Margaret Miller

P I P SThe Project on International Peace and SecurityInstitute for the Theory and Practice of International RelationsThe College of William and Mary

Brief No. 10.3

The Poor Man’s Air ForceUnattributed Mid-Range Drone Attacks

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The Poor Man’s Air Force Unattributed Mid-Range Drone Attacks

APRIL 2018

Margaret N. Miller

1

The Poor Man’s Air Force Unattributed Mid-Range Drone Attacks

Military and commercial technological advances make mid-range unmanned aerial vehicles (M-

UAVs) increasingly inexpensive and accessible. M-UAV proliferation enables resource-poor

states and non-state actors to target civilian population centers with lethal airpower that is

difficult to attribute. The United States faces difficulties countering asymmetric threats and

engaging with adversaries at below-war levels of conflict. Attributing and responding to

anonymous or proxy M-UAV attacks will exacerbate this gray-zone challenge. Uncertain

attribution will contribute to U.S. policy paralysis, allow deliberate misattribution of attacks for

propaganda purposes, and enable spoilers in peace processes and repression.

Introduction

On January 5, 2018, thirteen homemade drones loaded with explosives attacked two Russian

military bases in Syria.1 Estimates indicate that attackers may have launched these GPS-guided

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) from as far as 100 kilometers away, complicating attack

attribution.2 While Moscow suspects that United States and Israel enabled the attack, the

responsible actors remain unidentified.3

The January 2018 attack is early evidence of a developing trend in drone warfare. The proliferation

of mid-range UAVs (M-UAVs), characterized by falling production costs and more precise

navigation technology, is expanding access to lethal airpower. M-UAV attacks are difficult to

attribute because they launch from mobile platforms, fly below radar coverage, and use low-cost

navigation technology. More resource-poor states and non-state groups will be able to threaten

civilian population centers, while maintaining plausible deniability.

The United States is at a comparative disadvantage in gray-zone warfare. The gray zone is defined

as any operating environment in which states employ asymmetric means, including cyber-attacks,

information operations, and ambiguity in international law, to compete at below-war intensity.

Uncertain attribution of M-UAV attacks complicates retaliation and allows the misattribution of

attacks for propaganda and spoiling purposes.

The New Threat from M-UAVs

“The fact that terrorists have received assembly technology and programming technology

is the evidence that this threat stretches far beyond the Syrian borders. Such lethal drones

can be applied by terrorists in any country, targeting not only military objects.” – Russian Major General A. Novikov, 20184

2

M-UAVs are becoming more advanced, available, and dangerous. These drones are spreading to

new actors because of their appeal as reconnaissance and counter-value weapons and their

decreasing costs.5 A lower threshold to buying or building M-UAVs democratizes access to deadly

airpower by blurring the line between great powers and other actors. The inherent qualities of M-

UAVs coupled with their wider proliferation makes attribution of attacks potentially difficult.

Features of M-UAVs

M-UAVs are preferred options for actors seeking a low-cost alternative to military-grade UAVs

with better performance than hobby drones. These vehicles can be manufactured or equipped with

explosives, and commercial development is increasing their range. Sophisticated navigation

technologies are enabling alternatives to radio and GPS control so that even low-end M-UAVs

cannot be disabled by radio or GPS jammers.

• UAV taxonomy. The terms drone or UAV cover a variety of systems, ranging from hobby

quadrotor helicopters (quadcopters) to U.S. offensive oriented vehicles, such as the MQ-9

Reaper. Most discussions of “drone warfare” focus on the top or bottom end of the

spectrum (see Figure 1 in the Appendix).6 Mid-range UAVs are fixed-wing or hybrid

vehicles of military, commercial, or homemade production that carry a payload beyond

line of sight, but less than 200 km (see Figure 2 in the Appendix).7 The middle of the UAV

spectrum presents unique capabilities and opportunities for proliferation (see Figure 1 in

the Appendix). M-UAVs are a diverse category of vehicles, including low-end military

drones, such as AeroVironment’s Switchblade, and inexpensive 3-D-printed drones that

use smartphone sensors. The M-UAVs in the January 2018 attacks in Syria appeared to be

homemade, built with small combustion engines, polystyrene wings, and wood supports.8

• Carrying capacity. Actors can easily weaponize UAVs produced for commercial use or

military surveillance by attaching explosives. M-UAV carrying capacity is limited by its

maximum takeoff payload. For military-grade M-UAVs, most vehicles can carry up to a

20 kilogram (kg) payload. Top-tier vehicles like Israel’s HAROP can carry a 32 kg payload

(see Figure 4 in the Appendix). A single M-UAV can lift an explosive capacity similar to

a pipe bomb or briefcase bomb: 5-50 pounds (lbs). For comparison, the December 2016

bombing of a Cairo Coptic church used 12 kg (26 lbs) of TNT and killed 25, wounding

another 49.9 A coordinated M-UAV attack with 20 or more vehicles could deploy as much

explosive power as a car bomb (500-4,000 lbs TNT equivalent).10 The February 2016

Ankara bombing used approximately 90 kg of TNT equivalent and killed 28, wounding

61.11 The March 2016 Ankara bombing used 165 kg of TNT equivalent and killed 32,

injuring 125.12

• Range and endurance. Military long-range UAVs have made steady gains in their range

and endurance (see Figures 5 and 6 in the Appendix). In 2016, technological advancements

extended the endurance of Predator UAVs from 27 to 40 hours of non-stop flight.13 The

most sophisticated long-range UAVs remain airborne for over 30 hours, and

AeroVironment’s Global Observer can fly for a full week.14 Further, the commercial

market has invested heavily in drones for delivery, agriculture, and industrial uses.15 Fixed-

3

wing UAVs generally have better endurance, longer range, and higher payloads than

quadcopters.16 The commercial market has also made dramatic improvements in the range

and endurance of consumer UAVs.17 Top-end consumer fixed-wing UAVs currently have

flight times under an hour and ranges around 2.4 km.18 Consumer UAVs have limited range

because of Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulations. The FAA restricts

recreational UAV use, requiring consumer UAVs to be less than 55 lbs and flown in

daylight within operator line of sight.19

• Precision targeting and navigation. M-UAVs can use combinations of radio, GPS, inertial,

optical, and LiDAR sensors for navigation. Increasingly sophisticated sensors will make

M-UAVs more accurate over long distances. Additionally, less reliance on external control

by using internal sensors for inertial, optical, and LiDAR navigation is making M-UAVs

more difficult to disrupt and jam.20

1. Radio navigation. Radio-controlled consumer UAVs require line of sight to operate,

and electronic jammers can easily disrupt their operation. Radio-controlled UAVs are

mostly quadcopters with limited range.21 Radio-frequency-jamming technologies work

by emitting radio waves to block the UAV’s control signal and are relatively easy to

deploy. UAVs targeted by radio frequency jammers either fall to the ground, remain

motionless in mid-air, or return to a set point.22

2. GPS navigation. Global positioning system (GPS) navigation allows M-UAVs to travel

long distances with great precision. Russian experts claimed the M-UAVs used in the

January 2018 attack relied on GPS to navigate 100 km and attack two military bases.23

However, GPS-jammers can disrupt GPS-controlled M-UAVs.24 Low-end GPS

jammers cost about $80 and, despite bans against their purchase in the United States

and illegitimate use in the United Kingdom, they are a growing problem.25

3. INS navigation. An Inertial Navigation System (INS) measures the position of a UAV

based on a known origin, orientation, and velocity.26 INS is composed of internal

sensors that measure changes in rotation, acceleration, and sometimes altitude and

pressure.27 INS is not vulnerable to traditional jamming measures because it relies

completely on internal sensors. South Korean officials claimed there were no serious

interruptions due to North Korean GPS jamming, because aircraft using older INS were

“jam-proof.”28 INS sensors are sensitive even at high velocities, but have compounding

errors, or long-term drift. As a result, INS alone has limited value without additional

sensor inputs for navigation.29 INS often uses GPS or vision sensors to add absolute

position and velocity for error correction.30

4. Optical navigation. Optical navigation matches photo or video imagery taken from an

aerial vehicle to an internal database with a reference map. Cross-referencing reference

data with live images from the UAV’s surroundings provides navigation information.31

Like INS, optical navigation suffers from inherent errors. Joint use of optical and INS

sensors correcting biases, resulting in more accurate navigation than either alone.32

Synchronized use of vision and inertial sensors has been employed for navigation in

4

GPS-denied environments.33 The aerial photography industry is rapidly growing,

increasing the availability of high-resolution images for use in optical navigation.34

5. LiDAR navigation. LiDAR, or Light Detection and Ranging, sends out laser pulses to

measure distances, generating 3-D maps of the Earth’s surface.35 LiDAR can produce

high-quality information about topography through foliage and other debris.36 DJI, a

large Chinese company in the consumer UAV market, advertises that a ScanLook A-

series LiDAR can be mounted a DJI Matrice 600 for “an affordable, versatile and

accurate UAV-based 3D surveying solution.”37 LiDAR can give false measurements

when used alone on a moving vehicle, but joint INS-LiDAR navigation reduces the

error. Combined LiDAR and INS navigation was successfully tested indoors with a DJI

Phantom 3 quadcopter.38 Another study in 2016 navigated a helicopter 218 km using

LiDAR and INS without GPS correction, finishing only 27 meters from the target.39

Advanced sensor technology will increasingly migrate to smaller drones.40 Movement in

the UAV market away from human-in-the-loop operation makes jamming, disruption, and

detection of attacks more difficult. The M-UAVs used in January 2018 could be jammed

and brought to ground because they were GPS-controlled. However, radio and GPS

jammers will be insufficient to counter M-UAV attacks enabled by INS, optical, and

LiDAR navigation.41 According to the National Academy of Sciences, small UAVs are

shifting to navigation with internal sensors and swarming technology; the U.S. Department

of Defense, however, continues to invest primarily in radio and GPS jammers.42

Proliferation of M-UAVs

M-UAVs will continue to spread as commercial technological development drives down costs.

Resource-poor states and non-state actors will prefer M-UAVs for attacks that need to be launched

from a longer range in order to avoid checkpoints and defenses.

Cost and availability, on the supply side, and military utility, on the demand side, drive M-UAV

proliferation.

• Cost and availability. Access to military UAVs is restricted to large companies and

militaries, but increased battlefield use will inadvertently spread M-UAV capabilities.

Commercial competition in the rapidly growing consumer market is driving UAV costs

down. The price of UAV components, such as navigation sensors and 3-D printing, is being

reduced by use in other commercial goods.

1. Military M-UAVs. Information about prices for high-end military M-UAVs is

incomplete due to client restrictions. Producers of upper-end M-UAVs limit access to

large companies or militaries.43 State use of military M-UAVs on the battlefield will

spread this technology to other actors and enable wider M-UAV use in the future. As

an early example, the M-UAVs used in the January 2018 attacks were similar to a

Russian-made UAV, which rebel groups in Syria had shot down. The January attackers,

5

therefore, may have used the design to build a “cheap, garage-built copy of captured

[equipment].”44

2. Commercial M-UAVs. While the military has been at the forefront of UAV innovation

for years, the commercial market is providing more advanced technology at a lower

cost than military systems.45 In 2014, MITRE 3-D printed a military-grade UAV

controlled by commercial electronics and open-source software for $2,000. The

Economist notes that assembling a squadron of similar UAVs would cost less than “a

single shoulder-fired missile, let alone a modern combat aircraft.”46 Commercial

competition and recreational use of UAV technologies are lowering prices, especially

for more sophisticated models used for photography and video.47 Moreover, prices for

commercial UAVs have been steadily dropping.48 ISIS is reportedly using DJI Phantom

3 quadcopters available for $499.49 Time reported that DJI’s The Spark dropped in price

from $12,000 in 2016 to $499 in 2017.50 Market competition is rapidly driving down

prices and increasing the capabilities of consumer UAVs.51

3. Homemade M-UAVs. Component technologies for makeshift drones, including internal

sensors and 3-D printing, are increasingly inexpensive. Commercial uses for INS and

optical sensors have decreased prices to “just a few dollars.”52 The navigation control

for the AR.Drone Micro UAV uses accelerometers and gyroscopes for an inexpensive

inertial measurement unit available for under $10.53 Competition in the self-driving

vehicle sector is expected to further drive down LiDAR prices.54 Velodyne produces a

small LiDAR unit with limited sight line and low energy-usage for $8,000, but the

company hopes to lower the price to $1,000.55 Researchers at the University of Virginia

3-D printed a UAV in 2014. The UAV could be produced in about a day for $2,500

and carry a 1.5-pound payload. The aircraft could fly at 40 mph for 45 minutes and was

“made with off-the-shelf parts [with] an Android phone for a brain.”56 The M-UAVs

used in the January 2018 attacks were built with off-the-shelf electronics for “a couple

thousand dollars” total cost per vehicle.57

• Utility and demand. Cost is not the sole driver of proliferation.58 UAVs offer new

capabilities to both state and non-state adversaries “which they will use in novel ways, and

it is important for strategists not to fall into the trap of expecting other nations to use drones

the same as the United States.”59 M-UAVs can avoid checkpoints and other security

measures by launching from a distance, flying below radar, and minimizing reaction time.

Further, M-UAVs allow insurgents to conduct attacks with minimal risk to themselves,

unlike planting an improvised explosive device (IED) or a suicide bombing. These

characteristics make M-UAVs a cost-effective weapon for civilian attacks, compared to

vehicle bombs or other ground IEDs.

1. Bypassing ground security. Preventing M-UAV attacks will be more difficult because

the weapons can bypass ground security measures. M-UAVs will enable attackers to

strike crowded civilian areas protected by standard ground security. To prevent attacks,

the 2017 New Year’s Eve events in New York’s Times Square involved widespread

security measures: rooftop snipers, explosive-sniffing dogs, metal detectors, radiation

detectors, sand trucks and blocker vehicles, and more than 5,000 police officers.60 In

6

2014, there were 100 ground checkpoints in Baghdad run by local or federal police, the

national army, and other armed groups.61

2. Evading air defense. M-UAVs will evade detection from air defense systems, making

prevention and reaction to attacks more challenging. M-UAVs are capable of flying

under most radar-based air defense systems. War on the Rocks notes that UAVs evade

detection and minimize defense reaction time in crowded urban or rural areas by flying

low and fast.62 A report for the Department of Defense found that small unmanned

aircraft systems evade detection and identification because they “are small, can fly at

low altitude…can have highly irregular flight paths…[and] can take advantage of the

significant amount of background clutter close to the ground (e.g., birds and trees).”63

3. Air defense vulnerability. Existing air defense systems are vulnerable to low-flying

threats such as M-UAVs, small aircraft, and cruise missiles. Even areas with thorough

radar and air defense coverage have been vulnerable to small aircraft infiltration. In

2015, a man piloted a gyrocopter 65 miles to land on the White House lawn. A wide

array of civilian and military radars should have registered the vehicle, but North

American Aerospace Defense Command never detected the flight.64 Existing

discussion of air defense vulnerabilities has centered on cruise missiles, which fly at

lower altitudes and are smaller than ballistic missiles or aircraft. Cruise missiles evade

ground radar coverage until they are 20 miles from their target due to the Earth’s

curvature. The same radar could detect an aircraft flying at 10,000 feet 150 miles

away.65 Radars depend on line of sight coverage, allowing cruise missiles to hide

behind terrain like mountains and valleys to avoid air defense.66 In the future, M-UAVs

will pose a similar challenge to air defense systems.

The proliferation of M-UAVs will increase as these weapons become more inexpensive and useful.

We have already seen suggestive evidence of states and non-state actors acquiring M-UAVs,

accompanied by a growing inter-state M-UAV trade.

• State acquisition. Many countries are developing homegrown M-UAV production

programs. States have developed military UAVs called Loitering Munitions capable of

hovering over a target for prolonged intervals before launching an attack.67 Israel

produces HAROP Loitering Munitions with a 15 kg warhead.68 In 2012, South Korea

developed the Devil Killer M-UAV with a 2 kg payload and 40 km range.69 In 2017,

Poland, Taiwan, and the Czech Republic all introduced new Loitering Munitions.70 The

United Kingdom’s Fire Shadow M-UAV has a 100 km range and six hours

endurance.71 The United States’ Cutlass has a 56 km range and 1.4 kg payload.72

• Non-state actors. Non-state actors with some infrastructure and organization can

acquire and use M-UAVs.73 ISIS has deployed UAVs against U.S.-backed forces in

Syria and Iraq. Two Kurdish fighters were killed in October 2016 after shooting down

an ISIS UAV that later exploded, in the first known incident of insurgents inflicting

casualties with a UAV.74 In January 2017, ISIS established the “Unmanned Aircraft of

the Mujahideen,” a formal unit dedicated to drone warfare.75 Israel shot down a Hamas

UAV in September 2016 after it entered Israeli airspace. Hamas has used Iranian-made

7

UAVs, and imagery provided by Hamas shows a UAV with “four small rockets or

missiles under its wings.”76 Other groups reported to have used armed UAVs include

Hezbollah, Houthi rebels in Yemen, Libyan rebels, “the Donetsk People’s Republic,

the Kurdish Peshmerga, Jabhat al-Nusra, Faylaq al-Sham and Saraya al-Khorani, both

Syrian rebel groups, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), and

Colombian and Mexican drug cartels.”77 Early signs of UAV proliferation suggest that

M-UAVs will continue to spread, as they work better than hobby drones.

• M-UAV trade. There is a large and growing market for inter-state M-UAV trade. Israeli

companies accounted for 60.7% of global UAV exports from 1984 to 2014 (see Figure

7 in the Appendix).78 Israeli Loitering Munitions are being sold to smaller states,

including Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan (see Figure 3 in the Appendix).79

Israeli Aerospace Industries claims to have already sold hundreds of HAROP systems

to unnamed customers “for an accumulated amount of hundreds of millions of

dollars.”80 (See Figure 3 in the Appendix.) Israeli company Aeronautics has contracts

with countries around the world.81 The top five UAV importers globally are the United

Kingdom, India, Italy, Azerbaijan, and Germany with 33.9%, 13.2%, 9.8%, 7.8%, and

7.3% respectively of the global market share (see Figure 8 in the Appendix). This

evidence suggests that M-UAVs will increasingly be sold alongside high-end

counterparts, such as HAROP, and inexpensive hobby drones. The spread of M-UAVs

increases the risk of sale or transfer between countries and to non-state actors.82

M-UAVs, coercive airpower, and attribution

Advances in M-UAV technology lower the cost threshold for access to deadly airpower and

expand the number of actors, both state and non-state, that can credibly threaten civilians. Further,

increased proliferation creates an operating environment where M-UAVs attacks could be difficult

to attribute to those responsible. Difficulty attributing attacks could, for example, make it

impossible to determine definitively whether states are providing support for proxy organizations.

• Democratization of coercive airpower. More actors will be able to threaten deadly M-UAV

attacks against civilian targets.83 The United States and allies can expect to face counter-

value targeting from non-state actors and resource-poor states in the future.

1. Targeting civilian centers. More frequent use of weaponized UAVs increases the

likelihood that these weapons will be deployed against civilian targets.84 More targets

will be vulnerable to attacks as M-UAVs expand their range and proliferate to new

actors. The United States and its allies are likely to be within range of a potential

adversary in the future.

2. M-UAVs for coercion. UAVs have traditionally been considered poor devices for

coercion compared to more credible and costly threats. In the conventional view,

threatening to use UAVs is a poor signal of resolve because of their low cost, making

them “cheap talk.” However, M-UAVs are improving the ability of resource-poor states

8

and non-state actors to coerce.85 UAVs can be used during long-lasting conflicts at little

financial or human cost. Zegart argues that “in the old world of coercion, talk was

cheap. In the coming drone world, action will be cheap. Threat credibility can come

from low-cost fighting, not just costly signaling.”86 Accurate navigation also

guarantees precise punishment if the target state does not comply, thus increasing the

utility of M-UAVs for coercion.87

• Challenges of attribution. M-UAV attacks will be difficult to attribute because the drones

will be low-flying, increasingly long-range, and launched from mobile sites. In addition,

increased proliferation of M-UAVs means that sophisticated technology will no longer be

an identifying feature, enabling anonymous or proxy attacks. Attributing M-UAV attacks

will be difficult because of four characteristics inherent to these weapons:

1. Low-flying capability. M-UAVs fly close to the ground, unlike ballistic missiles and

other airborne threats. Current air defense systems are not built to detect and defend

against vehicles flying below radar, which depends on line of sight.88 Air defense is

also not equipped to track weaponry that does not follow missile trajectory.89 As a

result, tracking M-UAVs back to a specific launch site will be more difficult.

2. Remote navigation. The medium range provided by M-UAVs distances attackers from

the location of the attack, making attribution more difficult. In the past, individuals had

physically plant IEDs. However, M-UAVs are expanding the range even non-state

groups can threaten from localized attacks to more than 100 km. Locating a launch site

will become increasingly challenging as the range for low-cost M-UAVs expands.

3. Mobile launch sites. M-UAVs can be launched from mobile sites as opposed to fixed

launch positions. Attackers could launch an attack from unsophisticated mobile

transporters, such as the back of a truck. This capability is referred to as “shoot-and-

scoot mobility.”90 Attackers may abandon the launch site before the M-UAVs reach

their target and a response is initiated, further complicating attribution.

4. Indistinguishable technology. M-UAV proliferation reduces the ability to use advanced

technology as an identifying feature of future attacks. In the past, sophisticated

weapons signified that a resource-poor state or non-state group was receiving material

aid from a great power. For example, the Condor Legion bombing of Guernica

implicated Germany in the Spanish civil war, because Franco’s forces lacked such

sophisticated airpower.91 However, widespread commercial technologies, like

smartphone sensors and 3-D printing, reduce the ability to attribute. When many actors

have access to technology, it is no longer a distinctive characteristic of attacks. Proxy

and homegrown M-UAV attacks will become indistinguishable, and the United States

and its allies will not be able to punish the responsible groups. As a result, states may

be more willing to supply proxy groups with deadly force.

Together, these four characteristics of M-UAVs make it difficult to identify attackers. For

instance, consider an attack using M-UAVs similar to those from the January 2018 attacks

in Syria. Ten M-UAVs are launched from 100 km away to strike a crowded marketplace

9

in a city—for instance, Baghdad. Government or international authorities would have a

search area of 31,416 km2 to locate the attackers.92 Next, consider that the search is delayed

for an hour after the M-UAVs are launched. The attackers drive away from the launch

points at 50 km/hour. When the search begins, the radius has increased to 150 km and

search area is now 70,686 km2. For an attack on Baghdad, the one-hour search area includes

Iranian territory. After two hours, the search area is 125,664 km2.

Figure 1. Example M-UAV Attack on Baghdad 93

U.S. Gray-Zone Vulnerability

The United States has difficulty competing with adversaries at below-war levels of conflict and

countering asymmetric threats. In the gray zone, hostile actors employ emerging technologies,

such as cyber warfare and UAVs, to erode U.S. conventional supremacy. The proliferation of

increasingly lethal M-UAV technology risks proxy or anonymous attacks that make attribution

difficult. Without attribution, the United States and allies will find it difficult retaliate against an

adversary who is using M-UAVs against civilians. Further, U.S. forces will expend valuable time

and resources determining responsibility for an attack.

Characteristics of the gray zone

The gray zone is an operating environment in which hostile actors employ asymmetric means,

such as information operations, legal or political ambiguity, and proxy groups, to achieve

revisionist political goals. Actors in the gray zone operate below the threshold of conventional

warfare to erode the status quo and minimize the risk of retaliation.

10

The gray zone has three key characteristics:

• Below-war conflict. According to Barno and Bensahel, conflicts in the gray zone are “not

formal wars, and little resemble traditional, ‘conventional’ conflicts between states. If the

spectrum of conflict is conceived as a line running from peaceful interstate competition on

the far left to nuclear Armageddon on the far right, gray zone conflicts fall left of center.”94

Instead of conventional international conflict, states use offensive information operations,

cyber warfare, and legal ambiguity to achieve their goals in the gray zone without ever

declaring war. For example, China has conducted a large-scale campaign in the South

China Sea, occupying and militarizing disputed islands—namely the Paracel island chain

claimed by China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, and the Philippines—and building new

islands.95 To strengthen their control of the strategically critical area, China deployed

civilian ships, the coast guard, and maritime law enforcement in the South China Sea.96

• Weaponized ambiguity. Conflicts in the gray zone may involve the use of offensive military

force, yet they present a challenge to the targeted state by ambiguous action. Strategic

goals, involved actors, and legal violations are uncertain in the gray zone, so the necessary

response is equally unclear.97 For example, Russia fostered the separation of Abkhazia and

South Ossetia from Georgia in 2008 and has supported an ongoing insurgency of ethnic

Russians in Ukraine since 2014.98 Russia employed a combination of conventional forces

and information warfare to annex Crimea.99 Russia has taken significant steps to maintain

both international and domestic and international legitimacy through deception.100

• Blurred line between state and non-state actors. Gray-zone activities blur the boundary

between state and non-state actors. States operating in the gray zone may provide support

to foreign militaries or proxy groups, including insurgents or terrorist organizations.101

Ungovernable zones worldwide have seen an erosion of state authority and, as a result,

increasingly empowered non-state groups. State failure to maintain order results in a

vacuum filled by self-interested non-state actors and third-party states.102 This erosion of

state authority is often accompanied by the collapse of international law, resulting in more

frequent deadly attacks against civilian centers and humanitarian workers.103 In Crimea,

Russia worked “by, with, and through local forces,” exploited close economic ties with

Ukrainian businesses, and distributed propaganda to achieve annexation.104 Additionally,

the United States increasingly relies on civilians and non-governmental organizations to

attribute actions and counter information campaigns.105 On-the-ground actors can obtain

more accurate and credible information, but empowering them further erodes the line

between state and non-state actors.106

U.S. vulnerability to gray-zone strategies

The proliferation of advanced technology empowers gray-zone actors and threatens U.S.

conventional superiority. Technological development facilitates new strategies by lowering cost

barriers to weaponry and improving the capabilities of cheap options. Russian strategist Gerasimov

argues “the use of precision-guided munitions, robotics, unmanned aerial vehicles, and weapons

11

based on new physical principles will be the new main methods for engaging an enemy” in the

future.107 Commercial technologies that proliferate to non-state groups enable conflict short of

conventional war, using weapons such as cyber tools and UAVs.108

As the strongest global military power, the United States has conventional superiority and a

significant political and economic advantage over any adversary—including great powers like

Russia and China.109 Brands asserts that “the prevalence of gray zone approaches is actually a

testament to the strength of the liberal international order that America has led since World War

II.”110 In other words, actors resort to these “guerrilla geopolitics” from a place of weakness against

a stronger foe.111

Gray-zone strategies use emerging technology, threat of escalation, and weaponized ambiguity to

reduce the possibility of U.S. retaliation.

• Emerging technologies. New actors will gain access to advanced technology, eroding U.S.

conventional superiority. As the U.S. 2018 National Defense Strategy argues, commercial

technology will proliferate to “state competitors and non-state actors…a fact that risks

eroding the conventional overmatch to which our Nation has grown accustomed.”112 This

competition extends to every domain of military strategy, including air, naval, urban

warfare, and cyberspace.113 For example, cyber tools have empowered gray-zone actors,

as they have a low barrier to entry and are not easily attributable. Cyber warfare is an

inexpensive option for groups to achieve their strategic goals.114 Both theorists and

policymakers remain uncertain how to appropriately respond to a cyber-attack that may be

ambiguous, non-deadly, and involve non-state actors with state funding.115 Likewise, the

commercial proliferation of drones allows non-state actors to field “mini-air forces,” a

capability previously limited to a select number of great powers.116

• Ambiguity and escalation. Ambiguous strategies reduce the ability of policymakers to

attribute actions in the gray zone. The United States and its allies risk escalation, especially

when attempting to counter ambiguous strategies used by peer adversaries. Gray-zone

strategies exploit U.S. decision-making priorities, including reputational costs. The United

States has not effectively responded to gray-zone operations even when attribution was

almost certain, because of the steep geopolitical costs of overreaction and accidental

escalation.117 Recently, China and Russia have carefully pursued their interests using

strategies that fall below the threshold of war to avoid prompting a U.S. response.118 Russia

combined ambiguity with the threat of escalation to prevent U.S. response in Crimea. Their

use of “‘little green men’ (soldiers in unmarked green army uniforms)” and “providing

weapons and military support to separatist irregular forces [and] the threat of ‘escalating to

de-escalate’…dissuaded the West from even contemplating a military response of any

kind.”119 U.S. hesitation to respond to gray-zone aggression in the past has encouraged its

great power rivals to exploit this disadvantage.

The spread of M-UAVs threatens to provide the same ambiguous, cheap strategy as cyber

operations or “little green men” to any group. Ambiguous attribution will present a new challenge

to U.S. policymaking in response to M-UAV attacks.

12

Dangers of M-UAVs in Gray Zones

“…think of cheap off-the-shelf drones that allow insurgents and separatists to have their

own mini-air forces capable of surveillance and strike capabilities.” – M. Pomerleau, 2018120

M-UAVs will contribute to U.S. vulnerability in the gray zone by providing an inexpensive

strategy to new actors below the threshold of conventional war. M-UAVs create fundamental

uncertainty in attribution, potential for deliberate misattribution, and plausible deniability for

spoilers and repression. Uncertain attribution will make it more difficult for the United States and

its allies to respond to M-UAV attacks. Depending on the degree of certainty, the United States

may be unable to determine the identities of responsible actors, suspect attribution, or incorrectly

attribute attacks. States and non-state groups may find it beneficial to misattribute M-UAV attacks

for propaganda purposes. Difficulty of attribution provides opportunities for actors to use M-UAVs

against civilians where they may not have previously, knowing they will not be held accountable.

Uncertain attribution complicates U.S. policymaking

Gray-zone activities like unattributed M-UAV attacks pose a challenge for U.S. decision-making.

This weaponized ambiguity will contribute to U.S. policy paralysis and drain public resources.

• Policy paralysis. Counter-acting pressures in U.S. decision-making will result in policy

paralysis. Retaliating to counter-value M-UAV attacks will require almost certain

attribution before policymakers authorize action. Otherwise, the United States risks

misattributing an attack and responding with incomplete information. Like other gray-zone

threats, M-UAV attacks will blend weaponized ambiguity, below-war conflict, and a mix

of state and non-state actors to overwhelm decision makers with uncertainty. M-UAV

attacks only need to be plausibly ambiguous to present a challenge to U.S. policymakers.

• Resource drain. The United States will expend valuable time and resources determining

who is responsible for an M-UAV attack against civilians. The government has a limited

amount of bureaucratic resources and attention to devote to attributing a single attack.

Long-lasting investigations either distract from other national security issues or are

forgotten after another crisis. Past chemical weapons investigations demonstrate how

attribution problems reduce international ability to respond to civilian attacks.121

Foreign groups have incentives to misattribute attacks for propaganda purposes, making

M-UAV attack attribution even more difficult. States or non-state groups may intentionally

implicate third parties in the attack to “muddy attribution.” These actors know that the U.S.

intelligence community has access to high-quality information to attribute the attack, but

seek to “undermine public confidence… and therefore undercut political will to respond to

belligerent activity.”122 Private knowledge in the intelligence community cannot shape

13

public support for retaliation. For this reason, U.S. retaliation for a civilian attack could

target the wrong actors and spiral into a larger conflict.

Deliberate misattribution for propaganda purposes

Actors may claim responsibility for an attack they did not commit or blame a third party for

propaganda purposes in the future. Non-state groups have taken credit for unrelated attacks to

generate favorable recruiting propaganda and spread fear (e.g. ISIS).123

• Information operations. States and non-state groups will exploit misattribution for

information operations in the gray zone through social media and other publications.124

Regimes will most likely shift blame for attacks to adversaries for propaganda purposes.

These states may use misattribution to motivate domestic constituencies to support a

foreign policy objective. Similarly, states may use misattribution to generate international

support for their cause through alliances or in international forums.

• U.S. implicated in civilian deaths. The misattribution of M-UAV attacks risks implicating

the United States in civilian deaths unfairly or accidentally. This misattribution for

propaganda by U.S. adversaries could erode support in vulnerable regions. For instance,

Iranian information operations have sought to convince actors in Yemen that the United

States and allies support war crimes.125 As a result, the United States may have to

reconsider which non-state actors to support and in what regions. Potential adversaries will

be able to allege U.S. support or technological expertise for M-UAV attacks. Russian

officials and commentators implicated the United States and Israel as suspects in the

January 2018 M-UAV attacks in Syria, but the propaganda value would be even greater if

civilian lives had been lost.

Plausible deniability enables spoilers and repression

Actors in the gray zone will use ambiguity to reduce political will to issue threats of retaliation.

As more actors use M-UAVs without attribution, preventing attacks will be increasingly

complicated. Retaliation depends upon having full confidence in the identity of the attackers, so

plausible deniability will enable spoilers in peace processes or inter-state disputes and domestic

repression.126

• Sabotaging peace processes or inter-state disputes. Third-party actors will be able to use

M-UAVs to spoil peace processes or worsen conflicts. In terrorism literature, spoiling is

“sabotaging the peace” to prevent moderate elements of a terrorist group and a government

from reaching an agreement.127 Spoilers attack one side with some ambiguity to ensure that

the two groups cannot overcome mutual distrust. The other side cannot sufficiently trust

that its partners in peace were not involved in the violence, and one or both sides rejects

the agreement.128

14

Terrorist spoiling occurs because of mutual vulnerability during peace processes, so third-

party monitoring and verification increases certainty that all parties are adhering to the

bargain. However, this practice depends on being able to attribute attacks to some

degree.129 If monitoring reduces the chance for ambiguous violence and spoiling, uncertain

attribution creates space for opportunistic third-party actors. For instance, actors may use

M-UAVs to spoil an inter-state dispute or conflict, expecting a victimized state to lash out

without certain attribution. Similarly, actors could use M-UAVs to spoil peace processes

or to implicate a third party.

• Plausible deniability for domestic repression. Hostile regimes may be more willing to use

deadly M-UAVs to punish or repress civilians knowing that both attribution and an

international response are unlikely.130 These regimes will find relatively cheap M-UAVs

an attractive tool to repress dissident groups, as unattributed M-UAV use will not impose

reputational costs. Chemical weapons demonstrate how M-UAVs may be abused in the

future, because international law preventing chemical weapon usage depends on holding

perpetrators responsible. Critically, the complicated operational and political situation in

Syria has left alleged attacks unattributed and therefore unpunished. Human Rights Watch

asserts that “all available evidence strongly suggests” the Syrian regime attacked Khan

Sheikhoun in April 2017 with a nerve agent, killing at least 90 people.131

Uncertain attribution of M-UAV attacks will reduce the ability of international law to

punish abusive governments. For example, in Ghouta, observers cannot determine if the

planes bombing civilians are Russian or Syrian, so the states cannot be held accountable.

International observers are not on the ground in Syria, so they are having a difficult time

attributing civilian attacks. Sarah Margon, Washington Director of Human Rights Watch,

argues there is a “climate of impunity” for governments and non-state actors involved in

the conflict.132 Impunity for deadly M-UAV attacks against civilians at home will only

encourage future attacks.

Unattributed M-UAV attacks will strain U.S. policy and decision-making, similar to past gray-

zone operations. M-UAV attribution problems force U.S. policymakers to choose between

retaliating with imperfect information and inaction. In the past, weaponized ambiguity has

challenged the United States because of U.S. reliance on public support for military action and

concerns about escalating conflicts with peer adversaries. Uncertain attribution of M-UAV attacks

will require adjusting U.S. strategy for a more complex operating environment.

Conclusion

“Eighty-six different countries have military robotics today…And it’s not just countries…A

rebel group, a terrorist group operating a little miniature air force, that’s not something

we saw before.” – P. W. Singer, 2017133

15

“Iraqi forces in Mosul used to joke that trying to deal with an IS drone attack was like

being at a wedding celebration: everyone fired their Kalashnikovs into the air with no

effect.” – The Economist, 2018134

Military and commercial production will continue to decrease costs and improve the offensive

capabilities of M-UAVs—carrying capacity, range, and precision targeting. More actors, including

resource-poor states and non-state groups, will gain access to new medium range airpower to use

for counter-value targeting. M-UAVs fly below radar, launch from mobile sites, and use

increasingly ubiquitous technology. As such, these weapons can be used for unattributed attacks.

The United States faces growing threats in the gray zone from peer adversaries and non-state

groups. These actors use ambiguity and asymmetric actions, including propaganda, information

warfare, and cyber operations, to destabilize conventionally superior adversaries.

The attribution problem presented by M-UAVs presents a specific challenge to U.S. decision-

making which depends on full confidence in attribution before retaliation. Uncertain attribution

will result in U.S. policy paralysis, due to policymakers’ concerns about the risk of acting on bad

information and accidental escalation with a peer competitor. Further, actors in the gray zone may

intentionally misattribute M-UAV attacks for propaganda purposes and implicate the United States

in civilian deaths. Attribution problems allow plausible deniability for M-UAVs used as spoilers

in peace processes or inter-state disputes and domestic repression.

There are to two main implications of the threat discussed in this paper. First, counter-drone

technology for area defense will become more important than point defense. Second, U.S. leaders

and the U.S. public will need to become comfortable with uncertain attribution.

To date, responses to UAV proliferation have focused on technical fixes that are often more

expensive than the drones themselves.135 The Department of Defense is developing point defense

solutions— protecting small zones like military bases or patrols— that are incredibly expensive,

sophisticated, and may not work.136 We can expect adversaries to counter-innovate cheap

responses to anti-UAV measures developed.137 Thus, managing M-UAV proliferation will require

addressing area defense in addition to point defense.

M-UAVs will not just be tools for tactical use. Rather, the United States and its allies will

increasingly face a world where concentrated civilian populations are targeted by newly

empowered actors. Attribution problems decrease penalties for the use and abuse of deadly

airpower against civilians by allowing for plausible deniability. In addition to investigating

technical solutions for the M-UAV threat, the United States should take political steps to mitigate

attribution problems.138 U.S. policymakers may have to respond to attacks without full confidence.

Adversaries have exploited U.S. vulnerability in the gray zone before, and it is unclear that this

danger can be eliminated. M-UAVs will continue to spread to resource-poor states and non-state

groups. This paper points to the need to mitigate the threat of M-UAV attribution problems and

include this issue in future research and funding.

16

Appendix

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Figure 4142

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Figure 5143

Figure 6144

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Figure 7145

Figure 8146

1 Tom Wilhelm et al., “Multiple Drones Attack Russian Airbase in Syria,” OE Watch 8, no. 2 (February 2018): 48. 2 Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, “#SYRIA Security system of the Russian Khmeimim air base and

Russian Naval CSS point in the city of Tartus successfully warded off a terrorist attack,” Facebook, January 8, 2018,

https://www.facebook.com/mod.mil.rus/posts/2031218563787556. 3 Wilhelm et al., “Multiple Drones,” 48. Wilhelm et al explain that “Russian specialists are currently determining

supply channels through which terrorists obtained the technologies and devices, as well as examining the type and

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origin of explosive compounds and foreign detonating fuses carried by the drones. The MoD also stated that these

“aircraft-type drones” were fitted with pressure transducers and altitude control servo-actuators. The post also

suggested the “terrorists” could have gotten the technology from a country with well-developed technological

capabilities of satellite navigation and remote control to drop improvised explosive devices on assigned

coordinates…In the hours and days following the report of the attack, some Russian officials and casual

commentators quoted in Echo Moskvy, Interfax and TASS suggested that the US or Israel were behind the attack.” 4 “Head of the Russian General Staff's Office for UAV Development Major General Alexander Novikov holds

briefing for domestic and foreign reporters,” Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, published January 11,

2018, accessed March 13, 2018. 5 Various non-state actors including Hamas, Hezbollah, ISIS, and Libyan rebel groups have used small UAVs for

reconnaissance. This paper will discuss the use of weaponized M-UAVs for counter-value attacks, but the

proliferation of advanced UAV technology will enable these actors to conduct surveillance and complicated

battlefield operations as well. See Kelly Sayler, A World of Proliferated Drones: A Technology Primer,

(Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, 2015). 6 To read more about the quadcopter threat, see: Kevin Poulsen, “Why the U.S. Government is Terrified of Hobbyist

Drones,” Wired, February 5, 2015, https://www.wired.com/2015/02/white-house-drone/; Dan Gettinger, “Domestic

Drone Threats,” Center for the Study of the Drone, March 20, 2015, http://dronecenter.bard.edu/what-you-need-to-

know-about-domestic-drone-threats/. To read more about high-end military UAVs and security implications, see:

Jacqueline L. Hazelton, “Drone Strikes and Grand Strategy: Toward a Political Understanding of the Uses of

Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Attacks in US Security Policy,” Journal of Strategic Studies 40, no. 1–2 (January 2,

2017): 68–91; Michael Horowitz, Sarah Kreps, and Matthew Fuhrmann, “Separating Fact from Fiction in the Debate

over Drone Proliferation,” International Security 42, no. 2 (Fall 2017): 7-42; Matthew Fuhrmann and Michael

Horowitz, “Droning On: Explaining the Proliferation of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles,” International Organization 71,

no. 2 (2017): 397-418. 7 This definition loosely uses the Department of Defense classification provided in National Academies of Sciences,

Engineering, and Medicine, Counter-Unmanned Aircraft System [CUAS) Capability for Battalion-and-Below

Operations: Abbreviated Version of a Restricted Report (Washington DC: The National Academies Press, 2018),

10. This paper’s definition of M-UAV excludes the lower-end of Group 1 UAVs like consumer quadcopters,

includes Group 2, and the lower-end of Group 3 depending on each vehicles’ range capability. 8 Jeremy Zinnie, “Russians reveal details of UAV swarm attacks on Syrian bases”, Jane’s 360, January 12, 2018,

http://www.janes.com/article/77013/russians-reveal-details-of-uav-swarm-attacks-on-syrian-bases. 9 Ahmed Mohammed Hassan and Ali Abdelaty, “Cairo church bombing kills 25, raises fears among Christians,”

Reuters, published December 11, 2016, accessed March 8, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-

blast/cairo-church-bombing-kills-25-raises-fears-among-christians-idUSKBN1400AU. 10 Michael Chipley et al., Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks Against Buildings (Washington

DC: Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2003), ch. 4, p. 7. 11 For a news report about the attack, see: “Ankara blast: At least 28 dead in Turkish capital explosion,” BBC

Europe, published February 17, 2018, accessed March 8, 2018, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35599323.

For calculations of the blast size, see: Fikret Kuran, “Analysis: An Examination of Terror Attacks from an

Engineering Perspective,” MSI Turkish Defense Review, published October 21, 2016, accessed March 8, 2018,

http://www.milscint.com/en/analysis-an-examination-of-terror-attacks-from-an-engineering-perspective/. 12 For a news report about the attack see “Turkey explosion: Ankara car bomb kills at least 32,” BBC Europe, March

13, 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35798517. For calculations of the blast size, see: Kuran,

“Analysis.” 13 Mark Pomerleau, “Reaper’s retrofits extend its range and endurance,” Defense Systems, March 2, 2016,

https://defensesystems.com/articles/2016/03/02/reaper-retrofits-extend-range-and-endurance.aspx. 14 Praveen Duddu, “The 10 longest ranged unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs),” Air Force Technology, published

November 19, 2013, accessed March 8, 2018, http://www.airforce-technology.com/features/featurethe-top-10-

longest-range-unmanned-aerial-vehicles-uavs. 15 Divya Joshi, "Exploring the latest drone technology for commercial, industrial, and military uses," Business

Insider, July 13, 2017, http://www.businessinsider.com/drone-technology-uses-2017-7. 16 James Davis, “The 5 Best Fixed Wing Drones,” Drone Riot, published October 1, 2017, accessed March 8, 2018,

http://www.droneriot.com/best-fixed-wing-drones/. See also “Home-made drones now threaten conventional armed

forces,” The Economist, published February 8, 2018, accessed March 8, 2018,

https://www.economist.com/news/science-and-technology/21736498-their-small-size-and-large-numbers-can-

overwhelm-defences-home-made-drones-now.

21

17 Nevada Governor’s Office of Economic Development, “RECORD SET FOR LONGEST DRONE URBAN

PACKAGE DELIVERY IN THE U.S.,” published May 10, 2017, accessed March 9, 2018, http://nias-

uas.com/record-set-longest-drone-urban-package-delivery-u-s/. In 2017, a package delivery UAV flew 156 km to set

the record for the “longest drone urban package delivery” in the United States. 18 Davis, “5 Best Fixed Wing Drones.” 19 For an explanation of FAA's Part 107 restrictions, see: Michelle Dina, “Learn the Different Part 107

Requirements for Recreational vs Commercial Drones,” WYVERN Blog, published July 19, 2016, accessed March

13, 2018, https://www.wyvernltd.com/blog/learn-the-different-part-107-requirements-for-recreational-vs-

commercial-drones. For an explanation of the process for obtaining a waiver see: “Request a Part 107 Waiver or

Operation in Controlled Airspace,” Federal Aviation Administration, accessed March 13, 2018,

https://www.faa.gov/uas/request_waiver/. UAVs cannot be heavier than 55 lbs, must be flown in daylight and within

the visual line of sight of the operator, can't be flown over other individuals, and must be registered if they are over

.55 lbs. Commercial drone pilots must also obtain a certification. Most of the flying restrictions can be waived if

operators can demonstrate to the FAA the special circumstances that necessitate a waiver and that they will still be

able to carry out the operation safely. 20 National Academies of Sciences, Counter-Unmanned Aircraft System, 6. The National Academy of Sciences

argues that “the threat these capabilities pose are [sic] not looming in the future; they are here today. Commercially

available, small, autonomously guided aircraft components and systems are already on the market, and more capable

components and systems continue to be advertised to consumers.” 21 John Pullen, “This is how Drones Work,” Time, April 3, 2015, http://time.com/3769831/this-is-how-drones-

work/. Many UAVs with radio control also have GPS to allow for some level of autonomous flight. 22 Douglas Starr, “This Brilliant Plan Could Stop Drone Terrorism. Too Bad It’s Illegal,” Wired, February 28, 2017,

https://www.wired.com/2017/02/sky-net-illegal-drone-plan/. 23 Wilhelm et al., “Multiple Drones,” 48. 24 Kyle Mizokami, “North Korea is Jamming GPS Signals,” Popular Mechanics, April 5, 2016,

https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/weapons/a20289/north-korea-jamming-gps-signals/. Mizokami

reported in 2016 that North Korea was broadcasting jamming signals for the fourth time since 2010. 25 “Out of Sight,” The Economist, July 27, 2013, https://www.economist.com/news/international/21582288-satellite-

positioning-data-are-vitalbut-signal-surprisingly-easy-disrupt-out. The Economist reports that the London Stock

Exchange is GPS-disrupted for ten minutes every day; reportedly, because of “a delivery driver dodging his bosses’

attempts to track him.” 26 Oliver J. Woodman, An Introduction to Inertial Navigation, No. UCAM-CL-TR-696, University of Cambridge,

Computer Laboratory, 2007, 5. 27 Pierre-Jean Bristeau et al., “The Navigation and Control technology inside the AR.Drone micro UAV,” ICAF

Proceedings 44, no.1 (January 2011). INS uses gyrometers and accelerometers, augmented by additional sensors,

such as a sonar altitude sensor or barometer. 28 Mizokami, “North Korea.” 29 Justin M. Barrett et al, "Development of a low-cost self-contained combined vision and inertial navigation

system,” Technologies for Practical Robot Applications (TePRA), published June 14, 2012, accessed March 9, 2018,

http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/6215648/. 30 Bristeau et al, “The Navigation and Control technology.” 31 Jeffrey Rodriguez and J.K. Aggarwal, “Matching Aerial Images to 3-D Terrain Maps,” IEEE Transactions on

Pattern Analysis and Machine Intelligence 12, no. 12 (December 1990): 1138-1149. 32 Barret et al, “Combined vision and inertial navigation system.” Barret et al explain that by combining vision and

inertial sensors, “the errors from one sensor can be corrected for by using the information from the second sensor,

and vice versa. This ultimately results in a sensor system that produces data that is more accurate than the data that

is produced by either one of the sensors individually.” 33 Barret et al, “Combined vision and inertial navigation system.” 34 Tony Agresta, “A Billion Dollar Industry— What’s Driving the Growth in Aerial Photography?” Fair &

Equitable (April 2017): 39-42. 35 “What is LIDAR?” National Ocean Service, accessed March 12, 2018,

https://oceanservice.noaa.gov/facts/lidar.html; Alex Davies, “What is LIDAR, Do Self-driving Cars need it, and Can

it See Nerf Bullets?” Wired, February 6, 2018, https://www.wired.com/story/lidar-self-driving-cars-luminar-video/.

Laser ranges can be combined with GPS and INS data to generate a “point cloud” of millions of data points. 36 Zacc Dukowitz, “LiDAR for Drones: The Groundbreaking Technology that’s Changing the Way we See the

World,” UAV Coach, published August 25, 2017, accessed March 12, 2018, https://uavcoach.com/lidar-drones/.

22

37 “How LIDAR is Revolutionizing Mapping and Geospatial Data,” DJI Enterprise, accessed March 12, 2018,

https://enterprise.dji.com/news/detail/how-lidar-is-revolutionizing-mapping-and-geospatial-data. 38 G. Ajay Kumar et al., “A LiDAR and IMU Integrated Indoor Navigation System for UAVs and Its Application in

Real-Time Pipeline Classification,” Chung-Ang University, June 2, 2017,

https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/1ef6/5e8588fbb0ab549fe960782ae3860100f44a.pdf. 39 G. Hemann, S. Singh and M. Kaess, "Long-range GPS-denied aerial inertial navigation with LIDAR localization,"

2016 IEEE/RSJ International Conference on Intelligent Robots and Systems (IROS), Daejeon, 2016,

http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/7759267/?anchor=authors. 40 Arthur Holland Michel and Dan Gettinger, “Drone Year in Review: 2017,” Bard Center for the Study of the

Drone at Bard College, January 3, 2018, p. 5, http://dronecenter.bard.edu/drone-year-in-review-2017/. Michel and

Gettinger predict that “in 2018, we expect to see major breakthroughs in miniaturized drone technologies, including

advances in high performance sensor systems that are small enough to fit on tactical drones.” 41 “Home-made drones,” The Economist. 42 National Academies of Sciences, Counter-Unmanned Aircraft System, 1. The National Academies write that “the

U.S. Army and other Department of Defense (DoD) organizations have invested significantly in counter-sUAS

technologies, often focusing on detecting radio frequency transmissions by sUASs and/or their operators, and

jamming the radio frequency command and control links and Global Positioning System signals of individual

sUASs. However, today’s consumer and customized sUASs can increasingly operate without radio frequency

command and control links by using automated target recognition and tracking, obstacle avoidance, and other

software-enabled capabilities. Moreover, the committee believes that current and near-term (by 2025) capabilities

will enable the employment of multiple sUASs in coordinated groups, swarms, and collaborative groups.” 43 “Flexrotor,” Aerovel, accessed March 15, 2018, http://aerovel.com/flexrotor/. This company is an example of a

UAV firm where customers must log in as a client to buy their drones. This may be related to FAA regulations, as

large companies know that most customers will not be able to purchase high-end UAVs due to size and range

limitations. 44 “Home-made drones,” The Economist. The Economist writes that the M-UAVs “bore a resemblance to those of

Russian Orlan-10 drones, several of which have been shot down by rebel forces in Syria. The craft may thus have

been a cheap, garage-built copy of captured kit.” 45 “Taking Flight,” The Economist Technology Quarterly, June 8, 2017, 2018,

https://www.economist.com/technology-quarterly/2017-06-08/civilian-drones; “Home-made drones,” The

Economist. 46 “Home-made drones,” The Economist. 47 Andrew Meola, “Drone market shows positive outlook with strong industry growth and trends,” Business Insider,

published July 13, 2017, accessed March 8, 2018, http://www.businessinsider.com/drone-industry-analysis-market-

trends-growth-forecasts-2017-7. 48 Padraig Belton, “Game of drones: As prices plummet drones are taking off,” BBC News Business, published

January 16, 2015, accessed March 8 2018, http://www.bbc.com/news/business-30820399. Roger Sollenberger of

U.S. drone producer 3D Robotics says that drone prices are dropping and “these things were enormous, complicated,

and incredibly expensive to build three years ago…and now anyone can just buy one, for less than $1,000.” 49 Clay Dillow, “Islamic State Ups the Size and Sophistication of its Drone Fleet,” Fortune, April 18, 2016,

http://fortune.com/2016/04/18/islamic-state-ups-its-drone-fleet/; “Phantom 3 Standard,” DJI, accessed March 13,

2018, https://store.dji.com/product/phantom-3-standard. 50 Rob Wile, “Why High-End Drones Are Half the Price They Were a Year Ago,” Time Money, published June 2,

2017, accessed March 8, 2018, http://time.com/money/4800984/drone-prices-decrease-spark-dji/. For more on DJI,

see Joshua Bateman, “China drone maker DJI: Alone atop the unmanned skies,” CNBC, September 1, 2017,

https://www.cnbc.com/2017/09/01/in-race-to-dominate-drone-space-west-is-no-match-for-chinas-dji.html. 51 “Taking Flight,” The Economist. 52 Barret et al, “Combined vision and inertial navigation system.” Optical sensors are used in personal computer and

cell phone industries while INS sensors are used in automotive and videogame production. 53 Bristeau et al., “Navigation and Control Technology.” 54 Jamie Condliffe, “LIDAR just got Better—But it’s still too Expensive for your Car,” MIT Technology Review,

November 28, 2017, https://www.technologyreview.com/s/609526/lidar-just-got-way-better-but-its-still-too-

expensive-for-your-car/; Davies, “What is LIDAR?” 55 Alex Davies, “This Palm-Sized Laser could make Self-Driving Cars way Cheaper,” Wired, September 25, 2014,

https://www.wired.com/2014/09/velodyne-lidar-self-driving-cars/.

23

56 Jordan Golson, “A Military-Grade Drone that can be Printed Anywhere,” Wired, published September 16, 2014,

accessed March 8, 2018, https://www.wired.com/2014/09/military-grade-drone-can-printed-anywhere/. 57 “Home-made drones,” The Economist. 58 Fuhrmann and Horowitz, “Droning On.” Fuhrmann and Horowitz use a similar logic of supply and demand to

explain proliferation of higher-end UAVs. 59 Paul Scharre, “The Coming Drone Wars: A Headache in the Making for American Foreign Policy,” The National

Interest, July 25, 2017, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-coming-drone-wars-headache-the-making-american-

foreign-21662. 60 Benjamin Mueller, “In Wake of Attacks, Tighter Security for Times Square on New Year’s Eve,” The New York

Times, December 28, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/28/nyregion/times-square-new-years-eve-

security.html. 61 Martin Smith, “Baghdad Dispatch: Checkpoint (In)Security,” PBS Frontline, August 5, 2014,

https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/baghdad-dispatch-checkpoint-insecurity/. Ground checkpoints “are a

major headache” for everyone involved. 62 T. X. Hammes, “The Democratization of Airpower: The Insurgent and the Drone,” War on the Rocks, October 18,

2016, https://warontherocks.com/2016/10/the-democratization-of-airpower-the-insurgent-and-the-drone/. 63 National Academies of Sciences, Counter-Unmanned Aircraft System, p. 9. 64 Tyler Rogoway, “Gyrocopter Exposes Weaknesses In D.C.’s Elaborate Air Defense System,” Foxtrot Alpha,

April 16, 2015, https://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/gyrocopter-exposes-weaknesses-in-d-c-s-elaborate-air-de-

1698170601; Julian Barnes, “Norad: Gyrocopter Wasn’t Detected as It Approached Capital,” The Wall Street

Journal, April 15, 2015, https://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2015/04/15/norad-gyrocopter-wasnt-detected-as-it-

approached-capitol/. The blimp known as the Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor

System (JLENS) provided radar coverage for the D.C. area specifically to detect this kind of threat. 65 United States General Accounting Office, Cruise missile defense: progress made but significant challenges

remain: report to the chairman, Subcommittee on Military Research and Development, Committee on Armed

Services, House of Representatives (1999), 3. 66 Defense Intelligence Ballistic Missile Analysis Committee, Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat (2017), 35. 67 For a definition of loitering munitions, see Michel and Gettinger, “Drone Year in Review,” 5. Loitering Munitions

are “an explosive-laden drone designed to fly over the battlefield for extended periods before engaging ground

targets like a missile. In recent years, this technology has been proliferating rapidly, raising a host of ethical and

legal questions that have as yet remained largely unaddressed by the international community.” 68 “Successful Flight Demonstrations for HAROP Loitering Munitions,” Israel Aerospace Industries, published June

7, 2015, accessed March 13, 2018, http://www.iai.co.il/2013/32981-46464-en/MediaRoom_News.aspx; Arthur

Holland Michel and Dan Gettinger, “Loitering Munitions: In Focus,” Center for the Study of the Drone, 2.

HAROP’s capabilities include a mobile launcher, navigation to a target, and six hours of loiter and search ability.

Note that HAROP UAVs have ranges of 1000 km so they are not M-UAVs but still suggest the proliferation of

similar technology. Other Loitering Munitions have more limited ranges and so are included in the category of M-

UAVs. 69 Michel and Gettinger, “Loitering Munitions,” 2. 70 Bartosz Glowacki, “Poland's WZL-2 reveals Dragonfly loitering munition,” FlightGlobal, September 11, 2017,

https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/polands-wzl-2-reveals-dragonfly-loitering-munition-441018/; Dylan

Malyasov, “Taiwan develops new compact loitering guided weapon,” Defence Blog, August 18, 2017,

http://defence-blog.com/news/taiwan-develops-new-compact-loitering-guided-weapon.html; Dylan Malyasov,

“Czech company develops multimission Cantas unmanned aircraft system, February 27, 2017, http://defence-

blog.com/news/czech-company-develops-multimission-cantas-unmanned-aircraft-system.html. 71 “Fire Shadow Loitering Munition,” Lockheed Martin, accessed March 15, 2018,

https://www.lockheedmartin.com/us/products/cdl-systems/about-us/projects/fire-shadow-loitering-munition.html. 72 Michel and Gettinger, “Loitering Munitions,” 2. 73 Sayler, A World of Proliferated Drones, 18. Sayler notes that “midsize commercial and military drones, ranging

in cost from tens of thousands of dollars to no more than a couple million dollars, are widely available for purchase

by states and industry. They may also be procured and operated by more established or well-organized non-state

actors with limited supporting infrastructure.” 74 Peter Bergen et al., “Non-State Actors with Drone Capabilities,” New America, https://www.newamerica.org/in-

depth/world-of-drones/5-non-state-actors-drone-capabilities/; IS conflict: Booby-trapped drone kills Kurdish fighters

in Iraq,” BBC, October 12, 2017, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-37629517.

24

75 Bergen et al., “Non-State Actors”; Homeland Security Committee, “Terror Threat Snapshot,” March 2017, 5,

https://homeland.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/MarchTerrorThreatSnapshot-1.pdf. 76 Bergen et al., “Non-State Actors.” 77 Bergen et al., “Non-State Actors.” 78 It is unclear to what extent China will be a major player in the global M-UAV market. The Guardian reports that

from 1984-2014, China accounted for only 0.9% of global UAV exports (see Figure 7 in the Appendix): George

Arnett, “The numbers behind the worldwide trade in drones,” The Guardian, March 16, 2015,

https://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2015/mar/16/numbers-behind-worldwide-trade-in-drones-uk-israel.

However, the National Academy for Sciences argues that it is “more disturbing…that Chinese manufacturer DJI

accounts for 50 percent of the sUAS sales in North America, while 3D Robotics (American) and Yuneec (also

Chinese) trail with 7 percent and 4 percent of the market share, respectively.” National Academies of Sciences,

Counter-Unmanned Aircraft System, p. 4. 79 Dan Gettinger and Arthur Michel, “Loitering Munitions,” Bard College Center for the Study of the Drone, 2017,

http://dronecenter.bard.edu/files/2017/02/CSD-Loitering-Munitions.pdf. See also Kavitha Surana, “Israel Freezes

Export of Suicide Drone to Azerbaijan After Allegation of Abuse,” Foreign Policy, August 30, 2017,

http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/08/30/israel-freezes-export-of-suicide-drone-to-azerbaijan-after-allegation-of-abuse-

azerbaijan-armenia/. 80 “Successful Flight Demonstrations,” Israel Aerospace Industries. 81 “Aeronautics files for NIS 1.1b valuation TASE IPO,” Globes, Israel Business News, May 22, 2017,

http://www.globes.co.il/en/article-aeronautics-files-for-tase-ipo-at-nis-11b-valuation-1001189673; Kavitha Surana,

“Israel Freezes Export of Suicide Drone.” Aeronautics recently sealed a $15 million deal with Mexico for the

Aerostar unmanned aerial system. Aeronautics reports that in 2016, Europe accounted for 35% of company revenue,

Asia 30%, Israel 18%, United States 10%, and Africa 7%. 82 Sayler, A World of Proliferated Drones, 5. 83 For more on the democratization of airpower, see: Hammes, “The Democratization of Airpower.” Hammes argues

that “cheap commercial drones flying today can and, in the near future likely will, dramatically change the character

of conflict between state and non-state actors.” 84 Michel and Gettinger, “Drone Year in Review,” p. 7. 85 See Amy Zegart, “Cheap fights, credible threats: The future of armed drones and coercion,” The Journal of

Strategic Studies (2018), 1-41. 86 Zegart, “Cheap fights, credible threats,” p. 4. 87 Zegart, “Cheap fights, credible threats,” pp. 1, 4. Zegart argues that improving technology “will soon enable

drones to function in hostile environments. Moreover, drones offer three unique coercion advantages that theorists

did not foresee: sustainability in long duration conflicts, certainty of precision punishment which can change the

psychology of adversaries, and changes in the relative costs of war” (p. 1). 88 Jay Bennett, “Learn How Different Radar Defense Systems Work in Just 2 Minutes,” Popular Mechanics,

November 3, 2016, https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/a23694/radar-defense-systems-explainer-video/.

Radar works by “send[ing] out radio waves, and when those radio waves bounce off different objects and return to

the radar, they can be used to determine what the object is. The resulting "image" of the object is known as a radar

signature, and it can be analyzed to figure out exactly what is flying through the sky—bird or plane or missile or

cloud.” 89 Sandy Clark, “Cruise missiles—A Greater Threat than North Korea’s Ballistic Missiles,” Real Clear Defense,

December 12, 2017,

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2017/12/12/cruise_missiles_a_greater_threat_than_north_koreas_ballistic

_missiles_112768.html. Like sophisticated cruise missiles, UAVs will be difficult to defend against. Cruise missiles

are like “modern, extremely fast, well-armed, one-way drones. Because cruise missiles fly on totally different paths

from ballistic missiles, the vast majority of our investment of billions of dollars in ballistic missile defenses is

useless in defending against them.” 90 UAVs and cruise missiles can both be launched from a truck. See Jeremy Hsu, “The Army gets back in the Ship-

killing Business,” Wired, March 1, 2017, https://www.wired.com/2017/03/army-converting-missiles-ship-killers-

china/; Jack Stewart, “A Drone-Slinging UPS Van Delivers the Future,” Wired, February 21, 2017,

https://www.wired.com/2017/02/drone-slinging-ups-van-delivers-future/; Arjun Kharpal, “This firm beat Amazon to

drone deliveries by launching it from the roof of a truck,” CNBC, August 18, 2016,

https://www.cnbc.com/2016/08/18/this-firm-beat-amazon-to-drone-deliveries-by-launching-it-from-the-roof-of-a-

truck.html.

25

91 For a discussion of non-intervention in the Spanish civil war, see Francisco J. Romero Salvadó, The Spanish Civil

War: Origins, Course and Outcomes, Twentieth Century Wars (Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). Soon after the Spanish

civil war broke out, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, the USSR, and others pledged to maintain neutrality

in Spain. For a report on Guernica, see John Lloyd, “Commentary: From Guernica’s ruins, a lesson in face news,”

Reuters, December 8, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-lloyd-guernica-commentary/commentary-from-

guernicas-ruins-a-lesson-in-fake-news-idUSKBN1E136O/. The German Condor Legion bombed the historic Basque

capital Guernica, and “the spin-doctors of the day…ensured that telltale German and Italian shell fragments and bullet

cases were removed, and empty oil drums placed about the town. When journalists friendly to Franco were brought

in, they were told that the Basques had destroyed their own town by setting it alight – hence the empty oil drums.”

However, reports of Germany’s involvement had already been spread internationally. 92 The area of a circle with a radius of 100 km is 1002*π=31,416 km2. The same formula is used for subsequent

calculations 93 “Iraq road map,” On the World Map, accessed March 13, 2018, http://ontheworldmap.com/iraq/iraq-road-

map.html. 94 David Barno and Nora Bensahel, “Fighting and Winning in the ‘Gray Zone,’” War on the Rocks, May 19, 2015,

https://warontherocks.com/2015/05/fighting-and-winning-in-the-gray-zone/. Defining the gray zone is a contentious

topic. For more, see Hal Brands, “Paradoxes of the Gray Zone,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, February 5,

2016, https://www.fpri.org/article/2016/02/paradoxes-gray-zone/ Brands defines gray-zone strategies as “activity

that is coercive and aggressive in nature, but that is deliberately designed to remain below the threshold of

conventional military conflict and open interstate war.” Scholars often use the term “hybrid warfare” which includes

almost any kind of warefare – it is “a type of warfare widely understood to blend conventional/unconventional,

regular/irregular, and information and cyber warfare.” See Damien Puyvelde, “Hybrid war—does it even exist?”

NATO Review, https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2015/Also-in-2015/hybrid-modern-future-warfare-russia-

ukraine/EN/. Puyvelde notes that “the “hybrid” aspect of the term simply denotes a combination of previously

defined types of warfare, whether conventional, irregular, political or information. Even those who have put forward

such a definition must admit that the combination of war across domains is not new, but in fact is as old as warfare

itself.” See Michael Kofman and Matthew Rojansky, “A Closer Look at Russia’s ‘Hybrid War,’” Kennan Cable, no.

7 (April 2015), 2. 95 Bryan Clark, Mark Gunzinger, and Jesse Sloman, Winning in the Gray Zone: Using Electromagnetic Warfare to

Regain Dominance (Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2017), 4; Jeremiah Jacques, “Beijing Quietly

Ramps Up Militarization of South China Sea,” The Trumpet, November 6, 2017,

https://www.thetrumpet.com/16452-beijing-quietly-ramps-up-militarization-of-south-china-sea. 96 Clark, Gunzinger, and Sloman, Winning in the Gray Zone, 4. 97 Barno and Bensahal, “Fighting and Winning.” 98 “Kremlin hybrid war tactics in Georgia, 2008, and Ukraine, 2014-2015 | Infographic,” Euromaidan Press,

September 5, 2015, http://euromaidanpress.com/2015/09/05/kremlin-hybrid-war-tactics-in-georgia-2008-and-

ukraine-2014-2015-infographic/#arvlbdata. 99 Andrew Monaghan, “The ‘War’ in Russia’s ‘Hybrid Warfare,’” Parameters 45, no. 4 (Winter 2015-16): 68. See

also Clark, Gunzinger, and Sloman, Winning in the Gray Zone, 3. Clark, Gunzinger, and Sloman note that “Crimea

began as a covert military operation, combining ambiguity, disinformation, and the element of surprise at the

operational level with more traditional aids such as electronic warfare. The annexation was completed by a

traditional military invasion and occupation of the peninsula, using Russia’s airborne, naval infantry, and motor rifle

brigades.” 100 Fedyk, “Russian ‘New Generation’ Warfare.” Fedyk argues that “what Russia does may not be as important as

how it communicates and defends its legitimacy—both to thte international community and to its own domestic

population. The Ukrainian intervention is especially illustrative: first, Russia deceives the international community,

evades traditional deterrent mechanisms, and establishes its own definition of legitimacy; and second, Russia

inspires and sustains domestic popular support.” 101 Nicholas Heras, “Gray Zones in the Middle East,” Center for a New American Security, September 18, 2017,

https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/gray-zones-in-the-middle-east. 102 Rebecca K. C. Hersman, Meeting Security Challenges in a Disordered World (Rowman & Littlefield, 2017), 98-

99. 103 Hersman, Challenges in a Disordered World, 99. 104 Nicholas Fedyk, “Russian ‘New Generation’ Warfare: Theory, Practice, and Lessons for U.S. Strategists,” Small

Wars Journal, http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/russian-%E2%80%9Cnew-generation%E2%80%9D-warfare-

theory-practice-and-lessons-for-us-strategists-0. Fedyk argues that “unconventional war it is arguably the most

26

important” factor of the population component of Clausewitz’s trinity, “thus, the Russian view of modern warfare is

based on the idea that the main battlespace is the mind.” See Carl Von Clausewitz, On War. Eds. Michael Howard

and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), 89. 105 Brands, “Paradoxes of the Gray Zone.” 106 Brands, “Paradoxes of the Gray Zone.” 107 Lt. Col. Timothy Thomas, “The Evolving Nature of Russia’s Way of War,” Military Review, (July-August 2017),

35. Gerasimov does not use the terminology of new-generation or fourth generation warfare, but the concepts are

similar to his “new-type warfare.” 108 Pomerleau, “DoD Leaders.” Pomerleau argues that “the wide availability of commercial technologies to

militaries and nonstate groups provides ample openings for actors to conduct actions below the threshold of war and

in the process escalate the opportunities for a more traditional conflict.” 109 Lt. Gen. H.R. McMaster, Ph.D., U.S. Army, “Continuity and Change: The Army Operating Concept and Clear

Thinking About Future War,” Military Review, March/April 2015, 16. Lt. Gen. H.R. McMaster notes that “there are

two ways to fight the U.S. military—asymmetrically and stupid.” 110 Brands, “Paradoxes of the Gray Zone.” 111 Brands, “Paradoxes of the Gray Zone.” 112 Department of Defense, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America:

Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge (2018), 3. 113 Frank Hoffman, “Scraping Rust from the Iron Triangle: Why the Pentagon Should Invest in Capability,” War on

the Rocks, February 9, 2018, https://warontherocks.com/2018/02/scraping-rust-iron-triangle/. 114 Committee on Developing a Cybersecurity Primer, At the Nexus of Cybersecurity and Public Policy: Some Basic

Concepts and Issues (Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2014), 36. It is more expensive to defend

against cyber-attacks than to perpetrate them. Clark, Berson, and Lin argue “this asymmetry arises because the

victim (the defender) must succeed every time the intruder acts (and may even have to take defensive action long

after the intruder’s initial penetration if the intruder has left behind an implant for a future attack). By contrast, the

intruder needs to succeed in his efforts only once, and if he pays no penalty for a failed operation, he can continue

his efforts until he succeeds or chooses to stop” 115 Pomerleau, “DoD Leaders.” Cyber offers a valuable lesson as it has already proliferated and empowered new

groups. For cyber theory see: Lucas Kello, “The Meaning of the Cyber Revolution: Perils to Theory and Statecraft,”

International Security 38, no. 2, 7–40. Kello notes that “the new [cyber] capability is expanding the range of

possible harm and outcomes between the concepts of war and peace.” For cyber attribution, see David D. Clark and

Susan Landau, “Untangling Attribution,” in Proceedings of a Workshop on Deterring Cyberattacks: Informing

Strategies and Developing Options for U.S. Policy, (Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2010), 25–40.

For an example of unattributed cyber exploitation, see the Office of Personnel Management data breach in 2014-

2015. The official government report never attributed the attack: Jazon Chaffetz, Mark Meadows, and Will Hurd,

“The OPM Data Breach: How the Government Jeopardized Our National Security for More than a Generation,”

Majority Staff Report (Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, U.S. House of Representatives, 114th

Congress, September 7, 2016), https://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/The-OPM-Data-Breach-

How-the-Government-Jeopardized-Our-National-Security-for-More-than-a-Generation.pdf. However, news sources

reported the attacks were perpetrated by Chinese hackers: Brendan I. Koerner, “Inside the Cyberattack That Shocked

the US Government,” Wired (blog), October 23, 2016, https://www.wired.com/2016/10/inside-cyberattack-shocked-

us-government/. 116 Pomerleau, “DoD Leaders.” 117 Clark, Gunzinger, and Sloman, Winning in the Gray Zone, 6. 118 Clark, Gunzinger, and Sloman, Winning in the Gray Zone, 4. Clark, Gunzinger and Sloman argue that “China and

Russia are now exploiting the reticence of the United States and its allies to intervene in gray zone confrontations to

ratchet up the intensity of their aggression. Over the last several years, they have finely calibrated their peacetime

military and paramilitary operations to increase their reach and lethality without reaching a level of violence that

would trigger a large-scale U.S. response. This places the United States at a disadvantage in its long-term

competitions with both great powers.” 119 “Shades of grey: Neither war nor peace,” The Economist, January 25, 2017,

https://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21735474-uses-constructive-ambiguity-neither-war-nor-peace. The

Economist notes that Russian escalation carried the threat of “limited use of nuclear weapons.” 120 Mark Pomerleau, “Why DoD leaders are increasingly worried about the ‘gray zone,’” C4ISRnet, February 5,

2018, https://www.c4isrnet.com/it-networks/2018/02/05/why-dod-leaders-are-increasingly-worried-about-the-gray-

zone/.

27

121 “Amid New Reports of Chemical Weapons Use in Syria, United Nations Top Disarmament Official Says

International Community Obliged to Enact Meaningful Response,” United Nations, February 5, 2018,

https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/sc13196.doc.htm; “Syria/Russia: Airstrikes, Siege Killing Civilians,” Human

Rights Watch, December 22, 2017, https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/12/22/syria/russia-airstrikes-siege-killing-

civilians. 122 Levy Maxey, “False Flags in Cyberspace: Targeting Public Opinion and Political Will,” The Cipher Brief, March

6, 2018, https://www.thecipherbrief.com/article/tech/false-flags-cyberspace-targeting-public-opinion-political-will.

M-UAVs may pose a similar attribution problem as cyber-attacks. The intelligence community has access to better

quality information than the public regarding attacks but U.S. response depends in part on public support. 123 Greg Myre and Camila Domonoske, “What Does It Mean When ISIS Claims Responsibility For An Attack?”

NPR, May 27, 2017, https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/05/24/529685951/what-does-it-mean-when-

isis-claims-responsibility-for-an-attack; Michael Smith II, “Was ISIS Responsible for the Las Vegas Attack?”

Foreign Affairs, October 9, 2017, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2017-10-09/was-isis-

responsible-las-vegas-attack. 124 For Hezbollah information operations, see: Colin P. Clarke, “How Hezbollah Came to Dominate Information

Warfare,” Rand, September 19, 2017, “https://www.rand.org/blog/2017/09/how-hezbollah-came-to-dominate-

information-warfare.html. For more on leveraging information operations in the gray zone, Maria Snegovaya,

Russia Report I: Putin’s Information Warfare in Ukraine (Washington, DC: Institute for the Study of War, 2015);

Timothy Thomas, “Russia’s 21st Century Information War: Working to Undermine and Destabilize Populations,”

Defence Strategic Communications 1, no. 1 (Winter 2015): 10–25. 125 Heras, “Gray Zones in the Middle East.” 126 Clark and Landau, “Untangling Attribution,” 25. Clark and Landau argue that “Attribution is central to

deterrence, the idea that one can dissuade attackers from acting through fear of some sort of retaliation. Retaliation

requires knowing with full certainty who the attackers are.” 127 Andrew Kydd and Barbara Walter, “The Strategies of Terrorism,” International Security 31, no.1, 72. 128 Kydd and Walter, “The Strategies of Terrorism,” 73-4. Kydd and Walter note that “the goal of a spoiling strategy

is to ensure that peace overtures between moderate leaders on the terrorists’ side and the target government do not

succeed. It works by playing on the mistrust between these two groups and succeeds when one or both parties fail to

sign or implement a settlement. It is often employed when the ultimate objective is territorial change.” For example,

Israeli-Palestinian relations and continued attempts to reach a peace agreement have been plagued by spoilers. Israel

“frequently questioned whether Yasser Arafat was simply unable to stop terrorist attacks against Israel or was

unwilling to do so.” (p. 74) 129 Kydd and Walter, “The Strategies of Terrorism,” 75. 130 Fuhrmann and Horowitz, “Droning On,” 415. 131 “Death by Chemicals: The Syrian Government’s Widespread and Systematic Use of Chemical Weapons,”

Human Rights Watch, May 1, 2017, https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/05/01/death-chemicals/syrian-governments-

widespread-and-systematic-use-chemical-weapons. The number of officially documented attacks—16 chlorine

attacks from 2014 to 2016—is much lower than those reported in the media and on social media. 132 Erin Simpson et al., Bombshell: Been Caught Steelin’, War on the Rocks, podcast audio, March 6, 2018,

https://warontherocks.com/2018/03/bombshell-been-caught-steelin/; “Syria/Russia: Airstrikes,” Human Rights

Watch. 133 Peter W. Singer, quoted in Jeb Sharp, “How drones and robotics may shape the future of conflict under President

Trump,” PRI, February 10, 2017, https://www.pri.org/stories/2017-02-10/how-drones-and-robotics-may-shape-

future-conflict-under-president-trump. 134 “Home-made drones,” The Economist. 135 Gillis, “In Over Their Heads.” Saudi Arabia used a $3 million Patriot missile to shoot down a $200 drone fired by

Houthi rebels in Yemen. Army Gen. David Perkins joked that “I’m not sure that’s a good economic exchange ratio.” 136 Tyler Rogoway, “ISIS Dropping Bomblet on Abrams Tank is a Sign of What’s to Come,” The Drive, January 26,

2017, http://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/7155/isis-drone-dropping-bomblet-on-abrams-tank-is-a-sign-of-whats-

to-come. For instance, the DoD is developing “solid-state laser” weapons which are better “suited for the protection

of extremely high-value targets than for providing a shield for soldiers on the battlefield” and counter-rocket and

mortar systems which “can be horrifically expensive to use.” 137 Hammes, “The Democratization of Airpower.” Lasers, weaponized microwave energy (like an electro-magnetic

pulse), and jamming or hijacking UAV controls are all imperfect solutions. Counter-measures like a Faraday cage

and increased use of internal sensors for navigation. Hammes notes that “this will be the part of the ongoing action-

28

reaction-counter-reactions that have marked conflict throughout recorded history.” See also Zegart, “Cheap fights,

credible threats,” 27. 138 For an example of area defense development, see David Donald, “Tracking drones through the cityscape,” Jane’s

360, June 17, 2016, http://www.janes.com/article/61536/tracking-drones-through-the-cityscape-es2016d5. The

Thales (External Stand A690) uses a Smart Sensor Grid system to track UAVs in an urban environment. The sensor

grid “merges data from a wide range of available sensors, such as low-cost roof-mounted cameras, short-range

radars, passive radars and visual observations, and presents it on a 3D grid of the area of interest in a control centre.” 139 Sayler, A World of Proliferated Drones, 9. 140 National Academies of Sciences, Counter-Unmanned Aircraft System, 10. 141 Gettinger and Michel, “Loitering Munitions.” 142 Gettinger and Michel, “Loitering Munitions.” 143 Gettinger and Michel, “Loitering Munitions,” 2-4. 144 Gettinger and Michel, “Loitering Munitions,” 2-4. 145 Data from Arnett, “Worldwide trade in drones.” 146 Data from Arnett, “Worldwide trade in drones.”

The Project on International Peace and Security (PIPS)

Institute for the Theory and Practice of International Relations

The College of William and Mary