the modification of the theory of forms in plato’s sophist

The Modification of theTheory of Formsin Plato’s Sophist

Simon P. Oswitch

Oswitch, Sophist Essay, of 10

I.

Central to most discussions of Plato's epistemological-metaphysical views is the much celebrated theory of Forms. Traditionally, the Forms are understood as eternal,aspatial entities which are solely known from (1) the doctrine of recollection and (2) the employment of dialectical reason. Because they are eternal and aspatial, the Forms are regarded as ontologically superior to the temporal, spatial sensibles which are said to relate to and/or participate1 in them. The way that humans are able to have knowledge of particulars is via a recollection of the Form of that particular as well as the employmentof the dialectical method of inquiry which brings forth this innate knowledge; the soul, Plato believes, is itself eternal and in a previous life observed all of the Forms. Thus, whilst embodied in the temporal guise which characterizes humans, the soul, with the aid of the dialectical method, is regarded as the agent responsible for any knowing; any and all claims for knowledge, Plato believes, assume this relationship of soul-recollection-dialectical method-Form.

A classic depiction of the theory of Forms occurs in the sixth book of the dialogue Republic. Within this book, Socrates discusses the supreme concept of The Good and how it relates to the Forms. The famous “Divided Line” is offered as an explanation of how knowledge is deemed possible; also, the noted analogy of the sun is proposed as an aid in the understanding of The Good.

What ultimately emerges from Republic VI is a unified metaphysical-epistemological structure which explains how knowledge is possible. The cave myth in the seventh bookof the Republic underscores the correctness of this perspective; the philosopher escapes the binds of the physical world via an ascent to the world of the mind—i.e., via the recollection of the Forms which allow for knowledge.

However, this view of the Forms is not without problem. A key objection that couldbe (and historically speaking has been raised) is the question of how a particular, which is characterized as mutable and spatial, comes to be related to or participate in that which is regarded as immutable, aspatial, and separate. Similarly, Aristotle raised such questions

1 Though I’m not primarily concerned with, specifically, the participatory relationship discussed in Phaedo100c (“… whatever else is beautiful apart from absolute beauty is beautiful because it partakes (my emphasis) of that absolute beauty”), I mention it because it seems to be a very similar characterization of the Form/particular relationship as present in the Republic. Though the terminology of Republic VI and Phaedo 100c—in regard to this relationship—is different (“positing of a single unity”; to “partake”), they both, I feel, lead to the question of how a particular participates in a Form or how we are to understand the relationship between a “single idea” and its representation of its many particular instances

Similarly, the doctrine of recollection is present in Phaedo 73-76 but not in the Republic. However, it seems that the dialectical method assumes that there is, in fact, this innate knowledge which it alone has the power to bring forth.

I raise this/these issues because I wish to focus on Republic VI and not the Phaedo. Though the doctrines in each dialogue are not identical they are, I feel, very similar. However, their differences—if only terminological—need to be mentioned so as to prevent any possible confusion on the part of the reader.


as to how a Form can cause a particular to move; how sensibles are “patterned” afterForms; how sensibles “come from ideas,” etc. Though I believe that these are legitimate questions, I feel that Plato addressees the problem in sections 243-260a of his dialogue Sophist. This work, I feel, does away with much of the radical separation of particulars/Forms evident in Republic VI. We learn, in the Sophist, of five additional Forms, some of which participate in each other. These five Forms—i.e., existence, rest, motion, sameness, and difference—are evidence, I would argue, of a major modification on Plato’s part in regard to his earlier epistemological- metaphysical theories.

Thus, this essay seeks to explore the modifications which have been made in theSophist with respect to the views of Republic VI; ultimately, what I wish to demonstrateis that (1) Plato was cognizant of the aforementioned problems associated with the Forms of the Republic and (2) the Sophist evidences a reworking of the theory of Forms so as to offer a more coherent and intelligible epistemological-metaphysical structure. Thus, it can be said, I subscribe to a developmental position in regard to Plato’s views upon this matter; the perspective of the Sophist lends great support, I feel, to a developmentalthesis.

II.

In the latter half of Republic VI, Socrates discusses the aforementioned concepts of The Good and The Forms. With respect to assigning a Form to each sensible plurality, he states “… we speak of a self-beautiful and of a good that is only and merely good, and soin the case of all things that we then posited as many, we turn about and posit each as a single idea is… assuming it to be a unity and call it that which each really is.”2 Thus, for all sensibles, we come to understand them via the particular Form to which they are related.

From here, Socrates discusses the metaphor of sunlight which is necessary for the act of physical perception; just as we depend upon this sort of light for visual observation, likewise, the mind depends upon the idea of The Good for comprehension of the metaphysical world of the Forms. As Socrates states, The Good “gives… truth to the objects of knowledge and the power of knowing to the knower… (The) objects of knowledge not only receive from the presence of the good their being known, but theirvery existence and essence is derived… from it.”3

From here, the famous Divided Line is brought to the forefront.

Socrates speculates upon “two entities… one of then sovereign over the intelligibleorder and region and the other over the world of the eyeball….”4

2 Plato, The Republic, with an English translation by Paul Shorey. (Loeb’s Classical Library, 1930). Shorey's translation was found in The Collected Dialogues of Plato, ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (Princeton University Press, 1961), p. 742.3 Ibid., p. 744.4 Ibid., p. 745.


The “intelligible and the visible regions” are then divided into “two unequal sectionsfrom whence each section is itself divided again. Occupying the area of the first section are such images as “shadows and reflections” while the second section is inhabited by physical objects such as trees, animals, and manufactured items. These two sectionsconstitute the visible or perceptible realm; the third and fourth sections represent the intelligible world of mind. Because the inhabitants of one and two are subject tomutability one cannot have knowledge of them; rather, we can only opine as to their reality because of their different manifestations at different spaces and/or times.

In section three we are confronted with mathematical thought—specifically, geometry. Geometric figures can be considered transcendent in the sense that their measured dimensions remain the same at all times for all persons; Socrates speaks of their “obvious(ness)” which is open to all persons.

However, geometric figures are to Forms—i.e., the fourth section of the Line—what shadows and reflections are to physical objects. Just as a shadow presupposes that from which it is derived, Socrates believes that the transcendent nature of geometrypresupposes the transcendent in-and-of-itself—the Forms.

Thus, the final section of the line is that which:

… reason itself lays hold of by the power of dialectic, treating its assumptions not as absolute beginnings but literally hypotheses,… (which) enable it to arise to that which requires no assumption and is the starting point of all, and after attaining to that again taking hold of the first dependencies from it, so to proceed downward to the conclusion,making no use whatever of any object of, sense but only of pure ideas moving on through ideas to ideas and ending with ideas.5

The following concrete example may serve to illustrate what is meant by the divided line.

If I perceive the shadow of a dog I can assume that there is either a physical creature present or a manufactured replica of the animal. What allows for this act of perception is the physical sun itself; thus, the shadow and the creature, respectively, occupy the first two sections of the line. Because I understand that the creature is a dog—i.e., that it meets certain mathematical/geometric criteria such as height, weight, shape, etc., common to dogs—I can say that I an employing that which constitutes the third section of the line: mathematical understanding. Such criteria, Socrates believes, are obtained by the “understanding and not (by the senses)….” From here, I can ask the question of how it is possible to have knowledge of this temporal, mutable, spatial creature. The answer comes from the fourth part of the line—i.e., from the dialectical method of inquiry which will allow me to recall the aspatial, eternal Form of “dog-ness” itself. That is, if I merely investigate individual sensible dogs, I will constantly be confronted with numerous mutable creatures; because of this mutability I cannot claim to have knowledge of the animal because the dog at T1 is different from the dog at T2—ad infinitum. However, if I employ the dialectical method I can ask questions such as the one above; what unites 5 Ibid., p. 746.


these different and distinct sense perceptions? What is common to these distinct perceptions? The Idea or Form of dog-ness itself which my/the soul has recollected. Because the Form of dog-ness is, by definition, constant I can say that I have obtained orarrived at knowledge of this particular creature. Because I can have knowledge, that which allows for this knowledge is ontologically superior to the mutable particular which participates in the Form.

Thus, Plato’s epistemological-metaphysical structure can said to be complete and/or unified. At this point in his writings, knowledge is only possible with respect to such theories as present in Republic VI.

At this juncture, though, the aforementioned objections to such theories appear evident: in what sense can that deemed spatial and mutable be related to (or participate in that) which is regarded as a spatial and eternal? How does a particular participate in a universal? One of Aristotle’s criticisms is, I believe, also germane: how does the Form bring about motion in the particular? These are all legitimate questions which Plato doesn’t address until, I feel, the Sophist. In that dialogue the needed modifications are made which render the theory of Forms understandable in a way not evident in dialogues such as Republic VI.

III.

Ostensibly, the Sophist is concerned with a/the search for an objective definition for these deceptive rhetoricians—i.e., sophists. The Eleatic Stranger and his interlocutor Theatetus, determine, after much inquiry, that sophists deal in deception and imitation: the sophist merely mimics the true philosopher and thus cannot claim to have true knowledge.

This characterization leads the pair to posit the seemingly paradoxical view thatimitation (that which in not real) has, in fact, reality. An imitation—say, a statue of Socrates—most certainly exists but is not Socrates himself; thus, the Stranger concludes that this instance of the not-real is real. This leads him to surmise that Parmenides’ prohibition about the impossibility of proving the not-real can no longer be regarded as valid.

From here, certain metaphysical suppositions posited by other pre-Socratic philosophers (e.g., Empedocles, Xenophanes, etc.) are critiqued for their ambiguity and lack of clarity; because of the problematic nature of these claims, the Stranger feels that he must supply a new definition of reality.

The search commences with a critique of positions held by those who participate in the famous “battle of gods and giants”—i.e., respectively, the ‘friends of the forms’ and the raw materialists. The position of the materials is quickly rejected when the Stranger asserts that these thinkers would agree that “mortal living creatures, are animated by a


soul.”6 Thus, if they admit that even a “small part of reality is bodiless” the obvious inconsistency surfaces: reality is physical and non-physical.

The Stranger’s criticism of the friends of the forms is, I feel, critically important in that it (1) evidences Plato’s realization that his previous theory of Forms is problematic and (2) leads to the modification(s) of this theory which renders it, I believe, much more intelligible.

Basically, the criticism runs as follows:

(1) to know something is to act upon that thing,(2) when something is acted upon, it changes,(3) when we have knowledge of, say, a sensible, we have knowledge because of our

recollection of the Form of the thing.(4) by knowing a thing’s Form, we have acted upon the Form,(5) thus, the Form has been itself changed by the very act of knowing.

This argument leads the Stranger to conclude that the Forms are not “solemn…,aloof” and “devoid of intelligence”; rather, they must embody “change, life, (and) soul”because it is nonsensical to claim that something can embody intelligence (i.e., the Formsare regarded as intelligence itself) but not life. This leads the Stranger to surmise that:

(1) if everything is unchangeable, no intelligence can exist.(2) if everything is constantly changing, we can’t have knowledge because the thing

does not remain in a constant state long enough for us to assign a predicate to it(this, as seen, was the basic problem with opinable sensibles in the first two sections of the line in Republic VI).

The Stranger concludes, paradoxically, that reality is to be understood as that which is changing and that which is changeless.

However, this position is “baffling” and is said to leave the interlocutors “wholly

6 Of course, it may be argued that a philosopher subscribing to a brute materialist position could in fact, reject a supposition on that something non-perceptible effects—i.e., animates—that regarded as perceptible. On what grounds should/would a materialist accept this hypothesis? The materialist could rightly reply that if soul is non-perceptible there are no grounds on which to verify or prove the existence of this entity. Thus, in this instance, Plato appears to be begging the question or erecting a straw man: he has the materialist accept a position that they would have legitimate grounds for rejecting.

However, I think that this passage can be interpreted in a somewhat different manner.What I feel Plato is saying is that much of reality is animated or affected by non-perceptible

phenomena. For example, when we command one of our skeletal muscles to move it does so, but we are unable to observe any form of energy (or transference of energy) which is the agent responsible for such action? In what sense can we say that we perceive energy in-and-of-itself or even the transference of this energy? Similarly, how can we observe the will or will-power? And what of power itself? To employ empiricist terminology, what sense impression can we have of this phenomena/phenomenon? Thus, it seems reasonable to conclude that there are things non-perceptible which effect—i.e., animate—things perceptible.


in the dark.”

Because the definition of reality as change/changeless is contradictory, the Strangerreasons that though both phenomena are real they cannot be reality itself. Thatphenomenon must be a “third thing over and above the two”—neither in motion nor inrest; however, this alternative is inconsistent with the motion/rest argument becausereality was said to be comprised solely of these phenomena.

The way out of this apparent contradiction forms the basis for the modified theory of Forms which, I believe, offers great support for the developmental interpretation of Plato's metaphysics.

What we learn in Sophist 252-253 is that there must be a “blending together” of such forms as motion, rest, and existence if we are to comprehend what is meant by reality. Since certain Forms such as rest and motion cannot be combined due to their inherent opposite predication, we are in need, the Stranger argues, of a “science” which is able to determine what will blend and what will not. Such a science is none other than “dialectic” and the person able to perform such combining and/or dividing is the “rightful lover of wisdom”—the philosopher.

From here, the Stranger proceeds to enumerate the most “important” Forms and discuss their natures; similarly, their appropriateness in regard to combining and non-combining is mentioned.

Basically, there are five new Forms:

(1) existence(2) rest(3) motion(4) sameness(5) difference

Two and three are said to blend with one but not with one another; one can blend with both two and three because both exist. Similarly, one, two, and three are different from each other but the same as themselves; thus, respectively, one, two, and three blend with four and five.

To realize the significance of these modifications of the traditional conception ofForms (with respect to the theories of Republic VI) my previous example may be useful.

As seen, we arrived at knowledge of an individual dog via recollecting the Form of dog-ness. However, this leads to the question of how the particular came to participate or be related to the universal.

With respect to the Sophist, the relationship of Form-particular would be as follows:


(1) I have knowledge of this creature via recollecting its Form; the dialectical method is the instrument employed in bringing forth this innate knowledge.

(2) the Form of dog-ness is the same as itself and thus participates in the Form ofsameness.

(3) the Form of dog-ness is different from other Forms and thus participates in theForm of difference.

(4) the Form of dog-ness exists in as much as I can claim to have knowledge of the creature; thus, the Form of dog-ness participates in the Form of existence.

(5) the Form of dog-ness is in rest in as much as I can have knowledge of this particular creature; that is, the Form must remain in a constant state so that it can allow for and embody objective predication. Thus the Form of dog-ness is said to participate in the Form of rest.

With respect to Republic VI, one, two, and three seem to be implicitly assume the Form of dog-ness is the same as itself, different from all other Forms, and necessarily exists. The difference is that there isn’t any mention of Forms partaking in other on Forms; however, the general notion does seem to be evident.

The major difference between the Sophist and the Republic is in regard to the Form of motion. As we learned in the Republic, motion is immediately relegated to theontologically inferior realm of conjecture/belief—i.e., opinion. Motion can have no part in what is deemed real and knowable; knowledge must be aspatial, atemporal—in brief, eternal. Its objectivity is explicitly argued for in that discussion.

And yet this tremendous polarity of eternal/temporal, universal/particular poses the obvious question as to how a particular can partake in or be related to a universal.

The Sophist, I feel, offers an explanation, a possible solution to this problem.

By including the Form of motion (as well as that of rest) it seems that we can come to understand this relationship though it necessarily affords a revised and different definition of reality. The world of becoming is granted significant ontological status in the Sophist; change and thus, temporality play a crucial role.

Basically, because the strict polarity of temporal/eternal in Republic VI has been done away with in the aforementioned Sophist passages, the question of, how a particular comes to participate in a universal is no longer a crucial question. The entire definition of reality has been modified so as to include temporality; thus the above mentioneddistinction between eternal/temporal loses much significance. Knowledge can be had of mutable things or beings simply because of the Form of motion to which all such temporal things are assigned.

As seen in the Republic passages not only was temporality excluded from true reality, but anyone holding such a position was caught in an absurdity— i.e., claiming to have knowledge of that which admits of opposite predication.


Thus, in the Sophist, Plato confronts us with a new overall metaphysical epistemological structure—a structure which takes into account the basic polarity problem of the Republic—and incorporates it via the new Form of motion. Though opposite Forms are present in the Sophist (i.e., rest/motion), the entire epistemologicalstructure is not derived or based upon them; as seen, rest and motion themselves participate in another Form—namely, existence.

Also, the idea of the dialectician who blends and divides according to kinds, underscores, I believe, the emphasis, in the Sophist, of a modified and unified structure of knowing.

The dialectician doesn’t just divide and subdivide ad infinitum (something that (l) thesophist does because he takes refuge in non-being—i.e., difference (see Sophist 260ff.)and (2) the friends of the forms who “separate everything from every other thing” are guilty of—thus striking philosophy a mortal blow (Sophist 260ab)), but rather he unites what is logically compatible.

In contrast to the cave myth, the philosopher of the Sophist doesn’t seek to escape temporality but, rather, attempts to understand and make knowable the world of “change, life and soul.” The dialectician blends and divides according to whatever are deemedcompatible and, as seen, one of these Forms is motion; thus he must by definition, be rooted firmly in the world, of becoming.

Becoming, in this dialogue, has a definite place in what is regarded as real; Plato, to be somewhat colloquial, has brought the theory of Forms down-to-earth in a way makes them more intelligible. If temporality is included in a definition of reality, the Form/particular problem is sidestepped because of this very inclusion. The Sophist offers a unified epistemological-metaphysical structure which is more difficult to find fault with than the view expressed in Republic VI.

Such, at least, is one way to interpret certain metaphysical ideas of Plato. I feel that the modifications presented in the Sophist are evidence of a developmental thesis with respect to the theory of Forms; on my view this is why Plato introduced the five new Forms. He realized the problematic nature of the Form/particular polarity (i.e., Sophist248-250) and thus altered the theory as he saw necessary.

On my reading the basic problem is resolved via a radically new definition of reality—a definition which takes into account certain fundamental assumptions of Republic VI (i.e., that there are, in fact, Forms) and modifies them in a way that allows for a more coherent and logical overall metaphysical structure,


Bibliography

The translations of the Republic and the Sophist were found in The Collected Dialogues of Plato, ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961.

Plato, Plato’s Theory of Knowledge: the Theatetus and the Sophist with a running commentary by Francis Macdonald Cornford. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1935; with a passage from the translation by Benjamin Jowett in The Dialogues of Plato, 3rd edn. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1892.

Plato, The Republic, with an English translation by Paul Shorey. Cambridge, Mass.; London: Loeb’s Classical Library, 1930.

the modification of the theory of forms in plato’s sophist

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