The parliamentary election in Italy, April 2006

Paolo Bellucci�

Centre for the Study of Political Change, (CIRCaP), Universita di Siena, Via Mattioli 10, I-53100 Siena, Italy

185Notes on Recent Elections / Electoral Studies 27 (2008) 151e190

On April 9e10 2006, Italians voters elected theXV parliament, and, quite astonishingly, only onetenth of a percentage point (24,000 votes) separatedthe winning centre-left parties, led by Romano Prodi,from the centre-right parties, led by Silvio Berlus-coni, in the lower chamber (Camera dei Deputati).1

Many features contributed to make this election par-ticularly salient: the record full 5-year tenure of Ber-lusconi’s centre-right government; an election cyclesuggesting heavy losses for the incumbent parties;and the enactment of a highly controversial electorallaw.

1. Background

Unlike the centre-left governments during the1996e2001 legislature, whose political heterogeneitymeant three different prime ministers, the outgoingBerlusconi administration government had governedfor the entire period with only minor cabinet reshuf-fling. Berlusconi could proudly claim the longesttenure in the history of the Italian Republic. Hisrecord in government, however, was far fromuncontroversial.

On the one hand, the centre-right coalition ecomposed of Berlusconi’s Forza Italia (FI), thepost-fascist Alleanza Nazionale (AN), the regionalistLega Nord (LN), and the (post-Christian Democracy)Unione Democratici Cristiani di Centro (UDC) ehad been unable, in face of a severe economic reces-sion after ‘9/11’, to secure the early economic pros-perity that voters expected. Moreover, disagreementswithin the governing coalition (within FI, and be-tween FI and AN) prevented the implementation ofthe economic liberalization and privatisation policieswhich had been the backbone of the 2001 manifesto

� Tel.: þ39 0577 235 340; fax: þ39 0577 235 292.

E-mail address: paolo.bellucci@unisi.it1 These data refer to votes in the 26 constituencies in Italy, exclud-

ing the foreign constituency reserved for Italians living abroad and

the Valle d’Aosta’s single-member constituency.

for the ‘House of Freedoms’ (Casa delle Liberta,CdL). On the other hand, the government’s majorpolicy achievements had been highly controversial:a slate of legislation on justice e engulfing the par-liament in its first two years e was criticized for be-ing primarily geared towards shielding the PrimeMinister; support for US and UK military involve-ment in Iraq and Euroscepticism were perceived aschallenging Italy’s traditional pro-European foreignpolicy; tax reduction had been well below expecta-tion and state expenditures had not been cut. Finally,the constitutional reform e granting quasi-federal powersto the regions (advocated by the Lega Nord) and greaterpowers to the prime minister vis-a-vis parliament (AN’straditional demand) e faced fierce opposition from thecentre-left and within the ruling coalition. Thus, after aninitial ‘honeymoon’, the government’s popularity de-clined (see Fig. 1).

Together with Berlusconi’s personal ratings plum-meting in the opinion polls, this translated into elec-toral defeat in the 2004 mid-term European election:House of Freedoms’ parties polled 45.4%, the centre-left opposition 46.1%. More importantly, in 2005, withthe centre-left parties winning in 12 of the 14 regionalelections (with 52.5% of the vote against the CdL’s44.5%), it was widely assumed that the election cyclewould lead to the ousting of the centre-right parties inthe 2006 general election. Such expectations musthave convinced the centre-right leaders also, sincea new electoral law was implemented in an effort to re-duce possible electoral damage.

2. Electoral system

Under the mixed-plurality system introduced in1993, voters received two ballots: one to allocatetwo-thirds of the seats in the Chamber of Deputiesin single-member constituencies (based on first-past-the-post), and one to allocate the remaining one-thirdof seats via a party list vote in multi-member constit-uencies. The electoral system for the Senate was

186 Notes on Recent Elections / Electoral Studies 27 (2008) 151e190

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September 11

Iraq war

European Elections

Regional elections

Budget Law

Centre-Right governmentCentre-Leftgovernment

Fig. 1. Trend in government approval in Italy, June 2001eApril 2007. Source: CIRCaP-Universita di Siena.

similar, although the voters received only one ballot forregional-level single-member constituencies.2 Impor-tant effects of this electoral law had been to force partiesto enter pre-electoral alliances in order to maximize theirchances of victory, to produce (almost) clear majorities,and, eventually, government alternation. The centre-right parties, however, were systematically penalizedin the majority vote: proportional party votes had beensignificantly higher than their summed share in single-member districts, due to the difficulty of different parties(and their electoral base) to co-exist in a cartel.3

The new law, approved only four months before the2006 election (Law 270, 21 December 2005), exploitedthe record of its better performance in the proportionalvote by re-introducing a PR list system. Among the ex-plicit goals of the law was to create obstacles to thelikely success of the centre-left by differentiating theallocation of seats in the two Chambers e hoping fora different majority in each e and to give greater vis-ibility to parties rather than to coalitions. The hope wasto reduce the centre-left vote.

Three main features characterised the new electorallaw: a proportional representation system for both

2 The proportional seats for the Senate were allocated to parties ac-

cording to the votes received at the regional level for candidates not

elected in single-member districts within the region. For a fuller de-

scription and analysis of Italy’s electoral laws, see Cotta and Verzi-

chelli (2007).3 In 2001, the winning centre-right parties received 1.5 m fewer

votes in the majoritarian ballot than in the PR poll; see Parker and

Natale (2002).

chambers with a non-preferential party list vote inmulti-member constituencies;4 the establishment ofthresholds for seat allocations; and a majority bonusfor the winning coalition.5 Parties were thus encour-aged to enter electoral coalitions; contesting the elec-tion as single parties would entail meeting the 4%nationwide electoral threshold, but the threshold forelectoral coalitions was only 2%. In the Chamber, thecoalition winning the largest plurality of national voteswould be allocated 55% of the seats (if it had notreached that vote share); the same bonus is allocatedregionally for the Senate.6

Through the coalition bonus, the obligation forparties to subscribe to a common programme, and forparties to declare the leader of the governing coalition,the new electoral law contributed to Italy retaining itsbi-polar format, as experienced since 1994. At thesame time, however, it gave parties greater opportuni-ties due to very low thresholds, no preference votingfor candidates, and multiple candidatures in differentdistricts. It also risked promoting further party frag-mentation. Also, as called for by AN, Italians living

4 In 26 constituencies for the lower house; in 20 constituencies, co-

inciding with the Italian regions, for the Senate.5 After the election, the law was dubbed a ‘porcata’ (rotten trick)

by Northern League’s MP Roberto Calderoli to underline its partisan

goal. Calderoli was responsible for drafting the law.6 Given the traditionally uneven geographical strength of the

parties, this aspect was sharply criticised as different political major-

ities in the two Houses would be possible.

187Notes on Recent Elections / Electoral Studies 27 (2008) 151e190

abroad could vote; 12 Deputies and 6 Senators wereelected for the foreign constituency.7

3. Electoral campaign

Following the 2004e05 electoral set-backs andthe tarnishing of Berlusconi’s leadership, the centre-right coalition partners attempted to question his roleas head of the cartel prior to the 2006 elections. Indeed,the Secretary of the tiny UDC, Marco Follini, openlychallenged the leadership. However, the electoralstrength of Forza Italia in the coalition, the still wide-spread personal appeal of Berlusconi, and his skill asa political communicator (matched with greater payoffsto minor coalition parties granted by the new electorallaw), resulted in confirming Berlusconi’s leadership ofthe CdL.

In the centre-left camp, Romano Prodi re-launched the Olive Tree Federation, based on theDemocratic Left (DS), Daisy (DL), and the ItalianSocial Democrats (SDI).8 After successfully contest-ing the 2005 regional elections,9 Prodi assembledL’Unione, a larger coalition that included other leftand centre parties.10 Prodi’s goal, in the context ofthe mixed-plurality electoral system, was to createmomentum for L’Unione, thus legitimising himselfas a leader with no clear party behind him (althoughbacked by DS and DL). After quarrels among theparties, the strategy was to hold ‘primary’ polls,open to all citizens, to select L’Unione’s leader andits candidate for the premiership. Unexpectedly, 4.5million people took part, with 75% voting for Prodi.By the time the new electoral law was enacted, how-ever, differences among the centre-left parties hademerged (on issues ranging from pacifism to tax tobio-ethics), which meant Prodi holding together ideo-logically diverse political groups no longer con-strained to present agreed candidatures in single-member districts. Eventually, all L’Unione partiessubscribed to a 300-page manifesto, of such Byzan-tine complexity that every partner could claim

7 Provided for by Law 459/2001, but implemented for the 2006

election.8 Romano Prodi, a former prime minister (1996e1998), returned to

Italian politics at the end of his mandate as President of the EU Com-

mission in November 2004.9 Standing as a single list in 9 of 14 regions, Olive Tree polled

a healthy 34%.10 L’Unione included Communist Refoundation (RC), Party of Ital-

ian Communists (PdCI), Greens, Radical Party (PR), Italy of Values

(IdV), Union for Democrats for Europe (UDEUR), and other minor

lists.

some victory e but made it useless as a policy pro-gramme to appeal to the electorate. By contrast, theHouse of Freedoms’ manifesto was less than 10 pa-ges, with few but clear slogans.

The campaign was marked by the expectation ofa centre-left victory. Since months, all polls showeda rather stable 5% lead for Prodi’s coalition e withthe exception of one poll ordered by Berlusconifrom a US firm (PBS Associates).11 This poll, un-veiled in February 2006, showed a tie between thetwo coalitions. Whereas other centre-right leadersappeared to take defeat almost for granted, Berlus-coni went on the attack. Exploiting his influenceon his own and state-owned television stations, heappeared on countless programmes: as early as Jan-uary, 25% of air time in TV news was dedicated tohim, in contrast to just 5% to Prodi (ITANES,2006, p. 41). The imbalance persisted throughoutthe campaign, stopping only in the last monthwhen regulations require equal access to televisionby the parties.

The importance of the media in the 2006 cam-paign was stronger than ever, largely because the ab-olition of single-member constituencies andpreference voting entailed the virtual absence ofcampaigning on the ground. The media agenda wasshaped by Berlusconi; he personalized the campaign,called on voters to choose between him and the‘Communists’, and displaced attention from his cab-inet’s record in office by denouncing the risks asso-ciated with a centre-left government, such as raisingtaxes and threats to private property. The opposi-tion’s initial reaction, pointing to the leader’s lackof credibility and a coalition that failed to fulfilpromises and accomplished little, convinced votersonly mildly.12 However, it reinforced the centre-left’scampaign strategy of not convincing new voters withpolicy proposals but, rather, consolidating its existinglead by reminding its electorate of the government’sfailures. The centre-right’s strategy was to mobilizeits disappointed voters (who had abstained in the re-gional elections; see Segatti, 2005) and the politi-cally disengaged.

In the second half of the campaign Berlusconifocused on a minor but highly symbolic point in thecentre-left’s manifesto: the re-introduction of

11 Choosing a foreign ‘independent’ firm was part of Berlusconi’s

communication strategy to denounce (as he had in 2001) a ‘conspir-

acy’ by the national media against the centre-right, notwithstanding

that he is a media tycoon.12 After the first TV debate in mid-March, 45% gave the victory to

Prodi (Italian National Election Study, 2006).

188 Notes on Recent Elections / Electoral Studies 27 (2008) 151e190

Table 1

Results of the Chamber of Deputies election in Italy, 10e11 April 2006

Lists Italy (excluding Aosta Valley) Aosta Valley Foreign constituency All

Votes

(no)

% Seats

(no)

Votes

(no)

% Seats

(no)

Votes

(no)

% Seats

(no)

Votes

(no)

% Seats

(no)

Olive Tree List (DS þ DL) 11,930,983 31.3 220 11,930,983 30.4 220

Communist Refoundation (RC) 2,229,464 5.8 41 2,229,464 5.7 41

Rese in the Fist (Rnp) 990,694 2.6 18 990,694 2.5 18

Party of Italian Communists (PdCI) 884,127 2.3 16 884,127 2.3 16

Italy of Values (IdV) 877,052 2.3 16 27,432 2.8 1 904,484 2.3 17

Greens 784,803 2.1 15 784,803 2.0 15

Unions of Democrats for Europe

(UDEUR)

534,088 1.4 10 9692 1.0 0 543,780 1.4 10

L’Unione-Prodi (Italians abroad) 422,330 43.3 6 422,330 1.1 6

Alliance for Aosta Valley 34,168 43.4 1 34,168 0.1 1

Other centre-left lists 771,387 2.0 4 1135 1.4 0 772,522 2.0 4

Total: L’Union 19,002,598 49.8 340 35,303 44.9 1 459,454 47.1 7 19,497,355 49.7 348

Forza Italia (FI) 9,048,976 23.7 137 202,407 20.8 3 9,251,383 23.6 140

National Alliance (AN) 4,707,126 12.3 71 4,707,126 12.0 71

FI þ AN 13,374 17.0 0 13,374 0.0

Union of Centrist Christian

Democrats (UDC)

2,580,190 6.8 39 2282 2.9 0 65,794 6.7 0 2,648,266 6.8 39

Northern League (LN) þMovement

for Autonomy (MPA)

1,747,730 4.6 26 1566 2.0 0 20,227 2.1 0 1,769,523 4.5 26

New Christian Democracy (DC) þNew Socialist Parti (NSPI)

285,474 0.7 4 285,474 0.7 4

Italy in the World (Italians abroad) 73,289 7.5 1 73,289 0.2 1

Other centre-right lists 608,347 1.6 0 2017 2.6 0 8235 0.8 0 618,599 1.6 0

Total: House of Freedoms 18,977,843 49.7 277 19,239 24.5 0 369,952 37.9 4 19,367,034 49.4 281

Lists outside the two coalitions 172,902 0.5 0 24,119 30.7 0 146,008 15.0 1 343,029 0.9 1

Total 38,153,343 100.0 617 78,661 100.0 1 975,414 100.0 12 39,207,418 100.0 630

Blank Ballots 439,286 1.1 2505 3

Void Ballots 705,868 1.8 2767 3.3

Turnout 39,298,497 83.6 83,933 83.4 42

Source: Ministry of the Interior (provisional data for Foreign Constituency).

inheritance tax (abolished by Berlusconi’s government).He also promised to abolish local real estate tax. Thecentre-left’s confusion about the policy e manifest inthe different thresholds for tax levels voiced by differentleaders, ranging from a few hundred thousand Euros tomillions e did nothing for the centre-left’s image ofcompetence in government and highlighted the politicalheterogeneity of L’Unione. So a campaign wagedmainly on taxation and the economy, and to a lesser ex-tent on bio-ethical and foreign policy issues, which hadopened with Berlusconi on trial, ended with the centre-left on the defensive. The second TV debate improvedBerlusconi’s rating (34.6% approval against Prodi’s26.8%; ITANES, 2006, p. 181), which translated intoa 29% government approval rating at the beginning ofApril (up from 23% in November; Bellucci, 2006),and to closing the centre-left’s lead. It became clear,on opening the ballots, that the Centre-Left had wonthe election but the Centre-Right had won the campaign.

4. Election results

A salient election mobilises voters, and turnout was83.6% e which suggests an increase from 81.4% in2001 according to official figures. The comparison issomewhat misleading, however: for the first time, Italiansliving abroad had the right to vote, which resulted ina much higher participation rate. In previous elections,very few of the 2e3 m. Italian citizens living abroad couldreturn to vote, so they were deleted from domestic elec-toral lists on which turnout is computed.13 Estimates ofelectoral participation of Italian electors living in Italycomputed on comparable bases set the turnout in 2001

13 At the time of writing, definitive official data were not yet avail-

able. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, turnout among

Italians abroad can be estimated at 42%, based on returned mail bal-

lots out of 2.7 million sent out. See http://www.esteri.it/ita/4_29_73_

313_278_227.asp.

189Notes on Recent Elections / Electoral Studies 27 (2008) 151e190

Table 2

Results of the Senate election in Italy, 10e11 April 2006

Lists Italy Foreign constituency All

Votes (no) % Seats (no) Votes (no) % Seats (no) Votes (no) % Seats (no)

Democratic Left (DS) 59,77,313 17.2 62 5,977,313 16.8 62

Daisy (DL) 3,664,622 10.5 39 3,664,622 10.3 39

Communist Refoundation (RC) 2,518,624 7.2 27 2,518,624 7.1 27

Party of Italian Communists (PdCI) þ Greens 1,423,226 4.1 11 1,423,226 4.0 11

Italy of Values (IdV) 986,046 2.8 4 26,134 3.0 0 1,012,180 2.8 4

Rese in the Fist (Rnp) 851,875 2.4 0 851,875 2.4 0

Unions of Democrats for Europe (UDEUR) 476,938 1.4 3 13,265 1.5 0 490,203 1.4 3

L’Unione-Prodi (Italians abroad) 387,145 44.0 4 387,145 1.1 4

Other centre-left lists 1,191,112 3.4 8 1,191,112 3.3 8

Total: L’Union 17,089,756 49.1 154 426,544 48.5 4 17,516,300 49.1 158

Forza Italia (FI) 8,201,688 23,6 78 185,438 21.1 1 8,387,126 23.5 79

National Alliance (AN) 4,234,693 12.2 41 4,234,693 11.9 41

Union of Centrist Christian Democrats (UDC) 2,311,448 6.6 21 57,200 6.5 0 2,368,648 6.6 21

Northern League (LN) þMovement for

Autonomy (MPA)

1,531,939 4.4 13 18,455 2.1 0 1,550,394 4.3 13

New Christian Democracy (DC) þ New

Socialist Parti (NSPI)

190,724 0.5 0 190,724 0.5 0

Italy in the World (Italians abroad) 63,474 7.2 0 63,474 0.2 0

Other centre-right lists 889,262 2.6 2 8433 1.0 0 897,695 2.5 2

Total: House of Freedoms 17,359,754 49.9 155 333,000 37.8 1 17,692,754 49.6 156

Lists outside the two coalitions 330,917 1.0 0 120,389 13.7 1 451,306 1.3 1

Total 34,780,427 100.0 309 879,933 100.0 6 3,660,360 100.0 315

Blank Ballots 481,348 1.3

Void Ballots 652,234 1.8

Turnout 35,943,615 83.6

Source: Ministry of the Interior (Provisional data for Foreign Constituency).

at 1.6 percentage points higher than in 2006 (ITANES,2006). However the number of Italians who cast a validballot increased significantly: spoiled votes (blank andvoid ballots) fell to 3% (from 3 m in 2001 to 1 m),14 sug-gesting a strong mobilisation of citizens traditionally dis-engaged from politics.

The quasi-draw results shocked both the centre-leftand the centre-right: see Table 1. They defied expecta-tions; moreover, paradoxically, the slim majority ofcentre-left seats was due entirely to the (not unexpected)perverse functioning of the new electoral law. In thelower chamber, the centre-left polled just 130,000(0.03%) more votes than the centre-right. Even morestriking is the centre-left’s 0.1% advantage in the strate-gic Italian constituencies, where the majoritarian na-tional bonus translated the ballot results into a safe55.1% seat allocation for Prodi’s coalition.

14 The dramatic drop in spoiled ballots might be explained by the

simplicity of the voting format: one ballot cast as a party vote. Early

political allegations and journalistic accounts of supposed bribery

were later dismissed as ungrounded.

The shambles provoked by the electoral law ismost evident in the Senate results; see Table 2. Inthe national constituencies, the centre-right obtainedthe majority of votes in absolute values (270,000votes, 0.8%) but the bonuses allocated at the regionallevel (9 regions went to the centre-right and 11 to thecentre-left) translated into 155 seats for the House ofFreedoms and 154 for L’Unione. Ironically for thecentre-right, it was the result in the foreign constitu-ency e where the House of Freedoms’ parties mistak-enly contested the election with separate lists(winning only one seat against four to L’Unione) ewhich gave the centre-left a two-seat majority in theSenate.

Italy’s bipolarism was apparently reinforced by theelectoral law and the election results. Only 0.5% ofthe vote went to parties outside the two coalitions.However, party fragmentation has increased; so hasthe potential ‘black-mailing’ power of the minorparties within the now-ruling centre-left governmentand in the opposition. Amongst L’Unione’s parties,the radical left (Communist Refoundation, Party ofItalian Communists, and Greens) had a great result,

190 Notes on Recent Elections / Electoral Studies 27 (2008) 151e190

polling 10.2% and obtaining 72 seats in the lowerhouse.15 Among the opposition, LN confirmed itsstrength (4%) in its traditional Northern regions,while UDC doubled its vote, to 6.8%.

As for the major parties, Forza Italia was confirmedas the first-ranked political group, polling 23.7% in theChamber and 23.6% in the Senate, notwithstandingheavy losses (1.8 m votes) since 2001. The other majorcoalition partner, the AN (12.3%), performed belowexpectation. The results for the leading centre-leftparties were likewise unimpressive, polling 31.1% asthe Olive Tree list for the Chamber, but, standing asseparate lists, under-performed in the Senate election.The DS obtained 17.2% (a slight increase on 16.6%in 2001), while Daisy polled 10.5% (down from14.5% in 2001), which speaks of disaster.

The electoral results reveal both electoral strengthsand weaknesses. The strengths were that both coali-tions retained their 2001 level of support e evenamong political groups that had previously run outsidethe coalition that they later joined. Which means that ifItaly is, as it is, politically split in half, so it was also in2001. As to weaknesses, the more peripheral (and, forthe left also the most radical) members of the two co-alitions gained at the expense of the core parties. Thisimplies that the electoral geography of Italy haschanged little: the centre-right remains stronger inNorthern Italy and Sicily; the centre-left is strongerin the central regions. It is in the South that L’Unionegained the most. Individual level data broadly confirmsthis, with a growing swing-vote between coalitionssince 2001 (from 5.9% to 8.7%), especially amongSouthern voters dissatisfied with the economic situa-tion and the performance of the government. Morebroadly, why a diffused dissatisfaction with the perfor-mance of the government (as revealed in opinion polls,ITANES, 2006) did not translate into greater supportfor L’Unione lies in the tarnished image of ruling com-petence that L’Unione parties projected during thecampaign.

5. L’Unione government

Prospects for the Prodi-led government were dimwhen his cabinet won the confidence vote (May

doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2007.09.003

17). A dismal record was set by the increased numberof ministers (25) and the highest ever number of 77junior ministers (sottosegretari), which reflects theneed to accommodate the many parties in theL’Unione coalition. The government’s political het-erogeneity, coupled with its slim majority in the Sen-ate, could clearly affect policy-making, compellingthe Prime Minister to reach painstaking agreementson each major policy decision. This has been evidentsince the beginning of the legislature, when reconcilingbudget constraints with left-wing demands for social ex-penditure translated into a budget that raised taxes; a bigdrop in government popularity followed (see Fig. 1).Later, in February 2007, mutual vetoes within the coali-tion on a proposal to introduce legal recognition for un-married people (opposed by Catholics) and on Italy’sparticipation in Nato’s mission in Afghanistan (opposedby the radical left) led to a negative vote in Senate. Pro-di’s resignation was rejected by the President, and thecabinet won a confidence vote after the coalition partiesagreed to subscribe to a new government programme(very short: just 12 items) presented as ‘leave-it-or-take-it’ by Prodi himself.

Strong leadership, then, will be required to pro-ceed with a legislative programme. The government’sweakness is, after all, Prodi’s real strength. Threaten-ing resignation will keep the government united e untilthe major parties can agree on a new electoral law.Elaborating such a law is already proving to be highlydivisive in the centre-left camp.

References

Bellucci, P., 2006. All’origine della popolarita del governo in Italia,

1994e2006. Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica XXXVI (3),

479e503.

Cotta, M., Verzichelli, L., 2007. Political Institutions in Italy. Oxford

University Press, Oxford.

ITANES, 2006. Dov’e la vittoria? Il voto del 2006 raccontato dagli

italiani. Bologna, il Mulino.

Parker, S., Natale, P., 2002. Parliamentary elections in Italy, May

2002. Electoral Studies 21, 665e673.

Segatti, P., 2005. Elezioni regionali: analisi e promesse del voto.

Italianieuropei 5 (n.2), 11e20.

15 In the 2001 election, they won only 27 seats.