Journal of Common Market Studies Volume XIX, No. 3 March 1981

The rise and fall of Caribbean regionalisa tion

A N T H O N Y PAYNE'

Lecturer in Politics, Hudd ersfeld Polytechnic

EXPERIENCE of regional integration amongst the new states of the Third World has consistently given advocates of such schemes cause to rue the fallacies of hope. In the last two decades many free trade areas, common markets and economic communities have been created between different groups of Third World states. Borne along by the momentum of their establishment, they have generally prospered for a period of time, arousing perhaps excessive expectations. But almost inevitably - or so it has seemed - they have lapsed before very long into open strife or at best inactivity. The current pursuit of regional integration in the Commonwealth Caribbean has been no exception to this general rule.

The movement was begun in 1968 when the Caribbean Free Trade Association (CARIFTA) was established amongst the various territories of the Commonwealth Caribbean and reached its apogee in 1973 with the formation of the Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM). Within two years of this apparent triumph the Community had suffered setbacks which led many to predict its imminent demise. It still survives and in the past year or so has been led with rather more vigour, but there is no doubt that the extent of its overall achievements and its current standing within the Commonwealth Caribbean have disappointed the high hopes expressed by many when the treaty setting up the Community was first signed in 1973.

This article attempts to shed some light on the reasons for the limited success span of Third World integration movements by examining the rise and fall of CARICOM. Part I describes the emergence of the Caribbean Community and introduces the notion of regionalisation as an organising concept for understanding the dynamics of Third World integration; Part I1 considers the impact on the Community of the international economic crisis which began in 1973-4 and shows how CARICOM was thrown out of gear by

*The author would like to thank the Nuffield Foundation for providing support for a visit to the Caribbean in March-April 1980.

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the effects of the crisis; Part I11 re-examines the conditions which led to the emergence of regionalisation in the Caribbean and demonstrates the limitations of this type of regional integration.

I. THE EMERGENCE OF REGIONALISATION

Regional economic integration first came to the forefront of political thinking in the Commonwealth Caribbean in the late 1960s.’ With its implicit message of collective self-reliance, the appeal of the policy derived initially from the feeling of isolation which had come to dominate the outlook of practically all the governments of the region. Jamaica and Trinidad had become independent in 1962, Guyana and Barbados in 1966, whilst the small Leeward and Windward Islands were granted Associated Status, an arrangement which conceded full internal self-government but kept responsibility for defence and foreign affairs in the hands of the British government, in 1967. Thus by the end of the 1960s the region was for the first time beginning to feel the cold draught of self-government. The various governments felt themselves to be under pressure on several fronts. They were concerned about the region’s lack of economic development. They were particularly anxious about the future market prospects of their vital exports of primary products in the light of Britain’s application to join the European Economic Community and her possible abandonment of the Commonwealth preference policy. They were also alarmed by the way that opportunities for migration out of the region to Britain, America and Canada were being reduced, since throughout the 1950s migration had contributed considerably to mitigating the effects of the region’s over- population. In these circumstances, unity in adversity seemed to most West Indian governments to be a slogan worth hanging on to.

It was thus primarily as a defensive mechanism that regional integration was adopted in the Commonwealth Carribean. “Either we integrate or we perish, unwept, unhonoured,” * said Guyana’s Prime Minister, Forbes Burnham, to a conference of officials which met in Georgetown in 1967 to draw up a plan for regional economic integration. From this conference there emerged agreement on the establishment of the Caribbean Free Trade Association (CARIFTA), which eventually came into being on 1 August 1968. Although very little progress was made in the next few years towards the declared aim of deepening the movement in the direction of full market integration, it was at least still in existence when, after 1970, the enhanced

’ A full account of the origins and emergence of regional integration in the Commonwealth Caribbean can be found in Anthony Payne, The Politics o f t h e Can’bbean Community 1961-79: Regional Integration amongst New States, Manchester, 1980, pp26.164, from which the discussion in this section has been drawn.

F Burnham. “We Must Integrate or Perish”, in Burnham, A Destiny to Mould: Selected Discourses by the R i m e Minister of Guyana, London, 1970, pp56-7.

RISE A N D FALL OF CARIBBEAN REGIONALISATION 257 prospect of Britain joining the EEC again brought home to Caribbean governments the extent of their vulnerability to any disruption of the preferential trading links historically established with Britain. The officials in the CARIFTA Secretariat took advantage of the threat this posed. They pressed upon the region’s governments the need to advance the integration movement to a new and deeper level if the economic well-being of the Commonwealth Caribbean was not to be seriously affected.’ Thus began the process of negotiating the various steps necessary to convert CARIFTA into a Caribbean Common Market. The process of negotiation was long and difficult, but it was eventually brought to a successful conclusion in July 1973 when the Treaty of Chaguaramas was signed, establishing the new Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM).

The establishment of CARICOM constituted a considerable advance in the development of Caribbean integration. Its goals embraced three broad areas of co-operation4 which, taken together, extended far beyond the limited commitment to free trade represented by CARIFTA. The first was the furtherance of regional integration by the establishment of a common market: the second was the expansion of functional co-operation in such fields as health, education, transport and meteorology; and the third was the co-ordination of foreign policy amongst the fully independent states of the Community. CARICOM was thus an ambitious venture and even though from the outset it was obvious that the gap between intention and deed would not be easy to overcome, the establishment of the Community must be considered a genuine moment of success in the story of regional integration within the Third World.

The main reason why Caribbean integration prospered in this period was that it eschewed any commitment to the political integration of the region and thus contained no threat to the notional sovereignty of the independent nation-state. The Community Treaty was quite deliberately designed to avoid any mention, any hint even, of supranationality. The Community is controlled by a series of conferences and councils, made up of territorial politicians, and is only serviced by its Secretariat. With the exception of a few relatively unimportant items, decisions have to be agreed to unanimously by representatives of all the member states of the Community and then have to be legitimated by each state in accordance with its own constitutional procedures. In short, the Caribbean Community has been

See Commonwealth Caribbean Regional Secretariat, From CARIFTA to Can’bbean

Treaty establishing the Caribbean Community, Chaguaramas, 4 July 1973, Article 4 . For a discussion of this point, see W G Demas, West Indian Nationhood and Can’bbean

Inte ration, Bridgetown, 1974, pp44-5. For a description of the organisational structure of the Community, see K Hall and B

Blake, “The Caribbean Community: Administrative and Institutional Aspects”, Journal of Common Market Studies, vo1.16, no.3, 1978.

Community, Georgetown, 1972. ‘

258 ANTHONY PAYNE

designed and is run by men who remain, as Stanley Hoffmann put it, in “the mental universe of traditional inter-state relations” ’ where the concept of national interest still reigns supreme.

Indeed, strictly, CARICOM is not an integration movement at all, if the term integration is considered to have anything to do with a process in which countries have to be prepared to accept that the greater regional good must predominate over national concerns even to the point when, on occasion, their national interests are damaged. For good or ill, this has never been the case with CARICOM. It is simply not concerned with integration in that sense; it is a structure created by national governments to make nationalist policies more effective by pursuing them within a regional framework.

From a theoretical point of view what best describes the way in which the values and beliefs of Commonwealth Caribbean governments have been translated into practice in respect of the Caribbean Community is the concept of regionalisation. We have previously defined that as “a method of international co-operation which enables the advantages of decision-making at a regional level to be reconciled with the preservation of the institution of the nation-state.”* What has been created in the Caribbean is a regionalised economy and polity, exemplified by the existence of a coherent and systemised web of relationships between the various national units. The term regionalisation is designed therefore to catch the essence of an international political structure which cannot be said to have secured the economic and political integration of the region but in which the constituent states clearly no longer make policy solely as national units. What we have on our hands in the Caribbean is neither nationalism nor regionalism but a hybrid creature consisting of elements of both.

Regionalisation is not, however, a process by which a neat half-way position is reached between nationalism and regionalism: it is much more an artefact of the nation-state than the genuinely regionalist community. Of the two perspectives, the nationalist one is undoubtedly uppermost, the regional connection being conceived primarily as a support that is brought into play when nationalist policies come under threat. This is the vital point, for it draws attention to both the strength and the weakness of CARICOM as a type of regional integration. Its strength is that regional integration in the Caribbean has not been aimed at the replacement of economic and political action at the national level - which would be extremely difficult given the current determination of the region’s territorial politicians to be seen at least to possess the right to make policy - but rather at its reinforcement, which is something the politicians understand and naturally are prepared to support. Its weakness, however, is that the step back from

’ S. Hoffman, “Discord in Community: The North Atlantic Area as a Partial International System”, International Organisation, vo1.17, no.3, 1963, p527.

Payne, Politics of the Caribbean Community, p286.

RISE AND FALL OF CARIBBEAN REGIONALISATION 259

the politics of regionalisation to traditional inter-state nationalist politics is only a small one, relatively easy to take.

11, THE IMPACT OF THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC CRISIS

Almost as soon as the Treaty of Chaguaramas was signed, CARICOM ran into problems. The Community formally came into effect on 1 August 1973 as between the four so-called More Developed Countries (MDCs), Jamaica, Trinidad, Guyana and Barbados, and was expanded to include all the remaining so-called Less Developed Countries (LDCs) of the region within a year. However, it was precisely at this time, late 1973 and early 1974, that the world economy began to enter the period of severe crisis from which it has not yet recovered. It was in every sense a most unpropitious time in which to launch a wide-ranging programme of regional economic integration, for the effects of the crisis have undoubtedly taken their toll of the Community’s prospects. As the present Secretary-General of the Community, Dr Kurleigh King, explained to the Board of Governors of the Caribbean Development Bank in April 1979, “the ink was hardly dry on the signatures of the Treaty when the full force of the international economic crisis struck the bottom out of everything we had hoped to accompli~h.”~

Certainly the general crisis in the world economy dealt crippling blows to the individual economies of each and every CARICOM member state. l o It was especially virulent in its impact because it was really three crises in one: an acceleration of the inflation of the early 1970s was combined with a sudden fourfold increase in the price of oil at the end of 1973 and an emerging food crisis manifested in a sharply growing regional food import bill. As a petroleum exporting country - the only one in the region - Trinidad was partially insulated from these crises and indeed benefited to the extent that substantial sums of money accrued to its exchequer as a result of the new high price of oil. However, the other MDCs all suffered serious budgetary and balance of payments deficits and experienced significant increases in the cost of living, to which they responded with a variety of stem measures, including higher levels of taxation, the intensification of import restrictions and exchange controls and the imposition of subsidies on vital consumer goods. Barbados was helped by the high price of sugar on the world market in 1974 and Jamaica and Guyana were able to increase the revenue yield from their bauxite and alumina industries by imposing extra levies and taking into public ownership recalcitrant foreign companies. But these proved to be only partial

K King, “Statement by the Secretary-General of the Caribbean Community Secretariat to the 9th Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors of the Caribbean Development Bank, Barbados, 25-6 April 1979”, mimeo. p7.

The material summarised in the following two paragraphs has been drawn from the Caribbean Development Bank, Annual Reports 1974-8, Bridgetown.

260 ANTHONY PAYNE

palliatives: Jamaica and Guyana have experienced recurrent, frequently acute, balance of payments and budgetary problems since the crisis struck. In 1977 both countries resorted again to the imposition of import restrictions on a large scale. In 1978 both had to draw on the facilities of the International Monetary Fund. Jamaica in particular has continued to operate on the verge of bankruptcy and was forced to undertake a series of devaluations, expenditure cuts, and generally restrictive monetary policies at the behest of the IMF until its government rebelled early in 1980 and began to seek alternative means to economic recovery.

For their part, the Less Developed Countries of the Caribbean Community were even harder hit. They too suffered from the effects of the rapidly increasing cost of imports, but compared to the MDCs their economies are less flexible and less capable of adjusting to external economic circumstances. The price of sugar slumped dramatically following the peak of 1974 and generally in recent years the markets for the other agricultural crops grown in the LDCs, like bananas, citrus and spices, have not been favourable to producers. As a result, all of the LDCs have experienced sizeable budgetary deficits on current account which has meant that it has been extremely difficult for them even to maintain minimum standards of public services. Indeed, the situation became so bad in 1976 that the Caribbean Development Bank was forced to establish an emergency Eastern Caribbean (EC) $10 million fund to make grants and intermediate loans to the governments of the Leeward and Windward Islands for the support of essential national programmes.

Under the cumulative pressure of these difficult and demanding economic circumstances the carefully constructed edifice of CARICOM began to show signs of falling apart. The first breach in the unity achieved at the moment of the Community’s establishment came to light in 1975. In a speech in April of that year the Trinidad Prime Minister, Dr Eric Williams, complained that the recent advances in Caribbean integration were being prejudiced by the way in which many of the impoverished member states of CARICOM were making bilateral economic arrangements on supplicant terms with wealthy Latin American countries. ‘I He was particularly concerned by the growing economic penetration of the Commonwealth Caribbean by Venezuelan ‘petro-dollars’ and in a subsequent speech contemptuously denounced the visits of several of his regional colleagues to Venezuela as “pilgrimages to Caracas”. In this connection Williams was especially angered by the agreement signed between Venezuela and Jamaica in April 1975, as a part of which Jamaica agreed to supply Venezuela with considerable quantities of bauxite and alumina for a planned new aluminium smelter. In his view, it was “simply not possible” to regard this

‘ I See Tnnidad Guardian, 27 April 1975. I’ Ibid, 16 June 1975.

RISE A N D FALL OF CARIBBEAN REGIONALISATION 26 1

treaty “as anything but a calculated attack”’ upon the proposal, announced a year earlier, to build two CARICOM aluminium smelters to be owned jointly by the governments of Trinidad, Jamaica and Guyana. The project had been widely regarded as a major step forward in Caribbean integration in that it was the first time that an attempt had been made within CARICOM to establish a joint production programme between member-states. However, as a consequence of the row over Venezuela, the scheme was cancelled: as Williams told a special convention of his party, “one can only take so much, and I have had enough. To smelt or not to smelt, no big thing”. l 4

The dissension within the integration movement became worse in 1977 when Guyana and Jamaica were forced to restrict their imports even from CARICOM member-states as a means of alleviating their financial situation. l 5 This produced a real crisis in the Community to the point where fears were expressed about the future of the whole integration movement. Notwithstanding the fact that Article 28 of the Treaty permitted the imposition of quantitative restrictions on regional goods in the face of serious payments difficulty, the situation seemed likely to lead to retaliation. Trinidad announced its intention of instituting its own system of quantitative controls on the imports of regional goods. An official committee was appointed which identified forty companies seriously affected by the restrictions in CARICOM trade and recommended twenty- three products for protection.16 In the event, no action was taken administratively on the recommendations, and the immediate crisis passed. Both Jamaica and Guyana have since given commitments to restore the value of their imports from the rest of the region to at least 1975 levels and, according to the Secretariat, there are indications that intra-regional trade is beginning to recover from the sharp decline which was experienced during 1977 and the early part of 1978. l 7

Nevertheless, by so dramatically exposing the fragility of the free trade regime which is the mainstay of CARICOM, the affair constituted a major setback in the progress of Caribbean integration. I t certainly clouded the atmosphere within the Community. For a period the Secretariat found it hard to persuade the governments even to convene CARICOM meetings. For example, the Council - the main administrative body of the Community - is supposed to meet at least two or three times yearly: it was

” Ibid. “ Ibid. I * See R Ramsaran, “CARICOM: The Integration Process in Crisis”, Journal of World

l6 Government of Trinidad and Tobago, White Paper on CARICOM, Port of Spain,

I ’ Press Release. Common Market Council Sees very Significant Improvement in Intra-

Trade Law, vol 12, no 3, May-June 1978, pp210-14.

1979, pS5.

Regional Trade, Caribbean Community Secretariat, June 1979.

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summoned just once between September 1977 and December 1978. The morale of the staff of the Secretariat began to suffer, and when Alister McIntyre, the then Secretary-General, resigned his post in April 1977, no replacement was appointed for fifteen months; McIntyre's deputy stood in as Acting-Secretary General on a temporary basis. All these factors also meant that CARICOM was failing to develop into the deeper form of integration to which the Treaty aspired. An attempt to reach a joint agreement on the terms on which foreign investment could enter the region failed in 1974, ' I virtually nothing has been achieved in the way of regional industrial programming and although a Regional Food Corporation has been set up in an effort to organise joint schemes of agricultural production, it has not yet really succeeded in getting off the ground. Even the Community's long-standing attempt to redesign the so-called 'origin rules', which determine the products which are eligible for free trade treatment, has not yet been brought to fruition. l 9

Understandably then, in 1978 and 1979, much of the commentary on CAREOM affairs was couched in terms of the Community's impending disintegration. Something of a literature of doom seemed to dominate the regional press. Much of this melancholy talk paid insufficient attention to the continuing realities of Caribbean co-operation in the fields of common services and external diplomatic action, whilst it is only fair to say that in the past year the Community has regained some of its former vigour. Much of the credit for this can be attributed to the appointment of Dr Kurleigh King, formerly head of the industry division of the Caribbean Development Bank, as the new Secretary-General in November 1978. He quickly restored a sense of dynamism to the Secretariat's work and at least the CARICOM Council now meets regularly. 2 o

Despite the lessening of tension within the integration movement and the recent renewal of activity, it is clear that CARICOM has reached a critical point in its development. It has survived the traumas of the international economic crisis, but at the cost of stagnation. There must also exist genuine doubt as to whether the Community can regain sufficient momentum to move much further towards the ambitious goals set out at Chaguaramas (just seven years ago) in what already seems a different era. The officials of the Community remain optimistic, arguing that the various setbacks experienced by CARICOM in recent years can be explained almost entirely as the unavoidable consequences of external economic circumstances

See W A Axline, Caribbean Integration: The Politics of Regionalism, London, 1979,

A commitment to change the origin rules was, in fact, contained in the CARIFTA Agreement of 1968. No action was taken until 1976 and ratification of the new rules was only completed in July 1980. Even now actual implementation of the new system has to await the enactment of domestic legislation in all member states. Re55 Release. CARICOM Treaty Amendment Providing for New Origin Rules Ratfied. Caribbean Community Secretariat, ul 1980.

pplS6-57.

'' See CARICOM Bulletin, no 2 , March 1979, pp5-6.

RISE AND FALL OF CARIBBEAN REGIONALISATION 263

beyond their control. As we have seen, it is certainly not misplaced to draw attention to the difficulties engendered by the impact of the international economic crisis. Nevertheless, in seeming to pass off CARICOM’s travails in this way, the official explanation of the problems of the past few years is inadequate.

It is inadequate because it is superficial. In the first place, it does not explain why it is that the advent of an externally-generated crisis should have necessarily led to dissension within the regional integration movement. Why should the crisis have not worked in the opposite way and acted as a catalyst for bringing the region together? A przori, there was no reason why this should not have been the outcome. Secondly, by conceiving of the international economic crisis as something which blew CARICOM off course, it implicitly assumes that sooner or later that course can and will be resumed. And there is as yet no sign of that happening for all Dr King’s declaration to the Common Market Council in March 1980 that “the evidence of forward movement” in the last year is clear. *’ On the contrary, it is as if it has been recognised within the Community itself that a critical impasse has been reached in CARICOM affairs. The same Council meeting decided to appoint a prestigious team of regional experts “to review the functioning of Caribbean integration” and to prepare a strategy “for its improvement in the decade of the 1980s”. 2 2

In their reflections what this Group of Caribbean Experts will perhaps come to realise is that the international economic crisis of recent years has, in fact, set CARICOM back more seriously than the officials of the Community are prepared publicly to admit. It did not just disrupt the integration movement for a temporary period. Its impact was both more damaging and more lasting: it can now be seen to have changed the nature of the circumstances in which Caribbean integration has to be pursued in several quite crucial ways. Above all, it has demonstrated the inherent political limitations of the regionalisation model of integration.

111. THE POLITICAL LIMITATIONS OF REGIONALISATION

The limitations of Caribbean regionalisation are revealed most clearly by examining some of the changes which have taken place in the politics of the region between the period when CARICOM was conceived and established and the more recent period during which it has suffered the various setbacks previously described. The emergence and initial success of CARICOM were predicated upon the existence of four particular characteristics of the

K King, “Opening Remarks by the SecretaryGeneral of the Caribbean Community Secretariat at the 16th Meeting of the Common Market Council for Ministers, Georgetown, 26 March 1980”, mimeo, p l .

Press Release. Caribbean Team of Experts Appointed, Caribbean Community Secretariat, April 1980.

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region at the time, a congruence of factors which has since been undermined by the international economic crisis. In retrospect, the Community’s establishment‘ can thus be seen to have been a somewhat contingent affair. By extension, the absence of these supporting factors explains many of CARICOM’s recent problems and emphasises the Community’s extreme vulnerability to changing circumstances.

Turning now to the evidence, the four factors on which CARICOM’s rise depended were:

I . A Balance of Power Between Member States In its formative years CARICOM derived considerable impetus from the fact that there existed a genuine balance of power between the member states of the Community. The approximate parity between them greatly facilitated the process of inter-state negotiation by which Caribbean integration was pursued because it allowed for real bargaining between states, each of which realised that there were advantages to be gained in terms of national interest from the process of regionalisation. The necessary bargaining between the Commonwealth Caribbean thus took place in the context of mutual need in the face of what all recognised to be the common predicament of underdevelopment.

This argument remains important despite the fact that, as we know, there does exist a fairly neat distinction between the groups of states within the Community - the four MDCs and the remaining eight LDCs. According to figures for 1970, the former group had a combined population of 4 million out of a total regional population of 4.6 million and a combined Gross Domestic Product of EC$4,800 million out of a regional total of EC$5,100 million. In other words, the MDCs accounted for 87% of the population of the region and were responsible for 93% of total production.23 Moreover, as one would expect, the differences between the MDCs and the LDCs within CARICOM have been a constant problem for the integration movement. The LDCs were initially reluctant to join CARIFTA in 1968, delaying their entry until they had agreed upon a programme for instituting common tariff levels amongst themselves; they complained repeatedly during the existence of CARIFTA that they were receiving no benefits from regional free trade; and they only agreed to join CARICOM some months after it had been set up when they realised that no more concessions could be won from the MDCs. Each stage in the advance of Caribbean integration has thus been accompanied by the need to incorporate provisions designed to aid the LDCs, culminating in the establishment of the so-called ‘Special

’’ Caribbean Community Secretariat, The Caribbean Community: A Guide, Georgetown, 1973, pp5-6.

RISE AND FALL OF CARIBBEAN REGIONALISATION 265 Regime for the LDCs’ when CARICOM was set up in 1973. *‘ Even this has not stemmed the flow of LDC complaints, which continue to this day.25

Paradoxically, the continuing dissatisfaction of the LDCs with the integration movement draws attention to the weakness of their position in CARICOM. They are an irritant, a thorn in the side of the four MDCs, but really no more than that. Notwithstanding the fact that the CARIFTA era resounded with the sound of LDC leaders calling for the advent of a deeper, more meaninfgul form of economic integration calculated to bring real benefits within their grasp, the striking feature of the advance to a common market and a Caribbean Community was that it took place only when the governments of the MDCs came to agree upon its necessity in the light of their interests, not those of the LDCs. As Dr Vaughan Lewis observed at the time,

“it is clear to all of us now, and clear to the LDCs in particular when they go to these Heads of Governments meetings that the movement towards integration is not a movement based on sentiment . . . The More Developed Countries wish to engage in cooperation with the LDCs because it is necessary in terms of the protection and advancement of their own individual interests that such a system of cooperation should be devised . . . One can easily see that in this kind of situation the MDCs are going to advance their interests and so advance the cooperation or integration movement in so far as it protects themselves, and whether or not the Less Developed Countries are interested in coming along”. 26

The interests of the LDCs were considered, and special measures repeatedly devised in their name, but only such provisions as were compatible, or at least not incompatible, with the position of the MDCs. It is the latter who have determined the character and speed of advance of Caribbean integration.

This brings us back to the balance of power between the member states of CARICOM. Setting aside the LDCs, which for practical purposes the integration movement has consistently done, the level of political and economic development between the four MDCs in the period when CARICOM was being negotiated was broadly similar. At that time they

Treaty establishing Caribbean Community, Annex - The Caribbean Common Market, Chapter VII, Articles 51-62.

2 J In 1979 a study of the special measures designed to benefit the LDCs was undertaken at the request of the CARICOM Council by a member of the Commonwealth Secretariat in London. The resulting Lestrade Report recommended a number of further measures to improve the position of the LDCs within CARICOM, several of which were endorsed by the CARICOM Council in March 1980. See Press Release. 16th CARICOM Council, Caribbean Community Secretariat, March 1980.

l 6 V A Lewis, The Idea of a Caribbean Community, New World Pamphlet No 9, Kingston, 1974, pp4-5.

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were the only states in the grouping who were politically independent. Beyond that, they were the wealthiest, the most industrialised and the most populated. Of the four, Barbados possessed the smallest Gross Domestic Product and was the only MDC not to be blessed with valuable mineral resources,27 whilst Guyana had gained the least from the expansion of regional trade promoted by CARImA and generally was less advanced in the development of manufacturing than the other MDCs. 2 8 Nevertheless, they were able to operate more or less on equal terms with the two pygmy ‘giants’ of the Commonwealth Caribbean, Jamaica and Trinidad. These two were the first in the region to gain their independence and in 1970 were responsible between them for nearly 80% of the region’s total Gross Domestic Product.29 To some extent, it could be said that they vied for leadership of the region, but for the most part their rivalry was limited by the rough parity of their political and economic positions. In short, a genuine balance of power existed between the four MDCs - with no one territory pre-eminent and each aware of the need to compromise at the end of the day if the cause of regional integration was to be advanced.

The nature of the relationship between the MDCs was undoubtedly one of the conditions which facilitated CARICOM’s rise, but it has now been fundamentally changed as a result of the international economic crisis of 1973-4. As has already been explained, Jamaica and Guyana have since suffered severe and recurrent balance of payments and budgetary deficits, whilst Trinidad, in effect, has become a super MDC, possessed of huge payments surpluses and capable of sustaining expenditure programmes beyond the dreams of the other MDCs. To illustrate the differing economic positions of the four MDCs in the aftermath of the crisis, their net foreign exchange reserves during 1978 are presented below:

Jamaica September 1978 - USJ6275.64 million Barbados September 1978 + US$l0.37 million Guyana October 1978 + US$31.80 million Trinidad July 1978 + US1,684.87 million’’

The consequence of the changing fortunes reflected in these figures is that the former balance of power between the four states has been destroyed. An enormous gap has opened up between Trinidad, which is now unequivocally the dominant economy within CARICOM, and the other MDCs. Trinidad has, in fact, become the pivotal state in the region, able to decide more or less on its own terms what happens within the integration movement.

2 7 For a discussion of Barbados’ special position within the integration movement, see

29 Caribbean Community Secretariat, op czt, p101. 30 Adapted from Caribbean Development Bank, AnnuaZRePorf 1978, Bridgetown, 1979,

Caribbean Community Secretariat, op cit , p40. Commonwealth Caribbean Regional Secretariat, op czt, p37.

p25.

RISE AND FALL OF CARIBBEAN REGIONALISATION 267 In response to this fundamental change in the balance of power in the

region, the integration movement might have been expected to have moved in one of two directions. On the one hand, Trinidad could have assumed de facto leadership of CARICOM, used its oil wealth to shore up its faltering regional partners and generally advanced the process of economic integration to its own best advantage. Or, on the other hand, it could have decided that the CARICOM concept was likely to be of no further service to its national interest, reasoning that its development would only be hindered by further association with its poor neighbours, and could have formally withdrawn from the Community. Either way, the position of the integration movement would have been clear.

As it is, Trinidad has not moved positively in either direction, but has instead driven a rather equivocating course between the two positions. To some extent, it has used its wealth to help CARICOM member states. It has, for example, given direct balance of payments support to the other three MDCs, including as much as US$112 million to Jamaica; it established the so-called Caribbean Aid Council in February 1978 to coordinate its own economic aid and technical assistance programme for the area: and as the Trinidad White Paper on CARICOM, published in 1979, somewhat righteously stressed, it has paid up in full all its contributions to the various regional institutions. 31 Moreover, it has very recently been announced that it is setting up a credit scheme to help other CARICOM states buy oil from Trinidad. 3 2 Despite these initiatives, however, it is still only right to observe that Trinidad could have done much more to sustain the process of regional integration. The Aid Council has, in fact, approved very few loans, whilst a number of economists feel that Trinidad could have done much more, as an oil supplier, to help its regional partners with their oil bills. 3 3 In a more general sense, the Trinidad government has not given any lead as to the direction in which it wants CARICOM to move. The White Paper carped repeatedly at the inadequacies of CARICOM and the allegedly anti- integrative behaviour of some of its member states, but neither announced Trinidad’s withdrawal nor set out a policy for repairing the situation. The change in the balance of power in the region since 1973-4 means that only Trinidad can now give direction to the regional movement. Its reluctance either to move forward or to move out is one factor responsible for CARICOM’s current stagnation.

II. Ideological Consensus The initial emergence of regional integration in the Caribbean in the 1960s was also facilitated by the existence of a high degree of ideological consensus

J 1 Government of Trinidad and Tobago, op cit, pp10-16.

3 3 See, for example, Trevor Farrell, “Trinidad and the Caribbean Today”, Can’bbean Can‘bbean Contact, vol 8 , no 3, July 1980.

Contact, vol 7 , no 7, November 1979, ppl0-11.

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between the region’s governments about the strategy of economic development to be followed. The basis of this strategy was set out in a pamphlet written by the economist, W Arthur Lewis, 34 which argued that the West Indies could only escape from economic underdevelopment by devising a range of investment incentives which would encourage metropolitan industrialists, possessing technical skills and capital and commanding markets for their products, actually to locate their plants in the region. All the governments, especially those of the MDCs, quickly erected the institutional and legal apparatus attendant upon this policy of ‘industrialisation by invitation’, as it was soon accurately, if somewhat derisively, dubbed. ’’ Foreign capital responded predictably to this policy and flowed into the Caribbean in massive amounts, bringing in its wake a number of highly visible manufacturing industries. In combination with the traditional sale of sugar, citrus and bananas to European markets and the new export of bauxite from Jamaica and Guyana and oil from Trinidad to the North American market, the immediate post-war era in the Commonwealth Caribbean was one of fast economic growth, fuelled by and correspondingly completely dependent upon an expanding world economy.

By the mid-l960s, however, it was beginning to be widely realised in the region that the economic growth of the previous decade had not been accompanied by any real development of the regional economy. The level of unemployment and underemployment in the region remained high and was thought, in fact, to have worsened rather than improved. The high wage rates paid in the new mineral and manufacturing sectors had had the perverse effect of raising the reserve price of labour and thus of encouraging people to sacrifice low-paid agricultural employment in order to join the ranks of the urban unemployed. At the same time, most of the imported technology used in these sectors was highly capital-intensive and unsuited to the special needs of the labour surplus economies into which it had been introduced. Furthermore, the use of local West Indian resources in the process of growth had been negligible. Foreign investors in the manufacturing sector had preferred, on the whole, to locate within the Caribbean no more of the production process than was necessary to be awarded the tax incentives. The industries that grew up were usually, therefore, only final-assembly - ‘screwdriver’ - operations, producing shoes, cosmetics, household chemicals, stoves, refrigerators and other similar consumer goods. In the mineral sector, too, the value added locally to the region’s major raw material exports was very small. Even the tourist industry was characterised by its failure to create a web of linkages with local

” W A Lewis, Industrial Development in the Caribbean, Port of Spain, 1951. 3s N Cirvan and 0 Jefferson (eds), Readings in the Political Economy o f the Caribbean,

Kingston, 1971, Introduction, pl.

RISE AND FALL OF CARIBBEAN REGIONALISATION 269

agriculture and was thus partly responsible for the area’s growing imports of foodstuffs. 3 6

The resulting failure of this era of economic growth to bring about a major transformation of the region’s economy did not, however, lead to a complete disavowal of the basic premises of their strategy of development by Commonwealth Caribbean governments. Instead it was argued by another leading West Indian economist, William Demas,37 that the capacity of West Indian states to achieve economic development was constrained primarily by their small size, defined in terms of both land area and population number. The smallness of the domestic market, he reasoned, imposed sharp limits on the process of import-substitution industralisation, but could be overcome in his view by pursuing a policy of economic integration with neighbouring underdeveloped countries so as to enable the benefits of economies of scale and other external economies to be properly secured. As Demas himself put it, “the creation of an economic region can mean that the development pattern for the region as a whole can approximate more to import-substitution”. 3 8

The strategy of economic integration advanced by Demas was, of course, the strategy subsequently implemented mu CARIFTA. In ideological terms, it was entirely consistent with the view which West Indian politicians held of themselves and their interests in the mid-1960s. It did not question the principles behind the policy of ‘industrialisation by invitation’ or doubt the development potential of final-touch manufacturing. Indeed, economic integration in the Caribbean was at the outset really no more than an extension to a new and larger sphere of the economic policies being pursued by individual governments throughout the region - and was the more attractive to the governments concerned for this element of continuity. An alternative model of integration, which was put forward at the time by a group of economists from the University of the West Indies and which called for a radical break with the laissez-faire development ideology of the 1960s, 3 9 was rejected virtually without consideration.

Caribbean integration prospered for as long as the development ideology which it had been created to sustain held favour with the region’s governments. By the early 1970s there were signs that new ideas of economic development were abroad in the region as the Guyana government nationalised some of the foreign-owned bauxite companies operating in its territory, but there was still a sufficient reservoir of support for traditional views to allow for the establishment of CARICOM in 1973. However, the international economic crisis which began in that year has had the further

36 See ibid for an elaboration of the above analysis. ” W G Demas, The Economics of Development in Small Countries with Special Reference

to the Cun’bbean, Montreal, 1965. j8 Ibid, p89. Demas’s emphasis. 39 See H Brewster and C Y Thomas, The Dynamics of West Indian Economic Integration,

Kingston, 1967.

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consequence for regional integration of accelerating and ultimately completing the destruction of the ideological consensus of the previous decade. The pressure of the crisis brought home to several regional governments the extent of the dependence on the vicissitudes of the world economy necessitated by their former strategy of development. It encouraged them to experiment with more radical economic policies. Thus Guyana’s adoption of ‘co-operative socialism’ at the beginning of the 1970s was followed by the proclamation of ‘democratic socialism’ by the People’s National Party in Jamaica in 1974 and the espousal of socialism by the new revolutionary government in Grenada in 1979. In other territories radical political groups now make sure that an alternative vision of economic development is loudly voiced and, even when they have stopped short of declaring a commitment to socialism, governments in these territories have at least had to adopt a more interventionist approach to economic development in order to appease radical opinion.

There are thus many indications of the changing ideological composition of the region. The laissez-faire ideology which used to dominate the Caribbean is no longer supreme and a new concept has come into vogue to describe the present somewhat confused state of the region’s politics. It is the notion of ‘ideological pluralism’ - a term which is meant to suggest that there currently co-exist within the region several different ideological perspectives. At one level, this should perhaps be no cause for comment and certainly not alarm, but in the context of a group of governments trying to pursue regional integration there have been those who have seen the emergence of ideological pluralism in the Caribbean as a potentially fragmentary influence on the regional movement. In response to these worries, the Standing Committee of CARICOM Ministers responsible for Foreign Affairs discussed the whole question at their meeting in St Lucia in February 1980, but concluded that since ideological pluralism is “an irreversible fact of international relations” it should not “be permitted to constitute a barrier to the strengthening of the mechanism of CARICOM”.40

The question of what effect ideological pluralism in the region will have on the future of CARICOM remains an open one. There is no doubt that much of the discussion of ideological pluralism within the region has over- simplified a complicated situation. Journalistic commentators have tended to polarize too crudely the ideological divisions that exist. In recent years they have portrayed a region split into two camps - a left wing group, comprising Jamaica, Guyana and Grenada, all under the influence of Cuba, and a right wing group, led by Trinidad and Barbados and including most of the smaller islands, all of whom allegedly still endorse American

*’ Press Release. 5th Meeting of the Standing Committee of Minkters Responsiblefor Foreip Affuirs, Caribbean Community Secretariat, February 1980.

RISE AND FALL OF CARIBBEAN REGIONALISATION 27 1 hegemony over the region. This interpretation is overdrawn. In the first place, it exaggerates the commitment to socialism of the supposedly left wing regimes when it is probably more accurate to see their radicalism as a ploy to get a better deal for their countries from the forces that dominate the international economy rather than as a genuine attempt to disengage completely from the capitalist world; secondly, it misjudges the character of their relationship with Cuba which is seen not so much as a means of access to the Communist world but rather as a friendly, neighbouring power willing and able to provide assistance on non-exploitative terms; and, thirdly, it does not allow for the possible electoral defeat of left wing governments. For example, the defeat of the People’s National Party in Jamaica in elections in October 1980, and its replacement by the right wing Jamaica Labour Party, has obviously removed Jamaica completely from any such alliance of left wing states. By extension, the conventional analysis also underrates the efforts made by governments like that in Trinidad to pursue essentially similar policies of economic nationalism but without the accompanying claims of socialist intent, and it certainly ignores the extent of Dr. Williams’ personal hostility to America. The reality is that apart from the smaller territories, which feel that the old policy of attracting private foreign investment is still the only option open to them, there is less difference in actual practice between the type of development policies being pursued in the region than is often maintained.

However, having said that, it is clear that there is no longer a consensus in the region about the meaning of economic development. Different views are held, for example, about the value of foreign private investment, about the role of the state and about the extent to which a locally based bourgeoisie ought to be encouraged to emerge as the progenitor of indigenous capitalism. It would be wrong to minimise the importance of these areas of disagreement and suggest that behind the rhetoric there is, in fact, unanimity. Furthermore, one has to remember that politics is as much about what people believe to be true as about what actually is true. Differences in the use of rhetoric and in the willingnes to justify policies by reference to openly-articulated ideologies are real and should not be discounted in academic analysis. There is clear evidence, for example, in the Trinidad White Paper on CARICOM that the Trinidad government - on which the future of CARICOM so greatly rests - is disturbed by the socialist pretensions of some of its CARICOM partners. At one point, the White Paper observed that all too often Trinidad’s attempts to devise mechanisms through which a joint foreign policy for the region could be expressed had been “destroyed by the over-riding attraction which some harbour for foreign policies responding more to the rhetoric of revolutionary ideologies than to economic or social needs of the region.”41 It may be an

‘ I Government of Trinidad and Tobago, op czt, p7.

272 ANTHONY PAYNE

unfair judgement to make, but if it contributes in any way to Trinidad’s obvious current disaffection with CARICOM, it is a factor which cannot be ignored in assessing the future of the integration movement.

Thus the matter of the compatibility of ideological pluralism and regional integration is not easy to resolve. The Trinidad White Paper, in fact, raised the key question: ‘Can mutually acceptable strategies be created to project and satisfy the conflicting demands of democratic socialism, co-operative socialism and the other numerous paths to political, economic and social development that individual member countries of CARICOM have chosen?“* Dr King has argued in a recent interview that they can and that the region has got “to get used to the fact that everybody in our Community is not going to look at the world in the same way”.43 It certainly has if the level of Caribbean integration is to be further deepened, but whether it will do so remains to be seen. In the meantime, the collapse of the ideological consensus of the formative period of CARICOM’s life can be seen to be a further cause of its current travails.

III. Rapport between the Heads of Government Another moving force behind the emergence of Caribbean integration in the past decade or so has been the existence of a genuine rapport between the heads of government of the main CARICOM territories. This relationship has been .very effectively institutionalised within the Heads of Government Conference of Commonwealth Caribbean Countries. The Conference met for the first time in July 1963 in Port of Spain at the behest of Eric Williams who was keen to rebuild some sort of regional cooperation in the aftermath of the collapse of the former West Indies Federation in 1962. It subsequently met on a regular basis and was responsible at its Fourth Meeting in Barbados in October 1967 for the decision to establish CARIFTA. It functioned as the guiding hand of CARIFTA, even though there was no juridical basis for such a role in the CARIFTA Agreement, and it was again at meetings of the Heads of Governments Conference - the Seventh and Eighth in October 1972 and April 1973 respectively - that agreement on the establishment of the Caribbean Community was reached. The Community Treaty has now given the Conference formal recognition as the highest policy-making body of CARICOM with power to issue directions to be pursued by the Common Market Council and the other institutions of the Community. ““

The dominant role played by the Heads of Government Conference in the emergence of CARICOM has been necessitated by the highly personalist character of the political culture of the region. Individual heads of government have great power to influence the formulation of policy,

I 2 Zbid, p9. ‘’ CARICOM Perspective, no 1 , March 1980, p5. “ Treaty establishing Caribbean Community, Articles 6-9.

RISE AND FALL OF CARIBBEAN REGIONALISATION 273

especially in matters that involve negotiations with other states - a fact which the architects of Caribbean integration have always had to acknowledge. The officials of the Regional Secretariat realised from the outset that it would be impossible to forge a coalition of regional technicians and bureaucrats capable of directing the integration movement in accordance with a rationality higher than whatever accommodation could be found between the narrow concerns of the politicians. In the Caribbean it is the politicians, in particular the heads of government, who have inevitably come to control the regional decisionmaking system.

This has meant that the health of the regional integration movement is constantly dependent on the smoothness of personal relations between the heads of government. As has been explained, during the period of CARICOM’s emergence, relations were generally good. All the regional leaders appeared to Eave great respect for Dr Williams’ long-standing commitment to Caribbean integration, which dates back to the 1950s when he was a Research Officer with the erstwhile Caribbean Commission, whilst a real affinity existed between the other three leaders of the MDCs during this period, Michael Manley of Jamaica, Errol Barrow of Barbados and Forbes Burnham of Guyana. Burnham made this plain at the ceremony to mark the signing of the CARICOM Treaty by the four MDCs in July 1973 when he spoke nostalgically of “the dream Michael, Errol and I shared when we were radical undergraduates in the heart of imperialist L ~ n d o n . ” ~ ’ Indeed, all the heads of government knew each other well and habitually addressed each other on a first-name basis.46 Great store was set on this ‘club’ approach within the integration movement and undoubtedly for a while it worked well, providing an intimacy and opportunity for direct dealing between heads of government which certainly proved conducive to the establishment of CARICOM.

In the more recent past, however, CARICOM’s reliance on this personal style of decisionmaking has been revealed as a weakness. Rivalries and conflicts have emerged in the relations between several of the heads of government and they have destroyed the harmony and rapport which the Community depends upon for its vitality. Again it was the crisis in the international economy which precipitated the situation, for the issue over which the various leaders fell out concerned the response which the region should make towards the aggressive economic diplomacy of oil-rich Venezuela. As we saw earlier, there existed a genuine difference of view within the region on this matter - Williams detecting in the situation the beginning of an attempt by an expansionist Venezuela to ‘recolonise’ the Caribbean, the other regional leaders seeing only the readiness of the

‘’ Tnnidad Guardian, 5 July 1973. 4 6 See N Linton. “Regional Diplomacy of the Commonwealth Caribbean“, international

Journal, vol 26, no 2, 1971.

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Venezuelans to help their poorer neighbours. The problem was that the disagreement was not conducted through official channels, but was pursued via personal exchanges between the CARICOM heads of government. Relations between Williams and the other leaders, particularly Michael Manley who was especially close to the Venezuelan government, deteriorated sharply4’ and for a while the Caribbean was transported back to the bitter atmosphere of the days before CARIFTA and CARICOM were established when it was standard form for regional leaders to air their policy differences in the media.

Since 1975 the row as such has died down, but it has left behind a residue of bitterness between the region’s leaders that has undoubtedly contributed to CARICOM’s recent difficulties. Following Errol Barrow’s defeat in Barbados in 1976, relations between Trinidad and Barbados have been repaired: indeed, Williams and Barbados’ new Prime Minister, Tom Adams, appear to see the world with very similar outlooks. 4 8 However, the relationship between Williams and Manley remained cool. Nor does much benefit accrue to CARICOM from Manley’s recent election defeat because his successor has been Edward Seaga who, as Jamaica’s Finance Minister in the late 1960s, displayed great hostility to the notion of regional integration. For the Caribbean Community as a whole, the result of these conflicts has been that the Heads of Government Conference has not met in full session since December 1975. The failure to meet is, of course, all the more marked given the regularity and the extent of the contribution to the development of regional integration of previous conferences. By virtue of Trinidad’s new pre-eminence in the region and the political position of Williams as the senior regional statesman, the signal for another such conference can only effectively emanate from Port of Spain. Other leaders have expressed their interest in a meeting. Forbes Burnham, for example, in his 1978 New Year message to the Guyanese people made a point of calling for the “re- introduction of dialogue in regional affairs”” and Dr. King on assuming duties as CARICOM Secretary-General set as one of his early aims the summoning of a Heads of Governments Conference. Williams, however, has shown little inclination to travel outside of Trinidad in recent years and has resolutely refused to host such a conference. As a result Dr. King has adopted the tactic of farming out the items that were on the prospective agenda of a Heads of Governments Conference to other CARICOM institutions and in his recent address to the CARICOM Council admitted

4 7 See “Michael Manley replies”, Can’bbean Contact, vol 5, no 4, July 1975. “ A wide-ranging trade and co-operation agreement was signed between Trinidad and

Barbados in April 1979 and further talks held between Williams and Adams in May 1980. See Cun’bbeun Contact, vol 8 , no 3, July 1980.

4q Guyana Graphic, 2 January 1978. ’II CARICOM Bulletin, no 2 , March 1979, pp5-6.

RISE AND FALL OF CARIBBEAN REGIONALISATION 275 that the calling of such a meeting was no longer one of his priorities. J ’ No doubt he was being realistic, but given the sort of integration movement which CARICOM is, the disintegration of that rapport amongst the heads of government which contributed so much to its advance is a serious problem that cannot be so easily side-stepped.

I V . Limited international interest in the region

The other main inspiration behind the emergence of regional integration in the Caribbean in the 1960s was the increasingly obvious fact of the Caribbean’s neglect by the rest of the world. Britain was turning away from the Commonwealth as a whole and could scarely conceal its desire to divest itself as soon as practicable of its remaining possessions in the Caribbean area. The United States was concerned only with the non-British Caribbean, whilst Canada, although viewed by some as a potential fairy godmother to the region, demonstrated in a joint conference with West Indian governments held in Ottawa in 1966 that it was uninteresed in fulfilling such a role. Eric Williams pithily summed up the situation when he observed in 1965 that “the crux of the West Indian problem of today is that America does not want the West Indies, Canada wants them less and Britain wants them least of all.”’* No other powers needed even to be mentioned.

This lack of international interest in the Caribbean contributed considerably to the development of a sense of common destiny within the region. Since no other options were readily available within the international system, working together as a regional entity was the only alternative to a purely nationalist attempt to secure economic development. Growing realisation of this overcame resistance to the initial proposals for an experiment in regional economic integration and subsequently meant that CARIFTA and CARICOM were high priorities in the external policies of all states in the region. At this time most territories did not pursue elaborate and diversified foreign policies. Guyana was the only country to play a sustained role in international politics outside of the region5’ and it did not see any conflict between this and its support for regional integration. For the smaller territories the Caribbean was the limit of their perceptions and even for the other MDCs it was a central feature of their external relations.

Like so much else in the politics of the Caribbean, this perception of the importance of the regional connection has been fundamentally changed by

s 1 K King, “Opening Remarks at 16th Meeting of Common Market Council”, ppl-2. J 2 E. Williams, Reflections on the Caribbean Economic Community, Port of Spain, 1965,

J 3 Guyana’s active foreign policy derived from the fact that it was engaged in boundary disputes with both Venezuela and Surinam and needed international support for the maintenance of its territorial integrity. See Robert B. Manley, Guyana Emergent: The Post- Independence Struggle for Nondependent Development, Boston, 1979, pp.41-54.

p39.

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the international economic crisis of 1973-4. The crisis has had the effect of opening up the Caribbean to what is now fairly intense international competition for influence. In the first place, as we have seen, it further impoverished and thus radicalised a number of territories within the region, thereby bringing the Caribbean into the mainstream of ideological conflict at the international level; secondly, it elevated to ‘middle-power’ status one or two energy-rich Latin American states which now feel powerful enough to concern themselves with political and economic developments in the Commonwealth Caribbean. The consequence of these changes has been that a number of powers, several of them in their way new actors on the Caribbean scene, presently take a close interest in the affairs of the region. 5 4

The former consideration explains the activities of the United States and Cuba, each reflecting opposed ideological perspectives; the latter the activities of Venezuela and Mexico, each vying for the wider political leadership of the Caribbean basin as a whole. Between them they have greatly altered the framework of international relations in the Caribbean.

The United States in the last two years has certainly made a conscious attempt to strengthen its position in the region. The first sign of this could be seen in the State Department’s declaration after the Grenada revolution of March 1979 that the Caribbean had become one of the worlds newest ‘trouble-spots’. By this it meant to draw attention to what it saw as the growing influence of communism in the region. At any rate, it moved to strengthen its intelligence and diplomatic services in the area and responded in a very chilly manner to requests for help from the new Grenadian government. 5 5 In October 1979, following the ‘pseudo-crisis’ over the alleged presence of a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba, President Carter announced a number of positive steps to neutralize Cuban and Soviet influence in the hemisphere. These included the decisions to set up a new Caribbean Joint Task Force Headquarters in Key West, Florida, to expand US naval exercises in the Caribbean and to increase financial aid to poor countries in the Caribbean, many of which belong to CARICOM. s6 Since these moves were announced, American warships have been seen more frequently in the Caribbean and more money has undoubtedly been forthcoming. In November 1979 a huge conference was organised in Miami by the State Department to consider the economic and social problems facing the region. The keynote speech was given by the US Ambassador-at- large, Philip Habib, who emphasized that his government was now giving extra priority to the Caribbean and made great play of the United States’

5‘ For a fuller discussion of the recent increase in geopolitical conflict in the Caribbean, see Anthony Payne, “Giants and Pygmies in the Caribbean”, The World Today, August 1980, pp288-95.

5 J See D. Sinclair DaBreo, The Grenada Revolution. Castries, 1979, pp301-10. J6 See M. Azicri, “Cuba and the US’, Can‘bbean Review, vol.IX, No.1, Winter 1980,

p.51.

RISE AND FALL OF CARIBBEAN REGIONALISATION 277 initiative in forming, under the aegis of the World Bank, the so-called Caribbean Group for Co-operation in Economic Development. s 7 This body has been conceived as a sort of funnel for channelling increased aid to the Caribbean from willing donor countries and the various international lending agencies.

Closely related to the United States’ new concern for the Commonwealth Caribbean has been Cuba’s policy towards the region. Cuban foreign policy in this connection is dominated by the realization that any weakening of American power correspondingly strengthens Cuban security. Accordingly, the Cubans have taken the opportunity to establish close working relationships with those Commonwealth Caribbean governments which have moved towards a more radical position. Thus, during the last few years, Cuban medical teams have worked in Guyana and Jamaica, school buildings and mini-dams were constructed in Jamaica with Cuban help and currently Cuban workers are helping to build a new international airport in Grenada. s 8 These various moves have aroused much suspicion in the West, for undoubtedly Havana is becoming increasingly influential within the Caribbean. Often, though, it is more wooed than wooing and thus far has proved to be a willing and generous donor of aid and expertise.

For its part, Venezuela as a major oil-exporter found itself after 1973-4 in the possession of vast amounts of ‘petro-dollars’ - more than could be safely invested domestically without causing unwanted inflation. It has, therefore, used its newly found wealth, inter alia, to acquire widespread influence over the relatively poor territories of the Commonwealth Caribbean by making available to them loans for all manner of development projects. s 9 This has not been done without controversy, as we have seen. Williams has been bitterly critical of the many bilateral aid and trade deals made with Venezuela by Commonwealth Caribbean countries, but on this issue his has been a lone voice. Other CARICOM states continue to seek Venezuelan assistance, especially in buying oil at concessionary prices.

Although it has not been able to operate on the same scale as Venezuela, Mexico has also been attempting recently to extend its influence in the Commonwealth Caribbean area. This culminated in the signing of an agreement with the Jamaican government in 1975 whereby it would have contributed part of the equity towards the building of an alumina plant in Jamaica. However, it has since reneged on the deal in a particularly peremptory manner and has lost some standing in the region as a result. The extent of its newly discovered oil reserves nevertheless means that it is

” Philip C. Habib, “Text of the Keynote Speech at the Miami Conference on the

’* See Anthony P. Maingot, “Cuba and the Commonwealth Caribbean”, Caribbean

’’ See James John Guy, “Venezuela: foreign policy and oil”, The World Today, December

Caribbean’, United States International Communication Agency, 3 December 1979.

Review, vol.IX, no.1, Winter 1980, pp7-10 and 44-9.

1979, ~ ~ 5 0 8 - 1 0 .

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likely to become an ever more influential force in the international politics of the region.60

Thus the Caribbean is today far from being an area of limited international interest. For the Caribbean itself, this has potentially dangerous implications in that, as Williams fears, the region may again become, as it was historically, a battleground for other people’s rivalries and conflicts. But such intense geopolitical activity also creates opportunities for those states which are the objects of the attention. They are put in a position where they can genuinely bargain with the various contending powers for the best possible deal for themselves. This is something which the states of the Caribbean have not been slow to realise, which is why the past few years have seen a growing tendency on the part of the independent countries of the region to negotiate bilateral deals with other countries or groups of countries without prior consultation with their CARICOM partners. Venezuela has been the prime target, but agreements have been signed by Commonwealth Caribbean states with a vast range of countries, including those like Iraq and Libya with little connection with or real interest in the Caribbean. From a national point of view, external deals of this sort almost inevitably lead to co-operative arrangements more favourable to a particular member country than similar arrangements negotiated within the regional integration movement, especially as they are unlikely to be accompanied by the necessity to contribute to redistributive measures in favour of the LDCs. At the same time they cannot but create patterns of interaction which detract from the prospects of successful regional integration. In the Caribbean Community Treaty, member states are enjoined to organise their relations with third countries as a group, but in almost every instance they have failed to do so. For most of the region’s governments the improvement of relations with other CARICOM states has become a relatively low priority in the overall panoply of foreign policy options.

There is another way in which this change of perception concerning the future of the Caribbean Community can be seen, which also derives from the international economic crisis of 1973-4. The success achieved by the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) has subsequently inspired the Third World as a whole to try to bargain with the developed world on a group basis. It was in the immediate aftermath of the oil price rise that the demand for a ‘New International Economic Order’ was articulated at the United Nations. This has been followed by the signing of two LomC Conventions between the EEC and the group of African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries and by a series of international discussions encapsulated by the phrase the North-South dialogue. The countries of the Caribbean Community have involved themselves fully in this global

See George Philip, “Mexican Oil and Gas: The Politics of a New Resource”, International Affairs, vo1.56. no.3, Summer 1980, pp474-83.

See W. G. Demas, “The Caribbean and the New International Economic Order”, Journal of Znteramen‘can Studies and World Affairs, v01.20, no.3, August 1978, pp.229-63.

6 ’

RISE AND FALL OF CARIBBEAN REGIONALISATION 279 bargaining. 61 Indeed, one participant in the talks that led to the signing of the first LomC Convention in 1975 has argued that it would not be “immodest to say that much of the intellectual fuselage used in the battle with the EEC by the African, Caribbean and Pacific side, emanated from the Caribbean group.”62 A number of Caribbean leaders, notably Michael Manley, have also played central roles in the North-South debate and some have even given up jobs in the region to assume international posts in this field. Sonny Ramphal, for example, who as Guyana’s Foreign Minister played a big part in the formation of CARICOM, resigned in 1975 to become Commonwealth Secretary-General, whilst Alister McIntyre left the CARICOM Secretariat to become Head of the Commodities Division of UNCTAD. This type of international political activity makes obvious sense for dependent Third World states and outstanding Third World statesmen, but it has not been undertaken without some adverse side effects at the local level. In the Caribbean it has undoubtedly taken precedence over efforts to advance and deepen the regional integration movement. Many governments in the region now feel that more can be gained from politics on a wider international level and their attention has shifted accordingly. In summary, then, the greater salience of the Caribbean from an international point of view has created new opportunities for the region’s territories which has caused them to devote less concern and less energy to their own regional movement. CARICOM is now only one part of a truly international strategy of development; it is no longer the centrepiece of the region’s development effort.

IV. CONCLUSION

The experience of the Caribbean Community confirms the enormous fragility of integration schemes established between Third World states. It has not been able to maintain the momentum of its early days and now appears to have fallen into a state of stagnation. The contrast between CARICOM’s initial achievements and its current difficulties is undoubtedly a depressing one for all believers in Caribbean integration, but it does have the benefit of enabling political analysts to understand a little more clearly the dynamics of the success and failure of Third World integration.

CARICOM derived from the fact that it was predicated upon what we called the politics of regionalisation. It did not seek to challenge the institution of the nation-state but emerged to give sustenance to nationalist politics by enabling them to be pursued within a wider regional framework. Regionalisation was in essence a function of the nation-state, a type of politics only one step removed from traditional interstate politics. Thus

62 E. Carrington, ‘CARICOM - After One Year: its Achievements and Prospects’, amended version of address given to Trinidad and Tobago Economic and Statistical Society, Port of Spain, 6 August 1974, mimeo, p14.

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anyone who believed that CARICOM was the means by which there was being created within the Commonwealth Caribbean a genuinely integrated political community, was deluding himself. This is not to criticise the architects of the Caribbean Community who displayed great realism in understanding what were the bounds of international politics between new states not long independent or still seeking their independence: hence their initial success in getting CARICOM off the ground. It is simply to assert that, regardless of the ambitious goals set out in the Treaty of Chaguaramas, CARICOM in political terms always constituted a very limited form of regional integration.

The subsequent problems into which CARICOM has run have merely reflected the inherent limitations of the regionalisation model of integration. By definition, it did not possess a sufficiently developed sense of regionalism to withstand the impact of the international economic crisis that began in 1973-4. Instead, this crisis cruelly exposed the narrowness of the political base on which CARICOM was built. It revealed that the initial success of the movement had been dangerously dependent on the existence of four passing features of the regional environment: namely, an approximate balance of power between the main Commonwealth Caribbean territories, a high degree of ideological consensus within the region about the means to economic development, a close rapport between the various heads of government and the limited amount of international interest given to the region. With these conditions removed by the world economic crisis, CARICOM has been immobilised and there are presently no signs that these apparent prerequisites for its functioning can be recreated in such a way that the Community can be restored to health in the form in which it previously prospered. The team of experts now reviewing the state of regional integration in the Caribbean ought in honesty to admit that the CARICOM model of integration has, at least for the foreseeable future, run out of steam. If Caribbean integration is to regain its momentum, some new framework, possibly one built around Trinidadian leadership, will be required.

In a general sense, this does not mean that regionalisation in the Third World is doomed to failure or that it is not worthy of pursuit. It may be that it is the only alternative to traditional nationalist politics, but it does mean that the political limitations of this type of regional integration must be realistically understood. New states are understandably unwilling to sacrifice the sovereignty they have recently gained; only with skill and care can they be persuaded to enter into a structure of organised inter-state cooperation along the lines of the Caribbean Community. Even that is only a small step away from the parameters of nationalist politics, is far from easy to achieve and is likely to have been the product of a narrowly contingent set of circumstances which are vulnerable to externally-induced changes. It should not surprise anyone when such movements struggle to survive.