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The Military's Still in Charge

Why reform in Burma is only skin-deep.

BY BERTIL LINTNER | JULY 9, 2013

Since ex-general Thein Sein assumed the presidency in March 2011, foreign observers have

generally appeared optimistic that Burma is on its way toward some kind of liberal

democracy. The only snag seems to be the ongoing conflict with ethnic rebels in Kachin,

Burma's northernmost state, which has been explained as local commanders acting with "an

unusual degree of autonomy." Either that, or people question the president's ability to control

the military during the country's democratic reform. Some foreign analysts have argued,

however, that the outside world needs to support Thein Sein's "reformist" government against

so-called "military hardliners."

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According to this narrative, neither Thein Sein nor the military are held responsible for the

 brutal suppression of the Kachins, which has not come to an end despite a tentative peaceagreement reached in the state capital of Myitkyina in May 2013. In fact, the two sides only

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agreed to undertake efforts to achieve "de-escalation and cessation of hostilities" and "to hold

a political dialogue." No firm commitments were made concerning when and where such

talks would take place.

This decades-long civil war reached its height in January 2013 with the inclusion of massive

artillery barrages supported by airstrikes from helicopter gunships and fighter jets. It defieslogic that such a large-scale offensive could have been launched by some local commanders

or, as the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies claims, that "a

minority of the military" is acting "as a spoiler" to the democratization process. This

assessment reflects a lack of understanding of the Burmese military's command structure as

well as of its relationship with Thein Sein's government.

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It is too often forgotten that Thein Sein came to power through the State Peace and

Development Council (SPDC), the name for Burma's military regime. The SPDC seized

 power in 1988 and was officially dissolved in March 2011 when Thein Sein assumed the

 presidency. Thein Sein was heavily involved with the junta government. His positions

included general of the Burmese army, first secretary of SPDC, and later prime minister (a

 position he held up until he became president).

At no stage in his career did Thein Sein display any political independence or initiative. He

was a loyal soldier, hand-picked by then-SPDC chairman and prime minister, Than Shwe. 

Thein Sein always said and did what he was told.

For instance, in the summer of 2010, while serving as prime minister, Thein Sein received a

delegation from North Korea. He was quoted praising the military advancements of the

Korean people under Kim Jong Il and advocating the strengthening of the countries'

friendship. In those days, Burma was not shy to admit its friendly relations with North Korea.

The cooperation continues today, only in secret. A Burmese businessman who recently met

Thein Sein in private described him as "indecisive, just repeating what's been said in official

announcements, saying what he has been told to say."

So, who is telling Thein Sein what to say? According to sources familiar with high-level

Burmese military thinking, Thein Sein was selected because he had "no ambitions" and

would not pose a threat to Than Shwe, who slipped from public view into supposed

retirement.

In June 2010, Than Shwe picked his trusted colleague, Min Aung Hlaing, to become head of 

the armed forces. Min Aung Hlaing was another soldier who could be trusted not to turnagainst his former mentor; he, too, is not known for being an independent thinker.

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Both President Thein Sein and Senior General Min Aung Hlaing owe their positions to Than

Shwe. Than Shwe remains a powerful player behind the scenes and, according to military

insiders, still has the final say in matters concerning security.

Burma's power structure with the military at its apex has not changed. It would therefore be

incorrect to talk about a transitioning political system. It is more important now than ever tounderstand what is really happening in Burma and how change may or may not come about.

The country's constitution was drafted by a military-appointed body and was adopted after a

rigged referendum in May 2008. The referendum was held when Cyclone Nargis hit the

country, which caused widespread destruction in parts of the country near the coast.

Officially, 92.48 percent of eligible voters voted in favor of the new constitution, which came

into effect after a general election in November 2010.

That election was also blatantly rigged and thoroughly fraudulent. Even the regime's own

announcements demonstrated this. State-run media had to correct previous reports that stated

that 102.09 percent of Pegu Division had turned out to vote. The correct figure, theannouncement said, should have been 99.57 percent. Likewise, in a township in western

Rakhine State, 104.28 percent of the electorate were said to have voted; that number was later 

adjusted to 71.74 percent.

The  Irrawaddy (a Thailand-based newsmagazine run by Burmese exiles) quoted a Rangoon

 businessman as saying that the military's Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP)

"won in two constituencies where the elections had been cancelled in Kachin State -- the

USDP not only won across the country, but also in areas where the elections were not held."

A well-placed source in Rangoon said that he and many of his friends had voted for one of 

the pro-democracy parties that took part in the election. Its win in their township was

confirmed when the local votes were counted. But then, a number of "advance votes" were

dumped into the constituency, reversing the initial result. Similar cases of fraud were reported

all over the country.

The USDP is the successor to the Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA),

which was set up by the junta government in September 1993. Among USDA membership

were Than Shwe and Thein Sein. The association, which claimed to have 24 million

members, became a party in March 2010, with Thein Sein as its leader, in order to take part

in the November 2010 elections. It secured a solid majority in both houses of the new

 bicameral parliament. Even of the seats it did not win, a quarter of all seats in both houses are

directly appointed by the military and selected from serving military officers.

With a new constitution in place, and a parliament it could control, Burma's ruling military

elite felt that it could embark on a reform program to enhance its severely tarnished

international reputation. It hoped to improve relations with the West in order to

counterbalance its heavy dependence on China, which, according to internal documents from

the Burmese army made available to me, was causing "a national crisis." Thus opposition

leader Aung San Suu Kyi was released from house arrest shortly after the election, hundreds

of political prisoners were set free, and the media was allowed to operate amazingly freely

after decades of rigid censorship.

In April 2012, Aung San Suu Kyi's party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), took  part in a by-election to fill seats left vacant after USDP delegates were appointed ministers

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and deputy ministers. According to the new constitution, cabinet members cannot both sit in

the Parliament and be members of a political party. The NLD won 43 of the 44 seats the party

contested. Aung San Suu Kyi became a member of parliament -- but her party is in control of 

only 7 percent of all seats.

Critics say her performance, and that of the NLD, has been entirely disappointing. They havenot acted as an opposition, questioning official policies and presenting alternatives. Instead,

they have trudged after the government, asked a few questions but offered nothing new. Khun

Htun Oo, a prominent leader of the Shan people, one of Burma's many ethnic minorities, said 

that Aung San Suu Kyi had been "neutralized" by the government, and as such, "can no

longer speak for the people." Her  silence over the war in Kachin has caused not only criticism

 but also widespread condemnation, especially from Kachin community groups who feel

 betrayed. 

To the satisfaction of Burma's rulers, Aung San Suu Kyi has morphed from a once fiery

opposition leader into an avid supporter of their new order. In her most recent praise for the

military, speaking at the East-West Center in Honolulu in January 2013, Aung San Suu Kyisaid: "I've often been criticized for saying that I'm fond of the Burmese Army, but I can't help

it, it's the truth."

Such statements have been widely perceived as insensitive and have cost Aung San Suu Kyi

support among Burma's ethnic minorities, many of which looked to her for inspiration during

the darkest days of military rule. As Aung San Suu Kyi spoke in Hawaii, thousands of 

Kachins, mostly women and children, were hunkered down in newly dug bunkers near the

Kachin rebel headquarters while the army and air force ramped up their indiscriminate

 bombardment.

There is actually little Aung San Suu Kyi can do about the dominant role of the military. The

first chapter of the 2008 constitution states that the "Defense Services" shall "be able to

 participate in the national political leadership role of the State." And it does so by holding 25

 percent of all seats in the national parliament. The charter lays out complicated rules for 

constitutional amendments, which effectively give the military veto power over any proposed

changes to the present power structure. Minor constitutional changes may be considered by if 

20 percent of MPs submit a bill. However, a tangle of 104 clauses mean that major charter 

changes cannot be made without the prior approval of more than 75 percent of all MPs, after 

which a nationwide referendum must be held where more than half of all eligible voters cast

 ballots.

This complicated procedure, coupled with Burma's record of holding bogus referendums (the

first, held for the 1974 constitution was as lacking in credibility as the one held in 2008)

make it virtually impossible to change those clauses. This legally perpetuates the military's

indirect hold on power.

As for the MPs-to-be, constitutional safeguards are already in place to make sure they don't

cause any trouble after they are elected. Article 396 of the new constitution ensures that the

Union Election Commission (which is indirectly controlled by the military through personal

contacts and) can be dismissed for "misbehavior." And, if the "democratic" situation gets

really out of hand, Article 413 gives the president the right, "if necessary," to hand over 

executive as well as judicial powers to the commander-in-chief of the armed forces.

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It gets even trickier at the local level: Burma's seven regions and seven states all have their 

own assemblies. There, one-third of all elected seats are reserved for the military, and local

assemblies are subjected to perhaps the most curious of clauses in the 2008 Constitution.

 Number 183 reads: "The resolutions and proceedings of the Region and State Hluttaw

[assemblies] shall not be annulled, notwithstanding the acts of some person who was not

entitled to do so sat or voted or took part in the proceedings are later discovered."

In simple language, a group of imposters could enter the local assemblies, sit there, and vote,

and nothing can be done about it, even if they were not elected. The purpose of the clause is

to prevent local assemblies from passing decisions and regulations that would give them

more rights and jeopardize the centralized structure of the state. Through the clause, these

efforts can be thwarted by blocking elected local assemblypersons from voting and instead

sending in "some persons" to vote in their place.

A Burmese lawyer argues that the new setup is based on Than Shwe's calculations. Previous

Burmese dictators made the mistake of handing off power and not maintaining a proper 

legacy. When he stepped aside in 2010, Than Shwe took a different path in order to protecthimself and his children and grandchildren. He created four centers of power: the military,

the central government, the de facto ruling USDP, and parliament. Parliament is the only

center of power in which some token opposition is tolerated.

Of those four power centers, the military remains the most important. Apart from its special

 powers, it also controls the National Defense and Security Council, which acts above the

government. Thein Sein may be its chairman, but that is irrelevant. Five of its 11 members

are serving military officers and another five are former officers. Only one is an actual

civilian. The military is not under Thein Sein's command, but under that of Min Aung Hlaing

who, in turn, reports to his mentor Than Shwe.

What Burma has today is a military government and power structure with a quasi-civilian

facade. Opposition parties and freedom of expression are tolerated within the confines of 

what the military can manage and control. It is highly unlikely that the military would allow

the NLD to assume power even if it wins in the 2015 elections. It may, however, be able to

appoint some ministers in the government. But, according to the constitution, these ministers

and deputy ministers would have to resign from their parliamentary posts and even their 

respective political parties once assuming cabinet posts. The NLD will thus be "tamed" and

 become part of the established order.

The pervasive reach of the military doesn't just extend to the formal branches of power. It hasits hands in Burma's supposedly "freed" society as well. The media may be freer than ever 

 before under military rule, but more sophisticated methods have replaced old censorship

rules. In January and February, the website of the Eleven Media group, the country's largest

 privately-owned publishing company, was hacked and pictures and other material were

deleted. Eleven Media was the first domestic news group to report objectively about the war 

in Kachin State. One of its journalists, who traveled to the war zone in Kachin, was kept

under visible surveillance, a method frequently used to intimidate people. The email accounts

of several journalists, both Burmese and foreign, have been hacked  by the military. Burma's

dreaded secret police, known among the public as "M.I." or "Military Intelligence," is alive

and well. And Burma's most draconian press law, the 1962 Printers and Publishers

Registration Law, which was introduced after the first military takeover, has not beenrevoked.

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Though the 1962 law is not currently being enforced, in May 2013 the Committee to Protect

Journalists published a report that states that the media environment in the country remains

repressive despite recent liberalizations. In June, Time magazine was  banned for carrying a

story about a controversial Buddhist monk, U Wirathu, whose sermons allegedly encouraged

mobs to attack the country's Muslim minority.

At the same time, the military has retained its powerful position in the economy and

economic development through its two vast holding companies, the Union of Myanmar 

Economic Holdings (UMEH) and the Myanmar Economic Corporation (MEC). UMEH,

founded in 1990, is run by the Burmese military. The Directorate of Defense Procurement,

the body that oversees Burma's purchases of military equipment from abroad, owns 40

 percent of the shares while active and veteran military personnel control the remaining 60

 percent. According to a Reuters special report, UMEH "enjoys unrivaled access to import

 permits and monopolies." And according to Sean Turnell, an expert on the Burmese economy

at Australia's Macquaire University, "for years, ex-dictator Than Shwe controlled the profits."

MEC was founded in 1997 and is a far more secretive organization operated under the

Directorate of Defense Procurement with interests in heavy industries and IT ventures.

While this new system suits Than Shwe and his immediate underlings, it may not work in the

long run, and it is in this context that future conflicts could emerge. The man to watch is ex-

General Thura Shwe Mann, number three in the former SPDC and now parliamentary

speaker. He has reportedly forged an informal alliance with Aung San Suu Kyi against Thein

Sein, but that may be a temporary arrangement as sources who are familiar with the process

say that he will dump her when she is no longer needed to boost his popularity. On the other 

hand, military insiders assert that Shwe Mann is not popular with the regional commanders.

He is seen as "too ambitious" and could pose a threat to the established order.

Shwe Mann may or may not succeed, but there will be more conflicts and power struggles

within the ruling military elite. It is there -- and not in the parliament or even the government

-- that the future of Burma lies. Than Shwe has just turned 80 and is reportedly not in good

health. It remains to be seen if the power structure he has created will survive him. Optimists

argue that the passing of Than Shwe could herald in a new, even more open era in which the

military may even fade into the background. Skeptics, however, remember that foreign

observers and Burmese alike used to say the same thing about the old strongman Ne Win --

and that the military has managed to remain in power in one shape or another. The only thing

that is clear is that despite all the hype, Burma's "reform program" is only skin-deep and

designed to preserve the military's grip on power, not undermine it.