the neapolitan republicans and nelson's accusers

8/7/2019 The Neapolitan Republicans and Nelson's Accusers

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The Neapolitan Republicans and Nelson's Accusers

A. T. Mahan

The English Historical Review, Vol. 14, No. 55. (Jul., 1899), pp. 471-501.

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Thc Neajol i ta~zReju6Z'icnns nlzd

I)UR IN G th e pas t yea r th e cha rac ter of Nelson's condu ct i11 th eBay of Xaples in th e last week of Ju n e, 170 0, h a s again beellseriously called into question, an d th e grave im pu tatio ns formerlyillade against his integrity have been revived with much parade ofadditional evidence. It h a s become ilecessary for me, therefore, toreview th e evidence a nd to restate the case. Th e latte r I haveclone, briefly, ancl with avoida nce of a n ap pe ar an ce of controve rsy,in a revised edition of m y L ife of Nelson, which is expected toappear alnlost sin~ultaileouslywith this article. I n th at , I havernc l eavo~~redso to presen t th e eviclence, th a t a careful reader m aytl15rein find th e refu tation of all th e charges of trea che ry, false-hood . an d inadequate au thori ty, which have beell made against t head m iral, either openly, or in la ngua ge but slightly veiled. Th eobject of th e pre sen t pap er is more distinctly controve rsial ; theaim being to show the distortion, suppression, a nd ma nufac ture, ofevidence, by which it h a s been sou ght to fortify the old charges ofthe early part of the century, which were tottering on theirunsound foundations. I hope to demonstrate that , whateveropinion m ay be ente rtain ed as to th e propriety of NeIson'sdisallo~vin g an d suspending th e execution of a capitulation ,formal1~-signed Itnt not formally esecnted, his conduct throughout\\.as o11e11, above -board, an d co nsis tent; consistent v i t h itself, a ndconsistent also \\.it11 t h a t sense of dn ty v i t h which Se lso n's na m e isconspicuously identified. Incid enta lly, I hope to prove that the~ v i d e n c eadduced in supp ort of th e charg e of treache ry ha s beenso mangled an d perverted as hopelegsly to discredit th e accusers,convicting them ei the r of inexcusab le care lessne ss or of wilful m is-represent a t 'ion.The charges against the admiral have been suinlnarised by hisaccusers, with sufficient precision, under three heads, viz. : 1, t h a the exceeded his powers, whence his action was illegal; 2, t h a teffective execution liad been given t o a tr ea ty of cap itulatio n,~ ~ h i c hhe ilevertl~elessclisal lo~~ecl ,thereby becoming guilty of abreach of faith ; 3, t h a t he secured th e surreilder uf the castles ofS a l ~ l e s1 ) ~a clistinctly tieacherous assurance that this capitulation


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472 THE lVE,IPOLITAN REPUBI,IC~A-AS Julywoulcl be observed by him ; an end he is asserted to have at tainedby ~vordsand acts of equivocation, ~vhicheffectually and naturallydeceived th e othe r partie s concerned. Of these three , only pass ingmention vil l be made of the first in the present paper. The writerbelieves himself to hav e given ad equ ate refuta tion of it in th erevision of his Life of th e ad m irai. Th e Caracciolo inciden t willnot be mentioned, no cause having been seen to change the opinionon th e m at te r expressed in th e original edition. The stin g of thethree charges lies chiefly in the third, which has been enveloped ina m ass of misrepresentations, mingled ~ v it hhalf- truth s ancl tr uth s,which, unless analysed and the errors exposed, yield an impressionmost injurio us to Nelson's fame. I ha re also at tempted a na rra -tive, fuller an d more consecutive th a n I have elsewhere found, ofthe incidents precedent and attendant upon the final transactions,a s conclucive to a better und ers tan din g of th e whole ma tter. Th ispap er, therefore, is comp lenlentary an d supple111entar~- to th etreatment followed in the Life.After th e flight of th e Ne apolitan Co urt to Palernlo, inDecember, 179 8, ancl the en try into Naples of the F renc h ar m y inJa nu ar y, 1790, a republic was proclaimed und er th e title of th eParthenopea11 Republic. Altho ugh th e il e a form of gov ernm entfound a num ber of supp orters, not only in t he city itself but i nth e provinces, th er e was neve rtheless a gr ea t deal of disaffection.part icularly in the rur al districts an d among the lowest classes ofthe capital. The republic, in fact, rested upon force, an d th a t theforce of a foreign a rm y inadeq uate to th e task of impo sing order ind l p art s of a n exceedingly difficult coun try, peopled by larrlessinh ab itan ts. Th e influence of the priesthood over these being verygre at, th e Iiillg of th e two Sicilies, in th e early p ar t of Fe br ua ry ,ha d sen t Cardinal F abriz io Ruffo from Sicily to Calabria, to st ir u ptlie existing elements of the insurrection, and to give to then1direction an d orga nisatio n so far a s possible. At about th e sam etime a diplomatic envoy, the Chevalier 3Iicherous, was sent toCorfu, the n in th e possession of th e Fr en ch , but attack ed by acombined force of Turlis and Russians, to ask of these allies armedassistance ; pa rtl y for th e protection of Sicily, pa rtl y for a n expedi-tion to sou the rn Italy, in sup port of Rufio. Before ;\Iicheroux'sdiplomacy had t ime to bear fruit , Ruffo in his rnlc lcr t~ ~l~ ingwas sofar successful th a t a c ond ition of civil mar cnsuecl ; the niunbers ofChe rabble collected under him, to ~vllicllwas given t he nam e of thearm y of the H oly Fa ith , or, mo re briefly, th e C hrist ian ar m y,being more tha n sufficient to com pensate for their lack of individualefficiency a n d of organ isation. T'ery considerable prog ress ha dbee n m a d e to t h e n or th w ar d, t o ~ ~ a r d sNaples, in April, 1799.Sim ilar con ditions adverse to t he republic existed also in theno rth ern provinces of the Abruzzi, a s well as elsewhere.


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?tIeanryliile, in b farch, war hacl broken o ut be txe en Fr an ce an dAu str i a ; th e la t te r in a ll iance with Russia . Th e campa ign inn o r th e r n I ta l y v a s u n fo r tu n a te to t h e F r e n ch , ~ ~ 1 1 0were compelledto fa l l back rapidly to Piedmont . As th is re t rea t voulc l permitt lle all ies, as they ailvanced, to interpose be txe en th e arm y in th e~ i o r t han d the de tachm ent a t Kaples , the la t te r was direc ted toevacuate th e l iingdoni an d t o h aste n to rejoin th e m ain body. I naccordance v i t h these orde rs the Fre nch abandoned the c i ty o n% .?,April,leaving only a garr ison in th e Castle of St. Elm o, on th eliill overlooliing the place. 011 7 Nay they f ina l ly qni t ted theS e a po li ta n t e r r i t o r ~ .t lirowing garrison s into Ca pna in t he interior ,a nd in to &e ta on tlic ~ ~ e s t e r n no r th of Sa p le s .sea-coast-bothll7it1l these tr ivial exceptions, th e Sc apo lita n republicanswere left to t he ir orvn sc an ty resources. T l i e un f a ~our a b leout -looli for tlicizz ten de d n at ur al ly , by th e desertion of th e t imid , t odilninish their numbers, and to srrell those of their opponents.Tlzeir disa dva ntag es were incre ase d by th e app roac h of a body ofsonle five or six htuldred Ru ssia ns an d Tu rk s, 1~110,a s n result of3l ic l ie ro n~ 'smiss ion, landed in May, on the Adr ia tic seaboard, f romCorfu, ilad fallen on 1 ?Ifarch. Fo rm ing a junction with th eChris t ian arm y under Rufio, the ir commanders s n b s e q u e n t l ~tookpa r t in the ~ro ce ed ing s, and s igned th e capi tula tion, tl le dis-~ ~ l l o ~ v a n c eof nhich l )y Nelson ha s gis-en rise to so m u ch con troversy.A s t h e s e ~ a r i o u shosti le bodies approached th e capital , the ycame i l l to touch x~i thth e B ay of I iaples, an d received suppo rt the refrom a sinall squadroll of Bri tish an d Sc ap ol ita n vessels of war,tlie senior officer of which was Ca ptain E dw ar d J. Foote. Tht:latter hacl succeeded to this command in consequence of t h e\ r i t h d r a ~ ~ a lof Captain Thomas Tronbridge, called away lq Se l sonallout 10 M ay, with a11 th c ship s-of-th e-lin c, in conseque nce of aFrei ic li f lect o f t~ ~ e n ty - f iv esail-of-the-line ha^-ing entered theXediter ranean. To counterac t the enemy's designs , Se ls on 'ssluarlron of hear? ships vau l iept concentratecl througllout therema inder of Sfay, an d un til 90 Jun e , e i ther in th e ne ighbourhoodof Palermo, or about tlze l it t le islancl I far i t im o, to the ~ ~ e s t w a r dofSicily. Tlle Fr en ch , however, did not coine in th a t direction, a sllacl l~ e e n expecte d, bu t v e n t to To11lo11, :tnd the nc e to T-adoBa1, nea r Genoa, nh e re they communicated \\it11 the ir ar m y innor the rn I ta lv ; but, ;tlthough Sclsoil hacl occasional tidings oftheir movements, tlzeir ultimate object continued u nlino\~rnto h imon 20 June , a nd for some time la ter . On th a t day he conf ident lybelieved th em to be bou nd for Sap les .' Th is belief, coupled w ithfavourable news f ro m his super iors to th e w est~v ard,was theprinc ipa l reason ~ h yhe then left the neighbourhooil of Maritime.On the S ls t lie was a t Palermo, a nd the same cvening sa i led again

I Sico la s , iii. ~ 0 1 .


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47.4 THE ATEdPOLIT,4N REP UBLICdSS Julyfor Kaples, expecting t h at , with t h e eighteen ships he had with him ,he was likely soon to meet twenty-five hostile vessels, individuallyof force equal or supe rior to his own. Ruffo, Foo te, and theNeapolitan repnblicnns all shared this expectatioil of th e Fren chfleet-the coming of th e Br itish was to them less probable.Once before this, on 1 3 Jun e, Nelson had sta rted for Naples,and it is with this date tha t his par t in the transactions there, inJu ne , 1799, may be said really to have begun ; for on this firstabortive occasion, the admiral, besides embarking a large body ofNeapolitan troops, took with him , as representativ e of the king,th e hereditary prince, th e second person in th e kingdom. Theinstructions issued a t this time, dated 1 0 Ju ne , 1799, to th ecomm anders of th e troops, a nd th e letter of the same day from theking to Nelson, which, in addition to i ts own significance, explicitlymentions those instru ctions as enclosed, very strongly supp ort, an d,in the judgmen t of t he writer, demo nstrably prove, t he title ofNelson on this first occasion to act a s repre sentative of th e king,with th e full powere w hich were positively asserted for h im bothby himself and by Sir William Hamilton.

W ithin twelve h o u rs 2 of quittin g Palerm o for Naples with theCrown Prince on the 13th, information received by the admiralconcerning th e Frenc h fleet m ade it espedient to ret urn , which hedid, disembarking the prince and the troops on the morning ofthe 14th; an d proceeding again on the 16 th for Na ritimo .There, on he received which20 J ~ n e , ~ th e fu rth er intelligenceset his mind a t ease as regards th e cond ition of affairs to th ewestward of Sicily, an d decided him to go again to P alermo, inorde r to resume th e expedition to Naples, whither he was nowconvinced th a t the enemy was destined. H e arrived off Palerm oon the 21st, went ashore, an d had with the king an d queen a ninterview, which lasted only two hours." Precisely what tra il-spired is not recorded, but the result was that the fleet startedagain an d a t once for Naples ; Sir W illiam Ham ilton, the B ritishambassador, a nd L ady H amilton, accompanying the adm iral in theflagship. Hanli lton gives th e reason of his going, as follows : ' TheKin g of Naples en treated me also to accompany Lord Nelson, whichm igh t be of gre at service to H is M ajesty, having been so ma nyyears acquainted with Naples, and particularly as Lord Nelson wasno t accustomed to th e language of t h e country.' Ha milton actedthroughout, on the surface a t least, as a simple intermediarybetween Nelson and Ruffo. On thi s occasion th e Crown Prin ce didnot embark, nor did any Neapolitan troops.At this po int arises th e first controverted question, mhichunderlies all others : with w hat an tho rity was lord Selso n vested

' ' Foudroyai~t's' Log, Sicolas. iii. 207-8.I b id . Sico las. i i i. 391. ., I b id .


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1899 d,YD X E L S O S ' S d C C U S E R S 475011 th is second occasion? It i s conceded that no formalcommission is ex tan t , as i ssued on the 2 1 s t ; nor ar e fur therw rit ten instructions known to exist. W hatever formal auth ori tymas given is not a m att er of record. B ut there do rema in theinstructioils to the troops, and the letter to Nelson, issued tenday s bef ore ; an d of them , equally, there does not exist an yrevocation. It is, therefore, a perfectly reasonable inference thatth e full powers conferred by the m were considered still to exist, an dto be adequ ate to the present circumstan ces, al though these wereregarded as even mo re urgent . Th e t v o depa rtures were, in fact,only successive incidents in one trans actio n, which mas continuousin purpose through out , thongh interrupted in execntion. Theoriginal powers, therefore, held good. Nelson line~valso the viewsof th e sovereigns, a s to th e ch ara cte r of th e action to be take11und er his powers. These views ca n be inferred from letters of theking a n d queen to Ruffo of th e sam e week. The exposition of thesepowers a nd views is given, a s ha s been said, in m y revisedLife of Kelson.

011 th e afternooil of '34 J u n e th e B ritish fleet arrive d off K aples,Th e inail1 body rem ained du ring th e night some eight miles in theoffing ; but tllc flagship proceeded, anchoring just outside of thehay a t 9 P.-11. l Ieanr.rl~ile,affairs abo ut th e ci ty had been progres-sin g rapid ly. Of the course of events, th e almost daily letter s ofCa pta in l'oote to Kelson afford th e best account." On 13 J u n e t h eChris t i t~nfum y wit11 its allies came ne ar enough t o th e city to receives u l ~ p o r tfrom the Bri t i sh squadron, a nd Foote entered th e bay ofNaplcs, ha vin g previously been off t h e isl an d of Procicla. '011 t h eevening of th at day the royalists drove th e enem y ou t of th e fortsL'Esp eron and Vigliena, an d from Ponte della Ifadda lena. On th eevening of the 15 th, the garrison a t Castellamare, on th e bay, oppo-site Naples, surrendered to Foote, who ' pledged his word of honourtha t they should be treated as prisoners of war, a n d promised, morc-over, to intercede with his Sicilian Ma jesty i n th eir behalf.' Th isc,zpitulation mas ca rried into effect, t h e fortress ancl its c oiltentsbeing surrendered under the condit ions, a n d for th a t reason i t masre s~ ec te d by Selson . The inc ident, o therwise unimp or tan t , hasvalue, part ly a s i l lustrat ing the at t i tud e of Foote, who pe rmittedthe republicans to marc h out wi th mil i tary honours , ~ v i t hoption togo where they pleased, he receiving under th e Brit ish flag such a sthought proper to avail themselves of i t ; and , par t ly , a s th rowinglight upon the ground for hopes, an d the consequent tenacity, ofth e garrison s in Naples itself, who still held ou t expecting sim ilarterms . 011 the 1 6t h Foote reported to Nelson th a t th e c i ty , wi thtilc excep tion of th e th re e castles-St. E lm o, Uovo ancl Suovo-

$' It is to t he se i n a i n l ~ ,though not e x c l u s i ~ e l y ,t h a t , t h e 3larchese llaresca,wri t ing in 1?93 nnd 1$94 , refers, : l.'oote's T*i i : i i icn l io ic , pp . 1.55-158.


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476 THE NL"4POLITAIN REPUBLICAXS ' J u l ywas in the h an ds of th e royalists. St. Elmo was occupied by theFrench, the other tn.0 principally by Neapolitan republicans. Thisinforillatioii was taken to Palermo by the ' San Leon ' ship of war,Captain Harrrard ; bu t Foote, who hacl been notified of ?;elson'sprobable coming, l~opedthe fleet mould be met half way."On the 17th Ruffo wrote to Foote that Snovo was t reat ing,negotiations in fact having begun t h e da y before. H e requested,therefore, that hostilities against it should cease, but be continuedag ain st Uovo, unless the latte r hoisted a flag of truce.I0 Foo tecomplied, an d here began a n informal partial armistice, whichm us t be distinguish ed from th e final act of capitulatio n, a n d whichlasted, ~ ~ i t hbrief interrup tion, until Nelson's arrival on the 24th.On the 17 th i t embraced only Nuovo, Uovo rem aining obstinate,and St . El m o not at tacked. Th at evening Foote , who t il l thenbelieved Selso n sti ll t o be comin g t o Naples, in prosecu tion of hi sfirst de pa rtur e from Palerm o on the 1 3t h' received word from th egovernor of P rocida, an d from Count Th urn , the senior Neapolitannaval officer co-operating with him, that the admiral had beencompelled to re tu rn off M aritim o by th e news received concern ingthe great Fren ch fleet." Gnd erstanding f rom this th at the la t termight soon appear at Naples, he sent at once Captain Osnald,of the ' Perseus,' to Ruffo, ' to represent the absolute necessity ofge ttin g possession of t h e castles, even by gr an tin g favou rableterms.' l 2 To thi s Ruffo sent a writ ten reply th at thing s seemedto be going well ; th at he had offered as conditions that the F ren chshould be carried back by sea to Fr an ce , with their effects andproperty, at his Sicilian majesty's expense ; the republicans to hav eth e liberty of following them , an d to em bark w ith their effects, bu ta t the i r 01~11espense. ' Th ere is the whole of th e matter. ' '"Theenemy, however, were relu ctan t to s urre nd er to a n ecclesiastic, an dhe therefore wished Foo te to sum mo n them . Foo te accordinglysent Oswald to summon UOI-o,bu t h e met with a n uncivil refusal.Th e i nsu rge nts also ap pear to have received intelligence th a ttlle F re nch fleet JYas app roa chin g. Ex pec ting relief by it , theyhere broke off negotiations, making a sor tie dur ing the night , inwhich they lrilled a num ber of t he besiegers, an d spiked severalcan no n; and on the 18 th Ruff0 ~vro tcto Foote that i t was use-less to thillli of capitul,ztions, ancl that he proposed to attack St.E l m o s e r i ~ u s l y . ' ~Foote consequei~t lywent ashore th at af ternoon,a n d hacl a personal interview, in which he admitted th a t t he fallof S t. E l m o m us t cause the sularender of the oth er castles, bu t ex-pressed doubt as to th e sufficiency of th e card ina l's mean s. Hesen t 3t once, however, for m or tar s, a s recluested.'j Th e news of

' Foote ' s T'iiidiccctwls, pp . 133-134 . I b i d . p. 111. l o I b i d . pp. 176 , 177 .I b i d . p. 136. I b i d . p. 136. Ibicl. p . 179.

l 4 Ibici. p . 110. I b i d . p. 137.


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1899 Am SELSON'S A C C U S E R S 471these transactions, including part of 18 Jun e, reached Palermo, insubstan ce a t lem t, on th e 2Oth, ancl this v a s th e exten t of Nelson'sknowledge when he sailed thence on th e 21st.lG Th e king the nunderstood th a t negotiatioils ha d been initiated, an d te rm s offered ;s n d also th at negotiations had been broken off by a sortie of th erepublicans. Of their resumption nothing was certainly li110~11.On the 19 th ) Foote, who h ad been shelling 1-ovo cluring th enigh t," received, to his ' great surprise, ' l 8 a, letter from Rnffo,requesting him to suspeild hostilities, and not to recoinrnence theillwhile t he flag of tru ce \17as flying, a s a fresh negotiation ha d take nplace. As this suspension on the l g t h , tak en in connection rvitlith e previous one of th e 1 7 th , a n d in ter ru pte d o11ly by th e nigh t'sbom bardm ent of Uovo, gave considerable respite to the gar rison s,Foote, while accecting to the request, espresseci plainly his cliscon-tent ~r-it11' so long a n arm istice , which m ay prove very lsrejudicialto the in teres t of his Sicil ian Majest? .' ' H e also claimed hisrig ht, a s Br itish represen tative, to be k ept fully inform ed of allth at went on. Ruffo did no t feel th e sam e urgency, an(1 the ne stday, 20 June , a t 4 P . X . , ~ O Foote sent again a n urgent rep resentat ionof th e inespecliency of delay . ' Thirty-six h ou rs have now passedsince I was first made acqu aintrd with th e armist ice, ~v ith ou tbeinginfornled of anything further.' " Ruffo could give no satisfaction,but passed Foote's xiessenger on t o th e C hevalier 3Iicherous,*' 1~110,with the cardinal 's acquiescence, was conducting the negotiatiolls,a s ' J I in i s te r P len ipo ten tia ry o f His l f a j e s t ~the Icing of t he T noSicilies near th e Rnsso-Ottoman Fleet ; ' and who, lie xdded, n asmanaging this affair with the Eussian commander, ( to nhom,without proving myself a yery ungra teful m an , I cannot ofier theleast displeasure.' " At 10 p.11. he wrote ag ain, enclosiag thec a p i t ~ ~ l a t i o n s ,evidently a draft only, to which Foote 's ~v ri t te nconsent was v an te d before forixal sign atu re was given. Foo te diclsign unde r a liind of pro test, sayiiig he did not a pprove of th is naJ -of treating , but pn t his l lsnle to i t because Euflo hail signed, nndbec auie he considered hi m th e conficlential a ge nt of his Sicilia11majesty.? '

Th is was ~n idn ig h t ,20-21 June. T he succeeciing day, tlie ",it,the armist ice was estended by Ruffo to include St. TIIPterms had been drawn u p by the comi~~anclan tof Ca ste l Su ov o 011th e 19th,'' an d approved by a council of war, assembled in Suovoon th e 20th. The last article provided th a t the trea ty sllould not

l 8 Xicolas, iii . 391, 3 93 , n ot e. i l ~ i d ~ c n f l m z ," p. 137.l* I b i d . p. 154. I J Ib id . p. 183. '"Ibzd . p. 139." Ib~d.p. 186. " Ib id , p. 187.?9 Preamble to Treaty; Nicolas, i l i . 487." Vindication, pp. 134, 187. 2s Ib id . p. 190. Ibitl. p. 101.2- SO specified (&lessidor 1) by the c o m m a n d a n t of St. Elmo, i n afkiumg his

s ignature ,


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478 THE hrEAPOLITAS RlGP T7BLICL-ln;S Ju lybe valid unt i l rat if ied by the Fre nc h com ma ndan t of St . El m o,who gave h is approval on 2 1 ~ t . ~ ~th e Ruffo then signed, as didth e com man ding officers of the Russian an d Tu rkish contingents.T he paper was next sent , this t ime by Micheroux, to Foote, reach-ing h im ne ar m idnight of th e 22 nd -2 31 -d .~~Fo ote signed in th ecourse of the early m orn ing of th e 23rd, tak ing the precaution inhis let ter to Micheroux, thou gh not in th e capitulat ion i tself, ' toprotes t against everything th a t can in an y way be contrary to therights of H is Brita nnic Majesty, or those of th e En glish nation. 'This he explained, a t a much late r t ime, was not mea nt to reservea r ight to reconsider the t reaty, or to an nu l i t , as Nelson did, but' solely bec ause I ha d signed m y naiue und er those of th e Russianan d Turl iish com manders , which might no t be proper , as I was atth a t t ime act ing a s the immediate representat ive of my King.' 30B y his signa ture, affixed thirty-six ho urs before Nelson arrive d,com pletene ss was given to of a sthe doczcn~e~~t the capi tulat ion,distin guis hed from it s execzction, i n w hole o r in par t . The docu-m en t follows here . It will be observed that the time for receivingexecution is definitely fixed by th e second article of the ins tru m en t.Th e garrison mere to keep possession of th e forts un til th e vesselsto take the m to Toulon were ready to sail.

Article 1. The Forts Nuovo and Uovo shall be delivered to the Com-manders of the Troops of H.M. the Xing of the Two Sicilies, and of thoseof his Allies, the King of Eng land , the Emperor of all the Russias, andthe Ottoman Porte, with all warlike stores, provisions, artillery, andeffects of every kind now in the magazines, of which an inventory shallbe made by Coi~lmissarieson both sides, after the presen t Capitulation issigned.Article 2. The troops composing the Garrisons shall keep possessionof their Forts, un til the Vessels which sh all be spoken of hereafter,destined to convey such as are desirous of going to Toulon, are ready tosaiL3'Article 3. The Garrisons shall march out with the honours of war.with arms, and baggage, drums beating, colours flying, matches lighted,and each with two pieces of artillery; they shall lay down their arms onthe beach.Article 4. Persons and Property, both movable and immovable, ofevery individual of the two Garrisons , shall be respected and guaranteed.Article 5. All the said individuals shall have their choice ofenlbarking on board the cartels, which shall be furnished to carry them

% Nicolas, iii. 487-489. ?B Vindicatw?~,p. 194. " Ib id . p. 59.The first draft here contained these additional words : ' The evacuation shallnot take place until the mom ent of embarkation' (Vindication,p. 195). These dono t appear in the final terms. Th is might have been important, because Article 2fixes the time when, by evacuation, the treaty should receive practical execution, asdistinguish ed from comp leteness of form. A s it was, Nelson arrived before thetransports were ready, and consequently found the republicans still in possession ofth e forts. H e therefore claimed , and undoubtedly believed, tha t the treaty couldrightfully be suspended, because not executed.


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to Toulon, or of remaining at Naples without being molested, eith er intheir persons or families.Article 6. The conditions contained in the present Capitulation arecommon to every person of both sexes nom in the Forts .Article 7. The same conditions sha ll hold with respect to all theprisoners which the Troops of His Majesty the King of the Two Sicilies,and those of his Allies, may have made from th e Republican troops, inthe different engagements which have taken place before th e blockade ofthe Forts.Article 8. Ifessiel~rs,the Archbishop of Ealerno, I l l i c h e r o u ~ , ~ ~Dillon,and the Bishop of Avellino, detained in the Forts , sha ll be delivered to

the @onlinandantof Fort St . Elmo, where they shall remain as l~ost ages,until the arrival of the individuals, sent to Toulon, shall be ascertained.Article 9. All the other hostages and State prisoners, confined in thetwo For ts, shall be set a t liberty, iinniediately after tlie present Capitnla-tion is signed.Article 10. None of the Articles of the said Capitulation can be putinto execution until after they shall have been fully approved by theCommandant of Fort S t. Elmo.Concerning th e propriety of th is capitula tion, considered as a

m ilitary me asure, in th e ligh t of th e existing circumstances, someremarlis are admissible, i n view of Nelson's anger a nd stro ng de nun -ciation when the ter m s became know11 to him. Fo ote sta tes expresslyt h a t at no tim e during th e process of th e negotiatioils was he con-snltecl as to the terms ;3J except of course in receiving th e projet,and being aslred to sign it. I n view of the fact th at thi s admissionf o l l o ~ ~ simmecliately upon his opinion t h a t t h e 'difficulties wereonly got the be tter of by t h a t terr or which th e Br itish flaginspires,' 3 L his tardy protests can scarcely be considered a dueassertion of the influence of the British Savy upon the agreementreached by th e belligerents. All parties seem to have been expect-ing st i l l the arrival of the French fleet ; al though some news,alluded to as favourable in a letter from Ruffo to Foote, had beenreceived on th e 21st, before either th e comm andan t of St. Elm o orRuffo ha d signed th e paper.3' T he coming of t h a t fleet would hav eforced the ret i rem ent of Foote 's sq ua dro n; an d of the roj al is tforces also, if st i l l in th e open city. It was therefore important toha st en a solntion which mould enable th e position t o be held, evenif the fleet arrived ; a n d a ~lr~cisi resolut ion of th a t c harac ter mighthave justified th e gra ntin g of such full concessions t o th e ins ur-gen ts in Uovo ancl Suovo . B ut considering Foote 's own statem ent toPluffo, that the fall of St. El m o mu st insure th a t of the o thercastles " "ecause it corninanded th em ), a t re aty which only securedthe lower cast les and left St . E lm o indefini tely in F ren ch hands, toawa it th e ar riv al of th ei r fleet, can scarcely be deemed a decisive

' 2 A cotisin of the 3iicheroux before mentioned, n 3i~zdicatio?r,p. 155s* Ibid. " Ibid. p. 191. Ibid. pp. 93. 137.


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THE SE.4 POLITLIY ERPTTRLICASS Ju lygain. No wonder that Nelsoil thought extravagant-called' in fa m ou s '-the allowance of ho no urs of wa r, with assnrecl saf ety ,to ' rebels an d trai tors, ' a s h e regarded them , in so desperate aplight an d for so slight a n a dva ntage ; the more so because, inFoote's own opinion, St. Elm o could not, by the tre aty , ' withpropriety be attacked until advice is received of th e arriv al of th erepublicans at Toulon.' 3iI t is true , a conflict with th e castles would have produced mu chin ju ry to th e city, an d t h e an arc hy existing in th e ulldisciplinerlChrist ian arm y furnished another reason for hastening ma tters toa collclusion ; but, as against this urgency on the pa rt of t heroyalists, th e republican g arrisons in th e lower castles felt th eirsituation to be so desperate, th a t ' ever since this m orning,' th e19th,-four days before Fo ote signed the tr ea ty ,- - ' from th emoment they began to t reat about a, capitulat ion, a great manybegan to desert from the two castles, and among them fortyFrenchmen at least, besides a great inany Italians. ' 38 This FooteItnew, before h e signed even the pl'ojet for the capitulation ; and heknew also, from the sam e letter, tha t in consequence of th is panic' The Castle is al l open an d th e C nlabrians hav e already penetratedit.' Under a cornparisoil of the relative military conditions, nothinghut th e simultaiieo~zssurr end er of St. E lm o could be considereda satisfactory equivalent for th e very liberal ter m s granted .Count T h u rn , the senior Se ap olita n naval officer, coilsidered a t th et ime th a t the capi tu lat ion ~ v a sunsatisfactory for th is precise reason.Foo te, by h ie own avowal, deferred m uc h to Ruffo,3%nd no t un -justifiably, in view of t he instruc tions tur ne d over to h im ; but afterall, a s an ally, his rights were equal, an d he was responsible to hisgovernment. Knowing th e above facts, he canno t be considered tohave shofvn proper firmness.At 6 .i.ar., 24 Jun e, twenty-four hou rs after signing, Foote re-ceived a lette r fro m Nelscn, dated th e 18 th , off Maritiino, askinghi m either to bring th e British vessels of his squad ron to th atpoint, or a t least, if possible, to send to him the ' Perseus ' and the' AI ~~ tine . ' Not th ink ing it advisable to leave Naples himself, Footcordered the last named two ships to go, and they accordinglystar ted at once.40 At th e mo me nt, Nelson, unknown to Foote, Ta snearing Naples with the fleet , a n d th e ' RIutine ' met him beforeNo m ention is ma de of the ' Perseus ' joining : an d since i twas to her captain, being the senior, that Foote had intrusted oraldetails of every circumstance t h a t ha d passed,42an d n ot improbablyalso a letter wr itten th e previous day , enclosing a copy of the

57 TF~tdicat ion,p. 191. '* Ruffo to Foote, Tiud ica t io ,~ ,p. 185.J9 pp . 1 6 4 , 155,190,Vi?zdicatio~~, '" Ibid. pp . 135, 141. u Foudrogant's ' Log, Sicolas , iii. 508. 4 2 T' indicnt io~z,p. 111.


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1899 A SD ATELSOS'S AC'C USERS 48 1r a p i t ~ l n t i o n , ' ~Xelso11 dicl not learn the particulars of the latterunt i l F oot e himself joined him a t 4 P . M . ~ ~Ear l i e r on th i s same day,Nelson ha d taken th e f i rst step i n th e l ine of act ion which 11cpursued wi th s teadiness througho ut . H e drew up a paper , s tyled' Observat ions on th e Armist ice concluded between th e C ardin ala iid the Fr enc h an d Rebe ls . 24th Ju ne , 1799. ' Th e date appl iesno t t o t he ' Armistice, ' but to his own paper, which mill be spokenof thr ou gh ou t nnd er th e ti tle of th e Observations, to distingu ishi t from certain other papers afterwarcis quoted. Th e Observat ionscontain, first , a statement of a report-afterwards found to beerroneous-which hacl reached hin l on 23 J u n e , a t s ea , t h a t a narmistice hacl Lecn signed, providing that if the French ailclrebels were not rel ieved in t~venty-onedays they should snr renderthe three cast les, and be removed to a place of safety ' a t th eexpense of th e Iiing of th e Two Sicilies. ' Upon th is sta tem en tfollo~vsa course of reasoning, by which Kelson reached the conclu-sion th at th e arrival of ei ther f leet , Bri t ish or Fre nc h, ' destroyedtlie compact."" This being settled, anci consiileriiig no ~ a l i dcom pact to exist after t h e arriv al of his fleet, he goes on in the sam epaper to make to th e cardin al three proposi t ions for furt l ier act ion ;each of which after~vardsformed th e substance of three dist i i lctpapers, aildressed in the following order of t ime to thr ee differentpar t ies : 1. Th e 'Declarat ion, ' to ' the Seapol i t an Jacobius ' inCovo aiid Suovo. 2 . Tlle ' Summ ons, ' sent to the Fre ll ch in St.El mo. 3 . T he ' Opi n i o i ~ , 'delivered to R ufio in per so n, after th ela tt er an d Nelson hncl failed t o agree. I11 t l ie Observations,wri t ten before arrival , under the mistal ien report , thls order isexactly reversed. I t is the re proposed to Huffo : 1, to send norci toth e enemy tha t the arrival of th e fleet clest toyed th e compact ; 2 ,th at th e I 'rench be summoned to surre nde r ~vi thi i it ~ v ohours ; 3 ,t h a t , ' as to Rehels and Trai to rs, no polver 011 ear th has a r ight tos tand be tveen the i r grac ious I i inq an d them ; they m ust insta i lt lyt h r o ~ vthemselves on the clemency of their Surereign. '

I t v il l be seen in th e sequr.1 th at from these propositionsXelsou never w avered, althou gh h e ha s been accused of a colt,>-.firre o n t h e 2 6 t h ; '" and i t is to be presuii led that he equallyremain ed convinced of th e accuracy of th e reasonings by nlhich hereached his decisions, embodied i n th e th ree proposit ions ; for,nh en h i s ac tion was called illto cluestion i11 Pa rli am en t, ae ar ly ayear later , i t was the Observat ions, al thongh they Ivcre based ul~ona mistalren report , th a t he sent to his int im ate friencl Davison, ' t oexpla in h is co nd uc t; '-'"and Davison wit11 t h a t vlem carried the

I' T7iltdication,11. 110. " ' Seahorse ' s ' Log, Xicolnq, iii, 494. '3 Ib i t l , p . 381." j o b s e r v a t i o n s , &c., Kicolas, iii. 385.4 7 EXGLI~EHISTORICII.EF.~WIV,April 1898, p. 274.'8 Nicolas , i i i . 510.

VOL. SIT.---KO. LV, I I


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482 ?'Ill? NEAPO LITr lX l?EPU 13LIC~ 1ATjS Julyp ap er t o L o rd G r e n ~ i l l e , ~ ~ I n v irtu e ofthen Foreign Secretary.his conclusions, Nelson, t he in sta nt h e cam e in sig ht of th e flags oftruc e flying from th e ' Seahorse,' Foote's frigate, ,and from th e forts,made a, signal annulling th e truce.50 Th is was before 4 P.M., th ehour when Foote came on board.51After Foo te had seen him, a letter , dated 24 June , 5 P.M., waswritten to Ruffo, in Nelson's nam e an d a t his request, by SirWilliam Ham ilton, who acted throughout in appare nt subordina-tion to Nelson. Th e attitu de of th e British ambassador towardsth e adm iral througho ut these incidents is worthy of note. I n thisletter it was said th a t Nelson now knew from Foote th e term s ofthe capitulation ; that he disapprovecl them ; th at he would notremain neuter ; and ' th at he has detached to meet your Em i-nence the Captains Troubridge and Ball, who are fully inforined ofLo rd N elson's sentim ents, an d will have t he h onour to explain th emto your Eminence. My Lo rd hopes th at th e Cardina l Ruffo willagree with h im, a n d th a t to-mowow, a t the bveal; qf day, he will beable to act in concert with your Em inence.' " Whether the twocaptains who, the wind being light, preceded the ship in a rowingboat made mo re th an one trip in performance of th eir missioncannot be said ; from Nelson's expression to Keith, ' after muchcommunication his Eminence desired to comeaonboard and speakwith me on his situation, ' " i t seems likely th a t they did. Theycertainly carried to h im th e two papers," th e Declaration to th erebels an d the Sum mo ns to the Fren ch, an d most probably alsoth e Obs ervations; for to th e latte r is appended, in Nelson's ownhand , ' Read and explained, and rejected by the Cardinal. ' >'D ur ing th e nig ht, 24-25 Ju ne , Nelson wrote to D nckw orth, i11imm ediate com ma nd of th e ships outside, giving directions for th eorder of the fleet upon anchoring ; an d in his letter he mentionedtha t the ca rd inal and he had begun by d i~ a g re e in g .~ ~At 9 P.M. th e flagship ancho red for th e nig ht, abreast Naples,but outside. At daylight on th e mo rning of th e 25th, she shiftedher ber th near to the ci ty ;57 an d th e fleet, which had remainedoutside during the night, anchored towards noon in a close line ofbattle, two thir ds of a cable between th e ships. Th e cardinalhaving refused, categorically, either to send in the admiral'sDeclaration to the castles Uovo an d Snovo, or to co-operate ifth e armistice were broken, an d being able to reach no conclusioll

'* Foote's Vindicatiolz, p. 46. " Oicolas , iii. 398." ' Seahorse's ' Log, Nicolas, iii. 494 ; Foote's Vi?zdicatw?a,p. 71, Signal wasmad e before it was possible for m e to have any conversation with him.''? Diarq dc., of the Rt. Hmz. George Rose, i. 236. The italics are the author's .Sacchinelli, Mem. szeZla v it a deZ Ca rd. R u f o (Rome, 1895), p. 230.Nicolas, iii. 392. Sacchinelli speaks of much going and coming.i4 Nicolas, iii. 392. " B i d . p. 386. Ib id . p. 387.a - ' Foadroynnt 's ' Log, Sicolas, iii. 508.53


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1899 2-1ATTjATELSON 'S ACCUSERS 183with th e two captains, came on board th e f lagship on th e afternoonof th e sam e day. A long and s tormy interview between him andNelson followed." Ne ither p ar ty yielding hi s grou nd,N eison gave t h ecardin al, in w riting, th e following writte n O pinion, which embodiedth e f irst of th e th ree suggestions contained i n th e O bservations :-

'Foudroyant,' 26 June 1799.Rear-Admiral Lord Nelson arrived with the British fleet the 24thJune in the Bay of Naples, and found a treaty entered into with theRebels, which, in his opinion, cannot be carried into execu tion, withoutthe approbation of his Sicilian Majesty.j9

Th e date of thi s Opinion is misleading to-day , because it usesth e now obsolete sea-time. Th e log of the flagship establishes th a tRnffo's visit was th e aftern oo n of th e 25th.6"t is probab le, fro mthis, th at th e dates of th e Declaration an d th e Sum mo ns, which bothread th e 25 th, were really th e afternoon of th e 24 th ; th a t sea- timewas used in them , a s i t certainly mas in th e Opinion, which m u sttherefore be dated on t he afterno on of th e 25th.'j1 I n th a t case theDeclaration an d Sum mon s could have been ready for Troubridge an dBall, s tar t ing af ter 5 P.N. of t he 24 th t o go ashore.

Ano ther not wholly insignificant feature is to be rem arked inthe Opinion, as here quoted. Th e forin is th a t occurring i n theOrder Booli, an d asserts th at ' the t rea ty ca7znot be carried into exe-cution ' without th e Icing's approval. W riting to th e com man der-in-chief two clays later , Selso n qnoted it th ~ z s: ' The t rea ty oughtnot to be carried into execution, ~ v ith ou tth e app roba tion of his Sici-l ian Majesty, E ar l St. Vincent-Lord Iieith.' b2He re x a s a dead-locli , not only between th e representatives oftwo allies, but between two rep res ent ativ es of th e liing of th e twoSicilies. Th e ad nlira l h ad with h im over\.;helming force, an d fullpowers to act for th e king. Before either or both of these ad va n-tages the cardinal was po~v erlessto carry out the capitulation. H ecould only yield to su perio r force, bu t it n n s in h is power to refuseco-operation in an act which he maintained to be in violation ofpledges given by him , an d of good faith. Su ch a breach wouldhave been an open scandal , an d a n injury to the common cause ,not to be henled by mere display of force on the admira l ' s par t .H is arriva l with h is powers did indeccl supersede the, au tho rity of" ' Foudroyant's ' Log, Ficolas, i i i 382. i ~ i c o ~ s s ,iii. 886.

b" Ibid.p, 508, note.Hicolas gives both Opinion and Suinmons fro111 the Order Book. The

Declaration is from a copy in State Paper Office; but the copy of the Snmmons inthat office agrees with the one i n the Order Book." Nicolas, iii. 393. The names of the British admirals do not occur in thecopy of the Opinion given to Ruffo. Nelson seems to have ail after-thought, that forvalidity the signature of his commander-in-chief, ns well as of th e king, wasnecessary, whereas the failure of either to approve caused the whole to fall. Heseems to have learned, after penning the letter, that Keith had succeeded St. Vincent,which accounts for both names appearing.


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484 THE SESPOLIT.4N R E P U B L I C A S S JulyRuffo as Vicar G en era l; but it clid not necessarily follow th atXelson w ould himself be ab le to wield the influence, an d to exert thecontrol of th e cardin al over th e rabble which follo~vedhim, evenh ad he gone to th e length of arre stin g him , which under hispresent instructions th e conditions scarcely va rra nte d. Moreover,th e Russian an d Turkish allies had agreed with the cardinal in thecapitulation. 'N oth ing but m y phlegm prevented a n openrupture,' said Sir TS7illiam Hamilton.An open rup ture, however, was avoided a t th e m om en t; an dth e Opinion-' cann ot be carried into execution, without the ap pr o-batio n of his Sicilian M ajesty '-having been rendered by Nelson ,the cardinal went on shore. H e then made a proclamation bytrumpet throughout the city, and posted notifications as well, tothe effect thatthe surrender of the castles of Uovo and Nuovo, concerted with the com -mandan t of St . Elmo, is announced, and the public is notified not tomolest, even by word, in person or in property, any one who should leavethe castles or their surroundings, under penalty of being shot.""

At th e same time he wrote to Gen eral Massa," cornmanclant ofNuovo, notifying him th at ,although he himself, and the representatives of the allies, held as sacredand inviolable the treaty of Capitulation of the Castles, 7ze.~.el.thelesst l ~ erear-ndwziral of the E7zglisJ~s q ~ ~ a ~ l r o ntoas 7~ottoilli7zg to recogizise it,and therefore the garrisons were at liberty to avail themselves of the 5tharticle of the capitulation, as had been done by the patriots of St.Martin's Hill, who had all departed by land. He therefore made thiscomn~unicationin order that, co~zsideri~zgthat the Englislz com~7zaizdedthesea, the garrisons might take such resolution as sliould best please them.Although this noti fica tion n ~ u s tbe considered much less adequateth a n th e sim ple methocl of sen din g ill Nelson's own De clara-tion an d Opinion, i t can scarcely be denied th at th e ~ vo rd s initalics gave full knowledge to the garrisons that Nelson did notrecognise th e treat y, an d th at therefore the retr eat by sea, which i tstipulated, mas, to sa y th e least, closed as far as E ng lish powerwent. It justifies Nelson's assertion that the garrisons, when theycame out, did so 'w ith th is knowledge,' " viz . ' tha t the t rea tycannot be carriecl into execution ' without th e approval of t h e king.To th i s com munica t io i~from Rnffo, Nassa replied :

W e have given your letter the interpre tation which it merited. Firm,however, in our duties, we shall religiously observe the articles of thetreaty agreed upon, persuaded that similar obligation must be held by allthe contracting parties who have therein solemnly taken part. For therest, we cannot be either surprised or intimidated, and we shall resume63 Maresca, IZ Cacaliere AIicheroux ; Axhic io S lor ico per le povinee Xapoletane,

xix. p. 531.I b i d . The i tal ics are mine. " Sicolas, iii. 40G.


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our hostile attitude, whenever it may happen that you compel us theretoby violeace.H e the n asked a11 escort for a messenger to St. Elmo, forfurther conference with the com ma ndant ther e ; after which a moreprecise reply might be given.GGTh e garrisons continued in the castles, except such a s left, orhad alrea dy left, irregu larly, despite th e second article of th e capitu-la tion, which specif ied th at they should hold them unt i l the ~ e s s e l swere ready to convey to Toulon th ose w ho chose to go there .Th e sam e evening, 25 Ju n e, Ruffo wrote to N elson also, i n wordsr\hich will be given later, to tell him that ' the le t ter to the castleswill have been sent off by this time.' Th e cha rac ter an d con tentsof this ' let ter ' are not specified, but as the cardinal anticipatedfrom it either a surren der a t discretion, or an outb urst of despair,on th e pa rt of t he rebels, it m ay fairly be inferred th a t Nelson,who underetood th e allusion, Ivas by it assure d th a t h is req uirem entof unconditional su rre nd er ha d gone to them . Th is was th esitu atio n on t he evening of th e 25t11, an d d uri ng th e e nsuin g nigh t.l l e a n ~ ~ l ~ i l econimoiz standing ground had to be sought foraRuffo and Nelson, as ma ny thin gs needed to be settled. T h edisorder in the city approached anar chy , an d i t was essential tha tSt . Elm o should not remain in the hands of the French ; for bothcircumstances th reaten ed m aterial injury , approaching destruction,to the city. Th e safety of t he latte r, an d th e cessation of th epillage an d m ur de r therein coilt inually occurring, ve re th edom inating ideas in the cardinal 's m ind. These i t mas th at hadled him, originally disposecl to severity, to yield such extremelyliberal term s to th e castles. As soon as they had surrendered, heliopecl to devote th e reg ular soldiery to t h e supp ression of d isorder.The nes t morning , 26 June, Hanlil ton wrote to him, in Nelson'snanle, as follows :

' L o r d S e l s o n b e gs rile to a ssure Four Eminence! tha t he i s r e so lved to dono th ing w h ic h c a n b r e a k th e Armist ice which y our Ell l ine i lce ha s accorded tothe cast les of S ap les . ' "'

It must be observed, and that carefully, that Kelson herepromises to observe th e arm istice only-not th e trea ty of capitula-tion. I t is not only interesting , bu t essential, to keep in m ind hisa t t i t ude to~va rdsthe la t ter . It ' cannot '-or ' ought not to '-becarried into execution without th e king's approval. It is simplyin a suspended condition, un til approval or disapproval is given,neith er of rvhich is within h is own power. Being th u s inoper ative,it follorrs that any thing done, any step taken, in accordance rvithits term s, ha s no sanction from the ma n who, from first to last, as

h6 d ~ c l i i ~ i o Q.c., xix. 522 .S ~OY ~CO ," S~acchinelli,~ V e i i ~ ,sulla z'ita dcl Cnr,cli?~alcRz(J'o,p . 236 .


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486 THE SEAPOLITAN REPUBLICBATS JulyR21$0 t h ~~o z ~ g h o z ~ tknew, denied its validity an d refused to cons entto i ts execution. It m igh t eventually become valid, if th e kin gapproved ; till th en it was logically a blank sheet of pap er, a m ereorganic structu re int o which th e vital sp ark had not yet entered.It must be remembered also, that Nelson's disapproval of thest ipyoscd arm istice of twenty-one clays ha s no thin g to do n it h thearnlistice he actually found. Th e first , a s understood by him , wasin the natu re of a trea ty in itself, for i t was st ipulatecl th at a t i tsexpiration th e garrisons should go free ; everything, armisticeincluded, was embraced in one paper. Th e second was a n arm is-t ice pure and simple ; a m ere cessation of hostilities-not sti pu -lated, no r even mentioned, in t he articles of th e treaty-until th emom eilt arrived for pu tt in g the capitulation int o execution; an dt h a t m om ent, Nelson contende!, could no t arriv e un til th e app ro-bation of the Iring was given. The treaty i tself postponed them om ent of execution to th a t when th e vessels were ready to sail,which they were not when Nelson arrived.This Euffo thoroug hly well knew. H e knew there was a narmistice ar~cla treaty . H e knew also th at Nelson had denied thevalidity of the latte r, until ratified by th e king. Consequ ently,when on th e 26t h h e received a letter from Nelson, wr itten im -me diately upon th e receipt of his own 011 th e 25th-the connexionbetween th e two pap ers lies on th e surface-he was in no w a jliable t o draw from th e former an y such m istaken conclusions as i th a s since been soug ht to establish th a t he did. Nelson's letter isnot dated ; but the date , 26 June, is fixed by the refcrence toHamilton's letter, which was dated. It will shortly hereafter begiven i n full, bu t is now postponed, because a t t his point it becomesnecessary to adopt a somewhat m ore controversinl method than hasso far been employed in th e trea tm en t of our subject. Th e neces-sity arises from grave misr eprese ntation s, recently illacle rrithregard to the transactions im mediately following th e even ts of th e25th. I n order to be entirely just , both to the assertions thu scharacterised an d to the rebu ttal of them , which I no^^ seek tomake, it is desirable to quote in f~111 th e passage in nhicll theyoccu r; for the misrepresentation, if such i t be, consists not merelyin specific misstatements passing th e bounds of l~s rd on ab leerror-which it is proposed to d emon strate-but in a general ingeniousperversion of evidence, by suppression an d distortion , thr ou ghwhich an impression very con trary to t ru th, an d most damaging toNelson's hon our, is produced on a reade r n ot familiar with t hefacts.Th e passage alluded to occurs in a n article by Mr. F. P. Badham,in t he ENGLISHHISTORICA L for April 1898, pp. 274-276.REYIEWThe foot-notes, except one embodied as a parenth esis, ar e umittecl.O the r\\is e th e pttsbage is as follorrs :


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l b 9 9 A X P S E L S O S ' S .I C'C'CI'SEIL'S -487Su ch mas th e situation on th e even ing of th e 25t11, bu t on tlie m ornin gof the 26th Kelson esecuted a complete rolte-jncc. The fac t of the

ma tter seenls to be t ha t Ham iltol l h ad succeeded in imp ressing upon himthe extrem e dang er of an open rupture with th e cardinal, such as nowbcenled im m ine nt, especially after the arriv al of th e cardin al's U ~ ~ L I I L C Z ~ Z L I I L(see above, 11. 9 0 8 ) , i n ~ v h i c hhe threatel led to restore the stntzt, q i ~ o .Haillil ton had probably pointed out, too, tha t w hat could not well be doneby force mi gh t be ' decently ' don e by a feint. At all events, whoevercleserues th e credit of originating it , t h a t plan ha d been adopted ; a n daccordingly, on the morning of 26 J u n e , ' after mu ch reflection,' Yclsonauthor iscd Hi l l l i l ton to co~nl l~encenew opera tions wi th the fo l l o ~ ~ in gnote to Ruffo:L o r d h e l s o n h cgb m e t o as su r e \ o u r E u ~ i n e n c et l la t l ie is rcso l \ed to do no t ll ing n l i i ch cd l i b reak t li e a r~ i i i s t i c e(so Se lso i l l iad pcrsis tc i l 111 s ty li i lg the T ~ e ' t t y ,cf. ' l)espatches, ' l i l . 390-31 xthich y o u r C m i n c n c e h a s a cc o rd e d t o t h e c l i i t e ~ ~ u o f Sap les .

E ~ i d e n t l yKuffo replied, taking exception to th is assuran ce of H am ilton 's as ina dequate, for Se lso n presently writes hinlself : I a m just l ioiloureti nit11 )our Eininence 'z le t ter , x l id as Sir \I-. H a m i l t o n

v rote th is mornin!: th a t I wil l no t 011 a l ly co l l s idera t io~ lb reak t h e arnlisticeen tc red in to b j :on, 1hope y o u r 1:niinencc will be satisfied th a t I a111 su p p or ti n go u r icleka,. I \ en d o n ce In ore C ap t a i n? T ro n b ~ i d g eand I ln l l .

These t n o c apta ins, 1vho had previously been accleditcd by Hailliltona s thoro ugh ly inforlnecl of th e s en tim en ts of Lo rd Selso n,' caine toRuffo, and completed the intpression whidi the letters above quotect\\auld natu rally conley. They \crball . \- assured him t ha t Se l son 'wou ldnot interfere with the elec utio n of th e capitulation. ' The followingpaper, founded on their verbal assurances, was the n draw n u p for them tos ign :

Cn pta in i ' l ' i o~~l i r i ilgeancl n a l l l ia l e n u t h o r i t ~on t l ie par t of L or d Kelson todpclare t l ln t h i s lorcis ll ip wil l no t oppose th e ei llbarkat ion of the rebels and oft!lc peop!e ~ i h oco m po sc thr ,n ,uli5ons of th e castles.Troubridge nil Gall clemurred to signing 011 tlle gro11nd th a t sue1110~111,tlsii.naturc wonid be a n extension of their powers, h a\ ing probablyh e tn forbitldeii to sign anything whatever. ( O r n a s i t w i th an inhllng ofn l i a t T I ~ Sto happen thdt they shrdnlr fronl committing tliemsel~esmoli!t l i ' ~n tilt co111~1l1elp 2 ) E u t though Troubridge and Ball left t l lc paperu i ~ s i g n e ~ l ,th e < \a ct accnrzcy of BuEo's iepo rt of their verbal assman cc,

' Lo rd Kelson all 1 not oppose, LC.'i for it is on Ru ffo's testimony, recordedby h i s l~ te r a rg e secn to r , Sacchinelli , that the above facts rest), isspecifically confirined by a lette r of Ha milto n's, to be quoted presently.It i s co n v e ni e il t t o i n t r o d u c e h e r e t h i s e x tr a c t f r o m ' a l e t t e r of

H a m i l t o n ' & , ' t o n h i c h I s h a l l h e r e a f t e r r e c u r , t h o u g h in Mr.B a d h a m ' s a r ti c le i t i s to be f o u n d t h r e e pages f u r t h e r o n (p. 2'78)'o u t s i d e of t h e l i i ni ts of t h r p a s s a g e h e r e gi ve n . I i n t ro i luce i t h e r ebecause i t i3 haid to colnfirln ' the c l a e t aec1xrac.yof H u k ' s yepor t oftllcir verl3al t~ssurai1c.e. ' It i s hoped that t l l e i eac l t r n i l1 no te th i5


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4 8 8 THE IVEAPULIY'AIV BEPUBLICdlVS Julyasser t ion careful ly , for it will r ece ive s ingu la r comment . Ms.B a d h a m i n i n tr o d u c i n g t h e e x t r a c t w r i te s a s fo llow s (pp. 277 ,278) : -

If any l ingering doubt remain t ha t th is result was brought about , notby a series of accidents, bu t by deliberate design, i t is taken away by13ainilton's reference, in his lette r to Acton of 28 June :Lord iielson kept the promise he had given to the Cardinal. I-Ie did notoppose the embarkation of the garrisons, but the garrisons once embarlied, itbecame patent what he had done wit11 them.""Thus, following the Italian documents, we are irresistibly led back toFootc's view, t h at the garrisons were enticed out of th e castles 'un de rpretence of puttin g t he c apituletion I ha d signed into execution.'R e s u m i n g ( a ft e r t h e a b o v e w o r ds , ' t o b e q u o t ed p r e s en t ly '),

Mr. Radhnln con t i i l ues (p. 275) :-After these letters of Nelson's ancl Ham ilton's, and th e supplen ~en taryexplanations of the two captains, Ruffo could not reasonably rltisefu rth er objections. T h a t declaration of Nelson's, ' ~ v i l lnot permit themto e mb ark,' even if it ha d been directly se nt, was now distinctly rescinded.T ha t written opinion, 'ou gh t not to be carried into execution,' wasrescinded too, for the two captains promised n ot only th a t Nelson ' would

not oppose ' the esecut ion, but also that he ~vouldland f i ~ ehundredm arin es to assist. Ruffo w as completely deceived ; and, after deputingMicherous to inform the garr isons tha t they mu st embark imn~e diately,h e wrote off to Ham ilton tha nk ing him for hav ing used his moderatinginfluence, an d saying wh at a relief to his min d it Ivas th at affairs werebeing so happily concluded.Accordingly, Micheroux a nd th e two cap tain s visited th e castles, anildelivered Ruffo 's message. TVhat gro und s ha d the republicans forsuspicion ? I t is true t ha t, th e nigh t before, Ruffo had written toGen eral lla ss a, tllo goverllor of Nuovo, inforniing him th at Kelson ' h asshown himself untvilling to recognise th e treaty,' an d offering thogarrison s a safe conduct over land : but this intinlation .was all too vague,an d whatever disqnietucle i t left n u s t have been dissipated by th eassurances of th e two captains. IIow u naware th e republicans were ofNelson's real intentions is conclusively shown by the fact of theirrejecting Ruffo's g enerous proposal, an d complete inisuad erstand ing ofits true motive :

We have given your letter the interpretation ~vhichi t deserves. Standii~gfirm to our duties, we shall religiously observe the articles of tlle treaty that h asbeen concluded, persuaded tha t an equal obligation ought to bind all the con-tracting parties who have solemnly intervened. Tor the reqt. w e arc not to besurpiised or intimidated, and shall resume the hostile attitude if 3 ou atteinpt toconstrain us by force.

W ha t the king's mercy me ant, the republicans knew righ t well; andas sane men i t cannot be doubted that , 011 t h e afternoo n of th e 26t11,the y would h av e preferred availing them selves of Buffo's offer, neverwithdrawn, to coming out unoonditionally, ' to be hanged or otherwise astheir sovereign thought proper.'

Dumas, I 6 '0 t buiri d~ Ntzlloli, i ~ .34-b.


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400 TEil3 NEAPOLI?'L4N REPl'BLICA-I.ArS JulyOn the same fouizdetioi~ rests the insinuation, ' Hamilto11

yl.oEaBl!/ pointed ou t t h a t ~vlzat could no t well be done by forcemight be " decently " done by feint.' Th e words ' probably ' a n d' feint ' are seemingly employed to soften the fact th at H amiltoil isher e accused of suggesting, an d Nelsoii of aclopting, a discred itabletrick, in orcler to a tru ly infam o~zsdeception. Th e tr u th is, th a tthough Nelson had annulled the truce by signal, the signal appliedonly to th e naval vessels un der his comi~zand: int imation to theenem y of an intention to resume hostilities as necessary by thelaws of war, an d th at ha d n ot been given. After consideration,Nelson decided no t to break the armistice, an d this change ofpurpose he du ly conveyed to the cardinal by letter from Hamilton.The assumption, whether by Ruffo or by the writer under dis-cussion, t h a t by allowing t h e armistice he validated the trea ty, 1~1zenhe h ad given a wri t ten opinion tha t th e la t ter cotrlcl lzot be executed,is purely gr atui to us; an d re sts for foundation upon t h e init ialmista lre th at th e armist ice a nd t reaty were th e same thing.The inference, ' E ~ i d e n t l yRlrfo ~cyl ier l ,taking erccption to thisassura nce of Hamilton 's as inadeq uate, ' is, in default of th e supposedletter of Ruffo, equally gratuitous. It would be qu ite a s possible-quite a s evident-that Ruffo expressed gratif ication th at there ~vo nlda t least be no immediate attack upoil the castles. Fo r Euffo's ' ideas,'which Eelson hopes the cardinal is satisfied he is supporting, werepr imari ly to save th e c i ty f rom g reat injury by th e continuance, onthe one han d, of f ighting ancl f ir ing from th e castles, an d on th eother f rom th e ana rchy an d sael iing prevail ing among theIazzaron i an d his own semi-brigand forces. These, an d not hisown predisposition to clemency, ha d led Ruffo t o gr an t so easy acapitulation ; an d while it cannot he denied that he claimed thetreaty to be binding, i t is certain that his leading idea was tosave the city, and this idea was snpported by Nelson when heallo~v ed th e t~rnlistice. The la tte r sui~lmecl up th e ilifferencebetween th em th u s to Dneli1~0l.tl1: ' The Cardinal think s one housein Naples to be l7rixccl more thnn his Sovereign's honour.'Not only, Iiowever, is all th is anteced ently t he niore probablesolution, but the understanding between Ruffo and Selsoil n a srno1.e e ~ a c talicl more esplioit than has heretofore appeared. 1of Ar~nistice' is vague. It must be remembered that the object of the note clearly isto show the occasion of the paper's being written, in terms as brief as possible. Inthe Observations, Nelson, for Ruffo's information, had stated his views upon a treatywhich embodied an armistice as one of i ts terms, as at Calvi. Transmitt ing themafterwards for the inforiuation of hi s superiors, or of a successor, he briefly notes thetime and the occasion (reports at sea) of their being written. Whatever nleaniiig beattached to the expression, it is not adequate, in my judgme~lt, to overcome theaccuracy with which the supposed armistice, the real armiaticc, and the capitula-tion, are distinguished from each other in Selson's letter to Iieith of 27 Junc, and inthe coi~~m~uiicationsof Hamilton a n d o i hiwself to EutIo, oi 24 , 2;. ant1 21i Juilc .


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h ad advanced th us fa r, and beyond, in m y di scuss ion of th e sub-j ec t, w hen t he re mos t fo r t una t el y c a me i n t o m y ha n ds a let ter ,wri t ten by Ruffo to Nelson du r in g th e evening succeeding thei r in -tervie lv of the 25th. This le t ter , f rom i ts contents , app ears a lmostcer ta inly to be th e one th at drew for th Nelsoa's reply of th e 36 th,nl i ich Mr. Bad hain, in fur th eran ce of his arg um ent , mut i la tes , aswill he shown. F r om i t appe ars , first, t l i a t Euffo had , a s _ Ic tonwrote, ' yie lded to th e admira l 's wise and s teady d ecla ra t ioi~ s , 'i3 a n d ,secondly, th a t tho ug h th u s j ielcl ing, h e did, if Sacchii lel li r ightlyrepo rts, eiideavour indirec tly to evade th e collsequellces to th ega rris oa s of Xelson's cletermination.

Tlie letter is a s follows :Your Excellency,-The letter to the castles will have been sent offby this time, nlld if there is hope that they will surrender at discretion,it may meet with success, as they see the increase of the force, and incase they should JT-ishto attack, it will be well th a t we find ourselves inforce to destroy them.ii I therefore beg ;your excellency to disembark1200 men, TI-horn it would be well to place in position to proceed afte r-wards against St. Elm o, and therefore I offer for their quarters my house,

\vhich is vacant and very large. . . . I t is also difficult to be rei~c he dbyhoiiil~s.. . . I hope that your escellency will favour me, since there havealready t l ~ i sc>cc i l i ~ l gbeen liostilities froin S. Elmo, and there is no timeto losc. TYith tlie grentcst respect and profound esteem, I am, TourEscellency's t r u e and lnost devoted servantP. dclla JIadalena, June 2Z, 1'799.P. Carcl. RUFFO,T.G.i;J

His l.;scellcllcy I k n r Adn;ir , i l Selson.It seems quite evicleilt, therefo re, th a t o n tlie eveniiig of th e 25 th,

the day on nl l ic l l Ruffo visi ted th e f lagship du r ing t h c af ternoon,he nr o t e to Sc l son say iug th a t ' t h e l e t t e r to th e cas tl c s will havebeen sent off II.T thi s t ime. ' Talien in connesion wit11 th e m at te rl ieretofore in dispute I~ et n ee nthem, and wi th the fac t tha t Ruf fo ,as Xaresca shows, ha d himself wri t ten a le t ter to th e garr isons ,con vq -ing, i ll his on11 n or ds , th e decision of S elson , t l iere beems110 rooill left to do~zbttha t ' t l i e l e t t e r ' Ra s S e l s on ' s l e t te r t o t hecast le s , nh ic l l l lu f fo had l~e re to for erefused to hencl, and thatN elsoil m us t so l i a ~ eunderstood. TVliethcr l?ulfo sl~olit!t ru t l lo r no t , ~vhe t he rby th e let ter h e ineaii t Selsoll 's , or his owl1 in-adequate ren de ria g of i t , th e absurailce is there , and justifies ful lyXelson's assert ioi l th a t th e rebels received ' this Opinion, ' and had' th is knowledge. 'We come nest to a n extraord inary mu ti lat ion of a quo tat ion.

'3 Kicolas , vii . p. C ~ Y X S V ~ .I a L a k t t e r a a i c as te ll i s a r i a n d a t a a q u es ta o r a , e se v i 6 d a s p e r a r e che ;i

diallo a d i s re s s io n e p o t r i b u cc ed e re , p e rel l&vedono 1' aulnento della forda, e c jualoravo lesscro a t tac car e sa ra be lie cbe ci t r o v in o i n f o r m per Clistruggerli.'

' 5 British 3111sei11ll.Add. SISS. 34!111, fol . 235


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492 THE' ,Vh'dPOLIir,i,l: R E P U B L I C A X S JulySe lson 's reply of th e 26th, ' I am just honoured,' etc,, is deliberatelycut in twain ; a s will be seen by com paring it , a s given by Mr.Badham (supra, p. 487), with that which Kelson actually wrote,which was as follows :-

I am just lionoured wit11 you Eminence's letter ; and as His Excel-iency Sir Ti'illiam Haillilton has wrote you this nzorni?zg, tha t I will noton any consideration break the c~r~wis t iccentered into by you, I hopeyour Eminency mill be satisfied that I am supporting your ideas. I sendonce lllorc Captains Troubridge and Ball [, to arrange with your Ewzinencycrcrythi7zg 7.elati.z;~to n?hattack on S t. Elnzo : whenever your army andcannon are reacly to proceed against it, I will land 1200 inen to go withthem, under the present armistice. I have only to rejoice that HisBritannic Majesty's fleet is here, to secure the city of Naples froin allattacks by sea-I all1 etc.,

~ E L SO S ~ . ' "

I t ill bc observed th at SIr. Ba dha m's am putatio n of the pas-sages here inclosed i n brackets is no t merely to give what isnecessary, an d no more. T ha t inay have been the intention ; i tis not th e effect. B y sub stitut ing a period for a comma after thenam e of Ball, an d by eliminating all th a t follows, th e purp ort an dlimitation of t he captains ' mission ar e concealed, and upon th atc o n c e n l m e ~ ~ tis based th e imp lication th a t th e c aptains were fullyaccredited a t thi s time to express Nelson's views upon a subject no tmentioned in the let ter the y Lore ; ere n to th e extent of virtuallymaking a verbal engagement a s to what Ne lsoi~intended to do andwould do. And upon this promise, stated t h n s to have beenintimated, the argu me nt proceeds t h a t l luffo, being entirelydeceived, ordered the garrisons a t once to embark, an d th us placedlheill in t h e clntches of Kelson and the liing.Now, i t is perfectly clear, because distinctly sta ted by Nelson,th at the errand of the captains on the 26th was ' to arrange withyour Em inency everything relative to a n at tack on St. E l m o ; ' andthere is no mention of a n y other purpose whatever. Th e let ter ofthe 24th had indeed accredited th em a s ' fully informed of LordNelson's sentiments ; ' but upon what subject? Upon the t reaty ,the terins of which he ha d just learned from Foote, upon hisresolve not to remain neuter, an d upon his hopes th at they mig htttct in concert against the enemy ; noth ing more. To argu e th atbecause an envoy ha s received to-d ay cre dentials to re presen t hi sprincipal's views on one sul?ject, sta ted in writing, and two dayslate r is sent on a n entirely different m atte r, equally clearly definedin writ ing, he is on the second occasion empowered to say th a t hisprincipal has changed his mind on th e first subject, bu t will n ot

:"icolas, iii. 391. T l ~ ei ta l ics arc minc. ' T h i s m o rn in g ' was 26 J u n e , the da teot Haniilton'a Ictter.


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1890 493A A+lj SEIJ.YOSiS ACC T 'SERSput i t i n \vr i t i i~g ,is clearlv un tenable ; especial ly nhen t l ie princi-pal i s but a mile dista nt . Ruffo ha d in his ha nd s two wri t tenpap ers by Nelson-one th e letter of th e 2-lth1 brou ght to h im byth e c aptains, th e other th e Opinion, given him personally by Nelson-in both which i t was distinct ly stated that th e capitulat ion no nldnot be allowed. A child, in t he face of suc h papers, would n othave accepted th e assurance of a second party , unaccompanied bya wri tten re t racta t ion by the pr incipal. The only probabi li ty g i ~ e nto this argu m ent, which rests upon th e state nlen t of Sacchinell i,Ruffo's biographer, is obtained by cutting out that part of Nelson'slett er of th e 26th \vhich defined, an d limited, as Troubridge, evenacco rding to Sacchinelli, saicl, th e pon.ers h e ancl Ball possessed.They had absolutely no po\vers ~vhaterer,except to arrange for tlleat tacl i on St . Elm o.Tha t ' Troubridge and Ball demurred to signing, on the groundth a t sncli for m al sign ature would be a n extension of tl ieir po~v ers, 'is a statenlent which perverts, by suppression and insinuation, thcaccount 197 Sacchinelli , upon w hich alone it rests. Sacchinelli ';~ ~ o r d sa re :

Troubridge wrote with his own hand this declaration, but would notsign it, saying that they had been charged and accredited ~ i t hthe letterof June 24 to treat by voice concerning military operations, and not atall, in writing, affairs pertaining to diplomacy.Tt perverts by suppression, in no t mentionillg their l imit a t 'lonto military affairs ; by insinuation, in the expression ' formalsign ature being a n extension of the ir powers,' for i t was not t l lcformal s ignature, bu t the t reat ing 01; diplomat ic mat ters a t a l l ,th at mas th en beyoild their scope. T ha t Sacchinelli was in error insaying Troubridge wrote mith his own hand, Mr. Badham aclmits.i7H e mlgh t with l i t t le pains have seen th at Sacchinell i as equallymista lien in saying ' t h e le t ter of Ju ne 24.' The captains' missionproceeded on t he letter of 26 Ju ne , an d was of a purely nlili tarycharacter ; and Troubridge, ' vhose lionour,' to use St. T-incent'swords, ' was as br ight a s his s~vo rd, 'spolie only truth when he saidth at he n-as the n linlited to m ilitary operations. Sacchinelli clocsnot mention Selson's letter of the 26t11, ~vhichindicates either tl lathe dicl not know of it, or that he carelessly suppressed i t ; ei thersupposi t ion being very damaging to l lis authori ty. H e nt tribotesthe ir present mission to bringing H am ilto n's le tter of 2(i Ju ne ,which does no t illention tlzenl, ins tea d of to Se lso n's of tlle sam edate, which does.Th e sam e unf or tu nat e tendency to insinua te subterfuge is see11in th e succeeding words of th e write r- 'havin g probably been for-

" In a note on p. 275 .


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$94 T f IE cY13dPOLIY'Ail..V 3 E P t:RT,IC. I Xj5' Ju lybidden to sign an yth ing whatever. (Or was i t with an inkling ofwhat was to happen th at they s hran k from commit t ing themselvesmore th an they could help ?).' Th e innuendo is of the sa me natu rea s in th e case of Ha milton , before noticed. I n doubtful ma tters, asuggested solution i s doubtless ofte n permissible ; but not sugges-tion of evil, where me n's rep ute is a t stake, especially when the reis con trar y evidence so stro ng a s in the closing words of Nelson'sletter, om itted by Rfr. Ba dh am . Nor does th e word ' probably,' usedi n both instances, soften the implication. It must be left to thecandicl reade r to determ ine whether touches like th is do no t im pa rt.by insinuation, to the whole passage a colour not justified by thefacts. T h at the alleged pape r mas draw n 1111 for the captains to s ignis very possible. T he par ticula r sta tem en t of Sacchinelli, th a tTroubridge himself xr ot e i t , being untrue, an d his ignoringNelson's letter of th e 26t11, go far to inva lidate his testimony,which is all we he re hav e on Ruffo's side of the case. F o r we havenow to touch ~zponth e ne st most extraordinary misstatement, byth e side of which even th e mu tila tion of Nelson's lett er growssmall.

Ruffo's testimony, according to Sacchinelli, which, as erroneousin two particulars, sorely needs corroboration, receives it, so ourwriter says, from a let ter of H am ilton's which h e mill qu ote shortly.This quotation we have already given (szi;u~-a,p. 488). Will thereader believe that Hamilton dicl not write those words, thusgravely adduced ? They ar e merely the comment of th at prince ofromancers, 11.Alesandre D umas, upon w hat H am ilton ha d written ;-the inference of 31. D um as , wh atev er value m ay be attributecl tothat . The error occurs th us : 39. Dumas in h i s work , I B o ~ h o n itliSapol i , gives, with some elimination, Ha milto n's letter to Acton(the Sicilian Prim e Minister a t P alermo) of 28 June. I n the midst ofit he iaterru pts Ham il ton 's narrat ive to inter ject his own comment ,which ha s been gravely quoted in th is passage a s the words ofH am ilton. Th e justice of D um as' inferen ce each persoil mayestim ate for himself-to me i t seems wholly unfounded ; but, be itgood or bad, it i s Dum as, not H am ilton, who speaks. H er e follows,tra ns lat ed , so m uc h of th e text fsom Du m as' b001i a s is necessaryto show th e chara cter of th e mistake. H am ilton writes :Lord Nelson thought himself sufficiently authorised 7 8 to take pos-session of the polaccas, and to anchor them in the midst of the Britishsquadron, where they remain a t the disposition of His Majesty. . . .Th is is followed by th e com ment of Du m as himself, printed byMr. Badham a s if it were Hamilton's own :-

Lord Nelson, therefore, had kept the proinise he had given to th eBy a letter received 28 June from the Iring. See Rose'$ Diaries, i . 238.


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Cardinal. He had not opposed the embarkation of the garrison, but thegarrison once embarked, it appears what he had done with it.i9T he n follow sentences which Mr. Bad ham omits :-

That is n thing which surpasses by far the Pnnic faith so muchreproached to Carthage.After this Si r Will iam Ham il ton cont inues : ' Affairs cannot

go worse for their Sici l ian IIajest ies,' e t ~ . ~ OJve ar e all l iable to error-to oversight ; but error i s not1jardoilable when evidently careless, an d when directed to th edestruct ion ot a dead man's reputat ion. M. I h m a s v a s perfectlyfair an d accurate in his deal ing with the m atter . Not only areHamilton's words cureful ly guarded by quotat ion mark s, but , nsseen, when they ar e resumed, st 1:hrase is introduced which malresthe fact that they are so perfect ly clear : Si r Ki l l i am Hami l t o l ~contiilues.'S ex t follows an oth er atte m pt to confound thing s which differ,a s armist ice and capitulat ion differ. Permission to emb ark isbrought into close connesion with an alleged promise of thecaptains for Nelson, that he ' " J\-oulcl not oppose " the execution, 'an d the impression is produced tha t , if no t th e same thing, theyi i l l p l ~th e same sanct ion ; whereat;, in fact, embarliation (which,as they (lid embark, it is reasonable to suppose \\-as allowed) isqnite as consistent with Nelsoli 's dem and for ~ ulco nditio nnl su r-rencler, a s it is wit11 th e te rm s Iinfio gra nte d. Se ls on hadpermitted tl le armistice, while rejecting th e first capitulation. I nacceptin g sn rre nd er on hi s on-11 terms-unconditional-he allo~v ettenlbarliatioii , a~ va iti ng tlie Iring's decision. JI r. Ba dh am hasfollorved th e m et hod of Sa cchine lli , tr.110 gives tlle facsim ile of th ealleged declarat ion of the captains, ' Lorcl Se lso n will no t opposethe embarl ia tion ; ' while in the test (p. 236) he quotes them asdeclaring, ' Nelson will no t preven t th e es ecu tion of tlie ca pitu la-tion. ' T h at an y promise, espressecl or implied, was given not tooppose the execution ot th e te rm s g rxiited by Ruffo, depends hollyupon Sacchinelli, s1io1~i.nto be w o n g in two points, viz . thatTronbridge wrote the paper wi th his own hand , an d th at thei rauth ori ty s a s derivecl from the let ter of th e 24th ; not to speak ofthe discrepancy between th e facsimile an d the test . The solesupport to Sacchinelli 's assertio n of th e promise is a n alleged e s-pression of Si r W illiam H am ilto n's, proved to h ave proceeded no tfrom him, but f rom Dum as.The stateme nt th at the captains furth er promisecl t l int Xelson

I.c. ' v i t h hi s prolnise .' Mr . Ba dh am t rans la tes : ' t h e ga r ri sons once embarked ,it became patent \ \ -hat he h a d d o n e with tllem.' I n t h e o r ig ina l it s t a n d s : ' s i vedeche cosa ne av eva fa tto .'

'O Dumaq, I Rorb3?1idi X q o l i . iv. 51.5. !I(;.


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496 THE hrEAPOLITL1.\' REPI;BIJC-IYS Ju ly' mould land marines to assist in the execution ' of the capituln-tion is again a n error, based on a lette r of Ha milton's, given infull by Dum as, but here mangled a n d garbled. Th e reader isre fe rred t o t he o rig inal,$ l ~ ~ h i c h I n i t w ill beis dated 27 June.found two statem ents : one, th a t Nelson ha d promised to give allth e assistance th a t the fleet could give for th e service of th e king ;the other, some l ines furthe r, separated by a period, tha t , theemba rkation of the rebels having been arran ged , five hun dredm ar ine s will be latlcled to garr ison th e castles.82 Th e two, rela tingto differeilt times and conditions, are brought together, to con-st i tute a promise of which the re is no other p ro of ; an d it is quietlyassumed throughout th at i t was impossible any other arran gem entcould have been m ade t h an for th e execution of th e original treaty.Th e disentan glem ent of errors like these, from th e company ofpartial truths in which they are inserted, is proverbially difficult.Mr. Ba dh am 's ne st m isstateme nt, like two or three of th e pre-ceding, is easily exposed. Ruffo,' he say s, ' was conlpletely cleceizcd . 'Sacchinelli is our only autho rity as to Ruffo's inlpressions in thistransaction, an d these are his words :-

The Cardinal, abtlzo~~gl~ n ~ ig l~ t izk e suspectecl that t l ~ e ~ e Be bad fa i tht l ~ i s , ~ ~not wishing to dispute with those two captains, concerned hiinselfno further than to charge Minister Micheroux to accompany them to thecastles, to arrange with the republican commanders the esecutioil of thearticles ~ tipu late d.~ 'Ruffo evidently was not deceived any further than he chose tobe. Sacchinelli7sversion of Uiche ronx' mission-' to ar ra ng e th eesecution of th e articles stipulated,' i.e. of the treaty-must betaken with the large allowance due to his errors before indicated,and , in my judgillent, to s general looseness of statement andtendency to assumptions. H e also asserts afterwards th a t ' t h eEn glish themselves esecuted the trea ty which they a t first refusedto recognise.' Aga inst th is assumption-for, lacking othe r proof,such it is--is to be set Kelson's writte n Opinion, still on record,th at th e tre at y could not be esecu ted without the Iring's approval.The re is no proof th a t th e adnliral ever receded from thisposition. Ruffo had no ground to believe he had, except thealleged promise of th e cap tains , of which ad equ ate proof is

I Bol.boni di Nap oli, iv. 87, 86.d' AS there ha s come to m y notice some perplexity nt the seenling discrepancpbetweenxelson's let ter of 26 June , promising to land 1,200 men, th enu mb er Ruffoasked,and the fact tha t 500 only mere landed th e same day, I explain th at Selson's let ter waswritten before the garrisons accepted th e terms, an d referred only to t he enterpriseagainst St . Elmo. Upon the surrender 500 marines were landed to occupy S u o roan d Uovo. W hen ready to act against St. Elm o, Nelson asked th at these be relievedby Neapolitan troops, in order to make up th e promised British reinforcement of1,200.81 The alleged verbal promise, yet refusal to qign. Sacchinell i , p. 237,


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n-anting ; nor could any verbal promise of an envoy supersede tliewri t ten s ta tenlent of his pr incipal, ne ar a t han d. To thi s is to beaddecl Selson 's wri t t en s ta tem ent to hi s commander- in-chief, and to E a r l Spencer ," th e F irs t Lord of the Adm iral ty , bothwithin three weelis of the transaction, th a t th e rebe ls came out ofthe castles with the ki ionledge th at the t rea ty n a s by him dis-a l l ~ w e d , ~ 'and that they inui t submit themselves to t l le I i ing ' sdeterminat ion " upon i t .

I11 fact, aillit1 mncli conflict of te ~ ti m o ii y anlon g Ita lia nwitnesses, th is h:is a ln a y i been by far the mo st probable account.I t is also tlie iolntion accepted 1)y tlie recent Ita lia n writer, tlie;\Iarchese ;\[nl.eica, n h o s~ ui nin p his na r ra t ive by saying: It iqnllora ble to suppose tl iat 3Iicherou.i , together ~ v i t ht h e t n o E n g l is h -illell (Troubriclgc :xiid Ball) , arrang ed ~ i t htlle con im and ers of th eforts th at t he capitulation slio~ulclbe elecute d upon lines snbordi-na te d to tlie declaration s of S elso n. There n a s no lonaer rooin tospeal; of a n unmodified execu tion, af te r tlie declaration s of th eE n g l is h ( a dm i ra l) a n d a ft er t h e en fo rc ed a d he si on of X u f f ~ . ~ ~Onlyan unconditional surrender conld a t th at mom ent be discussed;and if conditions were offered, they could only be most brieflythese , th a t th e pa t r io ts should sur render th e cas tles, pure ly andsinlply, t h a t those who wishecl to go to Toulon shou ld enlbarl; a n drem ain in the road., the rem ainde r in t lie forts, until the deter-i l~ innt ionof th e kin:: in botl1 cases was lr n o ~ ~ n . ' Bnffo' i lett er ofth e 25 th to Sels on, published for the f irst t im e in this article,c linches I Iares ca ' s argum ent .I t will be notecl th a t M r. Bad hain nlis~.epresentsRuffo's missionof 3Iiche rons to th e forts, as given by his auth ority, Saccliinelli.Iccord iiig to th e latt er , l \I icherous' instruc tions \\-ere not th at t l legarr isons ' must embarlr inimediately ; ' they mere th at h e should,in coi~, junctionnit11 the capta ins , a r rang e n i t h th e reynblicancom ma nde rs for t l ie e\ecutioii of th e articles stipulated." Slight-ing allusioil only is mad e by M r. Baclhanl to t he lette r sen t by R u &to tlie ga rris on s o n tlie iiigh t of tlie "tli, n a r n i n g the111 t h a tSelson n nuld iiot recognise the treaty : ' The int inla t ion n FLS a11too \ague, and hat ever disquietndc it lef t m us t hav e been dissi-pated hy tlie nssiurances of th e cap tain s. ' T h at sucli ass ura nc esmere given is not only not proved ; the authority tllnt alleges the111l ~ a sbeen d isc redited . Ruf fo 's in t imat ion , a l so -p re ~ io u s l ~givenin ful l in t his ar tic le-~vas not vague, though less peremptory th anSelso n's o n n . Finally, Nelson himself not only n iade the statc-

" S i c o l a s , iii . 393. 'ti Ib id . 11. 401;." :bid, 1). 38s. " I b i d . 11. 386 ." 9Ia resca accep ts t h e \\.0l'd3 of A ct on to S e l s o n ( S ic ol ns . ~ i i .17 . c l s s x ~i . n o te l .' T h p Ca rd in a l yirldetl t u your wise a n d s t e a d y d e c la ra tio n . '

" "drcltivio S t o ~ i c o Ze I ' ~ . o r i ~ ~ c e xis. 5'23-2(;.~ W I ' X r ~ ~ o l r t n i t r .* ' Sncchine l l i , p. 23i.


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498 TFfE SIf~.lPOLTT,4SI l l? PUBI,TC=1NS Julynlents quoted to Keith and to Spencer, but less than a year after-ward also asserted : ' On Ruffo's refusal to send in a joiut declara-t ion to the Fren ch and Rebels , I sent ~ I L and on which thenzy ~ ~ o t e ,Reb els cam e ou t of t h e castles.' 92 If t he present writer ha s demon-strated, as clearly as he hopes he has, the utter untrustworthinessof Sacchinelli's story about the verbal assurances by Troubridgean d Ball, what difficulty rem ains to accepting th a t the republicancom manders were notified of the real st at e of the case by th ecaptains, and th a t Acton spoke tru ly in saying th at Ruffo yieldedto Nelson's declaration ; under protest possibly, but yielded ?Nelson's words, ' I sent in my note,' correspond precisely toRuffo'sth e evening after their interview, ' th e letter to th e castles will havebeen sen t off by th is time.' I t went from Nelson, witho ut Rnffo'sadhesion.So mu ch of this article ha d been ~v rit te a vh en the writerreceived from the Director of the Riz~istcr.J I n r i t t i s ~ ~ ~ - - t o h ewhomtakes this opp ortunity of expressing hi s tha nk s for m uch courtesyan d assistance received-two Ital ian p am phlets on th e sninesubject, published during 1898, subsequent to th e article i n th eENGLISHHISTORICALBEV IEV, which seems to hav e occasionedthem, a t least in par t . These are ent it led ' Nelson e Caracciolo,'by Francesco Lemmi," and ' Nelson, Caracciolo, e la RepublicaNapo letana,' by Pasqnale Villari ;" the latte r being a review in t heSuoc a ,.i,ttoloyin-by a writer whose high repu tat ion has beendeserve

the neapolitan republicans and nelson's accusers

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