the karamoja conflict - urban response...i would like again to underline (but not to repeat myself)...

THE KARAMOJA CONFLICTOrigins, Impact and Solutions

Michael Ochieng Odhiambo

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An Oxfam Publication

Oxfam GB is a registered charity and is a member of OxfamInternational

© Oxfam 2003First published 2003

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced,stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by anymeans electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwisewithout the prior written permission of the publisher.

ISBN 0 85598 4678

Photographs on pp.14,24,55,60: Oxfam; p.71 The New Vision

Prepared for Oxfam by Fountain Publishers Ltd

This book converted to digital file in 2010

Contents

1. Introduction 1

The background 1

The context 6

Objectives of the study 7

Methodology 9

2. Conceptual Issues 15

3. Causes of Conflict and Insecurity In Karamoja 23

Culture, poverty and political isolation 27

Government policy on Karamoja 32

Guns, the collapse of traditional authority and theineffectiveness of modern institutions of governance 40

Failure of local political leadership, economic

and social elite 46

4. Manifestations of Conflict and Insecurity 51

Intra-Karimojong conflict 51

Cross-district conflicts 54

Cross-border conflicts 58

5. The Impact of Conflict and Insecurity 61

Impact of conflict on women and other non-combatants 63

6. Conclusions and Recommendations 67

Conclusions 67

Attempted solutions: Lessons learned" 72

The way forward 75

iii

AppendicesAppendix 1: Itinerary: January-February 2000 80Appendix 2: List of Persons Interviewed 84Appendix 3: Key Research Questions:

Causes of conflict in Karamoja; 87Conflict resolution initiatives 88

Appendix 4A: Mapping of cross-district andcross-border conflict: The Jie 89

Appendix 4B: Mapping of cross-district andcross-border conflict: The Dodoth 90

Appendix 4C: Mapping of cross-district and cross-border conflict: The Pokot 91

Appendix 4D: Mapping of cross-district conflict:The Pian 92

iv

AcronymsASTUCBO

CBR

IGAD

IIED

KAPEPS

KDA

KISP

KPIU

KRPC

LCLWF

NGO

NRA

NRM

NURP

OAUPEAPRECONCILESPLATPDFUNLAUNOUPPAB

Anti Stock Theft UnitCommunity-Based OrganisationCentre for Basic ResearchIntergovernmental Authority onDevelopmentInternational Institute for Environment andDevelopmentKaramoja Association for Peace andEnvironmental ProtectionKaramoja Development AgencyKaramoja Initiative for Sustainable PeaceKaramoja Project Implementation UnitKaramoja Resource and Policy CentreLocal CouncilLutheran World FederationNon Governmental OrganisationNational Resistance ArmyNational Resistance Movement

Northern Uganda RehabilitationProgrammeOrganisation of African UnityPoverty Eradication Action PlanResources Conflict InstituteSudanese Peoples Liberation ArmyTanzania Peoples Defence ForceUganda National Liberation ArmyUnited Nations OrganisationUganda Participatory Programme for theAlleviation of Poverty

ForewordPoverty and suffering is sharply increasing in those regions,countries, districts and villages and households where peaceis at stake, conflict breaks out frequently and insecurityprevails. The most important victims are the poor, thechildren and the women.

I do not intend to pre-empt the arguments and findingsin this book, but I would like to express some of my thoughtsabout the research. It is simplistic to attribute the causes ofthe conflict and insecurity in Karamoja to 'backwardness'and the availability of guns. The Karimojong do not fightsimply because they are backward. I would say that thisattitude is sheer prejudice. With regard to guns, I agree thatsmall arms fueled conflict and insecurity in Karamoja, butdisarmament of illegal guns is just one part of the solution,and how we do it indeed matters. It should be strategic andcomprehenisve, for example a 'regional approach' isimperative to make disarmament sustainable.

I propose that we open up our minds to look into multipledimensions of the root causes of conflict. These includeuneven-development and economic insecurity in Karamoja,disputes over grass and water, issues that are associated withbad governance, ethnic,or any other form of identitydifferences, the stockpile of guns in the hands of theKarimojong, guns trafficking within the region (not onlywithin Uganda), and the history of previous raids. Giventhe diversity and complexity of the causes of conflict andinsecurity in Karamoja, simplistic solutions are neitherfeasible nor desirable.

Oxfam has taken the initiative on peace-building inUganda and elsewhere in Africa for many years. This studyon causes of conflict and insecurity in Karamoja is part of

VI

Foreword uii

Oxfam's regional and global strategic objective. From its20 years experience of continuous engagement withcommunities in Karamoja, Oxfam has witnessed the effectsof conflict, insecurity and cattle raids. We are speaking notonly on the basis of the knowledge from our experience,but also on the basis of participatory researches centred onthe voices of the victims and the poorest.

This book is based on the Oxfam report, Learning fromthe poor (2000), on Ugandan participatory povertyassessment. It has a lot to say in linking poverty/vulnerabilitywith conflict. The book argues that peace and security areprerequisites for poverty reduction. This study found thatcattle raiding by the Karimojong in the northeast has led toincreasing poverty for other groups further to the south. Forexample, the loss of oxen in Kumi and Kapchorwa has ledto decreasing acreage under cultivation, as well as reducedproductivity and food insecurity. As a result, the Teso regionhas, for the first time, experienced chronic food shortages inthe wake of the loss of cattle.

This book also explains that the poor people, in somedistricts, appreciate the government of Uganda for returningpeace and the rule of law in many parts of the country since1986. Such peace has enabled those districts to attain visibledevelopment over the past 16 years. The study recognisesthat there have been government and other peace initiativesin Karamoja but the security situation has not significantlyimproved.

According to the UPPAP report, cattle raiding, that israiding each other as a traditional means of acquiringwealth, for replacement of cattle lost due to raids, droughtor illness, is the most serious problem facing all thecommunities in Karamoja. The devastating effects of theseraids were clearly expressed by those communities. For them,losing cattle means losing everything. Episodes of insecurity

viii Karamoja Conflict Study

have impoverished both individuals and households. Thethreats of insecurity prohibit local people from breaking outof poverty. Moreover, local people reported that poverty hasworsened in the past two decades in the districts affected byinsecurity.

I must say that Oxfam is not a specialised agency inconflict management and peace-building. Oxfam makes itshumble contribution in terms of facilitation, money, ideas,commitment and, most importantly, Oxfam shares its 'vision'with those interested individuals and organisations. Ourstrategic programme is to contribute increasingly to shapingand building a just, equitable and sustainable peace withinsocieties so that fewer people will suffer from armed conflictand its consequences. Oxfam supports all peoples' right toenjoy local, national and regional equity, participation,representation and voice.

I would like again to underline (but not to repeat myself)that dealing with conflict is a poverty reduction strategy. Thishas been recognised by the government of Uganda's revisedPoverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP). Therefore it is notonly a humanitarian issue for us all, but it is also necessaryto ensure that poverty reduction programmes are notthreatened by insecurity and recurrent conflict.

Before publishing this book, we consulted a number ofnon-governmental organisations and senior governmentofficials. We are very much encouraged by the support andenthusiasm they extended to us. Oxfam believes that it ispossible to contain future outbreaks of violence in pastoraland agro-pastoral communities through effective partnershipand networking. In this regard, Oxfam's role is to facilitatethe efforts of communities, NGOs and the government atdifferent levels. We also strive to ensure that the samestructures take the ownership.

Foreword ix

Finally, let me express my gratitude to those whocontributed to the publication of this book. I'm very gratefulto the office of the Prime Minister. I particularly thankHon. Omwony-Qjwok, the former State Minister for NorthernUganda Rehabilitation and Hon. Peter Lokeris, Minister ofState for Karamoja, for their consistent support for theresearch that resulted in this book. I appreciate Mr MichaelOdhiambo, who conducted the research on behalf of Oxfam,and Oxfam staff members in Uganda who worked tirelessly,both in the field and the main office in Kampala.

Dereje WordofaOxfam

Ugandan Programme RepresentativeKampala

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Karamoja: Districts and neighbours

1

IntroductionThe background

Oxfam has worked in Uganda and Karamoja for over 20years. Throughout this time, the focus of the work, aselsewhere in the world, has been the fight against poverty.The work focuses on three sectors, namely emergency andhumanitarian action; long-term development initiatives andadvocacy; and education about poverty issues. TheKaramoja Programme has been based in Kotido Districtand situated at Kaabong.

In early 1999, the Programme Manager of Oxfam'sKaramoja Project was shot at within a few metres of his houseand the project offices at Kaabong. Although he sustainedsevere injuries, he luckily survived. Following the attack,Oxfam withdrew from Kaabong and thus from Karamoja inMarch 1999, as it was no longer able to guarantee thesecurity and lives of its field staff. Since then, the KaramojaProgramme has been put on hold to enable Oxfam toconsider options for its continued operations in the area.

While this temporary closure has understandably had anegative impact on the projects and people that theProgramme was supporting and working with, it has alsogiven Oxfam an opportunity to review and reflect on itsstrategy for working in Karamoja. As part of this review andreflection, Oxfam has sought to understand more clearly theplace of conflict and insecurity in Karamoja, as well as itsimpact on the livelihoods of the local population anddevelopment processes in the region. At the same time,

2 The Karamoja Conflict

Oxfam has used this temporary closure to align its work inKaramoja more closely with the organisation's RegionalPastoral Programme, implemented in the three countriesof Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania, which presently focuseson education, drought, land and insecurity.

Oxfam has always been alive to the implications ofconflict and insecurity on its work. However, the experienceat Kaabong and the subsequent temporary closure of theKaramoja Programme has demonstrated more starkly bothto Oxfam and to the stakeholders in the KaramojaProgramme the reality that no serious and sustaineddevelopment work can take place in the absence of peaceand security.1 Equally, the experience has demonstratedthe need for Oxfam, jointly with other development actorsin Karamoja, to address the problem of conflict andinsecurity in a sustained and programmatic manner.

In effect, it is now appreciated within Oxfam that theorganisation has to work on conflict in order to be able towork with conflict. Because conflict and insecurity defineto a large degree the reality of Karamoja, any developmentactor interested in working there must, in the short term,design strategies for working in an environment of conflictand insecurity. However, in the long term, such actors mustalso design programmes and projects that make a sustainedinput into the process of managing the conflict and buildingpeace, if they are to make a positive impact on thedevelopment and improved livelihoods of the Karimojong.

It is in response to this realisation that Oxfamcommissioned a study on conflict and insecurity inKaramoja, with a view to understanding the history, nature,causes, consequences and manifestations of conflict andinsecurity in the region, as well as its impact on livelihoodsand development processes there. The study also soughtto examine what attempts have been made to deal with the

Introduction 3

problem in the past, and with what consequences.Additionally, the study would consider what otherorganisations and institutions, including the national andlocal government are doing about the problem; and whatrole traditional institutions have and can play in themanagement of conflict and insecurity. It is expected thatwith this information Oxfam will be in a position to identifywhat role it can play in the management of conflict andinsecurity in Karamoja, and thus be able to design anappropriate programme of action to tackle the problem.

The definition of research objectives and the questionsto help address the objectives, have been done in the contextof and with a view to making the research results relevant toOxfam's search for an entry point for work on conflict inKaramoja. Even though the organisation has worked inKaramoja for so long, and has been involved in initiativesaddressing conflict and peace building, the previousinvolvement has been sporadic and unprogrammed. This,it is now felt, has affected the impact of the work; hence theneed to study the problem more extensively and design thestrategy for a long-term response.

In this connection, it is necessary to understand the historyof conflict in Karamoja, which entails understanding thehistory and socio-political organisation of the people, andhow this impacts on their internal relationships withinKaramoja, as well as on their relations with neighbouringcommunities both within and outside Uganda. Only thusmay one be able to clearly understand the nature of conflictin Karamoja, as well as its causes, consequences andmanifestations.

It is sought to understand the different types of conflict inKaramoja and how they manifest themselves. It isappreciated that while cattle raids and the violence thataccompanies them constitute the single most traumatic type


and manifestation of conflict in Karamoja, there arenevertheless other equally traumatic types andmanifestations of conflict in the region that are not sopublicised.2 Only by understanding these differenttypologies and manifestations of conflict can acomprehensive and sustainable intervention, with realchances of success, be designed.

Similarly, in investigating the causes and consequencesof conflict in Karamoja, it is intended to go to the underlyingcauses of the various types of conflict. These causes will beinvestigated and analysed from the point of view of thevarious stakeholders in Karamoja; principally the pastoraliststhemselves, government officials and political leaders, anddevelopment agents working in the region. In thisconnection, it is appreciated that in discussing the localpastoral communities, regard must be given to the fact thatdifferent sectors of the community tend to be affecteddifferently by conflict according to their respective positionswithin the social and political structures. As such thesedifferent sectors may have different perceptions of the causes,consequences and manifestations of conflict. It is intendedtherefore, that the investigation and analysis gives effect tothis reality by incorporating the perceptions of not only themen, but also the women, the youth and the elders, bothmale and female.

The impact of conflict on the livelihoods of the localpeople, and on the development process, is probably thesingle most important justification for the study; because thisis what has direct relevance to the concerns of Oxfam. Inthis connection, again the non-homogeneity of Karimojongsociety has to be taken into account, to ensure that theinvestigation and analysis gives effect to the diversity ofimpacts that conflict has on the different sectors of society.

Introduction 5

The diversity of impacts is informed by the different powerpositions and relations, which are in turn informed by thelevel of the group in the hierarchy of power and influencewithin the social and political set up. The relative positionsalso determine the capacity of the respective sectors torespond to the impact of conflict on their lives andlivelihoods. Ultimately, these considerations haveimplications for the strategies that may be put in place toaddress conflict in Karamoja.

As a development actor, Oxfam is also keen tounderstand the impact of conflict on development action inKaramoja. It has already realised, from its experience inKaabong, that it is not possible to undertake developmentwork in Karamoja in the absence of a measure of security.However, it would like to learn from the experiences of otherdevelopment actors in Karamoja in order to understand notonly how insecurity impacts on development work, but alsohow the other development actors have responded to andmanaged insecurity. Not only will this information be usefulfor designing Oxfam's own response and work on conflict,but it will also assist Oxfam in establishing how best to workwith the other development actors in Karamoja on this issue.

It is recognised that ultimately the responsibility formanaging conflict, removing insecurity, and establishinglasting security and sustainable peace rests with thegovernment of Uganda. In this connection, the study andefforts to understand conflict by organisations such as Oxfamare merely complementary to the role of government. Forthat reason, it is intended to establish the policy of thegovernment of Uganda relative to the conflict and insecurityin Karamoja, the efforts and strategies of the government inaddressing the problem to date, and the impact that thepolicy and strategy have had on the situation in Karamoja.


In this way, it is expected that Oxfam will be able to establishhow best it can work with the government of Uganda inaddressing the conflict and insecurity in Karamoja.

It is appreciated that there have been previous efforts toaddress the conflict and insecurity in Karamoja. IndeedOxfam has been involved in some of these initiatives, bothgovernmental and non-governmental. These previousattempts contain in themselves important lessons for anynew initiatives and strategies to address the same problem.As such it is intended to understand the nature and establishthe impact of conflict management and peace buildinginitiatives that have been tried in Karamoja in the past, andderive from them lessons that may be useful in designingnew strategies. In this connection, the study will alsoinvestigate and analyse what the Karimojong themselvesare doing about conflict and insecurity. This will also entaila study of such customary conflict management and peacebuilding initiatives as exist in Karamoja, their effectiveness,and other relevant factors.

The context

Karamoja lies in the north-east of Uganda, bordering Kenyain the east, Sudan in the north, the districts of Mbale andKapchorwa in the south, and the districts of Kumi, Katakwi,Lira and Kitgum in the west. With an area of 27,000-sq.km,the region covers 10 per cent of the country. The populationof Karamoja is estimated at 400,000 people,3 most of whomare semi-nomadic pastoralists, herding cattle but alsoengaged in small-scale agricultural production.

Karamoja is divided into three administrative districts,Moroto, Kotido and Nakapiripirit. The districts are in turndivided into counties, which correspond with and are namedafter the main clans that constitute the Karimojong. Moroto

Introduction 7

district comprises five counties: Matheniko, Bokora, Pian,Upe and Moroto Municipality. Nakapiripirit has one county:Chekwii. Kotido district has three counties, namely Labwor,Jie and Dodoth.

This study was conducted in all the three districts ofKaramoja, with the research team spending a total of tendays in the region; during which period interviews anddiscussions were held with respondents at the Moroto districtheadquarters, as well as at Amudat (Moroto) and Namaluin Nakapiripirit District. In Kotido District, interviews wereheld at the district headquarters, as well as at Kaabong andKomuria. These were in addition to the interviews previouslyheld at Kampala, with a variety of persons in governmentand other institutions active in Karamoja. In all, more than50 individuals were interviewed over the period of the study(see Appendix 2: List of Persons Interviewed).

Although the study was conducted solely within Moroto,Kotido and Nakapiripirit districts, it also sought to generateinformation relative to the manifestation of conflict in thedistricts that neighbour Karamoja, as well as the communitiesliving across the border in Kenya and Sudan. Clearly, thefact that this information has been generated solely withinKaramoja has to be kept in mind in considering the veracityof that information. It may be necessary to considerconducting a study that will involve the generation ofinformation from within the neighbouring districts, as wellas from across the border in Kenya and Sudan.4

Objectives of the study

The overall objective of this study is to analyse the causesof conflict and insecurity in Karamoja, and makerecommendations on actions to be taken for preparedness


and response. In order to realise this overall objective, thestudy has sought to:• establish the underlying causes of conflict and insecurity

in Karamoja. In this connection, the study analysesconflict in Karamoja at three levels: intra-Karimojongconflict, pitting one Karimojong sub-group againstanother within the borders of Karamoja; cross-borderconflict, pitting the Karimojong against communitiesliving in the districts bordering Moroto and Kotido; andcross-border conflict, pitting the Karimojong againstcommunities living across Uganda's internationalborders in Kenya and Sudan.

• analyse the impact of conflict on livelihoods inKaramoja; especially with reference to the livelihoodsof non-combatants who include women, children, theaged and the disabled. In this connection particularregard has been given to the position of women, with aview to establishing their perspectives on causes,consequences and possible solutions to conflict andinsecurity in Karamoja.

• generate and document information on the flow ofarms and the impact of arms on pastoral conflict inKaramoja. While it is appreciated that this informationis not easy to come by, given that trade in arms is aclandestine activity even in Karamoja, attempts werenevertheless made to understand the manner in whicharms flow into Karamoja, and the sources of arms forKarimojong warriors.

» consider attempts that have been made in the past toaddress the problem of conflict and insecurity inKaramoja, how these have fared, and the factorsinforming their success or failure. These attempts includethose in which Oxfam has been involved either directly

Introduction 9

or by providing funding. These attempts are analysedwith a view to establishing what lessons may be learnedfrom them; and how the experiences gained from themcan inform any future interventions.

Methodology

The study is based on both primary and secondary data,generated principally from Kampala and Karamoja. Theprimary data has been generated principally throughinterviews and discussions with major stakeholders inKampala and Karamoja (Appendix 1: Itinerary). In Kampala,the researcher interviewed and held discussions withresearchers on conflict, pastoralism and pastoraldevelopment, and representatives of development agenciesworking in Karamoja, as well as with government officialsworking in and on Karamoja.5 These interviews anddiscussions were held during a one-week stay in Kampalain the middle of January, 2000.

The researcher spent ten days in Karamoja during earlyFebruary, 2000 and held interviews at Moroto, Amudat andNamalu and at Kotido, Kaabong and Komuria in KotidoDistrict. Those interviewed in the three districts includedresearchers, government officials, local politicians, elders,the youth (both men and women), warriors, elders (bothmen and women), religious leaders and development agentsworking in the region. Efforts were made, in each instanceto identify a cross-section of stakeholders to ensure that arepresentative picture emerged in the discussions (seeAppendix 2: List of Persons Interviewed).

Although the interviews were unstructured, they werebased on a set of research questions agreed with Oxfam inadvance. The interviews sought to generate informationon the major issues of concern to Oxfam as defined by the


research questions (see Appendix 3: Key ResearchQuestions). In most instances, the interviews were conductedindividually, with the research assistant providinginterpretation from English to ngaKarimojong, wherenecessary. However, a number of women preferred to beinterviewed collectively, and this was done in Amudat,Kotido and Komuria.

The persons interviewed in Kampala were identified withthe assistance of Oxfam on the basis of their involvementand interest in the issues of conflict and insecurity inKaramoja. Attempts were made by Oxfam to arrangemeetings with Karamoja members of Parliament in Kampala,both in January and in early February, when the researcherpassed through Kampala on his way to Karamoja, but thisproved impossible, on account of the fact that Parliamentwas at this time on recess. Attempts to get hold of the MPsin Karamoja during the fieldwork proved equallyunsuccessful. In the end, however, the attendance of theMinister of State for Karamoja Affairs at the Oxfam RegionalWorkshop on Conflict at Momella Wildlife Lodge in Arusha,Tanzania, provided an invaluable opportunity to exchangeideas with him on the subject, and to have his input into thestudy.

In Karamoja, the researcher was assisted by RoseLochiam Miligan, a policy worker and researcher with theLWF's Karamoja Resource and Policy Centre (KRPC) basedin Moroto. Apart from having been born and bred inKaramoja, Rose has worked on issues of conflict and peacebuilding in Karamoja for over three years. She has throughher work and with her organisation built an impressivenetwork of contacts in Karamoja that proved invaluable inhelping mobilise correspondents for the interviews inKaramoja. The researcher's own previous work with LWF

Introduction 11

in Karamoja also proved a useful background andgrounding on the subject of the study, as well as thegeographical area.

As for secondary data, the researcher had access tomaterials in Oxfam's library on conflict managementgenerally, and conflict in Karamoja, in particular. Theseinclude material on the work done by Oxfam and otherorganisations on conflict in Karamoja, as well as minutes ofpeace meetings in Karamoja organised and/or funded byOxfam, or in which Oxfam has participated in the past. Inaddition, the researcher has read widely around the subjectof pastoral conflict, conflict management and peacebuilding. For this purpose, he has had the use of institutionallibraries at CBR, RECONCILE, KRPC and otherorganisations in the region that specialise in this area ofconcern.

At the end of the fieldwork, the researcher made apreliminary presentation of his findings to the CountryProgramme Representative at Oxfam offices in Kampala,and received his reaction and comments. Subsequently,the draft report was presented by the researcher to theregional workshop on pastoral conflict in East Africa,organised as part of Oxfam's East Africa Pastoral ProgrammeAnnual Meeting at Momella Wildlife Lodge, Arusha,Tanzania.

The workshop was attended by Oxfam programmepersonnel from Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania, as well as arepresentative from Oxfam headquarters in Oxford, England,and a cross-section of practitioners on conflict from the threecountries. Of greater significance for the purposes of thestudy was the attendance at the workshop of political andadministrative leaders from Karamoja led by the Ministerof State for Karamoja, Hon. Peter Lokeris. He was


accompanied by the Resident District Commissioner forMoroto which at the time also included Nakapiripirit Districtas well as the LCV Chairmen of Moroto and Kotido.

The draft report generated lively discussion from theseleaders as well the other participants at the workshop. Thisenabled the researcher to get feedback on some of the ideasgenerated by the study. An effort has been made to takeinto account the feedback received at the workshop in thecompilation of this study. It should however be noted thatthe study and the conclusions arrived at are informed mainlyby the findings made in the research described above.

The subject of conflict and insecurity in Karamoja is awide and complex subject on a region that is big and diverse.A study such as this, conducted within such limited timeand coverage constraints, cannot therefore claim to havecovered every aspect of the problem; and indeed this wasnever the intention of the study. What the study did was toidentify the major issues relative to conflict and insecurity inKaramoja, to make an analysis of the conflict and insecuritysituation, and to make suggestions to Oxfam about itspossible role in conflict management and peace building inthe region. In so far as these purposes are concerned, theresearch has generated sufficient information to make suchidentification, analysis and suggestions possible.

l.Ayoo, Sandra Josephine. Karamoja Programme Desk Review. OxfamUganda, December 1999.

2. The Ministry of State for Karamoja Affairs identifies rebel activities,banditry and road ambushes as other causes of insecurity in Karamoja.See Ministry of State in the Office of the President in charge of KaramojaDevelopment. Annual Report. December 1997, p. 13.

Introduction 13

3. This estimate is based on the figures from the last national censusconducted in Uganda in 1991, corrected by the annual population growthrate of 0.7%. See Karamoja Projects Implementation Unit AnnualReport 1996, p. 7.

4. Recent media reports of the hostility between the Iteso and theKarimojong are instructive in this regard. See New Vision, 15 March2000.

5. There are government officials whose mandate includes Karamoja,but who are based in Kampala. These are said to be working onKaramoja. On the other hand, some government officials actually workwithin Karamoja.


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Conceptual IssuesBefore embarking on a serious discussion of conflict andinsecurity in Karamoja, it is considered appropriate tohighlight and discuss some conceptual issues relevant tothe discussion. This is done to establish a conceptualframework and context for the overall discussion. It isappreciated that this does not and cannot constitute the lastword on the said concepts, but it is nevertheless consideredimportant to ensure that the conceptual underpinnings ofour analysis are understood.

While the subject of the research and the report has beendescribed as conflict and insecurity, it may legitimately beasked whether what Oxfam seeks to understand and tointervene in is conflict or insecurity, or both. Indeed, is thereany difference between conflict and insecurity? Is thedifference important for purposes of the concerns of thisstudy? What are the implications one way or the other if achoice is to be made between conflict and insecurity? Howwould the choice of the one or the other affect the responseto and suggested solutions for the problem?

As we understand it, conflict is the situation that existsbetween two persons or groups of persons who perceivethat they have competing interests relative to a single issue,thing or situation. Each party wants to pursue its owninterests to the full, and in so doing ends up contradicting,compromising, or even defeating the interests of the other.With regard to natural resources, especially in suchecologically vulnerable localities as Karamoja, conflict isinevitable given the disparity between the availability of the

15


resources and the demands for them. As the populationsof cattle and humans increase, the competition for accessto the diminishing resources whether these be pastures,water or salt lick becomes more and more acute.

There is a sense in which conflict in an environment likeKaramoja is not only inevitable, but even necessary anduseful in defining the competing needs for resources byresource dependent communities, or by different sectors ofthose communities. In this sense at least, there would be anargument as to whether conflict should, or indeed can beresolved altogether. Indeed this is what creates the need todistinguish between conflict and insecurity, and thereforebetween appropriate responses to either. In this connection,it can be seen that conflict is the larger and underlying issue,which is a function of inherent contradictions within andbetween resource dependent communities. It is informedby the competition for access to natural resources and theassertion of competing demands on those resources bydifferent groups and individuals.

Insecurity on the other hand, is a manifestation of conflict,which undermines personal and collective security, and ischaracterised by the incidence of violence. Given its specificmanifestations, insecurity is a more real and immediateproblem in Karamoja, and one with which the people easilyand readily identify. In comparison, conflict is too general aconcept and is not readily seen as an immediate problem.

It becomes clear that for purposes of this research, it isimportant to consider both conflict and insecurity. The two,though distinct, are actually part of a single continuum. Whathas to be kept in mind is that one is a wider, much moreencompassing, and therefore more intricate issue, while theother is more specific and is itself a manifestation of the other.This has implications for the nature of interventions that may

Conceptual Issues 17

be designed in each case. Conflict can only be addressedin the long-term with the objective of getting to its underlyingor root causes; while insecurity may be addressed by shortand medium-term measures that answer to specific aspectsof the problem. Ultimately, dealing with conflict andinsecurity requires a multi-pronged approach that willaddress both the general, long-term as well as the specific,short-term aspects.

Yet even with this distinction between conflict andinsecurity, it is important to determine whether the objectiveof the analysis, and of the ultimate intervention, is to prevent,resolve, manage, or respond to conflict and insecurity. It isour contention that the choice of one or other of these asthe basis of the analysis and intervention has implicationsfor both the process and the substance of such analysis orintervention. In this connection, it is quite clear that thequestions that people ask determine in large measure theresponses that are thereby generated whether by analysisor inquiry. Those questions are in turn informed by certainassumptions, even biases, some conscious and otherssubconscious.

Whether one seeks to prevent, resolve or manageconflict, what one is doing is responding to the conflict. Torespond is therefore understood here to mean to take actionin an effort to address conflict. To prevent conflict entailstaking pre-emptive action aimed at ensuring that the conflictdoes not occur or manifest itself. To resolve conflict wouldbe to bring it to an end altogether, while to manage conflictis to seek to control it and its impacts to ensure that it doesnot degenerate into socially disruptive behaviour. The latteris thus an attempt to live and work with conflict, and isinformed by a recognition that conflict is part and parcel ofsocial interaction, and will always be there.


Failure to recognise the continuing nature of conflict mayresult from confusing insecurity or other manifestations ofconflict with the actual conflict. This may lead to muchfrustration when an intervention that targets such amanifestation fails to address conclusively the real conflict.It is for this reason that we contend that the decision onwhether the objective is to prevent, resolve or manageconflict is important for both the analysis and design of theintervention. We do appreciate however that at the end ofthe day, within the context of a multi-pronged approach,prevention as well as resolution and management have toinform the proper response to conflict. What is important isto appreciate the limits of each of these concepts singly.

In the specific context of Karamoja, these considerationsas to the conceptual framework of analysis become critical.Given the diversity of players and interests at stake it isimperative to align and reconcile the approaches andinterventions by the various players with the needs andaspirations of the people of Karamoja. The various playersin Karamoja include but are not limited to government (bothlocal and national), religious organisations, NGOs, (local,national and international), CBOs, communities, elders,warriors, women, youth, the armed forces (specifically army,police and ASTU), politicians (both local and national), andthe local political and economic elite. It is legitimate toinquire whether in all this diversity there is a consensus onthe need to end or even address the conflict and insecurityin Karamoja.

While in most discussions of the problem it is alwaysassumed that such consensus exists, a lot more needs to bedone to ascertain this, in view of the diversity of stakeholdersand their respective interests. It is not safe to assume that allthe Karimojong and the people working in and on


Karamoja, whether as individuals or institutions, perceiveconflict and insecurity as a threat and a hindrance to theachievement of certain objectives. No doubt the vastmajority of people in Karamoja would like to see the situationchange for the better. Indeed publicly no one in Karamojacould possibly speak in favour of the conflict and insecuritythat prevails in the area. Yet it is quite possible that thereare certain individuals or groups within Karamoja whose,interests and purposes are well served by the conflict andinsecurity in the region.

These are the people who are wont to frustrate any effortsthat seek to manage the conflict and establish lasting peacein the region. Experience has shown that virtually everyinitiative for conflict management and peace building inKaramoja will have its support and its opposition. While itmay be true that this is usually a function of the divisivenature of Karimojong society characterised by very strongclan and sectional loyalties, it also demonstrates the pointthat there are indeed persons and groups within the societythat benefit from the conflict and insecurity.

It is important that in discussing conflict and insecurity inKaramoja, and in designing responses and possiblesolutions, this group is not ignored. It may indeed be criticalfor the success of any efforts aimed at addressing the conflictand insecurity, and building peace. In this connection itmust be understood that this is not some marginal groupingthat may be safely ignored. There are indeed outlaws,warlords and renegades who operate on the fringes ofsociety and outside the legal framework. These may beeasily marginalised and neutralised by the critical mass infavour of peace. However, the greatest threats to lastingpeace and security in Karamoja are people in the mainstreamwhose views and actions are critical for the achievement of


any lasting peace in the region, but who are not interestedin the establishment of such peace. This is why it becomesnecessary to establish the balance between victims andbeneficiaries of conflict in Karamoja. In the final analysis,the chances of success for any efforts aimed at creating lastingpeace and security in the region are dependent on theexistence of a critical mass in favour of peace and security.

It is also critical for a proper analysis and understandingof the conflict and insecurity in Karamoja, to determine towhat extent the conflict in Karamoja is a local, national,regional or global issue. There is clearly a sense in whichthe conflict and insecurity in Karamoja has all these differentdimensions. As a local problem, one is speaking of theconflict manifested in intra-Karimojong raids within theborders of Karamoja. It becomes a national problem whenthe Karimojong cross their borders into the neighbouringdistricts, and when their actions impinge on the nationalsecurity of Uganda. The regional dimension emerges whenthe Karimojong attack or are attacked by rival groups fromacross the border in Kenya and Sudan; while the globaldimension of the conflict derives from the phenomenon ofguns and ammunition. The proliferation of arms inKaramoja, and the flourishing trade in arms within the region,must surely be seen in its global dimensions, given that thereis no arms factory in Karamoja or for that matter in any ofthe neighbouring countries.

These dimensions or levels at which the conflict andinsecurity in Karamoja manifest themselves may be seen aspart of a continuum. The question that arises is how far inthe continuum are the different players in Karamojaprepared to go in search of lasting solutions to the problem.Unless there is a commitment to tackle the problem at alllevels of the continuum, it is obvious that little can be


achieved in real terms. Yet the limits of action along thiscontinuum may also be determined by the amount ofresources that can be mobilised by any one player or groupof players. Every player will want to concentrate their effortsat the levels where they can make the greatest impact givenresource and other constraints. While this is understoodand appreciated, it is nevertheless clear that unless themanagement of conflict and insecurity in Karamoja is donein a multi-pronged approach that addresses the differentlevels of the continuum, little real impact can be made. It issuggested that to do this may require the collaboration ofdifferent players acting at different points in the continuumwith each player operating within its area of greatestcomparative advantage.

It is clear that generally speaking, there is overwhelmingsupport within the Karimojong community and leadershipfor initiatives aimed at managing the conflict and insecuritysituation prevalent in the area, and building lasting peace.What is lacking is consensus on the best way to do this.This lack of consensus is in part a function of the absence ofagreement between the different stakeholders on the causesof conflict and insecurity in Karamoja. Nor is thereagreement on who should take responsibility for putting anend to the conflict and insecurity. As a result, one noticesthe peddling of accusations and counter accusations, withthe result that every effort to address the problem is boundto face opposition or even sabotage from one group or theother. At times one group will oppose an initiative for thesimple reason that it is being fronted by a specific group.

Yet perhaps the greatest threat to the management of theconflict and insecurity in Karamoja is the intricate clan andsectional loyalties and rivalries that characterise Karimojongsociety. These rivalries manifest themselves in alliances


created between clans and sections for purposes of war andcattle raids. Yet the Karimojong have not always foughtamongst themselves. In the past, 'the Karimojong and theTepeth were a single alliance'1 that would fight the Pokot/Upe. In recent years however, the nature of alliances haschanged, such that the Bokora are allied to the Jie and theNyakwae, the Matheniko are allied to the Turkana and thePian, while the Tepeth are allied to the Pokot. Thesealliances fight each other on and off in a never-ending seriesof raids and counter raids.2

1. Rose Lochiam Miligan. Peace Together: Field Report on Under-standing Violent Conflict, Reconciliation and Peace Building inKaramoja: A Case Study of Matheniko, Bokora and Tepeth. Moroto:KRPC, 1999.

2. The study by Miligan, ibid., is a useful resource on the dynamicsof war and insecurity in Moroto district. She does a good job inmapping out the way the conflict manifests itself both within thedistrict and with its neighbouring districts.

Causes of Conflict andInsecurity

A discussion of the causes of conflict and insecurity inKaramoja is problematic in a number of ways. For one,there is no easy distinction between cause and effect as isordinarily understood in a social science inquiry. Suchdistinction is useful for purposes of designing appropriateresponses and solutions to social problems. Once the causesare clearly identified, they become the focus of the designprocess, in the knowledge that upon addressing the causes,the consequences will by definition be taken care of.

With respect to conflict and insecurity in Karamoja,however, this distinction between cause and effect is not soobvious. Instead, in a listing of causes and consequences,the lists merge at some point, with some items appearingboth as causes and as consequences. This 'merger' of causesand consequences has implications for analysis as well asfor the design of responses and possible solutions.

Although in a sense there is agreement on a number offactors behind the persistent conflict and insecurity inKaramoja, different people emphasise the significance ofdifferent causes. The emphases seem to depend on whetherthe person speaking is a Karimojong or an outsider workingin or on Karamoja. For the Karimojong, the causes of thepersistent conflict and insecurity have more to do withoutsiders than with the Karimojong themselves. In particular,they lay blame on the government for ignoring theirproblems, and for doing nothing to address their plight and

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Causes of Conflict and Insecurity 25

provide an environment that would encourage other incomegenerating and livelihood enhancing activities. As a result,there are no alternative means of survival, apart from cattlekeeping and cattle raids, and there are no employmentopportunities for the youth, who in any event lack theeducation that would open up alternative opportunities.They argue that only through the creation of such alternativeopportunities would the cattle raids and general insecurityin Karamoja be stemmed. Thus, for a Karimojong, the basicproblem revolves around poverty, underdevelopment andlivelihood insecurity.

For the non-Karimojong, whether within or outsideKaramoja, the basic problem behind conflict and insecurityis culture. The Karimojong are said to be obsessed with thecow as the definition of wealth and status.1 This, it issuggested, is what encourages the cattle raids, which feedthe conflict and insecurity in the region. This cattle complexhas other dimensions, like the high bride price and thewarrior phenomenon. A Karimojong may pay as many as100 head of cattle for a bride; while the warrior complexwithin the society feeds on bravery which is demonstratedby the number of cattle a young man has raided from theenemy and even the number of enemies he has killed.

A list of major causes of conflict as identified by therespondents during this study is set out in Box 1 below. Thelist does not purport to be exhaustive, but it does highlightthe major causes of conflict as perceived by all sectors ofthe Karimojong society as well as major stakeholders. It isnot necessary to discuss each of the listed causes in turn;rather, related causes will be grouped together and discussedas such. In this connection, we have in this chapter groupedthe major causes together into four sections.


1. Culture, poverty and political isolation2. Absence of effective government and a clear

government policy3. Guns, collapse of traditional authority, and

ineffectiveness of modern institutions of governance; and4. Failure of local political leadership and elite to make a

positive impact.

Box 1: Major causes

• Culture and cultural practices - cattle complex, warriorphenomenon, high bride price

• Poverty, livelihood insecurity and underdevelopment

• Absence of effective government in Karamoja

• Ineffectiveness of modern institutions of governance inmaintaining security and enforcing law and order

• Absence of a clear, consistent and enforced governmentpolicy on the conflict and insecurity in Karamoja

• Proliferation of guns

• Collapse of traditional authority and traditional institutions

• Failure of political leadership at the local level

• Failure of the social and economic elite to impactpositively on the situation in Karamoja

• Social, political and cultural isolation of Karamoja bysuccessive governments of Uganda

• Cross-border insecurity


Culture, poverty and political isolation

That culture should be blamed for conflict and insecurity inKaramoja says something about the extent to which Karamojahas been impacted upon by influences from the rest ofUganda and even outside. Every community in Uganda,and for that matter in East Africa has some clear culturalattributes. Indeed, even the culture that revolves aroundcattle is not unique to the Karimojong, as it is shared by theother pastoral groups in the region and in the rest of thedrylands of Africa. Yet, while conflict is endemic in virtuallyall regions occupied by pastoralists in the region, theKarimojong situation stands out in terms of its persistenceand severity.

Elsewhere, tribal cultures have come into contact withother cultures, and have slowly evolved to accommodatethe impact of such contacts, shedding some of their morethreatening characteristics. What then explains thepersistence in Karamoja of these cultural tendencies? Whyhas the culture of violence that is characterised by cattle raidspersisted so long after independence, while the rest ofUganda has changed and modernised such aspects of itscultures?

A major explanation for this appears to be the political,social and cultural isolation of the Karimojong from theinfluences and experiences that have changed the rest ofUganda. In a paper written for a workshop held in Mbale inOctober 1999 on Cattle Rustling and Conflicts in NorthEastern Uganda,2 Paulo Wangoola suggests that theKarimojong have hardly been touched by the influences ofmodern government. He writes that:

It appears that after contradictions around ecologicalnecessity, the next basis for contradiction between stateand Karimojong; between Karimojong and neighbouring


peoples; and between Karimojong and elites/international community, is the fact that the Karimojonghave never been culturally conquered or subdued. Forexample, they do not have to ask for ebyaffe;3 they havethem.4

The social, political and cultural isolation of Karamoja gohand in hand with the absence of effective government andthe absence of a clear, consistent and enforced governmentpolicy on conflict and insecurity in that region. These factorshave combined to marginalise Karamoja and theKarimojong from the mainstream of Ugandan political, socialand economic discourse.

The isolation and marginalisation of Karamoja dates backto the colonial times. Mamdani, Kasoma and Katende5 havedescribed how the history of Karamoja was characterisedby military occupation right from the beginning of thecolonial experience, and how it was always a closed districtduring much of the period of colonial occupation. Karamojawas declared a closed zone under military restriction inNovember 1911, whereafter the colonial administration wasable to plunder and repress the local residents at will.6 Thishas meant that since the time of colonialism, Karamoja hasalways been treated differently and separately from the restof Uganda, and consequently the area has consistentlylagged behind the rest of Uganda.

The post-colonial experience of Karamoja has not beensignificantly different from that of the colonial era. Forinstance, it was the independence government of Ugandathat passed the 1964 Administration of Justice (Karamoja)Act, which

jettisoned the normally strict rules on admissibility ofevidence, placed sole discretion in the hands of a singlejudge, and overturned the time-honoured legal principle


of the presumption of innocence in cases within thedistrict. Indeed, any person who was accused ofengaging in a cattle raid, in which someone had beenkilled, was presumed guilty until they had proven theirinnocence.7

It has further been observed that the state in post-independence Uganda has tended to treat Karamoja as awar zone, where the principles of democratic governancedo not apply. Instead ad hoc crisis managementmechanisms are used in governing the Karimojong. As aconsequence, hostility and resentment characterise theKarimojong experience of government. This underminesthe authority of government in the area, as well as thecapacity of government to catalyse the transformation of thesociety.

This isolation of Karamoja from the rest of Uganda, andthe differentiation in the treatment of the Karimojong by thepolitical leadership, have created a feeling of isolation andbitterness on the part of the Karimojong. This feelingprojects itself in the way the Karimojong relate to thecommunities living in the neighbouring districts. Thesecommunities treat the Karimojong as if they originated froma different country. Indeed, generally speaking, theperception of the Karimojong by other Ugandancommunities is grounded on common stereotypes ofpastoralism that characterise the community as a bunch ofmarauding warriors. In return, the Karimojong have littleregard for their common nationality with the rest of thepeople of Uganda.8

To its credit, the NRM govemment'has gone further thanany previous government of Uganda in deliberately seekingto address the Karamoja problem, by mainstreamingKaramoja into the national fabric. Indeed, Karamoja wason the 10-point programme of the NRM government when


it took over power in 1986. In this sense at any rate, thegovernment can be said to have made an ideologicalcommitment to address the Karamoja problem as a long-term goal. Coupled with the policy of decentralisation, thiscommitment has seen a commendable effort on the part ofthe government to engage the Karimojong. Through LocalCouncils (LCs), the presence of government at the local levelhas become more pronounced, even though there arelegitimate concerns about the capacity of the councils todeliver.

In addition, the NRM government has created anelaborate institutional framework for dealing with Karamojaissues. The Karamoja Development Agency (KDA) wascreated by statute9 in 1987. Its functions, as set out in thestatute, are to oversee the transformation of Karamoja. TheMinistry of State in charge of Karamoja Development wasformed in the Office of the President the same year, andmandated with the supervision of the KDA. The ministryhas established the Karamoja Projects Implementation Unit(KPIU) which coordinates projects in Karamoja funded bythe European Union. Finally, the government has createda Ministry of State for Northern Uganda Reconstruction inthe office of the Prime Minister. This ministry is implementinga multi-sectoral and multi-district reconstruction programmeknown as Northern Uganda Rehabilitation Programme(NURP). The Karamoja programme of second phase (NURPII) will include Karamoja, which was excluded from NURPI.10

Even more significantly, NURP II has introduced a newobjective, which is 'to promote and stimulate communitybased conflict prevention measures'n

The creation of specific institutions to address the needsof Karamoja has been useful in focusing national and eveninternational attention on the problems of the region.


However, the performance of these institutions has beenwanting in many respects. Their operations have not madeany substantial impact on the ground. The KDA isrecognised as a general failure, famed more for loss of fundsthan for any serious contribution to the development ofKaramoja. KPIU appears in many respects to duplicate themandate of KDA, and it is indeed arguable that the needfor the establishment of KPIU would never have been felt ifKDA had been delivering efficiently on its mandate.12

The Ministry of Karamoja Affairs has very limitedpresence on the ground. Questions have been raised abouthow much it can contribute to the development of the regionfrom its location in Kampala. Even though, as a governmentministry, it needs to be in Kampala to liaise with other lineministries and government departments, the ministry needsto be more visible within the region. This would be oneway of bringing government closer to the people ofKaramoja, and making them appreciate that the governmentis committed to addressing their problems and developmentneeds.

The government itself has conceded that there are seriousdoubts about the benefits of these institutions. It hasrecognised the need to 're-examine the whole approach andeither streamline it so that the agencies can efficiently operatewithin the framework of the district structures or scrap theagencies altogether'.13 Indeed, given the very elaboratepolitical and administrative institutional framework put inplace under the policy of decentralisation, it is important toavoid the establishment of too many parallel institutions,lest these compromise the effectiveness of thedecentralisation process and framework.


Government policy on Karamoja

It has been contended that one of the major causes of conflictand insecurity in Karamoja, or at any rate one of the majorfactors that make it difficult to manage the conflict effectively,is a combination of the absence of effective government andthe absence of a clear, consistent and enforced governmentpolicy on Karamoja. The isolation and hostility that hasmarked the relations between the Karimojong andsuccessive governments of Uganda has left a legacy thatneeds to be addressed. There is need to get the Karimojongto identify with government, and to see the institutions ofgovernment that operate amongst them as belonging tothem and working for their benefits. Indeed when theKarimojong first acquired guns it was as much to protectthemselves against the government as against theirneighbours. It is reported that government forces used toappropriate Karimojong stock quite indiscriminately, whichthey can no longer do.

The first step in getting the Karimojong to identify closelywith the government is to establish government institutionswithin easy reach of the people of Karamoja. Theinfrastructure of governance, including administrative offices,courts of law, police posts and stations need to berehabilitated or established. Only thus can government beable to ensure the security of the people, and protect themfrom criminal elements within the society, as well as fromexternal threats. The people need to feel that the governmentprotects them, so that they can in turn see the need tosupport it and its initiatives.

The absence of effective government at the local level inKaramoja has serious implications for the maintenance oflaw and order. For instance, in the whole of Moroto District,there is a single operational court, which sits at the


headquarters. It simply cannot cope with the administrationof justice in the vast district. Similarly, there is a crying needacross the entire region for more police posts and stations,with sufficient resources to operate effectively.

Box 2: Law enforcement is needed

There is no law in Karamoja. How can there be any law inthe absence of law enforcement? In this area, when a crimeis committed and the criminals are identified and evenarrested and handed over to the authorities, they are keptin the cells for a short period, and then they are released.When they return to the communities, they seek revengeagainst those who reported them to the authorities. So, inthe end, we all know that it serves no useful purpose toreport a crime or a criminal; and we keep quiet even whenwe see crimes being committed. Otherwise, we solve theproblems ourselves; and that only leads to more killing.

A KISP Coordinator

There is no doubt that the cost of establishing effectivegovernment in Karamoja is prohibitive, given the vastnessof the territory. Nevertheless, this is a problem that needs tobe addressed as a matter of priority if government is to realiseall its development objectives in Karamoja. The LC systemis an attempt to take government to the people, but a lotmore needs to be done if it is to realise its potential in thisrespect. In particular, the LC system must be adequatelyfunded for effective operation and delivery of services tothe people to sustain its credibility and legitimacy. Therewere too many complaints that in spite of planning andbudgeting, there was no funding for the LCs. This has seriousimplications for the legitimacy of not just the LC system, butthe entire government.


In Amudat, for example it was reported that revenuecollection is hindered by the fact that the local populationdo not see what government does for them. There are nosocial services to speak of. What little exists is provided byinternational NGOs. When they are attacked by otherKarimojong groups, government does not come to theirassistance, in spite of the presence of an army detachmentwithin a few kilometres of the trading centre. As a result,they think that government only exists to tax them and, forthat reason, they would rather the government stayed awayfrom them.

Box 3: The LCs need funding

It is unrealistic to expect us to deliver services and fulfil ourpromises to the people without funding. Since I was electedas LC3 chairman in May 1998, we have not received anydirect assistance from the government. This sub-countyhas received no grants from the government since ourelection. We collect very little revenue, because the peopledo not want to pay taxes, since they do not receive anybenefits from the government. But even that little revenuethat we collect, we have to share with the district, whichtakes 35%. As long as these issues are not addressed, andas long as the people do not see any real benefits fromgovernment, there will continue to be problems withrevenue collection and even corruption

An LC3 Chairman

Yet perhaps the greatest problem with governance inKaramoja is the absence of a clear and consistent govemmentpolicy. True, Karamoja was on the Ten-Point Programmeof the NRM government when it took over power in 1986.Indeed, as has already been conceded, the NRMgovernment has taken significant steps to put Karamoja onthe national agenda. However, the policy of the government


on Karamoja is not properly understood, even by its ownsympathisers. The approach of the government on twoissues will serve to illustrate the point being made here.

While the government professes to be committed to thedevelopment of Karamoja, it has also stated its oppositionto the Karimojong way of life. The government, and morespecifically the President, has taken the position thatpastoralism is backward and primitive; and thatdevelopment, for the people of Karamoja, lies in theirabandoning pastoralism, and adopting settled agriculture.

Clearly, such a policy position does not appear to havetaken into account the nature of pastoralism, and therationale for nomadism. Moreover, it was not taken inconsultation with the people of Karamoja. It demonstratesa poor understanding of the culture of the local people. Itsmacks of the kind of arrogance and stereotyping that hasbeen responsible for the isolation of Karamoja by previousregimes; yet it is advocated by a government that hascommitted itself to the improvement of the livelihoods ofthe people of Karamoja. As a result, the people haveremained suspicious of the intentions of the government, inspite of its efforts to address the development challenges inKaramoja.

The perception among most Karimojong is that whilegovernment policy is against pastoralism, it is not offeringany viable alternative mode of production and means oflivelihood. Those advocating the abandonment ofpastoralism, have failed to appreciate that the Karimojongare pastoralists out of necessity rather than choice and thatpastoralism is the most appropriate land use system for mostof Karamoja. This means that for alternative modes ofproduction to be introduced, there has to be a consultativeprocess that incorporates the contributions of the localpeople. Otherwise, the NRM government in spite of its good


intentions will be no better than the colonial and previouspost independence governments that have sought to bringabout ready-made solutions to the Karamoja problem,without any consideration of what the local people thinkand want. Such solutions are bound to fail, as the history ofKaramoja has amply demonstrated.14

Indeed, it would appear that even the impressive arrayof institutions for the development of Karamoja have hadlittle impact in Karamoja precisely because they areconceived outside the region without much consultation withthe local population, and then brought to Karamoja to beimplemented by non-Karimojong.

Box 4: They do not understand us

These people have absolutely/ no idea or even interest in thedevelopment of Karamoja. They do not understand ourculture, nor do they care to learn anything about us evenwhen they come here. In fact, they look down on us. Theygeneralise about illiteracy and backwardness as the causesof the problems of Karamoja. All that most of them areinterested in, whether they be civil servants or developmentagents, is to build their careers on our problems. TheKarimojong have never been understood by the players here.

A Community Development Supervisor

Obviously, the government may have the best intentions;but that cannot in itself justify any unilateral attempt to imposea solution on the people of Karamoja. More elaborateconsultations must be done to ensure that the process ofdevelopment in Karamoja is owned by the local population,and informed by their values and perceptions. In thisconnection, there are replicable experiences in the Saheland other pastoral areas that can be drawn upon to informpolicy formulation for the sustainable development of


Karamoja. Pastoralism will not simply disappear, and neednot disappear for Karamoja to develop. On the other hand,the practice of pastoralism in modern Uganda, must takeinto account the interests and concerns of other Ugandancommunities and the imperatives of the nationalgovernment. The balance can only be realised through aconsultative process between government and people.

The second area that illustrates confusion overgovernment policy in Karamoja relates to the managementof conflict, particularly with reference to cattle raids and guncontrol. Like every modern government, the Ugandagovernment is concerned about insecurity within its borders.In Karamoja, the insecurity manifests itself most seriously inpersistent cattle raids and roadside thuggery. Thegovernment has stated clearly that it is against cattle raids;yet it does not seem to do much to back its commitment tostop these raids.

The view is gaining ground among the Karimojong,especially the youth and warriors, that government onlyconsiders cattle raids a problem when they involve the non-Karimojong and non-pastoral communities neighbouringKaramoja. As long as the raids are within Karamoja, thegovernment shows little interest. Even the army detachmentsthat are situated within Karamoja have proved ineffectivein stemming the cattle raids in the area. In Amudat, it wasrevealed that even where the members of the InternalSecurity Organisation inform the army personnel aboutimpending raids, the latter do not take any pre-emptiveaction. Moreover, when a cattle raid has taken place, thearmy personnel do not make any attempt to pursue theattackers and recover the stolen cattle. Yet, it is contendedthat the only deterrent to cattle raids is to ensure that theraided cattle are recovered and returned to their owners, soas to preclude the possibility of a revenge raid.


Box No. 5: Government can stem cattle raids

The government knows what needs to be done to stemcattle raids in Karamoja. What is lacking is simply the politicalwill to do the right thing. If the government follows up thecows with an intense operation, recovers them and returnsthem to the owners, there would be no cause for revengeraids. In any event the whole exercise would becomecounterproductive to the raiders. Furthermore, communalpunishment must be discouraged, so that it is the actualculprits that are punished. Otherwise you create generalbitterness within the punished community, which is directedat the other community or the government.

A Sub-County Chief

Claims have been made that government forces inKaramoja behave as if they are in cahoots with some groupsagainst others. The Pokot wonder whether the army iscolluding with the Karimojong against them. In Moroto, itis claimed that the army colludes with the Matheniko againstthe Tepeth; while in Kotido when the Dodoth and the Jieclash, it is claimed that the army supports the Dodoth againstthe Jie. This is because of the way in which the army failsto take decisive action in the event of the attacks, or takesselective action according to which group has been attacked.

For instance, at the time of the study, there was a lot ofbitterness in Pokot about a recent attack which was mountedby the Pian at Morita, and where many lives were lost andcattle stolen. Up to the time of the study, no recoveries hadbeen made, although it was claimed the raiders passed nearthe army camp at Morita with the stolen cattle. A governmentfact-finding mission had visited Amudat after the attack, andthe local people were still waiting for action from thegovernment, in the absence of which the warriors werethreatening to mount a revenge attack.


Similarly, the government has sent conflicting signals tothe people on roadside thuggery. This serious menace iscausing a lot of damage to the image of Karamoja. Indeed,it is worse for the image of Karamoja than cattle raids. It hasa negative impact on the development process as evendevelopment agents become fearful of travelling inKaramoja. Yet unlike cattle raids, which may be blamed onculture, roadside thuggery is simply criminal behaviour thathas no communal dimension. It should thus be easy todeal with within the framework of the penal laws of thecountry. However, this has not been done. Indeed, it wasestablished during the study that at one time it was agreedthat any person found molesting motorists would be shoton sight. Apparently, this decision was reached after muchconsultation within the local political and administrativesystem as well as with the elders.

However, when it came to implementation, the decisionwas rescinded, with the result that the roadside thugs becameeven more emboldened. While there are serious issues ofconstitutional law and fundamental rights with a directivethat says a criminal should be shot on sight without thebenefit of a trial, the unfortunate consequence of the failureto live up to the decision once it was made was that itundermined the authority and standing of government notonly among the thugs, but even more importantly amongthe elders who were involved in the decision making. Inthe long run, this has implications for the capacity ofgovernment to generate support from these same elders forsimilar initiatives in the future; and therefore on thegovernment's effectiveness in managing conflict.


Guns, the collapse of traditional authority andthe ineffectiveness of modern institutions ofgovernance

That guns define Karamoja to the outside world is no longeran issue for debate. The proliferation of guns in Karamoja,especially since the end of the 1970s, has become the mostimportant characteristic of the region and of its people. Notonly have guns come to define the way the Karimojongrelate to their neighbours, but it has also come to define theway the Karimojong live amongst themselves. It hasredefined social and political relations within thecommunity; and is also the major factor mediating therelations between the Karimojong and the government ofUganda.

As an agro-pastoral community surrounded for the mostpart by settled agriculturalists, but also in contact with a hostof other pastoral and agro-pastoral communities across theborder in Kenya and Sudan, the Karimojong have alwaysbeen involved in conflict, as they sought to map out thespace for themselves and for their cattle. With the gun, theseconflicts have assumed a different dimension by reason ofthe violence, loss and destruction that come in their wake.In this connection, the gun may be said to have had itsgreatest impact on cattle rustling, dramatically changing thecharacter of a cultural activity that is as old as the pastoralproduction system itself.

So overarching is the gun problem in Karamoja that it israrely appreciated that the Karimojong have not always hadguns. Indeed, the Karimojong have painful memories ofmistreatment by the Turkana of Kenya when all that theKarimojong had were spears, while the Turkana had guns.


Box 6: The Karimojong did not always have guns

Everybody out there thinks the Karimojong are trigger happyindividuals who use the gun to intimidate their neighbours.Nobody seems to remember when we were virtual captivesin our own homes, rendered totally helpless by the Turkanawho had guns, while we only had spears. From the 1950sthrough to the late 1970s, the Turkana wreaked havoc inthis region. They took away all our cattle, leaving usdestitute, and at the mercy of hunger and famine. Thegovernment could not protect us from them. They wouldattack our homes, take away our cattle, and force us towatch as they raped our wives and daughters. It is onlywhen we got guns that we were able to stand up to theTurkana and other neighbouring communities, and toavenge the humiliation we had suffered for ages at theirhands.

A KISP Coordinator

It is now acknowledged that the climax of the acquisition ofguns by the Karimojong was in 1979, following the collapseof the Idi Amin regime. The Karimojong looted the Morotobarracks, the police and prison armouries and carried awayall manner of guns and ammunition.

While the looting of the barracks and other governmentarmouries was done mainly by the Matheniko, the otherKarimojong communities were also able to obtain gunsfrom fleeing Amin soldiers. Moreover, between 1979 and1986, the insecurity and unrest that prevailed in Ugandawith successive regimes provided further opportunities forthe acquisition of arms. A number of Karimojong also joinedthe various armed factions that jostled for political power,ultimately returning home with more arms.


Box 7: How the Karimojong acquired guns

For decades the Karimojong were brutalised by the state.They always longed for modern guns to defend their cattlebetter; to acquire more; and to defend themselves betteragainst the state. Their chance of a lifetime came with thedefeat ofldi Amin's army in 1979. The army fled, leavingunattended armoury of sophisticated weapons, which Aminhad been proud of. It took weeks before UNLA and TPDFreached Moroto; by which time the armoury had beenemptied. All together 12,000 guns (mainly G3) areestimated to have been looted. Then in 1985 after theoverthrow of Obote II, thousands of Karimojong arereported to have joined the UNLA. When the NRM/NRAtook over, the Karimojong withdrew; this time with yet moremodern weapons, particularly AK47. In the meantime, yetother opportunities provided more small arms supplies: theLord's Resistance Army, the SPLA, the insurgency in Teso,etc. By 1998, papers gave an estimate of 15,000-35,000guns in civilian hands in Karamoja.

Paulo Wangoola15

In the absence of effective government in the region, theborders of Karamoja with Sudan and Kenya became routesfor the movement of illegal arms from as far as Ethiopia andSomalia. This remains true to date with respect to southernSudan. The major source of guns for Karamoja remainsthe SPLA-controlled southern Sudan. In Kaabong, it wasrevealed that the SPLA soldiers come into Uganda withdonkey-loads of guns and ammunition to exchange for cattleand grain. It was reported that guns are exchanged for oneor two calves according to the type of gun. Apart from this,other sources of guns include Ethiopia and Somalia,although it was reported that the guns from these sourcesare the old types and do not have a ready market in

Causes ofConflict and Insecurity 43

Karamoja. Guns from Eritrea rarely reach Karamoja, asthey are mostly sold to the Turkana. Government soldiersare also said to sell arms to the Karimojong.

Yet the point about the guns in Karamoja, which nevercomes to the fore in the discussions, is the global dimensionof the problem. In this connection, it is important toremember that there is no factory for guns in Karamoja, orfor that matter in any of the countries of the Horn of Africa.These guns come to the region from outside the continent,and it is thus from that source that ultimately the solutionhas to be found. As a lady respondent at Kotido observed,

As long as the Whites continue to manufacture and sellguns, the situation in Karamoja will remain tricky.16

This global dimension, not only of the proliferation of gunsin Karamoja, but also of the conflict and insecurity in theregion, is never adequately canvassed in discussions of theproblem. It is becoming increasingly clear that the globaldimension of the problem must be acknowledged andfactored into any meaningful search for a solution to theproblem. In this connection, the United NationsOrganisation must wake up to the problem and place it onits agenda.17 Similarly, at the regional level, the proliferationof guns in Karamoja must be placed on the agenda of suchorganisations as the East African Community, IGADD andthe OAU.

In Karamoja, the gun has redefined and realigned powerand authority within the society, and is critical incharacterising relations between the Karimojong inter se andbetween them and the rest of Uganda; particularly thoseliving in the neighbouring districts. Writing in the EastAfrican, Curtis Abraham has captured the problem in thefollowing words:


The gun has also caused a dramatic shift in the politicaland economic authority of Karamoja's elders, thedecision makers, and their sons, the warriors whotraditionally executed the decisions made by theirfathers. For example, in the not so distant past customdictated that when planning a cattle raid, warriors hadfirst to consult with a diviner or receive the blessings ofsome of the very important elders. In contemporaryKarimojong society, however, the gun has made thewarriors both the decision makers and executors.18

What is more, the gun has changed the character of conflictwithin Karamoja and between the Karimojong and theirneighbours, within and outside Uganda. New forms ofconflict, manifested in robberies and roadside thuggery havebecome increasingly rampant.

Unfortunately, the erosion of traditional authority hasoccurred in the absence of strong institutions of governanceto take the place of the traditional authority. Moderninstitutions, especially those that are meant to administerjustice and enforce law and order, have proved largelyinadequate to the task. This fact has been recognised bygovernment at the highest levels. It was reported that whenPresident Museveni visited Moroto on 5 December 1998,he acknowledged that the modern judicial systemcentralised in Moroto was totally inadequate to the task ofadministering justice in the district. He promised that eachcounty would have a court and the security apparatus forenforcement of law and order. More than three years later,there is still a single court for the district sitting in Moroto.

Apart from the sheer inadequacy of the infrastructure,the system is also inappropriate to the social organisation ofKarimojong society. The modern common law judicialsystem, which operates in Uganda, is founded on the needfor proof in an adversarial court proceedings. These

Causes of Conflict and Insecurity) 45

proceedings are in turn grounded on the adduction ofevidence in proof of guilt by persons who witnessed thecommission of the offence. The system cannot functioneffectively in the absence of witnesses who are prepared tocome forward and adduce evidence against the offender.

Among the Karimojong however, it is inconceivable thata Karimojong would come forward to adduce evidenceagainst a fellow Karimojong and this before a 'foreign'tribunal. A major principle of Karimojong solidarity isexpressed in the words kimuk ekile, meaning literally, coverthe man. The idea is that every Karimojong must protect afellow Karimojong against a foreigner, i.e., a non-Karimojong. Thus, the judicial system has been totallyunable to function in Karamoja. Invariably, the police haveto release suspects after they fail to procure any evidenceagainst them, even though they know that the suspects didcommit the offence.

What is most frustrating about this, of course, is that whenthe suspects are so released the same members of the publicwho refused to turn up and record statements with a view togiving evidence in court, then blame the police and thegovernment for not enforcing the law and punishingoffenders.

What this means, in effect, is that the government mustin the short term find ways and means of merging the formaljudicial system with the traditional mechanisms of crimedetection and punishment. The latter are still largelyoperational within the communities, even though they havecome under immense pressure from modernisation. Theyare most effective in detection and punishment of crime,because they function within a value system that is clearlyunderstood and approved by the communities.


Failure of local political leadership, economicand social elite

The political leadership in Karamoja is largely defined byclan and sectional loyalties between the major groups, e.g.,Matheniko/Bokora rivalry in Moroto, and that between theJie and the Dodoth in Kotido. As a result, the elected politicalleaders have not been able to provide the kind of leadershipthat would be useful and effective in stemming conflict andinsecurity in the region. Because the national leadershipdepends on these local leaders to articulate the problems ofthe region, and to report the situation on the ground, thenational political leadership is equally constrained.

There is widespread feeling, among the people ofKaramoja, that the government of Uganda is held to ransomby the competing interests of the local political elite. Assuch it is unable to get the correct position on the ground,or to take the painful steps that need to be taken to get tothe roots of the problem of conflict and insecurity inKaramoja. Every time the need arises to take a decisivestep against one group or the other, the government isconstrained by the pleas of the leaders that this will destroytheir standing within their communities. Moreover, no leaderis able to accept that his clan or community is in the wrong,however convincing the evidence. In this connection, it isinstructive that the constituency boundaries in both Morotoand Kotido are defined by clan identities, so that in effectthe political leaders are actually clan leaders.

The question that emerges from this scenario is whetherpoliticians in Karamoja, or at least some of them, encourageconflict in order to achieve their own selfish political ends.While it is not possible to confirm such claims, it is instructivethat decisive action on the part of government against specificcommunities in connection with cattle raids for instance, has


always been restrained by political leaders. Indeed, it hasbeen suggested that it is the political clout that a clan has atthe national level through its leaders that determines whetheror not action can be taken against that clan in the event of araid. The claims of collusion between soldiers and certaincommunities that have been referred to previously are saidto be manifestations of political power games by the politicalleaders of the various clans.

Box 8: Political leaders are the problem

The leaders of Karamoja are not united in the pursuit ofpeace. They are compromised by tribal and clan loyalties.The ordinary folk in the villages want peace, but they areconfused by their leaders. Each leader wants to be themost powerful and, for this purpose, uses those who supporthim to advance his own agenda. This makes it impossiblefor a leader to provide the kind of leadership needed tosolve the problem of conflict and insecurity once and forall.

An Imam from Moroto District

It has also been suggested that the social and economicelite of Karamoja have not played their part in seeking toinfluence positive change in the region. Indeed, it has beensuggested that some wealthy Karimojong have beenresponsible for the commercialisation of cattle raids. In theJanuary 2000 raid of the Pokot by the Pian, it was reportedthat some of the cattle captured in the raid ended up at theNamalu cattle market the following morning. This, it wasargued, meant that the cattle were literally driven directly tothe market from the raid. This is a new aspect of cattle raids,which has little to do with culture.

The bigger problem however is the fact that many of theKarimojong who attain higher levels of education end up


taking up jobs away from Karamoja in Kampala or othercentres in the region, and thus have little chance to makeany meaningful impact on the situation at home. Whilethis is probably understandable given the nature of theKaramoja countryside, it is also quite clear that it is thosesons and daughters of Karamoja, who have emerged fromthis hostile reality and made it in the modern sector whostand the best chance of influencing positive change athome, by example and involvement. Such people wouldbe useful in checking the political manoeuvres of the politicalleadership, but only if they were ready to get involved andplay their part. So far there has been little evidence of theirinterest in playing an effective role in the search for solutionsto the conflict and insecurity in Karamoja.

1. Quite obviously, the cattle complex is what defines the Karimojongfor any outsiders. In a recent interview with the East African news-paper, President Yoweri Museveni, on being asked about the cla-mour by Ugandan women for a provision for co-ownership of landwith men in the Land Act, is reported to have observed that 'It is liketelling the Karimojong that Parliament had passed a Bill allowingwomen to share cows. There will be a civil war' East African March13-19, 2000, p. 4.

2. See A Report on the Brainstorming Workshop held at Yiga NgokolaFolk Institute between 25 and 28 October 1999. Undated.

3. Luganda word meaning 'our things'. The word is associated withdemands made by Ugandan communities on the central governmentfor return of their communal properties upon the institution of adecentralised system of govemment. The point being made here is that;:he Karimojong did not make any such claims as they have always heldto their communal properties.

4. Paulo Wangoola, 'Cattle Rustling and Conflicts in N.E. Uganda:Views and Perspectives Reported by Ugandan Papers, 1989-1999'


p. 8. (A paper presented at the Brainstorming Workshop on CattleRustling and Conflicts in North Eastern Uganda, Yiga Ngokola FolkInstitute, 25-28 October 1999).

5. Mahmood Mamdani, with RM.B. Kasoma and A.B. Katende.Karamoja: Ecology and History. CBR Working Paper No. 22. Seeparticularly section IV.

6. Charles Emunyu Ocan. Pastoral Crisis in Northeastern Uganda: TheChanging Significance of Cattle Raids. CBR Working Paper No. 21.June, 1992, p. 10

7. Joe Oloka-Onyango, Gariyo Zie and Frank Muhereza. Pastoralism,Crisis and Transformation in Karamoja. IIED Drylands NetworkProgramme. Issues Paper No. 43. June 1993, p. 4.

8. 'Our people do not feel like part and parcel of the Ugandan nation.We are not treated as such by the rest of Uganda, and in turn theKarimojong do not know that other Ugandans are part of us.' ApusAndrew Lochiam, KISP elder, Kotido, in an interview with the author atKotido, 14th February 2000.

9. Karamoja Development Agency Statute (No. 4 of 987)

10. A number of respondents complained about how the original NURPcircled out and left Karamoja, while it included within its scope all thesurrounding districts.

11. Northern Uganda Reconstruction Programme (NURP II) DistrictProfile Study, Final Report, Volume 1: Office of the Prime Minister.August 1999, p. 20. While conflict prevention is an important concernin the region, one would think that given the prevalence of actual conflict,the Programme should have a specific objective that will enable it tocontribute to the management of existing conflicts.

12. The KPIU is said to be organised as a technical unit within theMinistry of Karamoja Affairs, and its staff reside within the KDAcompound in Moroto! See KPIU Annual Report, 1996, p. 20.

13. Ibid. p. 188


14. Mamdani discusses these solutions in a section appropriatelytitled, 'Solutions that Backfired'. Mamdani, Kasoma and Katende,supra.

15. Paulo Wangoola, 'Cattle Rustling and Conflicts in N.E. Uganda:Views and Perspectives Reported by Ugandan Papers, 1989-1999',p. 4.

16. Madelana Adengo, with Sisilia Achila and Naroth Nereta, in aninterview with the researcher at Kotido, 15th February 2000.

17. The UN international conference on the control of small arms inJuly 2001 focused attention on this problem.

18. 17-23 March,1997, Part 2

Manifestations of Conflictand Insecurity

In this section, we discuss how conflict manifests itself inKaramoja, in an attempt to understand the dynamics of theproblem and how it plays itself out on the ground. Asobserved earlier, the conflict in Karamoja plays itself out atthree different levels: intra-Karimojong conflict, which pitsone Karimojong group against another; cross district conflict,which pits the Karimojong against communities living indistricts neighbouring Karamoja, but within the borders ofUganda; and cross-border conflict, which pits theKarimojong against communities in Kenya or Sudan.

Intra-Karimojong conflict

Conflict within Karamoja pits the different Karimojong clansand sections against each other. The conflicts manifestthemselves in cattle raids between counties. There are noraids within counties. While these conflicts have existed fora long time, they have in recent years become increasinglyviolent and regular. For an outsider, the conflict and theraids do not make much sense, given that these communitiesare actually very closely related. Apparently, even theKarimojong themselves appreciate that there is little logic inthe inter-dan raids. The genesis of the intra-Karimojongrivalry is founded on mythology, while continuing raids areexplained in terms of revenge for previous raids. In the endwhat emerges is a series of raids and counter raids, eachraid explained with reference to the previous one, with nogroup taking responsibility for having launched the first raid.

51


Box 9: The origins of intra-Karimojong rivalry:We are cursed

A Karimojong legend, known as 'the legend of give me anenemy' has it that somewhere in the Karimojong past, whenLokolmoi was the ultimate elder of all of Karamoja, thewarriors petitioned him to allow them to go and mount araid. Then the Karimojong were still one united group andthey lived in Nakadanya, where they first settled. He wouldnot hear of it, and refused to authorise the raid. But theypressed him, and would not leave him alone for days onend.

When it became obvious to the old man that the warriorsand their parents were determined, he washed his hands ofthe matter, and let them go; but he refused to bless the raid.The young men proceeded to Turkana, mounted a raid, andcame back with cattle and stories of victory and death ofmany of the enemy.

Now, one of the kraals that the Karimojong youth attackedin Turkana had Lokolmoi's own cattle, and in the processof the attack, Lokolmoi's own son, Arion, was killed by theKarimojong warriors. They also carried away Lokolmoi'sown cattle, which they brought back to Karamoja as part ofthe spoils of war.

When the warriors arrived back in Karamoja, their parentsrecognised Lokolmoi's cattle, and confirmed that Arion hadbeen killed during the raid. Lokolmoi listened to the reportsof what had happened, forbade his family from crying, andcursed the Karimojong, saying that in view of what hadhappened, they would turn on each other and kill their own.This curse persists to date, and explains the killing ofKarimojong by Karimojong.

A Karimojong Elder, Kotido

Manifestations of Conflict and Insecurity 53

The Karimojong take this legend seriously. Indeed, acommunal cleansing ceremony was once organised by KISPto appease Lokolmoi and the ancestors of Karamoja, so thatthe curse may be lifted, in order for the Karimojong to livein peace amongst themselves. The cleansing ceremony washeld at Nakadanya, the traditional site for Karimojongcommunal ceremonies. However, as will be shown presently,even in this, clan-based loyalties and considerations wouldultimately prevail and an opportunity for real peace wascompromised by petty clanism and sectional suspicions andjealousies.

In Moroto District, the Matheniko appear to be the onesblamed by all the other clans for perpetrating intra-Karimojong rivalry. The Matheniko are at war with theBokora and with the Tepeth in Moroto, while the Dodothfight the Jie in Kotido. Indeed, so strong is the anti-Mathenikofeeling amongst the other Karimojong groups that they arethe ones blamed for the curse of Lokolmoi, as it is said thatit was the Matheniko that killed Arion and brought backLokolmoi's cattle from Turkana. And when the Nakadanyacleansing ceremony was held, it is claimed that theMatheniko sneaked into the traditional site the night beforethe ceremony to remove some artifacts, therebycompromising the success of the exercise. 'For this, theywere cursed by all Karamoja; and this is why they wereraided and killed by the Pokot of Kenya recently' assertsthe elder who narrated the story about the curse of Lokolmoi.

The absurdity of intra-Karimojong rivalry is perhaps bestdemonstrated by the raids and counter raids betweenLorengedwat and Lotome. The two sub-counties lie nextto each other to the south of Moroto District headquarters.They are separated by the border between Bokora and Piancounties, Lotome being in Bokora, while Lorengedwat is inPian County. So close are these groups that they have


intermarried, and share a lot of resources amongthemselves when they are at peace. However, raids andcounter raids have persisted, and in recent raids, thewarriors on each side have ended up killing their own kin,including sisters and brothers-in-law. It is when relativeshave to cross over to 'enemy territory' to bury their kin thatthe absurdity of these killings sinks in.

Cross-district conflicts

Cross-district conflicts are those that pit the Karimojongagainst the communities living in districts that share borderswith the two Karimojong districts of Moroto and Kotido.There are six districts that fall into this category: Kitgum, Lira,Katakwi, Kumi, Mbale and Kapchorwa; although at timesthe Karimojong reach as far as Gulu and Soroti, with whichthey do not actually share borders.

Unlike intra-Karimojong conflicts, where it is often difficultto tell who is the aggressor, in the case of cross-districtconflicts, it is almost invariably the Karimojong who are theaggressors. For one thing, the Karimojong are held in suchawe by neighbouring Ugandan communities that hardly anyof them other than the Pokot, would dare to provoke them.For another, it is the Karimojong who are nomadicpastoralists, all their neighbours from the neighbouringdistricts are settled agriculturalists. As such, it is theKarimojong who cross over into the neighbouring districtswith their cattle, in search of pasture and water. This is whythese conflicts are usually common during the dry spellswhen there is no water or pasture for livestock in Karamoja.

Because the Karimojong have to move into theneighbouring districts with their cattle, the image that mostUgandans have of the community is based on this fact. Forthe Karimojong, movement is prompted by their search for

Manifestations of Conflict and Insecturity 55

Guns have come to define how the Karimojong relate to theirneighbours and to the state. By 1998, it was estimated there were15,000 to 35,000 guns in civilian hands.


pasture, which they need for the survival of their cattle, aswell as their own. Yet this is not how the communities in theneighbouring districts understand the annual movement ofthe Karimojong. They see it rather as informed by thearrogance of this pastoralist community who have no respectfor borders and boundaries, and who think the whole landis theirs to move in and out of as they please.

Coupled with this misunderstanding is the behaviour ofthe Karimojong themselves. Over the years, they haveearned a reputation among the neighbouring communitiesfor reckless disregard for the sanctity of life and of privateproperty. Indeed, they are reputed to be very ungratefulguests, because of the destruction of property and cattle raidsthat they engage in at the end of the dry season when theydrive their cattle back to Karamoja. It is said that they literallytake back all the cattle on their way. This kind of behaviouronly serves to confirm and strengthen the stereotypes thatother Ugandan communities have about the Karimojongpastoral way of life. Yet, this kind of behaviour is self-defeating for the Karimojong because ultimately they needto go back to these neighbouring districts when the dryseason recurs.

The incursions into the neighbouring districts by theKarimojong constitute the most publicised face of the conflictand insecurity in Karamoja. As already stated, it is whenthe Karimojong move into the neighbouring districts thatthe conflict and insecurity in Karamoja assumes a distinctlynational character. It becomes a national security concern,as political pressure is brought to bear on the governmentto contain the Karamoja menace. The position of thegovernment becomes quite tenuous. On the one hand,government has an obligation to affirm the sanctity ofboundaries and district borders as well as of life and privateproperty. No settled agricultural community would move


en masse from one district into another without facing thefull force of the law. How then can government explain tosuch communities the apparent freedom and ease withwhich the Karimojong move in and out neighbouringdistricts, as if they were operating above or outside the law?

On the other hand, the government is aware that whenthe Karimojong move with their cattle into neighbouringdistricts, it is usually because the dry season has set in andthere is no pasture and water in Karamoja to sustain thecattle and the people. By that time, if the Karimojong donot move, their cattle as well as the people would surelydie. It is necessary, therefore, that the Karimojong movetheir cattle.to ease pressure and prevent a bigger catastrophicemergency within Karamoja. For this reason, governmentgets caught up right in the middle between the two groups.

Unfortunately for the Karimojong, the agriculturists havea much larger political clout, as they constitute a biggerpolitical constituency at the national level. Moreover, theirposition resonates well with the general social and politicaltrends in the rest of Uganda. The Karimojong, on the otherhand, as an absolute social and political minority, project alife style that few people within Uganda understand orsympathise with, and are victims of stereotypes that areinformed by lack of understanding of the nature of their life.One only needs to read the references to 'maraudingKarimojong warriors' in the national press to appreciate thelevel of hostility directed at the group.

Yet perhaps the cross-border incursions in search ofpasture are not the most difficult conflicts for the governmentto handle. There may be a moral argument to advance infavour of the Karimojong, who need to ensure the survivalof their cattle so that they too may survive. More difficult tohandle are the unprovoked attacks by Karimojong warriorsinto neighbouring districts for the sole purpose of raiding


cattle. It is this aspect that creates the greatest hostility againstthe Karimojong from the neighbouring districts, puts thegreatest pressure on the government to 'contain theKaramoja menace' and eats away at any good will that mayexist in the rest of the country in favour of the community.

We have mapped the cross-district dimensions of theconflict in Karamoja in Appendix 4 (See Appendix 4A-4D).The mappings also indicate the cross-border dimensions ofthe conflict, which bring in the Pokot, Marakwet and Turkanaof Kenya, as well as the Toposa and Didinga of Sudan.

Cross-border conflicts

Cross-border conflict pits the Karimojong againstneighbouring communities that live across the border inKenya and Sudan. The most notable 'enemies' are theTurkana and the Pokot in Kenya, and the Toposa and theDidinga in Sudan. An interesting feature of cross-borderraids is that they are always organised as Kenyan-Sudaneseallliances. Indeed, such is the certainty of these alliancesthat in Kotido we were informed that there is serious concernamong the Jie about the emerging alliance between theTurkana and the Toposa. 'We have not had problems withthe Turkana for a long time, but now that they have createdan alliance with the Toposa, they will surely turn on us,' wewere told by more than one person in Kotido. On this, boththe Jie and the Dodoth are agreed, and are equallyconcerned.

The cross-border dimension of the conflict and insecurityin Karamoja is critical in the design of any intervention andmanagement mechanisms. For one thing, it complicatesthe problem by introducing into it regional and globalperspectives that have a bearing on international law andgeopolitics. For another, it is the dimension that feeds the


gun problem in Karamoja, as it is through these bordersthat guns and ammunition infiltrate into Karamoja. This isparticularly true of southern Sudan.

The cross-border sourcing of guns is a serious constrainton disarmament as a method of controlling gun numbers inKaramoja, and thus managing the conflict and insecurity.Such disarmament would only be effective if the supplyroutes through which the guns come into Karamoja couldbe sealed. The Uganda government on its own cannot dothis. It needs the collaboration and support of theneighbouring states and agreement on the policing of thecommon borders. Given the vastness of its borders withKenya and Sudan, Uganda can never muster sufficientresources to police these borders on its own. Yet in thecase of southern Sudan, there is not even a legitimategovernment with which to negotiate or reach agreement.

However, the cross-border dimension of the conflict alsogives it a regional and global character that provides anopportunity for addressing the problem at those two levels.This is important if a lasting solution to the problem inKaramoja is to be found. The government of Uganda andother players in Karamoja must take into account theregional and global context of the conflict, especially inrelation to the proliferation of guns. The problem must beplaced on the agenda of regional and global organisationslike IGAD, the East African Community, the OAU and theUN.

The Impact of Conflictand Insecurity

There is a sense in which the discussion of causes andmanifestations of conflict ends up being a discussion of theimpact of conflict and insecurity on Karimojong society.From the discussion of causes and manifestations, it ispossible to deduce the impact of conflict and insecurity. Inany event, it has already been argued that causes andconsequences of conflict tend to merge at some point in thediscussion. For that reason, apart from listing the majorconsequences of conflict and insecurity (Box 10), we shallin this section only highlight two matters.

We shall discuss the way in which conflict and insecurityconstrain the free movement of people and flow of goodsand services, into and out of Karamoja. Such movement ofpeople and flow of goods and services is vital for thedevelopment and the integration of the region into thenational economy of Uganda. We shall also look at theimpact of the conflict on those members of Karimojongsociety who are not combatants. This category ofKarimojong includes women and girls, elderly men andwomen, children and the infirm.

It has been suggested that one of the major causes ofconflict and insecurity in Karamoja is the social, politicaland cultural isolation of Karamoja by successivegovernments of Uganda.

61


Box 10: Major consequences/impact of conflictand insecurity

Poverty/insecurity of livelihoods/underdevelopment

Pervasive insecurity, deaths and injuries

Persistence of inter-clan animosity, that constrains freemovement of people and exchange of goods andservices

Persistence of negative cultural tendencies and practices

Proliferation of automatic weapons

Food insecurity

Collapse of traditional authority and the influence ofcustomary institutions

Absence of law and order

Cultural, social and political isolation of Karamoja fromprocesses taking place in the rest of Uganda

This is true, and we have shown how this has happenedover the years. However, it must also be appreciated that,on the other hand, Karamoja is isolated from the political,social and cultural processes taking place in Uganda as adirect consequence of the conflict and insecurity associatedwith the region.

For many Ugandans, Karamoja remains a 'no go' areabecause of the conflict and insecurity. They keep away fromthe region and the people out of fear. As such, there is littleopportunity for other Ugandan communities to understandthe Karimojong and their way of life. Apart from the factthat this only serves to feed the stereotyping that characterisesany discussion of Karamoja at the national level, it also limitsinteraction between Karamoja and the rest of Uganda. Yetsuch interaction is needed for the free flow of goods andservices that would help spur the Karimojong economy, and

The Impact of Conflict and Insecurity 63

create opportunities for positive change in lifestyles andlivelihoods.

The limitation on free movement of people and free flowof goods and services is not only a matter between Karamojaand the rest of Uganda. Similar limitations and constraintsexist even for movement from one county to another withinKaramoja. In fact, it is probably easier for a person fromoutside the region to move freely in Karamoja than for aperson from within the region. In Amudat, we were informedthat a Pokot cannot walk freely in and around Moroto forfear of being killed.

The reality of the limitations and constraints on freemovement within the region was brought home to us in avery direct way during this research in Moroto. To travelfrom Moroto to Amudat, we had to move at night for fear ofroadside bandits. We were advised that the route to southernKaramoja is only safe at night, because the warriors do notexpect traffic at night, and in any event cannot identify thevehicles, to be able to distinguish civilian from militaryvehicles. We thus had to leave Moroto after 9.00 p.m. anddrive in the dark to Amudat Similarly, on our way fromAmudat to Namalu, we had to travel under the cover ofdarkness for the same reasons.

Impact of conflict on women and other non-combatants

Conflict and insecurity have an especially severe impact onwomen in Karamoja. Unlike the men for whom war is aglorious path to heroism, women are for the most part victimsof conflict. They do not take any direct part in the discussionsregarding the preparations for raids, and yet they sufferdirectly in being victims of attacks, rapes and slaughter whenthe other side comes for revenge. Because they do not bear


arms, they do not have the means to defend themselveswhen the attackers come. Moreover, they are the mothers,sisters, wives and daughters of the warriors and men whoare killed in raids.

It is the women who work the fields to plant crops thatprovide sustenance for the population. With conflict andinsecurity, the women cannot work the fields, which areusually situated a distance from the manyattas. They cannotsafely travel to search for firewood and foodstuffs and arerendered helpless in feeding the children, the aged and theinfirm.

Women are also victims of the domestic dimension ofthe conflict and insecurity in Karamoja, which is rarelydocumented or discussed. The proliferation of guns inKaramoja has changed the nature of domestic violence,making it more violent and deadly, to the serious detrimentof the women. Where in other parts of the country a manmay hit a woman with a rungu or a stick, in Karamoja aman will draw a gun. Many a woman has been killed indrunken fury in circumstances where in the absence of agun, a woman may have, at worst, sustained personal injury.

It is not suggested that there is anything positive aboutany form of domestic violence perpetrated against women,but clearly a woman faced with a rungu has a better chancethan one faced with the barrel of a gun. In this connection,it should be appreciated that the militarisation of theKarimojong society has been an entirely male phenomenon.Women have not been militarised; they do not carry guns,and in the emerging reality in which guns rule supreme anddefine power relations, the woman of Karamoja has beenrendered even more powerless than her sisters in the rest ofUganda. In effect the Karimojong woman has suffereddouble jeopardy. As a Karimojong she is isolated from thesocial and political gains made by the Ugandan woman as

The Impact of Conflict and Insecurity 65

a result of the affirmative action initiatives of the NRMgovernment. But what is more, because of the patriarchalnature of gun ownership in Karamoja, her position in thepower equation has been rendered even weaker.

It was suggested by a number of respondents, mostly men,that the Karimojong woman plays an active role inencouraging the men to go to war. She sings praises andululates in celebration when the warriors arrive with the spoilsof war. She wears a special cloth when her man is out on araid. She taunts her man if he refuses to go on a raid,questioning his manhood. She demands a large numberof cattle in dowry as this has implications for her standingamongst fellow women.

Box 11: Women and conflict

If there is a woman who supports raids, it can only be becauseshe has not suffered from the consequences of raids. Iwould say categorically that women should campaign foran end to war and conflict; because at the end of the day,they are the ones who are rendered destitute. Men havethe privilege of being able to die out there during the raids,but we have to die here at home slowly and painfully. Ihave lost all the men around me to raids. First it was myhusband, then my son, and finally my son-in-law. At myage, that means that lama destitute, because in this society,if there is no man in your life, you are nobody.

An elderly woman, Komuria Parish, Kaabong


When confronted with these allegations, all the womendenied that they have anything to do with cattle raids. Theyasserted that they are never consulted by their men aboutraids. 'Sometimes, a woman only knows that her man wasout on a raid when a friend of the man comes to inform herthat the man remained; that is that he was killed by theenemy.' As for dowry, the women insisted that they do notplay any part in the discussions, which are solely betweenthe man and the father of the girl. Finally, that they celebratewhen the men come back from raids was said to have moreto do with relief that they returned alive than approval ofthe raid.

Conclusions andRecommendations

This study has made it clear that the problem of conflictand insecurity in Karamoja is bigger than the resources orcapacity of any single player. As such, it will requireconcerted and protracted action by government, NGOs andthe people of Karamoja themselves to find a lasting solution.

Bearing this in mind, what conclusions can be drawnfrom the foregoing analysis? What is the way forward inmanaging the conflict and insecurity in Karamoja? In thisconnection, what can all stakeholders and players inKaramoja do to contribute to the search for a lasting solutionto the problem of conflict and insecurity in that region?

Conclusions

This study has analysed the causes, manifestation andconsequences of conflict and insecurity in Karamoja; andon the basis of that analysis a number of recommendationsare proposed on the way forward to manage the conflictand insecurity and build peace. The problem of conflict andinsecurity in Karamoja is intricate and involving; and tounderstand it sufficiently to be able to deal with it in asustainable manner requires much study and analysis, aswell as patient consultation over the long-term, which isbeyond the scope of this book. Nevertheless, this study hasmade ten major conclusions and recommendations.Theseare listed below.

67


1. The conflict and insecurity in Karamoja is a multi-facetedproblem that has political, social, cultural and economicorigins, and manifests itself at the local, national, regionaland even global levels. As a result, any serious attemptto deal with the problem must of necessity be foundedon this multi-level analysis and approach.

2. The basic problem behind conflict and insecurity inKaramoja is pastoralism as a production and land usesystem, and how to reconcile it with other competingland use and production systems. Hence, there is aserious need to understand the choice of pastoralism,the dynamics that inform pastoral production andchange, as well as the process by which pastoralproduction may be integrated into a modern nationaleconomy.

3. In order to design appropriate strategies for conflictmanagement and peace building in Karamoja, it isimportant to understand fully the root causes of conflictand insecurity, from the point of view of the numerousstakeholders and players; and this calls for participatoryprocesses of inquiry that will simultaneously generateinformation and ideas while empowering therespondents to participate in the search for solutions.

4. Many of the previous efforts at conflict management andpeace building in Karamoja have failed because theywere not founded on a proper appreciation of thedimensions of the problem; were not conceived at thelocal level or with the effective participation of the localpeople, and entailed externally conceived solutionsimposed on the local population.

5. There is need for a coherent and consistent governmentpolicy on Karamoja generally and on the conflict andinsecurity in the region specifically, beyond the good

Conclusions and Recommendations 69

intentions and pronouncements. Such a policy oughtto be developed with the full participation of the localpopulation in Karamoja, so that it may give effect totheir aspirations and needs, and be owned by them.So far the government's commitment to Karamojadevelopment has failed to deliver because it has beenimposed from outside with little regard for theaspirations of the Karimojong themselves or their input;

6. The local political leadership as well as the social andeconomic elite in Karamoja have failed to rise abovethe parochialism that characterises Karimojong society,and as such have failed to provide the necessaryleadership for positive change in Karamoja. As a result,the political leadership and the social and economicelite constitute not the solution, but part of the problemof conflict and insecurity in Karamoja.

7. The problem of guns in Karamoja cannot be handledsolely at the level of Karamoja, because it has regionaland global dimensions that go beyond the borders ofUganda. It must be addressed from all its dimensions,by ensuring that it is placed in the agenda of regionaland global organisations. Within Karamoja, gun controlmust be accompanied by the creation of incentives andalternative livelihood support and enhancementsystems.

8. There is need to understand better the cross-districtdimensions of the conflict and insecurity, by conductingmore research on the matter from within theneighbouring districts, to generate the ideas fordesigning an effective intervention and responsestrategy. Similarly, it is necessary to involve both theKarimojong and the communities from the neighbouringdistricts in a search for solutions, based on the proper


appreciation of the position of all parties. At the momentmuch of the discussion is based on stereotypes thatprovide little clarity and guidance.

9. Similarly, there is need for more research at the regionallevel on the cross-border dimensions of the conflict andinsecurity. Such research should be conducted in allthe relevant countries in a coordinated way, and shouldinvolve a diversity of stakeholders both at the nationallevel in these countries and at the regional level.

10. The conflict and insecurity in Karamoja cannot besolved overnight, nor can it be solved by any one playeror institution. All players must collaborate with oneanother, with the community and with the government,and all of them must approach the problem from a long-term perspective and be prepared to invest in it in thelong rather than short term.

These are not the only conclusions reached in the study. Anumber of other conclusions will be discerned from the text.However, these have been highlighted for purposes ofrecommendations on the way forward.

As a prelude to discussing the way forward, it is useful toreview in summary, previous and ongoing efforts atmanaging the conflict and insecurity in Karamoja. Theseefforts are useful whether seen as successes or failures. Assuccesses they provide lessons in what can work, while asfailures they help in ensuring that mistakes are not repeated.In any event, it is important to discuss them, and therebyappreciate that there are and have been in the past initiativesthat can be built upon.


President Museveni receives guns from the Karimojong during a 2003disarmament initiative.


Attempted solutions: Lessons learned

The conflict and insecurity in Karamoja have been thesubject matter of many initiatives by both government andcivil society organisations. Right from the moment that theNRM government took over power in 1986, it sought tocome to grips with the problem of conflict and insecurity inKaramoja. As already intimated, the NRM had Karamojain its Ten-Point Programme. It made a commitment toredress the errors of previous governments against the 'long-suffering Karamojong people.'1

Insecurity became a major concern for the NRMgovernment right from the beginning. A number ofinitiatives have been tried, to address this problem. Principalamong them are the following:

1. Given its own road to political power, it is not surprisingthat initially, the government saw the problem inmilitary terms, and sought a military solution. In thisconnection, a military operation for the disarmament ofthe Karimojong was tried. The military operationresulted in embarrassing defeats for governmentsoldiers, large numbers of whom were killed by theKarimojong warriors in Namalu, Nabilatuk and Kotido.The military option had to be abandoned.2

2. The establishment of a para-military group known asvigilantes. This idea was first introduced by the CatholicChurch, but ultimately was adopted by the government.It entailed the recruitment of warriors into an organisedforce working under the command of trained militaryofficers. The idea was that the warriors would be allowedto retain their guns, but would use them for the benefitof the people. The vigilantes were then used to recoverraided cattle and to flush out roadside thugs and other


criminals. At one point, the vigilantes worked very welland with much success, under the command of aKarimojong officer who was then stationed in Moroto.However, he soon fell foul of the local political elite whobecame nervous about his growing influence, and hewas recalled from Moroto. Today, everyone wishes hehad been left to do his job. Many people believe hewould have solved the insecurity problem if he hadbeen left alone. At the time of the research for this study,the vigilantes, now known as the ASTU, were adisorganised group with no command structure and nofacilities for any effective work. A number of them weresuspected of being involved in cattle raids and roadsidethuggery.

3. Peace meetings have been held all over Karamoja,bringing together senior government and politicalleaders. The meetings have been organised at the threedifferent levels in which conflict manifests itself, i.e.,within Karamoja, between the different clans; betweenthe Karimojong and neighbouring districts withinUganda, and between the Karimojong and their Kenyanneighbours, the Pokot and the Turkana. These peacemeetings have discussed the problem of conflict andinsecurity in great detail, and have maderecommendations which the various governments andgovernment ministries have adopted; but there has beenlittle implementation of such recommendations. In theend, the true value of the meetings has simply been theopportunity that they have provided for the warringparties to meet and discuss their problems.

4. Communities continue to organise meetings at the locallevel virtually every other day. These meetings are heldwithin the framework of the local government structures,


and with the involvement of local level communitygroups, including churches and other developmentworkers within Karamoja. In this connection, bothOxfam and LWF have supported such meetings byproviding material and moral support, and evenparticipating in them.

5. Mention has been made of the KISP initiative that ledto the cleansing ceremony at Nakadanya. This activityand ceremony were important in the sense that theytruly mobilised all Karimojong towards the peaceinitiative. That there have been criticisms of the initiativeis probably more a function of political competition thanof the merits of the exercise. KISP has also organisedand continues to organise meetings and other activitiesto spread the peace message across Karamoja.

6. A variety of peace mobilisation processes have beentried and continue to be tried by different players atdifferent levels within Karamoja. These include thepeace bicycle race that was organised by LWF and thelocal elders in Moroto, peace choirs and walks organisedby various groups including the churches, and peacegames sponsored by LWF, KPIU and KISR

This list is in no way exhaustive. It does nevertheless identifythe major peace-building initiatives that are ongoing inKaramoja, and upon which future initiatives could be built.In all these instances, the objective has been to mobilise thepeople of Karamoja to discuss the problems of conflict andinsecurity, and to get them to work out the way forward inconflict management and peace-building.

While these initiatives have not led to the end of conflictand insecurity in Karamoja, it would be unduly pessimisticto dismiss them as absolute failures. In this connection, it isimportant to appreciate that no peace-building initiative can


be expected to succeed phenomenally within a short period.It takes ages for peace to break down, and Karamoja is noexception. Similarly, what has broken down, over so long aperiod, is bound to take a long time to mend. Seen fromthis perspective, these initiatives need to be considered asbuilding blocks for the creation of a framework for peace,which may be realised in the future rather than today.

The way forward

A major objective of this study was to enable Oxfam todetermine how it can contribute to the management ofconflict in Karamoja. In this connection, we have establishedthat the local communities in Karamoja have very high regardfor Oxfam and its place in the development process of theregion. In Kotido, the local population has very fondmemories of Oxfam's work in Kaabong and the rest of Kotido.They were quite concerned when Oxfam suspended its workin the district, and were quite happy to note that it was nowin the process of resuming its activities.

Although Oxfam has not worked directly in Moroto andNakapiripirit, the communities are aware of its role in Kotido,and would welcome its involvement in the area of conflictmanagement and peace-building. A number ofdevelopment agents in Moroto and Nakapiripirit lookforward to collaborating with Oxfam in this area of work.LWF and KPIU are both interested in working with Oxfamin conflict management. The two are already involved in anumber of initiatives in the two districts. They see anopportunity for collaboration with Oxfam to learn from eachother and support each other's work.

In this connection, we also noted the high regard withwhich Oxfam is held by the relevant arms of the nationalgovernment in Kampala.3 All the departments mandated


to work in Karamoja recognise the major role that Oxfamhas played in the development of the area, and welcomeany opportunity to work with the organisation on conflictmanagement. This gives Oxfam a tremendous advantageand an opportunity to make a meaningful contribution tothe problem of conflict and insecurity in Karamoja. Wewould suggest that Oxfam concentrate on the area in whichit has the comparative advantage, to make a realcontribution. Clearly, Oxfam's comparative advantage liesin its capacity to convene and bring together the differentplayers both in government and civil society. In addition,given its national, regional and global outreach it is able tobring its experiences elsewhere to bear on the reality inKaramoja.

We therefore recommend that Oxfam should considerdesigning interventions focusing on the following areas:

• ResearchOxfam should support or conduct policy research tohelp generate policy options that will lead to sustainableconflict management and peace building. The researchshould be on an ongoing basis, involving communitiesin action-oriented participatory research, reflection andaction. Such research should focus on, but not belimited to: understanding pastoralism as a productionsystem uniquely appropriate to the ecology ofKaramoja; understanding the cross-district and cross-border dimensions of conflict; understanding themovement of guns and ammunition across borders inthe region; linking traditional and modern conflictmanagement mechanisms; mapping conflict inKaramoja; and establishing institutions for conflictmanagement and peace building in Karamoja.


Advocacy and awareness creationUsing its national, regional and internationalconnections and presence, Oxfam should work withother local, national and regional as well as globalNGOs to advocate more effectively on behalf ofpastoralists. This will involve doing for pastoralism whatOxfam has already done for land policy and povertyissues. The advocacy should be based on the outcomeof the researches already indicated. In particular, Oxfamshould advocate the establishment of a national pastoralpolicy and strategy in Uganda; and internationalattention to the proliferation of guns in Karamoja.

Additionally, Oxfam should invest resources insupporting the creation of awareness on pastoralism andthe pastoral production system across the country. Alot of the problems between the Karimojong and otherUgandan communities, as well as with government arefounded on a lack of understanding on the part of theothers about the Karimojong way of life. A lot needs tobe done to bridge the gap, and to project the positiveaspects of pastoralism, as well as its place and potentialin the national economy of Uganda.

Capacity buildingOxfam is renowned for its support to local groups byhelping build their capacity for effective advocacy. Itshould help to build capacity for pastoral conflictresearch, analysis and advocacy in Karamoja andUganda. Again it should be possible for Oxfam to workwith existing initiatives like the Karamoja Resource andPolicy Centre in Moroto and KAPEPS in Kotido.


In strategic terms, Oxfam should take this study, its findingsand recommendations as a starting point for generatingdiscussion among the actors and stakeholders on movingforward the process of searching for a lasting solution to theconflict and insecurity in Karamoja. In this connection,Oxfam should seek to do more than has been done to date,and to move away from the prevalence of workshops andconferences on conflict. These definitely have a value, butthere are already a sufficiently large number of playersinvolved in them. Oxfam should seek to identify a nichewhere it can use its comparative advantage most effectively.

The findings of this study should be discussed inconsultation with specific stakeholders whose positions androles have been identified to be critical to the search forlasting peace in Karamoja. These include, but are notlimited to, local political leaders and the social and economicelite, community groups notably the youth and women,elders, religious leaders, national political leaders,development actors working in Karamoja, and civil servantswhose mandates cover Karamoja.

This study should generate debate amongst allstakeholders in Karamoja on how the process of managingconflict and insecurity can be carried forward. These debatesshould then inform the development of a project andfunding proposal for a programme of action on conflict inKaramoja. On the basis of this debate, it is hoped that Oxfamwill develop a programme that, founded on the genuineconcerns and aspirations of the Karimojong and informedby their input, will have a real chance of success.

We would conclude by emphasising three points. Firstly,the major issue in Karamoja is the need to understand thenature of the conflict and insecurity. Only with suchunderstanding of the nature of the conflict can anappropriate intervention be made. This entails research and


analysis, which Oxfam can do or can support otherorganisations to do. Secondly, Oxfam's comparativeadvantage lies in its national, regional and global clout. Thisclout should be used to support ongoing initiatives onconflict and insecurity in Karamoja. In this connection,Oxfam should work with other organisations, preferablylocal and national NGOs and CBOs that have a commitmentto these issues. That way, Oxfam will support the emergenceof local capacity for conflict management and peace-building, and build a sustainable foundation for peace inKaramoja. Lastly, and this is probably the most importantpoint, when all is said and done, the conflict and insecurityin Karamoja is a function of the struggle for securelivelihoods. It is defined by poverty, underdevelopment andinsecurity of livelihoods. This places it squarely within thepurview of the mission and mandate of Oxfam.

1. This was the eighth of the ten points. See the discussion of the tenpoints by Michael Twaddle in 'Museveni's Uganda: Notes towardsan Analysis' in Holger Bernt Hansen and Michael Twaddle (eds).1988. Uganda Now: Between Decay and Development. London:James Currey.

2. In 2002 the Uganda Government carried out a new disarmamentexercise where guns were exchanged for agricultural tools.

3. The high level delegation from Uganda that attended the regionalworkshop on pastoral conflict in Arusha in February 2000 was both anindication of the importance government attaches to the issue, and thehigh regard it has for the role of Oxfam in the area.

80 The Karamoja Conflict.

Appendix 1: Itinerary, January-February 2000The researcher's programme in Kampala and KaramojaSunday 16 January Arrive Kampala from Nakuru.

Monday 17 January Meetings at Oxfam (agree onand sign contract; agreeitinerary for the week inKampala; and makecontacts with possibleinterviewees; interviewrelevant Oxfam staff).

Tuesday 18 January Conduct literature search inOxfam library at Oxfamoffices; while confirmingmeetings with interviewees.

Wednesday 19 January Meetings with governmentofficials, (Minister of State forKaramoja Affairs; NorthernUganda RehabilitationProgramme; KaramojaMembers of Parliament).

Thursday 20 January Meetings with local andinternational NGOs workingin Karamoja (ADRA, WFP,LWF, Catholic Church,Church of Uganda).

Friday 21 January Meetings with CBRresearchers involved inresearch on pastoraldevelopment generally, andon pastoral development inKaramoja in particular (FrankEmmanuel Muhereza).

Appendix 1 81

Saturday 22 January

Sunday 6 February

Monday 7 February

Tuesday 8 February

(a.m.)

(p.m.)

Wednesday 9 February

Return to Nakuru.

Arrive Kampala from Nakuru.

Meetings with Johnson,Dereje at Oxfam Offices inKampala (discuss itinerary inthe field, reschedulepresentation in Kampala;obtain approval for contractwith research assistant,vehicle and driver hire, andobtain funding foraccommodation andsubsistence in the field).

Discuss with Dereje plans forNgorongoro workshop andpresentation.

Possible meetings withLokeris, ADRA, ACORD.

Travel to Moroto.

Meet LWF/Karamoja Policyand Resource Centre; agreecontract and have it signed.

Meet research assistant anddiscuss itinerary and TOR.

Meet NGOs and individualswithin Moroto districtheadquarters,knowledgeable andinvolved in issues of conflictin the district.


Thursday 10 February

Friday 11 February

Saturday 12 February

Sunday 13 February

Monday 14 February

Meet government officialsand functionaries as well aspolitical players withinMoroto district headquarters,whose work has relevanceto conflict and conflictmanagement

Travel to Amudat forovernight stay with a view toworking there tomorrow

Meetings in Amudat withlocal officials, politicians,youth, women and otherstakeholders

Travel to Namalu overnight,with a view to holdingmeetings there tomorrow

Meetings in Namalu withvarious stakeholders fromgovernment, politicians, civilsociety, women and youthReturn to Moroto viaKangole and Matany

Travel to Kotido, forovernight stay, to conductinterviews there tomorrow

Meet NGOs and individualswithin the districtheadquarters

Appendix 1 83

Tuesday 15 February

Wednesday 16 February

Thursday 17 February

Friday 18 February

Saturday 19 February

Sunday 20 February

28 February to 3 March

Meet government officialsand political leaders inKotido, at the districtheadquarters

Meet government and NGOplayers operating withinKotido district but outsidethe district headquarters.Meetings at Kaabong andKomuria

Travel back to Moroto, andwrap up with LWF

Return to Kampala

Preliminary presentation offindings at Oxfam offices

Return to Nakuru

Attend Oxfam RegionalMeeting on Conflict to makea presentation on the study


Appendix 2: List of Persons Interviewed

1. Dereje Worfosa, Country Programme Officer, Oxfam

2. Bjorn Hagen, Regional Representative, Redd Banna

3. Florence Mpabulungu, Planning Officer, LWF

4. Mr Odochi, NURR Office of the Prime Minister

5. Dr Ochieng, NURR Office of the Prime Minister

6. Mr Obalin, NURR Office of the Prime Minister

7. Frank Emmanuel Muhereza, Centre for BasicResearch

8. Francesca Erdelman, World Food Programme

9. Thomas Okoth-Nyalulu, RDC, Moroto

10. Bishop Henry Ssentongo, Catholic Diocese of Moroto

11. Joseph Lorika, SSDD, Catholic Diocese of Moroto

12. Moses Mudong, KISR Moroto

13. Achia Terence Sodium, LCV Chairman, Moroto

14. Fr John Apurio, Catholic Diocese of Moroto

15. Simon Peter Egadu, KPIU, Moroto

16. Simon Nangiro, KRPC, Moroto

17. Rev John Robert Lorech, KRPC

18. Rose Lochiam Miligan, KRPC

19. Vincent Abura Omara, KRPC

20. Peter Amodoi, KRPC

21. Sheikh Mohamed Akida, Moroto

22. IP Angela Albino, LAP, Moroto

23. IP Lokong Samuel, Moroto

Appendix 2 85

24. Steven A. Motos, KPIU, Amudat

25. Lokol Paul, LC3 Chairman, Amudat

26. Lowaluk Loitaluk, Elder, Amudat

27. Shabani Mururu, Sub-County Chief, Karita

28. Albert Simiyu, GISO, Amudat

29. Akaloton Lokali, Warrior, Amudat

30. Det. Const. Bunga Dennis, Amudat Police Post

31. Esther Aleper, housewife, Amudat

32. Fatuma Katikati, Housewife, Amudat

33. Regina Lowoi, Housewife, Amudat

34. Priscilla Nakoloi, Housewife, Amudat

35. Koriang Zachariah, Sub-County Chief, Namalu

36. Philip Ichumar, KISP Elder, Namalu

37. Ademan Benjamin, Teacher, Namalu

38. Mary Aguma, Social Worker, Namalu

39. Lotyang Gabriel, LCV Chairman, Kotido

40. Apus Andrew Lochiam, KISP Elder, Kotido

41. Madelana Adengo, Women's Leader, Kotido

42. Sysilia Achila, Women's Leader, Kotido

43. Naroth Reneta, Women's Leader, Kotido

44. Akore John Bosco Jokothau, KAPEPS, Kotido

45. Serafina Lomoi, Women's Leader, Kotido

46. Ruth Aceboi, Housewife, Kotido

47. Becky Nachuge, Church Of Uganda, Kotido


48. Jepesa Lumuriamoi Lokidi, KISP Elder, Kaabong

49. Margaret Meri, Elder, Komuria

50. Anna Namoi, Elder, Komuria

51. Joseph Lokutar, Youth, Komuria

Appendix 3 87

Appendix 3: Key Research Questions

Causes of conflict in Karamoja• What are the different underlying causes of war and

conflict in Karamoja which have bearings in the district,neighbouring countries and neighbouring districts?

• What are the perceptions of the pastoralists in Karamojaof the causes of war and conflict?

• In what ways are the war and conflict linked with povertyand livelihood insecurity?

• In what ways are the war and conflict linked to andcaused by cultural practices and beliefs?

• Which cause has the widest, and most frequent impacton the people?

• How can these causes of war and conflict be overcomeor reduced?

• What are the different types of war and conflict inKaramoja?

• Is there a pattern to the times of the war and conflictfrom other countries, within Karamoja and with theneighbouring districts? Please give a chronology ofconflict from 1990 and draw out a pattern.

• How are the different organisations, including NGOs,affected by the conflict?

• Can Oxfam work in this insecure environment andmanage this insecurity and if so how?


• What has been the responsibility of government inreducing or fueling the insecurity and conflict?

• What are government policies and role on war andconflict in Karamoja? Are the policies implementedeffectively or not? Are the policies appropriate forKaramoja?

• What factors keep perpetuating insecurity and couldthey be reduced or removed?

Conflict resolution initiatives

• What customary dispute settlement systems exist inKaramoja? Are they still effective, if not why not?

• What are the natives doing about conflict resolution?

• What other peace solutions have been tried before, bywhom and what was the impact ? What improvementson these solutions are needed? What solutions for eachtype of conflict have been tried before?

• What was the impact of the peace work carried out byOxfam? Are there any lessons to learn from theseinitiatives?

Appendix 4A 89

Appendix 4A: Mapping of cross-district andcross-border conflict: The Jie

KEY

Theft (one sided weak)

Positive link

Weak link

Violence

Neighbouring district


Appendix 4B: Mapping of cross-district andcross-border conflict: TheDodoth

KEY

Violence

Positive link

Appendix 4 C 91

Appendix 4C: Mapping of cross-district andcross-border conflict:The Pokot

^Marakwet

KEY

Violence

Positive link


Appendix 4D: Mapping of cross-districtconflict: The Pian

Qlurkana ^) ^Matheniko)

KEY

Positive link

Violence

Neighbouring district

the karamoja conflict - urban response...i would like again to underline (but not to repeat myself)...

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