the role of cognition in marital relationships

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Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology

1989, Vol. 57, No. 1,31-38

Copyright 1989 by the American Psychological

Association,

Inc.

0022-006X/89/S00.75

The Role of Cognitions in Marital Relationships: Definitional,

Methodological, and Conceptual Issues

Donald

H

Baucom

University of

North Carolina

at

Chapel Hill

Norman

Epstein

University of Maryland, College Park

Steven Sayers and

Tamara

Goldman Sher

University of

North Carolina

at

Chapel Hill

Although

there

have

recently been numerous investigations exploring the role of

couples'

cognitions

in

an attempt to understand marital distress, at present there is little cohesion and direction in the

study of how couples think about their relationships. The current article asserts that this lack of

direction results from at

least

three

factors:

(a) a lack of delineation of the important cognitive

variables to be considered in marital functioning, (b) conceptual and methodological difficulties that

arise

in

attempts

to operationalize

cognitive variables,

and (c) a

dearth

of

models

of

marital function-

ing that incorporate cognitions in a detailed manner. These three factors are discussed, along

with

a

review of empirical investigations supporting the importance of cognitions in intimate relationships.

The

role

of

cognitions

in

intimate relationships

has

gained

in-

creasing

attention in recent

years.

Most

work

has focused on the

area

of

causal attributions,

and

numerous investigations have

demonstrated empirical relations between various types of attri-

butions

and level of marital maladjustment (see Baucom, 1987,

and Thompson & Snyder, 1986, for recent reviews of this work).

However, the study of cognitions in intimate relationships has

little coherent direction

of

movement, either

from a

research per-

spective or in

terms

of the

treatment

of

marital distress.

This lack of

focus

and direction probably stems from at least

three

factors:

(a) insufficient

delineation

of

important

catego-

ries

of

marital cognitions other than attributions (with

the

work

on relationship beliefs by Eidelson & Epstein, 1982, being one

exception), (b) methodological and conceptual problems in op-

erationalizing cognitive variables

and

comparing disparate

measures used in different studies, and (c) few descriptions of

explicit models to direct future research and to clarify the roles

that

cognitions play in intimate relationships (with the models

proposed by Bradbury & Fincham, 1987, and Doherty, 198la,

198

Ib,

being

the

exceptions). Consequently, this article focuses

on three related issues:

(a) a

proposed classification

of

cogni-

tions that are potentially important in intimate relationships,

along with

a

review

of the

empirical status

of

these variables

as

they

are related to intimate relationships; (b) important meth-

odological and conceptual issues to be considered in the opera-

tionalization of

these variables;

and (c) a

discussion

of

what

should be included in cognitive models of intimate relation-

ships and relationship maladjustment.

Cognitive Variables in Intimate Relationships

Derived largely from Beck's

(1976)

and Ellis'

(1962)

cognitive

theories

of

maladaptive behavior, five categories of interrelated

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to

Donald H. Baucom, Psychology Department, Campus Box 3270, Davie

Hall,

University of

North Carolina, Chapel Hill, North Carolina

27514.

cognitive

phenomena can be delineated that appear to play im-

portant roles

in the

development

and

maintenance

of

marital

maladjustment. The first of these involves the perceptual pro-

cess of

selective attention.

The

other four categories involve

the

outcomes of

cognitive processes: attributions (about

why

events

occur), expectancies (predictions of what events will occur in

the future), assumptions (about the nature of the world and cor-

relations between events

and

characteristics),

and

standards

(about

what "should" be). Although empirical investigations

are only beginning in most of these areas, much more is already

known

about

the

outcomes

of the

cognitive

processes

than

is

known about

the

cognitive processes themselves.

For

example,

as

will

be discussed, a

fair

amount is

known

about the content

of

couples' attributions and their relation to marital discord.

Yet,

little is known about the processes by

which

these attribu-

tions

are

made; that

is, are

couples

lay

scientists advancing

hypotheses

and evaluating data? Are they cognitive opportun-

ists who

advance self-serving attributions,

or are

they simply

responding to classically conditioned associations

between

emotion

and thought?

Cognitions vary in how appropriate they are and, thus, in

how much they might contribute

to marital distress. The

appro-

priateness

of a

cognition

can

involve

(a) its

validity

as a repre-

sentation

of

reality

or (b) its

reasonableness

as a

standard

or

explanation for

relationship events when there

are not

objective

criteria available for determining reality. Individuals do not

commonly question their own moment-to-moment thoughts

about events in their lives (Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979)

or

their long-standing assumptions and

standards

about the na-

ture of the world (Nisbett & Ross, 1980). Consequently, a major

task

of

cognitively oriented marital therapy

is to

help spouses

become

more active observers

and to

help them evaluate their

own cognitions so that their emotional and behavioral re-

sponses to one another

will

be minimally affected by distorted

cognitions (Epstein, 1982, 1986).

The following are descrip-

31



32

BAUCOM, EPSTEIN, SAVERS,

AND SHER

lions

of the five categories of cognitions that are

likely

to play

roles in marital maladjustment and are potentially important

foci for

treatment.

Assumptions

and

Standards

Spouses develop long-standing cognitions about the nature

of the

world, including both

the way

that they think

the

world

actually is and the way that they think that the world should be,

which we respectively label assumptions and standards. These

classes of cognitions are important because, together, they serve

as the templates by which an individual processes the ongoing

events in his or her

marriage. These cognitive

structures,"

knowledge structures, or "schemata" (Nisbett & Ross, 1980;

Seller, 1984)

are an

individual's internalized representations

re-

garding rules for categorizing objects and events, for solving

problems, for evaluating the appropriateness of events, and for

taking actions to achieve certain goals. Seller (1984) noted that,

beginning

in

infancy,

the

individual's repeated experiences

in

the world produce complex concepts about the characteristics

of classes

of

objects

and how one

relates

to

them. Once estab-

lished, cognitive structures are hypothesized to

have

vital sur-

vival value by allowing people to understand and interact

adap-

tively with the complexities in their lives.

Assumptions. Of relevance to marital interaction, an individ-

ual

develops assumptions about

the set of

characteristics

of a

person who fills the role of husband or wife (or comparable roles

in a

nonmarital

relationship) as well as assumptions about how

the members of a couple relate to one another. The

former as-

sumptions focusing on characteristics of persons are commonly

labeled

personae, and the

latter assumptions, which focus

on

events

or

chains

of

events,

are

referred

to as

scripts (Nisbett

&

Ross, 1980). (This is a restricted use of the term

script,

which

at

times has been used by other theorists to include standards

and expectancies as

they

are

defined

in this article.) A persona

about a person who fills a particular role includes not only a

set of characteristics but also a set of correlations among the

characteristics.

For

example,

an

individual

may

assume that

wives

tend to be loving, emotionally sensitive, cooperative, and

responsible. Also, the individual may assume that the degree to

which

a wife is cooperative is

highly

associated with how re-

sponsible a person she is.

An individual's personae can easily

influence

other cogni-

tions and are probably related to marital discord. For example,

the

assumption that men

are

only interested

in

sex could

re-

sult in a

wife

making biased attributions for her husband's be-

havior

and

inaccurate expectancies about

his

future behavior

and could also lead to marital discord.

The scripts relevant to marriage involve sequences of events

that

an

individual assumes typically occur between spouses.

An

individual's script

for an

argument with

his or her

spouse might

include

a

sequence

of

events such

as, We

begin debating

a

point. Then she tells me that I

don't know

what I'm talking

about. Then I

defend myself,

and then she

leaves

the room or

the house."

Personae (e.g.,

the

henpecked husband)

and

scripts (e.g.,

the

exploits of Archie and Edith Bunker) can be widely shared in a

culture,

or

they

can be idiosyncratic to an individual (e.g., a

husband's

fairly

unique

script about

how he and his wife behave

in order to respect each

other's

privacy). Accurate assumptions

allow individuals' past experiences to guide their current under-

standing and

interaction

with

their spouses,

but

inaccurate

as-

sumptions

may produce dysfunctional responses to marital

problems. Unfortunately, very little empirical research has in-

vestigated the importance of distorted assumptions in marital

discord,

so

their importance

in

marital distress

has not yet

been

demonstrated.

However,

Epstein and Eidelson (1981) found

that the more distressed spouses assumed that their partners

could

not

change

a

relationship and

that

overt disagreement

was

destructive to a relationship, the more they preferred individual

therapy

to marital therapy and the lower were their estimates

that therapy would

benefit

their

own

marital problems.

Standards. In contrast to the assumptions that a person

makes about the way relationships are, standards involve the

characteristics that

the

individual believes

a

partner

or

relation-

ship should

have.

As

emphasized

by

rational-emotive therapists

(Dryden,

1985; Ellis,

1962), an

individual may

hold an

extreme

or irrational standard about intimate relationships that no real-

life

relationship could match. For example, one spouse might

cling to the standard that "\bu should be able to read my mind,

and I should not have to tell you what I want or

need."

In addi-

tion,

he

or she

might also apply

an

extreme negative evaluation

when that standard is not met (e.g., It is awful if you do not

know what I want intuitively; I

can't

stand it ).

Standards per se are not dysfunctional; ethical and moral

standards

are

commonly quite functional guides

for

human

re-

lationships. They become problematic when they are extreme

or

rigid or when they detract from other aspects of an individu-

al's life (e.g., the person who strives to do the best I can in

everything I do may

suffer exhaustion

and may

alienate

ne-

glected

family

members).

As

in the area of assumptions, investigation into the role of

extreme

standards

in

marital discord

is

only beginning.

The

few

existing studies

have

typically distinguished between extreme

standards for individuals and extreme standards for intimate

relationships.

For

example, Epstein

and

Eidelson (1981) found

that spouses' marital distress and low involvement in marital

therapy were more strongly correlated with

a

measure

of

unre-

alistic assumptions

and

standards about intimate relationships

(Eidelson & Epstein, 1982) than with

Jones's (1968)

measure

of irrational

beliefs (extreme standards) about individual func-

tioning described by Ellis (1962). Similarly, Jordan and McCor-

mick (1987)

found

that unrealistic assumptions and standards

about relationships were more predictive of general marital dis-

tress than were extreme standards about sexual relationships.

These findings indicate the importance of assessing the content

of

assumptions and standards

focal

to relationships in order to

understand marital adjustment.

Selective Attention, Attributions, and Expectancies

Spouses' perceptions and

inferences

about each other's be-

havior

can contribute to marital distress independent of any

extreme

standards

and

evaluations because they

can

serve

as a

distorted and dissatisfying version of reality. That is, a spouse

might not violate standards about how a partner should behave,



SPECIAL SERIES: COGNITIONS AND MARRIAGE

but his or her behavior might be perceived or interpreted as be-

ing inconsistent with what brings the other person pleasure,

thus leading to dissatisfaction.

Selective

attention. Consistent with the idea that perception

is an active process rather than a passive reception of informa-

tion (Kelly, 1955),

we

define

perceptions as

those aspects

of the

information available

in a

situation that

an

individual notices

and

fits into cognitive structures (e.g., personae, scripts) that

have meaning to him or her. Social cognition researchers (cf,

Nisbett & Ross, 1980) and clinical writers (e.g., Beck et

al.,

1979;

Weiss,

1980)

have described how perceptions are suscep-

tible to selective attention because of factors such as emotional

states, fatigue, and preexisting cognitive structures. Perceptual

biases can

have powerful effects

on marital interaction because

spouses are normally unaware that the information they per-

ceive

is only a subset of the data available in any situation.

Two

types of related behavioral investigations

have

implica-

tions for the

issue

of selective attention. First, the extent to

which the two members of a married couple share a common

perception

of

what

has

occurred

in

their relationship provides

information

regarding the selective abstraction of information.

Several

investigations

have

demonstrated that married partners

have relatively different perceptions of what behaviors have oc-

curred

in the

marriage during

a given

24-hr period;

the

kappas

calculated between husbands' and wives' reporting of behavior

have averaged approximately .50

(Christensen

& Nies, 1980;

Christensen, Sullaway, & King, 1983; Jacobson & Moore,

1981). Jacobson and Moore (1981) concluded that two partners

in a marriage agreed less than half of the time about whether or

not a

certain event

had

occurred during

the

past day.

In

addi-

tion, all three of these investigations, as well

as

a study by Chris-

tensen

and

Wallace (1976), indicated that more satisfied cou-

ples evidenced a higher rate of agreement than more distressed

couples. Thus, although a certain degree of

differential

percep-

tion of marital events appears to be a way of

life

for most if

not all couples, couples who are more distressed seem to attend

selectively

in different ways to a greater extent.

Other investigators

have

compared a spouse's report of mari-

tal events with a trained rater's report of the couple's behavior.

The

logic

underlying such investigations is that a trained rater

will

have

less reason to ignore certain events and will be sensi-

tized to the full

range

of

behaviors under investigation.

For ex-

ample, Robinson and Price

(1980)

trained observers to rate the

behaviors

of both distressed and nondistressed couples in their

own homes. The couples also rated their own behaviors. A com-

parison

of the

raters' observations with

the

couples' observa-

tions

revealed results consistent with the findings of

differential

perception.

The

level

of

overall agreement between raters

and

spouses

was

low, with correlations

of

approximately .50. Also,

there was greater agreement between raters and nondistressed

spouses than between raters and distressed spouses. In fact,

dis-

tressed couples underestimated the frequency of pleasurable

events

by 50%.

Attributions. As noted earlier, a rapidly growing body of liter-

ature

has examined the attributions or causal explanations that

spouses provide

for

events in their relationships. The most com-

mon marital attribution dimensions investigated have been the

global-specific,

stable-unstable, and internal-external dimen-

sions

borrowed from

the

reformulated learned helplessness

the-

ory (Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978). This is a logical

link because

of the

many cognitive

and

behavioral similarities

between depression and marital maladjustment (Epstein,

1985).

In spite of several methodological issues to be discussed,

there have been some common findings across studies (e.g.,

Baucom,

Bell,

&

Dune, 1982;

Fincham,

Beach,

&

Baucom,

1987;

Fincham & O'Leary, 1983; Holtzworth-Munroe

&

Ja-

cobson, 1985; Jacobson, McDonald, Follette,

&

Berley, 1985;

Kyle &

Falbo,

1985). Distressed spouses tend to rate causes of

negative partner behaviors

as

more global

and

stable than

do

nondistressed individuals, whereas nondistressed spouses rate

causes

of positive behavior of the partner as more global and

stable. In addition, distressed spouses have a tendency to blame

their partners for negative marital events. These

attributional

tendencies serve to accentuate the positive in nondistressed re-

lationships and the negative in distressed relationships.

Recent studies have investigated other attributional dimen-

sions that focus on the characteristics and motives of the part-

ner, such as positive versus negative intent, blameworthiness,

selfish motivation, and lack of love (Epstein, Pretzer, & Fleming,

1987;

Fincham, Beach, & Nelson, 1987; Fincham & Bradbury,

1988;

Pretzer, Epstein,

&

Fleming, 1985). These studies have

consistently

found

strong associations between such attribu-

tions and

indices

of

marital maladjustment, again indicating

that distressed spouses explain their partners' behavior in ways

that

focus on

negative aspects

of the

partner.

As

with almost all of the studies on cognitions and intimate

relationships, the investigations of attributions and marriage

are correlational, and conclusions about cause and

effect

rela-

tionships cannot

be

drawn (see Fincham

&

Bradbury,

1987, for

an exception). Also, because there are no criteria for assessing

the validity of the attributions, it is unclear whether distressed

spouses are offering distorted attributions or whether their part-

ners

actually

do

behave with negative motivations.

Expectancies. Social learning theorists such as Rotter (1954)

and

Bandura

(1977)

have described

how

people learn

to

antici-

pate probable consequences of their behavior and alter their

be-

havior accordingly.

For

example,

an

individual

may

develop

an

expectancy that behaving assertively will elicit intense criticism

from

his or her

partner and, consequently,

the

individual will

choose a submissive response. Expectancies can be situation-

or

relationship-specific, or they can be more generalized (e.g.,

applied to a range of relationships, not only marriage, or ap-

plied across a

wide

range of situations within a marriage).

Bandura (1977) distinguished between an outcome

expec-

tancy

(a prediction that a particular action will produce

partic-

ular consequences

in a

certain situation)

and an efficacy

expec-

tancy (an

estimate

of the

probability that

one

will

be

able

to

carry

out the

particular action needed

to

produce those conse-

quences).

Individuals' expectancies about interactions between

spouses tend to take an "if-then" form and can involve predic-

tions about reactions of the partner to one's own

behavior,

reac-

tions

of the self to the

partner's behavior,

and

outcomes

of a

joint event (e.g.,

"If we argue in

front

of the

children, they will

be harmed psychologically").

As with some of the other cognitions described previously,

there is scant research on the role of expectancies in intimate



BAUCOM, EPSTEIN, SAVERS,

AND

SHER

relationships. Crossing two dimensions of expectancies—gen-

eralized versus specific

by

outcome expectancy

versus

efficacy

expectancy—results

in at least

four

different types of expectan-

cies that can be explored. Pretzer et

al.

(1985) conducted one of

the

only

studies in this area, and it focused solely on generalized

efficacy

expectancies. Their results supported Doherty's

(1981a,

1981b)

hypotheses that spouses'

low

efficacy

expecta-

tions regarding their ability to

solve

their marital problems are

associated with marital distress and depression and with attri-

butions of causality for relationship problems to their partner's

behavior, stable personality, malicious intent,

and

lack

of

love.

Operationalizing

Terms

To evaluate a model of marital

functioning

that primarily

considers cognitive factors, these cognitive variables must

be op-

erationalized.

Although there has been considerable attention

given to the role of causal attributions in marital functioning,

few attempts have been made

to

operationalize

the

other cogni-

tive variables previously discussed. Yet, even when attributions

have been considered alone, a number of unresolved conceptual

and methodological issues

have

surfaced. Several of these issues

will

be

considered because they

will

probably resurface when

attempts are made to assess the other categories of cognitions.

One

general issue that has arisen in assessing attributions is

the extent to which the assessment strategies mirror the attribu-

tional processes that occur in the

day-to-day

lives of couples.

This rather broad concern incorporates several

specific

issues.

First, the extent to which the individual is asked explicitly to

make attributions is

important.

That is, individuals do not

make attributions about every event;

to do so

would result

in

an

extreme amount

of

cognitive processing that

would

severely

curtail the

person's

ability to proceed through

even

uncompli-

cated events. Consequently, although most self-report invento-

ries

of attributions concerning marital interaction explicitly

ask

the respondent to explain why an event or behavior occurred,

it is

unclear whether

the

person would have provided

an

attribu-

tion for the event in the natural environment (e.g., Pyszcynski

&Greenberg, 1981). Holtzworth-Munroeand Jacobson (1985)

both directly

and

indirectly

probed

for

attributions regarding

marital events. They found that, although

the two

methodolo-

gies

resulted in attributions that were statistically

significantly

correlated,

the

correlations were

all

modest

in

magnitude.

Thus, the manner in which attributions are elicited probably

influences

what is

obtained,

and at present the relative merits

of the various strategies are unclear. Similarly, the extent to

which the assessment strategy directs the respondent's thoughts

is pertinent when cognitions other than attributions are consid-

ered.

The representativeness of the cognitive assessment strategy

for understanding

the

couple's marital

functioning is influenced

by a second factor whose relationship is

focused

on in the as-

sessment. Some inventories

ask

respondents only about their

cognitions regarding their own marriages (Baucom & Sayers,

1987; Pretzer et

al., 1985),

yet other self-report measures ask

respondents about their cognitions regarding marriages in gen-

eral

as well as their own marriages

(Eidelson

& Epstein, 1982).

Asking

about both types of relationships is appropriate, but

items

have

typically been combined into a single score, al-

though the two foci may yield very different information. For

example, clinical experience suggests that

many

distressed cou-

ples

hold different standards for their own marriage than for

marriages in general. To combine these two pieces of informa-

tion into a single score could result in misleading or confusing

results.

The extent to which the assessment strategy mirrors cogni-

tions in

day-to-day living

is

also

influenced by the specific

stim-

uli,

behaviors,

or

events with which

the

individual

is

presented.

Attributional assessment strategies can be divided according to

whether

they

ask

couples

to

consider hypothetical

or

real events

in their

relationships

(e.g., Madden

&

Janoff-Bulman, 1981;

Orvis,

Kelley, &

Butler, 1976). Hypothetical events have

the as-

set that all couples will be responding to the same set of stimuli,

which

allows

for easier comparison across couples; the liability

is that the events may not be representative of the couples' own

behavior.

Using actual events from

the

couples' lives ensures

that the events

have

relevance to them; however, comparison

across couples becomes more complex. Findings to date

have

been similar

when

attributions

for

both

actual

and

hypothetical

marital events

have

been considered; yet, only one study has

compared

the

equivalence

of

hypothetical versus actual events,

and then only for wives (Fincham & Beach, in press). Their

findings

revealed that similar attributions were provided

for the

two types

of

stimuli. Whether

to use

real

or

hypothetical events

must

also be addressed when the other classes of

cognitions

are

operationalized.

As stated previously, one major reason for using hypothetical

marital events is that all spouses are thus providing cognitions

about the same set of stimuli. To maximize the representative-

ness

of the stimuli and yet provide a set of questions or state-

ments to which all couples can

respond,

some investigators have

taken a different approach. They

have

constructed statements

that ask about the relationship in a very general way (e.g., Burns

& Volpicelli,

1987; Pretzer el al., 1985). Thus, in assessing ex-

pectancies, a

respondent might

be

asked

the

extent

to

which

he

or she agrees with the following statement, "No matter what I

do, my partner

will

not change." Such global expectancies

might be an

important part

of

marital adjustment. However,

marital discord also seems to involve cognitions about very spe-

cific situations and aspects of the relationship, and the spouses'

thoughts

about these specific components

of the

marriage also

need to be assessed.

In part,

the

relevance

of

obtaining cognitions about global

aspects or specific content areas of the relationship depends on

whether

or not individuals have global cognitive

styles

that in-

volve thinking about many aspects

of the

relationship

in the

same way. For example, if a spouse makes similar attributions

for marital events regardless

of the

specific content under con-

sideration (i.e., has a strong attributional

style),

then the content

provided

is of

less importance. Some marital investigators have

apparently assumed that spouses have an attributional style re-

garding

their marriage (e.g., Doherty, 1982). However, Baucom,

Sayers, and Duhe (in press)

found that,

whereas some spouses

do provide consistent attributions across marital situations,

other

spouses offer attributions that appear

to be

situation-spe-

cific.




35

Persons with individual

psychopathology often

have

distorted

and

extreme cognitions that should alert marital investigators

from a

methodological perspective.

For

example, ample evi-

dence exists that depressed individuals have negativistic attribu-

tions,

expectancies,

and so forth.

Therefore, when investigating

the

cognitions

of

maritally

distressed

couples, researchers must

also evaluate whether

the

individuals

are

depressed. Then, fac-

torial designs

can be

used

or the level of

depression

can be

co-

varied

to insure

that

extreme or

distorted

cognitions are a

func-

tion of the

marital distress

per se

rather than

a function of the

individual's

depression. Whereas depression

is one

variable that

should

be

considered

in

evaluating

spouses'

cognitions, marital

researchers must also take into account any other disorder or

phenomenon that

is likely to

confound

the relationship

between

marital functioning and

cognitions.

A

final

important issue

in operationalizing

cognitive vari-

ables relevant

to

marriage

is

whether

to focus on the

actual con-

tent

of

cognitions,

on

broader dimensions presumed

to be im-

portant within certain categories

of

cognitions,

or on

some

inte-

gration

of

the

two.

For

example,

in

assessing attributions

within

marriage, almost no investigators

have focused

on the actual

content

of the

attributions (see Pretzer

et al.,

1985,

for an excep-

tion). Respondents

are

typically asked

to offer

attributions

for

why

some marital

event occurred. Next, the

respondent

or

out-

side raters evaluate

the

attribution

on

several dimensions

such

as locus of control, globality, and stability.

Almost invariably,

these dimensions become the

foci

of the investigation. Thus,

the

content (e.g., whether

the respondent

believes that problems

result because the partner is stupid or lazy, etc.) is lost. Other

investigators have

focused on content but have not been as care-

ful

in

delineating

the

categories

of

cognitions under consider-

ation. For example, Burns and

Volpicelli's

scale (1987)

assesses

a broad range of content areas that cognitive theorists believe

are relevant to marital

distress

(e.g., partner is unwilling or un-

able to change). Whereas some of these areas are assessed with

questions focusing

on

assumptions

and

expectancies, other con-

tent areas are assessed by asking about standards and assump-

tions.

At times, it is unclear why a

given

content area is assessed

in

terms of certain

categories

of cognitions.

In future

attempts to investigate couples' cognitions and

marital

functioning, a

consideration

of

both content

and

type

of

cognition

could

be a

fruitful strategy.

That is,

investigators

might select

what

appear

to be the

important varieties

of

con-

tent

in

couples' cognitions

and

might then systematically

ask

questions about the couples' perceptions, attributions, assump-

tions,

expectancies, and standards in each particular content

area. Such systematic exploration

would allow

for a determina-

tion of how these different types of cognitive variables, such as

attributions and expectancies, interrelate in a

given

content

area. Certain patterns

across

cognitive variables might

well be

related to marital

distress.

For example, a spouse might (a)

have

a clear set of assumptions about a content

area,

make attribu-

tions about past behavior consistent

with

these assumptions,

and

similarly provide expectancies about

future

behavior

in

light

of these assumptions and attributions but (b)

have

stan-

dards as to how the relationship

should

be that are in conflict

with

these assumptions, attributions, and expectancies. As a re-

sult,

this

conflict

between

(a) how the

relationship

is

perceived

to be

versus

(b) how the

relationship should

be in this

content

area

might be a source of distress to the couple.

Thus, attempts

to

operationalize cognitions

and to

deal with

the methodological and conceptual complexities inherent in as-

sessing

couples' cognitions relevant

to

their marriages

are only

beginning. However, even as these issues become resolved, theo-

reticians and investigators must continue to

focus

on an even

broader

issue:

how

these cognitive variables

are to be

used

in

building a

model

of

marital

functioning.

Building

Models of

Marital

Functioning

Whereas new

research might

be

pursued based

on the defini-

tional

and

methodological issues already discussed, clear and

concise theoretical models of marital adjustment are needed to

embrace cognitive constructs

and to

provide direction

for

this

research.

If

models

of

marital adjustment

are to be

constructed

that include cognitions,

the

relations among

the

various catego-

ries

of

cognitions must

be

made explicit.

In

addition, relations

among

cognitions

and

other variables such

as

behavior

and

affect

must be integrated into a model of marital

functioning,

and

theoreticians must be explicit about the causal relations

that are hypothesized to exist

among

these constructs.

A potential source

of confusion

regarding causal models con-

cerns the

general

statement by investigators that cognitions,

affect, and

behavior interact

in influencing the

couple. Although

the

meaning

of

this statement seems

to be

self-evident,

a diffi-

culty

arises concerning

the

potentially different connotations

for the

term interact. Buss (1977) described these

different

meanings in his discussion of the trait-situation controversy in

predicting

and

understanding behavior.

In the first

meaning,

two

variables such

as

environment

(E) and

person

(P) are

used

to predict and explain a third variable, such as behavior (B);

these relations

can be

characterized

by the function, B = f(E,

P).

This

has

been labeled

the

analysis

of

variance

(ANOVA)

model because, conceptually,

E

and

P

variables are used as fac-

tors or as independent variables

whose

interaction is used to

predict B, the

dependent variable. Quite appropriately,

ANOVA

statistical techniques

have

been used

to

test this model.

(In

con-

sidering

marital

functioning,

other variables, including cogni-

tions, can be

substituted

for E, P, and B.)

This

is

generally

re-

garded

as a mechanistic

model

in that it embodies unidirec-

tional

causality from environment

and

person

to

behavior.

The

model

allows

for investigating whether two or more variables

are additively or interactively related to a dependent variable.

Interaction

in

this model means that

the

independent variables

need

to be

considered simultaneously

in

order

to

understand

their relation to the dependent variable.

Jacobson et al.

(1985)

utilized

this

meaning

when

examining

the effects of negative behavior and

level

of marital distress on

the

types

of

attributions made

by couples. The

investigators

asked spouses

to

participate

in a

conflict resolution task

with

their partners.

Before the

task,

the

experimenter

privately in-

structed one spouse to

behave

either positively or

negatively.

Both

distressed

and

nondistressed couples

were

included

in

this

procedure, yielding a 2 X 2 (Behavior X Couple Type) design.

The results

indicated

an

interaction

effect

such that distressed

spouses

were

more internal in their attributions concerning the



36

BAUCOM, EPSTEIN,

SAVERS, AND SHER

partner's behavior when that partner was instructed to behave

negatively and were more external when the partner was to be-

have positively. Conversely, nondistressed spouses were more

internal in their attributions for positive behavior and external

in their attributions for negative behavior. The investigators ap-

propriately noted that this type of design does not examine

whether there are reciprocal causal relations among the vari-

ables.

In

the second meaning of interaction, there is a reciprocal

relationship between person

(F)

and environment (E), which is

construed as bidirectional or cyclical between these two sets of

variables (E •* » f). Each variable is considered to be simulta-

neously both

a

dependent

and

independent variable,

and

this

is referred to as an organismic model.

Thus,

in

considering

a

married

couple, a spouse's cognitions may

influence

that per-

son's emotions toward the partner, and those emotions might

then

influence future

cognitions which that individual experi-

ences. This example

focuses on

reciprocal causality within

a

single individual; the model becomes much more complex

when

attempting

to

explain reciprocal causality between

two

persons

in a

relationship.

Thus, in the first instance, the concept of interaction focuses

on the

manner

in which two

variables combine

in a

unique

way

in relation

to a

third variable,

and the

causality

is

often

viewed

as unidirectional.

However,

in the second case, causality is

clearly

bidirectional,

and

interaction refers

to the way in

which

two (or more) variables mutually influence and change each

other.

The difficulty

arises

when

researchers espouse

a

model

that defines interaction from

one

perspective

but

then empiri-

cally investigate the concept using a methodology appropriate

for

the

other meaning

of

interaction.

Consequently,

in building models of marital distress that give

a

significant

role to couples' cognitions, the theoretician must

be attuned to several issues. Cognitions must not be described

in

a

general way; instead,

the

various types

of

cognitions must

be differentiated, and the relations between these cognitive vari-

ables and marital distress must be made clear (e.g., Fincham &

Bradbury, 1988). The relations among various cognitions and

among

cognitions and other important constructs such as emo-

tions and behavior should also be specified. In doing so, the the-

oretician must go beyond the self-evident yet potentially confus-

ing general statement that these variables interact. Instead, the

two meanings of interaction,

from ANOVA

and reciprocal in-

fluence

perspectives,

must be considered. At present, our

efforts

in these directions

have

just begun. Investigators

have

estab-

lished with some consistency that attributions are related to

level of

marital discord,

and the few

studies that exist confirm

a relation between standards or

beliefs

and

level

of marital ad-

justment. If these findings are to

have

maximal impact on our

understanding

of relationships, it is important that they be inte-

grated into more complete models of marital functioning incor-

porating the guidelines outlined here.

Intervening

in

Marital Discord

Given

that several of the previous categories of cognitions

have rarely been discussed by marital investigators, that opera-

tionalization of the constructs is only beginning, and that

models

of

marital functioning that incorporate cognitions

are

at an early stage of development, it is not surprising that at-

tempts to intervene with distressed couples' cognitions have

rarely been evaluated. Three investigations have implemented

cognitive restructuring alone without other interventions

(Em-

melkamp, 1985; Epstein, Pretzer, & Fleming, 1982; Huber &

Milstein, 1985), and two other investigations have explored

whether behavioral marital therapy (BMT) could be strength-

ened by

adding

a

cognitive component (Baucom, 1985; Bau-

com &

Lester, 1986).

The

results

of

these investigations

have

indicated that cognitive restructuring with distressed couples

can produce meaningful cognitive

changes,

particularly in rela-

tionship standards, assumptions, and expectancies. Selective at-

tention has rarely been investigated, and the potential for alter-

ing

attributions is unclear. Cognitive restructuring has also

al-

tered couples' attitudes toward therapy itself. Huber and

Milstein (1985) found that brief cognitive therapy increased

couples' expectancies that marital therapy would

benefit

them

and

increased their desire

to

improve their relationships.

In ad-

dition, the

treatments

were effective in

increasing marital

ad-

justment.

However,

as is consistent with other outcome studies,

cognitive restructuring in isolation or in combination with

BMT

appears

to be no

more effective than

BMT

alone

when

couples are randomly assigned to treatment conditions (see

Baucom &

Hoffman, 1986,

for a

review

of

marital outcome

re-

search).

Thus, the findings indicate that cognitive therapy can alter

distressed couples' cognitions and increase their levels of mari-

tal adjustment. Yet, to be maximally effective, these treatment

interventions must draw on basic research. At the least, this

means that the constructs must be operationalized and the

many methodological issues resolved. In addition, treatment

interventions involving cognitions can benefit from well-devel-

oped

models

of

marital

functioning

that incorporate cognitions.

Such

models

can

provide guidelines regarding which couples

will benefit most from cognitive restructuring

and how to im-

plement these interventions. Once these findings and theories

are available, there is an increased likelihood that cognitive in-

terventions will maximally

benefit

distressed couples.

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Mineka Appointed Editor

of

Journal

of Abnormal Psychology, 1990-1995

The Publications and Communications Board of the American Psychological Association an-

nounces the appointment of Susan Mineka, Northwestern University, as editor of the

Journal

of Abnormal

Psychology

for a

6-year term beginning

in

1990.

As of

January

1,

1989, manu-

scripts should

be directed to

Susan

Mineka

Northwestern University

Department

of

Psychology

102

Swift

Hall

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