the islamic independence movements in patani of thailand ...ted robert gurr, minorities at risk: a...

THE ISLAMIC INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENTS IN PATANI OF THAILAND AND MINDANAO OF THE PHILIPPINES

Syed Serajul Islam

In recent years the apparent success of the Mindanao Moros in the Philippines and the failure of the Patani Malay Muslims in Thai- land raises an important question: what has led to the relative success of the Moros and the failure of the Malay Muslims? In the late 1960s, Samuel Hunt- ington stated that a revolution or a violent separatist movement occurs in a political system that is incapable of accommodating the democratic participation of the separatist group.1 According to some scholars, however, a separatist movement may rise up due to "relative deprivation," the determination of an ethnic group to retain control of their own culture, language, and terri- tory," "manipulation of ethnic sentiment by ethnic minority elites for promot- ing their own career and status," or a combination of factors.2 Whatever the historical, political, or social circumstances of a separatist movement, Hunt- ington argues that in order to be successful it must be led by a political organization headed by strong leaders able to mobilize both internal and external supports. A competing view is offered by Ted Gurr. In a recent study, he argued that the success of a separatist movement depends on four factors: (i)

Syed Serajul Islam is Associate Professor in the Department of Polit- ical Science, International Islamic University, Selangor, Malaysia.

? 1998 by The Regents of the University of California

1. Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968).

2. For details, see Michael Hechter, The Celtic Fringe in British National Development (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1975); Walker Connor, "Eco or Ethno-national- ism?" Ethnic and Racial Studies 7:3 (July 1984), pp. 342-59; Anthony Birch, "Minorities Na- tionalist Movement and Theories of Political Integration," World Politics 30:3 (1978), pp. 325-44; Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Revival (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Cynthia Enloe, "Ethnic Diversity: The Potential for Conflict," in Diversity and Development in Southeast Asia, eds. Guy J. Pauker et al. (New York: McGraw Hill, 1977); and David Brown, "From Peripheral Communities to Ethnic Nations," Pacific Affairs 61 (1988), pp. 51-71.

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442 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XXXVIII, NO. 5, MAY 1998

the severity of the separatist group's "relative deprivation"; (ii) the applica- tion of "sustained force" by the regime against the separatist group; (iii) the cohesiveness of the group; and (iv) international support.3

Three common propositions can be derived from both Huntington's and Gurr's analyses. First, if the state uses too much force and other socioeconomic and political measures to suppress the minority group, that group will feel more alienated and frustrated and aspiring minority elites will exploit this sentiment to gain support for the separatist movement. Second, a movement is likely to be successful if it is led by a cohesive political organization under a strong leadership. Finally, the separatist group must be able to mobilize both internal and external support.

Do these theoretical propositions apply in the cases of the Muslims in Thailand and the Philippines? The Muslims in both countries are religious minorities constituting nearly the same percentage of the total population (5.5% in Thailand and 6% in the Philippines). The dominant religious group in Thailand is Buddhist, and in the Philippines, Catholic. In both countries, the Muslims are concentrated in a defined geographical area bordered by the same Muslim state, Malaysia. Since the end of the Second World War, the Muslims in both countries have made demands for an independent Islamic state (dar al-Islam) and initiated guerrilla insurgency movements. After half a century of struggle, the Philippine Moros appear to have been successful in achieving partial "autonomy" if not independence. In recent months, negotiations between the government of then-President Ramos and the Moro rebels suggested that further concessions would be forthcoming. On the other hand, the Patani Muslims in Thailand have been unable to achieve either autonomy or an independent dar al-Islam. The question is: why? To answer this query, it is essential to look at the historical roots of the two movements and then to their contemporary nature. It is against the backdrop of such historical and contemporary developments that one can assess the relative success of the Moros and the failure of the Malay Muslims in achieving their desired goals.

The Roots of Conflict The Southeast Asian region has been influenced by different external forces in the course of its long history. In the first centuries of the Christian era, the sprawl of the Indian and Chinese civilizations stretched into the region. Sub- sequently, the Arabs and Europeans entered the area. The arrival of various external groups contributed to the growth of heterogeneity in the region's societies. Southeast Asia's initial contact with Islam is undoubtedly a by-

3. Ted Robert Gurr, Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethno Political Conflicts (Washing- ton, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1993), pp. 123-38.

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SYED SERAJUL ISLAM 443

product of Arab trade in the region; Arab traders are believed to have brought the religion to the region as early as the eighth century.

The Patani Raya in Thailand Until 1786, greater Patani had been an independent kingdom. Originally the ancient kingdom of Langkasuka, the name was changed to the kingdom of Patani at some point in the 14th century. It was an important commercial center for Asian and European traders. Hinduism and Buddhism seem to have been practiced until the adoption of Islam as the state religion in the 15th century. Arab merchants had spread the religion throughout the area between the 12th and 15th centuries side by side with their trade activities, and large numbers of people converted. However, the most significant development in its spread occurred when the king of Patani himself embraced Is- lam and declared his kingdom to be an Islamic state in 1457. The Islamization of Patani replaced many elements of the Hindu-Buddhist culture and its institutions. The Muslim religious elites (ulamas) came to dominate the kingdom's sociopolitical system. The Muslim dynasty was abolished in 1786 when Patani was conquered by the king of Siam. The Siamese government divided Patani into seven provinces both for administrative purposes as well as to weaken Muslim power. The provinces were governed by appointed bureaucrats under a centralized administrative structure. There were sporadic rebellions in protest of the administrative reforms, but the Siamese government forces were strong enough to suppress them.

Nonetheless, such rebellious activity and later external pressure from the British in Burma did make Siamese government control over Patani uncertain through the end of the 19th century. Control was finally consolidated with the Anglo-Siamese Treaty of 1909. The British renounced the extraterritori- ality rights it had claimed previously and recognized Siam's governance of the province, though such came at the cost of conceding control of four other Malay states to the European power. The firm guarantee of Siamese control over Patani allowed the government to take various measures aimed at weak- ening the Islamic identity of the people in Patani in order to develop, in David Brown's version, "the mono-ethnic character of the state."4 The government first replaced the Islamic Shariah and adat laws with Siamese law. Second, an act was passed in 1921 that required all children to attend Sia- mese primary schools, institutions designed to offer a secular education where the medium of instruction was the Thai language. Thus, the local pondoks (Islamic schools) were closed, an action that "undermined the very roots of the lamas' power."5 Third, administration was further centralized

4. Brown, "From Peripheral Communities," p. 52. 5. Ibid.

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by reorganizing the seven provinces into three-Patani, Yala, and Narathiwat (now four, including Satun)-and replacing the local rulers with Thai gover- nors. This change led to the loss of political power of the traditional aristocrats. Fourth, during the Second World War, the Phibun regime issued the Thai Customs Decree prohibiting the "wearing of sarongs, the use of Malay [Muslim] names and the Malay language," which angered the common people. At the end of the war, Patani's districts and local governments were brought under the direct control of Bangkok.

All these measures were attempts to integrate Patani Muslims into the larger framework of Thailand, and they created serious resentment among them. The traditional elite and pondok religious teachers were very unhappy and objected to the introduction of secular education and the Thai language in schools. Haji Sulong, president of the Islamic Religious Council, submitted a seven-point demand to the Thai government. It called for (i) the "appoint- ment of a single individual with full powers to govern the four [Patani] provinces . . . this individual to be local-born in one of the four provinces ... and to be elected by the people"; (ii) 80% of government servants in those provinces to profess the Muslim religion; (iii) Malay and Siamese to be the offi- cial languages; (iv) Malay to be the medium of instruction in the primary schools; (v) Islamic law to be recognized and enforced in a separate Muslim court other than the civil court; (vi) any revenue and income derived from the four provinces to be utilized within them; and (vii) the formation of a Muslim Board.6 As a consequence of making this demand, Haji Sulong and his asso- ciates were arrested and charged with treason. At the end of the Second World War, the Patani separatist movement was brought under control by the Thai state through military intervention.

The Mindanao Region in the Philippines The Mindanao region in the Philippines, once an independent kingdom, con- sisted of indigenous tribes. Islam came to this kingdom at the same time that it appeared in Siam. Arab traders preached Islam in this land but established their permanent settlements only at the end of the 13th century. Over the next century, the Muslims established their sultanate, and by the end of the 14th century the Islamization process had reached the point where being a Muslim became an acceptable passport into the community. In 1565 the Spanish arrived and initiated a series of attacks on the Muslim sultanates in the southern Philippine islands of Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago. These attacks continued for the next 350 years. Although the Spanish failed to oc- cupy the region, they did establish a few garrisons in the area. Moreover, the

6. Lukman Thaib, Political Dimension of Islam in Southeast Asia (Kuala Lumpur: National University of Malaysia, 1996), p. 96.

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rest of the Philippines came under their control and they were successful in converting the local people to Catholicism.

In 1898, the U.S. victory in the Spanish-American War led to the transfer of the Philippines to U.S. control. Despite the fact that Mindanao and Sulu were never under complete Spanish control, the areas were included in the cession. The Muslim population fought several bloody battles to resist the American occupation and on August 20, 1899, the sultan of Sulu finally signed the Bates Treaty with the Americans. The treaty acknowledged the sultan's authority to govern his people and recognized some local authority. But it was too short-lived to produce any good results, for it was abrogated suddenly in 1902. A policy of direct rule was imposed; the Moro Province was created and brought under the direct control of the colonial government in Manila.

Once direct rule had been imposed on Moro, the colonial government adopted a "policy of attraction" in the area to "develop, to civilize and to educate" the public. This policy had disastrous consequences. The government introduced a secular system of education and non-Muslim teachers were appointed to the Moro schools. This was seen as a direct blow to the authority of the traditional religious teachers. Muslims generally refused to send their children to secular schools, leading to significant illiteracy. To integrate the province into the larger framework of the Philippines, the U.S. colonial government encouraged non-Muslims from other parts of the Philippines to settle in Moro Province. The government provided loans to those settlers who lacked funds, and between 1903 and 1906 increased the number of acres of land given to settlers from 40 to 200. In 1902, a Land Registration Act was passed to determine the extent of private landholdings in the country. This was followed by Public Lands Acts of 1905, 1913, 1914, and 1919. These gradually claimed all lands in the Philippines as state property, though individuals could apply for private ownership. The Moros lost ownership of their ancestral lands. According to the Act of 1919, a Christian Filipino could apply for private ownership of up to 24 hectares of land while a non- Christian could request only 10.7 This led to the beginning of "legalized land grabbing" in Mindanao. Finally, the government encouraged foreign corporations to operate in Mindanao, which resulted in an upsurge in agrobusi- nesses owned and managed by transnational corporations.

All these programs created a deep sense of frustration in the minds of Mus- lims in the Mindanao and Sulu region. Immediately before Independence in 1946, the Moro leaders submitted a memorandum to the U.S. government stating "we do not want to be included in the Philippines Independence. For once independence is launched, there will be trouble between us and the

7. C. A. Majul, Muslims in the Philippines (Manila: St. Mary's Publishing, 1978), p. 113.

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Christian Filipinos because from time immemorial these two peoples have not lived harmoniously.... It is not proper [for two antagonistic] peoples [to] live together under one flag."8 The U.S. did not accept the proposal. Thus, in 1946 the newly independent Philippines had two major religious communities in the Sulu-Mindanao region, the Muslims and the Catholics.

Contemporary Developments At the time of the Second World War, the Muslims in both Mindanao and Patani hoped to gain an autonomous status, if not complete independence. However, this did not occur and so resistance movements started in both Thailand and the Philippines whose goal was to establish in their respective regions an independent dar al-Islam.

Thailand In the initial post-war period, the Thai government adopted a policy of accommodation toward the Muslims. However, the state penetration in pre-war years into the civil society of Patani Muslims, together with the absence of political participation of Patani elites and especially the arrest of Haji Sulong in the late 1940s, contributed to the Dusun Nyiur incident, a violent clash between the Thai police and the Patani Muslims.9

The Thai government was able to suppress the revolt but the political situation in Patani remained very tense in the 1950s. In 1948, the government declared a state of emergency, an act that reinforced the Patani Muslim per- ception of the Thai nation as an "alien state."10 Once the emergency ended, Tengku Abdul Jalal, a follower of Haji Sulong, in 1959 formed an underground organization, Barisan Nasional Pembebasan Patani (BNPP, or Patani National Liberation Front), that drew support from traditional aristocrats as well as the religious elite. The organization's objective was complete independence and the establishment of an Islamic state. It adopted a strategy of armed guerilla warfare and, consequently, intermittent violent clashes oc- cuffed between government forces and BNPP cadres throughout the 1960s.

A fall in rubber prices led to a decline in the Patani economy in the late 1960s. This led to a fall in the region's per capita income compared to that of the rest of Thailand.1" Muslims believed that "the central government thinks

8. Pute Rahimah Makol-Abdul, "Colonialism and Change: The Case of Muslims in the Philip- pines," JIMMA 17:2 (October 1997), p. 319.

9. It was estimated that 1,100 Muslims and 30 policeman were killed in the incident. See W. K. Che Man, Muslim Separatism: The Moros of Southern Philippines and the Malays of South- ern Thailand (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 67.

10. Singapore Free Press, July 28, 1948. 11. David Brown, "From Peripheral Communities," p. 66. Between 1962 and 1968 rubber

prices fell by 27% and rubber output by 32%.

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in terms of taxes and duties which can be extracted from the region [rather] than in terms of investment and technical support, and the region's tin and rubber resources are siphoned off by Thai Buddhists and the Thai Chinese." 12 Concurrently, many Patani youth who had been educated in Egypt, Pakistan, and India now found on their return that the government was reluctant to employ them. These factors combined to make them politically active separatists. They differed in their orientation from the traditional aristocrats and were also divided among themselves between Islamists and secularists. The Islamists founded an organization, Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN, or Na- tional Revolutionary Front), whose aim was to establish the Islamic Republic of Patani. The BRN's base of support lay mainly in the pondoks. The secularists formed the Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO), which claimed that it had an "invisible government" whose tactic was to work by ambush.13 Many recent Patani university graduates as well as their fellows studying abroad supported this organization. Both organizations considered the Thai government to be an "internal colonial" power with which compro- mise was impossible; the only option was to achieve Patani independence through armed struggle. However, the two groups did not coordinate their activities, choosing to pursue their guerilla actions independently.

In response to the Patani separatist movement, Thai government launched a series of military operations against the guerillas while adopting a policy of accommodating certain demands. In 1961, the government repealed the Thai Customs Decree and allowed pondok schools to continue provided they offered both secular and Islamic education. The Patani Muslims were also allowed to keep Muslim names. In the 1970s, the government offered some special privileges to Muslims. These included quotas for admissions of Mus- lims to the universities and government bureaucracy, the establishment of National and Provincial Councils for Islamic Affairs, study tours to Bangkok for Muslims at government expense, and the creation of the position of chu- larajmontri, or state councilor for Islamic Affairs. Finally, the government initiated massive economic projects to construct roads, schools, colleges, and universities in the Muslim majority provinces. With respect to agriculture, the rubber plantation owners were given incentives to replace old trees with a high-yield variety. An irrigation system and flood control projects were started in the region. Not all of these government programs have been

12. Astri Suhrke, "Loyalists and Separatists: The Muslims in Southern Thailand," Asian Sur- vey 17:3 (1977), p. 241.

13. The term "invisible government" was used by some Muslim villagers to describe the fronts. See Lukman Thaib, Political Dimensions, p. 108. Fatin Ismail, a Patani Muslim from an aristocratic family and the niece of a former movement leader, informed me that the strength of the "invisible government" varies widely from area to area as the fronts lack coordination. Au- thor interview, June 15, 1997.

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viewed positively by Muslims. Instead, many perceive such measures as tricks of the Thai government to penetrate Patani culture, economy, and society. Guerilla activities continue. An aspiring elite still seeks the complete independence of Patani and the creation of a dar al-Islam. The opposition movement has remained factionalized, however. In late 1997, activists across the political spectrum joined to form an underground organization called the Council of the Muslim People of Patani (MPRMP). Taking inspiration from the Moros' success (discussed below), they sought to pressure the Thai government to come to an understanding with the Patani Muslims.14 The strategy remains the same, i.e., guerilla attacks on police stations and government offices. Since the Council is quite new, it is difficult to predict the success of the organization.

The Philippines The Moros continued their struggle for an independent Mindanao in the post- Independence Philippines. Rather than accommodating the demands of the Moros, the new Philippine government continued colonial policy and adopted further repressive measures. It encouraged the further migration of Christian population into Mindanao. By the 1960s, the influx of settlers from northern and central Philippines made the Moros a virtual minority. A substantial in- flow of domestic and foreign investment led to the transfer of wealth from Mindanao to other parts of the country. The Filipino government, like the colonial administration before it, passed a series of laws to legitimize its ex- propriation of lands traditionally owned by the Muslim population for reset- tlement projects and plantation agriculture. Many lost their lands to Catholic settlers. Violent clashes between Catholics and local Muslims became a reg- ular occurrence. Riots broke out in various parts of the region. Although the Moro elites were co-opted by the state, the gradual deterioration of the condi- tion of the Muslims together with the 1968 Jabaidah massacre led to the formation of the Muslims (Mindanao) Independence Movement (MIM) in 1968, and this group declared Mindanao's independence.15

In response to the MIM declaration, the Catholics launched the anti-Moro Ilaga Movement, a group whose activities culminated in the June 19, 1971, massacre of some 70 Muslims in a mosque at Bario Manili, North Cotabato.

14. This is according to a former Patani Muslim activist, Abdul Rahman Awang. Author interview, July 30, 1997.

15. Lela Nobel, "The Moro National Liberation Front in the Philippines," Pacific Affairs 49:3 (1976), p. 405. The Jabaidah massacre took place in March 1968. At that time, the Filipino Army was allegedly putting a group of Muslims through secret commando-style training called "jabaidah." Their mission would be to agitate among the people of Sabah and North Borneo to demand annexation by the Philippines. When the Moros refused to undertake the mission, they were summarily shot for mutineering.

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The government tried to co-opt MIM's top leaders by providing them with high positions in the administration. This disappointed many young MIM cadres who abandoned the organization and, led by a university graduate, Nur Misuari, went on to form the militant Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). The organization's main objective was the complete liberation of the Moros' homeland. The MNLF attracted the support of large numbers of Filipino Muslims who considered the movement to be spearheading a jihad against the Marcos regime. The MNLF opened an armed wing, the Bangso Moro Army (BMA), consisting of militant Muslim youths and they engaged in guerilla warfare against the Philippines Army. The MNLF also sought the support of the overseas Muslims and reported their grievances to the Organi- zation of the Islamic Conference (OIC). When President Marcos declared martial law in 1972, the MNLF continued its activities underground. Thousands of people lost their lives and property in the armed struggle in Mindanao.

In spite of the Marcos regime's tactics, the consequences of the armed struggle aroused the concern of the OIC countries over the conditions of Muslims in the Philippines. A delegation of four foreign ministers from Libya, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, and Somalia visited the Philippines to discuss the situation of the Muslims there with the Marcos government. The involve- ment of the Muslim states eventually culminated in the signing of the Tripoli Agreement on December 23, 1976, in Tripoli, Libya. This agreement provided for the creation of an autonomous region in Mindanao consisting of 13 provinces and nine cities. In return, the MNLF was forced to reduce its demand for complete independence to autonomy, settling for a peace that would keep the Bangsomoro homeland part of the Republic of the Philippines. However, after returning home the Marcos government interpreted "autonomy" as an internal matter that should be solved within the framework of the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Philippines. Marcos in- sisted that the attainment of autonomy was subject to the Philippine constitu- tional process. This required that a referendum be held to determine which among the provinces and cities claimed in the Tripoli Agreement should be included in the autonomous region.16 The MNLF strenuously objected to this plan and consequently the ceasefire that had been declared collapsed. Fighting resumed in late 1977 and MNLF leader Nur Misuari went into exile in the Middle East.

The breakdown of the Tripoli Agreement undermined the credibility of the MNLF leadership. Misuari was challenged by the chairman of MNLF's For-

16. The 13 provinces included the five (Maguindano, Lanao, Del Sur, Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi) with absolute Muslim majorities. The total population of the Sulu and Mindanao regions had a large Catholic majority. There are now 14 provinces.

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eign Affairs Bureau, Hashim Salamat. He accused Misuari of being a failure, corrupt, and a communist sympathizer.17 Shortly thereafter, he broke away from the mainstream MNLF and established the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). Salamat claimed, "We want an Islamic political system and way of life and can be achieved through effective Da'wah, Tarbiyyah, and Jihad."18 The MNLF and MILF conducted simultaneous guerilla warfare campaigns against the Marcos regime. In the 1980s, both provided strong support to Corazon Aquino when she led the mass upheavals for democratic government. In return, Aquino promised to grant autonomy to the Mindanao region if elected. After assuming office in 1986, President Aquino offered a new Constitution and declared the establishment of the Autonomous Regions in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). The MNLF was dissatisfied with this, however, as it granted autonomy to only four provinces, not the 13 provinces and nine cities indicated in the Tripoli Agreement. Misuari called on the MNLF' s various factions to unite and renew their armed struggle for a sovereign Bangsomoro Republic. 19

The ascendance of Fidel Ramos to the presidency of the Philippines in 1992 gave Misuari renewed hope to recoup his shattered prestige. President Ramos opened negotiations with the MNLF, and in 1996 an agreement was signed making the MNLF the overseer of economic development projects in all provinces in Mindanao for three years. The Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD) was established with Misuari as the region' s governor directly under President Ramos. The Ramos-MNLF agreement appears to have brought peace in the Philippines by ending the armed struggle in Mindano. Many of Southeast Asia's leaders felt great relief; for example, Indonesian President Suharto commented that

[t]he peaceful solution to the conflict in the Southern Philippines could serve to prove before the international community that conflicts within the region could be solved by the region or the community of nations concerned using their own resources, their creativity and their determination to achieve peace. In fact, I would not be surprised if analysts of international politics would see in the peace process in the Southern Philippines valuable lessons with possibly some applications else- where.20

17. R. J. May, "The Religious Factor in Three Minority Movements: The Moro in the Philip- pines, the Malays of Thailand, and Indonesia's West Papuas," JIMMA 12:2 (July 1991), p. 309.

18. Rogiberto Tigalo, "Peace in His Time," Far Eastern Economic Review, September 5, 1996, p. 24.

19. David G. Timberman, "The Philippines in 1989: A Good Year Turns Sour," Asian Survey 30:2 (February 1990), p. 26.

20. Farish A. Noor, "Hopefully the End of a Long Crusade," Impact International (London), October 1996, p. 7.

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SYED SERAJUL ISLAM 451 Despite the appearance that the Philippine's Moro problem was under con-

trol, MILF leader Hashim Salamat declared in 1996 that while autonomy in the Bangsomoro region was a feasible first step to independence, its effec- tiveness would depend upon the type of autonomy and the personalities of those involved in running the region. Salamat believed that the only viable solution to the plight of the Moros was complete independence and the establishment of an Islamic state. Thus, despite the MNLF's seeming break- through, the MILF remained engaged in armed struggle and so President Ramos opened negotiations with the group. In his sixth State of the Nation Address given on July 28, 1997, he stated that steps had been taken toward opening peace talks with the MILF. The government promised that "all leg- islative measures aiming to promote economic and social conditions of the Muslim indigenous cultural group in the country will be given priority. These include measures to recognize the ancestral domain of Muslim and cultural minorities."21 President Ramos hoped the peace agreement would be signed in the near future and end Mindanao's decade-old social unrest. Both the government and MILF pledged in late 1997 that the peace agreement would be signed before January 30, 1998, declaring, "We are one final step away from an agreement that would guarantee an enduring peace in Min- danao."22

The Results: Success and Failure The long struggles of the Malay Muslims and the Moros to create a dar al- Islam have had different outcomes. While the Moros have succeeded in achieving at least partial regional autonomy, the Muslims in Thailand have not. What factors are responsible for the relative success in the Philippines and the failure in Thailand? These different outcomes can be examined by looking at the extent of deprivation felt by the Muslims in both countries, the institutional strength of the revolutionary organizations, and mobilization of political support both at home and abroad.

The Degree of Deprivation In both Thailand and the Philippines, the minority Muslims have been deprived in many respects for a long period of time. However, the degree of deprivation is much lower in Thailand than in the Philippines, and the sense of deprivation is correspondingly much deeper among the Moros than among their Patani counterparts. This fact has resulted in making the Moros more aggressive in their struggle. In fact, the level of social, economic, and polit-

21. Philippine Daily Inquirer, August 2, 1997, p. 8. 22. Mindanao Cross (Cotabato City), August 2, 1997, p. 8. See also New Straits Times (Ku-

ala Lumpur), December 29, 1997, p. 1.

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ical subjugation is much lower in Patani than in Mindanao. In Patani, the Thai government is interested mainly in political domination and not in religious conversion, i.e., the "Buddhification" of Patani society by transferring Buddhists there from other parts of Thailand. In Mindanao, governments since the Spanish colonial period have been interested in both political domination and religious conversion. The domination continued after Indepen- dence as thousands of Catholics migrated to Mindanao at the government's urging. The Moros now constitute only 22% of the population in their own homeland. Today much of the wealth in Mindanao belongs either to Catholics or foreign investors. In contrast, no such land grabs took place in Patani and so the Malay Muslims' armed struggle lacked the communal as- pect present in Mindanao.

Economically, Patani has encountered less exploitation than Mindanao. Patani Raya is rich in rubber plantations and other natural resources, and the government initiated several projects to improve the socioeconomic conditions of the people and enhance the loyalty of the Muslims toward the Thai government.23 In the Mindanao region-much bigger than Patani24 and the Philippines's richest area in terms of natural and mineral resources-efforts have been made from the very beginning to exploit the resources for the benefit of industries in the northern Philippines. The flow of investment has exacerbated a growing economic disparity between the Catholic majority and the Muslims. After Independence, various multinational corporations were invited to set up industries in Mindanao that geared production to meet the requirements of the export market rather than local needs. It became a major area for earning foreign exchange for the Philippines. This pattern of economic development disrupted the Moro economic order by replacing subsis- tence production with export-oriented production and pushed the Moros to the economic periphery. The government believed that, with the declining wealth of the Moros, the Moro nationalist movement would collapse in the long run. In fact, the government's policy made the Moros more aggressive.

Politically speaking, while the Thai government took many steps to earn the loyalty of the Muslims in Patani Raya, the Philippine government adopted repressive measures in Mindanao. From the beginning, the government adopted integrative and assimilationist policies through a "control model." A commission for national integration was established in 1957, but rather than earning the loyalty of the Moros, its activities only deepened their sense of

23. Che Man, Muslim Separatism, p. 165. In fact, Dr. Imtiaz, a professor of Religion at Sonkhla University, informed me that "nowadays whatever we ask the government we get." Author interview, September 15, 1997.

24. The area covered by the Mindanao region accounts for 32.6% of the Philippines's total, while that of the Patani Raya accounts for only 10% of Thailand's. Author interview, W. K. Che Man, director of Malay Studies, National University of Malaysia, December 24, 1997.

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deprivation. There was a continuous denial of participation to the newly educated elites. The Muslims had neither the chance to become part of the ruling political elite in their region nor were any administrative jobs open to them. In 1980, T. J. S. George wrote, "Two decades after the Philippines became independent, Muslims in Mindanao were a devitalized people, their economic conditions stagnant, their social conditions in jeopardy, their laws and customs in danger of disintegrating."25 The Moros had no choice but to resort to violence and a war of attrition. In contrast, the Patani Muslims resorted to only a low level of violence. The Thai government's policy of integration was moderated by effective socioeconomic and political moves that have lessened movement toward a more violent response.

Institutional Strength A successful resistance movement also requires a stable, complex, and adapt- able institution. No such movement can succeed if it is led by a weak organization. The Muslims in both Patani and Mindanao organized liberation fronts but the organization behind the movement in Patani has remained weak all along compared to that in Mindanao. While the Moro movement has always been led by political institutions and leaders, those behind the Patani Mus- lims' movement have been religious. Leadership in both cases came initially from the traditional aristocrats. In Mindanao this leadership was transferred to educated, radical, political youths, while in Patani the core remained in the hands of religious leaders who lacked political tactics. The first two organizations created in Patani collapsed within a very short span of time, and the orthodox Islam and secularism that subsequently emerged weakened the dar al-Islam movement there. In fact, the Patani Muslims should have been more united than those of the Philippines because while the Muslims in Mindanao are divided into various ethnic groups, the Patani Muslims belong to a single one. Yet, they remained factionalized. None of the Patani organizations has any record of inspiring significant numbers of revolutionary cadres as has been the case with the MNLF. All the Patani revolutionary organizations seem to be struggling against each other rather than fighting against the government. Liberation activities persist in Patani but they will remain weak so long as they are not united.

On the other hand, the Moro liberation movement has always been led by a strong organization. Datu Untog Matalam, a member of a traditional aristo- crat family who had run for governor of Cotabato Province in 1967 and lost, founded MIM with other Muslim elites in the wake of the Jabaidah massacre to mobilize Muslim support and articulate calls for Muslim unity and auton-

25. Che Man, Muslim Separatism, p. 27; and T. J. S. George, Revolt in Mindanao: The Rise of Islam in Philippine Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), p. 120.

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omy for Mindanao. Initially, the MIM was a haven for the traditional Moro power elite who attempted to regain their lost political prestige and power. The rise of the MNLF was a challenge to both the traditional local elites as well as the Philippine government. There is no doubt that the MNLF was a very strong organization; it survived until it achieved its goal in 1996. Its leadership came from educated youth who understood political tactics and strategy. It is true that the MNLF's was divided later and that this resulted in the formation of the MILF. However, there is no record of fighting between the two. Both focused their efforts against the government forces. It is also true that the MILF remains unhappy with mere autonomy. It still demands complete independence and the establishment of an Islamic state in Min- danao, and the Ramos government was compelled to open negotiations with the MILF. Nonetheless, strong organization has always provided a cohesive force in the Moro liberation movement.

Mass Mobilization A revolutionary movement requires not only a strong organization but also domestic and foreign support at a broader social level. The Patani Muslim independence movement failed to mobilize such support either internally or externally. At home, there is a common consciousness among the Muslims in Patani about their identity but this consciousness needed to be translated into reality. The lack of a strong organization made it impossible to galva- nize the support of the masses. Leadership has remained divided between secular and religious elites. The opposition also could not provide the masses with an alternative source of security in the face of the Thai army. Region- ally, the Patani Muslims have not been able to draw serious attention from their neighbors. The Malaysian government never considered fighting Thai- land with its strong military. It did give tacit support to Patani Muslims, especially the Malay rulers of the Kelantan border state. However, after the formation of ASEAN in the late 1960s, Malaysia sought better relations with the Thai government. The Malaysian government needed its cooperation to suppress the Communist Party of Malaysia, which was carrying out guerilla operations from bases in southern Thailand. Internationally, the Patani Mus- lims failed to draw any serious support from either the OIC or Muslim countries generally. Neither the major powers, especially the U.K. and the U.S., nor the U.N. supported the Patani Muslim cause. Thus, they have been left to solve their problem by themselves.

The Moro movement, on the other hand, was fairly successful in mobiliz- ing mass support both at home and abroad. They were quite well organized, and the Moro populace gave the MNLF wholehearted support until it achieved some regional autonomy. Secondly, the MNLF attracted the attention of its strong neighbor, Malaysia. When the Philippines pressed territorial

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claims over the Malaysian State of Sabah, the Malaysian government re- sponded with support to the MNLF, seeing the movement as a lever to use to resolve the Sabah issue. Since its founding, the MNLF sought to develop a cordial relationship with Malaysia. The government of the Philippines was aware of this. Moreover, a large number of Filipinos were working in Malay- sia, their remittances contributing to the foreign exchange of the Philippines. Therefore, at the urging of the Malaysian government, the Ramos administration agreed in 1996 to peace talks with the MNLF. Finally, at the international level the Moros obtained support from Western countries, the U.N., and Amnesty International. There was support also from the OIC, and Mus- lim countries consequently came forward with direct help for the Moros. At the Sixth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers held in Jeddah in July 1975, the MNLF was given formal recognition by the OIC. The Muslim countries urged the Philippine government to negotiate with the MNLF's rep- resentatives; Manila could not ignore this request because 80% of the country's oil, as well as a huge amount of foreign exchange from Filipino overseas workers, came from the Middle East. The Tripoli Agreement was signed due to OIC pressure and in 1996 the Mindanao problem was resolved partially in light of that agreement.

Conclusion Some observations may be made on the basis of this comparative analysis of the Philippines's Moro and Thailand's Patani Muslim separatist movements. Huntington appears to be correct in stating that historical, political, and social circumstances may lay the groundwork for a separatist movement, but such a movement's success depends on both the state failing to accommodate the deprived group's demands and the cohesiveness and support base of the resistance forces. There also appears to be credence to Gurr's observation that a separatist movement becomes aggressive only with the "greater extent of deprivation." Since the Patani Muslims had not been severely deprived by the Thai state and lacked a strong cohesive organization and external supports, they have not been able to achieve autonomy for the region. On the other hand, the Moros have been relatively successful because they exper- ienced severe socioeconomic and political deprivations. Moreover, they were led by a strong organization that achieved both domestic and foreign support. While the Thai policy of integration was pursued through accommodation and development, the Philippine state used repression and exploitation for the benefit of the country at the expense of the Moros. This policy led to riots and massacres in Mindanao.

Unity based on religious identity may not necessarily lead to the success of a movement unless the religious group in question is severely affected by social, economic, and political deprivations. In both the Patani and Min-

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danao cases, religion initially helped to form a separate identity but ulti- mately religious unity did not make a substantial difference to the relative success or failure of these movements. Rather, it was the magnitude of the state's socioeconomic and political intrusions and its repression of minorities that seem to have had much to do with the success of a separatist movement. One may find similar trends in many other separatist movement cases. The Sunni Muslim Berbers in Algeria and Morocco, for example, have failed in their movements because both governments have made concessions to the cultural interests of the Berbers and accommodated them with a degree of economic and political powers. Similarly, the Sikhs in India's Punjab have failed to achieve an independent Khalistan because the degree of deprivation there is not that high; in fact, many Sikhs hold top positions in the Indian civil and military bureaucracies. Furthermore, not all Sikhs are in favor of independence; for example, the Akali Dal, a pro-Sikh party, does not support the separatist cause. Consequently, the separatist movement has failed to mobilize either internal or external supports. Conversely, the separatist movement in Bangladesh was successful as the Bengalis were severely deprived. The movement was led by a strong organization, the Awami League, which was aided and supported directly by India and the Soviet Union during its war of liberation. In contrast, the Buddhist tribals of Bangladesh's Chit- tagong Hill Tracts have led a separatist movement that has been a failure because the degree of deprivation is not that high. The government there has sought political accommodation and in November 1997 signed a peace treaty with the Shanti Bahini rebels and met their demands. Thus, though religion or culture may provide a separatist movement with an initial bond of unity and identity, such a movement becomes successful only if there exists ex- treme deprivations, the movement is led by a strong and cohesive political organization, and it earns support both at home and abroad.

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the islamic independence movements in patani of thailand ...ted robert gurr, minorities at risk: a...

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