the political economy of pro-poor growthinc-led minority coalition (upa) (left support) national...

1 © 2011 d·i·e Rippin and Boekle-Giuffrida (2011): The Political Economy of Pro-Poor Growth

The Political Economy of

Pro-Poor Growth

Evidence from Education Policies

in India and Brazil

Nicole Rippin and Bettina Boekle-Giuffrida


The Political Economy of Pro-Poor Growth: Evidence

from Education Policies in India and Brazil

1.1 Pro-Poor Growth

1. Introduction

2.1 Possible Equilibriums in Policy Formulation

1. Introduction

1.1 Pro-Poor Growth

1.2 Education Puzzle

2. Theoretical Framework

2.1 Policy Formulation

2.2 Policy Implementation

3. Empirical Application

3.1 Methodology

3.2 Country Case India

3.2.1 Formulation

3.2.2 Implementation

3.3 Country Case Brazil

3.3.1 Formulation


4. Lessons Learned

3. The Empirical Application

3.1 Methodology



4. Lessons Learned

1.2 The “Education Puzzle”

2. The Theoretical Framework

2.2 Possible Equilibriums in Policy Implementation

3.2.1 Policy Formulation in Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu

3.2.2 Policy Implementation in Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu

3.3.1 Policy Formulation in Pernambuco and Ceará

3.3.2 Policy Implementation in Pernambuco and Ceará


When is Growth Pro-Poor?

Pro-poor

recession

Anti-poor

recession/

growth

Pro-Poor Growth

(both definitions)

Pro-Poor Growth

(relative definition) 1. Introduction

1.1 Pro-Poor Growth






3.1 Methodology


3.2.1 Formulation



3.3.1 Formulation


4. Lessons Learned


Importance of Elementary Education for Pro-Poor

Growth

Source: Lopez (2004)

1. Introduction

1.1 Pro-Poor Growth






3.1 Methodology


3.2.1 Formulation



3.3.1 Formulation


4. Lessons Learned


The “Education Puzzle”: Impact of Educational

Investments on Poverty and Growth in India

Source: Besley, Burgess and Esteve-Volart (2005)

1. Introduction

1.1 Pro-Poor Growth






3.1 Methodology


3.2.1 Formulation



3.3.1 Formulation


4. Lessons Learned


The “Education Puzzle”: Impact of Educational

Achievements on Poverty and Growth in India

Source: Besley, Burgess and Esteve-Volart (2005)

1. Introduction

1.1 Pro-Poor Growth






3.1 Methodology


3.2.1 Formulation



3.3.1 Formulation


4. Lessons Learned


Theoretical Framework: Possible Equilibriums in

Policy Formulation

Clientele-Relationship with the Non-Poor Clientele-Relationship with

the Poor No Political Competition Political Competition

Government

Poor Electorate Supports Bribes Ignores Supports Bribes Ignores Supports Bribes Ignores

Support X , X X , X X , X X , X X , X X , X X , X X , X X , X Uninformed

Oppose X , X X , X X , X X , X X , X X , X X , X X , X X , X

Support X , X X , X X , X X , X X , X X , X X , X X , X X , X Informed

Oppose X , X X , X X , X X , X X , X X , X X , X X , X X , X

Reputation Financial

Capability

Political

Stability Constitution Supporting

External Parties

1. Introduction

1.1 Pro-Poor Growth






3.1 Methodology


3.2.1 Formulation



3.3.1 Formulation


4. Lessons Learned

Policies can ceteris paribus be expected to be formulated in a way

that releases their pro-poor potential if:

The poor are the clientele of the government

The government is confronted with a combination of political

competition and a majority of poor voters well aware of the

importance of the policy in question


Enforcing Power No Enforcing Power

Unaware Aware

Poor Beneficiaries

Public Official Lobby Don’t Lobby Lobby Don’t Lobby Lobby Don’t Lobby

Enforces X , X X , X X , X X , X X , X X , X Altruistic

Hampers X , X X , X X , X X , X X , X X , X

Enforces X , X X , X X , X X , X X , X X , X Not

Altruistic Hampers X , X X , X X , X X , X X , X X , X

Theoretical Framework: Possible Equilibriums in

Policy Implementation

Accountability

enforced by

Government

Interest Groups Financial

Capability

Geographic,

Socio-economic,

etc. Conditions

1. Introduction

1.1 Pro-Poor Growth






3.1 Methodology


3.2.1 Formulation



3.3.1 Formulation


4. Lessons Learned

Policies are ceteris paribus expected to be effectively

implemented in a certain area of influence if:

The responsible public official has a strong commitment to

implement

The poor have enforcing power and are fully aware of it


Methodology: Case Selection

1. Introduction

1.1 Pro-Poor Growth






3.1 Methodology


3.2.1 Formulation



3.3.1 Formulation


4. Lessons Learned

Responsibilities: India Brazil

Policy Formulation Centre, States Centre, States

Policy Implementation Centre, States Centre, States, Municipalities

Indicators: Andhra Pradesh Tamil Nadu Ceará Pernambuco

Area (sqkm) 275,045 130,058 148,825 98,911

# Districts / # Municipalities 23 30 184 185

Population 76,210,000 62,405,700 8,547,809 8,810,256

% SC Population 16.2% 19.0% - -

% ST Population 6.6% 1.0% - -

SGDP (in million at current prices) Rs 3,712,000 Rs 3,392,000 R$ 60,099 R$ 70,441

Work participation rate 45.8 44.7 58.5 (Fortaleza) 54 (Recife)

NER (upper primary) 57.5 88.1 98.3 96.8

Literacy Rate 60.5 73.5 80.9 82.1

EDI (1st – 8

th grade) 12 4 - -

IDEB (1st – 4

th grade) - - 4.4 4.1


Country Case India: The Lok Sabha (Lower House)

Elections

1. Introduction

1.1 Pro-Poor Growth






3.1 Methodology


3.2.1 Formulation



3.3.1 Formulation


4. Lessons Learned

The political environment can be divided in two main periods:

The majority of the poor electorate seems to be politically unaware

and uninformed about the importance of elementary education:

Before 1989/90: Indian National Congress, party of the

middle class, is uncontested dominating all elections

After 1989/90: Fierce competition between various parties

(362 in 2009), from Communists with focus on the poor to the

Bharatiya Janata Party of the upper castes

32% could not identify most pressing issues, 2% named

education (National Election Survey 2009)

Election campaigns concentrate on food subsidies, votes of

the poor are broadly distributed:

Left Front (10.6%), INC (27.3%), BJP (16.8%) (2009)


2.70

2.90

3.10

3.30

3.50

3.70

3.90

4.10

4.30

1980

-81

1981

-82

1982

-83

1983

-84

1984

-85

1985

-86

1986

-87

1987

-88

1988

-89

1989

-90

1990

-91

1991

-92

1992

-93

1993

-94

1994

-95

1995

-96

1996

-97

1997

-98

1998

-99

1999

-00

2000

-01

2001

-02

2002

-03

2003

-04

2004

-05

2005

-06

2006

-07(

RE)

2007

-08

(BE)

Indian National Congress

(centre)

National Front (right-left coalition)

Samajwadi Janata (INC supported)

United Front

minority

(centre-left support)

Bharatiya Janata Party (right)

(minority coalition + strong centre-left opposition)

National Democratic Alliance

(right minority coalition + weak

opposition)

Year of Lok Sabha Election

Unni Krishnan (1993)

83rd Amendment (1997)

93rd Amendment (2001)

2% education cess (2004/05)

Lost vote of confidence

Indian National Congress

(till 94 minority + strong right

opposition

INC-led minority coalition (UPA)

(left support)

National Education Policy 1992

National Education Policy 1986

Country Case India: National Educational

Investments over Time

1. Introduction

1.1 Pro-Poor Growth






3.1 Methodology


3.2.1 Formulation



3.3.1 Formulation


4. Lessons Learned

Before 1989/90:

Government ignores the

poor, pro poor potential not

released

After 1989/90: Government bribes the

uninformed poor, depending on coalition

sometimes clientele-influence, pro-poor potential

not / partially released


Country Case India: The Vidhan Sabha (Legislative

Assembly) Elections

1. Introduction

1.1 Pro-Poor Growth






3.1 Methodology


3.2.1 Formulation



3.3.1 Formulation


4. Lessons Learned

The political environment in Andhra Pradesh:

The political environment in Tamil Nadu:

Two main parties: Indian National Congress and Telugu

Desam Party, both in the centre of the political spectrum

Share of votes of the poor: 42.9% INC, 39.6% TDP (2009)

Two main parties: Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam and All India

Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam

DMK significantly in the lead among the poor and very poor

Political competition on social issues almost absent

Political competition on social issues, especially education,

but considerable amount of swing voters due to vote buying


1.75

2.00

2.25

2.50

2.75

3.00

3.25

3.50

3.75

4.00

4.25

1984

-198

5

1985

-198

6

1986

-198

7

1987

-198

8

1988

-198

9

1989

-199

0

1990

-199

1

1991

-199

2

1992

-199

3

1993

-199

4

1994

-199

5

1995

-199

6

1996

-199

7

1997

-199

8

1998

-199

9

1999

-200

0

2000

-200

1

2001

-200

2

2002

-200

3

2003

-200

4

2004

-200

5

2005

-200

6

2006

-200

7 (R

E)

2007

-200

8 (B

E)

Year of Vidhan Sabha Election

Telugu Desam Party (AP)

(centre)

All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (TN)

(centre/centre-right)

CLIP (2005)

ABL (2003)

PISA 2010

Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (TN)

(centre-left)

TN Midday-Meal-Scheme (1982)

Introduced

AP Midday-Meal-Scheme (2001)

Enforced by Court's decision 2001

Indian National Congress (AP)

(centre)

Country Case India: State Educational Investments

over Time

1. Introduction

1.1 Pro-Poor Growth






3.1 Methodology


3.2.1 Formulation



3.3.1 Formulation


4. Lessons Learned

Andhra Pradesh:

Governments almost

ignore the poor, pro-poor

potential not released

Tamil Nadu:

DMK has strong focus on education but

poor are uninformed and bribed, pro-poor

potential released when DMK is in office


Country Case India: The Implementation of SSA

1. Introduction

1.1 Pro-Poor Growth






3.1 Methodology


3.2.1 Formulation



3.3.1 Formulation


4. Lessons Learned

Administration in Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu:

Highly inflated due to two implementation societies,

monitoring almost absent

Commitment of high-level officials higher in Tamil Nadu:

Average tenure State Project Director: 20 months vs.

7.5 months in Andhra Pradesh (2004-09)

Chief Minister M.G. Ramachandran (Midday-Meal-

Scheme) and State Project Director Vijaya Kumar (ABL)

Beneficiaries have almost no enforcing power:

Teachers appointed, promoted, transferred by Education

Director: performance-based wages / promotions impossible

Resistance of teacher unions broken (not best practice!)

Minor role in construction, repair, maintenance through Village

Education Committees which are often not even active


Progress in Implementing Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan

(2002-08)

1. Introduction

1.1 Pro-Poor Growth






3.1 Methodology


3.2.1 Formulation



3.3.1 Formulation


4. Lessons Learned

Implementation of the national program Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan:

Progress (2002-2008) Andhra Pradesh Tamil Nadu

Expenditure (Percentage of SGDP) - 0.20% + 0.17%

Schools + 3% + 4%

Without building 15% 0.1%

Without girl’s toilet 53% 38%

Classrooms (since 2004) + 13% + 14%

Average number per school 4 6

Need for major repair 6% 4%

Teachers + 12% + 82%

Para-teachers 23% 0.4%

Absence rates 25.3% 21.3%

Engagement in non-teaching activities 57.0% 50.4%

Almost all the difference is made by the commitment of high-level

government officials in Tamil Nadu

“Things are mainly working despite not because of the system”


Country Case Brazil: The Câmara dos Deputados

(House of Representatives) Elections

1. Introduction

1.1 Pro-Poor Growth






3.1 Methodology


3.2.1 Formulation



3.3.1 Formulation


4. Lessons Learned

The political environment can be divided in two main periods:

The majority of the poor electorate seems to be politically aware

and informed about the importance of elementary education:

Era Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1994-2002): The centre-

right Brazilian Social Democratic Party led coalition forms

majority government

Era Luíz Inácio Lula da Silva (2002-10): The left Workers’

Party leftist-centre coalition first forms minority, after 2006

majority government

High political awareness after oppression under military

dictatorship and only recent redemocratization (since 1985)

Constitution of 1988 called Citizen’s Constitution, includes

universal right to education


3.8

4.0

4.3

4.5

4.8

5.0

5.3

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

National Education Plan 2011

PISA 2000

FUNDEF (1996)

FUNDEB (2007)

IDEB (2007)

National Education Plan 2001

Bolsa Escola Program (2001)

Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira

(centre-right coalition)

Partido dos Trabalhadores

(leftist-centre minority coalition)

Partido dos Trabalhadores

(leftist-centre coalition)

Bolsa Familia (2003)

Year of Câmara dos Deputados

elections

Country Case Brazil: National Educational

Investments over Time

1. Introduction

1.1 Pro-Poor Growth






3.1 Methodology


3.2.1 Formulation



3.3.1 Formulation


4. Lessons Learned

Cardoso (1994-2002):

Government cannot bribe

the poor, pro-poor potential

at least partially released

Lula da Silva (2002-10):

Poor cannot be bribed,

strong clientele-influence

from the left parties


Country Case Brazil: The Assembly Elections

1. Introduction

1.1 Pro-Poor Growth






3.1 Methodology


3.2.1 Formulation



3.3.1 Formulation


4. Lessons Learned

The political environment in Céara:

The political environment in Pernambuco:

Centre-right Brazilian Social Democratic Party (PSDB)

achieved governable majorities from 1991 to 2006

After a short mandate of left-wing Brazilian Socialist Party

(PSB) from 1995 to 98, Pernambuco was ruled by Union of

Pernambuco, a coalition between centre Brazilian

Democratic Movement Party (PMDB) and right-wing Party

of the Liberal Front (PFL) from 1999-2006

Political competition on social issues

Policy making highly influenced by PSBD at the national level

Political competition on social issues


1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

3.5

4.0

4.5

5.0

5.5

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

Alphabetization at the Right Age (2005)

Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira (Ceará)

(centre/centre-right)

Partido Socialista Brasileiro (Pernambuco)

(left)

Union of Pernambuco (Pernambuco):

Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (centre)

Partido da Frente Liberal (right)

Alphabetize with Success (2003)

Be Alert and Accelerate (2003)

Year of assembly elections

Country Case Brazil: State Educational Investments

over Time

1. Introduction

1.1 Pro-Poor Growth






3.1 Methodology


3.2.1 Formulation



3.3.1 Formulation


4. Lessons Learned

Ceará:

Government cannot bribe

the poor, pro-poor potential

at least partially released

Pernambuco:

Government cannot bribe the poor, but strong

liberal clientele promote privatization course,

effect yet unknown


Country Case Brazil: State-Level Implementation of

the National Program Brasil Alfabetizado

1. Introduction

1.1 Pro-Poor Growth






3.1 Methodology


3.2.1 Formulation



3.3.1 Formulation


4. Lessons Learned

Administration in Ceará:

Comprehensive reform from 1995 onwards, e.g. performance-

based appointments and community involvement

5 secretaries of education within seven years with rather low

levels of qualification and commitment

First education secretary appointed under reformed system,

Antenor Naspolini, was former coordinator of UNICEF in

Ceará and main reason for Ceará’s progress

Administration in Pernambuco:

Public officials still often appointed according to political

affiliation rather capability and qualification

Beneficiaries repeatedly excluded from implementation

processes and denied access to relevant information

(confrontation rather than communication)


Progress in Implementing Brasil Alfabetizado

1. Introduction

1.1 Pro-Poor Growth






3.1 Methodology


3.2.1 Formulation



3.3.1 Formulation


4. Lessons Learned

Implementation of the national program Brasil Alfabetizado:

Almost all the difference is made by the commitment of high-level

government officials in Ceará

But different to Tamil Nadu, the systems itself promotes the

commitment of public officials

Policy implementation in Ceará characterized by strong and

sustainable pro-poor alignment

Focus on institutional empowerment of municipal

administrations much stronger in Ceará:

59 out of 185 municipal administrations participating in

Pernambuco (2010)

182 out of 184 municipal administrations participating

in Ceará (2010)


Country Case Brazil: Municipal-Level Implementation

of the State Program Alphabetization at the Right Age

1. Introduction

1.1 Pro-Poor Growth






3.1 Methodology


3.2.1 Formulation



3.3.1 Formulation


4. Lessons Learned

Administration in Fortaleza:

Continuously insufficient literacy levels in primary education

Mayor committed and long time in office (1993-04, 2008-12)

Little commitment on higher administration levels, jobs are

often conceived as tremplin to a more prestigious career

Administration in Maracanaú:

Increase in IDEB from 3.9 (2005) to 4.7 (2009), one of

Ceará’s most successful municipalities

Known for making headlines with fraud and corruption

Beneficiaries have almost no enforcing power, school councils

weak and without real power

Reform of administration: performance-based component in

salaries, municipal law holds directors responsible for

school’s progress


Lessons Learned: Policy Formulation

1. Introduction

1.1 Pro-Poor Growth






3.1 Methodology


3.2.1 Formulation



3.3.1 Formulation


4. Lessons Learned

Awareness of the poor electorate for political processes and

importance of respective policies:

Brazilian experience recommends open political dialogue with

policy recipients from early on: Institutionalization of feedback

mechanisms between policy makers and recipients

Instrument to evaluate effectiveness of policies and monitor

progress of states, municipalities and schools

Monitoring of policy outcomes:

PISA results produced “healthy shock”, asserting pressure on

the government through public awareness and concern with

regard to (international) reputation


Lessons Learned: Policy Implementation

1. Introduction

1.1 Pro-Poor Growth






3.1 Methodology


3.2.1 Formulation



3.3.1 Formulation


4. Lessons Learned

Increase proportion of committed public officials:

Transparent recruitment according to merit and capabilities

Members of schools and village councils need to be trained

and provided with information necessary to monitor

achievements

Enforce good performance of those who are not:

Beneficiaries need de jure and de facto enforcing power to

hold officials accountable

Decentralisation ought to be handled with care:

But if beneficiaries are not endowed with de jure and de facto

enforcement power, implementation successes will crucially

depend on commitment of officials and consequently

reinforce inequality patterns

High level of state-level centralization hampers accountability


Thank you!

the political economy of pro-poor growthinc-led minority coalition (upa) (left support) national...

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