GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY

TAKE-HOME FINAL EXAM:

THE RELEVANCY OF SIMON HIX FOLLOWING THE LISBON TREATY

GEST 590: THE EUROPEAN UNION

DR. JEFFREY ANDERSON

BY

SEAN P. MCBRIDE

WASHINGTON, DC

17 DECEMBER 2009

AD MAIOREM DEI GLORIAM

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Introduction

Simon Hix’s What’s Wrong with the European Union and How to Fix It challenged the

European Union (EU) to address its debilitating problems through the implementation of what he

called “limited democratic politics.” He argued that the EU could address its most serious

problems without actually passing any new treaties. Nonetheless, the EU recently passed the

Lisbon Treaty, which implements many of the changes that were central to the rejected European

Constitution. While Hix’s arguments focused on elite behavior rather than institutional reform,

the implementation of the Lisbon treaty requires us to consider in what ways and to what degrees

the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty affect Hix’s characterization of the EU’s problems and his

proposed solutions. This paper argues that the Lisbon Treaty ultimately has had little effect on

Hix’s argument because “treaty reforms alone would not necessarily change the way political

elites behave” (Hix, 138).

This paper will largely mirror the structure of Hix’s book. First, it will examine the three

problems of policy gridlock, a lack of popular legitimacy, and the democratic deficit. Second, it

will look at Hix’s proposed solutions relating to the European Parliament, the EU Council, and

the European Commission. Each of these sections will first seek to clearly establish Hix’s

argument, followed by a summary of the relevant changes brought about by the Lisbon Treaty,

and concluded with an assessment of whether the Lisbon Treaty provisions have impacted Hix’s

argument, and if so, whether the impact will facilitate of complicate Hix’s desire to introduce

“limited democratic politics.”

The Impact of Lisbon on Hix’s Characterization of EU Policy Gridlock

Simon Hix diagnoses the European Union with a severe case of policy gridlock. In his

opinion, the cause of this gridlock is not institutional, but instead relates to shifts in the European

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Union’s policy agenda from the creation of the internal market to economic reform. While the

initial implementation of the internal market effectively offered net benefits of varying degrees

to all European states over the alternative of having no internal market, more recent attempts to

reform the generally centrist status quo in either a liberalizing or regulatory direction have had

net winners and losers. The result is that different European states now desire reform in

conflicting and opposite directions. The more classically-liberal Britain desires a different sort

of union than the more dirigiste France. Hix thus identifies the underlying cause of the EU’s

policy gridlock as “the problem of how to reform existing policies when one group of

governments and parties wan policy change in one direction while another group wants policy

change in the opposite direction (Hix, 48).

The Lisbon Treaty aims to make the EU more efficient through a series of institutional

reforms. Regarding the Council of Ministers, the treaty makes Qualified Majority Voting

(QMV) the normal voting procedure, excepting the areas of tax, foreign policy, defense, and

social security, which will continue to require unanimous voting. Regarding the European

Council, the treaty legally establishes this entity as an official EU body headed by a President

elected by a QMV of the heads of state. Regarding the Parliament, the Treaty’s reforms do not

substantially seek to promote efficiency, except possibly by capping the number of Members of

the European Parliament (MEPs) at 750 plus the President. Regarding the Commission, the

Treaty potentially could eliminate the arrangement of one commissioner per member state

beginning in 2014, although the European Council effectively reversed this decision following

the Irish Referendum.

Due to the long evolution of the proposed European Constitution into the Lisbon Treaty,

Hix was well aware of the proposals being considered to make the EU more efficient when he

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formulated his argument. After directly mentioning the then proposal to create a single president

of the European Council, Hix countered that this and the other proposals are “rather insignificant

relative to the major institutional reforms… [of] the Single European Act and the Maastrict,

Amsterdam and Nice treaties” (Hix, 48). The purpose of this characterization was to emphasize

his original point that institutional design had little to do with the current EU gridlock. Past

treaties failed to end the gridlock by major institutional reform, inferring that the Lisbon Treaty

would fail to do this as well. The Lisbon Treaty certainly creates a more majoritarian system,

but it fails to tackle the underlying conflict between governments that want EU policy change in

fundamentally opposing ways.

The Impact of Lisbon on Hix’s Characterization of the EU’s Lack of Popular Legitimacy

and Democratic Deficit

Hix argues that low public support for the EU, as registered the Eurobarometer polls,

represents a serious threat to European leaders. Pointing to previous efforts to increase

transparency in the EU, Hix counters the assertion that lack of popular support is due to lack of

knowledge about the EU. Instead, he argues that the period of affective support for the EU has

ended, and in its place, European citizen now base their level of support for the EU on a rational

cost-benefit analysis of personal gain. Further transparency does not necessarily make

Europeans more supportive of the EU, it just makes them more aware of the costs and benefits

that the union imposes on their lives.

Hix argues that when Europeans consider themselves net losers or net payers under the

EU framework or from EU policy, they blame the union as a whole. In contrast, when

Europeans perceive themselves as net losers or net at the state level, they blame the governing

coalition rather than the state as a whole. Hix explains this key difference as the result of the

inability of groups of Europeans to affect the policy at the European level by voting out

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governing coalitions. Because of this lack of meaningful competition for political control at the

European level, Hix likens the EU to “enlightened despotism” (Hix, 68). Hix argues that this

democratic deficit is the result of substantive issues, not institutional issues. He believes that the

EU is institutionally and procedurally capable of being democratic, as citizens can freely run for

the European Parliament and elections are free and fair. Nevertheless, he argues that MEP

elections have very little impact on policy outcomes at the European level. His explanation for

this phenomenon relates to the way that fact that power in the European Parliament is allotted on

a proportional basis, which ensures that electoral swings have negligible impact on European

policy. Using the example of the June 1999 elections, Hix points out that a large electoral swing

in favor of the European People’s Party (EPP) only gained the party one committee chair and no

meaningful increase in its ability to set or control the policy agenda of the European Parliament

(Hix, 139). Unable to use their vote to change policies that many European voters perceive as in

contrast to their interests, Europeans instead turn their frustrations against the larger framework

of the European Union.

The Lisbon Treaty includes numerous institutional reforms that attempt to increase the

popular legitimacy and lessen the democratic deficit of the EU. Regarding the Council of

Ministers, Lisbon makes all deliberations on legislative matters public. This greater transparency

seeks to combat the democratic deficit by allowing citizens to track how national ministers vote

on certain issues. This allows voters to hold national governing coalitions accountable for their

actions on the European level. Regarding national parliaments, Lisbon clarifies the EU’s

relationship with the member states as one of subsidiarity. It explicitly classifies areas where the

EU is sovereign (e.g. the internal market), where the states are sovereign (e.g. education), and

where the EU may act only according to the subsidiary principal of whether policy is more

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effective at the European level than the state level (e.g. the environment or transportation). The

treaty further lays out the mechanism through which member states can challenge EU violations

of the subsidiary principal. These efforts to clarify sovereignty at the European and state levels

seek to boost the EU’s popular legitimacy by placating fears that the EU represents an erosion of

the sovereignty of the nation states. Regarding the European Parliament, Lisbon increases the

body’s power through greater use of the co-decision procedure. In the interest of strengthening

the democratically-elected body of the EU, this expansion effectively makes the European

Parliament the equal of the Council of Ministers in most legislative areas. Regarding the

Commission, Lisbon establishes that the Commission and the choice of the Commission

President should reflect the results of MEP elections. Further changes include the Commission

President’s ability to dismiss other Commissioners and the creation of citizens’ initiatives,

through which petitions with one million signatures impact the agenda of the Commission. This

change seeks to make the Commission, often considered the most technocratic and undemocratic

element of the EU, more accountable to the political pressure of the European public. The

selection of the Commission should theoretically now correlate to the popular will expressed at

MEP elections, after which the President of the Commission can fire commissioners that become

politically unpalatable. This more politically sensitive Commission should also address the

popular concerns expressed by citizens’ initiatives. Each of these reforms significantly change

the relationship between European citizens and the EU, largely attempting to counter the recent

decline in political support of the EU due to charges of a democratic deficit.

This Lisbon reforms alter many of Hix’s characterizations of the EU’s public legitimacy

and democratic deficit. Hix argued that the Council needed greater transparency and public

debate in order to allow citizens to know what governments are doing to in their name. Lisbon

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accomplishes exactly that by making all legislative matters public. Lisbon’s clarification of the

subsidiary relationship between the EU and the member states further seems to strengthen

indirect accountability via national governments, which Hix had previously had classified as

“weaker than it used to be” (Hix, 73). The principle of subsidiarity also provides national

legislatures greater power in the EU, which could potentially alter Hix’s argument that national

general elections are solely about national issues. As the national governments gain more power

in the EU, it is conceivable that national politicians could campaign on issues related to

subsidiarity. Lisbon’s creation of citizen’s initiatives counters Hix’s assertion that referendums

are realistically the only opportunity that citizens have to make a choice about the EU agenda

(Hix, 79). Such initiatives potentially offer European citizens a very direct means to impact

policy at the European level outside of Hix’s “limited democratic politics.”

Despite these numerous changes to Hix’s assessment of democratic deficit, the Lisbon

treaty does not directly address his primary argument that the EU lacks the substantive norms to

make the MEP elections a meaningful political battle over the direction of EU policy. Although

the Lisbon Treaty strengthens the European Parliament, the methods of allocating power remain

proportional under the d’Hondt method, ensuring that electoral swings will continue to have

negligible impact on European-level policy. Furthermore, this emphasis on proportionality

makes Lisbon’s attempt to relate the composition and leadership of the Commission to the results

of the MEP elections relatively meaningless. Although this reform admirably attempts to make

the Commission more democratically accountable, it will ultimately be based on proportionality,

thereby ensuring that the Commission will continue to represent a centrist blend of all political

factions, rather than the largest and most successful political parties. In both the European

Parliament and the Commission, proportionality will prevent any single political faction from

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achieving the political mandate needed to carry out a policy agenda, ensuring that the outcome of

MEP elections will continue to have minimal effect on policy decisions.

The Impact of Lisbon on Hix’s Proposals for the European Parliament

Hix proposes two changes to make the European Parliament more responsive to

elections. The first proposal was that the president of the European Parliament be elected for

five years rather than two and a half. Hix argues that having two presidential terms during a

single parliamentary term ensures that the two largest parties will rotate the post, thereby

resulting in “horse-trading” rather than attempts to build majority coalitions (Hix, 141). The

second proposal was that the d’Hondt model of allocating committee chairs (as well as other

elements such as legislative rapporteurs, speaking time, etc.) proportionally be replaced with

either a winners’ bonus model or a modified d’Hondt model that would privilege the largest

political parties. This change would increase the importance of elections by providing the largest

party influence over EU policy greater than would be allowed under a purely proportional basis.

Hix argues that such a change would make the MEP elections a more important competition for

determining EU policy, which would in turn provide incentives for political parties to expand

their membership by actively courting voters, as well as incentives for the infotainment media to

begin covering the EU political drama.

The Lisbon Treaty’s reforms of the European Parliament have no impact on Hix’s

proposals. Lisbon’s reforms were essentially institutional and aimed and strengthening the

Parliament relative to the Council of Ministers, while Hix’s proposals were primarily substantive

and aimed at raising the political stakes of MEP elections. Lisbon’s institutional strengthening

of the Parliament vis-à-vis the other bodies of the EU through the expansion of co-decision will

simply not make the policy decisions coming out of Parliament any more responsive to the

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results of elections. Hix’s proposals thus still remain compelling for a post-Lisbon European

Union.

The Impact of Lisbon on Hix’s Proposals for the Council of Ministers

After asserting that even the Chinese National people’s Congress is more transparent than

the Council of Ministers, Hix proposes several changes to this EU body relating to transparency

and the substantive building of coalitions in support of policy objectives. Regarding

transparency, Hix argues that all legislative deliberations and documents of the Council of

Ministers should be open and available to the public. An important corollary is that all

legislative decisions should be voted on and recorded in the minutes in order to accurately record

dissention and prevent false consensus formed “in the shadow of a vote” (Hix, 119). The intent

behind these proposals is to allow the media and the public to pressure government to more

openly compete in building alliances and passing legislative measures. Hix also proposes that

Council amendment rights should be limited to coalitions of governments. Hix similarly views

this measure as a means to prevent spoiling amendments and better facilitate coalition-building.

Hix viewed these proposals as a means to transform the Council into “a proper and transparent

legislature” (Hix, 149).

In contrast to the European Parliament, the Lisbon Treaty has accomplished several of

Hix’s proposals. The treaty states that “the Council shall ensure publication of the documents

relating to the legislative procedures” and that the Council “shall meet in public… when

considering and voting on a draft legislative act” (Official Journal of the European Council,

C306/50-1). This legislation thus accomplished Hix’s proposals on fostering transparency.

Hix’s proposal to limit amendments in the Council of Ministers to coalitions is not addressed in

Lisbon, but it is likely that the Lisbon transparency amendments will foster this further change.

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Assuming that Hix is correct in his assertion that transparency in the Council of Ministers will

foster open competition in building alliances and passing legislative measures, spoiling

amendments could possibly become a problem among Councilors. If that becomes the case, it is

quite conceiveable that the Council would react to this development by enacting something

similar to Hix’s coalition amendment. Lisbon has therefore accomplished Hix’s most important

recommendations regarding the Council.

The Impact of Lisbon on Hix’s Proposals for the European Commission

Samuel Hix argues in favor of politicizing the European Commission. To this end, he

argues that political parties should use MEP elections as a means for voters to choose between

rival policy agendas. He proposes that parties or coalitions of parties should back candidates for

Commission President, whom then form and publicly debate competing policy agendas. This

would shape the MEP election into a decision on what direction the EU should take. Hix argues

that the winning manifesto should become the Commission’s work program, guiding the

allocation of portfolios. Hix believes that these steps would transform the Commission into an

political body, which he argues would be better placed to make what he calls “explicitly political

choices about… social and economic policies” (Hix, 163).

The Lisbon Treaty fosters Hix’s proposal to transform the parliamentary elections into a

decision between political agendas. The Treaty state that “representatives of the European

Parliament and of the European Council will… conduct… consultations… on the backgrounds of

the candidates for President of the Commission, taking account of the elections to the European

Parliament” (Official Journal of the European Council, C306/254). While this does not ensure

that Hix’s proposals will be carried out, the greater emphasis on the Parliament and the

parliamentary elections suggests a more explicit role for politics in the selection of the

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Commission President. The primacy of the European Council of heads of state naturally

complicates Hix’s proposal, but the post-Lisbon framework seems to facilitate Hix’s proposal,

should coalitions of national parties (backed by heads of state) agree to campaign in this manner.

Conclusion

Although the Lisbon Treaty accomplished or fostered many of Hix’s proposals, it

ultimately does not affect his substantive argument that elite behavior must change to make the

EU a more politically competitive body. Many of Lisbon’s institutional reforms suggest that the

EU is becoming more of the type of political body that Hix supports. Greater linkage between

the Commission President and the parliamentary elections suggests that political parties could

potentially transform the elections into a democratic decision on the direction of the EU. The

Council of Ministers is now more transparent and more like a normal democratic deliberative

body complete with political pressure. Nevertheless, Hix’s greatest complain about

proportionality remains the norm post-Lisbon. Absent a winner-takes-more system, the

European elections continue to have minimal impact on the formation of policy objectives. This

failure ultimately prevents the completion of Hix’s other objectives. Neither the Council nor the

Commission can become truly politicized bodies if the European parliamentary elections

continue to be ineffective in shaping the policy objectives of the EU. For these reasons, Hix’s

main substantive arguments about elite behavior remain extremely relevant to the EU post-

Lisbon.

Appendix: The Impact of Lisbon on the Module Simulation

The Lisbon Treaty would have substantially changed the module simulation. The Lisbon

Treaty explicitly alters the mechanism for suspending accession negotiations. Under the new

system, the Czech Republic could not simply table a motion calling for a moratorium on

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accession negotiations. Instead, either the Commission or the newly-created High

Representative for Foreign Affairs would have to table the motion in the Council to suspend

previous agreements (C 306/98). This new requirement would substantially change the nature of

the Council meeting, as the High Representative would effectively become the new policy

entrepreneur. This new dynamic would eliminate the potential for each country to produce

conflicting proposals in response to issues such as cutting off accession agreements following the

coup in Turkey. Under this new system, the interests, objectives, and strategies of the Republic

of Hungary would be to support the High Representative. This would reflect the pro-federalist

tendencies of Hungary.