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Shaping the Public Image of Islam: TheShiis of Ireland as “Moderate” MuslimsOliver Scharbrodt

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Shaping the Public Image of Islam: The Shiis of Irelandas “Moderate” Muslims

OLIVER SCHARBRODT

Abstract

Public discourse on Muslims in Europe has been characterized by a differentiationbetween “moderate” and “radical” Muslims. This discourse which distinguishesbetween acceptable and unacceptable forms of Islam also creates tensions and com-petitions among Muslims with organizations and individuals vying for leadership,recognition, and government sponsorship by presenting themselves as moderatevoices within Muslim communities speaking out against extremism and radicalism.In Ireland, the Shii community, its clerical leader and other lay activists emphasizetheir moderate and integrationist understanding of Islam and appear as outspokencritics of radical and militant expressions of Sunni Islam. Thereby, representatives ofthe Shii community adopt the differentiation between moderate and radical Muslimsin contemporary discourse and conflate it with the historical sectarian divide betweenSunnis and Shiis, translated into a European diaporic setting. In addition to provid-ing a profile of the Shii community in Ireland, this paper discusses the Shii self-representation as a moderate group among Muslims in Ireland. The reasons andmotivations for this particular self-representation in the public will be examinedby considering the socio-economic background of early Shii migrants, currentstreams of Shii thought and its impact on Shiis in Ireland and the double-minoritysetting as “a minority within a minority”.

Introduction

Post 9/11, in the context of “the securitisation of Islam”1 public discourse on Muslims inEurope has been characterized by a differentiation between “moderate” and “radical”Muslims.2 While the former are perceived as acceptable partners for governments andother political and social actors and need to be supported in their efforts to counter radic-alism, the latter are viewed as security risks, in opposition to integration and hostile toEuropean values and norms.3 This bifurcation also results in a certain public pressureon Muslims to prove their moderate credentials based, for example, on their attitudestowards women,4 the use of violence or the Middle East conflict.5 While a growingbody of academic literature has engaged with this phenomenon it has focused so far oneither government initiatives to promote “moderate” Islam through sponsoring or co-opting particular Muslim organizations or policing the activities of imams6 or on thepublic discourse on Islam and Muslims in the media, politics, or academia reflectingthis bifurcation.7 The current European public discourse which distinguishes betweenacceptable and unacceptable forms of Islam also creates tensions and competitionsamong Muslims with organizations and individuals vying for leadership, recognition,and government sponsorship by presenting themselves as moderate voices withinMuslim communities speaking out against extremism and radicalism.8 This paper

Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, Vol. 31, No. 4, December 2011

ISSN 1360-2004 print/ISSN 1469-9591 online/11/040518-16 © 2011 Institute of Muslim Minority Affairshttp://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13602004.2011.630860

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investigates how this bifurcating discourse is used byMuslim leaders and organizations inEurope in order to achieve public recognition or ward off suspicion from a particulargroup, community, or organization. As an example the paper will use contemporarydynamics occurring among Muslims in the Republic of Ireland.Although the Irish government officially does not express particular concern about the

potential security risks posed by radical Muslims resident in Ireland,9 the public debateon the various ideological orientations of Muslims and specific mosques and organiz-ations has followed the aforementioned pattern of bifurcating Muslims between radicaland moderate strands.10 In Ireland, the Shii community, its clerical leader and otherlay activists emphasize their moderate and integrationist understanding of Islam andappear as outspoken critics of radical and militant expressions of Sunni Islam.Thereby, representatives of the Shii community adopt the differentiation between mod-erate and radical Muslims in contemporary discourse and conflate it with the historicalsectarian divide between Sunnis and Shiis, translated into a European diaporic setting.This paper will provide some background information on the Shii community inIreland and its relationship with Sunni Muslim groups, followed by a discussion of theShii self-representation as a moderate group among Muslims in Ireland. Interviewswith the leadership and members of the Shii community were conducted and themedia coverage on Ireland’s Shiis analyzed for this purpose. In conclusion, the reasonsand motivations for this particular self-representation in the public will be discussed byconsidering the socio-economic background of early Shii migrants, current streams ofShii thought and its impact on Shiis in Ireland and the double-minority setting as “a min-ority within a minority”11 with its particular pressure to gain public recognition.

The Shiis of Ireland—A Profile

Estimates suggest that around 3,000-4,000 Shiis live in Ireland, about half of them inDublin.12 The ethnic composition and socio-economic status of the Shii communityreflect the overall development of Muslim migration to Ireland in the last decades. Upto the early 1990s, the community was primarily composed of educated professionals,medical doctors in particular, who came to Ireland for educational purposes, most ofwhom as students at the Royal College of Surgeons in Dublin. They arrived as studentsfrom Iraq and other countries of the Gulf region with significant Shii communities suchas Saudi-Arabia and Bahrain. The clerical leader of the Irish Shii community, Iraqi-bornDr Ali Al-Saleh, represents this background in his own biography: he came from Saudi-Arabia to Ireland in 1985 to complete his medical studies and then continued his trainingas a Shii cleric in Iran until 1997.13

With the start of the so-called Celtic Tiger Years (1995–2007) and the major economictransformation of Ireland, Muslim migration increased significantly, also affecting theShii community with a new influx of Muslim migrants from Pakistan, among themmany Shiis as well. At the same time, the number of refugees admitted to Ireland andof asylum seekers increased rapidly in the 1990s and early 2000s changing the demo-graphic composition of Muslims in general and of Shiis in particular. Iraq has beenone of the top countries of origin of asylum seekers in Ireland,14 many of whom areShiis fleeing from the continuing chaos and disorder of their country after the fall ofSaddam Hussein. Therefore, as other Muslim communities in Ireland, Shiis can bedivided into a group of more settled migrants who arrived in Ireland before the early1990s, are usually well-educated and part of the middle- or upper-class and a group ofrecent of arrivals of labor migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers.15

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This demographic shift is also reflected in the centers Shiis use for their religious andsocial activities. Themajor center is the Ahlul-Bayt Islamic Centre in theMilltown area inSouth Dublin which was opened in 1996. This purpose-built center, placed right in theheart of a middle-class neighborhood, includes several meeting rooms, a library, a prayerroom, kitchen facilities, guest rooms, and the apartment for the imam and his family. Thecenter is independently financed through donations made by local Shiis in Ireland and bywealthy Shiis in the Persian Gulf region. Al-Saleh’s father was until his death the personalrepresentative (wakil) of Grand Ayatollah Al-Sistani in Qatar and hence had access to awide network of Shiis in the region who have secured the funding of the center. Initialfunding to buy the land and build the center was also provided by the Maktoum Foun-dation, the sponsor of the Islamic Cultural Centre in Ireland, the major Sunni mosque inthe country. The foundation is run by Sheikh Hamdan Al-Maktoum, member of theruling family of Dubai and finance minister of the United Arab Emirates. The ratherunusual partial sponsoring of the Shii center by a Sunni-oriented foundation resultsfrom the openness of Maktoum to fund Islamic philanthropic projects in general andfrom the religious background of the head of the Maktoum Foundation’s Europeanoffice in London, Mirza Saig, who is a Shii.16 That the center receives its fundingthrough private donations by wealthy individual Shiis from the Gulf region and is notdependent on support by governments or government-affiliated agencies, creates acertain degree of financial autonomy, which Al-Saleh and other representatives empha-size as a particular advantage of the local Shii community. The fact that the center isrun by Al-Saleh and his family and financed through his father’s Shii networks in theGulf region illustrates how the traditional leadership of the Shii clerics is also central ina diasporic setting.17

The facilities of the center have been shared by Shiis of different nationalities.However, apart from the ritual salat prayers each national group organizes its ownevents, catering for their particular linguistic and cultural needs. Several reasonsaccount for this: first, the particular nature of Shii devotional practices which revolve pri-marily around the celebration of the birthdays and the commemoration of the martyr-doms of the Shii Imams differ culturally between different ethnic groups and also uselocal languages.18 For instance, central to religious gatherings of South Asian Shiis isthe recitation of Urdu hymns in praise of the Shii Imams. Second, given that mostShiis are first generation migrants, the language of their country of origin is still theirfirst language and consequently preferred for social interaction and community activities.Third, the religious and devotional meetings of the various Shii national groups alsoexhibit a strong socio-cultural dimension as they allow, apart from their actual religiouspurpose, the possibility to socialize with one’s own community, Iraqi or Pakistani, in afamiliar linguistic and cultural setting. In that sense, each national group of the Shii com-munity uses its own language and meets on its own, which is evidenced as well in the chil-dren’s classes, offered every Sunday in the center which are held for Arab and SouthAsian Shiis separately.

In June 2010, a group of Pakistani Shiis opened a Pakistani Shii center, the Azakhana-eZahra, in the Stadium Business Park in Blanchetstown, North Dublin. This new Shiicenter represents a new type of meeting place, reflective of the social realities ofnewly arriving Muslim immigrants. While the Ahlul-Bayt Centre in the affluentMilltown area in South Dublin represents the more settled Shii Muslims of fairlyadvanced economic status, the new Pakistani center is based in a business unit rentedin a remote industrial estate with a new African Pentecostal church as its immediateneighbor.

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The opening of a new Shii center in the north of Dublin is a result of the increasingnumber of Shiis in Ireland and part of the subsequent trend of diversifying Muslimreligious activities in general. Although Pakistani Shiis have used the facilities of theAhlul-Bayt Centre, there was a certain ambition to create their own center and theBabul-Ilm Society was created for that purpose.19 The location in north Dublin alsoreflects the social background of new arrivals. The social north–south divide ofDublin with a middle-class south and a working-class north has turned the northinto a more attractive location for Muslim labor migrants while the south of the cityis the primary residential area of the more settled, middle-class Muslim families. Asmost Pakistani Shiis live in the north, the location of the Ahlul-Bayt center in southDublin has caused some inconvenience and explains the choice of the industrialestate in the north.Unlike most initiatives to organize Shiis communities in Europe and North America

which are primarily led by Shii clerics and thereby maintain their traditional leadership,20

the Babul-Ilm Society was launched by non-clerical Pakistani Shiis and is typical of thelay-oriented forms of local leadership of Sunni-Muslim communities in the West. Never-theless, the importance of clerical leadership is evident by the presence of Al-Saleh at theopening of the Pakistani Shii center and of clerical representatives from the Shia IslamicEducation Society from the UK, among them its head Siyyid Rizvi. Until recruitment of apermanent resident imam, either Al-Saleh, other Shiis in Ireland with some clerical train-ing or South Asian clerics from Britain give lectures at the Pakistani Shii center inBlanchetstown.In addition to the Shii centers in Milltown and Blanchetstown in Dublin, Shiis from

Kuwait use a flat as their own meeting center. Outside of Dublin, a new Husayniyyacenter opened in Cork in spring 2010 and Shiis in Galway meet at a private residence.While the Ahlul-Bayt Centre served as the major Shii center of Ireland in the past, attract-ing large numbers of Shiis from the Dublin area and the rest of the country, the numbershave decreased in recent years as a consequence of different nationalities such asPakistanis and Kuwaitis opening their own centers in Dublin and elsewhere, turningthe Ahlul-Bayt Centre increasingly into a Husayniyya for Iraqi and Gulf Arab Shiis inDublin. These developments illustrate, on the one hand, the diversification of Shii com-munal activities due to the growth in numbers which makes the opening of communitycenters more feasible. On the other hand, they also reflect the national and ethnicfragmentation of Shii communities in the diaspora in Europe and North Americawhere most Shii prefer to socialize with fellow Shiis from their countries of origin andof the same cultural and linguistic backgrounds.21

The relationship between Shiis and Sunnis in Ireland is ambivalent. In certain areas,co-operation between Shiis and Sunnis exists and various religious services providedby Sunni mosques and organizations are also used by Shiis. Before the opening of theAhlul-Bayt Centre, Shiis would attend Sunni mosques in Dublin as Shiis still do inother Irish cities where a proper Shii center does not exist and usually only one majormosque is attended by Muslim residents of a city. In Dublin, Shiis use the educationalservices offered by the Islamic Cultural Centre such as the Qur’an school for children.Furthermore, Shii pupils attend the Muslim National School in Clonskeagh, based inthe facilities of the Islamic Cultural Centre and headed by the Sunni imam of theDublin City Mosque.22 Al-Saleh, who has sent his own children to this school,encourages in his sermons other Shiis to do the same.23 In addition to this shared useof mosque and educational services by Sunnis and Shiis—not uncommon amongMuslim minorities in the West,24—Al-Saleh is a member of the Irish Council of

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Imams, a body with 35 representatives from various mosques in Ireland, headed by theSunni imam of the Islamic Cultural Centre, Hussein Halawa.25

Despite these collaborations in various forms, sectarian tensions between Sunnis andShiis also become visible in the Irish context. Two factors have contributed to the mani-festation of the sectarian rivalry in Ireland: the appeal of more Salafi-oriented expressionsof Islam among Irish Muslims with its explicit anti-Shii stance plays a certain role.26 Inaddition, the political empowerment of Shiis in Iraq has also had repercussions onMuslims in Ireland, with a rising number of refugees from Iraq, both Shii and Sunni,bringing the sectarian conflict of Iraq to Ireland. The support of Iraqi Shiis for theremoval of SaddamHussein and hence for the American occupation of Iraq has separatedthem politically from most Sunni Muslims and their rejection of the Iraq war.27

Shiis as “Moderate” Muslims

The public discourse on Shii Muslims in Ireland emphasizes their moderate credentialsas a voice speaking out against Islamic extremism and radicalism. In particular, the cle-rical leader of the Shii community, Dr Ali Al-Saleh, has played a pivotal role in buttres-sing the self-definition and self-representation of Shiis in Ireland as followers of amoderate and tolerant form of Islam.28 Three examples will be used to illustrate this dis-course by Shiis and their leading representatives and their public reception as such inIreland: (i) attitudes towards life in a liberal, secular and pluralistic society in Europe;(ii) the assessment of the Iraq war and its aftermath; and (iii) responses to suspected ter-rorist activities of Muslims in Ireland.

In various interviews conducted with the author, Al-Saleh emphasizes the need ofMuslims to integrate into and engage with Irish society and to avoid the ghettoizationof Muslims as it has happened in other European countries and is also propagated bySalafi-oriented Muslims in Ireland.29 He also points at the benefits of living in a liberalsociety, allowing freedom of religion and freedom of speech, basic human rights notalways guaranteed in Muslim-majority countries in the Middle East.30 To provide anexample: although critical of the presence of Omar Bakri Mohammed, a Syrian-born Isla-mist activist based for many years in Britain, at an annual debate of the Trinity Philoso-phical Society on Islam in October 2007, at which Al-Saleh also participated, he stillconsiders the attendance of such a controversial figure, who is banned from enteringthe UK, for example, as a sign that shows “how beautiful liberal society is”.31

Al-Saleh is also supportive of other European initiatives to promote “moderate” Islamand to counter Islamic extremism. Speaking at a conference of the Quilliam Foundationin June 2008, an organization founded by two former members of Hizbut-Tahrir in theUK,32 Al-Saleh applauds the organizers for their fight against extremism and emphasizesthe need to protect young Muslims in particular against the influence of radical Muslims.Stating that Islam supports human rights, women’s rights and democracy, he also under-lines the essential harmony between religion and human rights, as all monotheistic reli-gions promote human dignity as part of their teachings. In conclusion of his speech, healludes to a hadith, attributed to the Prophet Muhammad, that one day the sun willrise from the West. While originally the hadith contains an apocalyptic prophecy describ-ing one of the signs of the Day of Judgement, he ignores completely its eschatologicalbackground in order to convey an allegorical interpretation: it refers to the firm establish-ment of human rights and democracy in the West that will influence the rest of the world.For Al-Saleh, Muslims in the West have the opportunity to develop an “Islam of

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democracy and human rights”33 and convey this new understanding of Islam to Muslimselsewhere.The American occupation of Iraq and the downfall of Saddam Hussein with the sub-

sequent empowerment of Iraqi Shiis and inter-sectarian struggle between Shiis andSunnis provide another area to which Shiis in Ireland resort in order to underlinetheir commitment to democracy. As in other parts of the world, demonstrations byIraqi Shiis in support of the American occupation of Iraq occurred also in Irelandas well as public celebrations after the capture of Saddam Hussein in December2003.34 While Iraqi Shiis in Ireland welcomed the toppling of Saddam Hussein, repre-sentatives of Sunni Muslim mosques and organizations were more skeptical of the Iraqwar and participated in demonstrations against it together with other Irish peace acti-vists.35

Al-Saleh contributed an article to The Irish Times in April 2006 presenting his views onthe current political situation in the country.36 Commemorating the third anniversary ofthe invasion of Iraq, he criticizes the organizers and participants of demonstrationsagainst the Iraq war and against the American occupation of the country who areunaware of the democratic benefits the toppling of Saddam Hussein’s regime hasbrought to the people of Iraq. Responding to criticism that the war has caused thedeaths of thousands of Iraqis, he attributes these deaths to the activities of terrorists,most of whom from outside of Iraq, and not to the invading armies. His account of theIraq war and its aftermath mirrors the discourse of political groups supportive of the inva-sion: the matter of whether Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction, originally pre-sented as main rationale for the war, is rendered irrelevant by referring to thepossibility of turning Iraq to “the role model for democracy and human rights whichwill spur democratic change across the Middle East”.37 The current political chaosand sectarian violence is not caused by Iraqis but a result of the activities of foreign,Taliban-style terrorists. In addition, he also appeals to Irish historical sentiments bylinking the need for sacrifices with democratic change. While he and his family have per-sonally experienced the loss of relatives in Iraq due to the current violence, they believe“that this terrible sacrifice is worth it for the sake of democracy”.38 The link betweensacrifices in the struggle for democracy and self-determination and its echoes in Irishhistory become more obvious when he creates a direct historical parallel between thecurrent situation in Iraq and the aspirations of the Iraqi people and the struggle forIrish independence from British colonial rule in the early twentieth century: “Iraqistoday want what the Irish wanted in 1922: to live in peace, to rule ourselves, to raiseour children according to the traditions of our religious faith and to be free of foreignoppressors”.39

Since 9/11, the activities of suspected Islamist terrorists provide a major discursivedividing line between “radical” and “moderate” Muslims, requiring Muslim organiz-ations and representatives to dissociate themselves explicitly from such activities inorder to be counted as moderates. The interviewed Shiis present themselves as victimsof radical Islam and its terrorist manifestations. During the ‘Ashura commemorationsto mourn the murder of Husayn, the Prophet Muhammad’s grandson and third ShiiImam, in Karbala in 680 C.E., a medical doctor from Kashmir described “the ahl al-bayt [family of the Prophet Muhammad] as the first victims of terrorism”. An IraqiShii juxtaposed the pacifist leadership of the first Shii Imam Ali to the early militantspread of Islam with looting and enslavement of inhabitants in the conquered territories.In contrast, Ali opposed the violent spread of Islam and sent emissaries to the non-Muslim world as part of peaceful missionary activities. For this young Iraqi Shii, it is

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therefore important for Muslims today to dissociate themselves from this violent pastwhich is used by radical Muslims as a historical role-model.40

Al-Saleh has played a central role in his responses to alleged terrorist activities ofMuslims in Ireland in order to prove the moderate credentials of Shii Muslims. InMarch 2010, seven people were arrested in Ireland in a major international investigationof a suspected plot to murder the Swedish cartoonist Lars Vilks, who depicted Muham-mad in 2007, which involved the American convert Colleen LaRose, known as “JihadJane” and seven other suspected co-conspirators based in Ireland.41 While the responseof leaders and representatives of Sunni organizations were rather muted,42 Al-Saleh wasone of the few Muslim leaders43 speaking extensively to the media and presenting hisinterpretation of events. He attributes such terrorist activities to the increasing influenceof Salafi groups in Ireland, among young Muslims in particular—activities which have,according to him, increased in recent years, as Ireland has provided a safe haven for mili-tant Muslim groups which act secretively outside of the purview of major mosque organ-izations.44

In his public statements in the aftermath of the arrests, Al-Saleh appeals to both allegedindicators of radical Islam, such as the burqa, and general resentments in Irish society tothe recent influx of refugees and asylum seekers. By opposing the burqa or full face veilingas unsuitable for the life of Muslims in Europe and supporting its ban in classrooms, forexample, he not only follows discourses and policy and legal steps to outlaw or circum-scribe its appearance in European societies, he also provides a further rationale for itsrejection by presenting it as the first sign of extremism and its spread as concomitantwith the spread of radical and militant interpretations of Islam among EuropeanMuslims.45 In addition, he also responds to anxieties within Irish society about thearrival of asylum seekers and refugees, their suspected exploitation of the state’swelfare system, and their potential danger. While the early Muslim migrants were ofan educated background and are well-integrated into Irish society, the Muslim newco-mers of the last two decades, who came as asylum seekers primarily, have broughtmore extremist views to Ireland.46 Al-Saleh attributes the rise of extremism to the laxIrish asylum policy and the welfare system which has easily granted Muslim extremistsasylum and consequently provided financial support. He suggests that asylum policiesshould consider in addition to the personal background and ideological attitudes of theasylum seeker outward expressions of radical Islam: “Any Muslim with a long beardand his wife wearing burka and he’s not working. I would put a question mark on that”.47

Reasons and Motivations

The following section will explore the reasons and motivations for this type of self-representation and self-definition of Shiis in Ireland by considering the socio-economicbackground of early Shii migrants to Ireland, the impact of the Iraq war and the sub-sequent ideological re-orientation of Iraqi Shiism on Shiis in Ireland and the double-minority experience of Shiis in the diaspora.

Socio-economic Status of Early Shii Migrants

The dynamics of Muslim migration to Ireland have been different to those of otherWestern European countries. While Muslim migration to the UK, France, andGermany served the purpose to fill the shortage of labor force after World War II and ori-ginated from rural, underprivileged and poorly educated social segments of the countries

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of origin, Ireland’s experience of Muslim migration has been different. The first Muslimimmigrants came primarily for study purposes, in the medical field in particular, and thendecided to stay in Ireland to work as educated professionals, becoming part of the Irishmiddle- and upper-class. This has been characteristic of the social composition ofMuslims in Ireland until the early 1990s. Likewise, early Shii Muslims, belonging tothe more settled group, were fairly well-integrated into Irish society, given their edu-cational background, language skills and economic status, and many of them marriedinto Irish families. Experiences of social marginalization and ghettoization, characteristicof Muslim communities in other Western European countries, have not been shared bythese early Muslim migrants, whether of a Shii or Sunni background, although instancesof discrimination did occur.48

The recent large scale migration to Ireland, commencing in the early 1990s, hasimpacted on this rapport. The influx of refugees and asylum seekers has led to an increas-ing skepticism regarding the benefits of migration and to the fear of an exploitation of thesocial welfare system, leading to the 2004 Citizenship Referendum, restricting migrants’access to Irish citizenship and social welfare services.49 The increasing number ofMuslimmigrants in the last 20 years has also caused unease among the more established segmentsof the Shii community. Muslim communities in Ireland have become more diversified interms of ethnic and cultural background, sectarian and ideological orientation and socio-economic status. As a result of large scale migration,Muslims entered Ireland who as partof their particular interpretation of Islamic identity espouse a strong rejection of Shiismwith a negative impact on inter-sectarian relations. Furthermore, the new socio-econ-omic complexity of Muslim communities has also yielded a certain sense of nostalgiafor the pre-1990s years when Muslims, whether Shii or Sunni, were part of a verysmall middle- and upper-class community outside of the public spotlight and well-inte-grated. Representatives of the Shii community in particular refer to changing nature ofMuslim communities in Ireland as a result of the post-Celtic Tiger waves of immigrationand make the recent arrivals responsible for the tensions within the communities and thenegative perception of Muslims by the Irish public. As one member of the Shii commu-nity in Cork stated: “We [the Muslims] used to be a well-respected and recognized com-munity. But with the arrival of asylum seekers, new forms of radical Islam wereintroduced, and we have lost this respect”.50 It is therefore important, for the more estab-lished Shiis in particular, to portray their community as well-integrated, moderate, andopen-minded in terms of its religio-cultural orientation and socio-economic status andto delineate a position of Shiis in Irish society outside of the problematic experience ofMuslim migration in the last 20 years51—notwithstanding that a large number of thegrowing Shii community is also constituted of refugees and asylum seekers who arrivedin the last decades.

Transnational Influences—The “Iraq Factor”

Transnational influences on local Shiis in Ireland also account for their self-represen-tation as moderate Muslims. The experiences of sectarian violence in Iraq which hasaffected many Iraqi Shiis personally whose family members have been murdered orwho have come to Ireland as refugees explain the explicitly stated opposition to militantexpressions of Sunni radicalism. Shiis in Iraq and elsewhere perceive themselves asvictims of militant anti-Shii forms of Sunni Islam and, hence, of the same radical andmilitant forces that have been made responsible for various terrorist attacks across theworld since 9/11.

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Recent developments in the political culture of Iraqi Shiism provide further clarifica-tion for the support for a pluralistic, democratic political system, expressed by represen-tatives of the Shii community in Ireland. The particular arrangement of religiousauthority within Shii Islam—unlike the more informal structures in Sunni Islam—

require any Shii believer to attach him/herself to the leading member of the Shii clergywho is regarded by his peers to be the most pious and knowledgeable Shii scholar ofthe time and the supreme source of emulation (marja‘ al-taqlid). A lay Shii needs tofollow and emulate the teachings, interpretations and fatwas of a marja‘ al-taqlid,usually referred to as a grand ayatollah, signifying the highest possible scholarly rankwithin the Shii clergy. Although Shii religious authority is in this sense more formalized,usually several leading Shii scholars in the world are considered to be the marja‘ al-taqlid,leaving individual Shiis with the option to choose one of several possible sources of gui-dance and emulation.52 This particular arrangement of religious authority peculiar toTwelver Shiis is also replicated in a diasporic setting in the West.53

Among the many high-ranking Shii scholars in the world today, Grand Ayatollah AliAl-Husseini Al-Sistani (b. 1930), based in the traditional Shii seminaries of Najaf, is con-sidered to be most senior of the grand ayatollahs and hence among the different sources ofemulation the most supreme. Sistani assumed political importance in post-Saddam Iraqwhen he—as spiritual leader of Iraqi Shiis –voiced strong support for the democratic tran-sition of Iraq.54 Given his pre-eminence as leading source of emulation in the Shii world,he enjoys a wide following not only among Iraqi and Arab Shiis of the Gulf area but alsoamong Pakistani and Iranian Shiis. The imam of the Ahlul-Bayt Centre, Al-Saleh, whosefather was Sistani’s representative in Qatar, follows Sistani as his marja‘ and is in perma-nent contact with him, meeting him whenever he travels to Iraq. He acts as Sistani’srepresentative in Ireland, communicating religious decrees to the Irish Shiis, submittingrequests for legal opinions to Sistani and most importantly collects the khums, a religioustax payable by Shiis to their clerical authorities. Other Iraqi and Pakistani Shiis in Irelandfollow Sistani as well, creating a certain sense of common allegiance to the same supremeauthority despite the cultural and ethnic differences between Arab and South Asian Shiisin Ireland.55

Al-Saleh and other representatives of the Shii community in Ireland have expressedtheir support for the democratic and pluralistic conception of state and society. Such apositive appreciation is to a certain extent reflective of their positive experience of inte-gration into Irish society and a reaction to their experiences of marginalization and dis-crimination in repressive and authoritarian Middle Eastern countries. However, it alsoillustrates current trends in Shii political discourse, spearheaded initially by the liberalsenior cleric Muhammad H. Fadlallah (1935–2010) in Lebanon,56 but also gainingfurther momentum with Sistani’s support for a democratic constitution in post-Saddam Iraq.57 Although Sistani’s idea of a democratic Iraq does not quite conformwith the notion of secular liberal democracies, since he maintains that Islam and its fun-damental beliefs and practices need to inform the new Iraqi constitution,58 references tonotions of “popular sovereignty”,59 “transparancy and legitimacy”60 as well as “politicalparticipation and active citizenship”61 can be read as an encouragement of democraticand civic engagement of his followers not just in Iraq but worldwide, as evident in state-ments made by representatives of the Shii community in Ireland.62

Although Sistani’s political interferences in the re-construction of Iraq were primarilydirected towards Shiis there, his support for democracy has also wider repercussions onShiis worldwide and those living in the West in particular.63 Sistani’s constructive role inthe efforts to create a democratic Iraq implicitly challenges Khomeini’s notion of wilayat

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al-faqih (guardianship of the jurisprudent) as the standard model of modern Shii polity.Khomeini differed from the mainstream interpretation of wilayat al-faqih by arguing thatthe Shii clerics should in addition to their religious roles assume political functions andare the only legitimate rulers of a Shii state since they collectively deputize for theHidden Imam during the time of his occultation. While even Shii clerics contemporaryto Khomeini such as Sistani’s teacher grand ayatollah Abul-Qassim Khoei (1899–1992) would restrict the notion of wilayat al-faqih to the spiritual and legal guidance ofthe Shii community, Khomeini’s understanding is more politicized by demandingactual political power for the Shii clergy. Sistani’s understanding of wilayat al-faqih ismore nuanced: although he does not explicitly support Khomeini’s more political under-standing of the role of the clerics, he certainly does not restrict it to the mere guidance inspiritual and legal matters as his teacher Khoei did. For Sistani, the Shii jurisprudent alsohas the responsibility to interfere in social issues affecting the community and to defendthe Shii community as a socio-political and cultural entity. This might require the juris-prudent’s occasional foray into politics, if deemed necessary, as evidenced by his ownvocal involvement in the preparation of the new Iraqi constitution. However, this invol-vement is only temporary and does not imply actively seeking public office, as explicitlydemanded by Khomeini.64

Although Sistani has never openly criticized Khomeini’s conception of wilayat al-faqih,his own definition constitutes a dissociation, if not indirect criticism, affecting the politi-cal orientations of those Shiis following him worldwide. This becomes evident in thedifferent attitudes Shiis in Ireland adopt towards Khomeini’s politicized understandingof wilayat al-faqih. The interviewees among the local Shii community avoid similar toSistani an open rejection but nevertheless express reservations to the universal applica-bility of Khomeini’s concept. The most open rejection of Khomeini’s understanding ofwilayat al-faqih was expressed by a retired medical doctor from Iraq who argues that inthe absence of an Imam a truly Islamic state is not possible. Hence, any politicalsystem that does not oppose basic Islamic principles is acceptable. In his view, a demo-cratic system does not stand against fundamental Islamic beliefs and practices; inaddition it also possesses the advantage of dealing fairly and effectively with society’sactual diversity.65 An Indian-born Shii who expresses strong support for the secular con-ception of the public space—as it exists in his country of origin—in order to facilitatediversity and multiculturalism still considers Khomeini’s model to be the best in Islam,though admitting that it only works in Shii majority countries such as Iran and that itwould be unsuitable for countries like Lebanon or Iraq. Khomeini still looms for himas a great Muslim thinker and anti-imperialist fighter, equal to Gandhi in this sense.66

The political views of the clerical leader of Ireland’s Shiis, Al-Saleh, are also reflectiveof the general ideological re-orientation of Iraqi and Arab Shiis. He studied in a religiousseminary in Qom, Iran, in the 1980s and 1990s, right in the clerical center of post-revo-lutionary Iran where Khomeini’s political reading of wilayat al-faqih was the commonideological reference point for Shiis in Iran and elsewhere. Hence, he himself subscribedto Khomeini’s understanding at that time. However, two developments have caused acertain dissociation from these views: his migration to the West provides one factor.According to him, for suppressed Shiis coming from Iraq but also from Saudi-Arabiawhere they have been discriminated against, life in the West has offered an environmentwhere they could practice their religion freely.67

The aforementioned political developments in Iraq provide another reason for the re-assessment of Khomeini’s interpretation. For Shiis in Iraq, the American occupation andthe transition to a democratic Iraq become opportunities for communal empowerment

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and mobilization, as recognized by Sistani himself. Given the pluralistic nature of Iraqisociety a pluralistic democratic system remains the only viable option, according toAl-Saleh. Sistani’s leadership and support for the democratic transition is central hereas well in terms of the ideological impact of his stance on his Shii following worldwide.Hence, Al-Saleh underwent his own ideological development from a supporter ofKhomeini’s political reading of wilayat al-faqih to an attitude of support for pluralisticconceptions of democracy. However, avoiding the appearance of any division betweenKhomeini and Sistani, he does not really perceive a contradiction between the two butrather considers their political ideas as reflective of different stages in the developmentof modern Shiism. While the Islamic Revolution in Iran of 1979 was central to thepolitical empowerment of Shiis worldwide and therefore Khomeini remains the mostimportant thinker and activist of modern Shiism, his revolutionary and ideological under-standing of wilayat al-faqih only reflects for Al-Saleh a temporary stage with Sistani’sapproach constituting the next step in the development of modern Shii politicalthought which is more accommodating towards pluralism and diversity and embracesdemocratic principles.68 While Sistani’s political intervention in support of Iraq’s demo-cratization targeted Iraqi Shiis in particular, Al-Saleh’s account of his own ideologicaldevelopment gives evidence of its possible impact on Shii communities outside of Iraq.Although Sistani has not produced a comprehensive formulation of a democraticconception of Shii political thought, his active support for democracy in Iraq has aneffect on the global Shii community.69

Double-minority Status

As one final consideration for the Shiis’ self-representation as moderate Muslims in theIrish context, the specific Shii experience in the West as “a minority within a minority”70

needs to be taken into account. Shiis living as a minority in Europe or North Americaneed to ascertain and maintain not only an Islamic but also a specific Shii identity.The public profile of Shiis as moderate Muslims provides them with a niche of recog-nition in Irish society as being Muslims, yet being different at the same time. While theIrish public is not interested in the subtle historical and theological differences betweenSunnis and Shiis, the self-delineation from radical Sunnis in order to appear moderateresponds to the current discourse on Muslims and their place in European societies.Such an approach is also used by other minority groups within contemporary Islam inEurope and North America, such as the Ahmadis71 or certain Sufi orders like the Naqsh-bandi-Haqqani Sufi order72 which refer to their own experiences of marginalization,opposition and denunciation by Salafi-oriented forms of Sunni Islam in order to seekthe public recognition as moderate Muslims. While the quest for such recognition andthe claim to represent moderate Islam is shared by many Muslim groups and organiz-ations, such claims appear more credible in the public when they come from historicallyand currently marginalized groups within Islam such as Shiis, Sufis, or Ahmadis.

Conclusion

The public perception of Shiis in Ireland as members of a moderate and tolerantexpression of Islam has provided them with their own niche to be recognizable asbeing part of Islam in Ireland, yet distinct from other Muslim groups. In this sense,the Irish example provides an interesting case of how current debates about the relation-ship between moderate and radical forms of Islam and their respective place in Europe

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are used by representatives of the Shii community to mould a public image that allowsShiis to publicly assert a distinct identity which at the same time appears as an acceptableexpression of Islam.Although efforts of leading representatives of the Shii community to gain such a public

image have been quite successful, the construction of Shiis or other groups as moderateMuslims is problematic. First, it lends credence to the bifurcating discourse of radical vs.moderate Islam by using it as a means to receive public recognition and to be consideredas acceptable representatives of Islam in Europe. The ongoing securitization of Islam inEurope is thereby justified by representatives of Muslim communities themselves, con-firming the current bipolar construction of Islamic identities in Europe: “this counterconstruction does not challenge the core stereotypes of Islam, it locates the ‘badMuslims’ elsewhere, but confirms them”.73 Second, it is problematic as Muslimleaders also respond to fears around the presence of an increasing number of Muslimimmigrants in Europe, thereby lending implicit support to “the anti-immigrant rhetoricof extreme right-wing parties [that] has become markedly anti-Muslim”.74 Third, whilean increase in the number of Salafi Muslims can be observed in Ireland as in other parts ofEurope and their hostility towards Shia Islam is also evident, the actual impact of Salafigroups in Ireland is difficult to estimate as well as the extent of which their presence con-stitutes a threat in Ireland and elsewhere in Europe.Finally, the complex religious and political allegiances of Shiis in Ireland undermine

the simplistic dichotomy between “moderate” and “radical” Islam. The support fordemocracy and pluralism as expressed by representatives of the Shii community can beexplained by recent political developments in Iraq and the religious backing of demo-cratic change by senior Shii clerics. However, at the same time Shiis in Ireland alsoendorse Shii religious and political figures and entertain relations with Shii organizationsthat would not be deemed as representing “moderate” Islam in current European dis-course. While Khomeini and his legacy are viewed with certain ambivalence, heremains a beacon of Shii empowerment for most Shiis with the anniversary of hisdeath being commemorated in the Ahlul-Bayt Centre. Given the independent fundingstructures, the influence of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the running of Shii centersis not significant. Nevertheless, connections with organizations receiving funding fromthe Iranian government exist such as the Urdu Mashrabe Naab publisher which endorsesthe supreme leadership of Iran Ayatollah Khameinei and dismisses the “Green Move-ment” in Iran as a Western conspiracy in its publications.75 The endorsement of democ-racy by representatives of the Shii community in Ireland and the ambivalent attitudes tothe Islamic Revolution and the Islamic Republic in Iran illustrate the complexity of iden-tity constructions within the Shii diaspora in Ireland which defy the simplistic suggestionthat “there is a fault line running through Islam, a line that divides moderate Islam, calledgenuine Islam, and extremist political Islam”.76

This article made a contribution to the study of Shii diasporic experiences, referring tothe example of Ireland. Given the dearth of academic scholarship on Shiis in the West,77

further research is needed on Shii communities in Europe and North America, theirtransnational connections and their impact on Shii identity discourses in the diaspora78

and the particular minority experiences of Shiis which are—as this article illustrates—often different from the experiences of other Muslim immigrants. In particular, forShiis coming from countries where they constitute marginalized minorities, the migrationto Europe is often seen as an opportunity to express their religious identity without anydiscrimination and thereby creates a different rapport with the non-Muslim majoritysocieties. At the same time, the experience of being “the other within the other”79

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requires particular efforts for the Shii diaspora to maintain both an Islamic as well asparticular Shii identity in terms of both communal activities and practices and publicperception and recognition.

Acknowledgements

This article stems from a research project on the historical development and current situ-ation of Muslim communities in Ireland, funded by the Irish Research Council for theHumanities and Social Sciences (IRCHSS) and the Department of An Taoiseach(Prime Minister of Ireland).

NOTES

1. Jocelyne Cesari, “The Securitisation of Islam in Europe”, CEPS Challenge Programme, Research PaperNo. 15, 2009, accessed May 26, 2011, http://aei.pitt.edu/10763/1/1826.pdf

2. See also further corollary bifurcations between “good imam” and “bad imam” (Jonathan Birt, “GoodImam, Bad Imam: Civic Religion and National Integration in post 9/11 Britain”, The Muslim World,Vol. 96, No. 4, 2006, pp. 687–705) or “good mosques and bad mosques” (Katherine Brown, “ThePromise and Perils of Women’s Participation in UK Mosques: The Impact of SecuritisationAgendas on Identity, Gender and Community”, The British Journal of Politics and InternationalRelations, Vol. 10, No. 3, 2008, p. 487). See also Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad and Michael J. Balz,“Taming the Imams: European Governments and Islamic Preachers since 9/11”, Islam and Chris-tian-Muslim Relations, Vol. 19, No. 2, 2008, p. 222.

3. Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad and Tylor Golson, “Overhauling Islam: Representation, Construction andCooption of ‘Moderate Islam’ in Europe”, Journal of Church and State, Vol. 49, No. 3, 2007, p. 499;Haddad and Balz, “Taming Imams”, op. cit., p. 216; Frédéric Volpi, “Constructing the ‘Ummah’ inEuropean Security: Between Exit, Voice and Loyalty”, Government and Opposition, Vol. 42, No. 3,2007, pp. 460–462; Brown, “Women’s Participation in UK Mosques”, op. cit., pp. 481–484;Cesari, “Securitisation of Islam”, op. cit., p. 5.

4. See, for example, Haddad and Balz, “Taming Imams”, op. cit., p. 222 and Brown, “Women’s Partici-pation in UK Mosques”, op. cit., pp. 475–484.

5. See also Richard Jackson, “Constructing Enemies: ‘Islamic Terrorism’ in Political and Academic Dis-course”, Government and Opposition, Vol. 42, No. 3, 2007, pp. 83–95. On this discourse and its his-torical roots see Mahmood Mamdani, Good Muslim Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and theRoots of Terror, New York: Three Leaves Press, 2005, pp. 15–16, 22–24, 260.

6. See Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad and Michael J. Balz, “Taming Imams”, op. cit.; Jonathan Birt, “GoodImam, Bad Imam”, op. cit.; Frédéric Volpi, “Constructing the ‘Ummah’”, op. cit.

7. See Richard Jackson, “Constructing Enemies”, op. cit.; Kevin M. Dunn, “Representations of Islam inthe Politics of Mosque Development in Sydney,” Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie[Journal of Economic and Social Geography], Vol. 92, No. 3, 2001, pp. 291–308.

8. See Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad and Tylor Golson, “Overhauling Islam”, op. cit., p. 512.9. See, for example, Migration Nation: Statement on Integration Strategy and Diversity Management,

Dublin: Office of the Minister for Integration, 2008, p. 33.10. See John Burke and Eoghan Rice, “Fascist Fundamentalism is Rife among Young Irish Muslims”,

Sunday Tribune, August 13, 2006, accessed May 26, 2011, https://www.tribune.ie/article/2006/aug/13/fascist-fundamentalism-is-rife-among-young-irish-m/; Mary Fitzgerald, “Muslims Divided overCleric’s Teachings”, The Irish Times, October 6, 2006, p. 12; “Suspicious Minds,” Prime Time,RTE1, December 18, 2006. See also “The Muslim-Irish Prove to Be a Surprisingly ModerateBunch…,” Irish Independent, December 19, 2006, accessed May 26, 2011, http://www.independent.ie/national-news/the-muslimirish-prove-to-be-a-surprisingly-moderate-bunch-65169.html.

11. Abdulaziz A. Sachedina, “AMinority within a Minority: The Case of the Shi‘a in North America”, inMuslim Communities in North America, eds. Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad and Jane Idleman Smith,New York: State University of New York Press, 1994, p. 3.

12. Estimates were provided by Dr Ali Al-Saleh and other representatives of the Shii community.13. Interview Dr Ali Al-Saleh, October 29, 2010.

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14. See Oliver Scharbrodt, “Muslim Migration to the Republic of Ireland: Past Perspectives and FutureProspects”, Éire-Ireland: A Journal of Irish Studies, Vol. 47, 2012, (forthcoming).

15. Tuula Sakaranaho, Religious Freedom, Multiculturalism, Islam: Cross-Reading Finland and Ireland,Leiden: Brill, 2006, pp. 276–279. While in 2003 Al-Saleh estimated that around half of the Shiifamilies were “settled” and the other half are “new-comers” (asylum seekers, refugees and labormigrants) (ibid., p. 287), given the recent influx of Shii migrants from Iraq and Pakistan the newco-mers outnumber the more settled Shiis by now.

16. Interview Dr Ali Al-Saleh, October 29, 2010.17. Liakat Takim, “Multiple Identities in Pluralistic World: Shi‘ism in America”, in Muslims in the West:

From Sojourners to Citizens, ed. Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad, New York: Oxford University Press, 2002,pp. 219–222.

18. See Liakat Nathani Takim, Shi‘ism in America, New York: New York University Press, 2009, pp. 54–80. This became particularly evident during the ‘Ashura commemorations in December 2010 at theAhlul-Bayt Centre in Dublin to mourn the death of the third Shii Imam Husayn. Iraqi and PakistaniShiis met in different rooms in the Ahlul-Bayt Centre, holding sessions with lectures and poetry reci-tations in Arabic and Urdu, respectively. The different cultural customs in commemorating the deathof Husayn also showed in the various ways of performing the ceremonial chest beating to mournHusayn’s death or in the use of replica miniature coffins of Husayn and other members of hisfamily killed in Karbala 680 C.E by Pakistani Shiis alone.

19. Babul Ilm Society, Ireland accessed April 19, 2011, http://www.babulilm.ie/.20. Liakat Takim, “Multiple Identities”, op. cit., pp. 219–222.21. Liakat Takim, Shi‘ism in America, pp. 57–59.22. Tuula Sakaranaho, Religious Freedom, op. cit., pp. 383–408. See also Tuula Sakaranaho, “‘For God

and Eternal Values’: Muslim National Schools in Ireland”, in Islamische Erziehung in Europa/IslamicEducation in Europe, ed. Ednan Aslan, Vienna: Böhlau, 2009, pp. 203–218.

23. Interview Dr Ali Al-Saleh, June 13, 2010.24. Liakat Takim, Shi‘ism in America, op. cit., p. 82.25. Interview Dr Ali Al-Saleh, June 9, 2009.26. Interview Dr Ali Al-Saleh, June 12, 2010. On similar views, already expressed in 2003, see also Tuula

Sakaranaho, Religious Freedom, op. cit., p. 289.27. See Betwa Sharma and Zachary Goelman, “Ireland’s Sunni-Shi’ite Divide”, Time, April 9, 2008,

accessed May 26, 2011, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1729341,00.html. See alsoPatsy McGarry, “Imams Deny Rift between Shias and Sunnis in Ireland”, The Irish Times, April12, 2008, p. 7.

28. On Al-Saleh’s good rapport with the media, see also Tuula Sakaranaho, Religious Freedom, op. cit.,p. 291.

29. Interview Dr Ali Al-Saleh, June 12, 2010.30. Interview Dr Ali Al-Saleh, June 12, 2010. See also Mary Fitzgerald, “Islam is Compatible with

Western Society, Says Imam”, The Irish Times, October 26, 2007, p. 14.31. Ibid.32. See Quilliam Foundation, accessed April 19, 2011, http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/.33. “Sheikh Dr Ali al-Saleh al Najafi”, Youtube, accessed September 9, 2010, http://www.youtube.com/

watch?v=4YRnpInL72c&feature=related.34. David Cullen, “Expatriates Stage Dublin Celebrations: Iraqis in Ireland”, The Irish Times, December

15, 2003, p. 12.35. Nuala Haughey, “Irish Iraqis Voice a Mixture of Feelings”, The Irish Times, April 11, 2003, p. 12.36. As a cable of the US embassy in Dublin to the US State Department, published by Wikileaks, indi-

cates, the article was written by Al-Saleh with assistance of the US embassy. See Patsy McGarry,“US Sought Information on Muslims in Ireland”, The Irish Times, April 27, 2011, p. 3; MaryFitzgerald, “Clonskeagh Mosque Rejects US Claims”, The Irish Times, April 28, 2011, p. 6.

37. Dr Ali Al Saleh, “What Future Do Iraqis Want?”, The Irish Times, March 18, 2006, p. 15.38. Ibid.39. Ibid.40. Interviews Ahlul-Bayt Islamic Centre, December 16, 2010.41. See Irish Examiner, March 10, 2010, pp. 1–3.42. June McEnroe, “Muslim Leaders in Ireland Give Mixed Reactions to Alleged Murder Plot”, Irish

Examiner, March 10, 2010, p. 3.

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43. For another example see Shaheed Satardien speaking about the threat of Islamic extremism on thepublic radio programme RTE Drivetime, March 10, 2010.

44. See Irish Examiner, March 10, 2010, p. 1. See alsoMark Tighe, “An Enemy within Irish Society?”, TheSunday Times, March 14, 2010, accessed May 26, 2011, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/ireland/article7061014.ece.

45. June McEnroe, “Community Faces a Fundamental Challenge Within”, Irish Examiner, April 10,2010.

46. Ali Bracken, “Al-Qaeda Extremists are Taking Hold Here, Claims Muslim Cleric”, Sunday Tribune,May 9, 2010, accessedMay 26, 2011, http://www.tribune.ie/news/home-news/article/2010/may/09/al-qaeda-extremists-are-taking-hold-here-claims-mu/.

47. June McEnroe, “Challenge Within”, op. cit.48. See Humaira Altaf, “Discrimination and Racism in the Irish Health System: A Study of Non EU

Doctors in Cork, Ireland”, MA Dissertation, University College Cork, 2008.49. See Ronit Lentin, “From Racial State to Racist State: Ireland on the Eve of the Citizenship Referen-

dum”, Variant, Vol. 20, 2004, pp. 7–8; Steve Garner, “Ireland and Immigration: Explaining theAbsence of the Far Right”, Patterns of Prejudice, Vol. 41, No. 2, 2007, pp. 109–130; Bernard Ryan,“The Celtic Cubs: The Controversy over Birthright Citizenship in Ireland”, European Journal ofMigration and Law, Vol. 6, No. 3, 2004, pp. 173–193.

50. Interview, private home, Cork, December 27, 2010.51. See also June McEnroe, “Challenge Within”, op. cit.52. Linda S.Walbridge, “Introduction: Shi‘ism and Authority”, inTheMost Learned of the Shi‘a: The Insti-

tution of theMarja‘ Taqlid, ed. Linda S. Walbridge, New York: Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. 3–7.

53. Liakat Takim, “Reinterpretation or Reformation? Shi‘a Law in the West”, Journal of Shi‘a IslamicStudies, Vol. 3, No. 2, 2010, pp. 143–144.

54. See Babak Rahimi, “Ayatollah Sistani and the Democratization of Post-Ba‘athist Iraq”, United StatesInstitute of Peace, Special Report, No. 187, 2007.

55. See Liakat Takim, Shi‘ism in America, op. cit., pp. 145–151.56. Haider Ala Hamoudi, “Between Realism and Resistance: Shi‘i Islam and the Contemporary Liberal

State”, Journal of Islamic Law and Culture, Vol. 11, No. 2, 2009, pp. 117–120. See also Hilal Kashan,“The Religious and Political Impact of Sayyid M. H. Fadlallah on Arab Shi‘ism”, Journal of Shi‘aIslamic Studies, Vol. 3, No. 4, 2010, pp. 427–441.

57. Babak Rahimi, “Sistani and Democratization”, op. cit., p. 10.58. Reidar Visser, “Sistani, the United States and Politics in Iraq: From Quietism to Machiavellianism?”,

Norsk Utenrikspolitis Institutt [Norwegian Institute of International Affairs], Paper 700, 2006, pp. 11–13;Babak Rahimi, “Sistani and Democratization”, op. cit., pp. 8–13.

59. Babak Rahimi, “Sistani and Democratization”, op. cit., p. 10 (italics in original).60. Ibid., p. 9.61. Ibid., p. 10 (italics in original).62. Liakat Takim, Shi‘ism in America, op. cit., pp. 159–160.63. See Haider Ala Hamoudi, “Between Realism and Resistance”, op. cit., pp. 107–120; Liakat Takim,

“Reinterpretation or Reformation?”, op. cit., pp. 151–152.64. Reider Visser, “Sistani”, op. cit., pp. 13–16.65. Interview at Ahlul-Bayt Islamic Centre, May 8, 2010.66. Interview, February 25, 2010.67. Interview Dr Ali Al-Saleh, June 13, 2010. See also Sakaranaho, Religious Freedom, op. cit., pp. 289–

290.68. Interview Dr Ali Al-Saleh, June 13, 2010.69. Haider Ala Hamoudi, “Between Realism and Resistance”, op. cit., pp. 114–115.70. Abdulaziz A. Sachedina, “Minority within a Minority”, op. cit., p. 3.71. See Simon Ross Valentine, Islam and the Ahmadiyya Jama’at: History, Belief, Practice, London: Hurst,

2008, pp. 189–203.72. See Jørgen S. Nielsen, Mustafa Draper and Gaijna Yemelianova, “Transnational Sufism: The Haq-

qaniyya”, in Sufism in the West, eds. Jamal Malik and John Hinnells, London: Routledge, 2006,pp. 111–112; David W. Damrel, “Aspects of the Naqshbandi-Haqqani order in North America”,in ibid., pp. 119–121; Simon Stjernholm, “A Translocal Sufi Movement: Developments amongNasqshbandi-Haqqani in London”, in Sufism Today: Heritage and Tradition in the Global Community,eds. Catherine Raudvere and Leif Stenberg, London: I.B. Tauris 2009, pp. 87–89.

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73. Kevin M. Dunn, “Representations of Islam”, op. cit., p. 303.74. Jocelyne Cesari, “Securitisation of Islam”, op. cit., p. 4.75. Mashrabe Naab, accessed April 19, 2011, http://www.mashrabenaab.com/iis6954.asp.76. Mahmood Mamdani, “Good Muslim, Bad Muslim – An African Perspective”, After September 11,

Essays, Social Science Research Council, accessed April 19, 201, http://essays.ssrc.org/sept11/essays/mamdani.htm.

77. Liyakat Takim and Abdulaziz A. Sachedina published on the Shii communities in North America. Inthe European context, Kathryn Spellman’s publications deal with Iranian Shiis in Britain. See KathrynSpellman, Religion and Nation: Iranian Local and Transnational Networks in London, Oxford andNew York: Berghahn Books, 2005; Kathryn Spellman, “A National Sufi Order with TransnationalDimensions: The Maktab Tarighat Oveyssi Shahmaghsoudi Sufi Order in London”, Journal of Ethnicand Migration Studies, Vol. 30, No. 5, 2004, pp. 945–960; Kathryn Spellman, “Gendered Spaces ofExchange: Iranian Women’s Religious Practices in London”, in Resituating Culture, ed. GavanTitley, Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 2004, pp. 151–161; Karin Hesse-Lehmann andKathryn Spell-man, “Iranische transnationale religiöse Institutionen in London und Hamburg: Ihr Einfluss auf dasinterkulturelle Zusammenleben” [“Iranian Transnational Religious Institutions in London andHamburg: Their Influence on Intercultural Co-existence”], in Zuwanderung und Integration: Kultur-wissenschaftliche Zugänge und soziale Praxis [Immigration and Integration: Cultural Studies Approachesand Social Praxis], eds. Christoph Köck, Alois Moosmüller and Klaus Roth, Münster: Waxmann,2004, pp. 141–162.

78. On the interface of diaspora, transnationalism and Islam and a discussion of possible areas of researchon transnational Islam in general, which could also be made relevant to the particular Shii experience,see Steven Vertovic, “Diaspora, Transnationalism and Islam: Sites of Change and Modes ofResearch”, in Muslim Networks and Transnational Communities in and across Europe, eds. StefanoAllievi and Jørgen Nielsen, Leiden: Brill, 2003, pp. 312–324.

79. Liakat Takim, Shi‘ism in America, op. cit., p. 143.

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