Cooperation and Member of the IISS Council about the potential for a wider trilateral security dialogue platform involving Nepal, Sri Lanka or Bangladesh, Parrikar said that the ability of such countries to take the initiative would be limited.

When Senior Colonel Zhou Bo of China’s Ministry of National Defense asked a question on Japanese public sentiment over changes in Japan’s constitution, Nakatani reiterated that Japan’s policy of non-aggression and self-defence remained unchanged. However, he added that given changes to Japan’s security environment, limited collective self-defence was warranted. Nakatani stressed that the Japanese government had discussed the issue exhaustively in the National Assembly in order to ensure public awareness of such concerns. Nakatani disagreed with a suggestion from P S Suryanarayana of the National University of Singapore that Japan was a reluctant partner in the trilateral India–Japan–US security relationship, saying that Japan welcomed such a relationship and that Exercise Malabar 2016 was evidence of growing trilateral cooperation. Asked by Dr William Choong from IISS–Asia if Japan would join US freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea, Nakatani revealed that Japan was not

undertaking permanent surveillance activities there but he underlined the significance of the three elements of his proposed Shangri-La Dialogue Initiative to address the problem.

Elina Noor of Malaysia’s Institute of Strategic and International Studies and Fleur de Villiers, Chairman of the IISS Trustees, both asked questions related to the international terrorist threat in the region. Hishammuddin argued that inter-regional coopera-tion was vital in tackling the threat from the Islamic State but that regional structures like ADMM-Plus or Five Power Defence Arrangements do not offer the opportunity for extra-regional engagement. He there-fore offered his support for strengthened links between the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue and IISS Manama Dialogue. The Malaysian minister observed that in his own experience as a former home minister, the lines between domestic security and external defence became blurred when dealing with the challenges of counter-terrorism. He stressed that all security agen-cies in respective countries needed to coordinate their efforts and avoid working in silos.

Responding to questions about Pakistan’s counter-terrorism efforts, Parrikar accused Pakistan of making a false distinction between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ terror-ists, and only targeting the latter while the former were encouraged to operate in Afghanistan and India. Parrikar stated that this problem needed to be tackled at a diplomatic level in order to encourage Pakistan

Dato’ Seri Hishammuddin Tun Hussein, Minister of Defence, Malaysia

27 Second plenary session

role of the US–Japan alliance, including the 2+2 con-ferences involving the US secretaries of defence and state, and the Japanese ministers of defence and for-eign affairs. Hishammuddin stated that the centrality of ASEAN was imperative and that whatever was decided by the major powers should not leave smaller states ‘on the beach when the tide goes down’. In considering the future of Sino-US relations in Asia, Hishammuddin recommended an increase in channels of engagement between ASEAN, China and the US. Nakatani repeated an East Asian saying: ‘where might is master, justice is servant’. He observed that the secu-rity of the region depended on partnership and rules to shape a new order that visibly reflected this.

to understand the pitfalls of the supposed distinc-tion and to work with India for a better-coordinated approach in the interests of both countries. Parrikar feared that the window opened by Prime Minister Modi when he met with Pakistan’s prime minister was slowly closing.

Questions from Barry Desker of the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore and Dr Chikako Ueki of Waseda University focused on the future of the Obama administration’s policy of rebal-ancing to the Asia-Pacific in light of US resource constraints among other factors, and China’s burgeon-ing strategic influence in Asia, respectively. Nakatani reiterated Japan’s support for the rebalance and the

Tadashi Maeda, Senior Managing Director, Japan Bank for International Cooperation; Member of the Council, IISS

Senior Colonel Zhou Bo, Director, Security Cooperation Centre, Office for International Military Cooperation, Ministry of National Defense, China

P S Suryanarayana, Editor, Current Affairs, Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore

Fleur de Villiers, Chairman of the Trustees, IISS

Professor Rory Medcalf, Head, National Security College, Australian National University

Ali Sarwar Naqvi, Executive Director, Centre for International Strategic Studies

THIRD PLENARY SESSIONSaturday 4 June 2016, 12:00

SPEAKERSGeneral (Retd) Ryamizard Ryacudu

Minister of Defense, IndonesiaHan Minkoo

Minister of National Defense, Republic of Korea Michael Fallon

Secretary of State for Defence, United Kingdom

CHAPTER 4

Making defence policy in uncertain times




In the third plenary session, Indonesia’s Minister of Defense, General (Retd) Ryamizard Ryacudu, opened by arguing that with every country facing more complex and more dynamic security challenges than in the past, a coordinated response was necessary. The terrorist threat had taken on a new dimension, he said, with ISIS turning from a regional militia in Iraq and Syria into a transnational threat. The minister warned that ISIS might inspire radicals in Indonesia, the Philippines and Malaysia. He maintained that ISIS ideology was ultimately more dangerous than any damage the group might inflict on infrastructure, because the ideology aimed to undermine the national unity of countries such as Indonesia. The minister singled out maritime security as another important area because of its importance for global trade which in turn was vital to support economic development in the region. Ryamizard expressed concern over disputes in the South China Sea, but also hope that intensive dialogue would ease tensions. Indonesia’s defence

strategy, he proceeded to explain, was built on five core elements. First, defence equipment modernisation would improve the ability of the armed forces to safeguard territorial integrity, counter transnational threats, and engage in peacekeeping activities. Second, Indonesia was trying to intensify defence cooperation in the region to build confidence and trust. Third, increased coordination in ASEAN should also involve friendly countries from beyond the grouping. Fourth, Indonesia was trying to build up support for defence in the population as part of its counter-radicalisation measures. Finally, the government was trying to empower state defence structures to adapt to a changing international environment, employing both soft- and hard-power elements.

The ROK’s Minister of National Defense, Han Minkoo, said military tensions on the Korean Peninsula were a grave and severe threat. North Korea’s recent nuclear tests and advances in mis-sile technology represented a clear escalation that

THIRD PLENARY SESSION

Making defence policy in uncertain times

General (Retd) Ryamizard Ryacudu, Minister of Defense, Indonesia

31 Third plenary session

was further underlined by aggressive and unprec-edentedly strong rhetoric. International support for UN Security Council Resolution 2270, condemning the DPRK’s test and launch activities and imposing powerful sanctions, showed that the international community did not tolerate its behaviour. Han emphasised that while the ROK was interested in sincere dialogue, such dialogue must be preceded by a strategic decision from the DPRK to relinquish its nuclear weapons. While Asia remained a dynamic region and an engine of global economic growth, it was undeniable that tensions were on the rise. While the region had many formats for cooperation, it still lacked an effective multilateral framework for secu-rity cooperation, the minister argued. There was no strong tradition of resolving differences through dia-logue. While it was true that negotiations between directly affected parties often presented the best and most effective way forward in conflict resolution, sometimes these parties needed help and collective wisdom provided by others. For the ROK, multilat-eral defence cooperation with countries in the region was a core objective. From the perspective of the armed forces, activities in the areas of humanitar-ian assistance and disaster relief, search and rescue, and combined maritime security exercises should be the foci, he said. The ROK would continue to stress multilateral security dialogue, building trust through transparency (including in the area of defence budg-

ets), and conflict resolution within the framework of international law and norms.

The UK’s Secretary of State for Defence Michael Fallon pointed to Britain’s 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) to underline the fact that unpredictability was increasing in international secu-rity. There was a resurgence of state-based threats, and a simultaneous rise of non-state actors, and increasing aggression by rogue actors. Furthermore, said Fallon, governments were confronted with new mechanisms for waging war, such as cyber and hybrid approaches. In this context, it was not possible to pick and choose adversaries. The only response was to stand up firmly and build greater capacity and capability, which was the aim of the SDSR, according to Fallon. He sug-gested that once the UK’s new aircraft carriers came into service in the 2020s, they would sail in the region to support regional security. However, it was clear, Fallon argued, that successful deterrence would not hinge on military might alone. Defence needed an integrated approach, uniting diplomacy and military means. He pointed to the UK’s cross government counter-ISIS task force which was working to fight its ideology, cyber capability and financial base. Fallon pointed to the assertiveness of the DPRK, con-cerns about terrorism, lingering territorial disputes and non-traditional security challenges to suggest that there might be a new arc of instability emerg-ing in the region. Because of this possibility, it was

Han Minkoo, Minister of National Defense, Republic of Korea


important to shore up the rules-based international order, strengthen alliances and do more with partners. This way, capabilities and capacity would increase while the costs of security and defence would come down. Referring to the Asia-Pacific, Fallon suggested the UK was ‘here to stay and here to help’.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERSThe three ministerial presentations triggered a diverse and lively debate. Dr Chung Min Lee from Yonsei University and Member of the IISS Council, asked whether the ROK had plans to engage in naval patrols with allies in the South China Sea. He also asked whether the ROK was committed with the US to deploy the THAAD missile-defence system. Turning to Fallon, Lee asked whether the British defence budget was large enough to support nuclear deter-rence, power-projection tasks and the fight against non-state actors such as ISIS. Following up one of Lee’s questions, Dr Ken Jimbo from Keio University asked how far the ROK was willing to go in coordinating its defence capacity-building with other countries such as the US, Japan and Australia. Aidan Foster-Carter from Leeds University asked whether the hotlines across the demilitarised zone had reopened and whether there were significant military-to-military relations between the ROK and China. He also asked the panellists to contrast the situation on the Korean Peninsula in 2013

with 2016. Dr Jonathan Pollack from the Brookings Institution returned to the issue of THAAD deploy-ment and asked what criteria would govern a decision to deploy and whether there had been efforts to reas-sure China about such a deployment.

Dr Nelly Lahoud, IISS Senior Fellow for Political Islamism, suggested Indonesian counter-terrorism efforts had been largely successful. However, she queried whether Indonesian authorities were doing enough to control the country’s imprisoned jihadis. Natalie Sambhi from the Perth USAsia Centre referred to Ryamizard Ryacudu’s speech and asked whether the threat of communist ideology was comparable to that of ISIS and whether it should fall within the remit of national defence. S K Tripathi, former chief of India’s Research and Analysis Wing, sought views from the Indonesian and British ministers on the relative impor-tance of fighting radical ideologies and fighting terrorist organisations. Ben Bland, South China Correspondent for the Financial Times, asked what Indonesia planned to do in the future to deter incursions by Chinese ships into its territorial waters. Colonel Lu Yin from the Chinese PLA’s National Defense University sought clarification from the Indonesian minister on how to integrate different approaches to resolving disputes in the South China Sea. Dr Collin Koh Swee Lean, from Singapore’s S Rajaratnam School of International Studies, asked Indonesia’s minister to expand on the prospects for improving Indonesia’s defence reform

Michael Fallon, Secretary of State for Defence, United Kingdom

33 Third plenary session

plans. Dr Liu Fu Kuo of National Chengchi University turned to the area of disaster relief, asking about Indonesia’s level of preparedness and the degree of military involvement in these efforts.

Dr Pierre Noël, Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah Senior Fellow for Economic and Energy Security at IISS–Asia, wondered whether Fallon could offer his interpre-tation of what China wanted to achieve in the South China Sea, and whether freedom of commercial navigation would be restrained or impaired to the det-riment of trade if China had its way there. Dr Zhang Yanbing of Tsinghua University suggested China had shown a growing interest in global governance. He asked Secretary Fallon what role China should play in the international system and what expectations he had of the G20 summit to be hosted by China in September 2016.

Responding, Ryamizard Ryacudu argued that Indonesia had to exercise vigilance regarding commu-nist political forces in the country, in particular given past attempts to disrupt political order. He reiterated that it would be important to strengthen the ideologi-cal foundation for national unity in Indonesia. Han Minkoo argued that because of the DPRK’s behav-iour, the ROK had no choice but to consider THAAD deployment. Conversations with the US government were ongoing on this matter. Michael Fallon pointed out that the British defence budget would rise every year until at least 2020 and that the UK would continue to meet NATO’s 2% of GDP spending commitment. With a view to China’s intentions, the defence secre-tary suggested it aspired to become a world power and as such would seek to benefit from the principles of freedom of navigation and overflight.

Dr Nelly Lahoud, Senior Fellow for Political Islamism, IISS–Middle East

Colonel Lu Yin, Associate Researcher, National Defense University, People’s Liberation Army, China

David Perry, Chief Global Business Development Officer, Northrop Grumman Corporation

Natalie Sambhi, Research Fellow, Perth USAsia Centre

Dr Jonathan Pollack, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, John L Thornton China Center and Center for East Asia Policy Studies, Brookings Institution

Dr Ken Jimbo, Associate Professor, Faculty of Policy Management, Keio University

SIMULTANEOUS SPECIAL SESSIONSSaturday 4 June 2016

Session 1Containing the North Korean threat

Session 2Military capability development: new technologies, limited budgets and hard choices

Session 3The security challenges of irregular migration

Session 4Enhancing cooperation against jihadi terrorism in Asia

Session 5Managing South China Sea tensions

Session 6Identifying common security interests in the cyber-domain

CHAPTER 5




CHAIR

General The Lord Richards of Herstmonceux

Senior Adviser for the Middle East and

Asia-Pacific, IISS; former Chief of the Defence Staff, UK

OPENING REMARKS

Shinsuke Sugiyama

Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, Japan

Yoon Soon Gu

Director-General, International Policy Bureau,

Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea

Colonel Lu Yin

Associate Researcher, National Defense University,

People’s Liberation Army, China

Aidan Foster-Carter

Honorary Senior Research Fellow in Sociology and

Modern Korea, Leeds University

In his opening remarks, session chair General The Lord Richards of Herstmonceux emphasised that North Korea would possess a nuclear capability that ‘is genuine and credible within a year or two’. He asked whether ‘we prevent it through military action, or con-tain it through a multidimensional strategy of military and political initiatives’. According to Japan’s Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, Shinsuke Sugiyama, North Korea’s increasing bellicosity and nuclear and missile tests had animated a new intensity in practi-cal and policy coordination between the US and its allies, the Republic of Korea and Japan. But this had not yielded notable effects on Pyongyang’s worsening behaviour.

Yoon Soon Gu, Director-General of the International Policy Bureau of South Korea’s Ministry of National Defense, warned against Pyongyang’s episodic but, he felt, insincere calls for talks. They were intended simply to relax pressure on the North Korean regime; whereas instead, he said, the

SPECIAL SESSION 1

Containing the North Korean threat

37 Special session 1

task should be to heighten the pain of sanctions in order to impose a higher cost for misbehaviour and provocation.

Colonel Lu Yin, of China’s National Defense University, expressed a different view: there was little evidence, she said, that sanctions would alter North Korea’s calculus for the better, and negotiations – however vexatious – provided the only viable route to a modicum of stability on the Korean Peninsula.

Aidan Foster-Carter from Leeds University pointed to the divergent assessments – of China and Russia on the one hand, and those of Japan, the US and the ROK on the other – about the balance of risks to

be borne and the threats to be managed. As a matter of diplomatic life, therefore, and as a requirement of an effective long-term strategy, both stick and carrot would need to be held in balance when addressing Pyongyang.

Subsequent discussion in the session revealed the often fraught dilemmas being arbitrated in various capitals on the way to proceed within established political and diplomatic tolerances. How, for example, could the US fashion a desirable strategy to in some way freeze North Korea’s nuclear capabilities without, in appearance or actuality, extending recognition of Pyongyang’s nuclear status?

Yoon Soon Gu, Director-General, International Policy Bureau, Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea

Colonel Lu Yin, Associate Researcher, National Defense University, People’s Liberation Army, China

Aidan Foster-Carter, Honorary Senior Research Fellow in Sociology and Modern Korea, Leeds University

General The Lord Richards of Herstmonceux, Senior Adviser for the Middle East and Asia-Pacific, IISS; former Chief of the Defence Staff, UK

Shinsuke Sugiyama, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, Japan


CHAIR

Dr Bastian Giegerich

Director of Defence and Military Analysis, IISS

OPENING REMARKS

Major General Perry Lim

Chief of Defence Force, Singapore Armed Forces

Major General (Retd) Gong Xianfu

Vice Chairman, China Institute for International

Strategic Studies

Philippe Errera

Director-General, International Relations and

Strategy, Ministry of Defence, France

Marillyn Hewson

Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer,

Lockheed Martin Corporation; Member of the

Council, IISS

Philippe Errera from France’s defence ministry summed up the perennial challenge facing all those in the defence community thus: ‘there are two things we will never see in our lifetimes, which are sufficient defence budgets and a cure for the common cold’. Singapore’s Chief of Defence Force Major General Perry Lim, however, said that the island-state’s armed forces had benefited from ‘steady and consistent investment’ over the years. He emphasised that, for the Singapore Armed Forces, budget limitations were pri-marily in terms of shortfalls in personnel and training space. Nevertheless, Singapore’s defence expenditure might ‘come under pressure’ as competition from other sectors for government funds grew in the future.

As chief of defence, his resource-allocation dilem-mas centred on the need to build joint capabilities while resourcing three services, balance conventional deterrent capability against operational demands such as counter-terrorism, build new capabilities in, for example, cyber and information operations, and strike

SPECIAL SESSION 2

Military capability development: new technologies, limited budgets and hard choices


the right balance between capability development and day-to-day operations and training. Lim said there was ‘no silver-bullet solution’ for these dilemmas, but there was a fundamental requirement to ‘maintain public support’ for the defence effort so that political leaders could continue to support it.

Major General (Retd) Gong Xianfu, vice-chair of the China Institute for International Strategic Studies, focused on China’s military reform process, initiated in 2015. This was a ‘direct response to the new challenges facing the military establishment’, he told delegates. The three main foci of the reforms were ‘intensifying strategic management and joint operational com-mand’, attaching greater importance to preparing for ‘military struggle’, and intensifying efforts to run the

armed forces ‘with strict discipline and in accordance with law’. Accelerating ‘in-depth development of civil and military integration’ was also important, accord-ing to Gong.

Marillyn Hewson, Lockheed Martin’s CEO, sug-gested that industry could offer flexibility, platform versatility, and interoperability as tools for addressing the demands of capability development and fund-ing constraints. With regard to platform versatility, Hewson used the company’s C-130 Hercules aircraft as an example. Originally designed as a tactical airlifter, the aircraft has now been in service for 60 years in some 70 variants for diverse roles. Hewson and Errera also emphasised the value of defence cooperation between industries as well as between defence establishments.

Major General (Retd) Gong Xianfu, Vice Chairman, China Institute for International Strategic Studies

Philippe Errera, Director-General, International Relations and Strategy, Ministry of Defence, France

Marillyn Hewson, Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer, Lockheed Martin Corporation; Member of the Council, IISS

Dr Bastian Giegerich, Director of Defence and Military Analysis, IISS

Major General Perry Lim, Chief of Defence Force, Singapore


CHAIR

Sir John Jenkins

Executive Director, IISS–Middle East

OPENING REMARKS

Air Chief Marshal Agus Supriatna

Chief of Staff, Indonesian Air Force

Senior Colonel Xu Qiyu

Deputy Director, Strategic Research Institute,

National Defense University, People’s Liberation

Army, China

Gunnar Wiegand

Managing Director, Asia and the Pacific, European

External Action Service

Peter Jennings

Executive Director, Australian Strategic Policy

Institute, Australia

This session provided a clear and collective exposition of the short-, medium- and long-term security chal-lenges arising from irregular mass migration. With an estimated 60 million displaced persons, the world is currently undergoing the largest displacement of people since the Second World War. Panellists spoke of broad geopolitical ramifications in terms of: the root causes of migration flows; the strains migration places on political and social cohesion in transit and destina-tion countries; the transnational organised criminal networks that profit from people-trafficking; and link-ages with the movement of foreign fighters, which complicate national responses.

Discussions focused on the extent to which irregular migration should be framed in security or humanitarian terms, and whether policy responses should, in the words of China’s Senior Colonel Xu Qiyu, be reactive or proactive. Geography plays a major role in shaping policy responses. Indonesia, due to its proximity to mainland Southeast Asia, has

SPECIAL SESSION 3

The security challenges of irregular migration


long served as a transit country for irregular migrants arriving by sea. By contrast, Australia has capitalised on its relative geographic isolation with a series of controversial policies – including the use of offshore processing centres – that have since halted the flow of irregular migrants arriving by sea. Panellists under-stood irregular migration as an industry of organised criminal trafficking networks, and advocated interna-tional law-enforcement efforts to break this business model. However, it remains to be seen how sustain-able such an approach is against a problem which is largely driven by pressures out of the hands of border-

control and law-enforcement agencies. Other panellists stressed that a refugee policy that

works in the long term would not just make destina-tion countries less accessible, but would also address the root causes of migrant flows. The EU has had to take stock of the fact that human displacement usually results from conflict or poor governance. China has become more actively engaged in conflict countries through peacekeeping engagements. All agreed that immediate security responses would need to be rein-forced by longer-term steps to manage migration in all its aspects.

Senior Colonel Xu Qiyu, Deputy Director, Strategic Research Institute, National Defense University, People’s Liberation Army, China

Gunnar Wiegand, Managing Director, Asia and the Pacific, European External Action Service

Peter Jennings, Executive Director, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Australia

Sir John Jenkins, Executive Director, IISS–Middle East

Air Chief Marshal Agus Supriatna, Chief of Staff, Indonesian Air Force


CHAIR

Dr Tim Huxley

Executive Director, IISS–Asia

OPENING REMARKS

General Tan Sri Dato’ Sri Dr Zulkifeli bin Mohd Zin

Chief of Defence Forces, Malaysia

General Sir Nicholas Houghton

Chief of the Defence Staff, United Kingdom

Lieutenant General Glorioso Miranda

Acting Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines

Dr Nelly Lahoud

Senior Fellow for Political Islamism, IISS–Middle East

The fourth special session focused on the challenges of building a better shared understanding of the threat from jihadi terrorism in Asia, and strength-ening effective inter-state cooperation to combat it. There was much discussion of the distinctive charac-teristics of regional jihadi and other radical extremist movements. Some were long-standing – Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines or Jemaah Islamiyah in Indonesia, for example. It was important to try to distinguish between criminality disguised as religious ideology and the sort of revolutionary insurgent violence asso-ciated with groups of Middle Eastern origin, such as al-Qaeda or Islamic State. This in turn could lead to a more effective diagnosis of the remedies, but this was not straightforward.

The sort of communal and sectarian divisions typical of Middle East conflicts were generally not present in Southeast Asia. And ISIS had not yet pro-claimed a wilayah (province) in the region. But the ideological connections were becoming more complex,

SPECIAL SESSION 4

Enhancing cooperation against jihadi terrorism in Asia


particularly through social media and secure online communications. Significant numbers of Malaysians and Indonesians were travelling to fight in Syria with ISIS-affiliated groups. Governments were still not as effective as they should be against facilitation net-works. Ideology itself could give a new impetus to groups such as Abu Sayyaf, whose strength had been degraded recently. Returnees would also have an energising effect. And ISIS would be looking for new areas into which to expand, as it lost territory and per-sonnel in its Middle East and North Africa heartlands.

Delegates heard that regional states had to guard against over-militarising their response. There had been progress on building structures for greater regional intelligence-sharing and counter-terrorism cooperation, with the creation of a Southeast Asian

counter-terrorism centre in Kuala Lumpur and pro-gress with de-radicalisation programmes, digital messaging and new legal frameworks. But more needed to be done in all of these areas.

For the panellists, terrorism was a threat vector: the underlying challenge was essentially about govern-ance, the integrity of state institutions and education. In the Middle East, stabilisation and reconstruction lagged badly, and the ideological deformations that led to radicalisation continued to feed on commu-nal grievances. The Islamic Military Alliance to Fight Terrorism, launched in Riyadh and in which Malaysia was already playing a role, was seen as a recogni-tion that this was an issue that crossed national and regional boundaries, and would require a more struc-tured, long-term global response.

General Sir Nicholas Houghton, Chief of the Defence Staff, United Kingdom

Lieutenant General Glorioso Miranda, Acting Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines

Dr Nelly Lahoud, Senior Fellow for Political Islamism, IISS–Middle East

Dr Tim Huxley, Executive Director, IISS–Asia

General Tan Sri Dato’ Sri Dr Zulkifeli bin Mohd Zin, Chief of Defence Forces, Malaysia


CHAIR

Adam Ward

Director of Studies, IISS

OPENING REMARKS

Senior Lieutenant General Professor Dr Bui Van Nam

Vice Minister, Ministry of Public Security, Vietnam

Major General Yao Yunzhu

Senior Fellow, Academy of Military Science, People’s

Liberation Army, China

Dr Michael Reiterer

Principal Adviser, Asia and the Pacific, European

External Action Service

Robert Beckman

Director, Centre for International Law, National

University of Singapore

With developments in the South China Sea already having been raised as part of discussions in all three of the preceding plenary sessions, this session offered delegates a chance to consider in more detail recent events in the South China Sea (SCS). It also took up the challenge of how to encourage or even institutionalise the strategic restraint that will be required in order to prevent tensions there from escalating further.

Speakers in the session considered the various types of disputes provoking tensions in the SCS: disputes over sovereignty of the land features them-selves, over the extent of the maritime zones generated by individual land features, and over what activities, in particular military activities, are permitted under UNCLOS within these zones. The continuing develop-ment, construction and militarisation of certain land features subject to sovereignty disputes within the SCS was noted with concern by delegates.

Presentations were made on their respective national approaches by speakers from Vietnam and

SPECIAL SESSION 5

Managing South China Sea tensions


China. A speaker from the EU outlined its interests and recent experiences with maritime dispute settle-ment, while the speaker from Singapore offered useful insights into the legal complexities of UNLCOS, as well as the logic behind freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea. All delegates were clear that gov-ernments would need to manage tensions actively, with one delegate suggesting that the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES), signed in 2014, could help-fully be extended to cover coast guards as well as navies.

The significance of the forthcoming ruling of the Permanent Court of Arbitration on the case brought to it by the Philippines against China’s maritime claims was also considered, along with likely reactions by key protagonists, including the potential for a renewed round of bilateral negotiations. One delegate noted that if maritime claims today could be staked on the basis of historical rights, then India could claim a ‘fifty dash line’ inherited from the British Empire stretching from the Red Sea to the Strait of Malacca.

Major General Yao Yunzhu, Senior Fellow, Academy of Military Science, People’s Liberation Army, China

Dr Michael Reiterer, Principal Adviser, Asia and the Pacific, European External Action Service

Robert Beckman, Director, Centre for International Law, National University of Singapore

Adam Ward, Director of Studies, IISS

Senior Lieutenant General Professor Dr Bui Van Nam, Vice Minister, Ministry of Public Security, Vietnam


CHAIR

Dr Eneken Tikk-Ringas

Consulting Senior Fellow for Future Conflict and

Cyber Security, IISS

OPENING REMARKS

David Koh Tee Hian

Chief Executive, Cyber Security Agency; Deputy

Secretary (Technology), Ministry of Defence,

Singapore

Santosh Jha

Joint Secretary, Policy Planning and Cyber, Ministry

of External Affairs, India

Qing Yu

Deputy Director-General, Bureau of Cybersecurity,

Cyberspace Administration of China

Sean Kanuck

Former National Intelligence Officer for Cyber Issues,

Office of the Director of National Intelligence, US

Panellists highlighted national, bilateral and mul-tilateral policy responses designed to improve cyber security. The issue was, former US National Intelligence Officer for Cyber Issues Sean Kanuck observed, part of every security discussion at the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue. And with all states, according to panellist David Koh Tee Hian from Singapore’s Cyber Security Agency, linked by ‘supranational criti-cal information infrastructures’, there was an ‘urgent need’ to work to develop platforms where cyber chal-lenges, and ‘rules of the road’, could be discussed.

Panellists discussed aspects of their countries’ policies designed both to enable greater and safer access to cyberspace, and also to tackle growing cyber threats on national and multilateral levels. Singapore was working on a national cyber strat-egy, while India had established a new post of cyber security coordinator. Meanwhile China was keen, Qing Yu from its Cyberspace Administration said, to secure the rights of its ‘netizens’, and was willing to

SPECIAL SESSION 6

Identifying common security interests in the cyber-domain


fund greater global access to the internet. However, cyber sovereignty was important. China was drafting an information security law.

On the basis of his own experience, Kanuck dis-cussed cyber-threat analysis. Many recent attacks were on the private sector. Non-lethal and ‘revers-ible’ actions were becoming more appealing and some actors now sought to intervene, and coerce behaviour, at a level below the threshold of armed conflict. Kanuck considered common interests, and cyber weapons. The dual-use nature of information and communication technologies, he said, made it nearly impossible to identify cyber-weapons. It was better instead to consider their effects on civilians. This could then lead to a common interest in ‘Geneva

law’ – protecting civilians and civilian infrastructure rather than looking to prohibit the proliferation or use of these capabilities. Questions followed on cyber sovereignty and whether cyberspace was ‘borderless’, proportionality in cyber responses, and cyber rela-tions between the US and China, including their 2015 bilateral agreement.

Asked about how cooperation could improve, Kanuck said there was a need to find strategic common ground. Rules associated with outer space, he said, grew because during the Cold War states with space launch capability saw a strategic benefit in satellite overflight. ‘Start with the common strategic interest,’ he concluded, ‘and you might find common ground for future laws or norms.’

Santosh Jha, Joint Secretary, Policy Planning and Cyber, Ministry of External Affairs, India

Qing Yu, Deputy Director-General, Bureau of Cybersecurity, Cyberspace Administration of China

Sean Kanuck, former National Intelligence Officer for Cyber Issues, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, US

Dr Eneken Tikk-Ringas, Consulting Senior Fellow for Future Conflict and Cyber Security, IISS

David Koh Tee Hian, Chief Executive, Cyber Security Agency; Deputy Secretary (Technology), Ministry of Defence, Singapore

CHAPTER 6

Istana Reception and Dinner



50 The Shangri-La Dialogue

52 The Shangri-La Dialogue

FOURTH PLENARY SESSIONSunday 5 June 2016, 09:30

SPEAKERSJean-Yves Le Drian

Minister of Defence, FranceSenior Lieutenant General Nguyen Chi Vinh

Deputy Minister of National Defense, VietnamAdmiral Sun Jianguo

Deputy Chief, Joint Staff Department, Central Military Commission, China

CHAPTER 7

The challenges of conflict resolution




As first speaker in the fourth plenary session, French Minister of Defence Jean-Yves Le Drian said that for him the question of security in the Asia-Pacific was not a theoretical issue, but a concrete concern. France’s 11m square kilometre Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), of which 85% lies in the Indian and Pacific Oceans, houses more than 1.6m French citizens and a perma-nent 8,000-strong French military presence.

According to Le Drian, several basic ingredients were necessary to achieve stability. The first was the rule of law. This was particularly important in relation to the challenges of maritime security, in not just the South China Sea but also the Arctic, the Mediterranean, and elsewhere. He insisted that France would continue to sail ships and fly aircraft wherever international law allowed and operational needs required. This year, he said, the French navy had already sent ships through the region three times.

The second indispensable ingredient, he said, was dialogue, and he regretted that there had not been

substantial progress on the South China Sea Code of Conduct. The third key ingredient was firmness in the face of challenges to the rules-based order, whether these came from terrorism or North Korea. And for France, he said, firmness involved being a reliable partner in the region. According to Le Drian, ‘in this globalised world of ours, there are no local or regional challenges; there are only common challenges of vary-ing intensity.’

France intended to contribute to maintaining stability in the Asia-Pacific region, he said. He also emphasised that France is a European Union country, and that the situation in the South China Sea directly concerns the EU. So he announced a proposal for European navies to coordinate their deployments, in order to ensure as regular and as visible a presence as possible in Asian waters.

Vietnam’s Deputy Minister of National Defense, Senior Lieutenant General Nguyen Chi Vinh, emphasised the growing weight of the Asia-Pacific as

Jean-Yves Le Drian, Minister of Defence, France

FOURTH PLENARY SESSION

The challenges of conflict resolution

55 Fourth plenary session

a driver of economic progress, and the leading role of ASEAN in the emerging regional security architec-ture. But lately, he said, there had been new sources of complexity such as terrorism, nuclear prolifera-tion, and maritime border disputes. In his view, the worsening security environment was rooted in clash-ing interests, a mismatch between actions and words, and what he called the practice of double standards and the pursuit of narrow self-interest by some coun-tries. If un addressed, he said, these phenomena would erode peace and stability, fuel confrontation, and lead to armed conflict.

According to Vinh, underlying this worsening security situation was a difference of perception as to what constitutes common interests, against a back-drop of weak institutions and enforcement measures. He called for a better, more holistic answer, saying it was vital for states to cooperate through multi lateral institutions, with the utmost importance placed on regional organisations like ASEAN. Vinh said the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue was a testimony to efforts to rationalise competition, and to foster cooperation to settle differences peacefully. With regard to the South China Sea, Vinh highlighted what he called ‘unilat-eralism’ and ‘coercion’, which risked responses from both inside and outside the region. If not addressed properly, these would lead to arms races, rivalry, and unpredictable and disastrous consequences, he said. Vietnam, however, was determined to safeguard

national sovereignty first and foremost by peaceful means, and would try also to have constructive dia-logue in accordance with international law.

PLA delegation leader Admiral Sun Jianguo said the world is undergoing historic changes, with multi-polarisation and globalisation gaining momentum. In the Asia-Pacific region, he said, a multifaceted, multi-layered, and comprehensive regional cooperation framework has been formed. He argued that Asia-Pacific countries faced common security challenges and opportunities, that the security environment was stable in general, but also that military alliances and deployments presented security risks to the region.

Asia-Pacific countries represented a commu-nity of shared destiny, he said. To promote common development, China put forward the One Belt, One Road development initiative and set up the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the Silk Road Fund. To safeguard security, Sun said, China advo-cated a new security outlook featuring inclusive, shared, and ‘win-win’ security cooperation. He noted that Chinese President Xi Jinping proposed that the Asia-Pacific should build a security governance model that suits the region’s characteristics.

The Chinese armed forces, Sun said, were com-mitted to world peace and regional stability. He pointed out that China was the largest contribu-tor of UN peacekeepers among permanent Security Council members. Since December 2008, he said,

Senior Lieutenant General Nguyen Chi Vinh, Deputy Minister of National Defense, Vietnam


and was designed to cover up the Philippines’ ille-gal occupation of certain reefs. The arbitration was not applicable and sovereignty issues were beyond the scope of UNCLOS, he said. The Philippines had breached its bilateral agreement with China, he said, and he repeated that China would not recog-nise or honour any decision by the Permanent Court of Arbitration. ‘This is … not a violation of interna-tional law’, Sun argued, ‘it is precisely the exercise of the rights of international law’. He also claimed that ‘some countries’ implemented international law only when convenient, for example on freedom of naviga-tion, while supporting countries confronting China. Pointedly, Sun declared, ‘we do not make trouble, but we have no fear of trouble.’

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERSQuestions from Dr Carlyle Thayer from Australia, Dr Rommel Banlaoi from the Philippines, Dr Nguyen Thi Lan Anh from the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam, and Dr Seiichiro Takagi from the Japan Institute of International Affairs challenged China’s perceptions of the South China Sea dispute. Bill Emmott, Member of the IISS Council and former Editor-in-Chief of The Economist, asked for a more detailed explanation of China’s opposition to the deployment of THAAD in South Korea. Dr Chung Min Lee from Yonsei University, also a member of

Chinese naval task forces protected over 6,100 ships in the Gulf of Aden, half of them foreign. The Chinese military, he added, was undergoing ‘holistic and rev-olutionary transformation’, including a cut of 300,000 personnel.

To underscore its cooperative approach, Sun said, China was committed to building a ‘new type’ of mili-tary relationship with the US, featuring mutual trust. China’s military relationship with Russia continued at a high level; China and Pakistan were enhancing their counter-terrorism cooperation; China–India relations were entering a new phase; and China–Japan military relations were being restored. In dealing with regional hot spots, relevant parties should – as Sun put it – stay calm and ease tensions through confidence-building measures. He added that China has always insisted on denuclearising the Korean Peninsula and solv-ing the issue through dialogue. However, Sun said, China opposed US deployment of the THAAD missile defence system to South Korea, because it undermined regional stability.

On the South China Sea, Admiral Sun said China and ASEAN were capable of preserving peace and stability through cooperation. The issue, he said, had become overheated because of provocations by certain countries for their own ‘selfish’ interests. The arbitra-tion case initiated by the Philippines under the guise of international law, he argued, denied China’s terri-torial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests,

Admiral Sun Jianguo, Deputy Chief, Joint Staff Department, Central Military Commission, China

57 Fourth plenary session

the IISS Council, suggested that if China wanted ‘to be trusted in Asia, make sure that you become less aggressive and much more transparent’. He asked what the Chinese PLA was doing ‘to decrease ten-sions by convincing your North Korean partners that they must reduce tensions.’

In response, Admiral Sun provided a lengthy, systematic and detailed defence of China’s claims and actions in the South China Sea. He said that ‘as a Chinese person and … a military man’, he found it ‘really very difficult to smile about this, because we have all believed since time immemorial that the South China Sea belonged to China.’ He said that China’s construction activities on the features that it occupied were a necessary response to challenges to its rights, and were anyway mainly civilian in nature.

However, China remained open to bilateral negotia-tions. Responding to remarks the previous day from US Secretary of Defense Dr Ashton Carter that by its actions China risked isolating itself, Sun said that other countries with a cold war mentality will build a wall of isolation in their minds. Regarding the deployment of THAAD, he said its capability went far beyond the defence requirements of South Korea and undermined China’s strategic interests.

There were relatively few questions for Le Drian and Vinh. Le Drian emphasised his view of the importance of scrupulously observing UNCLOS; any violation would have consequences across ‘all the oceans’. He said that France hoped that the US would ratify UNCLOS, and that ‘the right thing to do’ would be for the American Senate to ensure this. Asked by

Dr Carlyle Thayer, Emeritus Professor, Australian Defence Force Academy, University of New South Wales; Director, Thayer Consultancy

Bill Emmott, Former Editor in Chief, The Economist; Member of the Council, IISS

Dr Rommel Banlaoi, Director, Center for Intelligence and National Security Studies; Chairman, Philippine Institute for Peace, Violence and Terrorism Research

Dr Nguyen Thi Lan Anh, Associate Professor and Deputy Director-General, Institute for South China Sea Studies, Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam

Dr Seiichiro Takagi, Senior Adjunct Fellow, Japan Institute of International Affairs

Major General (Retd) Gong Xianfu, Vice Chairman, China Institute for International Strategic Studies


Chipman if Vietnam could solve its problems bilater-ally with China, Vinh replied that ‘where numerous countries are involved, such as in the Spratlys, it’s not only Vietnam and China, so there is no way Vietnam and China can discuss things’. Nevertheless, ‘Vietnam highly values and is strengthening cooperation with China to build and reinforce confidence’.

Asked by Major General (Retd) Gong Xianfu of the China Institute for International Strategic Studies if Vietnam expected it could ‘get whatever weapons’ it wanted from the US, Vinh replied that while the lift-ing of the US arms embargo was ‘significant for us in that it demonstrates respect for Vietnam’, there was no immediate intention of buying American weapons.

FIFTH PLENARY SESSIONSunday 5 June 2016, 11:30

SPEAKERSHarjit Singh Sajjan

Minister of National Defence, CanadaAnatoly Antonov

Deputy Minister of Defence, RussiaDr Ng Eng Hen

Minister for Defence, Singapore

CHAPTER 8

Pursuing common security objectives




Opening the fifth plenary session, Canada’s Minister of National Defence Harjit Singh Sajjan said that relationships based on principles served not only the interests of Canada but those of the entire world. He stressed that Canada was very much a Pacific nation, both in terms of its geography and the make-up of its people. This was the rationale for Canada’s commit-ment to increasing its engagement in the Asia-Pacific region. In the last several years, Canada had contrib-uted to disaster-relief operations in the Asia-Pacific, notably after Typhoon Haiyan in 2013 and the earth-quakes in Nepal in 2015. Since 1965, more than 2,500 participants from the region had received training under the Canadian Armed Forces’ Military Training and Cooperation Programme.

Sajjan said disputing parties in the region must resolve their conflicts peacefully and in accordance with international law. Canada strongly condemned the nuclear and ballistic-missile tests conducted by North Korea. He urged that country to honour its

international obligations. The minister noted that in the fight against global terrorism, conventional counter-insurgency methods would not work against groups such as Islamic State. As part of Canada’s fight against ISIS, the country had tripled its trainers and doubled its intelligence capabilities in Iraq. Sajjan said that Canada had embarked on a long-term, multi-billion-dollar initiative to renew its navy. Ottawa’s strategy was to build and maintain an ‘effective fleet’ to ensure the maritime security of Canada’s coasts. He added that Canada was proud of its involvement in the ASEAN Regional Forum and the Western Pacific Naval Symposium, and that Ottawa stood ready to contribute to emerging groupings such as the East Asia Summit and the ADMM-Plus.

Anatoly Antonov, Russia’s Deputy Minister of Defence, noted that the Asia-Pacific had become the driving force of global economic development. However, the region still faced long-standing chal-lenges such as the proliferation of weapons of mass

FIFTH PLENARY SESSION

Pursuing common security objectives

Harjit Singh Sajjan, Minister of National Defence, Canada

61 Fifth plenary session

destruction and their means of delivery, territorial disputes, organised crime, piracy, arms-smuggling, drug-trafficking and cyber crime. The arms race in Asia was also a particular concern.

Antonov noted that the global fight against ter-rorism was top of the agenda at the Fifth Moscow Conference on International Security in April. He stressed that it was high time to ‘stop playing with ter-rorists’ and argued that the international community should unite in the fight against terrorism. Antonov said that Russia shared the concern of Asia-Pacific countries over the threat posed by returning terror-ist fighters, so it would work with them to implement measures to address the challenge. Antonov said that Russia’s air and sea-based strikes against ISIS, Jabhat al-Nusra and ‘other terrorist groups’ in Syria had been ‘accurate, powerful and effective.’ Syria’s army, with Russia’s assistance, had ‘liberated’ over 500 towns. He lauded the February 2016 cessation of hostilities agreement.

Meanwhile, according to Antonov, Russia had ‘serious concerns’ about developments on the Korean Peninsula and was fully committed to the denuclearisation of the DPRK. However, Moscow found it ‘absolutely unacceptable’ that ‘some countries’ were, he said, using the ‘pretext’ of the DPRK’s nuclear and missile programme to change the regional military–political balance. Specifically, he referred to the ‘new segment’ of the American global

missile defence system: while South Korea had a right to cooperate with the US on anti-missile systems, he said, THAAD should not be allowed to undercut strategic stability.

Dr Ng Eng Hen, Singapore’s Minister for Defence, highlighted how the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue had grown in numbers and stature in its 15 years. Ng noted that the inaugural keynote address at the first IISS Shangri-La Dialogue by Lee Kuan Yew, then Singapore’s Senior Minister, still has resonance today. In 2002, Mr Lee highlighted two security challenges that would continue to confront the Asia-Pacific in the years to come – global terrorism, and the evolu-tion of the Sino-American relationship. Ng said that earlier festering territorial disputes in the Asia-Pacific had provided the stage on which the strategic rivalry between the US and China was being played out. Echoing Mr Lee’s remarks, Ng said that the Sino-American contest would set new rules that would govern inter-state relations and geopolitics in Asia for decades to come.

Ng emphasised the existential threat from global terrorism, with ISIS having superseded al-Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiah. Compared to 2002, however, recent attacks or fouled attempts in the region were conse-quences of deeper and stronger undercurrents. ISIS had already recruited more sympathisers in ASEAN than al-Qaeda over the previous decade. More than 1,000 Southeast Asian fighters were in Iraq and Syria.

Anatoly Antonov, Deputy Minister of Defence, Russia


Moscow did not support the Assad regime, but that it supported all forces, including the forces of Assad as well as opposition forces, that were fight-ing against ‘ISIL, Jabhat al-Nusra and other terrorist organisations’.

Addressing Antonov’s claim that THAAD would undermine strategic stability, François Heisbourg, Chairman of the IISS Council, said that THAAD inter-ceptors and their associated radar systems did not undermine stability per se. He noted that opposition to THAAD deployment in South Korea was motivated by fears that it was the ‘narrow edge of a much wider wedge.’ In response, Antonov said that Russia was not against anti-missile systems as such, but stressed that it would be dangerous for countries to seek to bolster their security at the expense of others. He repeated that anti-missile systems in South Korea would pose problems for Russian and Chinese deterrent forces.

Major General Yao Yunzhu, Senior Fellow at the PLA’s Academy of Science, agreed with this, noting that Russia and China have coordinated their posi-tions on Ballistic Missile Defence deployments in Eastern Europe and East Asia. She asked what more China and Russia might do together to react to the missile deployment in both continents.

Senior Colonel Zhao Xiaozhuo, director of the Centre on China–American Defence Relations at the PLA’s Academy of Military Science, asked Ng whether regional security architecture had become dominated

In this context, Ng lauded regional attempts to coun-ter the terrorist threat. A recent proposal by Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines to implement patrols in the Sulu Sea would be useful in dealing with maritime terrorism and smuggling. The ADMM-Plus countries had also conducted a joint counter-terrorism exercise.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERSSeveral questions focused on how regional group-ings could help meet regional security objectives. Abdul Mutalib Bin Pehin Orang Kaya Seri Setia Dato Paduka Haji Mohd Yusof, Brunei’s Permanent Secretary (Media and Cabinet), asked how the ASEAN Economic Community and the Trans-Pacific Partnership could help bolster regional security. Ichita Yamamoto, a member of Japan’s House of Councillors, asked how the G7 grouping could expand its global role. Sajjan replied that it made sense for regional countries to work together to foster a secure environ-ment in the Asia-Pacific. A greater degree of security would enable regional trade to flourish. More training and joint cooperation for disaster response would set the conditions for economic stability.

Ernesto Braam, Regional Strategic Advisor for Southeast Asia at the Netherlands Embassy in Singapore, asked whether Russia, with its leverage in Syria, could help reduce the sectarian Shia–Sunni divide in Syria. In response, Antonov claimed that

Dr Ng Eng Hen, Minister for Defence, Singapore

63 Fifth plenary session

by US bilateral alliances, which went against the basic principles of openness and inclusiveness. In response, Ng said that the suggestion that the regional security architecture was not inclusive was puzzling. China had been included in the ADMM-Plus; moreover, in a recent ADMM-Plus meeting in Laos, ASEAN minis-ters met China’s Minister of National Defence Chang Wanquan. Ng said that China had made enormous

contributions to the ADMM-Plus. How could the regional security architecture be made more inclu-sive? Ng said that ‘on behalf of all of us, I would like to invite Minister Chang Wanquan to come to Shangri-La Dialogue’. Ng noted that Antonov had said ‘there were some questions that were beyond his pay grade’, so ‘we also extend the invitation to [Russia’s Minister of Defence] Mr Shoygu.’

Ernesto Braam, Regional Strategic Advisor for Southeast Asia, Embassy of the Netherlands to Singapore

Senior Colonel Zhao Xiaozhuo, Director, Center on China–American Defense Relations, Academy of Military Science, People’s Liberation Army, China

Abdul Mutalib Bin Pehin Orang Kaya Seri Setia Dato Paduka Haji Mohd Yusof, Permanent Secretary, Media and Cabinet, Office of the Prime Minister, Brunei

APPENDICES

I. Selected press coverage of the 2016 IISS Shangri-La DialogueII. Selected IISS publications




Indeed, after his overtures to Cuba and Iran, Mr Obama may even go further with Vietnam than with the other two. “Under the rebalance we’ve promoted an extraordi-nary reconciliation with two former enemies,” US Assistant Secretary of State Daniel Russel said on Wednesday. “You’ll see that on this visit, as the President visits two nations with whom we’ve fought bitter wars, that we’ve now built an extraordinary record of cooperation and of partnership.”

How did things get to this stage? The shifting themes over the years at the Shangri-La Dialogue hosted by think-tank International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), and backed by the Singapore Government, are a useful pointer.

The inaugural meeting, in 2002, had taken place with terrorism as the key focus, coming in the wake of the massive jolt the world received with the Sept 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States. Japan did not even have a full-fledged defence ministry at the time. The Chinese were nowhere to be seen. What of the US? Well, they sent Mr Paul Wolfowitz, the deputy defence secre-tary, not his boss.

Al-Qaeda was the main danger then. The attack on Bali, which brought terrorism so much into Asia’s focus, was yet to take place. The Americans hadn’t yet toppled President Saddam Hussein in Iraq. The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, which, in some ways, was a result of the subse-quent collapse of the Iraqi state, had not been conceived. But those who knew something of the world recognised the danger of that action early. At the 2003 meeting, Mr Lee Kuan Yew presciently warned that the kind of govern-ment and society that emerges in Iraq will have a profound influence on all Arab nations, and a spillover effect on non-Arab Muslims.

“The possibility of a more fundamentalist Iraq is real - Iraqi Shi’ites form 60 per cent of the population,” he had said at the time.

It is interesting to note that the US pivot to Asia, sub-sequently called “rebalance”, was not even a glimmer in anyone’s eye. In fact, talk then was of “realigning” US forces in Asia in order to have small forces more widely distributed.

The Straits Times 20 May

Ageless issues at Shangri-La as regional sands shiftBy Ravi Velloor

In its 15th year, the annual conclave of defence chiefs is more relevant than ever.

A fortnight from now defence ministers and chiefs from more than two dozen nations will again descend on Singapore for their annual conclave, the Asian Security Conference, better known as the Shangri-La Dialogue. This one promises to be special not just because it is the 15th in the series but also because of the widely anticipated ruling by the international tribunal at The Hague that will soon pronounce on the Philippines’ query on the validity of Chinese claims to most of the South China Sea.

And since it is not only the Philippines but also Vietnam, Malaysia, Taiwan and Brunei that also lay claim to islands in these waters, and the US is firmly committed to ensur-ing freedom of navigation in what it takes as the global commons, there also is more than usual interest in this weekend’s visit to Hanoi by US President Barack Obama.

The first African-American president of the US is likely to get a hero’s welcome in the Vietnamese capital that’s even bigger than the one accorded the previous Democrat president, Mr Bill Clinton, in 2000. And it is an easy bet that it will hugely surpass the lukewarm reception accorded last year to Chinese President Xi Jinping.

When a people can put aside memories of Agent Orange and of Kim Phuc, the screaming nine-year-old girl memo-rably photographed fleeing in terror after being seared in a napalm bombing, and move on to embrace the power that caused them so much misery, you know how much the sands have shifted in Asia.

In turn, the US will probably lift significant restrictions on weapons exports to those little people in the conical hats who so embarrassed it on the battlefield four decades ago.

APPENDIX I

Selected press coverage of the 2016 IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

67 Selected press coverage

Mr Wolfowitz, asked about the Philippines, responded that the US wants its main points of military access to be “in countries where we have traditionally strong ties and which welcome us. The Philippines told us to go. I don’t expect them to want us back.”

Indeed, some Asean states like Malaysia and Indonesia were not too thrilled about the US Navy patrolling the Malacca Strait under its Regional Maritime Security Initiative. Japan those days was still pussyfooting around China, sending Mr Shigeru Ishiba to China for the first visit by a Japanese defence minister in five years.

By 2005, of course, the China worry had begun to show. US defence secretary Donald Rumsfeld, attending his second Shangri-La Dialogue, had started speaking bluntly on China’s military build-up, alleging Beijing was not transparent on its defence spending and its purpose.

“Since no nation threatens China, one wonders: Why this growing investment? Why these continuing large and expanding arms purchases?” he asked. The remarks sug-gested the increasingly tough stance towards China by the George W. Bush administration, following disagreements over trade, currency and human rights issues. What Mr Rumsfeld did not mention, of course, was that the US had already plans in the works to strengthen the operational control of the Pacific Command, enhance US forces in Guam and tighten the alliance with Japan. And there was one more factor: The US was soon going to sign a landmark civil nuclear agreement with India with wide strategic ramifications. Since last year, the IISS has started referring to the Asia-Pacific region as “Indo-Pacific”, a nuanced but important change.

The Rumsfeld remarks, and a robust response from Chinese diplomat Ciu Tiankai, would be the forerunner for some spirited exchanges between the two powers in the years to follow. The emerging perceptions of Chinese power would also lead the US to re-energise its relationship with South-east Asia after a period of mild neglect during Mr Bush’s first term. By the fifth Shangri-La Dialogue, in 2006, Mr Rumsfeld was already talking of “leaning forward and staying engaged with this part of the world”. The US was also taking steps to winkle itself into the East Asia Summit, which it would do in 2011.

The world began to sit up and take notice of this annual meeting in Singapore. From 17 nations that attended the inaugural summit, the 2007 meeting would attract 25, including new entrants Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Germany. This was not lost on China, which too raised its level of representation from the 2007 meeting, when it sent Lieutenant-General Zhang Qinsheng, deputy chief of the general staff of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Lt-Gen Zhang would be the first Chinese to address the security summit, a small signal of China’s increased self-confidence as it prepared to host the Olympic Games, its coming-out party, so to speak.

By that year, Japan had elevated its defence apparatus to a full defence ministry. On the sidelines of the annual meeting, the US, Japan and Australia held their first trilateral talks. It was clear that regardless of whoever succeeded Mr Bush in the White House in the following year’s elections, the direc-tion of US policy would be hard to shake, never mind that Dr Condoleeza Rice, as secretary of state, had missed several Asean summits, thanks to preoccupations elsewhere.

The widening differences between the world’s two major powers were out in the open by 2010, when US defence sec-retary Robert Gates sparred verbally at the summit with General Ma Xiaotian, deputy chief of the general staff of the PLA. Mr Gates had chided China for suspending military contacts with the US over its arms sales to Taiwan. Gen Ma fired back, accusing the US of “interfering”.

Beijing had pointedly declined to invite Mr Gates during his Asia swing. While the US arms sales to Taiwan were the stated reason for the discord, other developments had clouded the horizon: China had, months earlier, published its nine-dash-line claims to the South China Sea while US secretary of state Hillary Clinton had declared at an Asean Regional Forum meeting in Hanoi that the South China Sea concerned America’s “national interest” and should be resolved in a multilateral fashion “without coercion”.

The gloves, clearly, were coming off. In 2012, defence secretary Leon Panetta used the Shangri -La Dialogue to detail the US rebalance to Asia. The US Navy will reposi-tion 60 per cent of its warships in Asia by 2020, he said, including six aircraft carriers, destroyers, combat ships and submarines. The US would also increase the number and size of the training exercises it conducts alongside its allies in the region.

“We are not naive about the relationship and neither is China,” Mr Panetta told the delegates.

And so there it stands. Last year, shortly before he deliv-ered a conciliatory speech towards China at the summit, Defence Secretary Ash Carter flew in a VF-22 Osprey over the Malacca Strait, a key chokepoint, to emphasise the importance of freedom of navigation in the seas. He did so in the wake of some dramatic island-building by China in the disputed waters that prompted several tough state-ments from the American, including some made from the US Pacific Command headquarters in Hawaii. The mixing of the tough and the soft messaging was clearly deliberate.

For its part, Beijing cleverly timed its Defence White Paper for just before the summit, sketching out China’s military strategy for the first time. Aware that the summit would be seized by its land reclamation activity in the South China Sea, it sent an admiral, deputy chief of the PLA general staff Sun Jianguo, to head its delegation. The Shangri-La Dialogue was clearly serving its purpose as a gathering of the top defence and security policymakers of the region to discuss their differences and develop a sense of community.


Back in 2007 it was decided that the Shangri-La Dialogue would be continued until 2011. Today, it is headed for its 15th summit. If imitation is the highest form of flattery, the IISS and its backer, the Singapore Ministry of Foreign Affairs, can look on amusedly as others seek to emulate the meeting. China upgraded its Xiangshan Forum in 2014 to a so-called Track 1.5 process. India this February launched its Raisina Dialogue. Jaw-jaw is better than war-war, Winston Churchill famously said. There is no question that the jaw-jaws of the past 15 years in Singapore have contributed to avoiding some eyeball-to-eyeball situations.

©2016, The Straits Times Reprinted with permission

The Straits Times1 June

Why China’s Salami-slicing in South China Sea is bad newsBy William Choong

Earlier this year, a Japanese official came to talk to me about Japan’s bid to secure Australia’s massive A$50 bil-lion (S$50 billion) contract to build submarines. He touted the advantage of Japan’s Soryu class of submarines, and diplomatically sketched out weaknesses in the rival French and German bids. The French and Germans, he said, were “cheating” in trumping up the capabilities of their subs. He lamented the fact that, compared with the French and Germans, Japan was too strait-laced and lacking in creativ-ity when it came to selling subs to Australia.

The official’s instincts were right. In the end, the French won the contract. But what applies to Japan also applies to South-east Asia and its partners in managing the Chinese challenge in the South China Sea. As delegates gather at the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue today, there would be much debate about China’s reclamation and militarisation in the South China Sea. One thing should be clear, however: China’s guile and tact have laid the ground for it to endure in the South China Sea.

A key plank of China’s South China Sea strategy has been to undermine Asean’s involvement in the disputes. This was made clear in 2012, when China leaned on Cambodia, the Asean chair, such that no communique mentioning the South China Sea was issued. In April, China stepped up its divide-and-conquer strategy vis-a-vis Asean, by declaring that it had reached a “four-point consensus” with Brunei, Cambodia and Laos on the South China Sea, agreeing that the South China Sea is not “an issue between China and Asean as a whole”.

China’s position has been consistent – that Asean should not be involved, and that China and rival claimants conduct bilateral talks to resolve their disputes. The four

Asean claimants are Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam. From China’s point of view, Vietnam is a tough nut to crack, given Hanoi’s extensive claims. Brunei has not been strident in its claims. The key for China is to work on Malaysia and the Philippines. And in recent weeks, China’s bid to do so has gained some traction.

Malaysia’s position on the South China Sea has been a mixed bag. While it has stressed the need for non-military solutions and solidarity within Asean, Kuala Lumpur has also demonstrated a strong tone in asserting Malaysian sovereignty. What is less confusing is that in recent months, Chinese firms have made two multibillion-dollar strategic purchases in beleaguered 1Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB). One is a US$2.3 billion (S$3.2 billion) purchase of Edra Global Energy, the country’s second-biggest power producer, and the second is the purchase of a 60 per cent stake in a 1MDB property project, Bandar Malaysia, for US$1.7 billion.

The purchases have thrown a lifeline to Prime Minister Najib Razak, the South China Morning Post reported. This would serve to bolster China’s influence on Malaysia going forward. Last week, Prime Minister Najib Razak hosted Mr Meng Jianzhu, President Xi Jinping’s special envoy, and stressed “constructive joint dialogue” between Asean and China to achieve a “mutually beneficial long-term solu-tion” to the South China Sea problem.

The Philippines under President Benigno Aquino has been strident in pushing its claims. Manila has taken China’s nine-dash line claim to the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague. The verdict is expected to be out some time this month. But President-elect Rodrigo Duterte is a wild card. He has said that China and the Philippines can “set aside disagreements for a while” if China builds rail-roads in his home region. He has also expressed support for bilateral talks with Beijing – music to Beijing’s ears.

If Beijing gains traction in its dealings with Malaysia and the Philippines, any Asean bid to issue a joint state-ment when the PCA releases its judgment would become problematic.

This does mean that China will get off scot-free in the South China Sea.

Freedom of navigation opsSince October, the United States has conducted three Freedom of Navigation Operations (Fonops) in the South China Sea. Fonops have rattled China, but the US will likely go it alone from here. It is unlikely that Asean countries will participate in such operations, given sensitivities about riling China.

More importantly, China has demonstrated restraint to Fonops, notes a recent report by the Sydney-based Lowy Institute for International Policy. In October, when the USS Lassen sailed within 12 nautical miles of Chinese-occupied Subi Reef, it was shadowed at a safe distance by two


Chinese warships. Most US-China military encounters are now being safely conducted, write Mr Ashley Townshend and Professor Rory Medcalf. China’s passive-assertive behaviour, however, has shifted the “burden of escalation” to the US and its partners.

The PCA verdict represents the sternest challenge to China’s ambitions in the South China Sea. The consensus view, however, is that even if the PCA does not go China’s way, Beijing would continue to accelerate militarisation in the South China Sea. In the long term, China retains the initiative in the South China Sea. By the installation of radars, runways and missiles on reclaimed reefs, China will increasingly exert more control over the vital mari-time strait.

This in itself is not a game-changer. Despite American allusions to the fact, freedom of navigation for commercial vessels has not been challenged (only military access to exclusive economic zone and territorial seas has been). But what is worrying is an implicit agreement between China and the US over the South China Sea. Dr Michael Swaine, a scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, said such an understanding would centre on the US not staking its credibility on ensuring that a non-coercive process is followed in the South China Sea; China would privately state that the area within the nine-dash line is open ocean.

If this happens, smaller Asian nations would rue the costs. As Singapore’s veteran diplomat, Mr Bilahari Kausikan, notes, small countries would “pay the price” when big countries reach an agreement. Think Taiwan in the 1970s, when it was at the losing end of Sino-American rapprochement.

A Sino-US compact chills the bone, but it is not unthink-able. Speaking at a private function last year, a senior Chinese diplomat said that South-east Asian governments would face adverse consequences if they continued to criti-cise China’s South China Sea activities. This could take the form of reduced Chinese investment and the possibility of a Sino-American agreement on the South China Sea, say Dr Tim Huxley and Dr Benjamin Schreer, writing in the January edition of the IISS journal Survival.

China has to be credited for its consummate skill in salami-slicing in the South China Sea – taking steps that fall below the threshold of a strong response by interested parties. What is worrying about China’s approach is the selective application of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and its refusal to clarify its nine-dash line claim.

Speaking at the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue last year, Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong said any outcome in the South China Sea must be premised on international law to be legitimate and sustainable. Even if a physical clash is avoided, an outcome determined on “might is right” would set a “bad precedent”. This is some-

thing that delegates at the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue would need to think seriously over.


Agence France-Presse2 June

Chinese military moves key issue at Singapore forumAsia’s largest annual security forum opens Friday in Singapore with territorial disputes in the South China Sea, North Korea’s military provocations and Islamist extrem-ism expected to dominate discussions.

The Shangri-La Dialogue, organised by the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), is to be attended by at least 20 defence ministers led by Pentagon chief Ashton Carter, said IISS Asia executive director Tim Huxley.

Beijing’s claim to nearly the entire South China Sea has angered Southeast Asian neighbours and pitted it against the United States, which has conducted patrols near Chinese-held islands to press for freedom of navigation in the body of water that encompasses key global shipping lanes.

The Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia and Vietnam have competing claims in the area, which is believed to have sig-nificant oil and gas deposits.

“There is much speculation about China’s next steps in the South China Sea, particularly in the context of an apparently imminent ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague on a Philippine submission that challenges important aspects of China’s claims and activi-ties there,” Huxley wrote in a pre-conference blog.

Tensions in the South China Sea are expected to drive up Asia-Pacific defence spending by nearly 25 percent from 2015 to $533 billion in 2020, security think-tank IHS Jane’s wrote in a research note issued Thursday.

“By 2020, the centre of gravity of the global defence spending landscape is expected to have continued its gradual shift away from the developed economies of Western Europe and North America, and towards emerg-ing markets, particularly in Asia,” said IHS Jane’s director Paul Burton.

‘Jihadist terrorism’ Tensions on the Korean peninsula are another concern to be addressed at the Singapore forum.

The UN Security Council on Wednesday strongly con-demned North Korea’s latest attempted missile launches and urged world governments to ramp up efforts to impose sanctions on Pyongyang.

Huxley also said there has been renewed concern over “jihadist terrorism”, particularly the threat from organi-


sations and individuals in Southeast Asia who have associated themselves with the Islamic State.

Thai Prime Minister Prayut Chan-O-Cha, a former army chief who seized power two years ago, will open the Singapore conference with an evening keynote address.

The forum also serves as a venue for military officials to meet behind closed doors.

Past editions of the conference have been marked by heated public exchanges between US and Chinese officials.

Zhou Bu, an honorary fellow at China’s Academy of Military Science, wrote in Singapore’s Straits Times news-paper ahead of the forum that public acrimony between the two powers could lead people to believe that “a showdown between the two giants is inevitable”.

Recent editions of the Shangri-La Dialogue have been a “feast for the media” and could mislead people to believe that “a showdown between the two giants is inevitable,” Zhou wrote.

But he said the US-China relationship is “also resilient, partly because each side can ill afford the consequence of a conflict or confrontation”.

There are over 90 dialogues plus two hotlines between the two governments and two militaries to make sure the relationship stays on track, Zhou said.

He noted that China will take part in a 27-nation US-led naval exercise called the Rim of the Pacific Exercise, billed as the world’s largest such drills, off Hawaii and California starting in late June.

©2016, Agence France-Presse Reprinted with permission


Managing a new security dilemmaBy Alexander Neill

The 15th IISS Shangri-La Dialogue Asia Security Summit kicks off today with the Prime Minister of Thailand Prayut Chan-o-cha giving his keynote speech to about 600 delegates.

Twenty-one defence ministers and deputy defence min-isters are leading delegations to Singapore this year for the summit, and over 30 countries are represented. Over the course of this weekend, over 40 renowned panellists will address a range of regional security challenges. There is no doubt that tension in the Sino-United States relationship will be a deep undertone at the summit. In his recent land-mark visit to Vietnam, US President Barack Obama made some rather pointed remarks directed towards Beijing – “big nations should not bully smaller ones”, he stated – adding that the US will stand with partners in upholding core principles of freedom of navigation and overflight in accordance with international law.

Later during his visit, President Obama announced the lifting of the 50-year-old US arms sales ban on Vietnam, removing a “lingering vestige of the Cold War”. These words were chosen carefully because this is exactly how China describes the enduring US alliance system in the Asia-Pacific, illustrating fundamental differences in Chinese and US visions for regional order in the Asia-Pacific. Many Chinese thinkers blame the US’ Asia rebalance policy for fuelling a regional containment strategy in Asia and cur-rent tensions between Washington and Beijing. The US government does not see it this way, arguing that the reality is quite the opposite. US Deputy Secretary of State Anthony Blinken, for example, has suggested that China’s assertive actions are the very reason that some countries in the region have been pushed to deepen their security ties with the US.

In a similar vein, one week ago at a graduating ceremony at the US Naval Academy at Annapolis, US Secretary of Defence Ashton Carter proclaimed that China risks creat-ing a “great wall of self-isolation” because of its behaviour in the South China Sea and in cyberspace. The repeated use of a Chinese national icon as a metaphor for Chinese asser-tiveness is particularly grating in Beijing – Admiral Harry Harris, Commander of US Pacific Command, described China’s island-building campaign in the South China Sea as a “great wall of sand” one year ago.

China’s reaction was predictably acerbic – on Monday Foreign Ministry spokesman Hua Chunying accused [Dr] Carter of adopting a Cold War mentality and scripting a Hollywood movie in which, she stressed, China would refuse any role.

In recent meetings I have held with experts in Beijing, my Chinese hosts observed an inflection point in Sino-US relations and the emergence of a “new balance” in the international order, hitherto dominated by America. Noting “action-reaction” dynamics across the region, some experts acknowledged that a security dilemma between China and the US is under way. Others even feared the inevitability of fighting a local war or a proxy conflict with one of America’s regional allies. Significantly, I detected that Deng Xiaoping’s “hide and bide” mantra had all but been eclipsed by a sense of assuredness in China’s new military capabilities in the wake of President Xi Jinping’s recent military reforms. On territorial concerns, Beijing is now apparently prepared to escalate to a point where it can impose a new status quo on its own terms.

Events over the last year and in recent weeks, coupled with the messaging I witnessed in Beijing, would suggest that the Shangri-La Dialogue this year will be dominated by US-China rivalry. However, it is also possible that both the Chinese Ministry of National Defence and the Pentagon want to contain any animosity and to focus on the more positive aspects of their relationship. Both governments have indicated that they are not prepared to allow current


tension in the South China Sea to derail the broader bilat-eral relationship.

This year, as with last, [Dr] Carter may have inten-tionally absorbed vitriol from China ensuing from his Annapolis speech in order to vent bilateral pressure before the dialogue, opening the way for discussing more con-structive engagement with China during the summit.

Both the US and Chinese delegations are deeply wary of public messaging, especially in the presence at the dialogue of a large international media contingent. In the past few years, the People’s Liberation Army delegation has devoted as much energy to protecting its delegation leader from awkward lines of questioning as to the substance of his speech itself. Increasingly, the Pentagon too has attempted to ensure that its senior figures are on-message and that unguarded comments are minimised. This is symptomatic of a US and Chinese hope to avoid public acrimony during a low point in bilateral defence relations.

Senior Colonel Zhou Bo, a senior defence relations expert at China’s Ministry of National Defence, described the Shangri-La Dialogue as a “media feast” in an article in this newspaper earlier this week.

That may be true. But he also remarked correctly that, despite fundamental differences, the best hope for the China-US relationship is good management. There is some room for cooperation between China and the US, including curbing the North Korean nuclear threat, counter terror-ism and non-traditional security concerns such as irregular migration, all of which are special themes at the summit this weekend. Beyond this, the plenary sessions focusing on managing military competition, Asia’s complex security challenges, conflict resolution, common security objectives and the formulation of adroit defence policy should offer some advice to Zhongnanhai and the White House in man-aging their differences.



Military plays indispensable role in Thailand but democracy will return as planned: PM PrayutBy Lee Seok Hwai

The military plays an indispensable role in the peace and security of Thailand but democracy will return to the country as planned, Thai PM Prayut Chan-o-cha said in his keynote address at the Shangri-La Dialogue on Friday (June 3).

“As a former military officer, I believe soldiers should not limit their role to protecting national sovereignty but

also support development of the country. This is stipu-lated in the Thai constitution,” he told some 600 defence ministers, senior officials, scholars and business executives gathered at Shangri-La hotel for the three-day forum.

“And if we can bring peace and order back to society, reforms can then take place,” he added. “I can assure you Thailand will return to democracy in accordance with the roadmap and that Thailand upholds democratic process and all our international obligations as we have always done.”

Mr Prayut, Thailand’s former army chief, seized power from Ms Yingluck Shinawatra in a coup in May 2014. He has said that the putsch was necessary to end more than a decade of political chaos and street protests following the ouster of Ms Yingluck’s brother Thaksin and has promised to hold elections.

A military-drafted Constitution that will give the junta oversight of the future elected government for at least five years will be put to a referendum on Aug 7. Mr Prayut’s administration has warned that elections may be delayed if the charter is rejected.

Many Thais see the military as a steadying influ-ence given a looming royal succession. King Bhumibol Adulyadej, 88, has been hospitalised repeatedly in recent years for various ailments.

In his 30-minute speech focused on regional security issues, Mr Prayut said the regional architecture “lacks proper equilibrium”.

“The end of the Cold War brought about changes creat-ing multi-polar situation without clear-cut rules and this led to growing uncertainty,” he said in Thai.

He stressed the importance of Asean in building a new equilibrium in the region, as well as the value of free trade pacts like the 12-nation Trans-Pacific Partnership.

“US, China and Japan are still important but India, Russia, South Korea and Asean are more important.”

The Shangri-La Dialogue, now in its 15th year, is organised by the London-Based International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). Discussions over the next two days are expected to be dominated by growing tensions over the South China Sea, provocations by the North Korean regime under Kim Jong Un, and renewed concerns over Islamist terrorism in the region.

More than 30 countries are represented this year, and delegates include US Defence Secretary Ashton Carter, Admiral Sun Jianguo, deputy chief of the Joint Staff Department of China’s Central Military Commission, South Korean Defence Minister Han Min Koo, French Defence Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian, India’s Manohar Parrikar and New Zealand’s Gerry Brownlee.

Mr Prayut urged countries embroiled in territorial disputes over the South China Sea - China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei - to choose cooperation over confrontation, and look beyond border disputes.


“All claimants should take part in constructive, joint activities...so that territorial claims do not become obsta-cles,” he said.

“Countries in the region should think of sovereignty in less traditional terms in order to support collective security in the long term,” he added. “If we look at everything from the standpoint of conflict, we will never be able to see a way out.

“If we focus solely on borders, some of which are still in dispute, then again, we’ll never find a way out.”

On North Korea, which conducted its fourth nuclear test on Jan 6 and a month later launched a long-range rocket putting an object into space orbit, Mr Prayut called for long-dormant Six-Party talks to be revived to avoid further isolating the pariah state and lessen tensions.

He also called for the region to swiftly deal with terror-ism threat through cooperation to prevent it from spreading.

Overall, he said, the security situation has become more complicated and challenging since the Shangri-La Dialogue was launched in 2002.

“Fourteen years ago, Mr Lee Kuan Yew was the first leader to address the first Shangri-La Dialogue. Mr Lee’s observations about the regional security situation remain relevant today,” he said.


Defense News3 June

Shangri-La Dialogue Opens in Singapore; South China Sea Largely Dominating SummitBy Wendell Minnick

SINGAPORE — The 15th Asia Security Summit opened Friday in Singapore with a keynote speech by Thailand’s Prime Minister, retired general Prayut Chan-o-cha, who assured attendees that democracy would return to Thailand despite criticisms of that country’s 2014 military coup. He also said the constitution guaranteed an active role for the military in the country’s development. Delegates attending the speech traded amused looks, and occasional laughter could be heard, raising the question of whether his assur-ances are credible.

Commonly referred to as the Shangri-La Dialogue, run by the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies think tank, the annual three-day summit has become an unofficial conclave for regional defense min-isters, along with European and US military officials, to openly discuss and debate security matters.

The primary interest to delegates attending this year is China’s assertive activities in the South China Sea as it con-

tinues to gobble up islets and challenge the passage of US Navy ships and aircraft through the area.

The summit also serves as the last regional security meeting before an expected ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague on challenges by the Philippines to China’s claims to most of the South China Sea, an area roughly the size of India. A ruling is expected by the end of the summer, but China has already stated it does not recognize the court’s jurisdiction.

China and the US have sent large delegations to the summit this year. US Secretary of Defense Ash Carter will give the first speech at the opening of the summit. Expectations are high that Carter will contest China’s claims to the South China Sea and challenges to US military vessels and aircraft through the area.

There is debate at the summit among delegates as to whether China is planning the creation of an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) for the South China Sea, which would further complicate the activity of US military air-craft patrolling the area. China created an ADIZ for the East China Sea in November 2013 and included the Japanese administered Senkaku Islets, which Beijing claims as sov-ereign territory.

Carter’s views are expected to be challenged by Chinese military and semi-official delegates attending the summit, but China’s delegation leader, Adm. Sun Jianguo, deputy chief, Joint State Department, Central Military Commission, will not speak until the third day on the challenges of con-flict resolution.

A US Pentagon adviser said China is seeking to improve its crisis management skills to avoid another tragedy, such as the one in 2001 involving the collision of a Chinese fighter aircraft and a US military EP-3 Aries surveillance aircraft near Hainan Island.

This does not mean that members of the Chinese delega-tion will be silent; by far, the largest number of speakers are from China. These include Colonel Lu Yin, associate researcher, National Defense University; Ret. Major General Gong Xianfu, vice chairman, China Institute for International Strategic Studies; Senior Colonel Xu Qiyu, deputy director, Strategic Research Institute, National Defence University; Major General Yao Yunzhu, senior fellow, Academy of Military Science, will speak on the South China Sea issue; and Qing Yu, deputy director-general, Bureau of Cybersecurity, Cyberspace Administration of China.

However, during the first day, Manohar Parrikar, India’s Defense Minister, and Gen Nakatani, Japan’s Minister of Defense, will speak immediately after Carter’s opening speech. Both India and Japan have been challenged by China over territorial claims and assertive behavior, which have raised concerns that China’s military modernization effort is more than just defensive in nature.

©2016, Defense News Reprinted with permission


PTI4 June

Shangri-La Dialogue: India for regional security framework to resolve disputes

SINGAPORE: India today called for a regional framework for security management to peacefully resolve disputes, threat and use of force in the Indo-Pacific region, amid China flexing its muscles in the area to advance its mari-time claims against its Asian neighbours.

“Regional framework for security management must enshrine a commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes, the threat or use of force,” said Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar in his address at the 15th Shangri-La Dialogue.

He also called for collective efforts to tackle terrorism which remains the foremost challenge to the region.

“The security framework in our region still do not give enough attention to terrorism. This must change,” Parrikar said.

“Collective action and cooperation is the way forward to deal with the maritime threat, like terrorism, piracy and natural disaster,” said the minister, adding that such coop-eration will build trust and confidence.

“We need to oppose terrorism resolutely everywhere,” said Parrikar, calling for resolute efforts by all to destroy the terrorism.

Terrorism remains the foremost challenge to the region. Networks of radicalism and terrorism as well as the whole structure in the region and beyond continue to pose a threat to all peace loving societies.

Noting sensitivities of disputes and concern about growing tension, Parrikar highlighted India’s blue econ-omy initiative and prosperity of the region.

“We are also building economic cooperation with maritime neighbours to reap the benefit of blue economy,” he said.

Parrikar said there is no doubt that the Indo Pacific region, from East of Suez to Asia Pacific shores, will remain the driver of global prosperity for decades to come.

“India’s contribution as the fastest growing major econ-omy in the world, will be a significant factor in ensuring this.”

“I am equally confident that the countries of the region will rise to the challenge and tackle the security threat it faces,” said Parrikar.

He also touched on the South China Sea and stressed “While we do not take positions on territorial disputes which should be resolve peacefully without the threat or use of force, we firmly uphold freedom of navigation and over flights in accordance with international law in particu-lar the UN convention on law of sea.”

©2016, PTI Reprinted with permission

The Economist4 June

Dialogue of the deaf

As China and America continue to talk past each other, Asia frets

IN EAST ASIA, relations between China and America make the strategic weather. “When they are stable, the region is calm; when they are roiled, the region is uneasy,” noted Bilahari Kausikan, a Singaporean diplomat, in a recent lecture. In truth, ever since Richard Nixon went to China in 1972 and opened the modern era in Sino-American relations, the sky has rarely been entirely clear; but nor has it often been clouded by so many disparate disagreements as now. As the two countries’ bureaucrats from a range of ministries gather in Beijing on June 5th for their eighth annual mass date, the “Strategic and Economic Dialogue” (S&ED), rivalry is trumping co-operation. The best that can be expected this year is that the dialogue helps stem a slide into something more dangerous.

An implicit challenge by China to the American-led world order has become explicit, as will be apparent at this year’s Shangri-La Dialogue, an annual high-level powwow on regional security to be held in Singapore from June 3rd to 5th. The venue China has chosen for this contest is the South China Sea, where its territorial claims overlap with those of Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam (and are mirrored by those of Taiwan). That is where it has been throwing its weight around most alarmingly.

China’s building over the past three years of artificial islands on some much-disputed rocks and reefs has per-turbed the littoral states and exposed the hollowness of America’s naval predominance. American might has not deterred the construction spree; and it is hard to see how, short of full-blown war, the new islands will ever be either dismantled or snatched from Chinese control. America and China accuse each other of “militarising” the sea. Having insisted its island-building in the Spratly archipelago was for purely civilian purposes, the Chinese defence ministry used a row last month over its fighter-jets’ dangerous buzz-ing of an American reconnaissance plane to argue for “the total correctness and utter necessity of China’s construction of defensive facilities on the relevant islands”.

In fact, despite sending warships on “freedom-of-navigation operations” near Chinese-claimed features, and having an aircraft-carrier group on patrol in the sea, America seems to be trying very hard not to provoke China too much. China is also anxious to avoid conflict. The prime concern of the ruling Communist Party is to retain power. As a way of losing it, fighting a war with America might be the most certain as well as the most catastrophic. Yet, at a time of slowing economic growth, the party increas-ingly relies on its appeal to Chinese nationalism. In this


sense, as Mr Kausikan noted elsewhere in his lectures, “the very insignificance of the territories in dispute in the South China Sea may well be part of their attraction to Beijing.” Nobody expects America to go to war over a Spratly.

What alarms America is that Chinese behaviour in the South China Sea seems to fit a pattern. In a speech on May 27th Ash Carter, the defence secretary, made a point belaboured by American leaders: that “On the seas, in cyberspace, in the global economy and elsewhere, China has benefited from the principles and systems that others have worked to establish and uphold, including us.” What, Americans wonder, is China’s problem? No coun-try has gained more from the current order. Yet now, said [Dr] Carter, “China sometimes plays by its own rules, undercutting those principles.” The result: a “Great Wall of self-isolation”. Chinese analysts counter that America, too, plays by its own rules. A foreign-ministry spokes-woman accused [Dr] Carter of being stuck in “the cold-war era”, and implied his officials were typecasting China as a Hollywood villain.

Indeed, as [Dr] Carter suggested, it is not just in its maritime adventurism that China is at odds with America. Old differences widen, as new ones crop up. It is hard for American leaders to ignore human-rights lobbyists, at a time when China is conducting one of its harshest crack-downs on dissent in recent years. Nor is American business brimming with enthusiasm for China. Rather, it grumbles about cyber-espionage, the theft of intellectual property, the stalling of negotiations on a bilateral investment treaty and a general perception that the trajectory of economic policy in China is no longer towards gradually increasing openness, but towards greater autarky and protectionism. It does not help that massive Chinese overcapacity in indus-tries such as steel is generating trade disputes and fuelling anti-Chinese tirades in America’s election campaign.

It used to be argued that, despite manifold areas of ten-sion between China and America, the relationship was so complex and multilayered there would always be miti-gating areas of mutual benefit. One of the reasons why relations are so fraught now is that such bright spots are so few. Most hopeful are shared commitments to move to cleaner energy and limit carbon emissions. Last year’s S&ED saw a “breakthrough”, on curtailing the ivory trade to protect elephants. The two countries are also co-operating for now in trying to curb North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. But the suspicion lingers that China worries more about the enforcement of sanctions that might topple the odious regime in Pyongyang than about North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction.

One no-trumpA final reason for scepticism about the S&ED’s prospects is the leadership politics of the two countries. It is a forum for bureaucrats. But China’s have to some extent been side-

lined under the presidency of Xi Jinping, who has grabbed power for small party groups that he heads. So, in Beijing, the Americans may be talking to the wrong people. And, on their own side, Barack Obama’s presidency is ending. China may have taken his cautious foreign policy into account in pushing its claims in the South China Sea. It doubtless suspects that under either Donald Trump or Hillary Clinton, America is likely to be less of a pushover.

©2016, The Economist Reprinted with permission

Associated Press4 June

China says it will ignore South China Sea lawsuit decisionSINGAPORE (AP) — China said Saturday that it will ignore the decision of an international arbitration panel in the Philippines’ lawsuit against Beijing’s sweeping territo-rial claims in the South China Sea.

“To put it simply, the arbitration case actually has gone beyond the jurisdiction” of a U.N. arbitration panel, said Rear Adm. Guan Youfei, director of the foreign affairs office of China’s National Defense Ministry.

The Philippines has filed a case in the United Nations under the U.N. Convention on Law of the Sea, question-ing China’s territorial claim in the South China Sea. An arbitration panel is expected to rule on the case soon. The Permanent Court of Arbitration ruled last year that it has jurisdiction over the case despite China’s rejection.

“Because the territorial and sovereignty disputes have not been subjected to the arbitration, we think the arbitra-tion is illegal,” Guan told reporters on the sidelines of an international security conference here. “Therefore, we do not participate in it nor accept it.”

Guan’s statement is a reiteration of China’s longstand-ing position that it wants to settle its disputes with various countries on a bilateral basis and that it will not accept international mediation.

Still, it gains significance because of the overtures made by Philippine President-elect Rodrigo Duterte, who said recently that he is open to bilateral negotiations with China. This has given Beijing an opening that it hopes to lever-age in the event the panel rules in favor of the Philippines. China also has conflicting claims in the sea with Taiwan, Indonesia, Vietnam and Brunei, who all are looking for U.S. help, much to Beijing’s chagrin.

“The new Philippine leader also said that the Philippines hopes to conduct a dialogue with China,” Guan said. “We hope the Philippines could get back on to the track of dia-logue. The door to dialogue is always open.”

Earlier Saturday, India’s defense minister told the confer-ence, known as the Shangri-La Dialogue, that it is in China’s


economic interest to reduce tensions in the South China Sea.“It is ultimately economics,” Defense Minister Manohar

Parrikar said. “If you have an unstable region like what we have in the Middle East, I don’t think economics and pros-perity will really (be) enhanced.”

Although India is not a party to the South China Sea disputes, China is its traditional adversary. They fought a war in 1962, in which India lost land to China.

Parrikar said that however small or “however powerful” a country may be, “no commerce or commercial activity takes place in a highly tense (region). And I think it is in the interest of everyone, including China, to ensure that the peace remains in this region.”

Separately, Japanese Defense Minister Gen Nakatani said it was “getting increasingly important for all nations in the region to establish the order based on the rule of the law.”

Indirectly referring to China, he said that “powerful nations are required to act with self-restraint so as to avoid contingency.”

China claims virtually the entire South China Sea as its own, overlapping with territory claimed by other Southeast Asian governments. It has also started building airstrips on artificial islands it built on once-submerged reefs, much to the chagrin of the United States, which worries the buildup will impede freedom of navigation in the busy area.

The three-day Shangri-La Dialogue, which is being attended by defense ministers and experts from 25 coun-tries, ends Sunday and covers topics that also include terrorism, cybercrime and North Korea’s nuclear ambitions.

©2016, Associated Press Reprinted with permission

Xinhua4 June

Defense ministers, officials emphasize cooperation to combat global terrorism at Shangri-La Dialogue

SINGAPORE, June 4 (Xinhua) -- Defense ministers, mili-tary officials and experts called for cooperation between countries to combat terrorism during the ongoing 15th Shangri-La Dialogue on Saturday.

During a luncheon hosted by Singapore Minister for Defense Ng Eng Hen for participating ministers and their representatives, the ministers had an in-depth discussion on the global threat of terrorism.

The ministers viewed terrorism as a clear and present threat that no country can single-handedly manage given its amorphous and transboundary nature. They also talked about the threat of home-grown terrorists, Islamophobia, the danger of marginalizing moderate Muslims, and the

battle of ideology against Islamic State (IS).They stressed that international and regional coopera-

tion was necessary to effectively prevent terrorists from gaining a foothold in this region, especially given the threat of returning fighters.

At a forum on the same day, Malaysian Defense Minister Hishammuddin Hussein said the fight against IS has become “one of our greatest challenges today.”

He added that combating terrorism needs cooperation between countries in a non-traditional way.

“The scale and economic capability of IS is stronger than al-Qaida. They have telecommunication and mili-tary facilities, so the conventional way of anti-terrorism no longer works,” he said. “We need a different strategy, a more tailored approach that moves past outmoded forms of conventional warfare.”

The minister also urged countries to promote the aware-ness of terrorism or extremism among the public, and work together to exchange expertise and enhance coordination.

Lt. Gen. Glorioso Miranda, acting chief of staff of the Philippines armed forces, said terrorism is “no doubt” the worst security issue in this generation. However, he stressed that terrorism in the Asia-Pacific region is different from IS in the Middle East.

“The social and political situation, which are much better than the Middle East, does not provide hotbeds for radical terrorism, so extreme terrorism will not take root in this area. But the ideology of Jihad does exist in the region,” he added.

Therefore, he proposed countries enhance cooperation in areas such as transnational maritime cooperation as well as information sharing and social media.

“Terrorist activities aim to trigger fear of civil society, and also try to inspire other groups to follow suit. They spread their Jihad ideology on the internet, which all coun-tries should pay attention to, and collaborate with each other to implement online sanctions,” Miranda said.

Indonesian Defence Minister Ryamizard Ryacudu also called on countries in the region to make a “more serious and concerted effort” to defeat IS.

“It’s not easy because the threats are new ... but it can be done if we share good practices with those going through (radicalism) around the globe, networking and sharing intelligence among different agencies,” he noted.

Over 560 delegates from 52 nations and regions, includ-ing 32 official delegations, attended the 15th Shangri-La Dialogue, an Asia-Pacific defense and security summit, which kicked off here on Friday.

©2016, Xinhua Reprinted with permission


Australian Financial Review5 June

Shangri-La Dialogue: Australia failed to play full role in vital maritime debateBy Rory Medcalf

A contest far more consequential than the Australian election took the stage in Singapore at the weekend, and Australia missed a chance to influence it.

Many national defence ministers spoke out at the lead-ing regional security forum, the Shangri-La Dialogue. They advocated a rules-based order in Asia, in the face of the worsening tensions in the South China Sea and the impending decision by an international arbitration tribunal in The Hague on maritime differences between China and the Philippines.

It was quite the roll-call. The US, Japan, India, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Vietnam, France, Britain and Canada: all broadly in step in arguing for the interests of smaller powers to be respected, in messages clearly aimed at China.

This was an embodiment of the “principled security net-work” that US Secretary of Defence Ashton Carter called for in his keynote speech – a network China can choose to join or reject.

Unfortunately, Defence Minister Marise Payne was not there – the first time in the summit’s 15-year history that an Australian minister has not used this platform.

To be fair, the tightly fought election campaign was plainly the reason. Friends in fellow democracies presum-ably understood. Moreover, Australia was well represented in the summit’s bilateral meetings by the Chief of Defence Force as well as top foreign affairs and intelligence officials.

Even so, these are not normal times in regional security and Australia’s voice matters.

Trump’s erratic shadowAustralia has an important story to tell about its new defence white paper – which, ironically, underscores the need for much better defence-related diplomacy. And there are real expectations for Australia to show solidarity with regional partners and support for shared principles such as freedom of navigation and overflight.

After all, anxieties among our many fellow powers in the middle are not just about Chinese military modernisa-tion, assertiveness and unilateralism.

They are also about American reliability in the erratic shadow of Donald Trump, with his daft and dangerous message about allies such as Japan and South Korea fend-ing for themselves, if need be by breaking treaties and making their own nuclear weapons.

Defence Secretary Carter was determined to pre-empt such uncertainty with well-pitched remarks about the enduring US commitment to Asia and encouragement of the web of ties allies and partners are building among themselves.

Australia drew special mention, not least for crea-tive diplomacy in forging closer links with Japan, India, Singapore and others. He didn’t say it, but these middle power coalitions are the seeds of a hedge against the bad possibilities of Chinese efforts to dominate a region in which America’s credibility faces doubt.

Notably, in Australia’s absence, it was these and other powers that stepped up to confirm the view that our shared Indo-Pacific region is unashamedly multipolar in character, and not a lake for some imagined “G2” of China and the US.

Indian Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar picked up the Australian-championed concept of the Indo-Pacific – the fact that the two oceans are now one strategic system, with China now active in the Indian Ocean. He emphasised India was “acting East” and looking to deepen partnership with the US, Japan, Australia and Vietnam.

Convergent interestJapanese Defence Minister Gen Nakatani stressed his country’s reliance on a rules-based order and like-minded partnerships. He emphasised Australia, without a hint of the deep disappointment in Tokyo over the recent deci-sion against buying Japanese submarines. This reminds us of how shared Australian and Japanese security interests have become.

More surprising still was the presence and the points made by powers geographically distant from Asia.

French Defence Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian, who affirmed that France now saw Asia as the Indo-Pacific, was forthright in support of freedom of navigation. He said that the French Navy would continue to be present in regional waters, and called for greater co-ordination of EU navy activities in Asian waters.

He also declared an ambition to make the Australia-France relationship a true strategic partnership, with submarine-building just one convergent interest.

And even while Britain and Canada speak of a “golden age” of economic relations with Beijing, their ministers underscored the need to balance this with directness and independence in favour of a rules-based system.

But all ears were on the US and Chinese speeches, espe-cially once Carter openly warned China its militarised island-building in the South China Sea could become a “Great Wall of self-isolation”.

Profound effectsThe metaphor hit a nerve. The next day, Chinese Admiral Sun Jianguo insisted that China was not isolated in regional


diplomacy. Yet there was plenty of evidence to the contrary in the barrage of questions from many other nationalities in the room.

Admiral Sun’s tone was strident – perhaps because his speech was broadcast live for audiences at home. But elsewhere there were reminders that Beijing’s policies are not set in stone: one Chinese general told a side-meeting that internal debate was “ongoing” about what China’s notorious “9-dash line” claim around the South China Sea actually means.

Whether the future of those waters is about conflict, coercion or conciliation, it will affect the world profoundly. There is every reason for every country to seize every opportunity to shape it.

©2016, Australian Financial Review Reprinted with permission

Bangkok Post5 June

Prayut urges new Asean ‘equilibrium’By Anucha Charoenpo

Singapore - Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha has urged Southeast Asian nations to become more united and increase their role in building a new equilibrium in the Asia-Pacific region as it witnesses the manoeuvrings of the world’s superpowers.

Gen Prayut, who was invited to give the keynote speech at the 15th Shangri-La Dialogue, Asia Security Summit in Singapore, said the security and potential of the region are encouraging major countries to expand their political, eco-nomic and social influence.

Therefore, Asean member states need to “be united and step up their roles in building a strategic new equi-librium in the region in order to support an atmosphere of peace”, and to enable all sides to abide by principles, regulations and values that are universally accepted as constructive.

Asean members have clearly demonstrated they can create a zone of peace among themselves after the conflicts of the past, and are achieving the goal of the bloc’s found-ing fathers of building a dynamic community, he said.

Gen Prayut, who took over as prime minister after the coup of May 22, 2014, is the latest leader to address other leaders of Asia-Pacific states at the Shangri-La Dialogue, including Singaporean premier Lee Hsien Loong and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe.

US Defence Secretary Ashton Carter also attended, warning yesterday Chinese construction on a South China Sea islet claimed by the Philippines would prompt “actions being taken”.

Gen Prayut said the US is rebalancing its policies to push the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which Thailand

is interested in, and is boosting its appeal through studies and public hearings over all sectors.

Meanwhile, China has its “One Belt, One Road” policy and is seeking to advance business opportunities through the Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP) and Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), he said.

Russia has a policy that focuses on Asia and the Eurasian Economic Union, and India has its “Act East Policy”.

“The US, China and Japan remain the most important players in the region, while India, Russia, Australia and South Korea are becoming more important,” the prime minister said.

Gen Prayut said that while China considers that its economic growth and the development of its security capa-bilities are being carried out in a peaceful and constructive manner, many countries are concerned these developments will affect the balance of power and security in the Asia-Pacific region.

“This is a challenge. We must come up with ways and means for joint cooperation, we must initiate joint activities constructively so as to help narrow gaps and create balance in the regional architecture for our mutual benefit,” he said.

“Thailand’s equilibrium and resilience will help main-tain and protect Asean’s equilibrium, which will be vital towards creating a new strategic equilibrium in the Asia-Pacific.”

Geetha Govindasamy, a senior lecturer at the University of Malaya’s Department of East Asian Studies, said it would not be easy for Asean members to comply with Gen Prayut’s ideas on building equilibrium because each country has its own approach to security. Some solve their problems through bilateral talks, for example.

Apart from the strategic new equilibrium proposal, Gen Prayut also said Thailand has been paying much attention to seven security challenges.

These were tensions in the South China Sea and East China Sea, the situation on the Korean Peninsula, terrorism and extremism, the stockpiling of military arms, irregular migration, cybersecurity and climate change and disas-ter mitigation. He warned Asean must be united over its approach to maritime disputes as peace and stability in maritime areas are of mutual benefit to all.

“All sides must recognise the importance of maritime disputes, to preserve peace and stability with these issues, to have freedom of overflight and freedom of navigation, as well as to support peaceful resolutions to the disputes in line with international law,” he said.

The prime minister also raised concerns over the threat presented by North Korea’s nuclear programme and called on the Six Party Talks involving China, the US, North and South Korea, Japan and Russia to lessen tensions through diplomacy.

©2016, Bangkok Post Reprinted with permission


Nikkei Asian Review5 June

China raises the stakes at Shangri-La DialogueBy Daniel Twining

One country is militarizing the South China Sea and desta-bilizing the peace of Asia. One country is creating wedges between regional powers to prevent cooperation in resolv-ing Southeast Asian maritime disputes. One country is isolating itself by seeding regional conflict that could undercut Asia’s economic miracle.

Indo-Pacific powers concerned about its armed revi-sionism in maritime Asia would identify this country as China. But in the eyes of Admiral Sun Jianguo of China’s Central Military Commission, who on Sunday represented his country in Singapore as a keynote speaker at this year’s Shangri-La Dialogue, that dangerous nation is in fact the United States.

In the Chinese narrative, it is America’s military alliances and presence in the region that contribute to instability in Asia. According to Admiral Sun, the U.S. has decided to “sabotage [China’s] path of peace for selfish gains,” has pursued a “zero-sum mentality” rather than embracing “win-win cooperation,” has offered support through alli-ances that have “enabled small countries to make trouble against big countries,” and has single-handedly “milita-rized” the South China Sea in ways that have sown discord among otherwise harmonious Asian nations.

By contrast, the admiral called for a new model for Asian security that excludes the U.S. -- which might indeed promote peace in the region, albeit at the price of accepting a hierarchical regional order in which lesser powers defer to China’s wishes and subordinate their sovereign rights as part of a new Sinosphere.

Contrasting perspectivesDuring the dialogue, organized by the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies and held annu-ally at Singapore’s Shangri-La Hotel, U.S. Secretary of Defense Ash Carter offered a very different perspective on Asia’s future, focused on inclusiveness. He spoke of a “principled security network” that included all regional states, working with the U.S. and each other to safeguard freedom of the regional commons, the territorial integrity of member states, and the peaceful resolution of disputes according to international law. He argued that China was building a “Great Wall of self-isolation” by threatening Asia’s rule-based order in ways that were eroding, not improving, its strategic position.

John McCain, chairman of the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, reasserted America’s historic commit-

ment to an open economic and political order in Asia, in an attempt to reassure Asian allies troubled by both China’s revanchism and U.S. presidential candidate Donald Trump’s protectionism. Senator Lindsey Graham spoke of how Bashar al-Assad’s crossing of President Barack Obama’s “red line” in Syria, followed by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, had eroded U.S. deterrence powers, underscor-ing the importance of responding to China’s attempts to redraw Asia’s maritime map.

Asian anxiety is a product not only of Chinese revi-sionism but of questions about the future of America’s commitment to remain the region’s security guarantor. Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell argued that the most critical variable for Asia’s future is not the growth of Chinese power but the extent to which America will sustain its regional leadership. As long as U.S. engagement is assured, the strategic problems of Chinese expansionism, North Korea’s missile and nuclear threat, and contested maritime commons can be managed through old and new networks of security providers, encompassing friendly powers from India in the south to Japan in the east. If America was to withdraw from the region, all bets would be off, he said.

Gen Nakatani, Japan’s Defense Minister, meanwhile warned the Shangri-La gathering of “unilateral and coer-cive claims and actions” that undermine the region’s maritime order and threaten to “tear apart” hitherto peace-ful relations among Asian nations. Vietnam’s Deputy Defense Minister, Senior Lt. General Nguyen Chi Vinh, warned that China’s “unilateralism and coercion” would, if not addressed, “lead to armed crisis.”

India’s Defense Minister, Manohar Parrikar, empha-sized that India’s maritime interests stretched from Suez to the shores of the Pacific. He pointed out that more than half of India’s trade moves through the South China Sea and warned that Asia’s shared prosperity was in danger from aggressive behavior in the contested waters. He staked out India’s determination to uphold freedom of navigation and overflight to protect “seamless connectivity” across the Indian and Pacific Oceans.

Under hard questioning from representatives of many Asia-Pacific nations about China’s unilateral claims to con-trol of nearly all the South China Sea, China’s Admiral Sun fell back on Beijing’s historic “Nine Dash Line” claims to the region, including those he insisted the international community had recognized in 1949 when the Chinese Communist Party took power. A retired Indian official pointed out that if such historical claims were the basis of maritime rights today, India could stake out a “Fifty Dash Line” stretching from the Red Sea to the Strait of Malacca, reflecting the maritime expanse controlled by the British Raj in the heyday of empire.

As the International Court of Arbitration in The Hague prepares to rule in a case brought by the Philippines about


China’s violation of international maritime law, Chinese officials are engaged in a preemptive campaign to discredit the tribunal’s competence and jurisdiction. They have organized a rogues’ gallery of landlocked autocracies like Sudan and Belarus to support China’s position in the event of a ruling against it. Many Asia-Pacific nations fear that China’s rejection of an international legal judgment against it will only widen the fault lines in maritime Asia, requiring the U.S. and its partners to adopt a more robust position against China’s claims.

This eventuality raises the risk that, despite China’s protestations, the U.S. is doing not too much to challenge revisionism in the South China Sea, but rather too little. Infrequent freedom of navigation operations (FONOPS) by the U.S. Navy have invoked “innocent passage” when entering the territorial limits of China’s artificial islets, in some ways recognizing rather than undercutting Beijing’s position. U.S. military allies like Japan and Australia, and great powers like India, have been reluctant to conduct their own FONOPs, despite their rhetorical and in some cases operational support for U.S. forces.

Should China continue its strategy to assert sovereign control over a waterway through which one-third of all international trade flows, concerned Asia-Pacific powers may well have to signal more clearly to Beijing that a number of Chinese interests will be put at risk. A spat over a few rocks and reefs may strengthen President Xi Jinping’s nationalistic claim to be restoring China’s histori-cal rights over Asian waterways, reinforcing Communist Party rule at home. But if this behavior should jeopardize other Chinese equities -- for instance in Taiwan, Tibet, or in the realm of international finance -- China’s leadership may understand that the game is not worth the candle. Until then, representatives from Asia-Pacific nations leave the Shangri-La Dialogue less reassured than worried about the further deterioration of regional peace, and less inclined to embrace China than to work with America to balance against it.

©2016, Nikkei Asian Review Reprinted with permission

Yonhap5 June

Shangri-La Dialogue highlights deepening S. Korea–China row over THAADBy Park Boram

SINGAPORE, June 5 (Yonhap) -- China opposes South Korea and the United States’ plans to deploy the advanced American THAAD air defense shield on the Korean Peninsula, China’s military No. 2 once again made it clear

during an annual regional forum in Singapore on Sunday, which became the latest venue to expose a deepening South Korea-China row over the defense system.

“China is opposed to the ongoing U.S. moves to deploy the THAAD system in South Korea,” China’s deputy chief of the general staff department Sun Jianguo said in a ple-nary session of the Asia Security Summit, known also as the Shangri-La Dialogue.

“This will erode the security of the (Asia-Pacific) region,” the admiral said in his capacity as China’s top representa-tive to the annual security forum.

“As a soldier myself, I am well aware of the meaning of (the deployment). Deploying THAAD in the Korean Peninsula is an excessive measure that by far exceeds cur-rent U.S. defense capabilities,” he noted.

The Asia Pacific region should reject the Cold War-era mindset and move in a way to intensify and deepen secu-rity cooperation, Sun also said.

“Non-conflict, non-confrontation as well as non-tar-geting for a third country should be pursued,” he added, apparently accusing the U.S. of zeroing in on China.

It was one of several awkward moments of tension brewing between South Korea and China over the THAAD system, or Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, during the three-day forum that closed its three-day run on Sunday.

South Korea-China defense chiefs’ talks held a day ear-lier exposed the deepening bilateral row over the issue once again.

In the half-hour meeting with Defense Minister Han Min-koo, Sun brought up China’s indignation with the deployment move, protesting that a deployment of THAAD infringes on China’s strategic interests.

Seoul’s defense chief countered the opposition, saying, “The discussion of THAAD deployment originated in a move to defend against North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats.”

Han stressed that “THAAD would only be aimed at North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats that are becom-ing more sophisticated.”

In his speech during a separate plenary session on Saturday, the South Korean official made his coun-try’s stance even more clear by saying that the country “undoubtedly has the will to deploy THAAD.”

In the speech, Han also poured himself into muster-ing international support for the ongoing South Korean initiative to denuclearize North Korea with sanctions and pressure.

“The Republic of Korea (South Korea) will not cling to such meaningless dialogue,” the defense minister said, referring to Seoul’s recent rejection of Pyongyang’s propos-als for working-level military talks.

“I put my emphasis on the fact that in order to achieve the denuclearization of North Korea, the international com-munity should unite together to implement sanctions and


pressure North Korea thoroughly,” Han later told reporters.In a trilateral meeting, Han, U.S. Defense Secretary Ash

Carter and Japanese Defense Minister Gen Nakatani reaf-firmed Saturday their commitment to work together to counter North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats.

The defense ministers from the three countries came to an understanding that the partners “are facing common challenges, including North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats” and forged a pledge to step up military collabo-ration under the three-way framework, especially on the crucial sector of information sharing on North Korean security threats.

In a separate meeting that day, Nakatani proposed forg-ing a military intelligence sharing pact, but Han shrugged that off by saying, “Paving the way to lay the foundation for the GSOMIA is (more) important,” a comment in reflection of still unfavorable sentiments in South Korea over forging the sensitive military deal with the former colonial ruler.

These were rare moments in the defense ministerial-level meeting occasioned by the Shangri-La Dialogue which brought together some 500 defense and diplomatic officials and experts from 52 countries, including defense ministers from 23 out of all participant nations.

©2016, Yonhap Reprinted with permission

Bernama5 June

Change in strategy needed to address Daesh threatsSINGAPORE: A different strategy and a more tailored approach which seeks to move past outmoded forms of conventional warfare is needed to address the rising threats posed by the Daesh militant group.

Malaysia’s Defence Minister Datuk Seri Hishammuddin Tun Hussein said the tailored strategies should be the guid-ing principle in the fight against the terrorist group.

“We must realise that Daesh is not the usual terrorist group we are used to dealing with. Daesh is not al-Qaeda. They differ in their goals but are partly rooted in their his-tories,” he said during his plenary address on the second day of the International Institute for Strategic Studies’ (IISS) 15th Shangri-La Dialogue security summit which opened here Friday.

Hishammuddin said terrorist organisations like al-Qaeda had only hundreds of active cells, could not directly confront military forces, preyed on civilians and most importantly, they did not claim control of territories.

Daesh on the other hand, asserted control over vast amounts of oil-rich land which had allowed the group to build a self-sustaining financial model, unthinkable for most terrorist groups.

“At present, they boast more than 31,000 fighters with extensive military capabilities engaging in sophisticated operations while controlling lines of vital communication and commanding infrastructure.

“This is why conventional counter-terrorism and coun-ter-insurgency strategies have not and will never work against Daesh,” Hishammuddin said.

He stressed that Daesh was a clear and present danger to the Asia-Pacific, both in the form of potential returned fighters and self-radicalised lone wolves.

“They also have the potential to exacerbate instability in the region’s hotspots, such as the southern halves of the Philippines and Thailand as well as exploiting other fault-lines in the region.

“It is pure, unrefined evil that if left unchecked could poison our future. We have scored some successes against it on several fronts but we are by no means safe,” said Hishammuddin.

The Daesh threat, he said, could not be resolved by simply bombing certain countries into submission, nor could it be resolved by knee-jerk reactions.

“We need to agree on a comprehensive plan to defeat Daesh, and the plan needs to involve greater cooperation of all parties including, but not limited to the military.

“Destroying it could very well be the greatest challenge of our generation,” Hishamuddin said.

©2016, Bernama Reprinted with permission

Financial Times6 June

Beijing defies criticism as it charts course in S China SeaBy Ben Bland

Ashton Carter, US secretary of defence, led a chorus of inter-national voices criticising China at the weekend Shangri-La Dialogue, an annual security forum in Singapore, warning that Beijing seems to be building “a great wall of self-isola-tion” in Asia.

But defence officials and analysts say the rhetorical battle against Beijing’s territorial ambitions in the South China Sea obscures the fact that China has succeeded in changing the status quo in these resource-rich waters.

“Last year everyone was warning about the threat from China’s island-building plans but they’ve now constructed runways for fighters, ports and radar facilities in the South China Sea,” said one European diplomat in Singapore. “They’ve altered the facts on the water and there is nothing anyone can do about it now.”

Beijing claims almost the entire South China Sea and in recent years has become increasingly assertive in pushing


its case against the other claimants: Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam.

Citing concerns about the impact on freedom of naviga-tion and regional stability, the US has hit back, launching navy and air patrols close to the new Chinese islands and deepening ties with Asian nations including Vietnam and the Philippines.

The new Chinese facilities, built on reefs in the Spratly Islands, will extend the reach of the air force, navy and coast guard as well as the fleet of fishing boats sent out to maintain what Beijing calls its “historic rights” to this sea.

A senior defence official from Indonesia, which has pro-tested against recent incursions into its waters by Chinese fishing boats and a coast guard vessel, said he was “very worried” about Beijing’s growing audacity.

“Diplomats can criticise China but we badly need more equipment to boost our eyes and ears at sea so we can manage this threat better,” he said.

In addition to the tensions on the water, China is also facing a legal battle at the permanent court of arbitration in The Hague, where the Philippines has brought a case challenging Beijing’s “nine-dash line” claim to almost the entire sea.

In Singapore, [Dr] Carter joined counterparts from Japan, France, the UK and other nations in accusing China of disregarding international law by refusing to recognise the right of the court to hear the case, in which a ruling is expected within months.

Chinese officials, who have struggled to find many sup-porters for their position beyond the likes of Russia and Belarus, retorted that the Philippines was twisting interna-tional law and that the US was hypocritical because it has yet to ratify the UN law of the sea under which the case was brought.

Despite the condemnations of China’s stance in Singapore, Beijing hopes to use its economic might — and threat of further military pressure — to win over incoming Philippines president Rodrigo Duterte.

He has suggested that he could take a softer line on the maritime disputes and enter bilateral negotiations with Beijing in exchange for investment in the Philippines and joint exploitation of natural resources.

“The big wild card in the South China Sea right now is Mr Duterte and whether he seeks talks with China,” said Euan Graham, a security analyst at the Lowy Institute, a think-tank in Sydney.

The question mark over Mr Duterte, who takes office at the end of the month, highlights how China can use its economic and military power to support its position, regardless of international criticism.

“Don’t think China can be ganged up against,” said Yao Yunzhu, a defiant but good-humoured Chinese major-general who was busily fighting back against US rhetoric at the Shangri-La Dialogue. “China is too deeply

integrated into the world, economically, politically and in terms of security.”

©2016, Financial Times Reprinted with permission

Xinhua6 June

Delegates urge concerted efforts for further cooperation at Shangri-La Dialogue

SINGAPORE, June 6 (Xinhua) -- Delegates who partici-pated in the 15th Shangri-La Dialogue here exchanged views on counter-terrorism, cyber security, current situa-tion on the Korean Peninsula and the South China Sea as well as other issues related to regional peace and stability, urging concerted efforts for further cooperation.

Admiral Sun Jianguo, deputy chief of the Joint Staff Department of China’s Central Military Commission, deliv-ered a speech at the 15th Shangri-La Dialogue on Sunday. Sun elaborated on the new governance model from the defense and military perspective, stressing all countries should stick to the path of peaceful development and aban-don the outdated zero-sum mentality.

“The Asia-Pacific countries should refuse the Cold War mentality, deepen and expand security cooperation featur-ing no-conflict, no-confrontation, no targeting against a third party, mutual benefit and win-win,” said Sun.

Vietnam’s Deputy Minister of National Defense Nguyen Chi Vinh emphasized that cooperative mechanisms are crucial for trust and confidence building, and it is a must for nations to maneuver their cooperative and competitive processes in the struggle for settling differences and resolv-ing conflict.

He quoted Vietnamese leader Ho Chi Minh’s words, saying “to achieve peace, we must adhere to the princi-ple of equality, non-interference into each other’s internal affairs, non-aggression, mutual respect for national sover-eignty, territorial integrity and independence”.

Meanwhile, Singapore’s Defense Minister Ng Eng Hen stressed the threat of terrorism and called for security forces in Asia-Pacific countries to enhance cooperation, combine resources for operations.

“Collectively, we must work closely together to build up joint responses, and strengthen intelligence, surveil-lance and reconnaissance efforts,” Ng said.

Inaugurated in 2002, the Shangri-La Dialogue has now become a prestigious platform to discuss security issues among defence ministers, senior security officials, military chiefs, diplomats and executives.

Recalling the history of Shangri-La Dialogue, Huang Jing, professor and director of the Center on Asia and


Globalization, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore, told Xinhua that the Shangri-La Dialogue not only functions as a platform for communication, but also offers opportunities for the par-ticipates to better understand other countries’ views or elaborate on their own countries’ defense policies.

Huang said the agenda of the Shangri-La Dialogue has changed over the years following the security situation in the Asia-Pacific region and around the globe.

“Starting as small-scale meetings on security issues in the early stage, the Shangri-La Dialogue has developed over the past years and established itself as a crucial gathering with various regional and international topics included,” Huang added.

Organized by the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), the three-day Shangri-La Dialogue wrapped up here on Sunday afternoon. This year’s Shangri-La Dialogue attracted over 560 delegates from 52 nations and regions, including 32 official delegations.

©2016, Xinhua Reprinted with permission

Foreign Policy6 June

Europeans Push Back Against Beijing in the South China SeaBy Keith Johnson and Dan de Luce

France has thrown its hat into the acrimonious South China Sea debate, calling for more European naval patrols in a contested waterway that is at the center of a growing dispute between China and the United States and its Asian allies.

French Defense Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian, speaking Sunday at a three-day security conference in Singapore, called on European navies to have a “regular and visible” presence in the region to uphold the law of the sea and free-dom of navigation.

“If we want to contain the risk of conflict, we must defend this right and defend it ourselves,” he said.

Although the French defense minister did not explicitly call out China, his remarks amounted to thinly veiled criti-cism of Beijing, which has aggressively pursued its territorial claims in the South China Sea with vast dredging work and construction of military facilities on artificial islands.

“If the law of the sea is not respected today in the China seas, it will be threatened tomorrow in the Arctic, in the Mediterranean, or elsewhere,” Le Drian told the security conference, known as the Shangri-La Dialogue and hosted by the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

France’s stance marked the latest international pushback against China’s tough tactics in the strategic

waterway, where more than $5 trillion worth of goods pass through annually.

The Singapore conference gathered top defense offi-cials and diplomats from the region and beyond to hash through the security challenges facing Asia, especially the increasingly bitter spat over China’s claims to nearly the entire South China Sea. Beijing defended its policy at the forum and accused Washington of meddling in the region. But China was the target for indirect criticism from other countries, and U.S. Defense Secretary Ash Carter issued a stark warning to Beijing in a speech at the conference.

China would face unspecified U.S. “actions” if it tried to reclaim land at the disputed Scarborough Shoal off the coast of the Philippines, Carter said on Saturday.

And on Sunday, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, speaking ahead of a major summit this week with Beijing on economic and security issues, urged China to avoid declaring an air-defense identification zone over the South China Sea. Doing so, he said, would be a “provocative and destabilizing act.”

Since it started pressing its claims to little reefs and rocks, and feuding with other countries over fishing rights, Beijing has sought to keep the argument from being “inter-nationalized,” preferring to deal with its smaller neighbors on a one-to-one basis. China has regularly worked to keep the South China Sea disputes off the agenda at biannual meetings of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, which includes many of the countries with which Beijing is butting heads, especially the Philippines and Vietnam.

But China’s intransigence on sovereignty and ter-ritorial issues, coupled with an increasingly aggressive deployment of muscled-up coast guard ships, a rapidly modernizing navy, and a building spree on reclaimed reefs, has driven many of those Southeast Asian countries closer to the United States. Washington, for example, just ended a ban on the sale of U.S. weapons to Vietnam and has redoubled defense ties with the Philippines.

Other Asian countries are also worried about China’s activities. Japan last year said it would consider carrying out naval patrols in the South China Sea, even though Tokyo and Beijing have their own heated dispute in the East China Sea. This year, India has become increasingly vocal about the challenge China poses to free navigation in the Western Pacific.

And now, with France’s comments, even European nations are advocating a more muscular response to Chinese encroachment. For France and Europe, said Le Drian, it’s not just about protecting economic and trade interests in the region. It’s also about upholding the inter-national order and rule of law.

Le Drian said he would soon provide more details on his proposal for regular patrols by European navies.

The timing of the French defense minister’s remarks was no accident. An international court in The Hague is due to


rule this month on a long-running dispute between China and the Philippines, and Beijing has rejected the tribunal’s authority while lobbying other governments to back its view. The Permanent Court of Arbitration is expected to rule against China, and Washington has been calling on Beijing to abide by the results of the decision.

“More EU involvement in the South China Sea is some-thing the United States has hoped to see for quite a while now,” Mira Rapp-Hooper, a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security, told Foreign Policy.

“The timing of the French call may also mean that we see European Union governments come out in vocal sup-port of the Hague decision in a few weeks,” she said.

France’s involvement in the Asia-Pacific region hasn’t been purely theoretical. It inked a $40 billion deal this year to sell advanced submarines to Australia, citing increased fears over the region’s security, and called for a greater French presence around its colonial possessions in the Southern Pacific.

Le Drian’s words over the weekend also offer a reminder that while China is trying to parlay its growing economic might in Europe into diplomatic dividends, some European heavyweights are still ready to push back against Beijing.

Chinese leaders want to overcome what they call a “cen-tury of humiliation,” which started with European naval imperialism in the Opium Wars of the 19th century and lasted through the end of the Chinese Civil War in 1949. But, ironically, their actions appear to be forcing European gunboats to again steam for the South China Sea.

©2016, Foreign Policy Reprinted with permission

The Diplomat9 June

The Other Sea That Dominated the 2016 Shangri-La DialoguePrashanth Parameswaran

A quick glance at the headlines from this year’s Shangri-La Dialogue – Asia’s premier defense summit – would suggest that the proceedings were overwhelmingly dominated by the South China Sea. But to those who attended the meet-ing, another body of water also featured prominently in the proceedings. Speech after speech, officials highlighted the importance of the Sulu Sea as a key front in confronting Asia’s manifold maritime challenges.

The Sulu Sea – or, more specifically, the one million square kilometer tri-border area in the Sulu-Sulawesi Seas between the southern Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia – has long been a hub for transnational organized crime and terrorist threats, with its porous borders and weak governance. Following the September 11 attacks, concerns

surfaced about Jemaah Islamiyah militants either coalesc-ing around or transiting through the area – concerns that linger with the rise of the Islamic State today. And in 2013, the invasion of Sabah by Filipino militants claiming to be linked to the Sulu sultanate exposed an irritant in Malaysia-Philippine relations and revealed the lingering inter-state tensions that still persist in the area.

But the development that thrust this front in Asia’s mar-itime space into the headlines in recent months once again was a spate of kidnappings of Indonesian and Malaysian nationals by the Philippine-based Abu Sayyaf Group. Though these incidents are far from uncommon, they seemed to have reached an inflection point, with the three countries formally agreeing to pursue trilateral patrols on the sidelines of the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting (ADMM) in Laos just a week ahead of the Shangri-La Dialogue.

To close observers of Southeast Asian security issues then, it was no surprise that the Sulu Sea played a rather outsized role in both formal and informal discussions at the Shangri-La Dialogue last weekend. Unsurprisingly, in formal proceedings, the states directly involved in the area focused on it the most. During a rather lengthy address at one of the plenary sessions, Indonesian Defense Minister Ryamizard Ryacudu reiterated his country’s concern that if threats were not confronted, the Sulu Sea could become a new Somalia, weakening economic trade and threatening maritime secu-rity. Meanwhile, at one of the breakout sessions, Lieutenant General Glorioso Miranda, the acting chief of staff for the Armed Forces of the Philippines, said that managing the maritime border area was one key prong of Manila’s effort to address terrorism and transnational threats.

But other countries chimed in as well, reflecting the fact that this maritime front has implications that extend beyond its immediate stakeholders. Singapore’s Defense Minister Ng Eng Hen described the Sulu Sea patrols as a “welcome initiative” to deal with terrorism and smuggling. Malaysian Defense Minister Hishammuddin Hussein had previously floated an observer role for both Singapore and Thailand in the Sulu Sea patrols since both countries were involved in the successful Malacca Straits Patrols (MSP), which com-memorates its tenth year in 2016. In his own address at the Shangri-La Dialogue, Hishammuddin again referenced the MSP as a model for cooperation in the Sulu Sea.

Cooperation in the Sulu Sea also warranted a reference from the United States, reflecting both Washington’s recog-nition of indigenous subregional efforts as well as its own growing role in assisting countries to work towards them. In his remarks, U.S. Defense Secretary Ash Carter cited the Sulu Sea patrols as an example of regional partners under-taking trilateral efforts of their own in support of what he termed as a “principled security network”.

Beyond rhetoric, Washington’s own collaboration with regional states is also increasingly factoring in this front.


For instance, in the midst of the Shangri-La Dialogue and in between the bilateral phases of the Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) exercises that Washington does with the Malaysian and Philippine militaries, the U.S., Philippine, and Malaysian navies con-ducted a coordinated multilateral training activity in the Sulu Sea on June 4. While the United States recognized the importance of the Sulu Sea in regional cooperation even prior the Obama administration, the move reflects the U.S. view that the Sulu Sea is one promising avenue through which Washington can pursue multilateralization with its Southeast Asian partners. That should come as no sur-prise, considering the fact that apart from assisting ASEAN countries, the United States itself has an interest in tack-ling challenges like terrorism, piracy, and kidnapping that could directly or indirectly affect its own citizens.

To be sure, it is too early to determine if the Sulu Sea’s prominent role at this year’s Shangri-La Dialogue is merely the product of a reaction to recent events or part of an increasing focus on this front that will sustain into the future. And while developments like multilateral patrols are promising, specifics are being ironed out about their nature (for instance, whether those patrols would be coor-dinated or joint). Furthermore, the challenge of managing such a porous and ungoverned space with its manifold threats will likely take some time even if multilateral col-laboration endures. All the more reason, then, to watch the Sulu Sea as a key front within Asia’s maritime space.

©2016, The Diplomat Reprinted with permission

Financial Times10 June

Singapore DiaryBy James Crabtree

The name Shangri-La conjures up romantic images of an earthly Asian paradise promising inner peace and love. So when I arrived last weekend at the annual Shangri-La Dialogue, a major security forum in Singapore for countries from east and west, I was a touch disappointed to discover that its organisers had not, in fact, named their gathering in honour of such harmonious visions. Instead it takes its name from a rather more humdrum source: the city-state’s Shangri-La hotel, where the summit was first held more than a decade ago.

In the years since, Shangri-La has become more promi-nent as Asia’s security troubles have worsened — all the more so this year given the way China and America have been niggling at one another over recent Chinese moves to build artificial military islands in the South China Sea. Inside, the gathering was undeniably grand, as 2,000 or so crisply uniformed generals, defence ministers, arms deal-

ers and other Dr Strangelove-types gathered in a cavernous ballroom beneath seven huge chandeliers.

On the podium, discussions largely took place in lan-guage decipherable only by the kind of geopolitical panjandrums who talk of threats to the global “rules-based order” and warned darkly about “hegemonic powers”. Yet the gist was not hard to grasp: namely that America and China are not getting on.

For all that, many delegates seemed almost energised by the prospect of a renewed great power rivalry. At the opening-night reception, I chatted with one well-known western politician, who waved a glass of beer cheerfully while extolling the virtues of futuristic weapons systems — notably a new ship-based laser capable of zapping Chinese boats from great distances, disabling them without killing anyone on board.

Such fancy kit, he said, could transform the “strategic equation in the Asia-Pacific”. Gazing over his shoulder at the assembled throng, I reflected that all of these carous-ing soldiers, admirals and spooks might represent our best hope of fending off world war three. I hoped they knew what they were playing at.

This was my first Shangri-La, but old hands told me to expect a regular pattern. The Americans kicked things off on day one, warning the Chinese to behave. Other friendly nations — the Japanese, Brits, and so on — then said much the same thing. In the evening, everyone repaired for a slap-up meal at Singapore’s presidential palace, and awaited the second day, and China’s reply.

The Chinese representative spoke last because Beijing declined to send its own defence minister to a gathering it viewed as biased, in part because it was organised by a British think-tank, the International Institute for Strategic Studies. Instead the country’s delegation was filled with more minor figures, many specialising in dealing with uncouth foreigners, a diplomatic class often known affec-tionately as “barbarian handlers”.

Two years ago this pattern worked to a tee, as the Chinese representative duly blew his stack on the final day, departing from prepared remarks to assail America in colourful terms. There was nothing quite so dramatic this time round, but the conference was nonetheless brought to a satisfying crescendo as a Chinese admiral in spotless white uniform delivered a closing rebuke to the US, a trio of golden epaulettes glistening on each shoulder.

Mixing good humour and well-rehearsed angry theat-rics, Admiral Sun Jianguo, deputy chief of general staff of the People’s Liberation Army, warned: “We do not make trouble, but we have no fear of trouble.” Again the meaning was pretty clear: China knows who ought to be in charge in the South China Sea. The clue is in the name.

The real action at Shangri-La happened behind closed doors, as ministers scurried off for private meetings with one another — a kind of diplomatic speed-dating that,


in theory, ought to help heavily armed nations to avoid coming to blows. Those of us excluded from these high-level confabs were reduced to gossiping about another figure looming over proceedings: Donald Trump.

The real estate tycoon’s White House run was greeted with unanimous horror by delegates from western powers. For the Chinese, however, things looked somewhat differ-ent. “He is a businessman who does transactions, and the Chinese love deals,” one visitor from China told me. “Also, he will do crazy things with Mexico and in the Middle East. This would distract America from Asia. For Beijing, this would be a blessing.”

So great is the anxiety about China’s island-building around Asia that it is even creating imaginary conflicts — as with a spat the week before Shangri-La over a new holi-day spot called Funtasy Island. Although officially part of Indonesia, the resort lies a short boat-ride from Singapore and is operated by a company from the city-state.

Rather unwisely, that company produced a map featur-ing Singapore and Funtasy Island in the same colour. The Indonesians spied an island-grab, and even dispatched a small group of soldiers to the resort to reassert sovereignty by waving Indonesian flags.

All this left Singapore baffled, and protesting that it had no designs on the island in the first place. Yet the episode provides a wider warning. If even palm-fringed holiday resorts can now become Asian diplomatic flashpoints, it will take considerable effort on all sides to ensure no one ends up fighting on the beaches once again.

©2016, Financial Times Reprinted with permission

Carnegie Moscow Center10 June

Russia’s Prospective Niche on the Asian Security MarketBy Alexander Gabuev

Russia has finally hit on a security agenda of interest to its Asian partners. Buoyed by its success in Syria, Moscow is presenting itself as a standard-bearer in the war on Islamic terrorism and a source of cutting-edge practices for ASEAN countries that are facing this problem. The Syrian campaign is also helping to promote Russian military technology on Asian markets.

Despite its “pivot to the East,” Moscow had long been unable to formulate a regional security policy that would appeal to its Asian partners and explain why Russia should be more involved in the region. Nothing reflected this more clearly than the speeches Russian officials delivered at the Singapore Shangri-La Dialogue, the Asian counterpart to the Munich Security Conference.

Russia is represented at this high-profile forum by Deputy Defense Minister Anatoly Antonov, whose speeches in the last two years have elicited at best confusion and at worst cutting ridicule. In his 2014 address, which came soon after the Euromaidan revolution in Ukraine, Antonov said that the biggest threat that the Asia-Pacific region faces comes from Western-sponsored color revolutions and the resurgence of Nazism in Eastern Europe.

In 2015, a few months after the war in eastern Ukraine broke out, the deputy defense minister focused on Russia’s efforts to increase transparency in its military activity (though he couldn’t refrain from mentioning the “Ukrainian nationalists”). In the serious level of conver-sation at the Singapore forum, which is dominated by discussions about territorial disputes, United States-China rivalry, and regional crises, all these references to Russia’s domestic policy sounded out of place and simply convinced those present that Russia either had a poor understanding of the situation in the region, or was turning into China’s subservient sidekick.

In this context, Russia’s latest address at the Singapore Forum can be considered a breakthrough. While this year’s conversation still revolved around the South China Sea and United States-China relations, putting the spotlight on U.S. Defense Secretary Ashton Carter and top Chinese repre-sentative Admiral Sun Jianguo, the subject of international terrorism, especially the potential radicalization of Muslims in South and Southeast Asia, unexpectedly became another important subject at the forum.

The defense ministers of the region’s two largest Muslim countries—Indonesia and Malaysia—spoke on this sub-ject at length. Singapore’s Defense Minister Ng Eng Hen was most vocal, recognizing the fact that fundamentalists with Syrian combat experience are active in the region. Even prosperous and ostensibly stable Singapore has seen an increase in radicalism among migrant workers from neighboring countries. The Singaporean press is filled with reports on the dangers of terrorism and instructions on what to do in the event of an explosion or hostage-taking.

The Russian Defense Ministry’s decision to focus on counterterrorism therefore fell on fertile ground this year. It’s not entirely clear whether the Russian offi-cials consciously chose to pursue a different approach, or whether they were still guided by Russia’s domestic agenda, where the Ukraine crisis has given way to the Syrian conflict. Whatever the thinking, the change in topic was very effective.

Antonov focused on international terrorism as a threat to global and regional stability in his speech at the forum’s final plenary session. He related the details of Russia’s mili-tary campaign in Syria and said his country was prepared to share its combat experience with states in the region. He was also less confrontational toward the United States. While criticizing Washington for trying to distinguish


between “good and bad terrorists” and for refusing closer cooperation with Russia on Syria, Antonov concluded that numerous issues of common interest make cooperation between the two countries inevitable.

The initial text of Antonov’s speech contained Russia’s official position on disputes in the South China Sea, accord-ing to which Russia doesn’t take sides in territorial disputes and supports their resolution on a bilateral basis without international involvement. The deputy defense minister refrained from reading this passage, possibly to placate his ASEAN partners. However, his failure to articulate Moscow’s position on the region’s most pressing security issue did not detract from the effectiveness of the speech.

In fact, everything seemed to go Russia’s way that day. Antonov spoke alongside the Singaporean and Canadian defense ministers. The speech after Antonov’s, given by the Singaporean official, one of the region’s preeminent experts on security in the Asia-Pacific, backed up the arguments of his Russian colleague in every respect. In the absence of a Chinese representative, who would usually face most of the questions, Antonov was left to field the majority of the audience queries and did so very well.

He spoke and answered questions in excellent English, turning the session into an interactive discussion. A few of his jokes made the audience laugh. (In contrast, Admiral Sun spoke Chinese, making it difficult for the audience to interact with him.) Antonov demonstrated his in-depth expertise on North Korea’s nuclear program and U.S. plans to deploy a missile defense system in the Asia-Pacific. Before switching to the defense sector, he worked for the Foreign Ministry, where he played an important role in Russia-United States negotiations on missile defense and the New START Treaty.

On the whole, the forum delegates saw the Russian address in a positive light. Many of them wanted to know the specifics of how Russia tracks militants who return home from Syria. Some other questions related to the exchange of intelligence data with Middle Eastern coun-tries. Even some American participants who stayed for the final session admitted that “the Russians looked a lot better than usual.”

The subject of counterterrorism and an energetic PR campaign that highlights the Syrian operation being con-ducted by Russian Aerospace Forces isn’t just a rhetorical tool that will allow Russia to become a player with its own reasonable agenda in the Asia-Pacific region. It could also help to promote Russian military technologies among ASEAN countries. In light of the fact that Indonesia and Malaysia are particularly interested in Russian SU air-planes and other weapons, all of Russia’s activities at the Singapore forum seem—for the first time—coordinated and focused on a pragmatic agenda.

For instance, on June 4—the day before his speech—Antonov hosted a reception for the military delegations

of ASEAN and its dialogue partners aboard the Varyag cruiser, the flagship of the Russian Pacific Fleet, which just happened to be paying a friendly visit to Singapore, giving the guests an opportunity to take a look at the ship and its weaponry.

For Russia to take advantage of this modest success and expand upon it, in addition to arms deals Moscow will have to clearly articulate its proposals on counterterrorist cooperation, offer Southeast Asians the relevant aspects of its expertise, and consistently promote this agenda at a variety of forums. That would naturally include the East Asia Summits, the region’s main security forum that is attended by heads of state—though the Russian president has yet to attend.

©2016, Carnegie Moscow Center Reprinted with permission


Musings on the IISS Shangri-La DialogueBy Ravi Velloor

Three undercurrents permeated the discussions at the Shangri-La Dialogue organised by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). They were based on viewpoints that need debunking.

It has become something of a set-piece routine lately at the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue, the 15th edition of which concluded last weekend. The United States Defence Secretary delivers a tough speech on his way to Singapore, then comes up with a more reasonable tone on Saturday morning, the only full working day of the annual three-day event. Next day, the Chinese, typically represented these days only at the level of deputy chief of staff, come up with their response.

This year as well the pattern was repeated. Dr Ashton Carter, after laying out a vision of cooperative behaviour in the Asia-Pacific - even noting that the US and Chinese navies would sail together from Guam to Hawaii as they prepared for the annual Rimpac exercise - pointed out that China risked putting itself behind a “Great Wall of self-iso-lation” with its assertive behaviour in the South China Sea, including militarising the islands it occupies. The Chinese response, however, verged on the truculent.

Warning that “we don’t make trouble, but we are not afraid of trouble”, Admiral Sun Jianguo complained of Cold War mentalities, denied China was short of friends, claimed that it had agreed with Asean to settle disputes through “bilateral mechanisms” and generally painted his nation as a victim of bullying. Listening to him, Dr Euan Graham of the Lowy Institute thought he hit “Volume 10


on the decibel level” at times. A member of Adm Sun’s del-egation later told me, half-apologetically, that the officer belonged to a generation that believes it has to shout to make a point. The current crop, he assured me, know that you can be firm without raising your voice.

Adm Sun’s performance was reminiscent of an inci-dent a half-century ago when, at the height of the Cold War, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev banged his shoe on the table as he intervened in a United Nations debate in New York. Interestingly, then, as now, the provocation was the behaviour of the Philippines, which Khrushchev described as a “toady of American imperialism”. But Adm Sun’s speech also had hints of something else: China’s nervousness at the impending ruling of the UN Arbitration Tribunal that’s been asked by Manila to clarify Beijing’s claims over the South China Sea and the validity of its nine-dash line map.

Three MythsObserving the flow of the weekend discussions, it was impossible to ignore three things that permeated the dis-cussions. First, everyone, the Chinese included, seemed to assume that the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague would rule decisively against Beijing. It might yet, but how can you be so certain? Last week at a World Economic Forum panel on Asean which I moderated, Mr George Yeo, Singapore’s former foreign minister, said “it would be a serious mistake to underestimate the legality of China’s claims”. Likewise, Mr Yeo’s successor, Mr K. Shanmugam, said in 2014 that “the situation is a little more nuanced than the way it is being portrayed in the interna-tional media”.

The other pervasive myth, especially among delegates from the region, was that China, the No. 1 trading partner for most, was somehow more important economically to them than they themselves were to the Chinese.

In truth, the relationship is more symbiotic. China, whose exports are flagging, needs continued access to the big markets of India, Indonesia, Myanmar and Vietnam to keep its economic engines humming. Its biggest source of foreign direct investments lately has been tiny Singapore. Meanwhile, according to the Asean Secretariat, the top source of foreign direct investment into Asean is not China but the European Union, intra-Asean states and Japan. This, by no means, is a one-way street.

There was a third undercurrent.This was that the US would make a lot of noise but

back off ultimately from taking any decisive action against China, should the arbitral panel rule overwhelmingly for the Philippines, and China ignores the decision. Indeed, in private conversation some Chinese were sure that their aggressive tailing of US patrol craft in the air and in the sea had already begun to have an impact on Washington, which did not wish to provoke an incident.

But that, too, may be a miscalculation. Meeting on the fringes of the dialogue with Republican senators John McCain and Lindsey Graham - lawmakers whose influ-ence will only rise should Mr Donald Trump make it to the White House - I was taken aback at the vehemence with which both spoke about China’s assertive behaviour.

Senator McCain suggested that the US president should assemble a team of 10 of his best generals and diplomats - including people like Gen David Petraeus, Lt-Gen Sean MacFarland and the diplomats Kurt Campbell and Ryan Crocker - to discuss how best to tackle China. “They’ll know what to do,” he told me, meaningfully.

Senator Graham, one of the big voices in American secu-rity circles, had another tack. He is, he said, considering introducing legislation in Congress that would require the US to name state sponsors of cybercrime, rather on the lines of a similar one that names sponsors of terrorism. Those who get on the list would face consequences.

“We just need them to pay an economic price when they cheat... There are so many ways we could get their atten-tion,” Mr Graham said.

Despite the overwhelming attention that the US-China relationship gathered at the dialogue, also called the Asia Security Summit, there were plenty other matters to take note of this time around.

French Defence Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian launched the powerful idea that European navies should coordinate patrols in the South China Sea and fully participate in free-dom of navigation operations, or Fonops.

India sent its defence minister after a gap of some years, making it possible thus for Singapore and India to have their first bilateral strategic defence dialogue on the side-lines of the summit.

South Korea, which usually is reluctant to take the floor at the Shangri-La dialogues, chose to make a ministerial speech this year. Minister Han Min Koo clearly felt the need to remind Asia that the troubles in North-east Asia need to be given due airing and that the dialogue should not be dominated by the events in South-east Asia alone. And then there were the statements by the Malaysian, Indonesian and Singaporean defence ministers, all of whom raised concern over returning jihadist fighters unset-tling the region.

Backstage, out of the public view, more than a dozen intelligence chiefs from the Asia-Pacific region, including US Central Intelligence Agency director John Brennan, held their own meeting to discuss issues of common concern. From its modest beginnings in 2002, the dialogue organ-ised by the London-based global think-tank International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), has, indeed, travelled an impressive distance.

“The SLD has grown and established itself as the premier defence and security forum in the Asia-Pacific region,” President Tony Tan Keng Yam, who was defence


minister when the dialogue was conceived in 2002, told the delegates at an Istana reception. “This year, 31 ministers and participants from 35 countries came to the dialogue.”

Dr John Chipman, director-general of the organiser IISS, credits the dialogue for having helped foster an environ-ment that led to the establishment of the Asean Defence Ministers Meetings in 2006, and subsequently ADMM Plus, which adds Asean’s eight dialogue partners.

“The Shangri-La Dialogue, because it promotes flex-ible consultations and is not bound down by rules, tries to remain ahead of formal structures,” says Dr Chipman. “In the years to come, it is important to fully integrate the key South Asian states into the Dialogue - not just India, but also Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh.”

Now that India has formalised its Act East policy, he says, it should ensure that its defence minister turns up for every annual meeting. Also, that the Chinese must raise their level of representation to that of defence minister or, even better, the vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission.

“Technically, the Chinese deputy chief of staff is junior to every other person who spoke in the plenary. So, we bend over backwards to ensure that despite the represen-tation at a more junior level they still have a place in the plenary. This is not a privilege we can extend in perpetuity. The fluency of Chinese defence diplomacy at Shangri-La would be much strengthened by sending a minister.”

It’s tough to say what the next year will bring. By then the arbitration ruling would have been delivered. On cur-rent form, it does not look like any solutions to the region’s festering disputes are coming into view. Indeed, the best one can hope for is that the tense regional situation does not get worse, or is complicated by other factors, such as a successful jihadi strike on an Asian state or more wild behaviour from North Korea. One thing is for sure: There’ll be plenty to talk about.


The Washington Post24 June

The Obama administration is failing to stop China’s Pacific aggressionBy Josh Rogin

This month, on their way from Taiwan to Japan, a group of U.S. senators inadvertently flew over a set of islands that both the Chinese and Japanese claim as their own. The Chinese government was incensed.

I obtained a formal protest letter from the Chinese Embassy in Washington sent to the Senate Armed Services Committee this week demanding that no U.S. official ever

again fly in a straight line from Taipei to Tokyo, which takes you over what the Japanese call the Senkaku Islands and the Chinese call the Diaoyu Islands.

“Diaoyu Dao has been an inherent territory of China since ancient times,” the Chinese Embassy wrote. “The American aircraft entered China’s territorial airspace in violation of international law and the norm of international relations, which was a serious provocation against China’s sovereignty and security. . . . China will staunchly defend its territorial sovereignty over Diaoyu Dao.”

The incident was just the latest signal that the Obama administration’s strategy to deter Chinese aggression and encourage China’s good behavior in the South and East China seas is falling short. President Obama has tried to build a policy on diplomacy, quiet warnings and restrained military gestures. It’s not working. China has rebuffed them all, and if it loses and then ignores an arbitration case shortly as expected, then it’s not clear his administra-tion has any new tools in its toolbox.

Over the past few weeks, the administration has tried to maintain the image that its South China Sea strategy is viable. At the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore this month, top defense and military officials insisted that the policy still might bear fruit and restrained themselves from saying anything that might upset their Chinese counterparts.

Unlike last year, Defense Secretary Ashton B. Carter’s keynote speech at the conference contained no messages crafted to send tough signals to the Chinese officials in the room. He briefly criticized Chinese aggression toward the end of his remarks.

“China’s actions in the South China Sea are isolating it, at a time when the entire region is coming together and networking. Unfortunately, if these actions continue, China could end up erecting a Great Wall of self-isolation,” he said.

Asked directly how the United States plans to change China’s strategic calculation that maritime expansion is in its best interest, Carter had no real answer. He pointed to the upcoming decision by an international tribunal on a case between China and the Philippines as a “big opportu-nity” for the region to return to a rules-based international order and quickly added, “I wouldn’t single out China.”

The White House had made it clear to Carter’s staff that it wanted no disruptions ahead of the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue, which was to begin only days later, several U.S. officials told me. Only one week earlier, the White House scolded Carter after he gave a speech more critical of China at the U.S. Naval Academy. The White House was not upset at the content of the speech, officials said, but resented that Carter made headlines and upstaged Obama’s visit to Hiroshima.

Even Adm. Harry B. Harris Jr., head of the U.S. Pacific Command, who last year coined the phrase “great wall of sand” to protest Chinese island reclamation, avoided any criticism of China at the Singapore conference. “We’ve seen


positive behavior the last several months with China,” he told reporters, praising what he said were Chinese efforts to avoid incidents in contested waters.

Carter and Harris’s charm offensive was not returned in kind by the Chinese military officials at Shangri-La. Adm. Sun Jianguo, deputy chief of the joint staff develop-ment for China’s Central Military Commission, gave a fiery speech in which he declared that China had done nothing wrong in the South China Sea and has no intention of abid-ing by the ruling of the international tribunal Carter touted.

Sun then accused the United States of “openly flaunting its military force, and on the other hand pulling in help from cliques, supporting their allies in antagonizing China.”

As of yet, U.S. moves to respond to China’s expan-sion and militarization in the South China Sea have not persuaded China to change course. The United States has sailed ships through contested waters, deployed U.S. troops and equipment in the Philippines, held huge mili-tary exercises with India and Japan, moved two aircraft carrier groups into the region and invested millions of dol-lars in new security partnerships.

China continues to harden its military facilities on arti-ficial islands it built in the South China Sea, has begun sailing navy ships in the Senkakus and has ramped up its harassment of fishing boats from other countries in disputed waters. China reportedly is planning new construction on disputed islands in the Scarborough Shoal, and U.S. officials worry that China will soon announce a new Air Defense Identification Zone in the South China Sea.

The diplomatic effort to get all Association of Southeast Asian Nations countries together to stand up to China had recent setbacks as well. Last week, the United States worked behind the scenes to get all of the ASEAN foreign ministers to issue a statement criticizing China’s actions in the South China Sea. They issued a very strong statement but then retracted it only hours later under heavy Chinese government pressure. Now the Chinese are working hard to cut a side deal with the Philippines by offering the new president in Manila a new railway system.

The Obama administration has never been willing to use the big tools at its disposal — for example, economic sanctions — to confront Chinese maritime aggression, and there’s no sign that reluctance will change.

“If there were economic consequences of some kind involved, we would be more likely to get their attention,” said Bonnie Glaser, a senior adviser for Asia at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “But most people in this administration are reluctant to say we are going to put the whole relationship at stake over this. And when you get to the final months of an administration, you begin to lose leverage.”

To the unresolved problems the Obama administration will bequeath its successor — Syria, Iraq, Ukraine, North Korea — you can add China’s assertiveness in the South and East China seas.

©2016, The Washington Post Reprinted with permission


The Adelphi series is the Institute’s principal contribution to policy-relevant, original academic research. Books published since 2008 include:

Inkster, Nigel, China’s Cyber Power. Adelphi 456: Routledge for the IISS, 2016.

Fitzpatrick, Mark, Asia’s Latent Nuclear Powers: Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. Adelphi 455: Routledge for the IISS, 2016.

Parello-Plesner, Jonas and Duchâtel, Mathieu, China’s: Strong Arm: Protecting Citizens and Assets Abroad. Adelphi 451: Routledge for the IISS, 2015.

Lewis, Jeffrey, Paper Tigers: China’s Nuclear Posture. Adelphi 446: Routledge for the IISS, 2014.

Friedberg, Aaron L., Beyond Air-Sea Battle: The debate over US Military Strategy in Asia. Adelphi 444. Routledge for the IISS, 2014.

Barthwal-Datta, Monika, Food Security in Asia: Challenges, Policies and Implications. Adelphi 441–442. Routledge for the IISS, 2014.

Hokayem, Emile, Syria’s Uprising and the Fracturing of the Levant. Adelphi 438. Routledge for the IISS, 2013.

Le Mière, Christian and Raine, Sarah, Regional Disorder: The South China Sea Disputes. Adelphi 436–437. Routledge for the IISS, 2013.

Dodge, Toby, Iraq: From War to a New Authoritarianism. Adelphi 434–435. Routledge for the IISS, 2012.

Till, Geoffrey, Asia’s naval expansion: An arms race in the making?. Adelphi 432–433. Routledge for the IISS, 2012.

D. Pollack, Jonathan, No Exit: North Korea, Nuclear Weapons and International Security. Adelphi 418–419. Routledge for the IISS, 2011.

Holslag, Jonathan, Trapped Giant: China’s Military Rise. Adelphi 416. Routledge for the IISS, 2011.

Taylor, Brendan, Sanctions as Grand Strategy. Adelphi 411. Routledge for the IISS, 2010.

Cortright, David and Väyrynen, Raimo, Towards Nuclear Zero. Adelphi 410. Routledge for the IISS, 2010.

Bisley, Nick, Building Asia’s Security. Adelphi 408. Routledge for the IISS, 2009.

Raine, Sarah, China’s African Challenges. Adelphi 404–5. Routledge for the IISS, 2009.

APPENDIX II

Selected IISS publications


The IISS Strategic Dossier series harnesses the Institute’s technical expertise to present detailed information on key strategic issues. Recent publications include:

Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment 2016: Key developments and trends. IISS, 2016.

Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment 2015: Key developments and trends. IISS, 2015.

Regional Security Assessment 2014: Key developments and trends in Asia-Pacific security. IISS, 2014.

North Korean Security Challenges: A net assessment. IISS, 2011.

The FARC Files: Venezuela, Ecuador and the Secret Archive of ‘Raúl Reyes’. IISS, 2011.

Iran’s Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Capabilities: A net assessment. IISS, 2011.

Iran’s Ballistic Missile Capabilities: A net assessment. IISS, 2010.

Preventing Nuclear Dangers in Southeast Asia and Australasia. IISS, 2009.

Nuclear Programmes in the Middle East: In the shadow of Iran. IISS, 2008.

European Military Capabilities: Building Armed Forces for Modern Operations. IISS, 2008.

Strategic Comments is the Institute’s online source of analysis of international security and politico-military issues. Articles focused on South, Southeast and Northeast Asia published between March 2014 and June 2015 include:

‘China’s shaky trade figures and their ramifications’. Strategic Comments, vol. 22, no. 10, May 2016.

‘China’s energy policy: new technology and civil nuclear expansion’. Strategic Comments, vol. 22, no. 3, March 2016.

‘Myanmar: the challenges of power’. Strategic Comments, vol. 21, no. 38, December 2015.

‘India’s new maritime strategy’. Strategic Comments, vol. 21, no. 37, December 2015.

‘Malaysia’s political challenges’. Strategic Comments, vol. 21, no. 32, November 2015.

‘China’s ambitious Silk Road vision’. Strategic Comments, vol. 21, no. 28, October 2015.

‘China’s currency: faster steps towards global use’. Strategic Comments, vol. 21, no. 24, October 2015.

‘Thailand’s troubled politics’. Strategic Comments, vol. 21, no. 21, August 2015.

‘China’s land reclamation in the South China Sea’. Strategic Comments, vol. 21, no. 20, August 2015.

‘India–US relations acquire new momentum’. Strategic Comments, vol. 21, no. 12, May 2015.

‘Asian bank: funding infrastructure, building China’s influence’. Strategic Comments, vol. 21, no. 11, April 2015.

‘Japan’s defence budget bolsters altered military roles’. Strategic Comments, vol. 20, no. 2, February 2015.

The Military Balance is the Institute’s annual assessment of military capabilities and defence economics worldwide. Region-by-region analyses cover the major military and economic trends and developments affecting security policy and the trade in weapons and other military equipment. Comprehensive tables portray key data on weapons and defence economics. Defence expenditure trends over a ten-year period are also shown.

The Military Balance 2016. Routledge for the IISS, 2016.

Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, the Institute’s bi-monthly journal, is a leading forum for analysis and debate of international and strategic affairs. Recent articles of interest include:

David C. Gompert and Bruce H. Stover, ‘Creating a Sino-US Energy Relationship’, Survival, vol. 58, no. 4, August–September 2016, pp. 63–69.

Lanxin Xiang, ‘Xi’s Dream and China’s Future’, Survival, vol. 58, no. 3, June–July 2016, pp 53–62.

Christian Dargnat, ‘China’s Shifting Geo-economic Strategy’, Survival, vol. 58, no. 3, June–July 2016, pp 63–76.

Andrea Berger, ‘Disrupting North Korea’s Military Markets’, Survival, vol. 58, no. 3, June–July 2016, pp 101–130.

Denny Roy, ‘Preparing for a North Korean Missile’, Survival, vol. 58, no. 3, June–July 2016, pp 131–154.

Sarah Percy, ‘Maritime Crime and Naval Response’, Survival, vol. 58, no. 3, June–July 2016, pp 155–186.

Ryan D. Martinson, ‘Shepherds of the South Seas’, Survival, vol. 58, no. 3, June–July 2016, pp 187–212.

Brian G. Carlson, ‘China–Russia Relations and the Inertia of History’, Survival, vol. 58, no. 3, June–July 2016, pp 213–222.

Jonathan D. Caverley and Ethan B. Kapstein, ‘Who’s Arming Asia?’, Survival, vol. 58, no. 2, April–May 2016, pp 167–187.

Nigel Inkster, ‘Coming to Terms with Chinese Power’, Survival, vol. 58, no. 1, February–March 2016, pp 209–216.

Tim Huxley and Benjamin Schreer, ‘Standing up to China’, Survival, vol. 57, no. 6, December 2015–January 2016, pp 127–144.


Nien-chung Chang Liao and Dalton Kuen-da Lin, ‘Rebalancing Taiwan–US Relations’, Survival, vol. 57, no. 6, December 2015–January 2016, pp 145–158.

Bill Emmott, ‘China: It’s the Politics, Stupid’, Survival, vol. 57, no. 6, December 2015–January 2016, pp 221–228.

David C. Gompert and Martin Libicki, ‘ Waging Cyber War the American Way’, Survival, vol. 57, no. 4, August–September 2015, pp. 7–28.

Aaron L. Friedberg, ‘The Debate Over US China Strategy’, Survival, vol. 57, no. 3, June–July 2015, pp. 89–110.

William Choong, ‘Defence and Japan’s Constitutional Debate’, Survival, vol. 57, no. 2, April–May 2015, pp. 173–192.

Charlotte Kennedy, ‘Politics and Gender in Modern Australia’, Survival, vol. 57, no. 1, February–March 2015, pp. 189–196.

Robert Ayson and Desmond Ball, ‘Can a Sino-Japanese War Be Controlled?’, Survival, vol. 56, no. 6, December 2014–January 2015, pp. 135–166.

David C. Gompert and Martin Libicki, ‘Cyber Warfare and Sino-American Crisis Instability’, Survival, vol. 56, no. 4, August–September 2014, pp. 7–22.

Yogesh Joshi and Frank O’Donnell, ‘India’s Submarine Deterrent and Asian Nuclear Proliferation’, Survival, vol. 56, no. 4, August–September 2014, pp. 157–174.

Roderic Broadhurst and Peng Wang, ‘After the Bo Xilai Trial: Does Corruption Threaten China’s Future?’, Survival, vol. 56, no. 3, June–July 2014, pp. 157–178.

Michal Meidan, ‘The Implications of China’s Energy-Import Boom’, Survival, vol. 56, no. 3, June–July 2014, pp. 179–200.

Pierre Noël, ‘Asia’s Energy Supply and Maritime Security’, Survival, vol. 56, no. 3, June–July 2014, pp. 201–216.

Oriana Skylar Mastro, ‘The Problems of the Liberal Peace in Asia’, Survival, vol. 56, no. 2, April–May 2014, pp. 129–158.

Christian Le Mière, ‘The Spectre of an Asian Arms Race’, Survival, vol. 56, no. 1, February–March 2014, pp. 139–156.

Will Shield, ‘The Middle Way: China and Global Economic Governance’, Survival, vol. 55, no. 6, December 2013–January 2014, pp. 147–168.

Strategic Survey is the Institute’s annual review of strategic developments throughout the world. Recent sections of interest include:

‘India’s troubled relationships with Pakistan and China’, Strategic Survey 2016.

‘Minimal returns on Indian regional policy’, Strategic Survey 2016.

‘Shifts in Pakistani foreign policy’, Strategic Survey 2016.

‘Uncertainty in Beijing’, Strategic Survey 2016.

‘China’s developing great-power diplomacy’, Strategic Survey 2016.

‘Energetic Japanese diplomacy’, Strategic Survey 2016.

‘Pyongyang undermines strategic patience’, Strategic Survey 2016.

‘Southeast Asia and the South China Sea challenge’, Strategic Survey 2016.

‘ISIS and Southeast Asia’, Strategic Survey 2016.

‘Australia’s ambiguous policies on Asian security’, Strategic Survey 2016.

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