PhD., Lecturer, Claudiu Mesaros

Philosophy of Aristotle.Theory of substance.

Socrates lectures. University of Rzeszow, Poland

2005

1. What it means to be wise. Metaphysics I, 1. 2. Concepts of ontology. Categories, 1-5.3. Substance. Categories, 5.4. Substance in Metaphysics, VII.5. Soul as a substance. De anima, II, 1.

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1. What it means to be wise. Metaphysics I, 1.

First chapter of the Metaphysics is a search for: What a wise man look like? What are the signs for a wise and wisdom?The signs of wisdom are:

1. “We naturally desire knowledge”:

Ei)/dw - e„dšnai – eidenai: to know; To activate at the level of mind.

- to see with eyes- to observe, to examine- to look face to face- to build an image / representation- to see well, adequate

NOT proper word for: “to see”. It means: INSIGHT

By nature (fÚsei): - we have the desire to “see”- discussion: what we understand by physis?

*We wish to see with no practical purpose (prattomen).Therefore there is an action of non-practical seeing; a seeing without actually doing something. It is a non-instrumental act of seeing.

This first use of “seeing (eidenai) ” and “senses” is a metaphysical one. To “prove” our metaphysical use of senses Aristotle brings as examples our common use of senses:

- esteem for senses (their own sake)- we prefer sight as the most helping sense in

revealing distinctions

2. We value sensation. Sensation is the first step on the road to wisdom.

[980a][21] All men naturally desire knowledge.

An indication of this is our esteem for the senses; for apart from their use we esteem them for their own sake, and most of all the sense of sight. Not only with a view to action, but even when no action is contemplated, we prefer sight, generally speaking, to all the other senses.

The reason of this is that of all the senses sight best helps us to know things, and reveals many distinctions.

P£ntej ¥nqrwpoi toà e„dšnai Ñršgontai fÚsei.

shme‹on d' ¹ tîn a„sq»sewn ¢g£phsij· kaˆ g¦r cwrˆj tÁj cre…aj ¢gapîntai di' aØt£j, kaˆ m£lista tîn ¥llwn ¹ di¦ tîn Ñmm£twn. oÙ g¦r mÒnon †na pr£ttwmen ¢ll¦ kaˆ mhqn mšllontej pr£ttein tÕ Ðr©n aƒroÚmeqa ¢ntˆ p£ntwn æj e„pe‹n tîn ¥llwn.

a‡tion d' Óti m£lista poie‹ gnwr…zein ¹m©j aÛth tîn a„sq»sewn kaˆ poll¦j dhlo‹ diafor£j.

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All animals have senses by nature.- some have no memory- some have memory- some do not hear sounds

One condiiton for learning (mathesis, to acquire instruction) is: to have senses. Animals have sight (aisthesis) but not “sight” (eidesis).

+ Though they are capable of: - sensation (aisthesin), wherefrom:- memory (mneme), weherefrom:- learning (mathesis)

+ But very few (mikron):- experience (empeiria)

+ And not at all:- art (techne)- reflection/ reasoning (logismos)

First conclusions: beasts do not all the senses therefore do not acquire

complete experience There is a hierarchy of signs for wisdom:

- senses- memory- imagination - experience- art- reasoning

Art and reasoning are possible only from a complete experience.

CONCLUSION: SENSATION IS NOT ENOUGH

3. Experience.Experience (empeiria) is acquiring numerous memories of the same thing.

Now animals are by nature born with the power of sensation, and from this some acquire the faculty of memory, whereas others do not.

[980b][21] Accordingly the former are more intelligent and capable of learning than those which cannot remember. Such as cannot hear sounds (as the bee, and any other similar type of creature) are intelligent, but cannot learn; those only are capable of learning which possess this sense in addition to the faculty of memory.

Thus the other animals live by impressions and memories, and have but a small share of experience; but the human race lives also by art and reasoning.

It is from memory that men acquire experience, because the numerous memories of the same thing eventually

fÚsei mn oân a‡sqhsin œconta g…gnetai t¦ zùa, ™k d taÚthj to‹j mn aÙtîn oÙk ™gg…� �gnetai mn»mh, to‹j d' ™gg…gnetai.

kaˆ di¦ toàto taàta fronimètera kaˆ maqhtikètera tîn m¾ dunamšnwn mnhmoneÚein ™st…, frÒnima mn ¥neu �toà manq£nein Ósa m¾ dÚnatai tîn yÒfwn ¢koÚein (oŒon mšlitta k¨n e‡ ti toioàton ¥llo gšnoj zówn œsti), manq£nei d' Ósa prÕj tÍ mn»mV kaˆ taÚthn œcei t¾n a‡sqhsin.

t¦ mn oân ¥lla ta‹j � fantas…aij zÍ kaˆ ta‹j mn»maij, ™mpeir…aj d metšcei� mikrÒn· tÕ d tîn ¢nqrèpwn gšnoj kaˆ tšcnV kaˆ �logismo‹j.

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It does not mean to see now, but to see within the mind.

Experience it similar to art and science (homoion einai he empeiria), which memans:

- experience is a “sort” of art and science- experience is ordering what we see and

remember

discussion: lack of experience (¢peir…a), ignorance, lack of limitations. Words related to apeiria: apeiron.Words related to empeiria (finitude): - Empireus (visible universe)

Empeiria is a condition for techne and episteme. It is determination, limitation, finitude.

It is opposed to infinite as meaning:- lack of limitation- lack of border

EXPERIENCE IS NOT ENOUGH, AS WE SHALL SEE.

4. Art (techne)

produce the effect of a single experience.

[981a][1] Experience seems very similar to science and art,but actually it is through experience that men acquire science and art;

for as Polus rightly says, "experience produces art, but inexperience chance."11

g…gnetai d' ™k tÁj mn»mhj ™mpeir…a to‹j ¢nqrèpoij· aƒ g¦r pollaˆ mnÁmai toà aÙtoà pr£gmatoj mi©j ™mpeir…aj dÚnamin ¢poteloàsin.

kaˆ doke‹ scedÕn ™pist»mV kaˆ tšcnV Ómoion enai kaˆ ™mpeir…a� , ¢poba…nei d'epist»mh kaˆ tšcnh di¦ tÁj ™mpeir…aj to‹j ¢nqrèpoij·

¹ mn g¦r ™mpeir…a tšcnhn ™po…hsen� , æj fhsˆ Pîloj, ¹ d' ¢peir…a tÚchn.

1 Plat. Gorgias 448c, Plat. Gorg. 462b-c4

Art is a general supposition concerning similar cases occurred in experience. * g…gnetai d tšcnh – art is born / generated from universal presuppositions (hypolepseis). From experience (“to see in the mind”) art is generated.

Experience is organizing sensations in a system (see also De anima II, 6)

What kind of universal is tchne?Obviously not universal concept like in science.It is: opinion concerning many instances (pollois)

Experience: supposition that case B is similar to case A.

Art: judgement that cases A and B are a class and therefore similar by nature.

In this sense art is universal like science. It is a practical science.

Experience can be similar to art:- in practice (“for practical purposes”)- according to success (™pitugc£nw)

It is because in experience success might happen: Experience is:

- knowledge (gnosis, not episteme) of particulars

- knowledge of incidental successions in particulars

- lack of knowledge in generalArt is:

- knowledge of universals - knowledge of effects in general.- May lack experience of particulars

It is a first sign that:- theory has no practical goal

Art is produced when from many notions of experience a single universal supposition is formed with regard to like objects.

To have a supposition that when Callias was suffering from this or that disease this or that benefited him, and similarly with Socrates and various other individuals, is a matter of experience;

but to judge that it benefits all persons of a certain type, considered as a class, who suffer from this or that disease (e.g. the phlegmatic or bilious when suffering from burning fever) is a matter of art.

It would seem that for practical purposes experience is in no way inferior to art; indeed we see men of experience succeeding more than those who have theory without experience.

The reason of this is a that experience is knowledge of particulars, but art of universals; and actions and the effects produced are all concerned with the particular. For it is not man that the physician cures, except incidentally, but Callias or Socrates or some other person similarly named, who is incidentally a man as well.

[20] So if a man has theory without experience, and knows the universal, but does not know the particular

g…gnetai d tšcnh Ótan ™k pollîn tÁj �™mpeir…aj ™nnohm£twn m…a kaqÒlou gšnhtai perˆ tîn Ðmo…wn ØpÒlhyij.

tÕ mn g¦r œcein � ØpÒlhyin Óti Kall…v k£mnonti thndˆ t¾n nÒson todˆ sun»negke kaˆ Swkr£tei kaˆ kaq' ›kaston oÛtw pollo‹j, ™mpeir…aj ™st…n·

tÕ d' Óti p©si to‹j toio‹sde kat' edoj en �¢forisqe‹si, k£mnousi thndˆ t¾n nÒson, sun»negken, oŒon to‹j flegmatèdesin À colèdesi [À] puršttousi kaÚsJ, tšcnhj.

prÕj mn oân tÕ pr£ttein ™mpeir…a tšcnhj �oÙdn doke‹ diafšrein� , ¢ll¦ kaˆ m©llon ™pitugc£nousin oƒ œmpeiroi tîn ¥neu tÁj ™mpeir…aj lÒgon ™cÒntwn

(a‡tion d' Óti ¹ mn � ™mpeir…a tîn kaq' ›kastÒn ™sti gnîsij ¹ d tšcnh tîn kaqÒlou� , aƒ d pr£xeij kaˆ aƒ genšseij p©sai perˆ tÕ �

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- practice has individual goalsIt is like Ethics: has individual goals like good in particular occasion.

NEVERTHELESS:Art is conditioned by:

- Knowledge, “seeing inside” (e„dšnai)- Proficiency/skillfullness (™paein� )

Therefore, artists:- are wiser (sofwtšrouj) than men of

experience- know the cause (wherefore)- have understanding

CONCLUSION: Wisdom depends (that is: has as sign) understanding, the “seeing inside” (eidenai)

DISCUSSION: We have a hierarchy of signs for wisdom:Empeiria …….........PRACTICAL GOALTechne ……………...PRACTICAL GOAL AND UNDERSTANDING Eidenai (insight)…..NO PRACTICAL GOAL

CONCLUSION: BEING ARTIST IS STILL NOT ENOUGH FOR WISDOM

contained in it, he will often fail in his treatment; for it is the particular that must be treated.

Nevertheless we consider that knowledge and proficiency belong to art rather than to experience, and we assume that artists are wiser than men of mere experience (which implies that in all cases wisdom depends rather upon knowledge);

and this is because the former know the cause, whereas the latter do not.

For the experienced know the fact, but not the wherefore; but the artists know the wherefore and the cause.

kaq' ›kastÒn e„sin· oÙ g¦r ¥nqrwpon Øgi£zei Ð „atreÚwn ¢ll' À kat¦ sumbebhkÒj, ¢ll¦ Kall…an À Swkr£thn À tîn ¥llwn tin¦ tîn oÛtw legomšnwn ú sumbšbhken ¢nqrèpJ enai� ·

™¦n oân ¥neu tÁj ™mpeir…aj œcV tij tÕn lÒgon, kaˆ tÕ kaqÒlou mn gnwr…zV tÕ d� ' ™n toÚtJ kaq' ›kaston ¢gnoÍ, poll£kij iamart»setai tÁj qerape…aj· qerapeutÕn g¦r tÕ kaq' ›kaston)·

¢ll' Ómwj tÒ ge e„dšnai kaˆ tÕ ™paein� tÍ tšcnV tÁj ™mpeir…aj Øp£rcein o„Òmeqa m©llon, kaˆ sofwtšrouj toÝj tecn…taj tîn ™mpe…rwn Øpolamb£nomen, æj kat¦ tÕ e„dšnai m©llon ¢kolouqoàsan t¾n sof…an p©si·

toàto d' Óti oƒ mn t¾n a„t…an ‡sasin oƒ d' oÜ.

oƒ mn g¦r œmpeiroi tÕ Óti mn ‡sasi, diÒti d' oÙk ‡sasin· oƒ d tÕ diÒti kaˆ t¾n a„t…an gnwr…zousin.

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5. Leadership or master craftsmanship (to architekton)

Architekton – knows the cause.

Discussion: Aristotle said that artist also knows the cause. It is possible that for the master is essential to know the cause. He had just said that the artisan has

- insight- skillfulness

Master of art must have more. What?

The simple artisan knows through habit. His insight and skills are practical and come from habit.It is not theoretical knowledge but a repetitive action.Artisan is like inanimate objects which perform actions in virtue of a natural quality.

CONCLUSIONS ABOUT ARTISAN:- performs an action according to practical

akills- practical skill means repeating - repeating is habit (ethos)- habit is mechanical action- mechanical action is like inanimate action- inanimate action is not knowledge but

natural quality- artisan aquires a mechanical quality by

natural potencies not by knowledgeIT TAKES MORE FOR WISDOM.

Superiority of wisdom must be:- not doing things, but- possessing a theory- knowing the causes

(this can be achieved even by artist, so we need more):- ability to teach

Ability to teach makes wisdom rather than simple knowing because simple knowing can be mechanical.

First proper sign of wisdom is being able to share wisdom.

For the same reason we consider that the master craftsmen in every profession are more estimable and know more and are wiser than the artisans, [981b][1] because they know the reasons of the things which are done;

but we think that the artisans, like certain inanimate objects, do things, but without knowing what they are doing (as, for instance, fire burns);only whereas inanimate objects perform all their actions in virtue of a certain natural quality, artisans perform theirs through habit.

Thus the master craftsmen are superior in wisdom, not because they can do things, but because they possess a theory and know the causes.

In general the sign of knowledge or ignorance is the ability to teach, and for this reason we hold that art

diÕ kaˆ toÝj ¢rcitšktonaj perˆ ›kaston timiwtšrouj kaˆ m©llon e„dšnai nom…zomen tîn ceirotecnîn kaˆ sofwtšrouj, Óti t¦j a„t…aj tîn poioumšnwn ‡sasin

(toÝj d', ésper kaˆ tîn ¢yÚcwn œnia poie‹ mšn, oÙk e„dÒta d poie‹ § poie‹, oŒon ka…ei tÕ pàr t¦ mn oân ¥yuca fÚsei tinˆ poie‹n toÚtwn ›kaston toÝj d ceirotšcnaj di' œqoj),

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Discussion:Wise men must be able to share wisdom.

Aristotle sums up that wisdom is where there is:

- not aiming utility (no practical goal)- knowing why (the causes)- ability to teach (share wisdom)- causing admiration (thaumazein)

Senses do not give knowing whyExperience does not give lack of utilityArts do not give ability to teachBut each of them may cause admiration when no utility is aimed (perhaps by chance). Therefore lack of utility is the main condition for wisdom. Why?

6. Theoria. Skhole.

Because lack of utility is a sign for leisure (skhole).Leisure is a condition for wisdom. The very sign of it.

Skhole: means time not aimed at practical purposes.

(See Nicomachean Ethics, X, 6, 7, especially 1177b 4-6).Skhole is seen there as a condition for autarkheia therefore happiness.Skhole is the time that only the free person has.There are several categories of spending time

time with practical purpose (necessities of life): - work for survival- resting

time with no practical purpose:- playing (amusing), the hobby- intellectual activity (skhole), free of

purpose

There are two terms here also:

rather than experience is scientific knowledge;

for the artists can teach, but the others cannot. Further, we do not consider any of the senses to be Wisdom. They are indeed our chief sources of knowledge about particulars, but they do not tell us the reason for anything, as for example why fire is hot, but only that it is hot.

It is therefore probable that at first the inventor of any art which went further than the ordinary sensations was admired by his fellow-men, not merely because some of his inventions were useful, but as being a wise and superior person.

æj oÙ kat¦ tÕ praktikoÝj enai sofwtšrouj Ôntaj ¢ll¦ kat¦ tÕ lÒgon œcein aÙtoÝj kaˆ t¦j a„t…aj gnwr…zein.

Ólwj te shme‹on toà e„dÒtoj kaˆ m¾ e„dÒtoj tÕ dÚnasqai did£skein ™st…n, kaˆ di¦ toàto t¾n tšcnhn tÁj ™mpeir…aj ¹goÚmeqa m©llon ™pist»mhn enai� ·

dÚnantai g£r, oƒ d oÙ dÚnantai did£� -skein. œti d tîn � a„sq»sewn oÙdem…an ¹goÚmeqa enai sof…an� · ka…toi kuriètata… g' e„sˆn aátai tîn kaq' ›kasta gnèseij· ¢ll' oÙ lšgousi tÕ di¦ t… perˆ oÙdenÒj, oŒon di¦ t… qermÕn tÕ pàr, ¢ll¦ mÒnon Óti qermÒn.

tÕ mn oân prîton e„kÕj tÕn Ðpoianoàn eØrÒnta tšcnhn par¦ t¦j koin¦j a„sq»seij qaum£zesqai ØpÕ tîn ¢nqrèpwn m¾ mÒnon di¦ tÕ cr»simon ena… ti tîn eØreqšntwn ¢ll' æj sofÕn kaˆ diafšronta tîn ¥llwn·

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- diagoge (hobby)- skhole (leisure)

First there was the hobby, then it wisely turned into leisure.

Wise men are where there is leisure:- not pleasure (hedone, associated with

playing in N.E.)- not necessities (tanagkata)

7. Abstract by Aristotle

He declares as generally assumed that wisdom is where is: knowledge of primary causes knowledge of principles

That is, “to see”, to have insight.And he has shown more:Knowledge is made possible by skhole.

What is insight? It is a progressive state of no-purpose attitude at each level:

sensation (aisthesis) and experience (empeiria) practical arts (techne and master of arts or

architekton)

And as more and more arts were discovered, some relating to the necessities and some to the pastimes of life (hobby), the inventors of the latter were always considered wiser than those of the former, [20] because their branches of knowledge did not aim at utility.

Hence when all the discoveries of this kind were fully developed, the sciences which relate neither to pleasure nor yet to the necessities of life were invented, and first in those places where men had leisure. Thus the mathematical sciences originated in the neighborhood of Egypt, because there the priestly class was allowed leisure.2

The difference between art and science and the other kindred mental activities has been stated in theEthics3 ;

the reason for our present discussion is that it is generally assumed that what is called Wisdom4 is concerned with the primary causes and principles,

pleiÒnwn d' eØriskomšnwn tecnîn kaˆ tîn mn prÕj t¢nagka‹a tîn d prÕj diagwg¾n oÙsîn, ¢eˆ sofwtšrouj toÝj toioÚtouj ™ke…nwn Øpolamb£nesqai di¦ tÕ m¾ prÕj crÁsin enai t¦j ™pist»maj aÙtîn� .

Óqen ½dh p£ntwn tîn toioÚtwn kateskeuasmšnwn aƒ m¾ prÕj ¹don¾n mhd prÕj t¢nagka‹a� tîn ™pisthmîn eØršqhsan, kaˆ prîton ™n toÚtoij to‹j tÒpoij oá prîton ™scÒlasan· diÕ perˆ A‡gupton aƒ maqhmatikaˆ prîton tšcnai sunšsthsan, ™ke‹ g¦r ¢fe…qh scol£zein tÕ tîn ƒeršwn œqnoj.

e‡rhtai mn oân ™n to‹j ºqiko‹j t…j diafor¦ �2 Cf. Plat. Phaedrus 274, Hdt 2.109.3 Aristot. Nic. Eth. 6.1139b 14-1141b 8.4 i.e. Metaphysics.

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theory (theoria)

So it is “visible” (there is the evidence) that Wisdom means knowledge of causes and principles. so that, as has been already stated, the man of experience

is held to be wiser than the mere possessors of any power of sensation, the artist than the man of experience, the master craftsman than the artisan; and the speculative sciences to be more learned than the productive.

[982a][1] Thus it is clear that Wisdom is knowledge of certain principles and causes.

tšcnhj kaˆ ™pist»mhj kaˆ tîn ¥llwn tîn Ðmogenîn·

oá d' ›neka nàn poioÚmeqa tÕn lÒgon toàt' ™st…n, Óti t¾n Ñnomazomšnhn sof…an perˆ t¦ prîta a‡tia kaˆ t¦j ¢rc¦j Øpolamb£nousi p£ntej·

éste, kaq£per e‡rhtai prÒteron, Ð mn �œmpeiroj tîn Ðpoianoàn ™cÒntwn a‡sqhsin enai doke‹ sofèteroj� , Ð d tecn…thj tîn �™mpe…rwn, ceirotšcnou d ¢rcitšktwn� , aƒ d �qewrhtikaˆ tîn poihtikîn m©llon.

Óti mn oân ¹ sof…a per… tinaj ¢rc¦j kaˆ �a„t…aj ™stˆn ™pist»mh, dÁlon.

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2. Categories. Substance

Concepts of ontology (knowledge of substance)First quest for science of being qua being.To build a science of being we need to know first:

what is real- in what way a thing is real- how many kinds of real things there are

what are the realities we can speak (think) upon- in what way we can name a thing- how many kinds of naming are there

CONCEPTS OF SPEECHHomonimy.A name stands for two things and two different logoi:

Synonimy:A name stands for two or more things and one single logos

Paronimy:More syntactically composed names stand for many things, and many logoi.

translated by E. M. Edghill

1 Things are said to be named 'equivocally' when, though they have a common name, the definition corresponding with the name [logos tes ousias] differs for each. Thus, a real man and a figure in a picture can both lay claim to the name 'animal'; yet these are equivocally so named, for, though they have a common name, the definition corresponding with the name differs for each. For should any one define in what sense each is an animal, his definition in the one case will be appropriate to that case only.

On the other hand, things are said to be named 'univocally' which have both the name and the definition answering to the name [logos tes ousias, the logos of the thing] in common. A man and an ox are both 'animal', and these are univocally so named, inasmuch as not only the name, but also the definition, is the same in both cases: for if a man should state in what sense each is an animal, the statement in the one case would be identical with that in the other.

Things are said to be named 'derivatively', which derive their name from some other name, but differ from it in termination. Thus the grammarian derives his name from the word 'grammar', and the courageous man from the word 'courage'.

`Omènuma lšgetai ïn Ônoma mÒnon koinÒn, Ð d kat¦ toÜnoma �lÒgoj tÁj oÙs…aj ›teroj, oŒon zùon Ó te ¥nqrwpoj kaˆ tÕ gegrammšnon· toÚtwn g¦r Ônoma mÒnon koinÒn, Ð d kat¦ toÜnoma lÒgoj tÁj oÙs…aj �›teroj· ™¦n g¦r ¢podidù tij t… ™stin aÙtîn ˜katšrJ tÕ zóJ enai� , ‡dion ˜katšrou lÒgon ¢podèsei.

sunènuma d lšgetai ïn tÒ te � Ônoma koinÕn kaˆ Ð kat¦ toÜnoma lÒgoj tÁj oÙs…aj Ð aÙtÒj, oŒon zùon Ó te ¥nqrwpoj kaˆ Ð boàj· toÚtwn g¦r ˜k£teron koinù ÑnÒmati prosagoreÚetai zùon, kaˆ Ð lÒgoj d �tÁj oÙs…aj Ð aÙtÒj· ™¦n g¦r ¢podidù tij tÕn ˜katšrou lÒgon t… ™stin aÙtîn ˜katšrJ tÕ zóJ enai� , tÕn aÙtÕn lÒgon ¢podèsei.

parènuma d lšgetai Ósa ¢pÒ tinoj �diafšronta tÍ ptèsei t¾n kat¦ toÜnoma proshgor…an œcei, oŒon ¢pÕ tÁj grammatikÁj Ð grammatikÕj kaˆ ¢pÕ tÁj

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Naming may be simple or composed.

CONCEPTS OF REALITYThere are

two meanings of being real- to be in a subject- to be out of a subject

of each reality we can either say something or not.Therefore there are four kinds of realities.

1. exist on their own and predicable not in a subject (subsist; substance) predicable of a subject (universals)

- universal substances

2. do not exist as such and not preducable in a subject (do not subsist; accidents) not predicable of a subject (particular)

- particular accidents

3. do not exist as such but predicable in a subject (do not subsist; accidents) predicable of a subject (universals)

- universal accidents

4. exist as such but not predicable not in a subject (subsist; substance) not predicable of a subject (particular)

- particular substances

2 Forms of speech are either simple or composite. Examples of the latter are such expressions as 'the man runs', 'the man wins'; of the former 'man', 'ox', 'runs', 'wins'.

Of things themselves some are predicable of a subject, and are never present in a subject. Thus 'man' is predicable of the individual man, and is never present in a subject.

By being 'present in a subject' I do not mean present as parts are present in a whole, but being incapable of existence apart from the said subject.

Some things, again, are present in a subject, but are never predicable of a subject. For instance, a certain point of grammatical knowledge is present in the mind, but is not predicable of any subject; or again, a certain whiteness may be present in the body (for colour requires a material basis), yet it is never predicable of anything.

Other things, again, are both predicable of a subject and present in a subject. Thus while knowledge is present in the human mind, it is predicable of grammar.

There is, lastly, a class of things which are neither present in a subject nor predicable of a subject, such as the individual man or the individual horse.

But, to speak more generally, that which is individual and has the character of a unit is never predicable of a subject. Yet in some cases there is nothing to prevent such being present in a subject. Thus a certain point of grammatical knowledge is

¢ndre…aj Ð ¢ndre‹oj.

Tîn legomšnwn t¦ mn � kat¦ sumplok¾n lšgetai, t¦ d � ¥neu sumplokÁj. t¦ mn oân �kat¦ sumplok»n, oŒon ¥nqrwpoj tršcei, ¥nqrwpoj nik´· t¦ d ¥neu sumplokÁj� , oŒon ¥nqrwpoj, boàj, tršcei, nik´.

Tîn Ôntwn t¦ mn � kaq ' Øpokeimšnou tinÕj lšgetai , ™n ØpokeimšnJ d oÙden… ™stin� , oŒon ¥nqrwpoj kaq' Øpokeimšnou mn lšgetai toà tinÕj ¢nqrèpou� , ™n ØpokeimšnJ d oÙden… ™stin� ·

t¦ d � ™n ØpokeimšnJ mšn ™sti, kaq ' Øpokeimšnou d oÙdenÕj lšgetai� , ™n ØpokeimšnJ d lšgw Ö œn tini �m¾ æj mšroj Øp£rcon ¢dÚnaton cwrˆj enai toà ™n ú ™st…n� , oŒon ¹ tˆj grammatik¾ ™n ØpokeimšnJ mšn ™sti tÍ yucÍ, kaq ' Øpokeimšnou d oÙdenÕj lšgetai� , kaˆ tÕ tˆ leukÕn ™n ØpokeimšnJ mšn ™sti tù sèmati, ¤pan g¦r crîma ™n sèmati, kaq ' Øpokeimšnou d � oÙdenÕj lšgetai·

t¦ d � kaq ' Øpokeimšnou te lšgetai kaˆ ™n ØpokeimšnJ ™st…n, oŒon ¹ ™pist»mh ™n ØpokeimšnJ mšn ™sti tÍ yucÍ, kaq' Øpokeimšnou d lšgetai �tÁj grammatikÁj·

t¦ d � oÜte ™n ØpokeimšnJ ™stˆn oÜte kaq ' Øpokeimšnou lšgetai , oŒon Ð tˆj ¥nqrwpoj À Ð tˆj †ppoj,

12

CONCEPTS OF REASONING

Composed speech means reasoning (logos and logos)- Genus and species

- predicates of predicates may be predicated of subject

- Differentiae different species have different differentiae. Different differentia indicates different species

sub-ordinate species may have the same differentiae similar differentiae indicates

present in a subject.

3When one thing is predicated of another, all that which is predicable of the predicate will be predicable also of the subject. Thus, 'man' is predicated of the individual man; but 'animal' is predicated of 'man'; it will, therefore, be predicable of the individual man also: for the individual man is both 'man' and 'animal'.

If genera are different and co-ordinate, their differentiae are themselves different in kind. Take as an instance the genus 'animal' and the genus 'knowledge'. 'With feet', 'two-footed', 'winged', 'aquatic', are differentiae of 'animal'; the species of knowledge are not distinguished by the same differentiae. One species of knowledge does not differ from another in being 'two-footed'.

But where one genus is subordinate to another, there is nothing to prevent their having the same differentiae : for the greater class is predicated of the lesser, so that all the differentiae of the predicate will be differentiae also of the subject.

oÙdn g¦r tîn toioÚtwn oÜte ™n �ØpokeimšnJ ™stˆn oÜte kaq' Øpokeimšnou lšgetai·¡plîj d t¦ ¥toma kaˆ žn ¢riqmù kat� ' oÙdenÕj Øpokeimšnou lšgetai, ™n ØpokeimšnJ d œnia oÙdn kwlÚei enai� � � · ¹ g¦r tˆj grammatik¾ tîn ™n ØpokeimšnJ ™st…n. “Otan ›teron kaq' ˜tšrou kathgorÁtai æj kaq' Øpokeimšnou, Ósa kat¦ toà kathgoroumšnou lšgetai , p£nta kaˆ kat¦ toà Øpokeimšnou ·hq»setai· oŒon ¥nqrwpoj kat¦ toà tinÕj ¢nqrèpou kathgore‹tai, tÕ d zùon kat¦ toà ¢nqrèpou� · oÙkoàn kaˆ kat¦ toà tinÕj ¢nqrèpou tÕ zùon kathgorhq»se-tai· Ð g¦r tˆj ¥nqrwpoj kaˆ ¥nqrwpÒj ™sti kaˆ zùon.

tîn ˜terogenîn kaˆ m¾ Øp ' ¥llhla tetagmšnwn ›terai tù e‡dei kaˆ aƒ diafora… , oŒon zóou kaˆ ™pist»mhj· zóou mn g¦r diaforaˆ tÒ te pezÕn kaˆ� tÕ pthnÕn kaˆ tÕ œnudron kaˆ tÕ d…poun, ™pist»mhj d oÙdem…a �toÚtwn· oÙ g¦r diafšrei ™pist»mh ™pist»mhj tù d…pouj enai� .

tîn dš ge Øp' ¥llhla genîn oÙdn �kwlÚei t¦j aÙt¦j diafor¦j enai� · t¦ g¦r ™p£nw tîn Øp' aÙt¦ genîn kathgore‹tai, éste Ósai toà kathgoroumšnou diafora… e„si tosaàtai kaˆ toà Øpokeimšnou œsontai.

13

Simple speech divides reality into substance and accidents.

SUBSTANCE: oÙs…an or (ti/ e)sti): what it is ?

ACCIDENTS (because they cannot subsist outside substance):Quantity(posÕn): how much of it?Quality (poiÕn): how it is?Relation (prÒj): in what relation?Place (poÝ): where?Time (pot): when?Position/situation (ke‹sqai): how it stands?State (œcein): What is has?Action (poie‹n) : What it does ?Affection (p£scein) : What it suffers ?

Simple speech is neither true nor false.Composed speech:

is affirmation or negation unifies substance and accidents. It is true or false It asserts categories.

4Expressions which are in no way composite signify substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, action, or affection. To sketch my meaning roughly, examples of substance are 'man' or 'the horse', of quantity, such terms as 'two cubits long' or 'three cubits long', of quality, such attributes as 'white', 'grammatical'. 'Double', 'half', 'greater', fall under the category of relation; 'in a the market place', 'in the Lyceum', under that of place; 'yesterday', 'last year', under that of time. 'Lying', 'sitting', are terms indicating position, 'shod', 'armed', state; 'to lance', 'to cauterize', action; 'to be lanced', 'to be cauterized', affection.

No one of these terms, in and by itself, involves an affirmation; it is by the combination of such terms that [positive or negative] statements arise. For every assertion must, as is admitted, be either true or false, whereas expressions which are not in any way composite such as 'man', 'white', 'runs', 'wins', cannot be either true or false.

Tîn kat¦ mhdem…an sumplok¾n legomšnwn ›kaston ½toi oÙs…an shma…nei À posÕn À poiÕn À prÒj ti À poÝ À pot À ke‹sqai À œcein À poie‹n À p£scein. œsti d oÙs…a mn æj tÚpJ e„pe‹n oŒon ¥nqrwpoj, †ppoj· posÕn d oŒon d…phcu, tr…phcu· poiÕn d oŒon leukÒn, grammatikÒn· prÒj ti d oŒon dipl£sion, ¼misu, me‹zon· poÝ d oŒon ™n Luke…J� , ™n ¢gor´· pot d oŒon cqšj� � , pšrusin· ke‹sqai d �oŒon ¢n£keitai, k£qhtai· œcein d oŒon Øpodšdetai� , éplistai· poie‹n d oŒon tšmnein� , ka…ein· p£scein d oŒon tšmnesqai� , ka…esqai.

›kaston d tîn e„rhmšnwn aÙtÕ mn � �kaq' aØtÕ ™n oÙdemi´ kataf£sei lšgetai, tÍ d prÕj ¥llhla toÚtwn �sumplokÍ kat£fasij g…gnetai· ¤pasa

14

SUBSTANCE

The first and main meaning of Substance:- not predicated- not in a subject

Primary substance is particular substance.It is not predicable, therefore not object of knowledge. It is only an object of sensation and imagination.

Secondary meaning of substance:- includes primary substances.- [Predicated and in a subject]- Primary substances are included (Øp£rcei)

in secondary substances-

Primary substance is included (Øp£rcei) into secondary substance just as accidents are included in (™n ØpokeimšnJ ™st…n) primary substance.

RELATION BETWEEN PRIMARY AND SECONDARY SUBSTANCE:

- They are synonimous both name and logos must be said of the subject

(substratum) Primary substance means what secondary substance

means Secondary substance is always predicable of the

primary substance (example: “animal”, below) If it is not predicable of the individual, it is not

predicable of the species (“all men” – see below*)

5

Substance, in the truest and primary and most definite sense of the word, is that which is neither predicable of a subject nor present in a subject; for instance, the individual man or horse.

But in a secondary sense those things are called substances within which, as species, the primary substances are included; also those which, as genera, include the species. For instance, the individual man is included in the species 'man', and the genus to which the species belongs is 'animal'; these, therefore-that is to say, the species 'man' and the genus 'animal,-are termed secondary substances.

It is plain from what has been said that both the name and the definition of the predicate [ logos ] must be predicable of the subject. For instance, 'man' is predicted of the individual man. Now in this case the name of the species man' is applied to the individual, for we use the term 'man' in describing the individual; and the definition of 'man' will also be predicated of the individual man, for the individual man is both man and animal . Thus, both the name and the definition of the species are predicable of the individual.

g¦r doke‹ kat£fasij ½toi ¢lhq¾j À yeud¾j enai� , tîn d kat¦ �mhdem…an sumplok¾n legomšnwn oÙdn oÜte ¢lhqj oÜte yeàdÒj ™stin� � , oŒon ¥nqrwpoj, leukÒn, tršcei, nik´.

OÙs…a dš ™stin ¹ kuriètat£ te kaˆ prètwj kaˆ m£lista legomšnh, ¿ m»te kaq' Øpokeimšnou tinÕj lšgetai m»te ™n ØpokeimšnJ tin… ™stin, oŒon Ð tˆj ¥nqrwpoj À Ð tˆj †ppoj.

deÚterai d oÙs…ai lšgontai� , ™n oŒj e‡desin aƒ prètwj oÙs…ai legÒmenai Øp£rcousin, taàt£ te kaˆ t¦ tîn e„dîn toÚtwn gšnh· oŒon Ð tˆj ¥nqrwpoj ™n e‡dei mn Øp£rcei tù ¢nqrèpJ� , gšnoj d toà e‡douj ™stˆ tÕ zùon� · deÚterai oân aátai lšgontai oÙs…ai, oŒon Ó te ¥nqrwpoj kaˆ tÕ zùon.

fanerÕn d ™k tîn e„rhmšnwn Óti tîn �kaq ' Øpokeimšnou legomšnwn ¢nagka‹on kaˆ toÜnoma kaˆ tÕn

15

RELATION BETWEEN SUBSTANCE AND ACCIDENTS:Accidents in general are not synonymous with the substance they stand within.

some accidents are predicated (universal accidents)

no accident has a common logos (definition or species) with substance.

Accidents cannot exist withous primary substance (once the primary substance disappears, they are extinct). Example: “color”.

There are - primary accidents (in the primary

substances)- secondary accidents (predicated of primary

substances)QUESTION: Are secondary accidents (categories other than substance) organized in genuses and species?

Aristotle speaks of color (an accident) being present in all the bodies” (en somati holes).

So it is possible to say “All the bodies have color”. But it is a material, not formal species.

ON SECONDARY SUBSTANCE

With regard, on the other hand, to those things which are present in a subject, it is generally the case that neither their name nor their definition is predicable of that in which they are present. Though, however, the definition [logos] is never predicable, there is nothing in certain cases to prevent the name being used. For instance, 'white' being present in a body is predicated of that in which it is present, for a body is called white: the definition, however, of the colour white' is never predicable of the body.

Everything except primary substances is either predicable of a primary substance or present in a primary substance.

This becomes evident by reference to particular instances which occur. 'Animal' is predicated of the species 'man', therefore of the individual man, for if there were no individual man of whom it could be predicated, it could not be predicated of the species 'man' at all (*).

Again, colour is present in body, therefore in individual bodies, for if there were no individual body in which it was present, it could not be present in [all the] bodies at all. Thus everything except primary substances is either predicated of primary substances, or is present in them, and if these last did not exist, it would be impossible for anything else to exist.

lÒgon kathgore‹sqai toà Øpokeimšnou· oŒon ¥nqrwpoj kaq' Øpokeimšnou lšgetai toà tinÕj ¢nqrèpou, kaˆ kathgore‹ta… ge toÜnoma, tÕn g¦r ¥nqrwpon kat¦ toà tinÕj ¢nqrèpou kathgor»seij· kaˆ Ð lÒgoj d toà ¢nqrèpou kat¦ toà tinÕj ¢nqrèpou kathgorhq»setai, Ð g¦r tˆj ¥nqrwpoj kaˆ ¥nqrwpÒj ™stin·éste kaˆ toÜnoma kaˆ Ð lÒgoj kat¦ toà Øpokeimšnou kathgorhq»setai.

tîn d ' ™n ØpokeimšnJ Ôntwn ™pˆ mn� tîn ple…stwn oÜte toÜnoma oÜte Ð lÒgoj kathgore‹tai toà Øpokeimšnou· ™p' ™n…wn d toÜnoma mn oÙdn � � �kwlÚei kathgore‹sqai toà Øpokeimšnou, tÕn d � lÒgon ¢dÚnaton· oŒon tÕ leukÕn ™n ØpokeimšnJ ×n tù sèmati kathgore‹tai toà Øpokeimšnou, leukÕn g¦r sîma lšgetai, Ð d lÒgoj toà� leukoà oÙdšpote kat¦ toà sèmatoj kathgorhq»setai.

t¦ d' ¥lla p£nta ½toi kaq' Øpokeimšnwn lšgetai tîn prètwn oÙsiîn À ™n Øpokeimšnaij aÙta‹j ™st…n.

toàto d fanerÕn ™k tîn kaq� ' ›kasta

16

Secondary substance means species and genus.

Species is more truly substance than genus because is closer to particular.

DISCUSSION: To render (¢podidù - to order, to know according to reality).Mentioning species is closer to the truth than mentioning genus.

For primary substance:- secondary substance is predicate- cannot be predicated about genus- accidents are into it

Species:- Genus is predicate for them- cannot be predicated of the genus

(they behave like individuals towards genus)

Species are substances to the same degree Also, Individuals are substances to the same degree

There is no hierarchy between substances

Of secondary substances, the species is more truly substance than the genus, being more nearly related to primary substance. For if any one should render an account of what a primary substance is, he would render a more instructive account, and one more proper to the subject, by stating the species than by stating the genus. Thus, he would give a more instructive account of an individual man by stating that he was man than by stating that he was animal, for the former description is peculiar to the individual in a greater degree, while the latter is too general. Again, the man who gives an account of the nature of an individual tree will give a more instructive account by mentioning the species 'tree' than by mentioning the genus 'plant'.

Moreover, primary substances are most properly called substances in virtue of the fact that they are the entities which underlie everything else, and that everything else is either predicated of them or present in them.

Now the same relation which subsists between primary substance and everything else subsists also between the species and the genus: for the species is to the genus as subject is to predicate, since the genus is predicated of the species, whereas the species cannot be predicated of the genus. Thus we have a second ground for asserting that the species is more truly substance than the genus.

Of species themselves, except in the case of such as are genera, no one is more truly substance than another.

(…)

proceirizomšnwn· oŒon tÕ zùon kat¦ toà ¢nqrèpou kathgore‹tai, oÙkoàn kaˆ kat¦ toà tinÕj ¢nqrèpou , e„ g¦r kat¦ mhdenÕj tîn tinîn ¢nqrèpwn, oÙd �kat¦ ¢nqrèpou Ólwj·

p£lin tÕ crîma ™n sèmati, oÙkoàn kaˆ ™n tinˆ sèmati· e„ g¦r m¾ ™n tinˆ tîn kaq' ›kasta, oÙd � ™n sèmati Ólwj· éste t¦ ¥lla p£nta ½toi kaq' Øpokeimšnwn tîn prètwn oÙsiîn lšgetai À ™n Øpokeimšnaij aÙta‹j ™st…n .

m¾ oÙsîn oân tîn prètwn oÙsiîn ¢dÚnaton tîn ¥llwn ti enai� · p£nta g¦r t¦ ¥lla ½toi kaq' Øpokeimšnwn toÚtwn lšgetai À ™n Øpokeimšnaij aÙta‹j ™st…n· éste m¾ oÙsîn tîn prètwn oÙsiîn ¢dÚnaton tîn ¥llwn ti enai� .

Tîn d � deutšrwn oÙsiîn m©llon oÙs…a tÕ edoj toà gšnouj� · œggion g¦r tÁj prèthj oÙs…aj ™st…n. ™¦n g¦r ¢podidù tij t¾n prèthn oÙs…an t… ™sti, gnwrimèteron kaˆ o„keiÒteron ¢podèsei tÕ edoj ¢podidoÝj À tÕ �gšnoj· oŒon tÕn tin¦ ¥nqrwpon gnwrimèteron ¨n ¢podo…h ¥nqrwpon ¢podidoÝj À zùon, tÕ mn g¦r ‡dion �

17

Things that can be predicated are genuses and species accidents

Species and genuses are alone secondary substances because

they convey (dhlo‹ - show, provide evidence) knowledge of primary substance

Therefore: accidents do not provide knowledge

FIRST ELEMENT FOR DEFINITION OF SUBSTANCEEssence of substance is to underlie [be subject] of everything else.

IMPORTANT: any predicate applies to primary substance predicates that apply to primary substance applies

also to secondary substance universal accidents are predicates [therefore] universal accidents apply to secondary

substance(see Figure 1)

Discussion: Is accidental determination contained in definition?(is it like undesignated matter in Thomas Aquinas?)

NEXT ELEMENTS FOR DEFINITION OF SUBSTANCE Substance is not in a subject. Primary substance is not predicated

This means: S1 is never ontologically dependent S1 is not object of science

QUESTIONS ARISE:

It is, then, with good reason that of all that remains, when we exclude primary substances, we concede to species and genera alone the name 'secondary substance', for these alone of all the predicates convey a knowledge of primary substance.(…).

All other things that we state, such as that he is white, that he runs, and so on, are irrelevant to the definition. Thus it is just that these alone, apart from primary substances, should be called substances.

Further, primary substances are most properly so called, because they underlie [are the subjects of] everything else.

Now the same relation that subsists between primary substance and everything else subsists also between the species and the genus to which the primary substance belongs, on the one hand, and every attribute which is not included within these, on the other. For these are the subjects of all such. If we call an individual man 'skilled in grammar', the predicate is applicable also to the species and to the genus to which he belongs. This law holds good in all cases.

It is a common characteristic of all substance that it is never present in a subject. For primary substance is neither present in a subject nor predicated of a subject; while, with regard to secondary substances, it is clear from the following arguments (apart from others) that they are not present in a subject. For 'man' is predicated of the individual man, but is not present in any subject: for manhood is not present in the individual man.

m©llon toà tinÕj ¢nqrèpou, tÕ d �koinÒteron, kaˆ tÕ tˆ dšndron ¢podidoÝj gnwrimèteron ¢podèsei dšndron ¢podidoÝj À futÒn.

œti aƒ prîtai oÙs…ai di¦ tÕ to‹j ¥lloij ¤pasin Øpoke‹sqai kaˆ p£nta t¦ ¥lla kat¦ toÚtwn kathgore‹sqai À ™n taÚtaij enai di¦ toàto m£lista oÙs…ai �lšgontai·

æj dš ge aƒ prîtai oÙs…ai prÕj t¦ ¥lla œcousin, oÛtw kaˆ tÕ edoj prÕj tÕ �gšnoj œcei· ØpÒkeitai g¦r tÕ edoj tù �gšnei· t¦ mn g¦r gšnh kat¦ tîn e„dîn �kathgore‹tai, t¦ d e‡dh kat¦ tîn genîn �oÙk ¢ntistršfei·éste kaˆ ™k toÚtwn tÕ edoj toà gšnouj m©llon oÙs…a� .

aÙtîn d tîn e„dîn Ósa m» ™sti gšnh� , oÙdn m©llon ›teron ˜tšrou oÙs…a �™st…n·

E„kÒtwj d met¦ t¦j prètaj oÙs…aj �mÒna tîn ¥llwn t¦ e‡dh kaˆ t¦ gšnh deÚterai oÙs…ai lšgontai· mÒna g¦r dhlo‹ t¾n prèthn oÙs…an tîn kathgoroumšnwn·

18

S2 is predicated of S1 Accidents are predicated of S1 What is the difference between S2 and accidents? Are accidents like genuses and species? Can we recognize them as different and not being

proper science?

ANSWER: definition (logos) cannot be applied.

Therefore: S2 is synonymous to S1 Accidents are homonymous to S1

(See Figure 2)

RELATION OF DIFFERENTIAE TO SUBSTANCE

Differentiae is problematic: it is not substance (primary or second) it is not accident

Though it is: not present in a subject predicated of the subject is differentiae substance or accident?

1. Not accident because specific (see above, chapter 3)2. It is predicated. Therefore universal (not individual).

So it is not primary substance.3. It is not in a subject. Is it therefore a secondary

substance? NOT. “It is not in a subject” but NOT “otherwise than as parts in a whole”.Differentiae (diafor¦) see also Topics (101b, 122b, 125a, 128a, 143a-b):

it is a part of the (e.g.) genus. Therefore synonymous, like species Though, not species but OPPOSITIONS (like god-

man, philosopher-poet etc).

OTHER ELEMENTS FOR DEFINITION OF SUBSTANCE

In the same way, 'animal' is also predicated of the individual man, but is not present in him.

Again, when a thing is present in a subject, though the name may quite well be applied to that in which it is present, the definition cannot be applied.

Yet of secondary substances, not only the name, but also the definition, applies to the subject: we should use both the definition of the species and that of the genus with reference to the individual man. Thus substance cannot be present in a subject.

Yet this is not peculiar to substance, for it is also the case that differentiae cannot be present in subjects. The characteristics 'terrestrial' and 'two-footed' are predicated of the species 'man', but not present in it. For they are not in man. Moreover, the definition of the differentia may be predicated of that of which the differentia itself is predicated. For instance, if the characteristic 'terrestrial' is predicated of the species 'man', the definition also of that characteristic may be used to form the predicate of the species 'man': for 'man' is terrestrial.

The fact that the parts of substances appear to be present in the whole, as in a subject, should not make us apprehensive lest we should have to admit that such parts are not substances: for in explaining the phrase 'being present in a subject', we stated' that we meant 'otherwise than as parts in a whole'.

tîn d' ¥llwn Ó ti ¨n ¢podidù tij, ¢llotr…wj œstai ¢podedwkèj, oŒon leukÕn À tršcei À Ðtioàn tîn toioÚtwn ¢podidoÚj· éste e„kÒtwj taàta mÒna tîn ¥llwn oÙs…ai lšgontai.

œti aƒ prîtai oÙs…ai di¦ tÕ to‹j ¥lloij ¤pasin Øpoke‹sqai kuriètata oÙs…ai lšgontai·

æj dš ge aƒ prîtai oÙs…ai prÕj t¦ ¥lla p£nta œcousin, oÛtw t¦ e‡dh kaˆ t¦ gšnh tîn prètwn oÙsiîn prÕj t¦ loip¦ p£nta œcei· kat¦ toÚtwn g¦r p£nta t¦ loip¦ kathgore‹tai· tÕn g¦r tin¦ ¥nqrwpon ™re‹j grammatikÒn, oÙkoàn kaˆ ¥nqrwpon kaˆ zùon grammatikÕn ™re‹j· æsaÚtwj d kaˆ �™pˆ tîn ¥llwn.

KoinÕn d kat¦ p£shj oÙs…aj tÕ � m¾ ™n ØpokeimšnJ e �nai. ¹ mn g¦r prèth �oÙs…a oÜte kaq' Øpokeimšnou lšgetai oÜte ™n ØpokeimšnJ ™st…n. tîn d deutšrwn oÙsiîn �fanerÕn mn kaˆ oÛtwj Óti oÙk e„sˆn �™n ØpokeimšnJ· Ð g¦r ¥nqrwpoj kaq' Øpokeimšnou mn toà tinÕj ¢nqrèpou �lšgetai, ™n ØpokeimšnJ d oÙk œstin� , oÙ g¦r ™n tù tinˆ ¢nqrèpJ Ð ¥nqrwpÒj ™stin·

æsaÚtwj d kaˆ tÕ zùon kaq� ' Øpokeimšnou mn lšgetai toà tinÕj �¢nqrèpou, oÙk œsti d tÕ zùon ™n tù �

19

Primary Substance means an INDIVIDUAL (tÒde ti).

- SOMETHING THAT IS;- A CERTAIN THING

Secondary substance means “qualification” (poiÒn ti):

- IN WHICH WAY IT IS?- WHAT KIND OF BEING

Not the same with the category of quality :

- “quality” indicates mere quality (they do not refer to the substance).

- secondary substance indicates quality AND the primary substance

Therefore: primary substance is denoted by secondary substance

(synonymy) primary substance is not denoted by “quality”

(homonimy)

FINAL DETERMINATIONS OF SUBSTANCE:

(…)

All substance appears to signify that which is individual. In the case of primary substance this is indisputably true, for the thing is a unit.

In the case of secondary substances, when we speak, for instance, of 'man' or 'animal', our form of speech gives the impression that we are here also indicating that which is individual, but the impression is not strictly true; for a secondary substance is not an individual, but [a class with] a certain qualification ; for it is not one and single as a primary substance is; the words 'man', 'animal', are predicable of more than one subject.

Yet species and genus do not merely indicate quality, like the term 'white'; 'white' indicates quality and nothing further, but species and genus determine the quality with reference to a substance: they signify substance qualitatively differentiated.

(…)

tinˆ ¢nqrèpJ.

œti d tîn � ™n ØpokeimšnJ Ôntwn tÕ mn � Ônoma oÙdn kwlÚei �kathgore‹sqa… pote toà Øpokeimšnou, tÕn d lÒgon �¢dÚnaton·

tîn d deutšrwn oÙsiîn� kathgore‹tai kaˆ Ð lÒgoj kat¦ toà Øpokeimšnou kaˆ toÜnoma , tÕn g¦r toà ¢nqrèpou lÒgon kat¦ toà tinÕj ¢nqrèpou kathgor»seij kaˆ tÕn toà zóou.éste oÙk ¨n e‡h oÙs…a tîn ™n ØpokeimšnJ.

oÙk ‡dion d oÙs…aj toàto� , ¢ll¦ kaˆ ¹ diafor¦ tîn m¾ ™n ØpokeimšnJ ™st…n· tÕ g¦r pezÕn kaˆ tÕ d…poun kaq' Øpokeimšnou mn lšgetai toà �¢nqrèpou, ™n ØpokeimšnJ d oÙk �œstin, oÙ g¦r ™n tù ¢nqrèpJ ™stˆ tÕ d…poun oÙd tÕ pezÒn� .kaˆ Ð lÒgoj d � kathgore‹tai Ð tÁj diafor©j kaq' oá ¨n lšghtai ¹ diafor£· oŒon e„ tÕ pezÕn kat¦ ¢nqrèpou lšgetai, kaˆ Ð lÒgoj toà pezoà kathgorhq»setai toà ¢nqrèpou, pezÕn g£r ™stin Ð ¥nqrwpoj.

m¾ tarattštw d ¹m©j t¦ mšrh tîn �oÙsiîn æj ™n Øpokeimšnoij Ônta to‹j Óloij, m» pote ¢nagkasqîmen oÙk oÙs…aj aÙt¦ f£skein enai� · oÙ g¦r oÛtw t¦ ™n ØpokeimšnJ ™lšgeto t¦ æj mšrh Øp£rconta œn tini.

20

it has no contrary (only its parts can be contrary, but they are differentiae)

- there is no other substance B contrary to the substance A.

has no degree (nothing is more or less substance).- refers to either primary or secondary withing their range

has contraries within itmself- a substance can have contrary accidents at different times

Another mark of substance is that it has no contrary. What could be the contrary of any primary substance, such as the individual man or animal? It has none.

Nor can the species or the genus have a contrary. Yet this characteristic is not peculiar to substance, but is true of many other things, such as quantity. (…) Substance, again, does not appear to admit of variation of degree. I do not mean by this that one substance cannot be more or less truly substance than another, for it has already been stated' that this is the case; but that no single substance admits of varying degrees within itself. For instance, one particular substance, 'man', cannot be more or less man either than himself at some other time or than some other man.

(…) The most distinctive mark of substance appears to be that, while remaining numerically one and the same, it is capable of admitting contrary qualities. From among things other than substance, we should find ourselves unable to bring forward any which possessed this mark. Thus, one and the same colour cannot be white and black. Nor can the same one action be good and bad: this law holds good with everything that is not substance. But one and the selfsame substance, while retaining its identity, is yet capable of admitting contrary qualities. The same individual person is at one time white, at another black, at one time warm, at another cold, at one time good, at another bad. (…) To sum up, it is a distinctive mark of substance, that, while remaining numerically one and the same, it is capable of admitting contrary qualities, the modification taking place through a change in the substance itself. Let these remarks suffice on the subject of substance.

(…)

P©sa d oÙs…a doke‹ � tÒde ti shma…nein. ™pˆ mn oân tîn prètwn� oÙsiîn ¢namfisb»thton kaˆ ¢lhqšj ™stin Óti tÒde ti shma…nei· ¥tomon g¦r kaˆ žn ¢riqmù tÕ dhloÚmenÒn ™stin.

™pˆ d tîn � deutšrwn oÙsiîn fa…netai mn Ðmo…wj tù sc»mati tÁj �proshgor…aj tÒde ti shma…nein, Ótan e‡pV ¥nqrwpon À zùon· oÙ m¾n ¢lhqšj ge, ¢ll¦ m©llon poiÒn ti shma…nei, oÙ g¦r ›n ™sti tÕ Øpoke…menon ésper ¹ prèth oÙs…a, ¢ll¦ kat¦ pollîn Ð ¥nqrwpoj lšgetai kaˆ tÕ zùon·

oÙc ¡plîj d poiÒn ti shma…nei� , ésper tÕ leukÒn· oÙdn g¦r ¥llo shma…nei tÕ leukÕn �¢ll' À poiÒn, tÕ d � edoj kaˆ tÕ gšnoj �perˆ oÙs…an tÕ poiÕn ¢for…zei , poi¦n g£r tina oÙs…an shma…nei .

(...)

21

`Up£rcei d ta‹j oÙs…aij kaˆ tÕ mhdn� � aÙta‹j ™nant…on enai� . tÍ g¦r prètV oÙs…v t… ¨n e‡h ™nant…on; oŒon tù tinˆ ¢nqrèpJ oÙdšn ™stin ™nant…on, oÙdš ge tù ¢nqrèpJ À tù zóJ oÙdšn ™stin ™nant…on.

oÙk ‡dion d tÁj oÙs…aj toàto� , ¢ll¦ kaˆ ™p' ¥llwn pollîn oŒon ™pˆ toà posoà· tù g¦r dip»cei oÙdšn ™stin ™nant…on, oÙd to‹j dška� , oÙd tîn �toioÚtwn oÙden…, (…) Doke‹ d ¹ oÙs…a oÙk ™pidšcesqai �tÕ m©llon kaˆ tÕ Âtton· lšgw d �oÙc Óti oÙs…a oÙs…aj oÙk œsti m©llon oÙs…a, toàto mn g¦r e‡rhtai Óti œstin� ,¢ll' Óti ˜k£sth oÙs…a toàq' Óper ™stˆn oÙ lšgetai m©llon kaˆ Âtton· oŒon e„ œstin aÛth ¹ oÙs…a ¥nqrwpoj, oÙk œstai m©llon kaˆ Âtton ¥nqrwpoj, oÜte aÙtÕj aØtoà oÜte ›teroj ˜tšrou. (…)

M£lista d ‡dion tÁj oÙs…aj doke‹ �enai tÕ taÙtÕn kaˆ žn ¢riqmù ×n tîn �™nant…wn enai dektikÒn� ·

(…)

22

3. Substance in Metaphysics, VII.The text is based on: Aristotle's Metaphysics, ed. W.D. Ross. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1924.

In book VII of Metaphysics Aristotle continues his quest: WHAT IS A THING that we can consider object of knowledge?

QUEST FOR THE THINGAristotle is trying to find what the object of knowledge is, among other “things”. A thing (that is: object of knowledge) must be recognized from what is real but not a thing;

A real thing (to on) is said of in many ways.

- ti esti (what it is) – the “what”; the predicable substance ; - to de ti (the this) – the “this”; the individual;- quality, quantity, and so on.

DISCUSSION: Is Aristotle realist? He says the predicable substance is a real thing.

To ti: the prime meaning: primary substance.

- Ti esti is a to on only in a secondary sense.- An accident is not to on in itself but only as it determines the ti esti.

to qualify does not mean to indicate the thing accident predicates do not denote substance (also

Cat).- An action is not a real thing either.

- Only ths subject (subsistent) is a real thing.

- First meaning of Substance (real thing) is: that which stands alone unqualified. Only substance is a thing.

"THERE are several senses in which a thing may be said to 'be', as we pointed out previously in our book on the various senses of words;' for in one sense the 'being' meant is 'what a thing is' or a 'this', and in another sense it means a quality or quantity or one of the other things that are predicated as these are.

While 'being' has all these senses, obviously that which 'is' primarily is the 'what' , which indicates the substance of the thing. For when we say of what quality a thing is, we say that it is good or bad, not that it is three cubits long or that it is a man; but when we say what it is, we do not say 'white' or 'hot' or 'three cubits long', but 'a man' or 'a 'god'. (…) And so one might even raise the question whether the words 'to walk', 'to be healthy', 'to sit' imply that each of these things is existent, and similarly in any other case of this sort; for none of them is either self-subsistent or capable of being separated from substance, but rather, if anything, it is that which walks or sits or is healthy that is an existent thing.

Now these are seen to be more real because there is something definite which underlies them (i.e. the substance or individual), which is implied in such a predicate;

Therefore that which is primarily, i.e. not in a qualified sense but without qualification, must be substance.

TÕ ×n lšgetai pollacîj, kaq£per dieilÒmeqa prÒteron ™n to‹j perˆ toà posacîj· shma…nei g¦r tÕ mn � t… ™sti kaˆ tÒde ti, tÕ d � poiÕn À posÕn À tîn ¥llwn ›kaston tîn oÛtw kathgoroumšnwn.

tosautacîj d legomšnou toà Ôntoj �fanerÕn Óti toÚtwn prîton ×n tÕ t… ™stin, Óper shma…nei t¾n oÙs…an (Ótan mn g¦r e‡pwmen po‹Òn ti tÒde� , À ¢gaqÕn lšgomen À kakÒn, ¢ll' oÙ tr…phcu À ¥nqrwpon· Ótan d t… ™stin� , oÙ leukÕn oÙd qermÕn oÙd tr…phcu� � , ¢ll¦ ¥nqrwpon À qeÒn), (...) diÕ k¨n ¢por»seiš tij pÒteron tÕ bad…zein kaˆ tÕ Øgia…nein kaˆ tÕ kaqÁsqai ›kaston aÙtîn ×n shma…nei, Ðmo…wj d �kaˆ ™pˆ tîn ¥llwn Ðtouoàn tîn toioÚtwn· oÙdn g¦r aÙtîn ™stˆn � oÜte kaq ' aØtÕ pefukÕj oÜte cwr…zesqai dunatÕn tÁj oÙs…aj, ¢ll¦ m©llon, e‡per, tÕ bad…zon tîn Ôntwn kaˆ tÕ kaq»menon kaˆ tÕ Øgia‹non. taàta d m©llon fa…netai Ônta� , diÒti œsti ti tÕ Øpoke…menon aÙto‹j ærismšnon (toàto d' ™stˆn ¹ oÙs…a kaˆ tÕ kaq' ›kaston), Óper ™mfa…netai ™n tÍ

23

Does Aristotle have a system? What does he mean by “in the first meaning”?

WHAT IS A FIRST MEANING (e.g. of substance)?- Science speaks of things from three perspectives. So Substance is the individual because of all three reasons:

the definition or rational perspective (1: the logos of a thing includes the logos of substance). That is: thing and substance are synonymous.

in order of knowledge or according to method, according to how knowledge works (2: knowing what a thing is does not require other qualifications, whereas when we know qualifications we do not understand the thing).

- What it is does not depend on descriptions, like in Quine. in time, that is, because of duration (3: it stands

alone; it is separable - choriston; only substance can be without matter)

A THING IS PRIMARILY THE SUBSTANCE.NOW, WHAT IS THE SUBSTANCE?

1. Substance is obviously said of the corporeal things.

We have this first quest for substance: where is substance to be found?

- In the corporeal things.Corporeal things are:

Animals and their parts Plants and their parts Natural (physical) bodies

- The four elements and their parts- The four elements and their compounds- Heavens and its parts (stars, moon, sun)

Supplementary question: Are there non-corporeal substances?- The problem of universals posed.

"Now there are several senses in which a thing is said to be first; yet substance is first in every sense-(1) in definition, (2) in order of knowledge, (3) in time.

For (3) of the other categories none can exist independently, but only substance .

And (1) in definition also this is first; for in the definition of each term the definition of its substance must be present .

And (2) we think we know each thing most fully, when we know what it is, e.g. what man is or what fire is, rather than when we know its quality, its quantity, or its place; since we know each of these predicates also, only when we know what the quantity or the quality is.

(…)

Part 2

"Substance is thought to belong most obviously to bodies; and so we say that not only animals and plants and their parts are substances, but also natural bodies such as fire and water and earth and everything of the sort, and all things that are either parts of these or composed of these (either of parts or of the whole bodies), e.g. the physical universe and its parts, stars and moon and sun.

But whether these alone are substances, or there are also others, or only some of these, or others as well, or none of these but only some other things, are substances, must be considered. Some think the limits of body, i.e. surface, line, point, and unit, are substances, and more so than body or the solid.

kathgor…v tÍ toiaÚtV·

éste tÕ prètwj ×n kaˆ oÙ tˆ ×n ¢ll' ×n ¡plîj ¹ oÙs…a ¨n e‡h.

pollacîj mn oân lšgetai tÕ prîton� · Ómwj d �p£ntwj ¹ oÙs…a prîton, kaˆ lÒgJ kaˆ gnèsei kaˆ crÒnJ.

tîn mn g¦r ¥llwn kathgorhm£twn � oÙqn �cwristÒn , aÛth d mÒnh� ·

kaˆ tù lÒgJ d toàto prîton � (¢n£gkh g¦r ™n tù ˜k£stou lÒgJ tÕn tÁj oÙs…aj ™nup£rcein)·

kaˆ e„dšnai d tÒt� ' o„Òmeqa ›kaston m£lista, Ótan t… ™stin Ð ¥nqrwpoj gnîmen À tÕ pàr, m©llon À tÕ poiÕn À tÕ posÕn À tÕ poÚ, ™peˆ kaˆ aÙtîn toÚtwn tÒte ›kaston ‡smen, Ótan t… ™sti tÕ posÕn À tÕ poiÕn gnîmen. (...)

Doke‹ d' ¹ oÙs…a Øp£rcein fanerètata mn to‹j sèmasin� (diÕ t£ te zùa kaˆ t¦ fut¦ kaˆ t¦ mÒria aÙtîn oÙs…aj ena…� famen, kaˆ t¦ fusik¦ sèmata, oŒon pàr kaˆ Ûdwr kaˆ gÁn kaˆ tîn toioÚtwn ›kaston, kaˆ Ósa À mÒria toÚtwn À ™k toÚtwn ™st…n, À mor…wn À p£ntwn, oŒon Ó te oÙranÕj kaˆ t¦ mÒria aÙtoà , ¥stra kaˆ sel»nh kaˆ ¼lios )·

pÒteron d aátai mÒnai oÙs…ai e„sˆn À �24

It has been said that substance is the first meaning for thing. NOW: What is the first meaning for substance? (same method required). We expect Aristotle to discuss the three criteria: reason, definition and time). He will!

2. More meanings for substance

Substance has four meanings: to ti hen einai (essence).

- “What it was [meant for] a thing to be”.- “quiddity” (lat: quidditas).

katholou (universal) Genos (Genre). Hypokeimenon (subject or substratum):

- subject of all predicates, not itself a predicate.

[the main indication for substance was this: to be subject and not predicated]. Substance is: the substratum.

* QUEST FOR SUBSTANCE AS SUBSTRATUMWhat is the substratum?

Substratum is: matter (hyle) shape or configuration of logoi (morphe – schema

tes ideas); compound of these

QUESTION: Is matter or form the substratum in a main sense?

According to the definition of substance, the matter seems to be substance as substratum.

(…)

Part 3

"The word 'substance' is applied, if not in more senses, still at least to four main objects; for both the essence and the universal and the genus, are thought to be the substance of each thing, and fourthly the substratum.

Now the substratum is that of which everything else is predicated, while it is itself not predicated of anything else. And so we must first determine the nature of this; for that which underlies a thing primarily is thought to be in the truest sense its substance.

And in one sense matter is said to be of the nature of substratum, in another, shape, and in a third, the compound of these. (By the matter I mean, for instance, the bronze, by the shape the pattern of its form, and by the compound of these the statue, the concrete whole.) Therefore if the form is prior to the matter and more real, it will be prior also to the compound of both, for the same reason.

"We have now outlined the nature of substance, showing that it is that which is not predicated of a stratum, but of which all else is predicated. But we must not merely state the matter thus; for this is not enough. The statement itself is obscure, and further, on this view,

kaˆ ¥llai, À toÚtwn tinj À kaˆ ¥llai� , À toÚtwn mn oÙqn ›terai dš tinej� � , skeptšon. doke‹ dš tisi t¦ toà sèmatoj pšrata, oŒon ™pif£neia kaˆ gramm¾ kaˆ stigm¾ kaˆ mon£j, enai oÙs…ai� , kaˆ m©llon À tÕ sîma kaˆ tÕ stereÒn. (…)

Lšgetai d' ¹ oÙs…a, e„ m¾ pleonacîj, ¢ll' ™n tšttars… ge m£lista· kaˆ g¦r tÕ t… Ãn enai� kaˆ tÕ kaqÒlou kaˆ tÕ gšnoj oÙs…a doke‹ enai ˜k£stou� , kaˆ tštarton toÚtwn tÕ Øpoke…menon.

tÕ d' Øpoke…menÒn ™sti kaq' oá t¦ ¥lla lšgetai, ™ke‹no d aÙtÕ mhkšti kat� ' ¥llou· diÕ prîton perˆ toÚtou dioristšon· m£lista g¦r doke‹ enai oÙs…a tÕ Øpoke…menon �prîton.

toioàton d trÒpon mšn tina � ¹ Ûlh lšgetai, ¥llon d trÒpon � ¹ morf», tr…ton d tÕ ™k �toÚtwn (lšgw d t¾n mn Ûlhn oŒon tÕn � �calkÒn , t¾n d morf¾n tÕ � scÁma tÁj „dšaj , tÕ d ' ™k toÚtwn tÕn ¢ndri£nta tÕ

25

Aristotle is not satisfied with stating that matter is the substratum.

He will define matter (on one hand) and substance again.

CAN SUBSTRATUM BE MATTER (hypothesis)?BUT WHAT IS MATTER?Matter is:

not a (ti) particular thing (- is it a universal?) not a category ( - is it a particular?) it is predicated of (- a substratum) not a predicate (- a particular?). cannot be negated.

If matter is substratum we have a sophism:- Predicates must be different than substance- Substance is predicated of matter.

It is not a sophism in case it is a tautology.

It seems matter is [like] substratum.

MATTER CANNOT BE (adunaton) SUBSTRATUM because the definition of matter does not include definition of substance.Substance is:

Separable. To de ti (a “this”)

These conditions are satisfied only by form and compound. But compound is not substratum because it is:

- Posterior (compounded by nature, so not separable)

- Dele, obvious (sensible, so, not separable) Matter is also dismissed as separability and thisness do not belong to matter (substratum is fourth meaning of substance). – Matter is not synonymous with substance.

[Remember: we were looking for what is a thing? The first option, thing as substratum, is not satisfying.

matter becomes substance. For if this is not substance, it baffles us to say what else is. When all else is stripped off evidently nothing but matter remains. For while the rest are affections, products, and potencies of bodies, length, breadth, and depth are quantities and not substances (for a quantity is not a substance), but the substance is rather that to which these belong primarily. But when length and breadth and depth are taken away we see nothing left unless there is something that is bounded by these; so that to those who consider the question thus matter alone must seem to be substance.

By matter I mean that which in itself is neither a particular thing nor of a certain quantity nor assigned to any other of the categories by which being is determined. For there is something of which each of these is predicated, whose being is different from that of each of the predicates

(for the predicates other than substance are predicated of substance, while substance is predicated of matter).

(…)

"If we adopt this point of view, then, it follows that matter is substance.

But this is impossible; for both separability and 'thisness' are thought to belong chiefly to substance. And so form and the compound of form and matter would be thought to be substance, rather than matter.

The substance compounded of both, i.e. of matter and shape, may be dismissed; for it is posterior and its nature is obvious.And matter also is in a sense manifest.

sÚnolon), éste e„ tÕ edoj tÁj Ûlhj �prÒteron kaˆ m©llon Ôn, kaˆ toà ™x ¢mfo‹n prÒteron œstai di¦ tÕn aÙtÕn lÒgon.

nàn mn oân tÚpJ e‡rhtai t… pot� ' ™stˆn ¹ oÙs…a, Óti tÕ m¾ kaq' Øpokeimšnou ¢ll¦ kaq' oá t¦ ¥lla· de‹ d m¾ mÒnon oÛtwj� · oÙ g¦r ƒkanÒn·

aÙtÕ g¦r toàto ¥dhlon, kaˆ œti ¹ Ûlh oÙs…a g…gnetai. e„ g¦r m¾ aÛth oÙs…a, t…j ™stin ¥llh diafeÚgei· periairoumšnwn g¦r tîn ¥llwn oÙ fa…netai oÙdn Øpomšnon� · t¦ mn g¦r ¥lla tîn �swm£twn p£qh kaˆ poi»mata kaˆ dun£meij, tÕ d mÁkoj kaˆ pl£toj kaˆ b£qoj �posÒthtšj tinej ¢ll' oÙk oÙs…ai (tÕ g¦r posÕn oÙk oÙs…a), ¢ll¦ m©llon ú Øp£rcei taàta prètJ, ™ke‹nÒ ™stin oÙs…a. ¢ll¦ m¾n ¢fairoumšnou m»kouj kaˆ pl£touj kaˆ b£qouj oÙdn Ðrîmen �ØpoleipÒmenon, pl¾n e‡ t… ™sti tÕ ÐrizÒmenon ØpÕ toÚtwn, éste t¾n Ûlhn ¢n£gkh fa…nesqai mÒnhn oÙs…an oÛtw skopoumšnoij.

lšgw d ' Ûlhn ¿ kaq' aØt¾n m»te tˆ m»te posÕn m»te ¥llo mhdn lšgetai oŒj� éristai tÕ Ôn. œsti g£r ti kaq' oá kathgore‹tai toÚtwn ›kaston, ú tÕ enai �›teron kaˆ tîn kathgoriîn ˜k£stV

(t¦ mn g¦r ¥lla tÁj oÙs…aj kathgore‹tai� , aÛth d tÁj Ûlhs� ),

(...)

26

There is a result though:- a thing is not matter]

* QUEST FOR SUBSTANCE AS ESSENCE

[Now Aristotle discusses another hypothesis: can a thing as substance be the essence?]He says it is a difficult (aporetic) research.

What is essence?

1. Dialectical inquiry

Essence (to ti hen einai) is propter se (kath’auto). - Thing itself, by/ in itself; the “self” of a thing.

Distinction 1: To be you essentially (kata sauton, by essence) To be musical (not kata sauton, but an accident)

- the accident is not essenceDistinction 2:

to be (essence) to be white (accident)

- the combination is not essence (the self of a thing), because the accident is added into the formula.

The essence does not have a formula of itself. It is only expressed by other terms.

- a compound is not an essence because a compound means to predicate a thing of a different thing. There are two things in a compound.

The essence does not have a name

But we must inquire into the third kind of substance; for this is the most perplexing. (…)

Part 4.

"Since at the start we distinguished the various marks by which we determine substance, and one of these was thought to be the essence, we must investigate this. And first let us make some linguistic remarks about it. The essence of each thing is what it is said to be propter se. For being you is not being musical, since you are not by your very nature musical. What, then, you are by your very nature is your essence.

"Nor yet is the whole of this the essence of a thing; not that which is propter se as white is to a surface, because being a surface is not identical with being white. But again the combination of both-'being a white surface'-is not the essence of surface, because 'surface' itself is added. The formula, therefore, in which the term itself is not present but its meaning is expressed, this is the formula of the essence of each thing. Therefore if to be a white surface is to be a smooth surface, to be white and to be smooth are one and the same. "(…) "But is being-a-cloak an essence at all? Probably not. For the essence is precisely what something is; but when an attribute is asserted of a subject other than itself, the complex is not precisely what some 'this' is, e.g. white man is not precisely what some 'this' is, since thisness belongs only to substances.

™k mn oân toÚtwn qewroàsi sumba…nei� oÙs…an enai t¾n Ûlhn� ·

¢dÚnaton dš· kaˆ g¦r tÕ cwristÕn kaˆ tÕ tÒde ti Øp£rcein doke‹ m£lista tÍ oÙs…v, diÕ tÕ edoj kaˆ tÕ ™x ¢mfo‹n oÙs…a �dÒxeien ¨n enai m©llon tÁj Ûlhj� .

t¾n mn to…nun ™x ¢mfo‹n oÙs…an� , lšgw d t¾n œk te tÁj Ûlhj kaˆ tÁj morfÁj� , ¢fetšon, Østšra g¦r kaˆ d»lh·

faner¦ dš pwj kaˆ ¹ Ûlh·

perˆ d tÁj tr…thj skeptšon� , aÛth g¦r ¢porwt£th. (…)

1029b1

'Epeˆ d' ™n ¢rcÍ dieilÒmeqa pÒsoij Ðr…zomen t¾n oÙs…an, kaˆ toÚtwn ›n ti ™dÒkei enai tÕ t… Ãn enai� � , qewrhtšon perˆ aÙtoà. kaˆ prîton e‡pwmen œnia perˆ aÙtoà logikîj , Óti ™stˆ tÕ t… Ãn enai ˜k£stou �Ö lšgetai kaq' aØtÒ. oÙ g£r ™sti tÕ soˆ enai tÕ mousikù �

27

must be expressed by other terms the terms must not refer to different things (must be

synonymous with the essence) [THEREFORE] The formula of an essence is a

definition.

What is a definition? not a name not a description not a conventional equivalence between a name and

an expression. BUT: a predication of a primary thing, that is:

- Expression meaning the one and only thing - A synonym expression for the thing- The expression that describes the logos /

reason / species of the thing. (Given that species is not a compound)

CONCLUSION CONCERNING ESSENCE:Only species of a genus have essence.Accidents are not species.

* [ Do we say “definition in many ways, like thing? ]We say thing (what a thing is – ti esti) in two ways:

- substance and to ti (the object of knowledge)- accidents (the einai that are not subsistent)

Though, categories (accidents) are not essences. They do not have a ti esti (essence).

- only in a limited sense, that is:- accidents have only a linguistic essence, like

in the case when we say that non-being is not.

Aristotle is leaving the dialectical discussion and states that it is better to see how things are in reality.

Therefore there is an essence only of those things whose formula is a definition.

But we have a definition not where we have a word and a formula identical in meaning (for in that case all formulae or sets of words would be definitions; for there will be some name for any set of words whatever, so that even the Iliad will be a definition), but where there is a formula of something primary; and primary things are those which do not imply the predication of one element in them of another element.

Nothing, then, which is not a species of a genus will have an essence-only species will have it, for these are thought to imply not merely that the subject participates in the attribute and has it as an affection, or has it by accident; but for everything else as well, if it has a name, there be a formula of its meaning-viz. that this attribute belongs to this subject; or instead of a simple formula we shall be able to give a more accurate one; but there will be no definition nor essence.

"Or has 'definition', like 'what a thing is', several meanings?

'What a thing is' in one sense means substance and the 'this', in another one or other of the predicates, quantity, quality, and the like. For as 'is' belongs to all things, not however in the same sense, but to one sort of thing primarily and to others in a secondary way, so too 'what a thing is' belongs in the simple sense to substance, but in a limited sense to the other categories. For even of a quality we might ask what it is, so that quality also is a 'what a thing is',-not in the simple sense, however, but just as, in the case of that which is not, some say, emphasizing the linguistic form, that that is which is not is-not is simply, but is

enai� · oÙ g¦r kat¦ sautÕn e mousikÒj� . Ö ¥ra kat¦ sautÒn.

oÙd d¾ toàto p©n� · oÙ g¦r tÕ oÛtwj kaq' aØtÕ æj ™pifane…v leukÒn, Óti oÙk œsti tÕ ™pifane…v enai tÕ leukù enai� � . ¢ll¦ m¾n oÙd tÕ ™x ¢mfo‹n� , tÕ ™pifane…v leukÍ, Óti prÒsestin aÙtÒ. ™n ú ¥ra m¾ ™nšstai lÒgJ aÙtÒ, lšgonti aÙtÒ , oátoj Ð lÒgoj toà t… Ãn enai ˜k£stJ� , ést' e„ tÕ ™pifane…v leukÍ ena… ™sti tÕ ™pifane…v enai le…� �v, tÕ leukù kaˆ le…J enai tÕ aÙtÕ kaˆ ›n� . (...)¢ll¦ tÕ ƒmat…J enai «r£ ™sti t… � Ãn ena… �ti [À] Ólwj; À oÜ; Óper g£r t… ™sti tÕ t… Ãn enai� · Ótan d' ¥llo kat' ¥llou lšghtai, oÙk œstin Óper tÒde ti, oŒon Ð leukÕj ¥nqrwpoj oÙk œstin Óper tÒde ti, e‡per tÕ tÒde ta‹j oÙs…aij Øp£rcei mÒnon·

éste tÕ t… Ãn ena… ™stin Óswn Ð lÒgoj �™stˆn ÐrismÒj.

ÐrismÕj d' ™stˆn oÙk ¨n Ônoma lÒgJ taÙtÕ shma…nV (p£ntej g¦r ¨n een oƒ �lÒgoi Óroi· œstai g¦r Ônoma ÐtJoàn lÒgJ, éste kaˆ ¹ 'Ili¦j ÐrismÕj œstai),

¢ll' ™¦n prètou tinÕj Ï· toiaàta d' ™stˆn Ósa lšgetai m¾ tù ¥llo kat' ¥llou lšgesqai.

oÙk œstai ¥ra oÙdenˆ tîn m¾ gšnouj e„dîn Øp£rcon tÕ t… Ãn enai� , ¢ll¦ toÚtoij

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“In reality”, we say that things are in the following manner: by equivocation (homonymously) by composition (we add accidents to substance) by abstraction (we take away the copula) by paronimy

But only substance has an essence, therefore it is. Essence is always expressed by a synonymous

expression.

non-existent; so too with quality.

"We must no doubt inquire how we should express ourselves on each point, but certainly not more than how the facts actually stand. And so now also, since it is evident what language we use, essence will belong, just as 'what a thing is' does, primarily and in the simple sense to substance, and in a secondary way to the other categories also,-not essence in the simple sense, but the essence of a quality or of a quantity.

For it must be either by an equivocation that we say these are, or by adding to and taking from the meaning of 'are' (in the way in which that which is not known may be said to be known),-the truth being that we use the word neither ambiguously nor in the same sense, but just as we apply the word 'medical' by virtue of a reference to one and the same thing, not meaning one and the same thing, nor yet speaking ambiguously;

(…)

mÒnon (taàta g¦r doke‹ oÙ kat¦ metoc¾n lšgesqai kaˆ p£qoj oÙd' æj sumbebhkÒs)· ¢ll¦ lÒgoj mn œstai �˜k£stou kaˆ tîn ¥llwn t… shma…nei, ™¦n Ï Ônoma, Óti tÒde tùde Øp£rcei, À ¢ntˆ lÒgou ¡ploà ¢kribšsteroj· ÐrismÕj d' oÙk œstai oÙd tÕ t… � Ãn enai� .

À kaˆ Ð ÐrismÕj ésper kaˆ tÕ t… ™sti pleonacîj lšgetai; kaˆ g¦r tÕ t… ™stin ›na mn trÒpon �shma…nei t¾n oÙs…an kaˆ tÕ tÒde ti, ¥llon d ›kaston tîn �kathgoroumšnwn, posÕn poiÕn kaˆ Ósa ¥lla toiaàta. ésper g¦r kaˆ tÕ œstin Øp£rcei p©sin, ¢ll' oÙc Ðmo…wj ¢ll¦ tù mn prètwj to‹j d� ' ˜pomšnwj, oÛtw kaˆ tÕ t… ™stin ¡plîj mn tÍ oÙs…v pëj d to‹j ¥lloij� � · kaˆ g¦r tÕ poiÕn ™ro…meq' ¨n t… ™stin, éste kaˆ tÕ poiÕn tîn t… ™stin, ¢ll' oÙc ¡plîj, ¢ll' ésper ™pˆ toà m¾ Ôntoj logikîj fas… tinej enai tÕ m¾ Ôn� , oÙc ¡plîj ¢ll¦ m¾ Ôn, oÛtw kaˆ tÕ poiÒn.

de‹ mn oân skope‹n kaˆ tÕ pîj de‹ lšgein �perˆ ›kaston, oÙ m¾n m©llÒn ge À tÕ pîj œcei· diÕ kaˆ nàn ™peˆ tÕ legÒmenon fanerÒn, kaˆ tÕ t… Ãn enai �Ðmo…wj Øp£rxei prètwj mn kaˆ ¡plîj tÍ �oÙs…v, eta kaˆ to‹j ¥lloij� , ésper kaˆ tÕ t… ™stin, oÙc ¡plîj t… Ãn enai ¢ll¦ poiù À �posù t… Ãn enai� .

de‹ g¦r À ÐmwnÚmwj taàta f£nai enai �Ônta, À prostiqšntaj kaˆ ¢fairoàntaj, ésper kaˆ tÕ m¾ ™pisthtÕn ™pisthtÒn, ™peˆ tÒ ge ÑrqÒn ™sti m»te ÐmwnÚmwj f£nai m»te æsaÚtwj ¢ll' ésper tÕ „atrikÕn tù prÕj tÕ aÙtÕ mn kaˆ�

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›n, oÙ tÕ aÙtÕ d kaˆ ›n� , oÙ mšntoi oÙd �ÐmwnÚmwj·

(…)

30

4. Soul as a substance. De anima, II, 1, 5,

Translated by J. A. Smith

Starts from a plan: what is soul what is its most general definition

“Most general”:- for any existent soul, including animals and plants (Themistius)- For every part of the soul (Averroes)- cause for every operation and accidents of the soul (Albert the Great)* Search for a definition which explains all acts of any soul

Suggestion:Soul is a substance. Therefore we need to know what is substance.

SUBSTANCE:Aristotle says substance as one meaning for being. This is why he uses the term genos (gšnoj): substance is a genos of being. By substance we may mean:

- matter (not an individual. A potency).- species or form (secondary substance)- compound (prime substance, individual compound) (Cf. also Metaphysics, V, 8, 1017b 10 sq; 1069a 18 sq).

1. Substance is not matter.

Book II Chapter 1 Let the foregoing suffice as our account of the views [412a] concerning the soul which have been handed on by our predecessors; let us now dismiss them and make as it were a completely fresh start, endeavouring to give a precise answer to the question, What is soul? i.e. to formulate the most general possible definition of it.

We are in the habit of recognizing, as one determinate kind of what is, substance, and that in several senses, (a) in the sense of matter or that which in itself is not 'a this', and (b) in the sense of form or essence, which is that precisely in virtue of which a thing is called 'a this', and thirdly (c) in the sense of that which is compounded of both (a) and (b).

Now matter is potentiality ,

T¦ mn d¾ ØpÕ tîn prÒteron paradedomšna perˆ yucÁj e„r»sqw· p£lin d' ésper ™x ØparcÁj ™pan…wmen, peirèmenoi dior…sai t… ™sti yuc¾ kaˆ t…j ¨n e‡h koinÒtatoj lÒgoj aÙtÁj.

lšgomen d¾ gšnoj ›n ti tîn Ôntwn t¾n oÙs…an, taÚthj d tÕ mšn� , æj Ûlhn, Ö kaq' aØtÕ oÙk œsti tÒde ti, ›teron d � morf¾n kaˆ edoj� , kaq' ¿n ½dh lšgetai tÒde ti, kaˆ tr…ton tÕ ™k toÚtwn.

œsti d ' ¹ mn � Ûlh dÚnamij ,

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2. Substance as species means potential form and actual form.

Substance as species means act in two senses:- possible science (episteme). - actual exercise of knowledge (theoria)It is because:* species can be either potential or actual (realized; entelecheia)

(Alexander of Aphrodisias)

form [species] actuality; of the species there are two grades related to one another as e.g. [possible] knowledge to the exercise of knowledge.

tÕ d ' edoj ™ntelšceia� , kaˆ toàto dicîj, tÕ mn æj � ™pist»mh, tÕ d' æj tÕ qewre‹n.

Substance as species : See also II, 5, 417a 21 sqq, Alexander of AphrodisiaMatter Pure possibility to learn

(potentiality that produces accidents sometimes)

Material intellect. (has the function of matter)

Possible science Potential possesion of science(formal potency)

Aquired intellect. Like a disposition – e(/xij, habitus

Exerciţiul ei actual Actual exercise of science Active intellect

substance:MATTER – pure possibility. Generates accidents.POSSIBLE SCIENCE – formal possibility. Generates scienceACTUAL SCIENCE - formal actuality. IS Science.COMPOUND: bodies (! Matter does not mean body !)

3. Substance as compound is the body

Principle of all substances is natural body.Because it has the principle of movement in it.

Among substances are by general consent reckoned bodies and especially natural bodies; for they are the principles of all other bodies.

oÙs…ai d m£list' enai dokoàsi t¦ sèmata, kaˆ toÚtwn t¦ fusik£· taàta g¦r tîn ¥llwn ¢rca….

Substance as body

Themistius Thomas (sent. II, 1, 8) Aristotle (see also Metaph., 7, 2, 1028 b8)

Substances (as bodies)

Natural bodies Composed of the four elements

Have substantial form

Have in them the principle of movement and non-movement (De an II, 1, 412b 17).

Artificial bodies Derrived from natural bodies

Have accidental form Imitate natural bodies (Phys, 194a 21-23).

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Natural bodies * Have principle of movement in them because:

- have self-nutrition- have growth- decay

* that is, they have life and are compound:Body is not predicated of the subject (Cf. Categories)

- so, body is not a form or species- therefore body is not the same with the soul

CONCLUSION: SOUL MUST BE A SUBSTANCE IN THE SENSE OF SPECIES.

Soul is substance as species or form of a natural living body.- soul is the species of the living bodies.- Living bodies are compound of matter and form- The very form in that compound is soul

But he has already said that form has two meanings:- possible form (not exercised)- actual form (in exercise)

WHICH ONE IS THE SOUL?

A. SOUL IS POSSIBLE FORM AND ACTUAL FORM

Soul has both meanings:- possession of knowledge (episteme)- actual exercise of knowledge (theorein)

(not theoria but theorein , to contemplate)

Of natural bodies some have life in them, others not; by life we mean self-nutrition and growth (with its correlative decay). It follows that every natural body which has life in it is a substance in the sense of a composite.

But since it is also a body of such and such a kind, viz. having life, the body cannot be soul; the body is the subject or matter, not what is attributed to it.

Hence the soul must be a substance in the sense of the form of a natural body having life potentially within it.

But substance is actuality, and thus soul is the actuality of a body as above characterized.

Now the word actuality has two senses corresponding respectively to the possession of knowledge and the actual exercise of knowledge.

tîn d fusikîn t¦ mn œcei zw»n, t¦ d' oÙk œcei· zw¾n d lšgomen t¾n di' aØtoà trof»n te kaˆ aÜxhsin kaˆ fq…sin. éste p©n sîma fusikÕn metšcon zwÁj oÙs…a ¨n e‡h, oÙs…a d' oÛtwj æj sunqšth.

™peˆ d' ™stˆ kaˆ sîma kaˆ toiÒnde, zw¾n g¦r œcon, oÙk ¨n e‡h sîma ¹ yuc» · oÙ g£r ™sti tîn kaq' Øpokeimšnou tÕ sîma, m©llon d' æj Øpoke…menon kaˆ Ûlh.

¢nagka‹on ¥ra t¾n yuc¾n oÙs…an enai æj edoj sèmatoj fusikoà � �dun£mei zw¾n œcontoj.

¹ d' oÙs…a ™ntelšceia· toioÚtou ¥ra sèmatoj ™ntelšceia.

aÛth d lšgetai dicîj� , ¹ mn æj � ™pist»mh, ¹ d' æj tÕ qewre‹n.

33

Soul is actual form in the sense of potential form (knowledge as possessed).

[This baffles us.How can be “actual” in the sense of “potential”?

Aristotle uses the term entelecheia.So: Soul is entelecheia in the sense of potential form.That means, soul is entelecheia of the body but not yet actualized.

Example: Sleeping is waking in potency. Waking is entelecheia (en telos ehein).While we sleep we have waking as potency but not yet realized.

But why does Aristotle say that potential form is the first sense ?- Because:

Possible is prime, anterior Possibility is prior to actualization

It is obvious that the soul is actuality [refer to entelecheia] in the first sense, viz. that of knowledge as possessed, for both sleeping and waking presuppose the existence of soul, and of these waking corresponds to actual knowing, sleeping to knowledge possessed but not employed,

and, in the history of the individual, [possibility of] knowledge comes before its employment or exercise. (…)

fanerÕn oân Óti æj ™pist»mh· ™n g¦r tù Øp£rcein t¾n yuc¾n kaˆ Ûpnoj kaˆ ™gr»gors…j ™stin, ¢n£logon d' ¹ mn ™gr»gorsij tù qewre‹n� , Ð d' Ûpnoj tù œcein kaˆ m¾ ™nerge‹n·

protšra d tÍ genšsei ™pˆ toà aÙtoà ¹ �™pist»mh . (…)

The living individual (natural living body)

Potential possession of science.

Prime act (soul). Prime, that is, anterior as principle.

e)ntele/ceia

Potency of life (body) dynamisActual exercise of science Act, similar to actual exercise of

knowledge (living being). e)ne/rgeia

34

B. SOUL IS THE ENTELECHY OF NATURAL BODY

[in conclusion]

Soul is entelechy not yet realized.A full of possibilities.These possibilities should be actualised.

HOW? by means of organs.

Organs are tools for the body.

This is a general definition, corresponding to all functions of the soul.

It equals life with organs.

To have life means - to have organs, that is, - to be able to exercize the potencies that were priorily given by the form. Actualised function of organs is (energeia) actual exercising of

This is why soul is the entelechy of the natural body having life in potency.

[412b] (…)If, then, we have to give a general formula applicable to all kinds of soul, we must describe it as the first grade of actuality of a natural body having organs.

diÕ ¹ yuc» ™stin ™ntelšceia ¹ prèth sèmatoj fusikoà dun£mei zw¾n œcontoj.

(…) e„ d» ti koinÕn ™pˆ p£shj yucÁj de‹ lšgein, e‡h ¨n ™ntelšceia ¹ prèth sèmatoj fusikoà Ñrganikoà.

35

entelecheia.- The form is potential first and it is understood as entelecheia.

The definition of the soul has been obtained by the method of division.These are the alternatives Aristotle had from the beginning:

SOUL

Substance

matter (not individual)

potencyAs virtual science

pure possibility to learn

Form or species (secondary substance)

act

Ca ştiinţă posibilă

Possession in potency of science (formal potency).

Prime act , entelecheia SOUL

POTENCY, as species

Ca exerciţiu actual

Actual exercise of science

energeia LIVING INDIVIDUAL

ACT, as individual

Compound (prime substance or the individual compound)

Natural body

Have life as potency

Organs, that is, instruments for exercising the life

BODY

Have life as potency

Accident (not the case)

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GENERAL CONCLUSION.SOUL AS [tÕ t… Ãn enai]

tÕ t… Ãn enai

The expression is invented by Aristotle.

1. Thoms Aquinas,, Sentencia de anima, II, 2, 2: „quod quid erat esse

2. Albert the Great, De anima, ed. Stroick, 1968, p. 68, r. 85-86:

„quod quid erat esse, hoc est quidditas essentialis”3. D. Ross, in his commentary to De anima:

(1961, p. 214): „what it was for it to be”.

4. Rodier, Commentaire, Aristote, De l’ame, Paris, Vrin, 1900, p. 180:

- The expression means form as present in corporeal individual , different from universal (to\ kaqo/lou)- essence

Starting question is: „what is a thing that exists?”

Answer is: „a thing that exists is a form projected into a purpose as it is envolved in matter”.

„What it was for it to be” is essence but still semantically it is more: it not only indicates but also explains what essence is. It explains essence as presence of form in matter. It denotes the coming-to-be as a real phenomenon.

(…)

We have now given an answer to the question, What is soul? -- an answer which applies to it in its full extent.

It is substance in the sense which corresponds to the

definitive formula of a certain body's essence .

(…)

(…)

kaqÒlou mn oân e‡rhtai t… ™stin ¹ yuc» ·

oÙs…a g¦r ¹ kat¦ tÕn lÒgon.

toàto d � tÕ t… Ãn enai� tù toiJdˆ sèmati ,

(…)

37

Also, cf. P. Courtes, L’origine de la formule to\ ti h)=n ei)=nai, in Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Theologiques, 1964, pp. 169-197.

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Selected bibliography :

I. Editions and translations:

Aristoteles graecae, ex recensione Immanuelis Bekkeri, Berlin, 1831.Ross, W. D., The works of Aristotle translated into English, Oxford, 1910-52. Revised text with introduction and commentary, 2 vols, Oxford,

1924 (repr. 1958).Aristotle, Categories, translated by Edghill, E. M., University of Adelaide Library.Aristote, Traite de l’ame, commentaire par Rodier, G., Ed. Leroux, Paris, Vrin, 1900 [1985]. Aristotle, De anima, ed. by R. D. Hicks, Cambridge, 1907.Aristotle, De anima, edited, with introduction and Commentary by sir David Ross, Oxford, 1961. Aristotel, Despre suflet, traducere din greaca sin ote de Alexander baumgarten, Humanitas, Bucuresti, 2005.

II. Secondary sources:

Ackrill, J. L., “Aristotle on Good and the Categories”, în: J. Barnes, M. Schofield, R. Scorabji (eds.), Articles on Aristotle, 2. Ethics and Politics, Duckworth, London, 1977, pp. 17-25.

Aubenque, Pierre, “Hèrmeneutique et Ontologie. Remarques sur le Peri Hermeneias d`Aristote”, en: Penser avec Aristote, Etudes reunies sous la direction de M. A. Sinaceur, Paris, Érès, 1991, pp. 93-105.

Aubenque, Pierre, Le probleme de l’etre chez Aristote, Quadruge/PUF, deuxieme ed.Barnes, Jonathan (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995.Chevalier, Jacques, La notion du nécéssaire chez Aristote et ses predecesseurs, Felix Alcan, Paris, 1915.During, I., Owen, G.E.L. (eds.), Aristotel and Plato in the Mid-Fourth Century. Papers of the Symposium Aristotelicum held at Oxford in August,

1957, Goteborg, 1960.Evangeliou, Christos, Aristotle’s Categories and Porphyry, E.J.Brill, Leiden, New York, Kobenhavn, Koln, 1988.Guthrie, W.K.C., A History of Greek Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, 1981, vol. VI: „Aristotle: an encounter”.Jaeger, Werner, Aristotle. Fundamentals of the History of his Development, Oxford, At the Clarendon Press, 1948.Nussbaum, Martha, and Rorty, Oksenberg Amelie, Essays on Aristotle’s De Anima, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1992.Nuyens, Francois, L’évolution de la psychologie d’Aristote, Louvain, La Haye, Paris, 1948.Robin, Leon, Aristote, Paris, 1944.

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