SHIP PRODUCTION COMMITTEEFACILITIES AND ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTSSURFACE PREPARATION AND COATINGSDESIGN/PRODUCTION INTEGRATIONHUMAN RESOURCE INNOVATIONMARINE INDUSTRY STANDARDSWELDINGINDUSTRIAL ENGINEERINGEDUCATION AND TRAINING

THE NATIONALSHIPBUILDINGRESEARCHPROGRAM

August 1987NSRP 0281

1987 Ship Production Symposium

Paper No. 31: A Study of theConstruction Planning and ManpowerSchedules for Building the Multi-Purpose Mobilization Ship, PD214...

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVYCARDEROCK DIVISION,NAVAL SURFACE WARFARE CENTER

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NSRP1987SHIP PRODUCTION

SYMPOSIUM

AUGUST 26-28, 1987HYATT REGENCY HOTEL

New Orleans, Louisiana

HOSTED By THE GULF SECTION OF THE

SOCIETY OF NAVAL ARCHITECTS AND MARINE ENGINEERS

and Marine Engineer ing ABSTRACT

This paper presents the results of astudy for building five PD-214 ships in ashipyard of The People’s Republic of China.The study was performed by the author in1987 at the Men jiang She.muldinglnstltute, The People’s Republic of China Acomparison of shipbuilding planning andresource expenditure estimates is made forbuildlng a series of identical ships in anadvanced shipyard in the United Statesand in The People’s Republic of China.

INTRODUCTION

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) isgenerally regarded as a future major forceamong the world’s shipbuilding nations.Starting about 1980 (known in China as thebeginning of the “Reform”), the countryplaced major emphasis on a plan to up-grade its shipbuilding industry to be one ofthe world’s leaders. Throughout thedecade of the eighties, the Chinese ship-building industry has shown growth aver-aging a compounded increase of about 13.7percent/year. [1]1 Importantly, an ex-panding portion of its output is beingplaced into the export market. [2] Thetentative plan, according to Hu Chuanzhi,Managing Director of China StateShipbuilding Corporation (CSSC), is to havean annual output in excess of one milliondeadweight tons by 1990 [3].Approximately one-third would be for theexport market.

This study is the presentation of theconstruction planning and manpowerschedules for building five PD214 generalmobilization ships at Hudong Shipyard,Shanghai. (Earlier studies developed theconstruction plans and manpower schedulesfor building five PD214 ships at a shipyard

lNumbers in brackets designate References atend of paper.

in Japan and at a shipyard in the U.S.A.All studies used the same designs andmade similar assumptions [4] [5].)

Hudong Shipyards, Shanghai, was select-ed as the shipyard for which the schedulesand estimates would be prepared. It is oneof the most advanced yards in the nation,and has been designated as a facilitywhere major priority would be given tothe implementation of advanced technolo-gy.

In January, 1987, the Chinese govern-ment announced new rules to “ ....promotethe system of factory directors assumingfull responsibility for production and man-agement...’’.[6] The new system makes thedirector fully responsible for productionand management of the enterprise, withthe political organization (which exists inall Chinese enterprises) being assigned therole of advisor. Now, the enterprise direc-tor has the right to control production andto make decisions on finance. He also hasmanagement appointment responsibility,and the right to “praise” and/or “punish”the’ worker. Hudong Shipyard has beendesignated as one of the enterprises to im-plement the new rules on a pilot basis.This designation was further indicationthat the yard is considered one of the mostprogressive in China, and confirmed its se-lection.

The research was performed by the au-thor and a team of staff and graduatestudents of Zhenjiang Shipbuilding institute(located in Zhenjiang, Jiangsu Province,PRC) during 1986-87. The team received theconstant advise and counsel of Hudong’smanagers and engineers during the effort.All analyses and projections were approvedby Hudong management as being accuraterepresentations of the yard’s planning doc-umentation.

The baseline ship for the study was thePD214 general mobilization ship [7] with thefollowing options multi-purpose design,Jumbo size option, steam turbine (vice

31-1

.

diesel) main propulsion plant, cargo cranes.and a slewing stern ramp. The study wasprepared on the basis of practices and fa-cilities in place in 1987, with a contractsigning on January 1, 1986. Other studyassumptions were

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

(f)

the construction contract wassigned on the final day of businessnegotiations;the engineering working drawingsfor the ship were complete andavailable to the shipyard at signingof the contract;the total shipyard facility wasavailable to construct the five ships,and no existing contracts or follow-on work would impact the PD214schedules;five ships of the PD214 (Jumbo) classwere ordered in the contract, andall were identical;purchase orders for equipment, ma-terials, and supplies would be issuedsubsequent to receipt of the con-tract; andthe five ships would be consecu-tively constructed in the shipyard’smain facility.

Figure 1 shows the inboard profile viewand the main deck of the PD214 (Jumbo)ship. Table 1 is a listing of the principalcharacteristics of the ship. Table 2 is a listof the appropriate laws and classificationsthat would apply to construction of thePD214. The complete description of the shipwith options is contained in the referencedMarad report. [8]

This paper is divided into four sections.First, there is a discussion of Hudong’s fa-cilities and organization. Then there is ananalysis of the construction methods em-ployed; next, a presentation is made of thetime and man-hour budget for each of theproduction activities, Finally, generalconclusions are made from the analyses,

Comparisons are made throughout thepaper with the facilities and operations ofAvondale Shipyards, Inc., New Orleans,Louisiana. The information and datasource “for the Avondale comparison is asimilar study [9] that developed the con-struction schedules and manpower plan-ning to build a like series of PD214 generalmobilization ships. In the Avondale case,however, the date of contract award wasl/1/83--some three years earlier than thecontract date assumption used in theHudong study. (And, the reader should beaware that Avondale’s facilities and pro-ductivity factors are now considerably dif-ferent than those shown.)

31-2

TABLE 1PRINCIPLE CHARACTERISTICS

PD-214 -GENERAL MOBILIZATION SHIPJUMBO OPTION

Length Overall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...719’Length Between Perpendiculars , . . . . . . . ...670’Beam(Molded) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...97'Depth(Molded) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .61’Draft (Full Load). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30'Draft (Scantling). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .35’Light Ship .- . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...14.520 L.T.Crew Effects-and Stores . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 L-T.Fuel Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..3.OOO L.T.Cargo Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..3.9OO L.T.Fresh Water. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...340 L.T.S.W. Ballast . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..4.9OO L.T.Lube Oil & Diesel Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60Cargo Deadweight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19,960 L.T.Total Deadweight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..23.3lO L.T.Total Displacexnent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..37,380 L.T.Bale Cubic Holds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1,963,900 Cu.ftLiquid Cargo Volume . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..l7’4.80O Cu.ftCrew Accommodations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37Extra Mobilization Accommodations . . . . . . . . . 7Total Accommodations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .53Horsepower (Max. Continuous Rated .22,500Speed (Knots 100.% Power) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..2l.lSpeed (Knots 80% Power) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..20.lFuel Consumption @ SEA (bbl/day) . . . . . ...840Fuel Consumption @ Port (bbl/day) . . . . . . ...86Range (In Nautical Miles) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13,800Propeller -6 Blades . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..22’8”Total Containers On Deck (TEU) . . . . . . . . . ...436Total Containers Below Deck (TEU) . . . . ...850

Total Containers (TEU) . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...1.286

Hudong Shipyard is one of the threelargest yards in the Shanghai area itbuilds a variety of ships, including coastaloil tankers, coastal passenger and cargovessels, oceangoing vessels, oceanographicresearch ships, oil drilling ships, and mili-tary frigates. [10] The yard is capable ofproducing ships up to 70,000 DWT; addi-tionally, it has a diesel engine productionfacility that builds marine engines up to25,000 brake horsepower. Table 3 showsthe yard’s production output for the five-year period, 1982-86.

2A11 material in this section was obtained duringa series of interviews with Hudong Shipyardmanagement. The interviews occurred inShanghai during March and April, 1987.

Figure 1: INBOARD PROFILE AND MAIN DECK PD214 GENERAL MOBILIZATION SHIP

I

TABLE 2LIST OF APPROPRIATE LAWS AND

CLASSIFICATIONS THAT WOULD APPLY TO

CONSTRUCTION OF THE PD214

-- ABS Classification Rules + AIE + E + AMS-- U.S. Coast Guard, including International

Rules of the Road-- USPHS Publication *393 (Sanitation) and

PB161OI9 (Ratproofing)-- SOLAS Convention 1974-- USCG Panama Canal and Suez Canal

Tonnage Certificates— Panama Canal Company Regulation-- Suez Canal Company Regulation-- IEEE #45-- Federal Communication Commission-- ABS Cargo Gear Requirements-- USDL Safety and Health Regulations for

Longshoring

Sorce: References 4, 5.

The total employment for the yard was12,000 persons on March 1, 1987, distributedas follows

Shipbuilding Division (Workers) 3,785 (31,4%)Engine Division (Workers) 1,898 (15.8%)Management 1,507 (12.6%)Engineers 1,014 ( 8.5%)Service 1,100 ( 9.2%)All Others 22.5%

Total 12,000 (100.0%)

Organization for the entire shipyard isshown in Figure 2. Besides theShipbuilding Division, other line units arethe Engine Division, the Material SupplyDepartment Civil Engineering Department,

and the Chief Engineer’s Office.Administrative and staff groups include theChief Economist, Accounting Department,and the Personnel Department.

The Engine Division designs, fabricates,and markets the low- and medium-speedengines, and associated auxiliaries. Theunit also has large forging, casting, andheat treating shops.

The Material Supply Department is re-sponsible for acquisition and transportationof all materials for the yard.

The Civil Engineering Department doesall of the civil engineering projects for theyard, including employee housing. Thegroup maintains all of the yard’s facilitiesand all stationary equipment and tools. Inaddition, the department is responsible forthe construction of all industrial projectsthat are fabricated and assembled at theyard. (An example would be steel bridgesthat the yard builds.)

The Chief Engineer is responsible forquality control, metrology, and for all oth-er technology management within theyard, including physical and chemicalanalyses. The unit directs the CAD/CAMdevelopments and application program.

On the staff side, the Economics Officeris responsible for long term planning, laborbalance coordination, and contract adminis-tration. The Chief Accountant deals withall financial matters. The PersonnelDivision is responsible for training, educa-tion, personnel administration, and opera-tion of the numerous support groups (likethe hospital, visitor hostel, and children’snurseries).

TABLE 3PRODUCTION OUTPUT FOR HUDONG SHIPYARD

FOR A FIVE-YEAR PERIOD, 1982-1986

Year Ship Production* Engine ProductionTonnes)

1982 62,000 63,0001983 91,000 95,0001984 104,400 129,0001985 117,5001986

133,600102,300 136,900

*--Excludes military production, estimated at less than two Jianghu-classfrigates/year.

Source: Hudong Shipyards

31-4

The Shipbuilding Division is the principaldivision in the yard. This division has ap-proximantely one-half of the yard’s totalworkforce in its organization. There arefour departments and SIX productionshops/factories in the division.

The Shipbuilding Design Department de-signs the ships, including advanced con-cepts. It prepares production working doc-uments, as well as material for regulatoryapproval. The Production Management

Department handles the productionmanagement for the entire yard; It has re-sponsibdity for preparing production plansand coordinating of the shop production.The Shipbuiding Planning Departmentperforms the work load balancing it pre-pares the production instruction and co-ordinates the milestone schedules. Andthe Safety Department is responsible forsafety in the entire shipyard

(Administration Shipbuilding Other production andand Staff Division Production Support

FIGURE 2: HUDONG ORGANIZATIONAL CHART

31-5

The Hull Construction Shop is one of themain shops for the division. It is responsi-ble for all of the steel production for bothship and industrial products, and associatedlofting.

The Machinery and Electrical Workshopis responsible for installation of the mainengines, the navigational equipment, theelectrical equipment, and sea trials. Thisshop is also responsible for processing ofpipe, and its installation aboard the ship.1t is considered one of the strongest shopsin the yard.

The Painting and Woodworking Shop isresponsible for all painting and coating op-erations and all woodworking Jobs, in-cluding the manufacturing and installationof any wooden furniture.

The Outfitting Material Fabrication Shopmakes foundations, doors, boilers, smallhatch covers, and aluminiumdoors/windows, and runs the galvanizingand oxide finishing operations. The shopdoes not perform any of the installationactivities.

The Electrical Products Factory fabri-cates switchboards, cabinets, steel furnitureand ship models. Its products are also soldoutside the shipyard.

The Valve Factory manufactures allvalves used on the ship. The casings aremanufactured by the Casting Shop--a unitin the yard’s Engine Division.

There is a labor union organization inHudong; however, it is structured differ-ently than in an American or Japaneseyard. First, there is no focus on craft ori-entation by the union, and there are nowork rules requiring that work be per-formed only by people with a recognizedJourneyman skill, As a result, workers canbe, and are, cross-crafted in their assign-ments.

There is only one labor union, and 90percent of the workers participate. Someof the workers are elected to represent allof the workers they are called “Workers’Representatives”. The labor union leadersare elected from these representatives, AtHudong there are 1,000 Workers’ Represen-tatives, and about 40 labor union leaders.

About twice each year the shipyard di-rector is obliged to make a formal reportto the Workers’ Representatives, Afterthis meeting the representatives will cau-cus in a series of small, special focus ses-sions to develop comments on the director’sreport. Their comments will contain sug-gestions and recommendations for future

direction of the yard, as well as suggestedaction for management.

The Workers’ Representatives will alsomake decisions concerning how to allocateand spend the workers’ portions of thecompany’s profits. The worker’s share isabout 15-20 percent of the company’s netprofits. The management is bound to fol-low the Workers’ Representatives directionson the profits allocated to the workers.There is no absolute requirement thatmanagement follow the sugges-tions/recommendations on any other topic.

The labor union leaders have the func-tion of following up on the sugges-tions/recommendations of the Workers’Representatives. They make detailed re-ports to the representatives at the meet-ings as to what happened relative to eachrecommendation during the preceding peri-od.

At Hudong shipyard, and at all Chineseenterprises, the union is under the leader-ship of the Communist Party. The Communist Party organization has a struc-ture in the shipyard that replicates theproduction/management organization. AtHudong the party (or political) structure iscomprised of about 200 persons. About 80percent (160) are assigned full-time to thestructure. The head is the Chief PoliticalOfficer. This person is always a member ofthe Communist Party and is elected to thisposition by a vote of the Communist Partymembers in the shipyard. At Hudong, thisman is a university graduate who hasbeen at the yard for all of his working ca-reer. Prior to becoming Chief PoliticalOfficer, he was head of the shipyard direc-tor’s administrative office.

Figure 3 shows the layout for the ship-building portion of the shipyard as ofJanuary 1, 1987. (It should be noted thatthere is presently a 36,000 square meterassembly shed under construction. The fa-cility will be completed in 1988, and willconsiderably enhance the production capa-bility of the yard, The new facility is notshown in Figure 3.)

The total yard embraces 913,000 squaremeters (212 acres) of land, most of which isdevoted to the ship production activities.

Table 4 shows the size of the ship pro-duction facilities, and makes a comparisonwith Avondale shipyards--a typicalAmerican yard, [11] As seen, the ship pro-duction area at Hudong is considerably lessthan that found at Avondale. The differ-ence is especially evident in the spacedevoted to fabrication and to erection.

31-6

HUANG PU RIVER

FIGURE 3: LAYOUT OF HUDONG SHIPYARD SHIP PRODUCTION FACILITIES

TABLE 4SIZE OF PRODUCTION FACILITIES

AT HUDONG AND AVONDALE SHIPYARDS

(IN SQUARE FEET)

SHIPYARDHudong’ RATIO

Current(l/1/87) Future(1988) Current(t.llm)Production Category/ (A) (B) (c) A/c B/CFabrication 138,460 310,680 318,800 .43 .97Sub-Assembly 99,030 314,330 112,700 .88 2.79Assembly 335,190 335,190 441,150 .76 .76Erection 203,480 203,480 421,800 .48 .48

Total 776,160 1,163,680 1,294,450 .60 .90Approximate ProcessingCapacity (s. tons stl/Yr.) 33,075* 88,200* 50,400@Ratio ft2/tons/vear 23.5 13.2 25.7

* Based on steel pre-treatment flowline capacity of 30K tonnes/year. After expansion, the steelcapacity will be 88,200 tons of steel/year. Erection facilities will then be the limiting facility.

@ Based on average erection rate of 4200 tons/month [12] Source: Hudong Shipyard Interview

Currently, Hudong only has one slipwaycapable of building the PD214 ship.

Hudong’s production facilities will beconsiderably enhanced when its new as-sembly shed is completed in 1988. At thattime the total ship production space willnearly equal Avondale’s, and the sub-as-sembly area will be nearly twice that ofAvondale’s.

Table 4 also relates the facility spacewith the stated steel production capacityfor the two yards. (The indicated capacityis for the individual production unit thathas the smallest tonnage output. ForHudong, this is the steel pre-treatment fa-cility with an indicated capacity of 33,075short tons/year (30,000 tonnes/year). AtAvondale, expected erection rate is statedas 4200 short tons of steel/month which isthe same as the capacities of the assemblylanes.) As seen, Hudong’s utilization ratio

Avondale’s is

bly shed will significantly change Hudong’sutilization ratio because the steel through-put capacity will increase to about 80,000tons/year. The facility area/throughputratio for Hudong will then become

Both Hudong and Avondale have ap-proximately the same profile of open- ver-sus covered-production facilities. The fab-rication facilities are under cover at both

31-8

yard; sub-assembly is partially covered atboth yards; and assembly and erection arein the open at both yards.

Table 5 summarizes the machinery andcrane capacities utilized by Hudong in itsship fabrication and assembly operations.Comparison of these specifications withthose found at Avondale in like operationsreveals many similarities. The gas cuttingmachines are of approximately the samecapacity, each yard has the same numberof numerical cutting and optical cuttingmachines; and each has about the sameprofile of forming equipment, even thoughthere are marked differences in the capaci-ties (Avondale’s equipment is generallylarger).

There are major differences in the ship-yards’ operational capabilities. The mostsignificant differences are found in the cut-ting operations, welding operations, pipeshop operations, CAD/CAM operations andpainting operations.

Of especial significance is the fact thatHudong does not have any plasma-arc cut-ting equipment. As a result its thermalcutting is confined to mild steels of lessthan 60,000 psi yield. Aluminum andhigh-alloy materials are cut mechanically.

Automatic and semi-automatic weldingoperations are more extensive at Avondalethan at Hudong. At Hudong, approxi-

mately 55manually;

percent of all welding is donethe percentage is considerably

less at Avondale.

Avondale’s pipe shop is nearly fully au-tomated Hudong’s pipe fabrication is com-pletely manual, and is also segmented intothree separate operating locations (thus re-ducing potential benefits from economics ofscale),

Avondale has utilized CAD/CAMthroughout its operations for several years,being one of the earliest American ship-yards to emplace CADAM graphics soft-ware. Hudong, on the other hand, is onlynow beginning to utilize the more ad-vanced systems of CAD/CAM software.Further, Hudong’s planting and manage-ment control systems are still not fullyemplaced on a computer data base.

Finally, Avondale has automated manyof its paint shop operations by the use ofrobots in the application of coatings in haz-ardous and difficult situations. While both

Hudong and Avondale have large paint sheds for painting complete blocks,Avondale’s environmental controls aremore complete and finely tuned than thosefound at Hudong.

The only major difference in the lift ca-pacities for the two yards is found at theerection site. Hudong can lift 400 tonnes(by combining the four 100-tonne cranes)Avondale’s capacity at the erection site islimited to a 200-ton lift. On some uniquecircumstances, a 400-ton lift can be accom-plislhed by combining the two gantry

Because there is significant groundmovement of the blocks at Hudong, the ca-pacity of the flatbed carriers is a limitingfactor. The yard has one 150-tonne flatbedcarrier, and for that reason no block canexceed 150 tonnes unless it is built at a lo-cation where the gantry cranes from theslipways have direct access.

1.

2.3.4,5.6.7,8.9.10.

11.

TABLE 5

DESCRIPTION OF FABRICATION MACHINERYAT HUDONG SHIPYARD

Gas Cutting Machines: 5, with all but one being numerical control.Layout is 24m x 4m x IOOmm.Plasma Arc Cutting Machines: None.3. with largest hating a 500-ton capacity.

ending Machines: 3, largest is 13m x 43mm radius.Plate Straightener One 5-roll, and one 7-roll machine.Shears: None.Plate-Edge Plans: 2, largest is .12m x 80mm.

F r a m e M a c h i n e s: 2, largest is 400-ton capacity, with thickness of 400mm.One-Side Welding Fixture 2, largest is 12m x 24mm.

Submerged Arc Welding Machines: Several all portable, except for one-side weldingfixtures described above.Crane Lifting Capacity:

Location

Cutting AreaFabricationSub-Assembly(including panel line)

Inside Assembly WorkshopOutside Assembly and Erection Areas

Horizontal BerthInclined Berth

Quays

Source: Hudong Shipyards

42

104

8162

Largest Unit

15 tons5 tons

15 tons30 tons

40 tons100 tons40 tons

31-9

Figure 4 displays some scenes of theHudong ship production facilities. Thereader’s attention is especially directed tothe photographs of the pipe and structuresstorage and the fabricated parts and sub-assembly storage. In China, the nationalplanning system permits the ordering ofmaterial only two times per year. As aresult, the purchasing department doesmuch anticipatory ordering and stockpilingof material to prevent outages. The resultis seen in the large amount of pipe andstructural material found in the storage lot(Figure 4a).

The photographs of the fabricated partsand sub-assembly storage areas (Figures 4Cand 4d) indicate the extent to which theyard cuts and fabricates parts for futureuse. The large numbers of identical parts

reflect the extent to which the yard builds“standard” ships, and the confidence thatthe identical parts will eventually be calledfor by the assembly operations.

A final observation concerning Hudong’sfacilities relates to the use of permanentjigs in the assembly of curved blocks.Until recently all of the Jigs at Hudongwere of the permanent rigid style, indi-cating that the yard constructed the Jigsfully expecting to reuse them severaltimes. This fact indicates that the yard’smanagement felt their work would be al-most exclusively directed toward ships of astandard design. The yard has only re-cently acquired and installed pin Jigs, indi-cating its feeling that future work mightcontain one-of-a-kind ship constructionprojects.

4.a Pipe and Structures Storage

4,c and 4.d Fabricated Parts and Sub-Assembly Storage

FIGURE 4: VIEWS OF HUDONG SHIPYARD

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4.1i Small Pipe Fabrication Facility 4.j Portion of Superstructure and

4.,k Block Painting Facility

Figure 4 (continued) Views of

Curved Unit Assembly Platens

4.1 Horzontal Building Berth Facility

Hudong Shipyard

31-13

31-14

CONSTRUCTION METHODS

Figure 5 is an isometric presentation ofHudong’s block definition for the PD214. lnmaking the divisions, Hudong’s plannersfollowed these principles

-- no block to exceed 180 tonnes, ex-cept for the superstructure finallift

-- attempt to control the weight ofmost blocks to less than 100 tonnes;

-- attempt to pre-outfit blocks beforeerection;

-- avoid breaking blocks at the majorstress zones (e.g., the areas of thebig hatches in the decks);

— recognize the standard steel platesizes in making the block breaks(lengths of 6, 8, 10, and 12 meters,widths of 1.5, 1.8, and 2.0 meters);

-- make breaks at major ship’s struc-ture points, especially in the Dowand stern, and

-- make breaks so that the most ef-fective construction technology canbe utilized.

For comparison, Avondale’s block defini-tions for the same ship are shown inFigure 6. There are areas of major differ-ence in the break points for the two yards,Hudong, for example, divides its double bot-toms so that the centerline units in themid-ship section extend to the outboardlongitudinal bulkheads (35’ 6“ off center-line). The entire bilge radius is included ina side-shell block. Avondale, on the otherhand, divides the double bottom into threesections the centerline unit that includesthe pipe tunnels (14’ 6“ off center-line), andthe port/starboard outboard units that in-cludes part of the bilge radius. Figure 7shows the block-breaks in the mid-bodyarea in the two yards. (Avondale com-pletes many of its double-bottom blocksbefore erection starts. Their unit breakpoints permit easy storage of the complet-ed blocks by simply stacking them. On theother hand, Hudong would have only fourblocks completed when erection starts, andstorage would not be a factor in the breakpoint decisions.)

Another difference is at the break pointsfor the side-shell blocks. Hudong makes itsbreak at the 3rd deck or below; Avondaledivides its units at the 2nd deck.

A third major difference occurs in thesuperstructure. Here, Hudong divides eachdeck of the structure into a port and star-board unit the two-unit sequence is causedby the fact that erection occurs afterlaunch, and transporters must move the

units from the assembly area to quay-side.At Avondale, space and lift limitationsdon’t exist and the superstructure iserected as a single unit.

Although Hudong has not implementedgroup technology through a rationalizedproduct work breakdown structure, theyard does have in place a process systemthat incorporates many of the features ofproduct work breakdown. As Table 6shows, hull structure blocks are dividedinto six categories

a.

b.

c.

d.

f;

Cargo area double bottoms, bilges,decks, and ramps (standard flatblocks);Three-dimensional side shells, deckswith side shells (special flat blocks);Engine room double bottoms(curved and/or flat blocks of heavyweight);Bow and stern curved sections(curved special blocks);Superstructure;Hatches, transverse and longitudinalbulkheads and beams (other blocks).

Hudong divided the ship into 194 produc-tion blocks, each with an average weight of56.9 short tons (51.6 tonnes), as shown inTable 6. There was a wide dispersion inthe block sizes, with the standard deviationcalculated at 27.7 short tons, or 48.7 per-cent of the average weight. For compari-son, Avondale’s block count is 210, with anaverage weight of 52.7 short tons.Standard deviation was 20.5 short tons, or38.9 percent of the average weight. Thedata shows clearly that Hudong does notmaintain the same consistency of block sizeas Avondale this fact can also be visuallyverified by close examination of Figures 5and 6, the isometric views of the block di-visions for the two shipyards.

Table 6 shows, for each category, thefollowing information: block count and itspercentage of the total count, the weightrange of blocks, the total steel weight forthe category and its percentage of thegrand total, the average weight of theblocks, the dispersion of these weights(expressed as standard deviation), and dis-tance of movement of the material as it isbeing processed. The same information isalso shown for Avondale’s production s ys-tem for comparison.

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FIGURE 5: ISOMETRIC VIEW OF HUDONG’S BLOCK DIVISIONS

FIGURE 6: ISOMETRIC VIEW OF AVONDALE ’S BLOCK DIVISIONS

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HUDONG AVONDALE

Figure 7: Schematic of Block Divisions at Midship Section for Hudong andAvondale Shipyards

TABLE 6BLOCK PRODUCTION CATEGORIES FOR HUDONG AND AVONDALE SHIPYARDS

HUDONG SHIPYARD weights (Shorttons) lProcess PathJ

BlockCategory # % Range sum % of Total Avg. Sigma Distance(ft)A.-Flat(cargo area double bottoms

bilge, decks, and ramps.) 51 26.3 4.9--143.5 3,498 31.7 68.6 39.4 7,870B.-FlatSpecial(3-dimenziom&iide-

shell, deckd with side-shells.) 63 32.5 21.9--155.7 5,023 45.5 79.8 35.3 7,870C.-Curved (Engineroom double

bottoms.) 2 1.0 50.7–142.9 194 1.8 96.8 46.2 7,550D.--CurvedSpecial

(Bow and Stern) 15 7.7 i3.2–i38.9 1,191 10.8 79.4 31.1 8,350E.-Superstructure

20 10.3 25.1-31.1 541 4.9 27.0 3.8 6,250F.-Other(hatch, transverse and

horizontal beams) 43 22.2 2.8-41.7 588 5.3 13.7 7.3 7,400-8,050

TOTALS 194 100.0 2.8--155.7 11,035 100.0 56.9 27.2 7,800

A VONDALESHIPYARDcount Weights (short tons) Prucess Path

BlockCategory # % Range sum % of Total Avg. Sigma Distance(ft)l.-Flat Pannel Units(mid part, double

bottoms, side-shells, long blkheads) 97 46.2 9.7-123.9 6,814 61.6 70.2 29.0 7,0502.-Curved Shell Units (Aft&Fore

PartUnits, side shell.) 31 14.8 19.3-100.6 1,630 14.7 52.6 24.6 2,9003.-superstructure

19 9.0 23.1-71.2 807 7.3 42.5 14.6 2,8504.–Fore Peak and Aft Peak Units

(large & very heavy 3D curved) 13 6.2 13.1-97.2 778 7.0 59.5 34.9 2,9005.--EogineRoomInner Bottoms(large

and Heavy, intricate, flat units) 6 2.9 31.0-97.2 292 2.6 48.7 22.2 4,6006.-Special Units (skegs, rodders,

bulbous shapes, stern castings) 4 4 21.0 8.6--130.6 749 6.8 17.0 18.8 3,050

TOTALS 210 100.0 13.1--140.0 11,070 100.0 52.7 20.5 5,500

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Importantly, Avondale has rationalizedits system to incorporate the features ofgroup technology. This rationalization hasincluded the requirement of expandingengineering activities to meet the increasedplanning needs associated with grouptechnology and zone outfitting.

The data presented in Table 6 revealsthe wide dispersion of block weights withinevery Hudong production category. Thedifference between the largest block andthe smallest block is great in one instance(category #l) the ratio is 29:1. For the en-tire ship the weight difference is a ratio of55:1. Avondale’s weight difference for itsblocks is significantly less for the entireship the ratio is 11:1 (140 tons versus 13.1tons). And, the greater dispersion in blockweights at Hudong is further confirmed bythe greater standard deviation in the unitweights, as discussed earlier.

Finally, Table 6 indicates that an aver-age ton of steel being processed for thePD214 at Hudong will travel a distance ofnearly 7900 feet. (By contrast the averagetravel distance for a ton of steel atAvondale would be about 5500 feet.) lt isnoted, however, that when the new as-sembly shed at Hudong is completed(scheduled for mid-1988), the travel distancefor a ton of steel will be significantly re-duced.

The high priority that Hudong places onthe time that a ship is on the slideway isindicated in Table 7. This table is a com-parison of the time (in weeks) that Hudongand Avondale processed components foreach of the ship’s areas as a function ofthe production activity. For the erectionactivity, Hudong needed only 21 weeks;Avondale took 32 weeks or about 50 per-cent longer.

Further examination of the erection ac-tivity indicates that as the erection contin-ues, Hudong increasingly concentrates itsattention on getting the ship launched.Note that those areas of the ship that areearly in the erection sequence (engine roomand holds) take longer times at Hudongthan at Avondale. The reverse is true forthose areas that occur late in the erectionprocess (bow, foreholds, and stern); here,the period of involvement is significantlyshorter at Hudong. (In fact this phenome-na exists for all of the production activities;the engine room and holds area materialconsistently being processed longer atHudong than at Avondale, and the reverseis true for the foreholds, bow, and sternmaterial. Hudong executives indicated in apersonal interview at Hudong Shipyards onMay 16, 1987 that this occurs because ofthe system of work load leveling that isemployed. Hudong’s system is to allowmore time for the early units, thus givingthe production shop additional leeway inadjusting its daily work load.)

Hudong’s fabrication space is limited (asseen in Table 4, shown earlier); this is re-

fleeted in the fact that the time allowedfor fabrication is greater. As Table 7 indi-cates, the fabrication of material at Hudongis 1.1 times that needed at Avondale.Hudong overcomes its space limitation bystarting the fabrication process earlier andstockpiling material until it’s needed. (Thestockpiles are shown in the photographs inFigure 4.)

Figure 8 compares the erection status ofthe PD214 ship for the two shipyards at thequartile points from keel to launch: one-fourth, midway, and three-fourths. One-fourth of the way from keel to launch (fiveweeks after keel at Hudong, and nineweeks after keel at Avondale), depicted inFigure 8a, both shipyards have laid wellover half of the double bottoms, and the

TABLE 7COMPARISON OF PRODUCTION ACTIVITY BY SHIP’S SECTION

Fabrication Assemblv Erection

HSY Ratio HSY ASI Ratio HSY ASI Ratio

SHIP’S AREA (1) (2) (1)/(2) (1) (2) (1)/( 22)

Engine Room 27 15 1.8 23 18 1.3 15 12 1.3Holds 32 18 1.8 29 17 1.7 21 11 1.9Fore Holds 17 21 .8 16 24 .7 6 16 .4Stern 14 1.8 .8 23 22 1.1 14 17 .8Bow 21 18 1.2 17 20 .9 2 15 .1

Entire Ship 32 2.8 1.1 29 30 21 32 .7

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Hudong (5 Weeks After Keel)

FIGURE 8A: COMPARISON OF ERECTION STATUS HUDONG AND AVONDALE SHIPYARDS

ONE--FOURT o OF THE WAY BETWEEN KEEL AND LAUNCH)

Avondale (17 Weeks After Keel)

Hudong (9 Weeks After Keel)

FIGURE 8B COMPARISON OF ERECTION STATUS HUDONG AND AVONDALE SHIPYARDS-- .---—

Hudong (15 Weeks After Keel)

FIGURE 8C COMPARISON OF ERECTION STATUS HUDONG AND AVONDALE SHIPYARDS

( TH R E E- FO U R T H S O F T H E W A Y B E T W E E N K E E L A N D L A U N C H)

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stern tube casting is in place. Avondale,however, has progressed further in itserection of side-shell units, with the majorblocks in place up to the second deck.While it’s not evident in the figure, bothyards started their erection process at thesame point the forward engine roombulkhead. And, each yard erected unitsboth fore and aft of this point in approxi-mately the same sequence.

At the mid-point of the erection period(shown in Figure 8b) Hudong would havefinished laying all of the double bottoms,and begun to put the side-shell units inplace. In the engine room area, all of theunits to the second deck would be in place,and a limited number of blocks to themain-deck height would have been erected.At the same point in time, Avondale wouldhave erected all of the side-shell blocks inthe parallel mid-body area.

At the three-quarters point (Figure 8c)Hudong would have most of the ship’sstructure in place except for the finalblocks at the bow and at the “close-up”section in the parallel mid-body. The su-perstructure is landed after launch.Avondale would have completed its entireerection process at this point, including thesuperstructure. Because Avondale has am-ple erection locations, its policy is to leavethe ship on the erection way for an ex-tended period while it continues outfittingwork. In the case of the PD214, Avondale’sschedule indicates the ship stays at theerection site for approximately nine weeksafter the final block has been put in place.

SUBCONTRACTING

The general policy of Hudong is not tosubcontract any of the production activi-ties. On rare occasions specific portions ofthe engineering work will be subcontractedto another division of China StateShipbuilding Corporation, such as CSSC’SShipbuilding Research Institute. These or-ganizations are utilized when a technicalquestion arises that cannot be adequatelydealt with by the shipyard’s own staff.Seldom, if ever, is work subcontracted be-cause of facility overload.

It has traditionally been the policy inCommunist China that each enterprise isassigned a mission, and then it is to devel-op itself both vertically and horizontally toaccomplish that mission. Until recentlythere was no economic penalty imposed forsuch an expansion. As a result, a typicalChinese shipyard has production facilitiesenabling it to build, from basic raw materi-als, most of the equipment found on a

31-20

ship, Hudong, for example, builds its ownengines, makes its own valves and fittings,and makes all of the castings and forgingsthat are required. Likewise, all of thesupport services necessary to design andbuild a ship are contained within the ship-yard organization. The result has been ashipbuilding enterprise that typically willoperate without recourse to outside sourcesof supply.

MATERIAL PURCHASING

As mentioned above, Chinese shipyardswill fabricate internally as much of theequipment as possible. As a result, agreater portion of their requisitions will befor “raw materials”. The remaining mate-rials will be divided into two categories (1)those materials (or equipment) that can bepurchased from domestic sources withinChina, and (2) those materials that mustbe purchased abroad.

Materials acquired within the Chinesedomestic system, either raw materials orfinished goods, are ordered at specifiedtimes each year. The typical order monthsfor shipyards are February and August; atthose times the purchasing agents indicateto the central organization their materialneeds 6-12 months fnto the future. Theserequests are then forwarded to the speci-fied supplier, or to a supplier of the centralorganization’s choice if it is deemed neces-sary to make the supplier change.

1f for some reason it is necessary to ac-quire the material from abroad, the ship-yard must first secure approval from thecentral organization. This process takesapproximately three months; only afterthe approval is given will the purchasingagent be in a position to place the purchaseorder with the overseas supplier. Approvalof the central organization is only given ifone of the following conditions exist: (1) theequipment is specifically requested by theowner; (2) the material of acceptable quali-ty is not available from a Chinese sourceor (3) the material is not available from aChinese source within the time period re-quired.

CONSTRUCTION SCHEDULES

Figure 9 shows the milestones for thefirst ship and the purchase schedule forthe principal items. The figure reflects thefact that almost one-half of the items (12out of 25) will be manufactured by theyard. (By contrast, Avondale would only

manufacture two items in-house: the fun-nel and tanks.)

It should also be noted that all of theprincipal items are purchased within thesecond month of the contract, in keepingwith the specified purchase “window” ofthe central government.

Table 8 compares the lead time re-quirements for those items that are notpurchased in the yard. The Hudong timeperiod included an additional three monthsin each case to allow for the necessary ap-provals from the central organization.

In only one instance-the electric genera-tor--is the Hudong lead time period greaterthan that at Avondale. The quicker over-all delivery is reflected in the faster deliv-ery time for the ships, as is shown inFigure 10. This figure compares Hudong’sbuilding milestones with those of Avondale.The building period for Hudong’s first shipis 104 weeks after contrack by contrastAvondale’s building period for the first shipis 140 weeks after contract. A second mile-stone chart was prepared for Avondale

(also Shown in Figure 8) that revises theproduction schedule based on critical mate-rial being delivered on a schedule compa-rable to that found in a Japanese ship-yard. ln this instance, Avondale’s schedulefor the first ship is reduced to 117 weeks,nearly the same as that of Hudong.

TABLE 8LEAD TIME REQUIREMENTS FOR

SELECTED MATERIAL, FOR THE PD214

Item Lead Time Requirement (months)Hudong Avondale

Steel Plates 6 8Auxiliary Machinery 12 12Main Boiler 14 14Bridge Console 10 15Electric Generator 10 15Main Turbine 14 14Propeller 6 15ProDeller Shaft 6 6I Steering Gear 12 12

Source: Hudong Shipyard and Avondale Shipyard

ITEM

PRINCIPLE WORKS

AIR COND. UNITSDECK CRANEDECK MACHINERIESPUNNELHATCH COYERHULL STEEL PLATEHULL STEEL ANGLEI MAIN YALYE

STEEL PIPEsSTERN CASTING

FIGURE 9: GENERAL CONSTRUCTION AND PURCHASE SCHEDULE FOR FIRST SHIP

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The schedule for building all five ships isshown in Figure 11. Even though Hudong’sdelivery schedule is considerably less thanAvondale’s on the first ship, the differencenearly disappears over the five-ship series.The difference attenuation is caused by thefact that Hudong can only erect one ship ata time, whereas Avondale can have sever-al under erection simultaneously. Hudong’sfifth ship is delivered at 179 weeks aftercontract; Avondale’s is turned over to theowner 189 weeks after contract. (It shouldbe noted, however, that Avondale’s finaldelivery would be 169 weeks after contractif the company were given the option ofpurchasing critical lead time equipmentoutside the United States.)

Figure 11 reflects the fact that there is areduction in the production time for eachship as it is being processed. At Hudongthis reduction is one week, from 51 weeksfor the first ship to 50 weeks for the fifth

ship. The reduction is consistent with theexperience curve benefits that are dis-cussed later in this paper.

The effect upon changes in erection manhour rates by having only one launch wayis shown in Figure 12. This illustration is athree-week-moving-average plot of theweekly erection tonnages for the five ships.The sharp valleys and fast recoveries areevident as each ship is launched and thekeel for a new ship is laid. Hudong’s aver-age erection rate is 573 short tons perweek over a 97 week period. As the chartvisually reflects, there is wide variation inthis rate the standard deviation is 241short tons per week, or 42 percent of theaverage. Avondale’s is only slightly betterits weekly erection rate is also plotted inFigure 12 for comparison. The average is717 tons per week, with a standard devia-tion of 274 tons, or 38 percent of the aver-age.

FIGURE 10: COMPARISON OF MILESTONES FOR BUILDING FIRST PD214 SHIPH UDONG S HIPYARD V ERSUS A VONDALE S HIPYARD

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* –

P -START PRE FABx -LAYKEELM-LOAD MAIN REDUCTION

L - LAUNCHT -mATRAuD - DELIVERY

WEEKS AFTER CONTRACT

FIGURE 12: ERECTION TONNAGE SCHEDULE FOR BUILDING FIVE PD214 SHIPS(THREE WEEK MOVING AVERAGE)

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(including SheetMetal) 261 [ 119 601 112 5---

I

MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS

In spite of the faster construction time,Hudong requires significantly more directmanhours to build the PD214 than doesAvondale. The direct manhour estimatesfor both yards for each of the five shipsare shown in Table. 9. For all of the pro-duction activities Hudong requires an aver-age of 1,916 thousand man hours for eachship, which is about 156 percent greaterthan Avondale’s requirements for each ofthe five ships.

The Chinese yard offsets part of thisdisadvantage however, when the planningand engineering manhours are factoredinto the estimates. On the basis of the to-tal direct manhours, which includes bothproduction and engineering, Hudong isabout 1.27 times greater than Avondale onthe first ship (2,326 thousand manhoursversus 1,835 thousand manhours), andabout 1.47 times greater for the five shipaverage. As seen, Avondale improves onits greater investment in engineeringmanhours for the first ship as the seriesprogresses. (It should be noted, also, thatAvondale’s estimates were developed at atime when the yard was in the throes ofimplementing group technology and zoneoutfitting technology. As a result of thisimplementation, engineering investmentfor the PD214 increased 150 thousand man-hours. [13] Prior to implementation ofgroup technology concepts Avondale’s engi-neering investment would have been ap-proximately that shown for Hudong.)

Relative to Table 9, it must be remem-bered that Avondale’s estimate was basedon production procedures in place as ofJanuary 1, 1983—nearly three years beforeHudong’s assumed contract date. Duringthat three-year perfod, Avondale has prob-ably continued to improve its productivitymaking the actual difference in productivi-ty for the two yards greater than thatshown in Table 9.

Table 10 rearranges the Table 9 datainto summary form by major productionarea. The production estimates for pro-ducing the ships with a diesel engine powersystem (instead of the steam turbine) arealso shown. As would be expected, there isa significant reduction in the manhoursestimate when the diesel engine is speci-fied–about 95 thousand manhours per shipin the case of Hudong’s estimate, and ap-proximately 65 thousand manhours pership for Avondale. There is no change inthe relationship of the estimates betweenthe yards; Hudong requires about 1.47times as many manhours in either case.

As would be expected, the savings inmanhours by use of the diesel engine arereflected in specific areas outfitting,painting and insulation, and engineering.The major savings occurred in outfittingwhere 91 thousand manhours/per ship isaccounted for at Hudong, and 51 thousandmanhours/per ship occurs at Avondale.

31-24

TABLE 10COMPARISON OF MANHOUR REQUIREMENTS FOR MAJOR PRODUCTION & ENGINEERING ACTIVATES FOR A

SERIES OF FIVE PD 214 SHIPS (000 M/H)

STEAM TURBINE POWER PLANT

DIESEL ENGINE POWER PLANT

FIRST SHIP 5 SHIP AVERAGE FIFTH SHIPProduction Category Ratio

HSY ASI HSY/ASI HSY ASI HSY/ASI HSY ASI HSY/ASIHull Production Activities, including Mold Loft 980 515 1.90 928 492 1.89 900 479 1.88

658 387 1.70 623 363 1.72 606 350 1.73Painting & Insulation Activities 212 128 1.66. 204 122 1.67 197 119 1.66Testing&Trials Acdvities 30 32 0.94 28 30 0.93 27 28 o.96AllotherActivities 44 165 0.27 43 158 0.27 41 154 0.27

TotalProductionActivities x1925 1225 1.57 1827 1165 1.57 1771 1130 1.57

Engineering&PlanningAaivities 284 532 0.53 101 146 0.69 48 46 1.04TotalPruducdon&Engineering 2209 1757 1.26 1928 1310 1.47 1819 1176 1.55

* Number may not add correctly because of rounding

The effects of learning on productivityimprovement are shown n Table 11. Theproduction activities show approximatelythe same rate-of-change for the two ship-yards over the five ship series, with thefifth ship requiring only 90-93 percent ofthe manhours estimated on the first ship.The major improvement occurs in the en-gineering and planning activities where theestimated manpower requirements for thefifth ship is only 16 percent of the first atHudong, and only eight percent of the firstat Avondale.

On a total manhour basis, Avondale’sreductions are greater than Hudong’s. TheAmerican yard needs only 67 percent ofthe manhours for the fifth ship as for thefirst, whereas Hudong’s reduction is only to82 percent of the first.

There is a marked difference in the “S”curves for the two shipyards. Figure 13displays the estimates of the cumulativeexpenditures of manhours. as a percentageof the total manhours. As seen, Avondalestarts quicker, increases more slowly, andterminates at 100 percent later (196 weeks).

budget manpower at about 109 weeks,about 60 percent of the way to completion.Avondale’s 50 percent point is at 118 weeks,about 60 percent of the distance to finaldelivery of the fifth ship.

TABLE 11EFFECTS OF EXPERIENCE ON PRODUCTIvITY

IMPROVEMENT

Avondale 96 95 94Engineering & planning

Hudonq 22 20 18Avondale 10 10 9

Total Manhours86 84 83

Avondale 70 69 68Hudong has expended 50 percent of its

31-25

PERCENT 50%OF TOTALMANHOURS -----EXPENDED .

.

i

Figures 14 and 15 show the manhour ex-penditure estimates on the basis of 20-week periods through the contract. Figure14 presents the estimates for Hudong, andFigure 15 makes the same presentation forAvondale. Both tables show that the earlymanhour expenditure is for engineering, aswould be expected. The early “production”hours shown are for production planning(which for these illustrations has been con-sidered a production function).

Hudong’s peak expenditure is during the101-120 week period, when about 2.2 millionmanhours are budgeted. Avondale’s peakspending period is during the 121-140 weektime frame, when slightly over 1.7 millionmanhours are budgeted.

CONCLUSIONS

Hudong’s production facilities are gener-ally adequate for its assigned mission, i.e.,building merchant ships up to approxi-mately 70,000DWT, and navy surface shipsup to about 5,000DWT. When comparingthese facilities with a typical Americanshipyard (Avondale), one also finds the twoyards approximately the same in most ar-eas. Where differences do occur, they gen-erally have significant impact on limiting

Hudong’s ability to expand or to improveon its mission. The major deficiencies are(1) lack of plasma-arc cutting equipment; (2)lack of automatic welding equipment; (3)lack of state-of-the-art CAD/CAM hardwareand software (this deficiency is currentlybeing overcome with the installation of anIBM 4310 computer); (4) limited launch-waycapacity and antiquated erection area; and(5) limited space for fabrication processes(this problem is only being partiallyovercome with the construction of the newassembly shed currently being built).

Hudong’s organizational structure ismore complex than that typically found inan American shipyard, in that it has a -much more extensive basic design capabili-ty and associated equipment manufactur-ing capability. ln fact, most of the shipsbuilt at Hudong have been designed bytechnical staff within the yard, and muchof the outfitting equipment and machineryis built at the yard. The yard’s managersare well-trained (most have universitytechnical degrees), and are experienced (allhave been in the yard most of their pro-fessional careers).

The relationship between “management”and “labor” is totally different than thatfound in the United States. There is onlyone labor union; it is controlled by the

M/H(000)

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

00-20 21-40 41-60 61-80 81-100 101-120121-140141-160 161-180181-200

Weeks

o0-20

2,500

2,000

500

21-40 41-60 61-80 81-100 101-120121-140141-160 161-180181-200Weeks

FIGURE 15:

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Communist Party, which also maintainsthe political organization that exists in theshipyard. The impact of the party and thestate control is pervasive and strongly in-fluences all decisions that are made bymanagement. Since the beginning of the“Reform” (about 1980), however, manage-ment has slowly expanded its ability tomake decisions on purely economic baseswith less of a political orientation. The re-sult has been more rational economic oper-ations and a steady improvement in pro-ductivity.

The yard has not implemented arationalized group technology productionsystem, even though many of thecharacteristics associated with such asystem are in place. The lack of adeveloped group technology is evidenced inthe wide range of sizes of blocks that areprocessed in each of the production lanes.The same spread in block size is alsoevident in the total system the smallestblock is nearly 50 times smaller than thelargest block. (At Avondale this differenceis a multiple of only 11:1).

The material lead time at Hudong, whilebetter than that found in an Americanyard where only American-built materialis permitted*, is nonetheless burdensome.The Chinese yard can only order materialfrom domestic sources twice a year; ob-taining supplies or material from an over-seas source requires approval of CSSCheadquarters, This process adds aboutthree months to the lead time require-ments.

Hudong estimates that it will require2.02 million manhours to build each of fivesteam turbine powered PD214 GeneralMobilization Ships. This is about 147 per-cent more manhours than was estimatedin 1983 for Avondale, and about 340 per-cent more than was estimated byKawasaki-Kobe in its 1980 study, [14] Theonly area where the American yard re-quires more manhours than Hudong is forengineering activities. But this difference isexplained by the fact that Avondale hasincorporated group technology and zoneoutfitting into its production system; suchan approach requires significantly moreman-hours, especially in the early years ofimplementation, Before adoption of grouptechnology and zone outfitting, Avondale’sengineering manhours were in the sameapproximate range as was that estimated

*At the time of the Avondale study, commercialships built in U.S. yards for American-flagregistrations were required to be built ofAmerican-made material. This is no longer thecase, and Avondale today would have the optionof purchasing equipment from abroad.

by Hudong for the PD214 ship.

Much of the difference in the produc-tivity can be explained by the effect onHudong of the political and social system inwhich the yard must operate. The Chinesemanager cannot adjust his labor force atwill; he must provide continuing employ-ment and many of the social services to allof the workers assigned to his organization.ln the case of Hudong, this is 12,000 peopleand their families. This fact colors everydecision made by management. Manpoweris approached as if it is a constant fixedcost. An improvement in productivity fora Process may not, in fact, reduce theyard’s cost since the worker must still bepaid. (There is, however, some change be-ginning to occur in this situation, and indi-cations are that the manager will havegreater control over work forces in the fu-ture.)

ln the final analysis productivity is notthe issue in a Chinese shipyard. The coun-try is already one of the world’s low-costproducers. The man-day rates (defined asdirect costs and apportioned indirect costs)in the U. S. and Japan are at least 10times that of China, and the differences inproductivity are much less than that ratio.The issue is the purchaser’s perception ofquality. The ships put into the exportmarket by China are still not perceived tobe at a standard of quality that exists inJapan, South Korea, Taiwan, WesternEurope, and the United States. TheChinese shipbuilders are aware of thisdifference, and are striving to change thisimage. Only time will tell the extent oftheir success.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The author is grateful to the HudongShipyard for its willingness to cooperate inthe project, and for its continuing opennessin responding to questions during the re-search effort. Without such cooperationthe effort would have been impossible toaccomplish.

Special thanks are also extended to theU. S. Maritime Administration for fur-nishing sets of the drawings and specifica-tions of the PD214 ship, and permittingtheir use by Hudong Shipyard and by thestudy team.

In addition to the author, the studyteam was comprised of Hu Mao-Zi, ZhuJun, Dow Pei-Lin, Hua Wei-Ha (translator),and twelve graduate and undergraduatestudents at Zhenjiang Shipbuildinginstitute. The material presented in this

31-28

paper was based on data and analysis [141 Bunch, H. M., Comparison of the Con-performed by the study team, which struction Planntig & Manpower Sched-worked together on the project for thebetter part of a year. The dedication and

ules for Buildihg the PD214 General

cooperative spirit of the members of theMobilization Ship in a U.S. Shipyard

team was an inspiration to the author,and a Japanese Shipyard.,Journal ofShip Production Volume 3, #1..

and the individual and group efforts areacknowledged with appreciation.

Lastly, and most importantly, gratitudeis extended to the two universities that fi-nancially supported the project ZhenjiangShipbuilding Institute in The People’sRepublic of China, and the University ofMichigan in the United States. Bothschools committed significant resources tothe program. ZherJiang’s commitmentwas in permitting a large number of staffand students to work on the project, andcovering associated out-of-pocket expensesof travel and per-diem costs. TheUniversity of Michigan’s support was pro-vided by the Transportation Researchinstitute and the Department of NavalArchitecture and Marine Engineering, andincluded travel expenses to and from Chinafor the author, and his salary during theperiod of involvement.

REFERENCES

[1]

[21[31[41

[51

[61[71

[81[91[101[111[121

[131

Maritime China Summer, 1986,page 97.[Ibid.Ibid.Construction Planning & ManpowerSchedules for Single Screw Multi-Purpose Mobilization Ship PD214Kawasaki Heavy Industries, U.S Dept.of Commerce, MARAD, 1980Bunch, H, M., Comparison of the Con-struction Planning & Manpower Sched-ules for Building the PD214 GeneralMobilization Ship in a U.S. Shipyardand a Japanese Shipyard., U.S. Dept. ofCommerce, MARAD, 1986.China Daily, 1/12/87.PD214 Multipurose Mobilization ShipU.S. Dept. of Commerce, MARAD,November, 1978.Ibid.Bunch, op. cit.Business China, January 5, 1983.Bunch, op. cit.Manufacturing Technology for Ship-building--Project Condensation, U.S..Dept. of Commerce, MARAD NSRPReport #0225, 1986.Manufacturing Technology for She-building Volume I,II,III,IV, U.S. Dept. ofCommerce, MARAD NSRP Report #137-140, 1982.

31-29

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