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THE MEMORY OF VIRTUE: ACHIEVINGIMMORTALITY IN PLATO'S SYMPOSIUM

Anthony Hooper

The Classical Quarterly / Volume 63 / Issue 02 / December 2013, pp 543 - 557DOI: 10.1017/S0009838813000086, Published online: 08 November 2013

Link to this article: http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0009838813000086

How to cite this article:Anthony Hooper (2013). THE MEMORY OF VIRTUE: ACHIEVING IMMORTALITY INPLATO'S SYMPOSIUM. The Classical Quarterly, 63, pp 543-557 doi:10.1017/S0009838813000086

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THE MEMORY OF VIRTUE: ACHIEVING IMMORTALITY INPLATOS SYMPOSIUM1

I

The prospect of human immortality is manifest in many of Platos writings, appearing asearly as the Apology (28c, 41cd) and the Crito (54bd), and as late as Book 12 of theLaws (967d). But nowhere is immortality given so much attention, nor as central a placein Platos philosophical projects, as in what have traditionally been referred to as hisMiddle Period works,2 so it is hardly surprising that we find an extensive treatmentof the subject of immortality in Socrates own encomium in the Symposium (206e209e). Eros, Socrates tells us, is not merely a desire to possess the good, but one thatpushes us towards possessing the good forever (205a, 206a) and, because of this,eros is necessarily a desire for immortality (207a). However, it is evident thatSocrates presentation of immortality in the Symposium is fundamentally differentfrom those found in other dialogues. This is not merely because in this work aloneSocrates attributes the desire for immortality to eros;3 rather it is also because the natureof the immortality that Socrates recommends here, and the means by which he suggestsit is achieved, are wholly unique to this work. Whereas in other dialogues Plato casts hisdiscussions in terms of the persistence of the soul in some super-sensible realm, here heoffers a picture of lovers achieving human immortality by creating memorials ()that will outlast them.4

Several attempts have been made to account for the peculiarity of Socrates accountof human immortality in the Symposium,5 but I will not undertake such a project in this

1 All quotations from Platos dialogues in this paper are from their respective translations in JohnCooper, Plato: Complete Works (Indianapolis and Cambridge, 1997).

2 Besides the Symposium, which is the subject of this paper, each other dialogue that is commonlyincluded in this period contains extensive discussions of immortality. The Phaedo itself is both dra-matically and philosophically a meditation on immortality, and issues concerning many facets ofimmortality are raised throughout. The passages that most explicitly concern immortality in theRepublic are found in Book 10 (608d611d) and the Myth of Er at the end of the dialogue(614b621b). In the Phaedrus Socrates gives a proof of the immortality of the soul (245c246a),and a dramatization of the souls journey through the heavens and its fall to earth makes up therest of the opening of his palinode (246e248e). The souls return journey from earth to the heavensis then the subject of the rest of his speech.

3 The Phaedrus also contains extensive treatments of both immortality and eros, but nowhere inthis dialogue does Socrates suggest that immortality is an object of erotic desire for lovers.

4 For comments regarding the position Socrates takes regarding the separability of the soul from thebody in the Symposium, see n. 14 below.

5 e.g. R. Hackforth, in his article Immortality in Platos Symposium, CR 64 (1950), 435, accountsfor the discrepancy in the presentation of immortality in the Symposium with that of other dialogues bysuggesting that Plato revised his opinions on immortality after the Phaedo in the Symposium, only toreturn to his original position in the Republic and other dialogues. Given that recent Plato scholarshiphas moved away both from the idea that Platos works are clearly separable into different periods andfrom concerns regarding the precise dating of dialogues even within those traditionally separateperiods, this interpretation no longer finds much support. Other commentators, such as R.E. Allen,

Classical Quarterly 63.2 543557 The Classical Association (2013) 543doi:10.1017/S0009838813000086

paper. Instead, following recent treatments of human immortality in the Symposium byGabriel Lear6 and Frisbee Sheffield,7 my focus here will be on examining Socratespresentation of human immortality in this dialogue on its own terms it being anaccount that, I believe, is of equal philosophical depth to those found in other ofPlatos works, and one that is perhaps more palatable to a modern philosophical audi-ence. This examination will take place in three parts: first, I will consider some key pas-sages in Socrates encomium to establish the kind of immortality he recommends here;second, I will explore how, for Socrates, this immortality is to be achieved; and finally, Iwill say a few words about who will be most successful in winning this immortality forthemselves.

II

To begin this examination I wish to consider the examples Socrates lists of those whohave achieved human immortality. The first figures named are Alcestis, Achilles andCodrus (208d);8 he later adds Homer and Hesiod (208d) and finally Solon andLycurgus (209de) to the list.9 Of particular interest to us here are the first group,whom Socrates lists under the label lovers of honour.10 Of such people Socratessays the following:

Do you really think that Alcestis would have died for Admetus or that Achilles would havedied after Patroclus, or that your Codrus would have died so as to preserve the throne for hissons, if they hadnt expected the memory of their virtue which we still hold in honour tobe immortal?

(Symposium, 208d)

Platos Symposium (New Haven, 1991), 72, W.K.C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, vol. IV(Cambridge, 1986), 391 and J.V. Luce, Immortality in Platos Symposium: a reply, CR 66 (1952),13741, have offered a different explanation, which is still often accepted by many Plato scholars.In this account it is argued that the discussion of immortality in the Symposium relates specificallyto that of embodied souls in all of their particularity, while other dialogues focus on the indestruct-ibility of the divine part of the soul, considered in abstraction from its particularity. It should benoted that those commentators that fall into this later group believe that the account of immortalityin the Symposium is commensurate with those of other dialogues.

6 G. Lear, Permanent beauty and becoming happy in Platos Symposium, in J. Lesher, D. Nailsand F. Sheffield (edd.), Platos Symposium: Issues in Interpretation and Reception (Cambridge,2006), 96123.

7 F. Sheffield, Platos Symposium: The Ethics of Desire (Oxford, 2006).8 The inclusion of Codrus in this list is peculiar, as the stories of Codrus (or rather, the ones that we

have), unlike those of Alcestis and Achilles, make no reference to his gaining immortality for sacrifi-cing himself for the sake of his throne. It is most likely that Socrates added Codrus name here as asign that he will seek to replace with his own conception the standard conception of immortality oftenbelieved to be held by these other two figures.

9 At 209d Socrates does mention that other good poets have also achieved immortality in thesame way as Homer and Hesiod, but he neither specifies nor gives any hints as to who these figuresmight be.

10 It is apparent from these examples that death is still very much on the cards for those who havegained immortality, and this is shown most obviously in the figures of the first group, for whom deathis a central motif in the stories told of each. The tales of Alcestis and Codrus focus specifically on thehand they took in their own deaths and, as Phaedrus points out in his own encomium (179e180a),death lingered over all Achilles heroic deeds, as he chose his actions with the full knowledge thatthey would lead to his demise. But it is hardly surprising that the Garden of the Hesperides remainsbarred here, as nowhere in the dialogues does Socrates suggest that death is anything but imminent forall mortals.

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The role that the memory of virtue plays in achieving human immortality will bedetailed in the next section, but for now this passage will be useful for what it tellsus about the models of immortality that Socrates will shun here, and most illuminatingare his comments regarding Alcestis and Achilles.

It is unsurprising that Socrates lists the figure of Euripides Alcestis as an example ofa person who has achieved human immortality, both because she is a figure with whomhe can assume his audience is familiar,11 and because Phaedrus has paved the way forher addition by detailing her self-sacrificing actions in his own speech (179bd).Phaedrus recounts how Alcestis, alone of all people, was willing to die for Admetus,and how for this sacrifice she was delivered from the realm of the dead back to her hus-band.12 As we saw in the above quotation, Socrates also recounts the deeds of Alcestisin his own encomium, but what is notably absent from his account is any reference tothe deus ex machina who delivers Alcestis back to life the element of the story that isof central important to Phaedrus. One could possibly explain away this omission on thegrounds that Socrates did not feel this part of the story worth mentioning again, particu-larly given Phaedrus extensive treatment in his own speech of her return from death, butsuch an explanation seems unlikely given the similar, but more obviously significant,omission by Socrates in the comparable part of the story of Achilles. Phaedrus laysthe foundation for Socrates addition of Achilles to his list of immortal people, aswith Alcestis, since his own encomium also contains a discussion of the immortalityAchilles wins for himself (179e180b). Phaedrus details Achilles heroic deeds follow-ing the death of his friend Patroclus, and tells how he was rewarded for them with aneternal home in the Isles of the Blest. Socrates has a similar account of Achillesdeeds in his speech, but again missing from his encomium is any mention of the persist-ence of Achilles soul in the underworld. We could dismiss this omission for the samereason as for the omission to mention Alcestis reincarnation and here with even stron-ger grounds, given the huge influence of Homers works in Greek life13 were it not forthe fact that, by leaving out this part of the story, Socrates misses a prime opportunity toadvance a fundamental Platonic point concerning the persistence of disembodied soulsin the underworld after death an assertion found in every other major discussion ofimmortality in the dialogues.

At this point it is important to note that nowhere else in his presentation of humanimmortality, nor anywhere else in the Symposium, does Socrates raise the possibilitythat the dead could return to life at some stage, or to the idea that, after death, thesoul persists in some non-spatiotemporal realm.14 And neither in his general statements

11 Many speakers in the Symposium appear to be intimately aware of Euripides plays. Eryximachusquotes fromMelanippe at 177a, and Agathon uses a line from the (now lost) play Sthenoboea at 196e.And Socrates himself demonstrates his intimate knowledge of the playwright by reciting a line fromHippolytus during the elenchus with Agathon that immediately precedes his encomium at 199a.

12 This story differs slightly from the account offered in Euripides Alcestis, as in the play it isHeracles that rescues Alcestis from the clutches of death, while in Phaedrus account it is the godswho, being so touched by Alcestis actions, deliver her from Hades.

13 Even though Euripides is the second most frequently referenced figure in the Symposium, allu-sions to and quotations from Homer occur four times as often in this dialogue. Homer is referenced atvarious points by Phaedrus (179b, 179e180a), Aristophanes (190bc, 192de), Agathon (195d,196d), Alcibiades (214b, 218e219a, 219e, 220c, 221d, 221c) and Socrates himself (174c, 174d,206d).

14 In the Symposium Socrates comments concerning the soul are restricted to those which deal withit as an object of erotic attention (210bc), or as a subject of vicissitudes similar to those of the body(207e208a).

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concerning human immortality, nor in his comments regarding the other figures whomhe lists as having achieved immortality does Socrates suggest that people engage in anyother mode of existence beyond the one they enjoy in this life.15 It would be reasonableto think, then, that the omissions from the stories of Alcestis and Achilles are both inten-tional and significant. In raising these points, however, I am not advancing the idea, asHackforth does,16 that in the Symposium Plato has come to reject, or at least doubt, theidea that the soul is immortal. As Allen17 and OBrien18 argue, an omission is not equiv-alent to a denial. But what I wish to suggest is that all of this evidence implies thatSocrates is distancing his present discussion of human immortality from those modelsof immortality that concern the continuation of ones sheer existence after death eitherin this world or the next. Support for this reading can be found in Socrates commentsregarding mortal possession earlier in his encomium.

Shortly after introducing the prospect of human immortality in his speech Socrateslaunches into a discussion of the nature of mortal possession that is Heraclitean intone (207c208b). Everything that makes up who we are, Socrates tells us, both inbody and soul, is constantly in flux:

each living thing is always being renewed and in other respects passing away, in his hair andflesh and bones and blood and his entire body. And its not just in his body, but in his soul, too,for none of his manners, customs, opinions, desires, pleasures, pains, or fears ever remain thesame, but some are coming to be in him while others are passing away.

(Symposium, 207de)

From this Socrates concludes that, unlike the gods, in whom everything is preserved byremaining exactly the same, mortals can only be said to preserve anything in any mean-ingful sense through reproduction; that is, by replacing that which is passing away withsomething that it just like it. For example, a person can justifiably claim to have a thickhead of hair, not because she possesses the exact same hairs throughout her life, butbecause, for every hair that falls out, there is another qualitatively similar one growingto take its place. Significant for our present purposes are Socrates comments regardingthe mindset with which people approach this process. Because mortals remain the samethrough a process of replacement, mortals will care little for their continuing numericalidentity. Where losing a hair for an immortal god would fundamentally change theiridentity, it is no crisis for a mortal provided that another is growing. And Socratesextends this point yet further by arguing that, rather than sentimentally cling to a pos-session because it is ones own, people will dispose of any of their possessions themoment they recognize that it is absent of value:

15 Even at the end of the lovers ascent up the Ladder of Love there is strong evidence to think thatthe lover is still a living, embodied person here, rather than a disembodied soul. Consider the follow-ing passages: And there [in the presence of divine beauty] in life if anywhere should a person livehis life [ ] (211d); Do you think it would be a poor life [] for a human being[] to look there and behold it [divine beauty]? (212a). Socrates repetition of the terms and here suggest that, even at the top rung of the Ladder, the lover is still a living,embodied human being. Contrast this with the passage in the Phaedo at 81ab, where Socratessuggests that the soul can only exist in the presence of the Forms after it has left the body, i.e.only after the end of his life.

16 Hackforth (n.5), 44.17 Allen (n.5), 72.18 M. OBrien, Becoming immortal in Platos Symposium, in D.E. Gerber (ed.), Greek Poetry

and Philosophy: Studies in Honour of Leonard Woodbury (Chico, CA, 1984), 195.

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people are even willing to cut off their own arms and legs if they think that they are diseased. Idont think an individual takes joy in what belongs to him personally unless by belonging tome he means good and by belonging to another he means bad.

(Symposium, 205e)

In no uncertain terms Socrates is stating here that the concern for that which is onesown has little significance in a persons life, and that it is entirely subordinate to his con-cern for the good. Therefore, people, over the course of their lives, will only work topreserve those parts of themselves that they understand as good, and will allow topass away those things that are deficient. As Socrates discussion of immortality followsdirectly from his comments regarding reproduction (indeed, these comments form thepremisses to his picture of human immortality here), it is reasonable to assume fromthis and we are given no evidence to the contrary that people also approach the pro-blems that death presents with a similar mindset. In the face of death, then, people willnot strive to preserve themselves in all of their particularity a goal that is often calledpersonal immortality; instead, they will work only to preserve those parts of them-selves they understand as good and valuable, thinking little for the rest.19

To clarify what Socrates is getting at here let us consider the cases of John, whoamong his possessions only values his commitment to justice, and Joan, who considersmost valuable her physical prowess. On this reading, these people will be concerned pri-marily to preserve these parts of themselves (their justice and fitness respectively) afterthey die, as these are the elements of themselves that they have identified as most valu-able. Furthermore, they will care little for the continuing existence of those aspects ofthemselves they identify as bad, or value-neutral.20 This, I suggest, is the model ofimmortality that Socrates advances in the Symposium: not one of personal immortality,but one that concerns the eternal preservation in the world of those parts of oneself thatone values.

III

For Socrates, the immortality for which mortals strive concerns the preservation in theworld of those parts of themselves that they value. I now wish to outline how he ima-gines this human immortality is to be achieved. Socrates suggests that people do thisthrough creating things that are external to them that will outlast them, and dependingon each persons disposition these creations will take very different forms. Socratesdivides those who seek immortality through creation into three groups: first, lovers ofbodies, who work to give birth to physical children (208e); second, lovers of honour,who strive to produce fame for themselves (208ce); and third, those who are pregnant

19 Bernard Williams, in his article The Makropulos Case: reflecting on the tedium of immortality,in id., Problems of the Self: Philosophical Papers 19651972 (Cambridge, 1976), 82100, uses theexample of Elina Makropulos, a character from the Karel apek play, The Makropulos Case, whohas discovered the means to live forever, to highlight the undesirability of personal immortality.Williams argues that, without the prospect of death lingering over our lives, a severe feeling of tediumwould attend all of our actions, thus rendering our lives unlivable (p. 95).

20 In the Phaedo there is some evidence that Socrates approached his own death with a similarmindset. He says to those present: If you will take my advice, you will give but little thought toSocrates but much more to the truth (Phd. 91b). For Socrates, what is important is not that helives for ever in all of his particularity i.e. as Socrates but that what he values most in himself,his concern for the truth, continues on after he dies.

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in soul, who will create logoi, in the form of either poems, codes of law or, perhaps,even philosophical treatises (209ae). But at this point things still remain quite unclear,as it is difficult to see how these creations help these people preserve their virtue.21 Inorder to determine their role in the lovers quest for human immortality we will have tolook more closely at Socrates descriptions of peoples productive activities here:

Now, some people are pregnant in body, and for this reason turn more to women and pursuelove in that way, providing themselves through childbirth with immortality and remembrance[] and happiness, as they think, for all time to come.

(208e)

Do you really think that Alcestis would have died for Admetus or that Achilles would havedied after Patroclus, or that your Codrus would have died so as to preserve the throne of hissons, if they hadnt expected the memory [] of their virtue which we still hold to hon-our to be immortal?

(208d)

Everyone would rather have such children [that is, logoi] than human ones, and would look upto Homer, Hesiod, and other good poets with envy and admiration for the offspring they leftbehind offspring, which, because they are immortal themselves, provide their parents withimmortal glory and remembrance [].

(209d)

Of immediate interest here is Socrates repeated use of the term , meaning eithermemory or remembrance. Regardless of whether lovers seek immortality through theproduction of children, fame or logoi, what appears to be important is the ability of thesecreations to act as memorials for these people after they die. However, given thatthe concern for the good takes priority over what is merely ones own, it is highly doubt-ful that people would be interested in preserving the memory of themselves warts andall; instead, as we can see from the second passage particularly, their goal here is topreserve the memory of their virtue an idea reiterated in his discussion of loversof souls at 209e.

Several prominent commentators on the Symposium have recognized the significanceof memory in Socrates discussion and have suggested that people attain immortalityprecisely because, through their creations, they are remembered as being virtuous.22

Let us consider some examples to clarify this idea. Alcestis valued her love for her hus-band above all other things and, on this reading, she achieved immortality because,

21 Lear (n.6), 108 advances the idea that lovers of honour consider fame to be of supreme value andof central importance to their happiness. However, although this may prima facie seem to be the casefor Achilles, who is greatly concerned with his , it is difficult to see how this is so for Alcestisand Codrus. In both Phaedrus and Socrates recounting of the story of Alcestis her main concern issaid to be her love for her husband, while in the case of Codrus, his priority is the preservation ofhis throne for his children. Although Socrates does say that each of these figures died for theirloved ones in the expectation that the fame they earned through their self-sacrifice would ensuretheir immortality, the most we could conclude from this is that they value fame in an instrumentalway. The same could even be argued in the case of Achilles. First, it is difficult to determine whetherAchilles was motivated to action by his love of Patroclus, or his desire for ; and second, the term captures both the concept of fame and glory simultaneously. Those who value wouldnot be content simply with fame, in the sense purely of making a name for oneself () as, perhaps, some modern celebrities do, unless this fame was related to their gloriousdeeds. So even in the case of Achilles it could be argued that fame is not that which he values primarily.

22 Both Lear (n.6), 109 and Sheffield (n.7), 107 advance this idea, although the former does so onlyin the context of lovers of honour.

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through the fame she gained from her actions, she is remembered as a loving wife.Similarly, Hesiod won immortality through the Theogony and Works and Days,which are memorials to his piety, and Solon did the same through his system oflaws, which preserve the memory of his justice.

But although I believe that this reading is on the right track, I do not think that it isyet sufficiently fleshed out to explain the role of remembrances in the preservation ofvirtue. We must remember that, in his discussion of mortal possession, Socratesmakes it clear that, if people wish to preserve their virtue throughout their lives, theymust continually reproduce this virtue as time goes on; they cannot merely produce vir-tuous deeds in their youth, and rest on their laurels for the remainder of their life. Topreserve ones charity, for example, one must act charitably consistently over time;merely performing a single grand act of charity, and then talking about it until onesdying day, is insufficient. The problem here is that remembrances and memorials canby definition only provide images (eidola) of what was actual, and the memories thatthey conjure up in those present to them are also mere representations of past realities.But, as Socrates says at the very end of his speech, the goal of the best life is to producetrue virtue, rather than merely images of it (212a). Therefore, those who attempt topreserve their virtue through memory alone will only succeed in preserving an imageof their virtue in the world, and not the virtue itself. For example, although theTheogony may be quite effective at stirring in its readers memories of Hesiods piety,the work itself, and the memories it conjures, are only images of the piety thatHesiod actually possessed in life. But one might argue that death presents impressiveimpediments to our reproductive activities, and conclude from this that, although it isa deficient method of preservation, preserving images and memories of ones virtueis the best that one can hope for, given the circumstances. And with Socrates silenceregarding disembodied existence, there is little room to hope that people are somehowable to effect the generation of the good in this world from some super-sensible realm,as the gods interfere with the lives of mortals from Olympus. But we need not resignourselves to this deficient form of preservation, as we should be mindful that, eventhough death marks the end of our capacity to act in the world, it does not followfrom this that it removes our ability to affect the world, and in a way that would satisfySocrates account of mortal preservation. To demonstrate this, let us consider anexample.

A Christian martyr in ancient Rome, because she values her piety above all of herother possessions, willingly chooses a course of action that she knows will result inher being thrown into the arena. By doing this she gains fame for centuries to come,and people long remember her as pious because of this. But this is not the only reper-cussion of her action. In addition to being remembered as pious, she inspires in others,upon hearing of her deeds, a desire to be pious themselves, and moreover to give birth topious actions. In this case her fame does not merely result in the preservation of thememory of her virtue but in the production and reproduction by others of that same vir-tue that she herself possessed. History is replete with examples of people who have hadgreat influence on the actions of others long after they themselves have died, andSocrates himself lists some of the best examples of such people in the ancient world.Achilles was a hero who inspired many generals, the most prominent beingAlexander the Great, to seek glory for themselves; and Alcestis, for many, is a modelof familial virtue, whose willingness to die for her partner is an enviable expressionof love. It is this kind of influence, I suggest, that people are hoping to effect whenthey create memorials of their virtue in Socrates account, as they will be able, by

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inspiring others to produce and reproduce the same virtues that they themselves valuedin life, to achieve in others long after they have died the preservation not merely of animage of their virtue but of this virtue itself.

But, one may object, there is something lost in this process, and that is the specificrelationship that I have with my virtue. When I give birth to a virtue in life the virtue isspecifically mine, but in the model of human immortality advanced here, although Iam the catalyst for the production of this same virtue in others, this virtue will belongspecifically to the person who produced it; it will be theirs, and not mine. However,one must remember that, for Socrates, the concern for ones own virtue is entirelysubordinate to ones desire for the good. So although it is important to produce virtuefor oneself while alive, given the reality that death presents that one will no longer be asubject of anything after death it would be absurd for people to work to preserve virtuein themselves after they die. But given that for Socrates, to take justice as an example, itis one and the same thing that makes all just people just, likewise with any of the virtues,it should be perfectly satisfactory to work to ensure that this virtue is instantiated inanother person; all that matters is the preservation of the virtue itself in the world. SoJohn should not be concerned specifically with the preservation of Johns justice,nor Joan for Joans fitness; instead, their aim should be the preservation of these vir-tues qua good.

So what sense, if any, does it now make to claim that Hailey, for example, preservesJohns justice in her own actions? We cannot take this in the strong sense of saying thatshe preserves the justice that John possessed as it was particularly instantiated in Johnbecause, necessarily, only John can do this. But we can still meaningfully make theclaim that Hailey preserves Johns justice because she values and performs justice inthe same way that John himself did while he was alive. But this is enough to satisfySocrates demands regarding mortal preservation, and if Johns memory continuallyinspires others towards justice, then John can truly claim human immortality in thesense outlined by Socrates.

IV

Having now established the method by which people seek to preserve the memory of theirvirtue, I wish to say a few words about the problems people face in achieving this immor-tality. Because Socrates does not consider this issue in the Symposium, this discussion willremain somewhat speculative; there are, however, certain passages in the Protagoras andthe Phaedrus that may allow us to reconstruct some of Socrates opinions on this issue.That there is sufficient evidence in the dialogue to do this is itself interesting, as it mayindicate that the model of immortality that Socrates advances in the Symposium wasnot created for purely rhetorical purposes, but is one that follows naturally from variousother commitments Plato holds concerning the transmission of virtue.

Before I turn to the Protagoras and the Phaedrus it will be important to make a fewintroductory comments concerning the subject matter of this discussion. In the previoussection I argued that those who seek immortality work to preserve the memory of theirvirtue by creating remembrances that will outlast them, and that Socrates divides suchpeople into three groups according to the media through which they hope to preservethis memory: either through children, fame or logoi. But although Socrates labelssuch people as lovers of bodies, honour and souls respectively, he gives us no reason

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to think that people utilize particular media based on the kind of virtues that theyvalue.23 Achilles, Alcestis and Codrus, although they all seek to preserve the memoryof their virtue through fame, clearly value a diverse range of virtues: glory, familiallove and patriotism in turn (208d). Similarly, in his comments regarding lovers ofsouls, although he does make some judgement as to which virtues are more valuablethan others, he does not prescribe which virtues lovers of souls must value if they areto seek remembrance through logoi; instead, he says that such people value wisdomand the rest of virtue ( ) (Symp. 209a, my emphasis) hardly anexclusive list. So any given medium of remembrance is capable of preserving the mem-ory of a variety of virtues, and in addition it seems entirely possible for the same virtueto be preserved in different media. Nestor, for example, was able to preserve the mem-ory of his wisdom through his deeds in the Trojan War, while Parmenides did sothrough the creation of a philosophical treatise. Therefore, when we consider whowill be most successful at achieving immortality, we should not focus on what kindof virtues people value, but on the efficacy of their chosen media at preserving the mem-ory of their virtue. So let us begin with lovers of bodies.

In the literature there are many different views concerning how producing childrenhelps lovers of bodies achieve immortality,24 and although we now know that theydo so through helping a person preserve the memory of their virtue, the exact waythat children do this remains somewhat obscure. In light of what we have learnt I believethat Frisbee Sheffields interpretation is most reasonable: that children preserve thememory of virtue through continuing on a persons family name.25 To unpack thisidea, let us take the example of Cornelius Smith, a lover of bodies who seeks immor-tality for his temperance. Smith has children knowing (or at least hoping) that, whenpeople come into contact with his progeny or hear of his family name in conversation,they will remember temperate old Cornelius and be inspired by this memory to becometemperate themselves. But how reliable is this as a method of preserving the memory ofvirtue? As Sheffield argues, in so far as his children flourish and take after their

23 For some commentators, Socrates division is indicative of the kinds of virtues that people find tobe supremely valuable. Lear (n.6), 108, for example, argues that lovers of bodies, honour and souls arethose who believe physical well-being, fame and knowledge respectively to be the central componentof their happiness. He is forced into such a reading because he believes that remembrance is specifi-cally the goal for lovers of honour, and concludes from this that fame is all that such people value.Without recourse to the claim that children and logoi are means of preserving memory, Lear is com-pelled to conclude that the production of children is indicative of a concern for the preservation ofbrute physical existence, while the creation of logoi indicates a concern for knowledge. As I haveshown in the previous section, however, remembrance is the goal of all lovers, and these creationsare merely valued instrumentally as means for the preservation of whatever virtues people hold tobe valuable.

24 Another prominent interpretation of why lovers of bodies seek to generate children is advancedby Allen (n. 5), 73 and M. Dyson, Immortality and procreation in Platos Symposium, Antichthon 20(1986), 689, who argue that they do so because their aim is not personal immortality, but the immor-tality of the human species. There is one point in the dialogues where such a view is explicitlyadvanced. At Laws 721bc the Athenian justifies his law that all men and women of a certain agemust wed and begin producing children, as it is only through childbirth that mortals gain immortality.The Athenians discussion here is quite reminiscent of mortal possession in the Symposium, as here heargues that humans achieve immortality through leaving behind later generations to replace the onesthat are dying away. However, there are two important differences between this discussion of immor-tality and the one in the Symposium: first, no reference is made here to either memory or remem-brances; and second, the Athenian makes no reference to the other two methods of achievingimmortality in the Symposium, i.e. through gaining fame or producing logoi.

25 Sheffield (n. 7), 107.

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ancestor, Cornelius may be quite successful at inspiring others for generations to come.But, as Socrates cautions Protagoras in the Protagoras, one cannot always be assuredthat children will assume the virtues of their parents. Socrates here suggests that virtuemay not be a teachable thing, and as evidence he raises the example of Pericles chil-dren, who failed to live up to their fathers reputation in matters of state (319d320b). And even Protagoras, who assumes the opposite view and argues that virtue isteachable, suggests in response that, although education may help to ensure that childrenwill emulate the virtue of their parents (and other notable citizens), some children simplylack by nature the disposition to be virtuous (328cd). There is the possibility, then, thatone (or several) of Cornelius descendants may fail to be temperate, and perhaps be sointemperate as to besmirch his family name so that, upon hearing of the Smiths, onemight be reminded of their depravity rather than Cornelius temperance. So unlessone can ensure that ones descendants will be virtuous, preserving the memory ofones virtue through having children is unreliable.

There are not many dynasties that manage to retain their good name for more than afew generations, so perhaps the chosen medium of lovers of honour fame will besuperior for preserving the memory of virtue. Prima facie this seems likely as, whenprodded, most of us would be able to list dozens of individuals warriors and pacifists,lovers and explorers whose exploits have brought them renown for centuries, if notmillennia, after their deaths. But although heroes are frequently a topic of discussionfor Socrates, both in the Symposium and in other dialogues,26 and despite the factthat Socrates is often shown conversing with lovers of honour,27 the matter of the effi-cacy of fame as a means of preserving the memory of virtue is never raised. From theevidence in the text one point is pressing: at several places in the dialogues Socrates isopenly critical of those who pursue fame, and in the Symposium Alcibiades recounts inhis own encomium (216ab) Socrates distaste for the famous generals need for notori-ety among the mob.28 Here Alcibiades desire for fame is closely linked to his hubris, aconnection that is also found in the Republic concerning one of Socrates own examplesof a lover in the Symposium, Achilles. In Republic Book 3 Socrates criticizes the best ofthe Achaeans (at least, as portrayed by Homer) for his arrogance () towardsgods and humans (390c5). In these cases, at least, Socrates seems to believe that thememory of the vices of these individuals may overshadow that of their virtue.

Whether Socrates believes that this hubris necessarily attends lovers of honour isopen to debate, but given that nowhere in the dialogues does Socrates or any of his inter-locutors portray Alcestis or Codrus his two other examples of lovers of honour in theSymposium as anything but models of virtue, we should at least entertain the

26 See especially the Hippias Minor, a discussion of lying, with continual reference to Odysseus.27 The two most obvious examples of those whom Plato would label lovers of honour would be

Laches and Nicias, two famous Athenian generals who served during the Peloponnesian War,whose discussion with Socrates concerning the nature of andreia (manliness) is dramatized in theLaches. The other most prominent figure who ought to be added to this list is Critias, the future leaderof the Thirty Tyrants after the fall of Athens, whose opinions on courage are cross-examined bySocrates in the Charmides. Critias concern for honour is shown clearly in Xenophons Hellenica,where he denounces Theramenes for lacking concern for honour and friendship (Xen. Hell.2.4.33). Alcibiades, however, is perhaps the most memorable figure. But although he is a colourfulcharacter in the Protagoras and the Symposium, not to mention the (most likely spurious)Alcibiades I and II, Socrates never engages in an extensive elenchus with Alcibiades.

28 Alcibiades longing for fame is also dramatically described in the Alcibiades I (see previousnote), where Socrates claims that the then young Alcibiades is already desperate for his name andinfluence to saturate all mankind (105c34).

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possibility that fame is a reasonable medium for some individuals to preserve the mem-ory of their virtue. But what impediments face such people in their endeavour for humanimmortality? Here our task becomes much more difficult, as there is little evidence inthe dialogue to bring to bear on this issue. But perhaps we can glean one point, some-what indirectly, from Socrates list of famous lovers of honour. Although Socrates andhis audience would have been quite aware of the deeds of each of the figures listed aslovers of honour, we moderns are really only familiar with Achilles and Alcestis.Although we know something of Codrus through various sources,29 only the fame ofthe first two has truly stood the test of time. What Codrus lacks is the considerationof a great poet. The fame of Achilles and Alcestis lingers because of Homers powerfulportrait of the former in the Iliad and Euripides dramatization of the latter in hisAlcestis. Similarly, we remember Abelard and Heloise through their letters to eachother, the voyages of Marco Polo from his writings about his travels, and the deedsof Belisarius from the likes of Edward Gibbon. Here we have encountered an impressiveproblem for those who wish to preserve the memory of their virtue through fame: withfew exceptions, even the fame of the most glorious war hero or the most passionate lovercan only be preserved for any significant length of time with the aid of poetry, history orwriting of many kinds that is, through logoi. So unless one is a skilled creator of logoi,or at least the muse of another writer, then severe problems also attend the preservationof the memory of ones virtue through fame.

The final group we have to consider is the lovers of souls; those who attempt to pre-serve the memory of their virtue through the production of logoi. Of all of the media thatpeople use to secure immortality, discussions of logoi are by far the most frequent in thedialogues, which are littered with passages that concern the quality and utility of differ-ent kinds of logoi,30 and for a variety of purposes. Throughout the dialogues there aretwo kinds of logoi that receive particular attention, poetry and argumentation, and weare given important insights into the efficacy of each for inspiring people to act virtu-ously. However, because of the considerable attention that has been given toSocrates critiques of poetry and particularly to his attacks in Book 10 of theRepublic, where he censures the poets for nourishing a more tyrannical and less virtuouscharacter,31 my focus here will be on those who seek to inspire others to produce virtuethrough argumentation philosophers.

29 The story of Codrus is most notably preserved in the speech Against Leocrates by the logogra-pher Lycurgus of Athens.

30 I am including poetry here in the category of logoi because in the Republic, and particularly inthe Ion, Platos focus is on the opinions asserted by poets, and the basis for these assertions, ratherthan the aesthetic features of their creations.

31 Earlier in the Republic Socrates acknowledges the powerful ability of poetry to influencepeoples behaviour, and even suggests that it has the potential to inspire people to act virtuously, pro-vided that the content of the poetry is noble (Book 2), and that it meets certain formal requirements(Book 3). However, in Book 10 Socrates all but banishes the poets from the city once again, as he hereargues that, because poetry appeals to peoples appetitive soul, it is a great cause of psychic disso-nance, which confounds its audiences ability to judge what is true: So we were right not to admithim into a city that is to be well governed, for he arouses, nourishes and strengthens this part ofthe soul and so destroys the rational one, in just the way that someone destroys the better sort of citi-zens when he strengthens the vicious ones and surrenders the city to them. Similarly, well say that animitative poet puts a bad constitution in the soul of each individual by making images that are farremoved from the truth by gratifying the irrational part, which cannot distinguish the large and thesmall but believes that the same things are large at one time and small at another (Resp. 605bc).

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Philosophers speak directly to their audiences rational souls, so, unlike the poets,who attempt to inspire virtue in others through providing images of virtuous charactersperforming noble deeds (or ignoble individuals meeting deservedly disastrous ends),these people attempt to educate their audience in what is virtuous and instil in them arational desire to produce the virtues that they have now learnt to be valuable. Inorder to uncover the possible problems philosophers face in achieving human immortal-ity it will be illuminating to look to Socrates meditation on writing and speeches32 inthe second half of the Phaedrus, as these are the kinds of argumentation that can reachthe widest possible audience and are the longest enduring, with the potential to commu-nicate to people for millennia to come.33 Socrates discussion here touches on manyissues, but the passage that will be most relevant for our present purpose is his exam-ination of the aptness of written works for education (247b277c),34 which containshis most vehement attacks on writing.

Socrates begins this discussion with a story that has come to be called the Myth ofTheuth, in which he describes how the god Theuth, having invented the art of writing,recommends it to the Pharaoh Thamus as a tool for educating the people of Egypt. ButThamus spurns his gift because he believes that it would actually impede the educationof his people: you will make them seem to know much, he says, while for the mostpart they know nothing (Phaedrus, 275ab). Cryptically, he suggests that writing onlyhas a role in reminding, and never in helping people to remember. After the con-clusion of the myth Socrates expands on this remark. The problem with writing, hetells us, is that it speaks to all different kinds of people indiscriminately, regardless oftheir level of understanding, but when a reader asks something of it, it remains silent(275de). Even here Socrates discussion remains somewhat esoteric, but his criticismseems to amount to the following: the written work is insensitive to whether what ithas to say is lost on its readers, who may be confused about a key term, be unable tofollow every step of the argument, or perhaps be confused about the basic premisesof the work. However, readers are not able to elicit any extra information from a writtenwork in order to help them overcome these problems should they need it. But Socratesmain concern is that readers do not often appreciate that they may have missed thesubtleties of a written work and so, having read a piece, they may come to believethat they are now knowledgeable in the subject matter of the work, even though theymay find themselves incapable of holding their new beliefs in the face of even themost basic questioning. The problem here is that, believing themselves wise, suchpeople will feel no desire to inquire into these matters any more because, as we learnin the Symposium, it is only those who appreciate that they are at an intermediarypoint between ignorance and wisdom who desire to develop their understanding

32 I will refer to both of these activities together as writing, as speeches will be relevant to ourpresent discussion only in so far as they are written down and are therefore accessible to futuregenerations.

33 Interestingly, Socrates claims in the Phaedrus that, through speeches and writing, people are ableto attain immortality (258c), though whether this is a direct allusion to his discussion of immortality inthe Symposium is difficult to tell. Certainly the kind of immortality that could be yielded from oratorywould be far more akin to that raised in the Symposium than the one for which Socrates offers a proofat the beginning of his second speech on eros (245ce).

34 Although questions of the truth and organic structure of a logos the topics of the first two partsof Socrates discussion of writing here may well be relevant to its ability to inspire others to be vir-tuous, examination of these matters is beyond the scope of this paper, and must be left for anothertime.

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(Symp. 204a). From this Socrates concludes that no one ought to write down anythingwith the hope of pouring knowledge into another person, as one fills a jug with wine.35

Writing, he argues, is most useful for reminding people of what they already know, butwhich may not be presently to mind (Phdr. 276d); in itself it is not a reliable tool foreducation. Socrates awards this honour to conversation and specifically dialectic36 because it overcomes each of the problems of writing that I listed above and can con-sistently instil in others a desire for knowledge. Unlike a writer, a dialectician, becauseshe is present to her audience, can be sensitive to her audiences level of understandingand so can adjust the tenor and content of the discussion appropriately. And further-more, whenever people become lost and express a desire for clarification, she can pro-vide them with any extra information they may need. But most important for Socrates isthe fact that a dialectician is able to test her partners understanding of a particular topicthrough question and answer, and reduce them to aporia, a state from which they will beable to appreciate the limits of their knowledge, and from there (hopefully) feel a desireto develop their understanding. Knowledge for Socrates only comes to those whoactively seek it out for themselves, so it is important that any logos produce a seedfrom which more discourse grows in the characters of others (Phdr. 276e277a).

Writing, then, appears only to be of limited use to philosophers in their quest forimmortality, as their goal is not simply to provide reminders for those who alreadyhave knowledge of virtue (although this is an important role), but to impart knowledgeto those who are ignorant, so as to inspire as large a group as possible to produce virtue.However, if education only takes place in dialectic, then it seems that the only logoi thatphilosophers ought to produce are conversations with others. But philosophers, then,would only have a limited window of opportunity to impart knowledge to others beforedeath silences them forever. However, as we learnt above, even though death ends onesability to act in the world, it does not follow that one will no longer be able to affect theworld. So although philosophers may not be able to converse with others post mortem,they may be able to inspire these people to engage in dialectic with each other on thetopic of virtue long after they have died. In the Symposium we are given explicit evi-dence of Socrates himself doing just this in the speech of Alcibiades, who claims thatSocrates attempted to instil in him the Bacchic frenzy of philosophy (Symp. 218b).Indeed, the majority of Platos dialogues detail Socrates attempts at implanting in awhole variety of people a desire to develop their knowledge of a number of topics

35 In the Symposium Socrates seems to attribute this position to pederastic models of education, inwhich a lover is expected to impart knowledge to a passive and receptive beloved (see L. Brisson,Agathon, Pausanias, and Diotima in Platos Symposium: Paiderastia and Philosophia, in J.Lesher et al. [edd.], Platos Symposium: Issues in Interpretation and Reception [Cambridge, MA,2006], 22951) an institutional arrangement Socrates attempts to transform into one which ismore equal and dyadic in his palinode in the Phaedrus. In other dialogues Socrates also levels thiscriticism at the sophists, who attempt to use speeches as a way to communicate rigorous, systematicand coherent pieces of thought to their audience. In the dialogues the figure who engages in thisactivity most avowedly is Protagoras (as dramatized in the Protagoras), who believes that merelyhearing one of his speeches is sufficient to make people wise in the subjects of which he talks(318ab) a belief shared by many of his supporters (310d). Another sophist who seems to holdsuch a position regarding education is Thrasymachus who, in Republic Book 1, after several abortiveattempts to convince Socrates of the view that justice is the good of the stronger, offers to take [the]argument and pour it into [Socrates] very soul ( , Resp. 345b).

36 I am using the term dialectic here, not in the technical sense Socrates advances in the Phaedrusand more completely in the Sophist and the Statesman, but merely as an intercourse between differentparties with the intention of testing each others views and yielding a more complete account of a cer-tain topic.

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such as courage, piety, and even knowledge itself. By planting this seed in others, phi-losophers can ensure that such people will desire to learn about these matters for them-selves and seek out conversation with others regarding matters of virtue. Here they canthen test the limits of their knowledge and work to overcome any deficiencies that theyuncover. And, having developed their knowledge of virtue, such people will then workto produce virtue for themselves.37

But here philosophers appear to be at a significant disadvantage with respect toachieving human immortality when compared to lovers of bodies and honour. Wherefamily names and fame are capable of preserving the memory of virtue in the mindsof a large number of individuals, the philosopher seems only able to influence a selectnumber of friends and associates, as she needs to be immediately present to plant theseeds of philosophy in others. But although we have seen that dialectic is superior towriting as a form of education, could writing aid the philosopher here, at least insome respect? If so, then perhaps it would be a useful tool for philosophers in theirquest for immortality, as it does have the ability to reach a wider audience than any con-versation. Keeping in mind Socrates criticisms in the Phaedrus, for writing to have aplace in education it must: i) not attempt to pour knowledge into its readers and ii) itmust point the reader towards dialectic, as only there can people truly develop theirknowledge. Such a work, then, would aim at providing only an introduction to a particu-lar topic and, moreover, it must also signal to its readers that it is of limited use. That is,it must instil in its readers a desire for knowledge but undermine its own authority as asource of knowledge and point them towards the only method by which they can effec-tively develop their understanding dialectic.38

Unfortunately, a detailed discussion of the role of writing in philosophical educationin Plato would require far more time than could possibly be spent here, but I do wish toconclude this paper with the suggestion that Platos dialogues themselves could be readas performing just this function. Each dialogue dramatizes discussions, usually betweenSocrates and other parties, in which the interlocutors either attempt to discover thenature of a particular virtue or consider topics that bear importantly on the developmentof a virtuous character such as the nature of knowledge or the soul, or the problems ofpoetry and rhetoric. But nowhere in the dialogues are we ever given a comprehensiveaccount of these topics, although we are constantly reminded of the importance of hav-ing knowledge of these issues if we wish to produce the truly good life for ourselves,and that real knowledge of these issues can only come through philosophical discus-sions. But so effective have these dialogues been at this task that they have inspiredthousands of individuals throughout history to become philosophers and to explorethese topics in greater detail. And this is true no more so than today, two millennia

37 It should be noted that this procedure did not always yield the desired results for Socrates.Although Socrates may have been successful at planting the seed of philosophy in figures such asCrito, Adeimantus and Apollodorus, others, such as Callicles in the Gorgias and Thrasymachusin the Republic, rejected Socrates efforts out of hand. But perhaps the most tragic, for Socrates,are those in whom the seed was sown but never came to flower, such as Critias and Charmides(from the Charmides), who went on to be members of the Thirty Tyrants, and most prominentlyAlcibiades, Socrates lover who, despite Socrates tireless efforts, rejected philosophy for the pursuitof glory a path that ultimately led to his ignoble demise.

38 In the past two decades much work has been done on Platonic myth and some commentatorshave suggested that myths fulfil just this function. See especially J. Smith, Platos use of myth inthe education of philosophic man, Phoenix 40.1 (1986), 2034 and E. Benitez, Philosophy, mythand Platos two-worlds view, The European Legacy 12.2 (2007), 22542.

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after Platos death. One could therefore argue that Plato, more than almost any otherfigure in the history of Western thought, has a right to claim that he has achieved thehuman immortality Socrates describes in the Symposium.

The University of Sydney ANTHONY HOOPER

anthony.hooper@sydney.edu.au

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mailto:anthony.hooper@sydney.edu.au