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The Regicide of the Caliph al-Amīn and the Challenge of Representation in Medieval Islamic

HistoriographyAuthor(s): Tayeb El-HibriReviewed work(s):Source: Arabica, T. 42, Fasc. 3 (Nov., 1995), pp. 334-364Published by: BRILLStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4057380 .

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THE REGICIDE OF THE CALIPH AL-AMIN AND THE

CHALLENGE OF REPRESENTATION IN MEDIEVAL

ISLAMIC HISTORIOGRAPHY*

BY

TAYEB EL-HIBRI

University of Massachusetts at Amherst

Introduction

FIFTY years after its founding in A.D.762 as the ideal political

center of the Abbasid caliphate, Baghdad underwent its first

destructive siege during the civil war between the two sons of

Haruin al-Rasid, al-Amin and al-Ma'muin. Within the boundaries

of the city, and for over a year, the caliph al-Amin held his last

ground against the armies of al-Ma'm7un, governor of the eastern

province of Khuras-an and pretender to the throne. Defended

throughout previous battles by the central Abbasid military elite,

the Abna', al-Amin found an unexpected source of popular support

during the siege among the city's commune. While al-Ma'mu-n

continued to reside in Marw, his new capital on the eastern fron-

tier, Hartama b. A'yan, Tahir b. al-Husayn, and Zuhayr b. al-

Musayyab, the commanders who led the campaign on his behalf,

found themselves unable to overcome or see the reason for thenewly emerged resistance against them. The stalemate was finally

broken when T-ahir b. al-Husayn succeeded in causing internal

division by convincing the merchants of Baghdad to destroy the

pontoon bridges that had served as critical communication routes

between the resisting forces. This offered the assembled eastern

armies the opportunity to attack by the Tigris inside the city. Prob-

ably suspecting such a maneouvre, al-Amin now listened to the

advice of his associates that he stood a future chance of a

counterstrike if he escaped the city to the north and then to Syria

or Egypt, where he could reorganize a new power base. Tahir,

* I would like to thank Professors Richard Bulliet, Lawrence Conrad, and Fred

Donner for commenting on an earlier draft of this paper.

c) E.J. Brill, Leiden, 1995 Arabica, tome XLII



REGICIDE OF AL-AMIN 335

however, apparently having caught word of such a plan, sent a

message to the Abna' threatening to retaliate by destroying not

only their property inside Baghdad but their estates (diya') outsideas well if they did not dissuade al-Amin from this decision. Al-Amin

was soon afterwards convinced, again by his advisors, of the benefit

of surrender.' His reluctant agreement to take that choice was the

beginning of a humiliating fall from power that culminated in a

pitiful murder ordered by Tahir.

A cursory review of the narrative of the civil war might at first

strike oneas

overwhelmingly supportiveof

al-Ma'mu-n, not a sur-prising feature given that the sources were written after his victory.

This essay, however, shall argue that if we analyze the textual

representation of al-Amlin's death closely, we can discern beneath

the seemingly pro-Ma'mu-nid historical narrative a complex

historiographic attitude towards the regicide and the harvest of vic-

tory. Al-Amin's capture and execution was an event that intro-

duced a radically new dimension to the civil war, and critically

transformed public perceptions of the caliphal office. For this was

the first violent end to befall an Abbasid caliph since the founding

of the dynasty. As such it left an indelible mark on the collective

religio-political consciousness of a community that had perceived

the dynasty to be the ultimate deliverant of stable caliphal rule in

the aftermath of the revolution that overthrew the Umayyads in

A.D. 750.

Two aspects of the caliph's murder summarized the poignantmoral challenge that it presented. First, it was an action taken

deliberately, which made it different from previous suspected

events of assassination. This was particularly important when it

came to ascertaining the party responsible for the murder. Second,

it was an event that was carried out publicly and <(presented>>o the

city commune. Nothing could have softened the grim nature of

caliphal defeat when the head of al-Amin was put on public display

at the entrance of Baghdad at the Gate of al-Anbar. With al-Amin's

death, the Abbasid caliphate faced a moment that was in complete

contrast with the moment of revolution that brought it to power

over half a century earlier.

1 Tabarl, Muhammad b. Garir, Tdrih al-Rusul wa'l-Muluik, ed. M. Ibrahim,(Cairo, 1966), v. 8, p. 478; al-MasCiudi, Abu 'I-Hasan 'All b. al-Husayn, Muruij

al-Dahab wa Ma'ddin al-Jawhar, ed. C. Pellat, (Beirut, 1973), v. 4, p. 293.



336 TAYEB EL-HIBRI

For observers writing about these events at the end of the 9th and

beginning of the 10th centuries, after the Abbasid caliphate had

been carved up into provincial successor states, there were a set ofreligious/historical issues to address, such as: How could they

explain the failure in Abbasid leadership under al-Amin? How

could it be that the founding generation of the dynasty, the Abna',

viewed as the descendants of the Perso-Arab generation credited

with the righteous achievement of overthrowing the Umayyads,

could themselves be overthrown by a new eastern power and in the

context of civil war? Finally, what did the failure of al-Amin's

leadership signify, especially to these later observers whose

experience encompassed the eventual political disintegration of the

Abbasid caliphate and the predominance of feeble reigns during

that intervening century. There was a necessary historiographical

exercise to be undertaken, that of explaining the collapse of al-

Amin's regime. For some, this was a clear-cut result of al-Amin's

alleged treachery, recklessness, ineptness, or even predestined

fate.2 But for others, the issues involved were not so one dimen-

2 The perspective that casts the conflict as predestined fate is best illustrated in

an anecdote that survives in the works of Dinawarl, Mas'utdi, and Ibn ACtam al-

Kfift. The anecdote describes al-Rasid on one occasion being visited by a promi-

nent literary figure of the time (al-AsmaCi according to al-Dinawari, but al-Kis2'i

according to al-MasCtdl and Ibn Actam al-Kufi). Proud of the blossoming talents

of the two young princes, al-Amin and al-Ma)mfin, the caliph sought to display

them to the scholar for a literary test. The narrator recounts: ,They (i.e., al-Amin

and al-Ma'muin) soon after entered together like two stars on the horizondecorated by tranquility and majesty. They were looking down in modesty and

walking in short steps until they stood at the entrance of the audience chamber.

Then they greeted their father by the caliphal title and said prayers for his prosper-

ity. He then ordered them to approach. So they did, and he put Mubammad (al-

Amin) to his right and cAbdallah (al-Malmuin) to his left. The caliph then invited

me to have them recite passages from the Qur'an and to ask them some questions.

They replied to all of these in the most satisfactory manner...>) Delighted at his

children's success, the caliph then asked Kisa'i to comment on their performance.

((Having found them equally prepared, knowledgeable, and of keen memory, the

literary scholar told the caliph, JI have never seen among the children of caliphsand in the branches of this blessed [family] tree, any children more eloquent or

knowledgeable.>> He characterized the brothers as (<two moons of majesty,)) and

concluded by saying prayers for their well-being, to which al-Rasid said ((Amen,>>

and hugged them both together in a single long embrace at the end of which tears

flowed on his chest. When the two children left, al-Ragid turned to the scholar and

told him, ((what to do when fate has befallen them; hostility is born aniong them

and grows into conflict, and blood is shed until many will wish that they both were

among the dead.)) When al-Ragid is then asked, ((Is this (i.e., the conflict) some-

thing shown by signs at their birth or a tradition transmitted from men of

religion,)) he responds, ((Verily it is something recounted by scholars (al-culama-)




tional. We will see how they contrived a more controversial

blueprint for the history of the civil war, one that was subtly critical

of al-Ma'muin.

The Structure f HistoriographicalApologetics. The Anti-Amin Current

The most obvious level on which some sources sought to explain

the downfall was in religious terms. Just as the earlier fall of the

Umayyad dynasty was seen as the inevitable fate of rulers who

ruled as monarchs, and not as caliphs, authoritarian and preoc-

cupied with squandering wealth, a similar exercise was now to be

applied to al-Amin. But because al-Amin belonged to the chosen

and sacred Abbasid house, there was to develop a rich hagiographic

tradition that sought to explain how his flaws were the exception to

the Abbasid norm.

The construction of a hagiographic web of anecdotes predicting

downfall around the person of al-Amin was one of the mnajor

historiographic tools used to explain his murder. The medievalhistorian al-MasCu-diepitomizes this method when he provides a

wide array of such hagiographic accounts. In his lengthiest of such

anecdotes, he recounts how Zubayda, al-Amin's mother and sole

wife of Haruin al-Rasid, once experienced apparitions in her

dreams predicting ill-fortune for al-Amin.3

Quoting Zubayda, but without specifying the link of transmis-

sion of the report (except by saying that the report was relayed bysomeone like al-Mada'in1 and al-'Utb1), he says that these dreams

occurred on three occasions: the first when she became pregnant

with al-Amin; the second on the night just after she had given birth

from those chosen (al-awsyd') from the prophets (al-anbzya-d).>>l-Dinawarl adds inhis version, ((It is reported that al-Ma'muin used to say, during his reign, 'al-Rasid

had heard all that was to happen between us (i.e., with al-Amin) from Mu-sa b.Jacfar [al-Sadiq]. Thus he said what he did.,) al-Dinawari, Ahmad b. Dawu-d, al-Ahbar al-Tiwdl, ed. V. Guirgass, (Leiden, 1888), pp. 384-85; al-MasCu-di, Murtijal-Dahab, ed. C. Pellat, (Beirut, 1973), v. 4, pp. 211-12; Ibn A'tam al-Kutfi, AbulMuhammnad Ahmad b. A'tam, Kitdb al-Futuih,ed. A. Shirn, (Beirut, 1991), v. 8,pp. 387-389. Al-Dinawarl's additional comment has to be placed and understoodin light of al-Mamutn's nomination of cAll b. Mu-sa al-Rida- for succession in A. H.201.

3 al-Mascu-di, Muruigal-Dahab, v. 4, p. 262; A similar pattern of this story, butwith different wording for the prophecies (and sometimes a different rhyme for

ending) is given in al-Dinawarl. al-Akhbadrl-Tiwdl, p. 383.



338 TAYEB EL-HIBRI

to him, and the third one evening after she had weaned al-Amin.

On each of these occasions, Zubayda says, three women appeared

to her, each making a statement purporting to describe the nature

of al-Amin's future rule as despotic, corrupt, weak, unjust, and

extravagantly wasteful. On each occasion, Zubayda awoke in great

horror.

On the final visit, the three women made their harshest predic-

tions yet when they graphically described al-Amin's future death

and how his death is more beneficial than his life. Given the clear

hagiographic tendentiousness of these accounts, one might easilybrush aside their investigation as unnecessary. The reports, how-

ever, deserve a close examination to investigate the process and

context of their construction. For example, in the statement of one

of the women on the third occasion, she describes al-Amin by say-

ing, <<A ontested speaker (ndtiqunmahsuym)nd a vanquished war-

rior (muhalribunmahzuim)and a seeker denied (ragibuznmahruim) nd

an anxious unfortunate person (saq0yyunmahmum).>>he particular

choice of the word "<nadtq>>s not accidental. It betrays an attempt

by MasCidil's narrator to include the title of al-Amin's contested

heir apparent, his infant son al-Natiq bi'l-Haqq.

This three-stage progression in prediction seems to be analogous

to another anecdote in Masfidi, where he describes a visit that

Ibrahim b. al-Mahdi made to al-Amin during the siege. Quoting

this time Ibrahim, the narrator describes an entertainment held in

the presence of al-Amin and IbrThim. IbrThim says that one nightwhen the siege of Baghdad particularly intensified, he visited al-

Amin in order to comfort him. The caliph, feeling somewhat

relieved by the company of his uncle, called on a female singer to

sing; but as she began to sing, it became apparent that her lyrics

were totally inauspicious, even indirectly predicting the murder of

<<the ne in her presence>> i.e., al-Amin]. Furious, al-Amin ordered

her to be silent, and then after Ibrahim comforted him again, al-

Amin forgot the singer's mishap and ordered her again to sing,

which she did. Yet again she used lyrics similar to the first. When

finally on a third chance the singer continued to sing inauspicious

songs, al-Amim expelled her from his presence; but as she rose to

exit in haste, she stumbled on his drinking cup and inadvertently

broke it. Ibrahim concludes his account by saying: <<itwas a full-

moon night and we were in his al-Huld Palace located by the Tigris

when we heard a voice saying: <What you debate has been preor-




dained. )>4 Al-Amin anxiously asked me if I heard it, and I

pretended not to have.))5

In similar fashion to the first prediction, this anecdote is intendedto show the inevitable coming of al-Amin's fate, particularly when

it concludes with the prophesying voice coming from the Tigris.

The three-stage progression in the account is very similar to the one

attributed to Zubayda, and shows some shared origins. In fact, it

seems plausible to hypothesize that both reports were initiated by

the same narrator. The clue to this lies in the statement that is

quoted as the voice coming from the Tigris. This statement isdrawn from a Qur'anic verse in the chapter that describes the life

of the Prophet Joseph. In the context of the Qur'anic account, the

verse represents the statement with which Joseph concluded the

dream interpretation which he gave to two prisoners who came to

him for interpreting dreams that they had experienced. The par-

ticular choice of this verse by the narrator may reflect the train of

thought of the composer of the first hagiographic account, which,

as we saw, was entirely about dreams and Zubayda's great anxietyover failing to interpret them.

The Oppositional Current. The Historiographic Voice of Sympathy or

al-Amin

Viewing and justifying the war of succession as al-Amin's

responsibility or as predestined fate, was also a position that had itslimitations. It was insufficient for some medieval observers and

chroniclers to simply explain the victory/defeat as a function of the

virtuous image of al-Ma'mu-n and the vile nature of al-Amin or

through prophetic anecdotes. They were equally interested in inter-

preting, albeit indirectly, events on the ground. For these medieval

observers, notably Tabarl, conflict within the community (fitna)

was not a purely political phenomenon but a religious one as well,

one which, while having a place in a transcendental plan, depends

4 Qur'an, Suirat Yu-suf, 41.

s al-MasCu-di,Murzit al-Dahab, v. 4, pp. 266-267. A very similar version of thesame story is given by Tabari, Tdrih, v. 8, p. 477; also al-cUyu-nwa'l-Hada'iq, ed.M.J. De Goeje and P. De Jong (Leiden: Brill, 1869), pp. 336-37; al-Azdl, AbiuZakariyya Yazid b. Muhammad, Tdrdhal-Mawsil, ed. A. Habiba (Cairo, 1967),

pp. 329-30; Ibn Actam al-Kuifi, Kitdb al-Futtih, v. 8, p. 411-412; Ibn al-Saci, Taj

al-Din cAll b. Anjab, Muhtasar Ahba-ral-Hulafd', (Cairo: Bu-laq, 1891), p. 37.



340 TAYEB EL-HIBRI

to a great extent on the active participation of individuals in events

and their reaction to things.6 They subtly shed skepticism about the

purity of arms of Tahir and the responsibility of al-Mamfin, rais-ing not only new questions, but leading us to make important

distinctions among issues. For example, whether al-Amin was truly

responsible for provoking the war is a totally different question

from whether the war had willy-nilly to be brought to conclusion,

in the aftermath of Baghdad's fall, through the humiliation of the

caliphal office and person.

There was no escaping the reality that al-Amin was a caliph who

had fallen captive, and who prior to his arrest had anyway agreed

to surrender to al-Mamfin. Therefore, for the execution still to

take place after victory was achieved and the insignia of the

caliphate confiscated, was clearly an event that appeared

unjustified and cold blooded. Perhaps if al-Amin had been given a

trial and proven guilty of religious treason for violating Harun al-

Rasid's purported protocols, then the event of the caliph's murder

might have had the semblance of a judicial execution.7 Without aframework of justification, however, the event stood as an obstacle

for his successor's power legitimacy.

While the narrative leading up to the downfall of al-Amin is iden-

tically reported in the sources, we notice that the sources provide

conflicting accounts of how the event was received at al-Ma3mu-n's

camp in Marw. The question of whether the decision to execute

was taken on the field at Tahir's command or secretly ordered byal-Mazmiin forms the crux of a muted controversy in the sources.

It is useful to examine the divergences among the sources in repor-

ting various reactions to the news of conquest.

1) The chronicler Yalqabi entirely avoids mentioning the reac-

tion of either al-Ma3mu-n or al-Fadl ibn Sahl, his vizir, at court in

Marw.

2) Gahsiyari, on the other hand, says in his al-Wuzard7 wa'l-

Kuttdb that when the head of al-Amin arrived in Marw, al-Fadl

reflected in amazement, ((What has Tahir brought on us? He shall

6 M. Hodgson, The Ventureof Islam (Chicago, 1974), v. 1, p. 356.

7 Although of a slightly different quality, the trial of Afsh-in in al-Mu'tasim's

reign, for example, shows one such attempt on the part of the Abbasids to

elaborately justify a drastic turn in their political attitude towards a member of the

state elite.




now unleash on us the tongues and swords of people. We ordered

him to send him (al-Amin) prisoner, and he sends his head.>)'

3) Tabari, agreeing with Gahsiyar1, adds that al-Fadl b. Sahlwept when he made his reflective comment and that al-Ma'mun

casually told him, <(What has passed is now past; now find the

means to exonerate him (i.e., Tdhir).)> In this context, Tabari con-

tinues, saying, ((so people (i.e., scribes) wrote [sample letters of

apology]. But these were lengthy. Then came forward Ahmad b.

Yuisuf [with his letter].>>9

4) The anonymous author of al-IUyunwa '1-Haddaiqoffers various

reports. In the first he mentions that al-Ma'muin bestowed one

million dirhams on Muhammad b. al-Hasan b. MusCab (Tahir's

cousin), the messenger who brought the head of al-Amin together

with al-hdtim (the ring), al-qadfb(the staff), and al-burda(the man-

tle), together the insignia of the caliphate. He then continues to say.

<<..and then Du 'l-Riyasatayn [al-Fadl] entered and found the head

of al-Amin positioned on a shield in front of al-Ma'mufn. It is said

that when he saw it, he prostrated himself (sagad).>>'0In the next, the anonymous chronicler agrees with a report of

Tabari that shows al-Fadl weeping and making his reflective com-

8 Gahsiyari, Muhammad b. 'Abdus, al-Wuzaradwa'1-Kuttdb, ed. M. al-Saqqa,p. 304. Ibn al-'Imrani attributes this comment to al-Ma'muin, while al-Fadl isshown saying, ,What has passed past; let us now consider a means of apology.)>Ibn al-'Imrani, Muhammad b. cAll, al-Inba) ft Tdri7hal-ijulafid, ed. Q. al-

Samarra'i, (Publications of the Netherlands Institute of Archaeology and ArabicStudies in Cairo, Leiden: Brill, 1973), p. 94.9 Tabari, Tdri/h,v. 8, p. 507; Ibn cAtam al-Kufif, Kitab al-Futuih,v. 8, p. 415;

Ibn Miskawayh, Abui 'All Ahmad b. Muhammad, Tajdribal-Umam, ed. M.J. DeGoeje, (Leiden: Brill, 1871), p. 418.

10 al-cUyu-nwa'l-Hadd'iq, p. 341; Ibn Miskawayh, Tagdrib al-Umam, p. 415;Tabari, Tdrih, v. 8, p. 488; Ibn al-Athir, cIzz al-Din Abu'l-Hasan cAli b. Muham-mad, al-kamfif'1-TTdrFh, Beirut, 1965-67), v. 6, p. 287; al-Dahabi, Sams al-DinMuhammad b. Ahmad, Tdrihal-Isldm wa Wafaydtal-MasdhIzrwa'1-A'ldm, ed. U.A.Tadmuri, (Beirut, 1990), v. 12, p. 62. Tabari, Ibn Miskawayh, Ibn al-Atir, Ibn

al-Gawz1, and Dahabl's version of this makes al-Fadl the one who presents al-Amin's head on a shield to al-Ma'mu-n, and the latter the one who prostratedhimself. Ibn al-Athir completely drops the mention of the monetary gift to theTahiri messenger, while Dhahabi simply cuts it down to a mere one thousanddirhams. It is notable that this almost identically phrased report among thesesources corresponds in Tabarl, Ibn Miskawayh, and al-Dahabi to the identifica-tion of the royal insignia as al-burda, al-qadfb, and al-musalld (see discussion belowon the insignia). Ibn al-Gawzi differs from the other chroniclers when he statesthat al-Ma'muin ordered the monetary gift, set at one million dinars, for Tahirhimself. (see, Ibn al-Gawzi, Abu 'l-Farag 'Abd al-Rahman b. 'All, al-MuntazamjfF

Tdrih al-Umam wa'1-Muluik,ed. M.A. 'Ata, (Beirut, 1992), v. 10, p. 48.



342 TAYEB EL-HIBRI

ment and describes al-Ma'muin's cold attitude toward the event

and his ordering al-Fadl to find the means for apology. But he stops

short of the story of Ahmad b. Yiisuf and does not include the textof the letter, itself a subject of controversy. The anonymous

chronicler, however, adds that it is also said that when al-Ma'miin

saw the head of his brother, he wept, asked God to forgive him [al-

Amin], and reminisced about the favors that al-Amin had once

done for him, and the good times they had spent together in al-

Rasid's time.11

5) al-Mas'uiid1, on the other hand, narrates that when the headof al-Amin was brought to Marw, it was al-Ma'mun who wept and

felt great sorrow over his death. Al-Fadl ibn Sahl said, according

to Mas'fdi, <<Commanderof the Faithful, praise be to God for this

great reward (al-niCmaal-Mfalfa), or al-Amin had wished to see you

in the position that God has afforded you of him today.)) Mas'udl-s

same report continues, <<al-Ma'munthen ordered that the head be

placed in the central courtyard (sahn al-dar) on a wooden stand. He

then distributed sums of money among the military and ordered

whoever had earned his reward to proceed and curse the head. One

11 al-Uyuin wa '-Haddliq, p. 341. The author of al-Uyuin wa '-Haddaiq does not

exactly specify what "good times" al-Ma'muin was referring to, but the 12th-

century chronicler Ibn al-cImran! illustrates this point in a unique report which

represents a rare case of favorable depiction of al-Amin. Ibn al]-Imran! states that

after the head of al-Amin arrived in Marw, al-Ma'mfin wept, and when asked byal-Fadl about the reason for his distress, al-Ma'muin said: <Despite al-Amin's

treachery (mac cuquqih[)and his lack of goodwill, I remembered an occasion when

al-Rashid once commanded that I be given 100,000 dinars and al-Amin 200,000

dinars. I happened to learn of this gift before my brother did, so when I came to

him and informed him of the rewards he said to me, 'My brother, if you feel some

discomfort about my more favorable share of the gift, then there, I give it all to

you in appreciation for your bringing me this good news.' So, 'al-Ma man con-

cludes, 'I received the 300,000 dinars myself., (Ibn al-cImrdni, al-Inbadfr Tdrfhal-

,ujlafed, p. 95). Ibn al- Imrani's story clashes with the far more widely cited story

that describes how al-Rasid once sought to prove to Zubayda that her son was lesstrustworthy and honorable than al-Ma'mu-n, To demonstrate this, the caliph sent

to each prince a messenger who asked him what his (i.e., the messenger's) reward

would be if he were one day to convey the news of succession to the prince. Al-

Amin allegedly promised that he would generously reward the messenger, while

al-Ma'mun hurled an inkwell at the messenger and spoke to him threateningly

saying, ,Dare you, indeed, ask me what I shall do on the day that the Commander

of the Faithful dies? I hope that God may make of all of us a ransom for him!)>

Upon hearing of the divergent reaction of his sons, al-Rasl-d found his suspicions

confirmed, and he eagerly stunned Zubayda with the results. The account in N.

Abbot, Two Queens of Baghdad, (University of Chicago, 1946), p. 188.




of those in his turn, said, <<MayGod's curse be upon this, and his

parents, and upon all those to whom they had given birth.)>It was

said to him, <<You have just cursed the Commander of theFaithful,)> but al-Ma'muin smiled and pretended not to have heard

him. He then ordered the head be sent back to Iraq for burial.o"2

Outside this immediate context, al-Mas'uCdireports that when at

a later point al-Ma'mfin received word about a poem in which al-

Amin's mother eulogized her son's death, al-Ma'mu-n wept and

said, <<ByGod, I can only say what the Commander of the Faithful

'All b. Abi Talib said when he received word of 'Utman's murder,

<<ByGod, I did not kill or order, or sanction the murder.)) May God

bring agony to Tahir's heart.'>13

6) Al-Zubayr b. Bakkar also provides a version that places the

responsibility on Ibn Sahl. Ibn Bakkar states: <I am told by al-

Zubayr who says on the authority of Ish-aqb. Ibrahim al-Tamimi,

who says that he was told by 'Ali b. Abi Sa'id, <<whenhe <<deposed

one?> i.e., al-Amin) was killed, his head was brought to al-Ma'm-n

seventeen days after the announcement [of victory]. I was with [al-Fadl] when he entered [with the sealed wrapping of al-Amin's head]

into the presence of al-Ma'mun, and then [al-Fadl] told me,

<<unsealt (al-hdtim),>>which I did until I finally got to a velvet cover.

When I further unfolded this, the head, which was covered with

cotton, became visible.>)Al-Ma'mufn looked at it, as if in a glimpse

from the side of his eyes, then grimaced and turned his face away

from the scene. Dii'l-Riyasatayn then said, <<OCommander of theFaithful, this is a time for gratefulness, therefore, thank God who

has shown him (i.e., al-Amin) to you in the position that he had

hoped you will be in.>) He then ordered me to fully unveil the head,

and looked at it at length, and subsequently ordered that it be

placed on a pole for public display. He then designated a reward

for people who came forth to curse <<thedeposed one,)? (until the

man who indirectly cursed al-Ma'muin). Finally, al-Ma'muin

ordered the cursing to cease.?>14

7) Al-Maqdisi, however, probably comes closest to an une-

quivocal blaming of al-Ma'muin. He provides the unusual report

12 al-MasCuid1,MurugVl-Dahab, v. 4, p. 296.13 Ibid., v. 4, p. 298.

14al-Zubayr b. Bakkar, al-Ahba-r l-Muwaffaqzyydt,ed. S.M. al-AnI, (Baghdad,

1972), p. 140.



344 TAYEB EL-HIBRI

which says that Tahir had written to al-Ma'mu-n asking for orders

regarding al-Amin, upon which al-Ma)mfin sent to him a shirt that

had no opening for the head (gayr muqawwar), from which Tahirunderstood that the message was an order to murder al-Amin.'5

8) Finally, mention must be made of the later version that is

given by the 15th-century scholar al-Suyfiti. Providing a somewhat

varying description of the event, either because he drew on some

earlier sources that are no longer extant or because he interpreted

the existing accounts differently, al-Suyuiti-portrays al-Ma)mun as

disappointedwith the news of al-Amin's death. As he put it: G(Al-

Ma'muin was greatly distressed at the news of his brother's killing,

for he had hoped (kdnayuhibbu) hat al-Amin's life would be spared,

and [that al-Amin] would be sent to him so that he could decide in

his matter. It is for this (i.e., the murder) that he (al-Ma)miin) held

a grudge against and neglected Tahir by creating a distance from

him until [Tahir] died far away.)>16

The above excerpts display the range of views describing al-

Ma'muin's and al-Fadl's reactions to the murder. The divergence

among these accounts reflects a basic division among observers on

how to assign responsibility for the events of the civil war. No single

report among the above shows that there was a coherent plan

known to all three, al-Ma'min, al-Fadl and TThir, for dealing

with the captured caliph. Each description seems to exonerate one

of the three while implicating the others. The challenge presented

by the problem of regicide was never resolved. Once it surfaced inthe early medieval sources, it continued to pose a difficulty for later

chroniclers who were also divided on how to understand the

statements of the early accounts.

The ControversialLetterof Apology

Another interesting case of divergence among the sources con-

cerns the purpose and content of an official document that was

intended to justify the murder of al-Amin. The document seems to

15 al-Maqdlsl, Mutahhar b. Thhir, al-Bad) wa'l- Tdrih, ed. C. Huart (Paris,

1899-1919), v. 6, p. 1 0; Ibn Khallikan, Wafaydtal-A ?ydnwa Anbd'Abnd'al-Zamdn,

ed. I. 'Abbas, (Beirut, 1968-72), v. 2, p. 518.

16 al-Suyiiti, Galal al-Din Abui'l-Fadl CAbd al-Rahman b. Abi Bakr, Tdrih al-

Jjulafa-, ed. M.M. CAbd al-Hamid (Cairo, 1964), p. 300.




exist in two versions which will be discussed below. Yacquibi reports

that Tahir wrote in his own hand to al-Ma'muin:

<<...In spite of the fact that the deposed one [al-mahlu`] (i.e., al-Amin) is a partner to the Commander of the Faithful in genealogy

and kin, the judgment of the Book has separated between them in

matters of state [fi'l-wildya] and sanctity [al-hurma], for he (i.e., al-

Amin) has abandoned the knot of religion [Cismatal-dfn] and strayed

from what Muslims have agreed on. God the almighty says, <<O

NuIh [Noah], he (i.e., Noah's son) is not of your family [any

longer]. It is not a righteous path [that he followed.])) And there isno obedience to anyone when in disobedience to God, and, if

people shall part, it must be in matters relating to God. [I dispatch

here] my present letter to the Commander of the Faithful, when

God has brought death to the deposed one, and surrendered him

[to us], for his treachery. He has settled his problem for the Com-

mander of the Faithful, and He has fulfilled for him what He had

pre-ordained. Praise be to God who has returned to the Com-

mander of the Faithful his rightful [rule], and for frustrating the

treachery of the one who broke his oath [i.e., al-Amin] so that He

has restored unity after dissension, reconciled the umma after its

fragmentation, and revived the banners of the Faith after they had

been tattered.17

If this letter was not actually written by TThir, it was at least

intended to be thought to be his by his contemporaries. Here,

again, we find a disagreement pertaining to the true origin of theletter. For Gahsiyari and Tabari, in contrast with YaCqubi, claim

that it was after the arrival of al-Amin's head in Marw, and the

astonishment of al-Fadl, that al-Ma'mu-n told al-Fadl to compose a

letter that could be attributed to Tahir, apparently for the purpose

of justifying the murder. Both mention that the text of the letter

that was finally adopted was by Ahmad b. Yu-suf, an assistant scribe

who at a later point would take up the position of chief kdtib(vizir),

and was not sent by Tahir from Baghdad as YaCqu-biasserts.

Another area of divergence, also pertaining to the above letter,

has to do with the differences in its stylistic composition in various

sources. On the one hand, Ya'qu-bi and Gahsiyari provide a version

17YaCqu-b1, Ahmad b. Abi Yacqub b. Wadih., Tdrfh, (Beirut, 1960), v. 2, p.

442. Gahsiyari, al-Wuzara-'wa'l-Kuttdb, p. 304.



346 TAYEB EL-HIBRI

that is clearly marked by an emphatic and direct style. The opening

sentence is:

1) even though ...,it is clear/known that they (al-AmIn and al-Ma'muin) are to be separated.

2) This separation in the same sentence is underlined by a legal,

rational, and binding verdict on the basis of <<al-Kitdba'l-sunna>.18

Later in the text, the statement is made in conclusion in congratula-

tion to al-Ma'muin for receiving ((back))what was his ((right)). These

congratulations are put in a variety of synonymous forms.

On the other hand, Tabarl's version of the same letter divergeson important details which make this version sound milder, less

belligerent to al-Amin, less enthusiastic about al-Ma'mun' s

takeover of power, and altogether more like a general factual state-

ment on a historical theme than a propaganda message. For exam-

ple the opening sentence starts as follows:

((The deposed one was the partner of the Commander of the

Faithful in genealogy, however, now God has distinguished

between them.)> The style of this sentence is devoid of the emphatic

and argumentative style of Ya'qubl's text, and looks like an

ordinary description. In the second sentence of the text, in addition

to the lack of emphasis, Tabari does not make of the separation

between the brothers something that can be proven on the basis of

the Qur'an [the Book] and the sunna. Rather, it is merely stated

that God has willed it to be so. By emphasizing the predestinatory

nature of al-Amin's fall, he thus downplays the argument thatcenters on highlighting the flaws of al-Amin's personality. The

downfall, therefore, is no longer the necessary and deserved fate of

an incompetent ruler, but an event whose purpose is beyond the

comprehension of the community. And in the conclusion, Tabari

is much more brief, and does not show the signs of sensationalism

present in the other versions. He closes, significantly omitting the

statement to be found in other sources, saying: ((praise be to God

for returning to al-Ma'mufn his rightful due [haqqahu] i.e., rule).>>19

18 The usage of the concept of 'al-Kitdbwa'1-sunna' (the Book [the Qur'an] and

the tradition of the Prophet) here builds on al-Ma'mu-n's earlier civil war prop-

aganda that articulated his conflict against al-Amin as a war for the restoration of

pious government which the latter was charged with forsaking.

19 Tabarl, Tdrih, v. 8, p. 508; also agreeing with Tabarl's version of the letter

is Ibn Miskawayh, Tajdribal-Umam, p. 418.




Tabarl also provides the text of a letter that, he says, Tahir sent

to al-Ma'muin, but this letter is merely a description of the final

days of the siege of Baghdad, and nowhere in it does Tahir lectureal-MaDmiin as to who might or might not be his rightful kin in the

religious sense. The stylistic divergences among the sources in

phrasing this letter may therefore indicate another aspect of the

conflicting historiographic approaches to al-Amin's downfall. From

the above, several aspects of al-Ma'muin's role can be discerned:

1) that al-Ma'muin unlike Fadl b. Sahl, was better prepared for

receiving news of thepossible murder

ofal-Amin.2) that al-Ma:mhn had a well thought out means of justifying

the event (in the form of a public letter).

3) that al-Ma'miin sought to place the full burden of the deed on

Tahir. He deliberately sought to show not only that Tahir per-

sonally ordered the murder but that he had a justification for the

murder that was addressed to al-Ma'mun as much as to the Muslim

community at large. Al-Ma3mun could once again appear, in this

case, under the sway of powerful aides (this time the Tahirids) justas he was earlier under the influence of al-Fadl ibn Sahl.

The Place of al-Amn 's Regicide in the Historical Perceptionof the Com-

munzty

The thematic structure of al-Amin's regicide is one that has rele-

vance and connections beyond the particularities of Islamic history.

The main outline of its development, for example, finds parallels

in the regicide of the English monarch Richard II. The downfall of

both can be summarized as the tragedy of a king accused of

misgovernment, of surrounding himself with men of inferior birth,

and of listening to flatterers who lead him to make wrong decisions.

Both suffered humiliating ends, and in their physical humiliation,

there came about a diminishing in the credibility of the office. At

times, if we draw on Shakespeare's depiction of Richard II's fall forcomparison, even their words reflect a shared sense of disillusion.

Richard's disillusion with supporters after his betrayal and arrest is

mirrored by al-Amin's statements during the intensified bombard-

ment of his palace during the siege: ((Would that both parties died.

For these (i.e., his supporters) fight for me for my money, and the

others fight to take my life>>20. oth pronounce words of reflection

20 Masciidi, Murug al-Dahab, v. 4, p. 290.



348 TAYEB EL-HIBRI

and wisdom on rulership and life in general in their hours of

imprisonment just before execution. But whereas in the European

case, the humility of a Christian king could connect with the idealof the humbled Christ-king2t, there was no parallel meritorious

angle for interpreting a Muslim caliph's violent death.

The regicide of al-Amin, it might be argued, contrary to our

view that it was of unprecedented impact, was one that in fact had

precedents such as the murder of the caliph 'Utman (d. 656), com-

panion and third successor to the Prophet, and al-Walid II (d. 744),

the short-reigned Umayyad caliph. Al-Amin's death, however, was

qualitatively different from both of these cases. For 'Utman's per-

son is assessed in the sources more as that of a saint than as caliph.

Hence the magnitude of tragedy that his murder takes on in the

sources derives more from the fact that such humiliation befell

cUtman than that it befell the caliphal office. After all, in the early

Islamic period, the caliphal office was still not defined according to

a standard Islamic political theory, one which would develop only

much later in Abbasid times. The office of caliph in the earlyIslamic period was being shaped, perceived, and defined according

to the characteristics of the personalities that filled the post. On the

other hand, there was no viable basis for a comparison between al-

Amin's regicide and al-Walid's since in the view of the early

Abbasid society, the latter's was part of the Umayyad era regarded

in its entirety as an interregnum anti-caliphate whose history was

an aberration from the idealized reigns of the first successors to theProphet.

The murder of al-Amin, therefore, stands on its own as the first

of its kind in the restored ideal political order of the caliphate. We

must here appreciate the mentality of cAbbasid society, which lived

at a historical distance from the early age and thought it had suc-

ceeded in establishing a stable rule based on the widest popular

acceptance and aided by supernatural support. For that society,

any change in that order was to be regarded with anxiety. For a

caliphal regicide to take place must have constituted nothing short

of a psychological shock to the perceptions of the community; a

shock whose religio-historical significance was amplified by the

21 Ernst Kantorowicz, The King's Two Bodies:A Studyin Medieval Political Theology

(Princeton University Press, 1957), pp. 24-41.




approaching close of the second Islamic century which must have

inspired millennial expectations about the era that would follow22.

Popular anxiety over the possible murder of al-Ami-n alreadybegan to surface two years before the fall of Baghdad. When a coup

against al-Amin by some commanders of the Abna) led by al-

Husayn b. (All b. (Isd b. Mahan succeeded in briefly seizing powerand imprisoning al-Amin, Tabarl reports, an elder member of the

Abna) stood against the rebels and declared to the public, <<[Know]

all you people ... [that] there has never been a people who killed their

caliph and found themselves but becoming the target of God'swrathful sword>>23.At the time, the words of this leader evidently

stirred a deep sense of sympathy among the masses for the caliph,

as they soon after rose in support of al-Amin, freed, and then

restored him to power24.

This caution against harming the caliph's body was at an earlier

time extended to the Abbasid house as a whole. When the caliph

al-Hadi in A.H. 170/A.D.786 contemplated killing his brother and

heir apparent, Hariin al-Rasid, allegedly for the latter's depositingof the caliphal ring at the bottom of the Tigris, but more

realistically for the purpose of removing al-Rasid from the succes-

sion in favor of his own son Ga'far, an action which al-Rasid

resisted, al-Hadi was strongly cautioned of the possible public out-

cry and ramifications of harming al-Rasid since the latter was both

his brother and successor to the throne. Hence al-HadI ordered his

imprisonment only25.If the order to execute represents the antithesis to this idealized

earlier restraint by al-Hadd, we may also interpret the cited public

discontent after al-Amin's death as the realization of the predicted

response. The first signs of public disaffection appeared

22 W. Madelung, (New Documents Concerning Al-Ma)mfin, al-Fadl b. Sahland cAli al-Rida-,> Studia Arabica et Islamica, ed. W. Qadi, (American University

of Beirut, 1981), p. 345.23 Tabari, Tdrfh, v. 8, p. 430; al-Uyun wa'1-Hadd'iq, p. 329.24 The episode of internal rebellion against al-Amin clearly reflects the

hesitance of the rebels to take the full step of overthrowing and executing al-Amin.25 Al-Qd4i al-Ra'sid b. al-Zubayr, Kitdb al-Dahadir wa '1-Tuhaf, ed. M.

HamidullTh (Kuwait, 1959), p. 182. A similar case of the caliphs' refraining fromharming members of the Abbasid household is to be found in the reign of al-Rasid,who once suspected his uncle cAbd al-Malik b. Salih of treachery, and came closeto murdering him, but then refrained and stated, ((Had I not made it a customto saf'eguard the lives of Banu Hashim, I would have had you killed!,, (Yacqobi,

7Trrzh,v. 2, p. 425).



350 TAYEB EL-HIBRI

immediately after al-Amin's death in A.H. 198 when al-Ma'mun

still ruled from the east26. However, even after al-Ma'muin's return

of the capital to Baghdad, there are numerous signs that he wasalways conscious of the blame which the public assigned him for al-

Amin's death. This popular attitude is best expressed in the words

of a Baghdadi commoner who, upon spotting al-Ma'muin once,

reportedly commented, ((do you think that I will ever regard this

man (i.e., al-Ma'mfin) honorably after he killed his brother>"27. he

statement is probably apocryphal, but it illustrates what contem-

porary and later medieval observers saw in the event; the vile

murder of a brother and a reigning caliph.

TheMulti-layeredNarrativeandthe Undercurrentf HagiographicSympathy

for al-AmTn

By far the most effective method by which the undercurrent of

sympathy surfaces in the sources is illustrated in Tabarl's chronicle,

when he lets his sources recount al-Amin's final hours in vividtragic detail. The majority of the sources contemporary with

Tabari agree with his account of al-Amin's fall, but their versions

tend to be brief, which may reflect the fact that they were influ-

enced by the pro-Ma'mu-nid post-civil war propaganda28. In fact,

so deeply rooted did the negative perception of al-Amin become

26

Tabarl, Tdrih,v. 8, pp. 492,

494.27 Al-Hatib al-Bagdadi, Abui Bakr Ahmad b. 'All, TdrihBakgd&d,Cairo, 1931),

v. 10, p. 189; Ibn Hamduin, Mahmuid b. al-Hasan, al-Tadkira al-Hamduiniyya,ed.

I CAbbas, v. 2 (Beirut, 1983), p. 163; al-Kutubi, Muhammad b. Shakir, Fawdt al-

Wafaydt, ed. I. CAbbas, (Beirut, 1973), v. 1, p. 240; al-Dahabi, SoyarAcldm al-

Nubald, ed. M.N. al-'Irqsfisi, (Beirut, 1982), v. 10, p. 279; al-Suyiiti, TJrZh al-

Ju lafd2, p. 320. Interestingly, the sources characterize this 'Baghdadi commoner'

as a sailor (mallah). This choice of profession may have been inspired by the

accounts which describe al-Amin's attempted escape across the Tigris, the caliph's

fall in the river, and the rescue of others (Hartama) from the river by sailors. (See

the capture scene below).28 The sources that only briefly refer to al-Amin's fall are: al-Dinawari, al-Ahbar

al-Tiwdl, p. 395; Yacqobi, Tdrfh, v. 2, p. 441; al-Azdi, Tdrfihal-Mawsil, p. 331;

while among the later medieval sources, Ibn al-Scl-, cAl b. Angab al-Bagdddi,

Muhtasar Ahbaral-HulafaD,(Cairo: Bu-laq, 1891), p. 37; Ibn Dihya al-Kalbi, Magd

al-Din cUmar b. Hasan, al-Nibrassfr Tdrfh Hulafd2 Ban1)l-cAbbds,ed. A CAzzdwi,

(Baghdad, 1946), p. 46; Ibn al-Tiqtaqa, Muhammad b. cAll b. Tabataba, al-

Fahrt, (Beirut, 1966), p. 215; Ibn Tagrl Bardi, Abui'l-Mahasin Yuisuf, al-Nug7im

al-Zdhira if Mu/lk Misr wa'l-Qdhira, (Cairo, 1963-72), v. 2, p. 159; al-Yafici,

cAbdalldh b. Ascad, Mir'dt al-Janan wa CIbrat l- Yaqzanif MacrifatHawddit al-Zaman,

ed. A. Jubuiri, (Beirut, 1984), v. 1, p. 461.




that when Ibn al-Atir wrote about al-Amin in the 12th century, he

commented, by way of concluding the brief account of his reign,

<<andwe did not come across any stories that were flattering for himso that we should mention them>)29.

This overt bias against the reign and policies of al-Amin during

the civil war, however, did not preclude the historical redemption

of al-Amin, the caliph and member of a meritorious house, in his

final hours. By his very choice of style, and the subjects that he

addresses in the narrative, Tabarl betrays a very potent and

peculiar shade of sympathy for the fallen caliph. His account does

not challenge the pro-Ma'mu-nid historical account outright, but it

dwells on subjects that are not flattering to the image of religiosity

that al-Ma'muin used to cloak his civil war campaign; in this way,

he is able to raise a doubt in the reader's mind on issues that are

ignored in other sources. Put differently, Tabari tries to condition

the reader's sense of what to accept and what to regard as abhor-

rent. Throughout the account, Tabari breaks with his customary

curtness when describing events of lesser importance, and insteadquotes at length his specific narrators.

He begins by showing how al-Amin, in the final days, was a vic-

tim of a circle of inept advisors or double-faced collaborators and,

by listening to their advice, unwittingly entered the path that would

bring about his destruction. Then, on the basis of an account

relayed by al-Madadini, he describes how throughout these uncer-

tain days of al-Amin, a bitter disagreement was brewing in al-Ma'muin's camp. Tahir b. al-Husayn, convinced that he himself

was the source of imminent victory, was adamant that al-Amin

should surrender directly to him together with all the caliphal

regalia, which he identified as the ring (al-hdtim); the mantle (al-

burda), believed to have been the Prophet's; and the staff (al-qadib),

all three of which, the reporter interjects, constituted the symbols

of 'the caliphate' (wa ddlikaal-hilafa). Hartama and others were of

the opinion that al-Amin would refuse to surrender to Tahir, which

probably reflected their fear for al-Amin's life rather than the

possibility that his refusal would cause a stalemate. (Hartama, in

fact, had communicated to al-Amin that if harm were to befall al-

Amin from either Tahir or al-Ma'mun, he would personally fight

them in his defense.)

29 Ibn al-Atir, al-Kiimilfr'1-Tdrffh,. 6, p. 295.



352 TAYEB EL-HIBRI

Finally Tahir agreed to a compromise whereby al-Amin would

surrender to Hartama while the caliphal insignia, as defined above,

would be sent to him30. But on the eve of the day this arrangementwas to be implemented, Tahir was cautioned of treachery and

became suspicious that al-Amin would not abandon the insignia of

the caliphate. On the same night, al-Amin likewise became anxious

about treachery and about the possibility that TThir's troops might

storm the now unguarded Round City. So he resolved on leaving

at night to Hartama's boat anchored just outside the gate of

Khurasan. Hartama, having received word of al-Amin's resolu-

tion, immediately advised against it saying that there were

suspicious movements by Tahir's troops in the vicinity, and that he

feared if things were to come to a scuffle, he (Hartama) might be

outnumbered and defeated. Al-Amin, however, feeling greatly

vulnerable after being abandoned by his guard, decided to go

ahead.

Continuing his account from al-Madadini, Tabari now cites

Muhammad b. cIsa al-Gulfidd3l as narrator. Tabar1 describes, howal-Amin ordered that his favourite mare al-Zuhri (elsewhere al-

Zuhayr1) be saddled and then bid farewell to his two children,

embracing them and tearfully telling them: <<Ieave you in God's

trust.> He then wiped his tears with the [edge] of his sleeve,

mounted his horse in a single jump, and rode with his servant, the

narrator of this report, Muhammad b. cIsa al-Gulufdi, who says

<<.. ahead of us, one candle lighted the way. When we got to the

peripheral arcades [al-taqdt] just before the Gate of Khurasan, my

father then told me 'protect him [i.e., al-Amin] with your arms lest

he get hit.' Thus I did until we got to the Gate of Khurasan, which

we ordered opened32. Then we went down to the shore where

30 Tabari, Tdrih, v. 8, p. 482; al-(Uyuznwa'l-IHadd3iq,p. 338.31 The author al-'Uyuin wa'1-Had&3iq, p. 338), as well as MasCuidiin his Murug

al-Dahab (pp. 294-295), recount a shortened version of Tabari's account and leaveout the narrator's name.

32 Another account narrated by al-Hasan b. Abi Sa'id on the authority of Tariq

al-b-adim sets the exit at the Gate of Basra. This account deserves close attention.

It tells the story of al-Amin's arrival with his escort at the abandoned sentry post

near the Gate of Basra. Just before leaving, al-Amin reportedly asked to drink

from the guards' well. But when he was handed a cup of that water, it emanated

such a foul odor that he had to turn it away. (Tabari, Tdrih, v. 8, p. 482). Far

from being merely a report of historical description, this story seems to harbor a

carefully constructed political motif. As he was now about to describe al-Amin on

the verge of monarchal downfall, the chronicler sought to allude to the caliph's




Hartama's boat was anchored, but as we rode to board it, [al-

Amin's] horse suddenly came to a halt. It refused to move until he

divestment from kingship in symbolic terms. The denial of the caliph of a meredrink of water is a signal of the imminent end of his political rule and life. To

appreciate the meaning of this report fully, we must here leaf back in Tabarl's

chronicle to the annals of al-Rasid's reign. Among the various stories of al-Rasid,

Tabarl tells us that on one occasion the caliph summoned to him the ascetic Ibn

al-Sammak for general religious advice. At one point during their conference, al-Rasid asked a page for a drink of water. The pitcher was brought to him. ((But

when he tipped it up to his mouth in order to drink from it, Ibn al-Sammak said

to him, 'Wait a moment, Commander of the Faithful, and tell me, by your kinshipwith the Messenger of God! If this drink of water were to be withheld from you,

how much would you purchase it for?' He replied, 'For half of my kingdom.' He

said, 'Drink, may God refresh you.' When he had drunk, Ibn al-Sammak asked

him 'I ask you in the name of your kinship to the Messenger of God, if you were

prevented from passing that drink of water from out of your body, what would

you pay to get rid of it?' He replied, 'All my kingdom.' Then ibn al-Sammak told

the caliph, 'A kingdom whose value is only a drink of water isn't, indeed, worth

aspiring to (or: contending over, a1Idyundfasahi)!' At this Haru-n wept. Al-Fadl

b. al-Rabl' then gestured to Ibn al-Sammak to depart, so the latter left.)) Tabarl,

Tdrfh, v. 8, p. 482. This translation is a synthesis of the two Tabari translations:J.A. Williams, Al- Tabari-, The Early Abba-st- mpire, (Cambridge: Eng., 1989), v. 2,

p. 309; and C.E. Bosworth, The History of al-Tabart-, The Abbasid Caliphate in

Equilibrium, (State University of New York: Albany, 1989), v. 30, p. 323. By jux-

taposing the two anecdotes we can notice that the story of al-Amin's thirst before

his downfall responds to the moral embedded in the story from al-Rasid's reign.Al-Raslid's weeping may be interpreted as a sign of his religious awakening andhis recognition of the ephemeral nature of his power, but it can also be connected

with the accounts of his alleged fear of an approaching civil war between his sons

(see f.n. 2 above). Ibn al-Sammak's address to al-Rasid about the worthlessness

of contention over kingship only makes sense in light of the civil war between al-Amin and al-Ma'muin. That al-Fadl b. al-Rabl', who became the vizir of al-Amin

and the alleged architect of the war against al-Ma'mu-n, is not only present in theplot, but is the one who gestures Ibn al-Sammak to leave, tells us something aboutthe construction of this anecdote. The story of al-Amin's attempt to drink water

before his departure, therefore, is in dialogue with this anecdote from al-Rasid's

reign. Water, the implication in these stories runs, symbolizes imperial authority,and one is left wondering about the value of rivalry over political power. Controlof the dominion is made to appear as essential to the lives of al-Rasid and al-Aminas water is to their survival. But whereas al-Ra'sd is <(awakened))to this reality in

peacetime, al-Amin is not, and thus ends up forced to experience the loss of thekingdom in order to grasp the lesson. Tahir, or the chronicler, may be referringto this story of al-Amin when he writes in a letter addressed to al-Ma'mu-n,announcing victory, stating: ,I have previously written to the Commander of theFaithful about...how I disliked what Hartama proceeded to do on his own

initiative regarding him (i.e., al-Amin) after God had exhausted him and cut offhis hope concerning every stratagem or support...and after he had been preventedfrom reaching the water, let alone other things.)) Tabarl, Tdrth, v. 8, p. 490.(translation by M. Fishbein, The History of al-Tabari-, The War Between Brothers,(State University of New York: Albany, 1993), v. 31, p. 198). For another report

in Tabarl that also hammers the point that al-Amin died thirsty, see Tabari, Tdrih,



354 TAYEB EL-HIBRI

struck it with the whip, at which point it went on board. Al-Amin

then dismounted and his horse retraced its way back)>33!

The next report from that moment on is narrated by Ahmad b.Sallam, an official who had held a post in the judiciary (sdaib al-

mazalim) in al-Amin's reign. Ibn Sallam picks up the story from the

previous narrator inside the boat. He tells how when al-Amin

descended to the lower deck to the chamber of Hartama where his

staff was in council, they all rose in respect except for Hartama who

apologized for an illness that prevented him. Instead, Hartama fell

to his knees and gave al-Amin a full embrace, kissing his eyes,

hands and feet, and addressing him <<Omy master and son of my

master.)) (ya sayyidf wa mawldy wa ibn sayyidf wa mawldy) Then al-

Amin gazed around the assembly and recognized Hartama's men

v. 8, p. 476. The picture of al-Amin's abandoned palace with a nearby well of

stagnant water may well be influenced by the Qur'anic verse which reads: (How

many a city We have destroyed in its evildoing, and how it is fallen down uponits roofs. How many a ruined well and a lofty palace.)> (wa bi'rin mucattalatinwa

qasrin masid). Qur'an 22:45. (Partly drawing on Arberry's translation: A.J.

Arberry, The Koran InterpretedLondon, 1955), v. 2, p. 45).

33 Tabari, TdriIh,v. 8, p. 484. In contrast, al-MasCfidi's report says that al-

Amin killed his horse before boarding the boat. See Muzig al-Dahab, v. 4, p. 293.

Whichever account we accept, the chroniclers agree on focusing on the horse as

an image of monarchal power. Al-Amin's gloomy image of departure from the

Round City on horseback, and Masnufdl's reference to the demise of the horse both

provide oblique hints at the fate of al-Amin's monarchy through the symbolism

of the horse. However, the divergence in the two accounts as to what happens tothe horse conceals the chroniclers' tacit commentary on al-Amin's political inten-

tions after his acceptance of surrender. Killing the horse projects an image of a

jealous and treacherous al-Amin who is attempting, down to his last moment, to

undermine his successor's royalty by destroying the image of his authority. Spar-

ing the life of the horse, in contrast, is consistent with Tabari's effort to show al-

Amin as a wise and trustworthy ruler on his last night. Tabari's historiographic

redemption of al-Amin's virtuous nature in the way he narrated this event, was

not an end itself but served a theoretical purpose. Al-Amin's release of the horse

indicates his acceptance to pass the caliphate on to his successor, and thereby

underlines the autonomy of the caliphal institution from his person; an autonomywhich is only offset by the attachment of the horse to him when it refuses to let

him board the boat where he will surrender. The horse as the symbol of royal

authority derives from the Persian monarchal tradition with its emphasis on the

image of Sasanian rulers receiving the coronation while seated on horseback, such

as depicted in the rock carvings of Persepolis and Bishaphfir. In later times, as H.

Busse has shown, the Buyids tried to revive this imagery in a subdued form when

'Adud al-Dawla demanded that, for the occasion of his coronation by the caliph,

he be allowed to enter the caliphal palace on horseback. H. Busse -The Revival

of Persian Kingship Under the Buyids,>> n D.S. Richards, ed., Islamic Civilization

950-1150, (Oxford, 1973), p. 63.




and thanked one of them for rendering him a favor34. Then sud-

denly the boat came under attack by Tahir's men, who drilled holes

in its hull and overturned it. As everyone fell in the water, al-Aminmade his way to the shore with his clothes torn. The account then

digresses to describe how Ibn Sallam escaped to shore and came

close to getting killed but was imprisoned in a house instead35. He

34 The wording of this report in Tabari is the following: [al-Amin] (began toexamine our faces. He looked at 'Ubaydallah b. al-Waddah and said to him,(<Which of them are you?)) He replied, (J am 'Ubaydallah b. al-Wadd h.>>,Yes,)>

he said. ((May God reward you well. How thankful I am for what you did in thematter of the snow! If I meet my brother, may God preserve him, I will not failto praise you before him and ask him to reward you on my behalf.)> M. Fishbein,The WarBetweenBrothers,p. 190. Although it is not clear to what al-Amin was herereferring in his thankful comment to cUbaydallah b. al-Waddah, this exchange is

important because it shows that al-Amin, now having surrendered to Harthama,envisaged a meeting with al-Ma'mu-n. This ultimately implies that Harthama wasplanning to reconcile the brothers, and not merely provide al-Amin with an escaperoute from al-Ma'miun. The dialogue also gives us a rare flattering reference byal-Amin toward al-Ma'miin when he says, ((If I meet my brother, may God

preserve him...,,35 Ibn Sallam's arrest represents a pivotal development in the account of al-

Amin's downfall, and for this is worth some scrutiny. His testimony says thatwhen he came ashore he was arrested by one of Tahir's men, and was thenbrought to a commander who interrogated him. When asked about his identity,Ibn Sallam pretended to be sdhib al-surta (police chief), a claim the commanderimmediately dismissed as a lie, but proceeded anyway to ask him about the fateof al-Amin. To this question Ibn Sallam answered saying, "I saw him (i.e., al-Amin) when he tore his clothes (here clearly referring to the black caliphalgarments) and dived into the water.(( This tip surely enlightened al-Ma'miin's

commanders about the appearance of the fugitive caliph, and quickened the searchfor him that night. Ibn Sallam was then put in chains and forced to march withthe soldiers, but the latter quickly became annoyed that he was failing to keep upwith them so they discussed the need to kill him. Sensing this, Ibn Sallam nowimplored the commanding soldier to spare him, promising to pay him 10,000dirhams if he would only imprison him, and hence allow him the chance to senda messenger for the money. Considering this to be a reasonable offer, the com-mander consented and had him locked up in a house. Ibn Salldm continues by say-ing, (He (i.e., the commander) ordered his soldiers to guard me.. and found outfrom me the story of Muhammad's (al-Amin's) fall in the water, and headed to

Tahir to inform him of the news. His troops put me in one of the rooms of thehouse, which had two or three pillows-and in another version-some rolled-upmats. I sat down in the room. They lit a lamp, and secured the lock on the door,and sat down to talk. When a portion of the night had passed, we suddenly heardthe noise of horses (or horsemen). They knocked on the door, and when it wasopened, they entered, saying, ((Pusar-iZubayda!,. [Zubayda's son]. A man was thenbrought in to me, unclothed, wearing drawers, and he had veiled his face with aturban, while on his shoulders hung a tattered piece of cloth. They put him withme, and instructed those in the house to guard him, and brought in additionalguards. After the man had settled down in the room, he removed the turban from

his face. It was Muhammad [al-Amin]! I wept and said to myself, ((Surely we



356 TAYEB EL-HIBRI

then tells how al-Amin was brought into the same house by a group

of Persian speakers. When al-Amin recognized his subordinate,

they exchanged warm words of sympathy36.Ibn Sallam then describes al-Amin's agony and reflection during

this imprisonment. In the conversation, while in captivity, al-Amin

commended Ibn Sallam for his loyal service37 while the latter

charged al-Amin's 'vizirs' with misguiding the caliph; a charge to

which al-Amin responded in gallant rebuke: ((Speak not ill of my

vizirs, for it is not their fault.)) Then pondering his fate, al-Amin

asked Ibn Sallam, somewhat rhetorically, ((to what [end] shall it

lead; do you see them killing me or fulfilling their oaths (ayman)to

me))38 to which the loyal client responded assuringly saying,((Indeed they will be faithful to their word.>>When Ibn Sallam, then

noticing the caliph's torn clothes, took off his own cloak and asked

him if he would cover his body with it from the cold, al-Amin pro-

udly refused, saying, ((leave me to my own. This is but from God,

and I am rewarded in this position (1lJi hadd'i-mawdtihayr)39.Ibn

Sallam then says, ((Aswe were in this situation, someone IMuham-mad b. Humayd al-Tahirl] entered in full armor. He stared hard

belong to God, and to Him we shall return.,, Here it becomes up to the reader

to decide whether Ibn Sallam's surprise at al-Amin's arrest is genuine or covers

a duplicitous role. I am inclined to take the latter view. Ibn Sallam's alerting

testimony at the beginning of this account clearly supports this position. (Tabarl,

Tdrih, v. 8, p. 485-486). The translation of the passage describing al-Amin's

imprisonment is based on M. Fishbein, The History of al-Tabarz, The War BetweenBrothers,v. 31, p. 192.

36 Tabari, Tdrfh, v. 8, p. 485.3 When Ibn Sallam introduced himself to al-Amin here as <<hismawla,. and as

a former official (sahib al-mazalim), al-Amin told him, (but I know you from some-

where else. You used to visit me in Raqqa, and you were very kind to me. You

are not my mawla; but my brother and part of my family.- Tabari, 7drzh, v. 8,

p. 486. Al-Amin's innocent trust in Ibn Sallam contrasts vividly with the

aforementioned complicity of the latter in bringing about al-Amin's arrest. Al-

Amin's reference to visits at Raqqa probably describes an occasion from Harun's

time when the caliph frequently took up residence in Raqqa. There, as littleprinces, al-Amin and al-Ma'mu-n would have been pampered by various courtiers

and officials, one of whom was probably Ibn Sallam. Hence in a bizarre twist of

tragic irony al-Amin praises his subordinate as ((his brother,)) when he is at the

same time at war with his brother, al-Ma'mu-n, and places blind faith in Ibn

Sallam when the latter was responsible for his final wretched state'

38 Ibid., p. 486; elsewhere ((aman)> promise of saftety) instead of (ayman>,. Sec

Ibn Miskawayh, Tagarib al-Umam, p. 414; al-'Uyuin wa'l-HIadd'iq, p. 340; Ibn al-

Atir, al-Kdmilfi'l-TdrFh, v. 6, p. 286.

39 Ibn a]-Atir and Dahabi here add the emphasis (l-Jif hdda al-mawdi" hayrun

katir); al-KdmilfJ'l-Tdrih, v. 6, p. 286; Tdrthal-Islam, v. 12. p. 61.




at him [al-Amin] and left40. I knew that he was about to be killed,

so I wanted to perform my prayers; but al-Amin told me to do so

while remaining close.to him, for he felt great anxiety. So I did41.Then when it was around midnight, I heard the noise of horses,

there was a knock at the door [of the house] and when it was

opened, a group of easterners entered with their swords drawn.

When he [al-Amin] saw them, he said, 'We are God's and to Him

we shall return! By God my soul is now going in the path of God

(f sabdl'lldh). Is there no alternative? Is there no helper? Is there

none of the Abna'?'Then they came to the door of the house in

which we were, but they hesitated from entering, although each

started inciting the other to enter first. I retreated behind a stack

of mats in the corner while Muhammad picked up a cushion and

said, 'Woe on you! I am the cousin of the Messenger of God; I am

the son of H-ariun;I am the brother of al-Ma'mu-n. Fear [you not]

God in my blood?')) In the following minutes a scuffle took place

in which al-Amin was overpowered and decapitated42. The murder

40 Muhammad b. Humayd al-Tahiri was a client of Tahir b. al-Husayn. He

appears in Tabari in another story that complements the present one. Al-Hasan

b. Abi Sacid narrates on the authority of Hatt-ab b. Ziyad who says, ,I was in the

entourage of [Tahir] with al-Hasan b. (All al-Ma2m5ni and al-Hasan al-kabir al-

hadim for al-Rasid, when he (Muhammad b. Humayd) caught up with us and toldhim (Tahir) that he had captured Muhammad (al-Amin) and that he had sent him

[under guard] to the house of Ibrahim al-Balhi at the Gate of al-Kuffa. Hattab then

says, <Tahir hen looked at us and said, 'what do you recommend?' Al-Ma'muini

told him in Persian, 'Makun' [Don't do it], that is, don't do like al-Husayn b.Ali [b. CIsa b. Mahan],>> [here interpreting the phrase by referring to al-Husayn'searlier imprisonment of al-Amin during the civil war, and the fact that al-Aminwas later able to free himself and reorganize support which drove al-Husayn out

of Baghdad]. Hattab then says, ,so Tdhir called a servant of his called Qurays al-

Dandani and ordered him to kill Muhammad [al-Amin].>>Tabarl, Tdrih, v. 8, p.

483.

41 Tabarl provides another slightly different version of Ibn Sallam's account,

where the latter says that on that night he taught al-Amin how to ask God for

forgiveness, which al-Amin began saying. This additional detail corroborates the

view that medieval chroniclers saw in al-Amin's death a moment of both religiousand political redemption.

42 Tabarl, Tirhli, v. 8, p. 488; similar versions in al-Uyuzn wa'l-Haddiq, p. 340,

Mas'uidi-, MurziV l-Dahab, p. 294. By the time the regicide was finished, dawn wasbreaking, and now the soldier who had spared the life of Ibn Sallam in exchangefor the ransom demanded the money. In compliance Ibn Salldm reports, <so I sentto my agent who came forth, and I ordered him [to bring the money] which hedid.)) It is, of course, quite odd that the agent could not be disturbed earlier in thenight to carry out this transaction. This strengthens the evidence of cautious col-

laboration at work. In his description of the final moments of Ibn Sallam's

imprisonment, Ibn al-CImrdni provides an embellished and varying conclusion.



358 TAYEB EL-HIBRI

needed no further comment in the chronicle than the reminder that

it took place in the month of Muharram, a clear signal to the tradi-

tional injunction forbidding blood shedding during this month43.In conclusion, Tabari cites a short report that is narrated by al-

Husayn b. Abi Sacid who says that he had been entrusted with the

safe keeping of the cabinet in which were placed the heads of

Muhammad [al-Amin], ['All b.] cIsa b. Mahan, and Abui'l-Sarayd

(a rebel who was defeated and killed two years after al-Amin's

death). He says that al-Amin's head, <<except or a slight blow on

the face, was in its original condition and its color unchanged)>44.

The variety of the historical accounts cited above are more than

mere detailed reporting of events. They converge from various

directions to shape a central encoded message. They show the

There, he says that when the soldier came in the morning to collect the ransom

from Ibn Sallam, he noticed that the latter looked very different, so he asked him,

((where is my captive [who promised the ransom]?>>When Ibn Sallam told him that

it was he who made the promise, the soldier responded in amazement, ?...but mycaptive last night was a young man, and I see you are very old.? Ibn Sallam then

says, (,so I looked at my beard, and, indeed, it had turned gray, no doubt because

of the prodigious events that I witnessed that night.>, When the soldier finally

believed that he was speaking to the same person, he said reflectively, <[Old man],

get up and leave. I have set you free from all your obligations. By God I will not

be the cause of both your poverty, and your aging!>>Ibn al-'Imrani, al-InbVPfiATarth al-Hulafd), p. 94.

43 Another version places the event of murder in the month of Safar (al-

Ya-qfibi, Tdrih, p. 441). One mysterious question concerns the insignia of the

caliphate. We have seen that the insignia were defined in the negotiations as: thering, the staff, and the mantle, (al-bdtim, al-qadfb, and al-burda). However, a report

that figures prominently among some sources as mentioned above, enumerates the

insignia that Tahir sent to Khurasan with al-Amin's head as: the mantle, the staff,

and the prayer carpet (al-burda, al-qadfb, and al-musalld) (Tabari, Tdrih, 8, p. 488;

Ibn Miskawayh, Tagdrib, p. 415;). Still, what Tahir mentions in his letter of vic-

tory addressed to al-Ma)mian as being the insignia negotiated over, are: the man-

tle (he uses the word ridd) not burda),the sword, and the staff, (al-ridd), al-sayf, and

al-qadtb), all of which he attributes to the Prophet (Tabari, Tdri, 8, p. 490). The

actual insignia of authority must have constituted: the ring, the staff, and the man-

tle, for it was these that were dispatched from Khurasan, where al-Rasld had died,to al-Amin upon his accession in Baghdad in A.D. 809 (Tabari, Tdrfh, 8, p. 390).

Finally, Ibn al-Gawzi defines the caliphal insignia as al-ridd) al-qadib, and al-burda.

This report is particularly curious because it signifies that the burda(the Prophet's

mantle) is something different from al-ride' (perhaps a caliphal mantle). It is

unclear why there are such variations in identifying the insignia at the end of al-

Amin's reign. (See Ibn al-Gawzi, al-Muntazam, v. 10, p. 48. The topic of caliphal

insignia, with stress on the burda, is dealt with in a cursory fashion by D.S.

Margoliouth, ?The Relics of the Prophet Mohammed,?, The Moslem World, 27,

(1937), pp. 20-27.)

44 Tabari, Tdrih, v. 8, p. 488.




rebirth of wisdom and piety in the fallen caliph, the

historical/religious sanctity of the caliph's person (manifested both

in al-Amin's cry against his assassins, and in al-Fadl's prostrationbefore the decapitated head), and the representation of the caliph

as a supernatural figure to whose aid even the horse is trying to

come by signalling to prevent him from taking the wrong decision.

But when the flickering candle finally fades, and the caliph's life

comes to an end, al-Amin's personality is redeemed. His death is

then interpreted as martyrdom, and he is portrayed as an

individual endowed with miraculous signs when the color of his

complexion stays the same even two years after the regicide.

The undercurrent of sympathy that transpires from the above

narrative, is a synthesis of the actual statements by contemporary

reporters on the events and of Tabarl's personal historiographic

notion of what is fit to write down. M. Hodgson has demonstrated

the value of analyzing Tabarl's ordering of narrators' reports, and

of comparing the messages in each report with their place in the

narrative. He argues that through such a method, one can discernTabarl's historiographical skill, method, and subtlety in leading the

reader to detect the theme or 'truth' pursued45 But Tabarli's

message, or that of his authorities, can be discerned also beyond the

isnddsthrough the very content of some of the reports cited. In these

reports it is left for the reader to discern phrases that obliquely

answer some central issue of controversy and to detect words

which-when contextualized within a framework of religio-historical signs garnered from tradition as well as the way he

reported earlier events in Islamic history-constitute in an

abbreviated form his personal interpretation of thorny central

issues. The undercurrent of criticism of al-Ma'mun, as shown

above, is nowhere direct.

In his account of the final day of al-Amin, Tabari, as we saw,

mentions that a deal was reached between al-Amin and Tahir

through Hartama's mediation that would have allowed al-Amin a

peaceful surrender to Hartama in exchange for leaving the insignia

behind. We have seen the conflicting reports about how both Tahir

and al-Amin were each suspicious of one another as possibly reneg-

ing on the promise. Tabarl nowhere states openly who betrayed the

agreement and was responsible for the ensuing tragedy. Rather he

45 M.G.S. Hodgson, The Ventureof Islam, (Chicago, 1974), v. 1, pp. 353-56.



360 TAYEB EL-HIBRI

lays out the conflicting accusations. It is not until al-Amin's final

moments-an occasion which he depicts with a solemnity that lends

an irresistable air of sincerity and trustworthiness to what is saidthere-that Tabarl, by having al-Amin wonder if his opponents

will respect their promise to him, finally points at the possibility

that it was TThir who betrayed his share of the agreement46.

This indirect historiographical method of interpretation of

Tabari, is however, best illustrated in one anecdote that confirms

his critical view in this regard. It is a story mentioned under the

biographical information about Haruin al-Rasid and his reign.

Tabari reports that Ya'qiib b. Ishaq al-IsfahanI said that al-

Mufaddal b. Muhammad al-Dabbi, the famous grammarian, said:

<<Al-Ras'd once sent for me. It was at night when I suddenly saw his

messengers at my door. They said: 'Answer the call of the Commander of

the Faithful.' So I went to him. It was a Thursday. When I entered, I saw

him reclining with Muhammad b. Zubayda (i.e., al-Amin) seated on his left

hand side and al-Mamtin on his right47. I greeted him, and he signalled for

me to be seated. He then said:

<<OMufad.dal.,>

,< am at your service Commander of the Faithful,,, I said.

,,How many grammatical subjects (references to names) are there in the word

fasayakftkahumu alldh48[He shall thwart them for you],' he asked.

,,Three subjects,)) I said

((What are they)) he inquired.

,,The letter 'kdf' (i.e., the pronoun suffix -ka) refers to the Messenger of God,

the 'ha'` and 'mlm' (i.e., the pronoun suffix -humu) refer to the unbelievers,

and the 5yJ" refers to God the Almighty.))

((You have spoken correctly,)) he said. ((Thus this scholar (al-sayh) has

informed us.)) pointing to al-Kisa-) [also a famous grammarian of Harun's

reign and tutor to al-Amin and al-Ma)man]. Then he turned to Muhammad

and said, ((Do you understand now, Muhammad?)) to which Muhammad

said ((Yes.)) So al-Rasid said, ((then repeat to me the answer of al-Mufaddal,>)

which he did49.

46 Against the testimony of al-Amin, Tahir's accusation of al-Amin of

treachery, which is only mentioned in the dubious letter to al-Ma'muin informing

him of victory, is therefore portrayed as less convincing.47 Note the reversal in the seating arrangement from the anecdote describing

al-RagTd's foreknowledge of the civil war (f.n. 2 above).48 Quran, 2:137.49 Tabari, TdriLh, . 8, p. 361; al-Za"gji, Abui'l-Qasim cAbd al-Rahmmanb.

Ishaq, Magdlis al-'Ulama-', (series, al-Turdt al-cArabz),ed. A.M. Haruin, (Kuwait,

1962), no. 9, pp. 35-36. In translating this anecdote I have partly relied on the

two available translations of Tabari's Tdrih, J.A. Williams, al-Tabari, The EarlycAbbasfEmpire, (Cambridge, Eng., 1989), v. 2, p. 312-313; C.E. Bosworth, The

History of al-Tabari (State University of New York, Albany, 1989), v. 30, pp.

328-329.




This anecdote is more than a recounting of a grammatical exer-

cise. To fully appreciate its significance, we must recall the place

of the verse at the center of the discussion. For this verse is providedearlier in Tabarl's chronicle as the verse in the Qur'an at which the

caliph 'Utman stopped his recitation when his assasins broke into

his house. Upon his murder, it is reported that blood from his fatal

wound dropped on this very verse thereby prophesying that God

would punish those who murdered him50. The connection between

the cases of 'Utman and al-Amin is therefore apparent. Al-Rasid

specifically addresses his query to al-Amin and asks him whether he

has become convinced of it (i.e., that such a fate would befall him

and/or that God will suffice him), as if al-Amin had refused to

accept al-Mufaddal's grammatical interpretation when given by al-

Kisa'i earlier51. The reader, already prepared by the chronicler

who described al-Amin and al-Ma'muin's thorough knowledge of

50 Tabari, Tdriih, v. 4, p. 384; Halifa b. Hayyat, Tdrfh, ed. A.D. al-'Umari

(Beirut, 1977), p. 175; Ibn al-Atir, al-Kdmilfr'l-Tdrih, v. 3, p. 179; al-Dahabi,

Tdrfh al-Isldm, v. 3, p. 457. And just as the assassins of 'Utman were eventually

tracked down and executed, the assassin of al-Amin, Tahir, is shown to have met

an end representing punishment for his responsibility for al-Amin's murder. This

is clearly implied in the report that says al-Ma'mu-n once wept during a meetingwith Tahir. A lengthy account afterwards tells how TThir, after leaving, sent his

trusted client at court to find out discreetly the reason why the caliph wept. The

caliph, not knowing of the servant's motive from the query, told him that he wept

because he remembered his brother's death and imagined how humiliating it musthave been for al-Amin. He concluded by saying, -Ta-hir will not escape that from

me which he will find unpleasant.,, (C.E. Bosworth, TheHistory of al-Tabarl, v. 32,p. 103). This statement is usually connected, according to the chronicles, with an

alleged secret assassination of Tahir after his secessionist attempt in Khurasan in

A.H. 207. Tabari, Ta-r-h,v. 8, 595; Ibn Tayftir, Abu'l-Fadl Ahmad b. Muham-

mad, Kita-bBagddd (Baghdad, 1968). Suyuiti later reflected on Tahir' s death, and

interpreted it as the fulfillment of al-Amin's warning to Tahir, during the siegeof Baghdad, of a likely future reversal of al-Ma'mufn's favorable attitude towardshim. Al-Amin's statement was: <O Tahir. There has never been since the rise [of

our dynasty] anyone who led our cause, and found his reward from us anythingbut the sword (here referring to the sack of Abu Muslim al-Hurasani by the caliph

al-Mansuir in A.D. 755). So ponder your circumstance.>) Suyuit1, Tdrihal-Hulafd',

p. 300.

51 The presence of al-Kisa)i in this prophetic story is itself significant, (see f.n.

2) for he is also present in another hagiographic anecdote connected with the civilwar, when Zubayda informs him of her horrible dream about al-Amin, and urgeshim to devote extra attention to raising her son. Al-Kisa)i himself reportedly con-firmed that he did when he once stated, <Al-RasIdhad appointed me to tutor

Muhammad (al-Amin) and 'Abdallah (al-Ma'mufn) and I used to be very stern

in raising them particularly Muhammad.,, al-Dinawari, al-Ahba-r l- Tiwal, p. 383.



362 TAYEB EL-HIBRI

the Qur'an52, would have been reassured that in the end al-Amn

grasped the message.

How or when this report was fabricated cannot be exactly deter-mined, but the fact that it was formulated against the background

of the civil war is shown by the degrading reference to al-Amin

('ibn Zubayda'). In addition, its spuriousness is evident from the

fact that al-Mufaddal al-Dabbi died ca. A. H. 17053, the year of the

birth of al-Ami-n and al-Ma'muin, and therefore years before either

of them could have comprehended the subtlety of the debate!

The account signals the role of fate in bringing aboutfuturejustice. But what, against the idealized event of murder, might an

ideal reaction be? If we continue the analogy with the time of the

earlyft-tnas a little further, the battle of the Camel that followed the

murder of cUtman in connection with the caliph's death quickly

comes to mind. But Mascuid1here swiftly dispels any expectation

that al-Amin's mother Zubayda might or should assume a political

role similar to that of cA)isa in leading armies anew. When a ser-

vant of Zubayda suggests to her that she should set out to avengethe blood of the ((Commander of the Faithful>)54,in a manner

similarto cA)isa'sattemptedvengeancefor cUtman's murder,Zubaydas madeto reprimand er servantangrilyandtellhim, ((it

is not for women to seek revenge and to challengethe cham-pions)>55.he then ordered hat her garmentsbe blackened,andbegan eulogizingher sonin a poemaddressed o al-Ma)mdn.The

poem, in light of the supposedcontext for its composition,isuncharacteristically ild in conveyinga sense of anguish56.Al-Ma'muin,on the otherhand,when told of the lines of the poem,is said to have broken into tears, expressedgreat agony, and

52 See f.n. 2 above, and the test by Kisa'i.5 al-Gazari, Sams al-Din Muhammad b. Muhammad, Gdyatal-Niha-yafr Taba--

qat al-Qurra', Biblioteca Islamica, no. 8, ed. G. Bergstrasser and 0. Pretzl, (Leipzig,

1935), v. 2, p. 307; I. Lichtenstadter, <al-Mufaddal b. Muhammad al-Dabbi,,,Encyclopaediaof Islam, 2nd ed., (Leiden: Brill, 1991), v. 7, p. 305; C.E. Bosworth,

trans., The History of al-Tabarl, The Abbasid Caliphate in Equilibrium, (State Univer-

sity of New York, Albany: 1989), v. 30, p. 328.

54 It is notable that the instigator here, in order to draw a complete historical

parallel with the case of WA'isha,s made to try to convince Zubayda on the basis

of the fact of al-Amin's caliphate, and not on the basis of kinship.

55 Mascu-di, Mur4gVl-Dahab, v. 4, p. 298.

56 Some accounts state that the poem was composed on Zubayda's behalf,

which increases the likelihood that it was composed in isolation from her, if not

after her death.




resolved on becoming the one to avenge his brother's death. The

line of responsibility, therefore, for al-Amin's regicide, as well as

the mission to execute justice in that incident here comes full circle.It is intertwined in a complex web of medieval historiographical

attitudes towards al-Ma'mu-n's caliphate, and legitimacy for rise to

power in the civil war.

Conclusion

On the eve of hisdeath,

Haru-n al-Rasid left ahighly developedimage of political power, partly the cumulative legacy of his

predecessors. The success of the Abbasid caliphate up to that point

is not to be measured in terms of complete territorial sovereignty

or centralization, both of which lay beyond the capability of their

bureaucracy, as they did their predecessor empires in the Near

East, but rather in terms of the success of the caliphs in developing

an image of legitimacy for their dynastic rule, and the invention of

a mystical dimension for their authority. The foundation for thisachievement once lay in their inheritance of the right of leadership

to the revolution which overthrew the Umayyads, but in the long

term it was a synthesis of the Persian monarchal ideal and the

ambiguous meaning and nature of the historical caliphal succession

to the Prophet's position of leading the community. Caliphal

authority was not a structured claim to both religious (legislative)

and political authority in a caesaro-papistic sense, as is so oftenpresumed, but an informal assemblage of ambiguous shades of

power that meant different things to different people. In time,

Abbasid monarchal continuity led to their successful projection of

a public image of their household's supremacy, and sanctity.

The fall and murder of al-Amin, as this essay has shown, was an

event that rocked the concept of Abbasid authority, if not the

caliphal one, to its foundation. The pro-Ma'miunid civil war nar-

rative tried hard to portray the regicide merely as an accident or a

passing event, and at times tried to justify it by painting a grim

image of al-Amin's personality. The multiplicity of historiographic

undercurrents that are critical of al-Ma'muin's rise to power, how-

ever, point to the failure to suppress an inevitable public reaction.

The medieval Islamic historiography of al-Amin's downfall pro-

vides a classic illustration of the universal theme of regicide

historiography showing the king in his final hour admitting his



364 TAYEB EL-HIBRI

flaw, often only to himself, then suddenly seized by an unknown

hand and killed in a corner, while in later life the murderers are

unthanked, ignored, and even punished57. All the elements of afinely crafted tragedy are fully developed in the chronicles, most

prominently in Tabarl's, but the episode is also more than that. It

highlights the tarnishing of caliphal office, and the diminished

loyalty to its powers in public; in essence the inevitable combined

damage to both king and crown. In the years that followed, al-

Ma'mu-n endeavored to emphasize the continuity of the dynasty's

power, and the survival of its image and mystique. A genuineattempt to underscore the political autonomy of the caliphal office

and its power prerogatives can be read in his promotion of the

epithet <al-nmahlul>>the deposed one) that redefined the nature of al-

Amin's exit from power, and made it rationally justified and less

personal. The renewed phase of civil war, however, and his failure

to revitalize the old level of Abbasid prestige showed the need for

a more direct expression of authoritarianism. It was then, a few

years later, that al-Ma'muin finally sought, and rather desperately,

to assert a heightened and explicit claim on total religio-political

authority by publicly and officially adopting the title <<God's

Caliph.>>The new title, which, for many was to announce the start-

ing point of a long and turbulent religious policy that would be

imposed by the caliph in the later years of his reign, was in origin

a political answer born in the context of civil war and the loss of the

old tradition of Abbasid caliphal power.

57 Michael Walzer, ed. Regicideand Revolution, Speechesat the Trial of Louis XVI,

(Cambridge University Press, 1974), p. 3.