the m-290 shipping container - nuclear regulatory commission · 2012-12-02 · m-290 shipping the...

The M-290 Shipping Container

November 12, 2009

The M-290 Replaces the M-140 for Carrier Spent Fuel

Slide 2November 12, 2009

Current M-140 System New M-290 System(16.2 ft tall, 175 tons - loaded) (30.1 ft long, 260 tons - loaded)

requires spent fuel disassembly @ shipyard accommodates full-length Carrier spent fuel

M-290: Dual-Purpose

1 Design

Fleet Support

Transports full-length


Transports full length aircraft carrier spent fuel to INL

Repository Support

Transports Naval Spent Fuel Canisters (SFC’s) to the Geologic Repository

The M-290 System:

• New, More Efficient Transportation Container System for Carrier Fuel– necessary to support Fleet schedules

• M-290 allows transport of full-length spent fuel


p g p– Canister-based System for CVN65 (A1W) & SFCs

– Cask-based System for Nimitz-Class (A1G) Carrier and Future Carrier Designs

• Eliminates use of Surface Ship Support Barge and associated presence of spent fuel at shipyard

First M-290 use: A1W (canister-based)

M-290 Configuration and Features

Topic 2a


M-290 Dimensions• Length

30.1 ft with Domes22.9 ft, Cask alone21.6 ft, internal cavity

• Diameter


Diameter10.7 ft at Domes8.8 ft, Cask alone

• Wall Thickness12.5 inches, lower Cask10.5 inches, upper Cask

M-290 Weight & Material

• Weight260 tons – loaded

• Materials: constructed of


Materials: constructed of ductile materials

Cask: Type 304 and Nitronic 40 forgings

Domes: Type 304 castings

M-290 Compared to M-140

M-290

M-140


Transport Package

M-140 M-290

Overall Length, ft 16.2 30.1

Weight, tons 175 260

M-290 Container Features

Thick wall provides shieldingand resists puncture

Domes absorb energy from accidental drop; Top Dome protects Containment Cover


Containment Cover – leaktight seal; not loaded by cargo or contacted by Dome

Closure Head/Restraint Plate - restrains cargo

Fins improve thermal performance

Internals Hardware position & support cargo

M-290 Defense-in-Depth Protection1) Naval Fuel Cladding

• robust Navy fuel: contains primary fission products

• Carrier spent fuel previously shipped in M-140

2) Closure plus Restraint Plate• confinement of cargo

Top Dome

Containment Cover


g• protects Containment Cover

from below3) Containment Cover

• containment: contains releasable crud

4) Top Dome• protects Containment Cover

from above• both domes reduce loads

delivered to cargo

RestraintPlate

Canister

M-290: Confinement

• Non-canister: Closure Head confines non-canisterized cargo and provides operational containment boundary

• Canister: Confinement achieved by

Shear RingBacking Ring


• Canister: Confinement achieved by combination of canister closure (holds fuel in canister) and restraint plate (hold canisters in place)

Restraint Plate (for canisterized cargo)

Canister Closure

M-290: Containment

Bo

un

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y

The M-290 Cask has only one opening: the Containment Cover. The mechanical joint at the edge of this Cover is comprised of 3 o-rings (allowing for efficient leak testing). The middle o-ring is the containment boundary.


Co

nta

inm

ent B

detail of containment boundary at the testing port

M-290: Containment

• Containment Cover is M-290 containment boundary

• Cover is not contacted during hypothetical accident(protected from above by Top

Containment Cover


(p y pDome and from below by Closure/Restraint Plate)

• Cover provides lateral restraint of upper Cask region

• Analysis demonstrates no yielding in region of Containment Cover

M-290 Domes

Top Dome

Top Dome

Hinge Region

Impact Mitigation• Stainless Steel• O.D. 128” (AAR Plate F)• “Hinge” region (transition to attachment) controls side &

slapdown decelerations• Loose fit between Pins & Top Dome (0.3 in, radial)

reduces Pin loading during impact (the load is transferred directly to the Cask)


Top Dome• No Contact with Containment Cover• Accommodates Lift Equipment

(M-290 is lifted via the Top Dome) Pins loaded in double shear

Bottom Dome• Container (vertical) can be seated

on cask bottom, through opening at Dome base

– can also be seated on upending hardware (which is fastened to Dome only during operations)

scaled M-290 test unit

Bottom Dome fastened in place by wedges

Bottom Dome

Attachment Pin Ass’y

M-290 Shipping The M-290 is too tall to be shipped vertically.

Bolts fastenCradle Caps

Shear features preventM-290 axial motion


Shipping Cradle secures the M-290 to the railcar

Reaction Pad prevents M-290 rotation during accelerating or braking

M-290 Shipping• Cask Fits Within AAR Plate F

Envelope

• Cask Ships in Near Horizontal Orientation (with Approx 1° Tilt)– Carrier Shipments essentially dry

SFC V D i d


– SFC Vacuum Dried

Blue Contour = Plate F Envelope

M-290 Lifting & HandlingLifting Plateattaches toTop Dome

• M-290 is upended and lifted through the Top Dome

• Pivoting hardware attached to bottom dome for upending

• Handling equipment removed for shipment


Upending Hardware attaches to Bottom Dome

The M-290 is designed so that, for normal operations, it can only be lifted with the domes attached.

Upending stand is attached to railcar

SFC Design Overview• All-welded canister• Planned for Direct Placement in Geologic Repository• Also used for NRF on-site storage of Spent Fuel

– Storage SAR per 10CFR72 (NRC reviewed Jan. 2001)• Cargoes to Include All Naval Cores


Temporary Dry Storage at NRF

SFC Design OverviewLeak-Tightness is

assured by robust closure:

- Shear Ring with Seal Welds

- Outer Seal Plate with Seal Welds


- Vacuum Dried & Leak Tested

- Demonstrated Via Analysis and Testing

- Ductile Type 316/316L steel construction

SFC Design Overview

• Naval Fuel Assembly: most of this spent fuel has been previously shipped

• SFC:– Loaded with spent fuel while Fully Flooded– SFC Vacuum Dried, Backfilled, Leak Tested


, ,– Analyses will demonstrate Baskets maintain

configuration– Analyses will demonstrate Fuel Assemblies

experience no gross rearrangement

• SFC Meets Intent of ISG 18– seal welds in lieu of structural welds (reviewed by

NRC (Naval Storage SAR))

M-290 Certification Strategy

Topic 2b


gy

M-290 SARPs

M-290 Core-Independent SARP

M-290 A1W SARP (Core-Dependent)M-290 A1G SARP (Core-Dependent)M-290 A1B SARP (Core-Dependent)


SFC-in-M-290 SARP: Core-Independent

SFC SARPs (various) – Core-Dependent

M-290 SARPs

• The M-290 Core-Independent SARP evaluates common hardware:– Cask Body, Domes, Containment Cover, and their attachment

systems– Hardware (¼-scale) is tested in the Certification Test Program

• Test Report will be included in the Core Independent SARP


• Test Report will be included in the Core-Independent SARP

• Core-Dependent SARPs will address specific spent fuel cargoes– Shipments from shipyard to NRF

• A1W canister• A1G and A1B internals

– Shipments from NRF to Geologic Repository• Naval Spent Fuel Canister (SFC)

M-290 SARPs

• All Impact Orientations are Being Evaluated: Top, Bottom, Oblique, Side, and Slapdown– M-290 Peak Axial Deceleration: 125g hot, 130g cold– M-290 Peak Lateral Deceleration: 250g hot, 310g

cold (at cask ends)


cold (at cask ends)– Analyses performed using a combination of hand

calculations and explicit, dynamic finite element codes

• Static analyses use orientation-specific Dynamic Load Factors (DLF)

• FEA codes: LS-DYNA and ABAQUS

Closure Regions for Canister-Based & non-Canister-Based Configurations

Understanding the Closure region will help in understanding the Containment and Confinement Posture.


Closure HeadRestraint PlateCanister Closure

Canister-Based Configuration non-Canister-Based Configuration

Layered, Defense-in-Depth Design

Layer Canister-Based Not Canister-Based

1 Cladding achieves Containment of Primary Fission Products

- Battle-Worthy Shock-Tested Naval Fuel Assembly

- Either previously shipped or same as previously shipped cross-country (e.g., A1G: M-140)

2 Canister Closure, combined with Restraint, achieves Confinement

- Shear Ring is identical for Canister-Based & non-Canister-Based

Closure Head achieves Confinement (operational containment boundary, but

Containment at more than one level


y,seals not relied on for Certification)

3 Containment Cover contains releasable crud Containment Cover contains releasable crud

3a. SFC Closure achieves Containment (contains releasable crud): Shear Ring with seal welds plus Outer Seal Plate with seal welds

4 M-290 Cask and Domes: support and protect all of the above levels

M-290 Approach Relative to ISG-19

ISG-19 Guidance M-290 Approach1. Approval based on reconfigured fuel, with water inleakage – This is the primary approach that the NNPP is pursuing.

Bounding or credible reconfiguration NNPP will use either of these approaches for different M-290 cargo. A1W: 2nd approach. (Note that NNPP has extensive data for irradiated hydrided cladding material properties to support the conclusion of subcriticality.)

Reconfiguration based on actual structural & material behavior

2 Approval based on moderator exclusion


2. Approval based on moderator exclusion - NNPP will demonstrate the following as part of its overall defense-in-depth approach. NNPP may pursue a moderator-exclusion-based approval for SFC cargo.

Demonstrate water-tight barrier subsequent to hypothetical accidents.

NNPP will demonstrate by analysis that the

M-290 maintains its (mechanical) seal.

Welded canister scale-model drop* of canister with impact limiter, with before-&-after leak testing

SFC only: welded canister: scaled testing will demonstrate SFC stays sealed. (note: seal weld vice ISG-19 structural weld)

Bolted closure scale-model drop* of cask with bolted closure & impact limiter, with before-&-after leak testing

Scale-model testing of M-290 will demonstrate that its bolted closure maintains its seal.

* ISG-19 objective: “Physical test of scaled [canister/bolted closure] to provide added assurance of moderator exclusion under accident conditions.”

Sub-criticality Assessment

• Sub-Criticality Demonstrated for:– Normal Conditions: optimum moderation of

Cask and Canister

– Post-accident: Moderation to the most


Post accident: Moderation to the most reactive credible extent consistent with the package damaged condition

• Carrier defueling cargoes: moderated spent fuel

• SFC cargoes: flooded Cask and un-moderated cargo

• SFC cargoes: (additional defense-in-depth) flooded cask and moderated cargo

Structural Analysis Approach

• M-290 analysis model with Cask and Domes– General representation of

internals and cargo• Internals and cargo are


~25% of the total weight

– The weight and C.G. variation of the several cargoes are not substantial, and the model is run at the extremes of the range to account for this variation.

Drop Angle Orientations

• The cask model is evaluated for Top, Bottom, Side, and the oblique angles in


between, including Slapdown

Acceleration Curves

• Explicit, dynamic finite element analysis (FEA) of the Cask/Dome model produces acceleration curves:Local acceleration

curves (LA##)


– Rigid body curves, and

– Local acceleration curves (account for cask flex)

• These curves are used for “driving” the submodels.

curves (LA##) generated at the points identified

Structural Submodels

• Regions of interest that require finer FEA mesh are evaluated with

submodel of closure region

-1.00E+04

0.00E+00

1.00E+04

2.00E+04

3.00E+04

4.00E+04

5.00E+04

0.0000 0.0050 0.0100 0.0150 0.0200 0.0250 0.0300 0.0350


submodels– Closure region

– Cargo and internals

submodel of internals and cargo

-1.00E+04

0.00E+00

1.00E+04

2.00E+04

3.00E+04

4.00E+04

5.00E+04

0.0000 0.0050 0.0100 0.0150 0.0200 0.0250 0.0300 0.0350 0.0400

Analysis Conditions

• These considerations figure into the total number of analysis models and runs– Drop Orientation

Deceleration (rigid body local acceleration)


– Deceleration (rigid body, local acceleration)• If one is clearly more limiting, run only that.

– Temperature (hot, cold)

– Material strength• Domes: min/max variability (effect on deceleration)

• Spent fuel: irradiation effects

M-290 Certification Test Program

• ¼-scale M-290• Supplements M-290 Cask design and SARP analysis• Supports Cask certification for compliance with 10CFR71• Will execute drop tests in 2010-2011 (1st drop: Oct. 2010)

– Based on Limiting Orientations


Based on Limiting Orientations– Seven 30 foot plus one or two 40 inch puncture drops– A1G-based and SFC-based internal configurations– Includes helium leak testing of cask and SFC– Based on previous testing experience with M-140 Shipping

Container– Supplemented by previous M-290 proof-of-principle drop tests

(following slides), which validated M-290 design as viable

¼-scale Drop Tests

• Testing performed at Sandia National Lab

• Included helium leak testing to ANSI N14.5

• 6 drops: top, top corner, and slapdown (same

M-290 Proof-of-Principle


and slapdown (same cask used in all tests)

• Leak-tightness demonstrated for all tests

• Representative A1G and SFC Cargo Used– SFC remained leak-tight for

all drops in M-290

¼-scale Drop Tests

• Measured Deformations Agree Well with Analytical Model

Top Drop



– Analytical model deformations slightly exceed measured data

Slapdown

Shaded Image = Analysis ResultRed Dots = Measurement Data

¼-scale Drop Tests

• Measured Decelerations Agree Well with Analytical Model

Analysis

Top Drop



– Analytical model decelerations slightly exceed test data

• (note that analytical model includes no damping)

-800

-600

-400

-200

0

200

400

600

800

1000

0 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06

Time (s)

Ac

cele

rati

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(g

)

Analysis (Q_001) Test (T180X-IIR600Hz)

Slapdown

— Test— Analysis

the m-290 shipping container - nuclear regulatory commission · 2012-12-02 · m-290 shipping the...

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