the singapore strategy and the deterrence of japan

8/7/2019 The Singapore Strategy and the Deterrence of Japan

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The 'Singapore Strategy' and the Deterrence of Japan: Winston Churchill, the Admiralty andthe Dispatch of Force ZAuthor(s): Christopher M. BellSource: The English Historical Review, Vol. 116, No. 467 (Jun., 2001), pp. 604-634Published by: Oxford University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/579812 .Accessed: 17/01/2011 12:38

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English Historical ReviewC Oxford University Press 200I 0013-8266/OI/0000/0604

The 'SingaporeStrategy'and theDeterrenceofJapan: WinstonChurchill,theAdmiraltyand theDispatchof ForceZ*ON the eveningof 8 December I94I, two Britishcapital ships- the newlycompleted battleshipHMS Prince of Walesand the FirstWorld War-erabattlecruiserHMS Repulse- set out from the navalbase at SingaporetodisruptJapaneselandingsin MalayaandThailand.Underthe commandofAdmiral Sir Tom Phillips, the two ships and four destroyers whichaccompaniedthem were code-named Force Z. The decision to seek outenemy forceswas a calculatedgamble.As the RoyalAir Forcecould notprovide continuous air cover for these ships as they traversedthe SouthChina Sea,Phillips had to count on speedand surprisefor protection.Thegambledid not payoff. On the morning of io December,ForceZ, havingabandonedits mission,was caughtoff the eastcoastof MalayabyJapaneseland-basedaircraftoperating from Indo-China. Within hours, both thePrinceof Walesand Repulsehad been sunk.

The loss was a tremendous blow to wartime Britain. WinstonChurchill, the Prime Minister, later claimed that 'in all the war I neverreceived a more direct shock'.' The intrinsic superiority of the RoyalNavy was a matterof faith for the Britishpublic and elites alike: a navaldisasterof this magnitude was as unexpected as it was distressing.Thedirector general of political warfare, Robert Bruce Lockhart, recalledthat 'going into the smoking-room [of his club], crowded withhigh-ranking naval and military officers, was like entering a Scottishhouse in which the will is being readaftera funeral.Therewere drinksonthe table, but gloom on every face. Officers spoke in low tones. Theatmospherewasheavywith the deadweight of tradition. Militarydefeatsare the initial fate of the English in almost everywar and can be bornewith stoical courage. A disaster to the navy is unthinkable andunbearable.'2Although the destruction of the Princeof Walesand Repulsehad littleimpact on the course of the war in the Pacific, nonetheless it marks awatershed.More than any other episode, the sinking of Britain'snewestbattleship from the air symbolizes the moment when the battleshipceased to be queen of the seas.The Royal Navy's impotence in the FarEast in I94I also points to the collapse of Britain'smaritime supremacy:after centuries of ruling the waves, Britanniahanded over her trident to

*1amgratefulto EdwardIngramandJohnFerrisfor theircommentson an earlierversionof thisarticle,andto the Countessof Avonfor permissionto quotefrom the papersof the firstEarlofAvon.Researchforthisarticlewasassistedby the ChurchillMemorialandLibrary,WestminsterCollegethroughtheawardof a TylerResearchFellowship.i. WinstonS. Churchill,TheSecondWorldWar(London:Cassell,I950), III,p. 55I.2. R. H. BruceLockhart,ComestheReckoning(NewYork:ArnoPress,I972), p. I46.

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200I THE DETERRENCE OF JAPAN 605the United States.Last,although most important, the dramaticdefeatatthe hands of an Asian power,followed two months laterby an even morehumiliating disaster,the fall of Singapore, marks the beginning of theend of Britain'simperialpower in the Far East. The sun began to set onthe British Empire.The fate of Force Z fits so easily into the framework of Britain'simperial and naval decline that it too now seems inevitable. Whendecision-makers in London took the decision, however, peace stillreigned in the Pacific: war with Japan, naval disasters,and the loss ofempireappearedanything but inevitable.The shipsweregiven a politicalnot a military role - to deter Japanfrom war - only to find themselvescaught up in the conflict they were meant to avert. Their peacetime roleis often obscured, however, by the debate between Churchill and hisadvisersover wartimenavalstrategy.And becausethey arrivedin the FarEast less than a week before the Japanese onslaught began, London'sdecision to send them to Singapore is often conflated with Phillip's tosail them from Singapore. Disaster became inevitable, according totraditionalaccounts, from the moment capital shipswere earmarkedforthe FarEast.The decision to dispatch the Prince of Walesand Repulseto easternwaterswas taken in October I94I by the cabinet'sDefence Committee.The motives of the main participantsarefrequentlymisunderstood. TheAdmiralty, for example, has been criticized for relying on inadequateforces against Japan because of its devotion to an obsolete andunworkable 'Singapore strategy'. Churchill is blamed for disregardingthe threat posed by Japan, relying on a grossly inadequate deterrent topreserve peace in the Far East, and possessing a poor grasp of theprinciplesof navalstrategy.Ian Cowman, on the other hand, has arguedthat orthodox interpretations are inadequate because the Admiralty'sresistance to the dispatch of Force Z was really a ruse to distractChurchill from its plans to build up a British fleet based on Manila.The decision-making process as a whole is typically reduced to adialogue between Churchill and the first sea lord, Admiral Sir DudleyPound.This article will show that Cowman's argument is unfounded; thatneither the Royal Navy's pre-war planning nor its strategy weresignificant factors; and that Churchill's failings as a naval strategistmattered less than his assumptions about the value of capital ships as adeterrent to Japan. It will also demonstrate that these assumptions werecommonplace in Whitehall and had a long history: Churchill wasneither the first nor the only civilian to advocate the movement of asmall deterrentfleet to the FarEast.The idea that something had gone terribly wrong with Britain'sFarEastern naval strategywas planted by a retiredflag officer,Admiral SirHerbertRichmond, shortlyafter the fallof Singapore.In MarchI942, an

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6o6 THE 'SINGAPORE STRATEGY AND Junearticle by Richmond in The FortnightlyReview charged that the fate ofSingapore had been sealed by 'the folly of not providing adequately forthe command of the sea in a two-ocean war'. The author, anaccomplished naval historian, argued that Britain'splans for sending abattle fleet to eastern waters between the two world wars were utterlyunrealistic given the restrictions on the size of the Royal Navy. InStatesmen and Sea Power, published shortly after the war, Richmondconcluded that it was 'the illusion that a Two-Hemisphere Empire can bedefended by a One-Hemisphere Navy that sealedthe fate of Singapore'.'Privately,Richmond blamed Britain'spoliticians for this state of affairs.'It is Parliamentwhich bears the responsibilityfor these measures whichhave crippled our sea power,' he maintained.2Richmond's writings did not specifically address the loss of Force Z,but the first volume of Stephen Roskill'sofficial history, The Warat Sea,described the Admiralty'sopposition to the movement of these vesselsand provided enough evidence of political interference to convince ageneration of historians that, on this occasion at least, the admiralty wasnot at fault.3 Most early works to address this subject concluded thatWinston Churchill was principally to blame for placing these ships inharm'swayin I94I.4It was not until the I970S that Britain'spreparationsfor a Far Easternwar were closely scrutinized, and by the early I98os a consensus hademerged that the plans developed were inherently unsound.5 Scholarshave not been content with condemning the politicians who reducedBritain's naval strength during the interwar period: they have alsocensured the naval profession as a whole and criticized virtually everyaspect of its preparations for war with Japan. According to theconventional view of British navalplanning, the Admiralty intended todispatcha largebattle fleet from Europeanwaters to Singaporeonce warwith Japanhad begun. Beforethese vesselsarrived,Britishforcesalreadypresentin the FarEastwould prevent Singaporefrom fallinginto enemyhands. Subsequent operations would be directed exclusively towardssecuring a fleet action with the Japanese navy. On the basis of this

i. AdmiralSir HerbertRichmond,'Singapore',FortnightlyReview(MarchI942); id., Statesmenand SeaPower(Oxford:ClarendonPress,I946), p. 328.2. Richmondto AdmiralSir RogerKeyes,29 June I942, TheKeyesPapers,ed. PaulHalpern

(Navy Records Society, I98I), III, p. 244.3. StephenRoskill,The WarAt Sea (London:H[er]M[ajesty's]S[tationary]Q[ffice],I954), I.4. For example,RussellGrenfell,Main Fleetto Singapore(London:Faber,I951); BernardAsh,SomeoneHad Blundered:TheStoryof the Repulseand thePrinceof Wales(NewYork:Doubleday,

I960); StephenRoskill,Churchilland theAdmirals(London:Collins,I977); ArthurMarder,OldFriends,NewEnemies(Oxford:ClarendonPress,I98I).5. In particular,Paul Haggie,BritanniaAt Bay (Oxford:ClarendonPress,I98I); Marder,OldFriends;IanHamill,TheStrategicIllusion(Singapore:SingaporeUP, I98I); W. DavidMcIntyre,The Riseand Fall of the SingaporeNaval Base,I9I9-42 (London:Macmillan,I979); RaymondCallahan,TheWorstDisaster(Newark:Universityof DelawarePress,I977); MalcolmMurfett,' "Livingin the Past":A CriticalRe-examinationof theSingaporeNavalStrategy,I9I8-I94I,' WardiSociety,ii (MayI993) 73-I03.

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200I THE DETERRENCE OF JAPAN 607superficial reconstruction of Britain's'Singapore strategy', it has beenargued that the idea of sending a fleet to the Far East was unrealisticwhen it was conceived in the early I920S; that it became whollyimpracticalduring the 193os;and that the Admiraltystubbornly clung toit long after its defects should have been obvious. It has also beensuggested that the Admiralty'sunwavering devotion to this scheme wasresponsiblefor the decision to dispatch the Prince of Walesand Repulseto Singapore in late I94L.'Although British naval planning is open to serious criticism, most ofthe chargeslevelled at the Admiraltyare unfounded. In the firstplace, itis often claimed that the 'Singapore strategy' was inherently flawedbecause the likely existence of hostile powers in Europe made itunrealistic to expect a Britishfleet everto be sparedfor the FarEast. Thischarge contains a germ of truth, but it does not point to any inherentflaw in the strategy itself. This would only be true if there was nopossibility of a fleet ever being dispatched to Singapore under anyconditions, which is not the case. During the I920S Britain possessed acomfortablemarginof navalsuperiorityover its rivals,and it might havemaintained a large fleet in the Far East and still dominated Europeanwaters. This possibility was only undermined by the emergence of atriple threat from Germany, ItalyandJapanin the mid-I93os, and it wasonly precluded by the fall of France in I940. These events wereexceptional and unpredictable. If they had been foreseen, interwarplannerswould have regardedBritain'sposition ashopeless. But becausethis threat seemed remote, they based their plans on the reasonableassumption that diplomacy could prevent such a threat from emerging.If they had been correct, the rise of a single European naval challengerneed not have prevented the transfer of a fleet to the Far East, in whichevent the navy could still have contemplated a defensive strategy in thatregion.The dispatch of a fleet to Singapore is often treated as an all-or-nothing proposition. In fact, by the mid-I930s the real problem facingBritishplannerswas not whether they could send a fleet to the FarEast,but whether they could dispatch enough ships for an offensive strategy,or only those for a defensive one. British naval strength was stillsufficient to allow a vigorous defensive stance in both regions simul-taneously. As long as Britain had a reliable ally, it might even haveassumed the offensive in one of these theatres. During the late I930SBritainhad such an ally in France;and even in I939 the Admiralty couldreasonablyhope for the activeassistanceof the United Statesin the eventof war with Japan. A two-front naval war need not have posed aninsurmountable threat to the British Empire in the I930s, and ifBritainhad built up to a full 'twopower standard'of naval strength, mostof the 'inherent' difficulties allegedly facing the Admiralty would have

i. For example, Haggie, Britannia, p. 211; Marder, Old Friends, p. 24I.EHR June oI


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6o8 THE 'SINGAPORE STRATEGY AND Junedisappeared.' A single-handed struggle against three naval powers wasanother matter, but because British naval strength was insufficient forthisworst-casescenario,it does not follow that plans to send a fleetto theFarEast could not have been implemented under any conditions.

The Admiralty's critics have also claimed that the Admiralty wasobsessed with Mahanian visions of surface fleet actions, and thatdevelopments in air power somehow rendered its whole strategyirrelevant.2 The underlying assumption is that war plans whichenvisaged the use of heavily gunned battleships in any capacity wereboth antiquated and foolish. Thus, critics such as Ian Hamill havecharged that the 'concept of sea power around which the whole policyrevolvedwas demonstrated to be obsolete. Naval engagements were nolonger a simple matter of two battle fleets blasting away at each other.'3Statements such as this are riddled with fallacies. Jon Sumida andGeoffreyTill have shown that by I939 Britishfleet tactics had advancedconsiderably since the Battle of Jutland.4The navy did underestimatethe impact of aviation on naval tactics, but this was not done to theextent which is frequentlycharged,and it does not point to any intrinsicflaw in the admiralty's strategic thinking. The United States Navydemonstratedduring the Second World Warthat the dispatch of a fleetto the FarEast was still necessaryto secure the defeat of Japan.A betterunderstandingof the effects of modern aircrafton navalwarfarewouldhave compelled the navy to increase both the carrier-and land-basedaircraftallocated to its eastern fleet, but its basic strategy would haveremainedessentiallyunchanged.Nor were the navy's strategy and war plans dominated by apreoccupationwith majorfleet actions. Britishnaval decision-makersofthe interwarperiod had in fact learnt two important lessons from theFirst World War. First, the failure to annihilate the German High SeasFleet had driven home the truth of Sir Julian Corbett's dictum that aweaker fleet cannot be expected to oblige its opponent by sailing to itscertain destruction.5This realizationweakened the role which the ideaof the single decisive battle played in naval doctrine and led officers toexpect futurewars at sea to be prolonged strugglesof attrition. Secondly,naval decision-makers were strongly impressed by the role whicheconomic warfare at sea could play in such a conflict. 'EconomicPressure,'the Admiralty declared 'is nowadays a cardinal doctrine ofwar. ... It has been used, in greateror less degree, ever since history

I. The 'two-powerstandard'beingsoughtby the navy duringthe 1930S would haveentailedmaintaining a capital ship strength at least equal to that of Germany and Japan combined. Thisstandard was never approved.

2. See especially Hamill, StrategicIllusion, pp. 3, 3I0; Murfett, 'Living in the Past', pp. 77-8.3. Hamill, Strategic Illusion, p. 3I0.4. Jon Sumida,"'The Best Laid Plans": The Development of British Battle-Fleet Tactics,

1919-42', International History Review, XIV (Nov. i992); Geoffrey Till, Air Power and the RoyalNavy (London: Jane's Publishing Company, I979), Chapter 6.5.Julian Corbett, Some Principles ofMaritime Strategy (London: Brassey's, I988).

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2001 THE DETERRENCE OF JAPAN 609began, but its irresistiblepower when efficiently applied has never beenmore effectively demonstrated than in the I9I4-I8 War.'1

When navalplannersconsidered their requirementsfor a FarEasternconflict, they assumed that Japan would be particularlysusceptible toeconomic pressure applied through sea power. Japan was an islandnation and the centre of a maritime empire, like Britain itself.As Britainwas vulnerable to economic warfare,it was assumed that Japan,with aless developed industrial base, weaker financial position, and smallernavy, must be even more exposed. Admiral SirErnleChatfield, the FirstSea Lord, noted in 1937 that in 'a European war economic pressurewould be only a contributing factorto our ultimate victory,albeit a veryimportant one.'

In a Pacificwar,however,it was only by meansof economicpressurethatvictorycouldbeachieved- anyideaof an invasionofJapanandherdefeatbymilitaryactionon her own soilwas out of the question.The warwouldbefoughtat a greatdistancefroma largepartof theEmpire,only partof whichwould be affectedby it. Exceptin the FarEast,Empiretradewouldnot beinterferedwith.Japan,however,could be almostcompletelyisolatedby navalactionand hernationallifedirectlyaffected.The expansionof Japaneseoverseastrademeantthatshehadgivena hostageto fortune.Interferencewith thistradewouldhavefatalconsequencesforher.2By 1937 planners had concluded that Japan could be forced to accepttermsif the navysevered its essential maritime communication, and thatthis could be achieved without first destroying the main Japanese fleet.The navy preparedto fight a fleet action because the possibility existedthat one might occur, and because it could not afford to lose one if it did.But it was hardlyobsessed with visions of a Far EasternJutland.

The most serious criticisms of the navy stem from an assumption thatit possessed only a single rigid and unchanging strategy for war withJapan,one which authorities would neither abandon nor modify. In fact,naval decision-makers considered the plan to dispatch a massive battlefleet to Singaporeas only one of the options open to them in the event ofwar.They knew that this strategy was feasible only if the requisite baseswere available and Britain'smargin of naval superiority was sufficient,and that these factors could not be guaranteed.The need to retain capital ships in home waters was also clearlyforeseen. Even during the I920s, when Britain possessed a comfortablemargin of superiorityover Japan and any single European naval power,planners were unwilling to leave Britain vulnerable to pressure from astate like Franceby dispatching its entire fleet to the FarEast. During thecourse of the 1930S a growing number of capital ships were required inI. Plans Division memo., 'The Possibilities of the Exercise of Maritime Economic Pressure uponItaly,' March 1931,P[ublic] R[ecord] O[ffice], Admiralty Records, hereafter ADM 1/8739/47.2. C[hiefs] O [fl S [taff Committee] 209 Mtg, i June 1937, PRO, CAB [inet Office Records] 53/7.

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6io THE 'SINGAPORE STRATEGY AND Junehome watersto contain Europeanthreats.The Admiralty'sreluctancetorely on the French navy to bolster British strength in Europe eventuallyled to an admission that the forces availablefor dispatch to the FarEasthad so far diminished that a less-than-idealstrategyagainst Japanmighthave to be adopted. As a result, a wide rangeof contingency plans weredevelopedbetween1937 and 1941. The natureof theseplanshas beenobscured by the haphazarduse of the term 'Singaporestrategy'to coverall of the schemes produced during the interwarperiod.The Admiralty intended the naval base being built at Singapore toprovideessentialdocking and repairfacilities for a Britishfleet operatingin eastern waters.' However, given its distance from Japan, Singaporewas considered unsuitable as a base for offensive operations. For thispurpose, the Admiralty initially hoped to use Hong Kong, and to seizeother baseseven closer to Japan.Only from advancedbasesto the northof Hong Kong did it expect to be able to exert decisive pressure on theenemy.The natureof that pressurewould be principallyeconomic. Themain fleet would tie down the bulk of Japanese naval strength, thuspreventing it from endangering other British interests. Meanwhile,detached cruiser squadrons in the Pacific would cut the arteries ofJapanese commerce, while massive British naval construction wouldbegin at home. Over the next few yearsBritain would become steadilystrongerwhile Japanwas bled into submission.This scheme representsthe Admiralty'sbest-caseappreciationof howJapan could be forced to accept British terms. It was a remarkablyoptimistic assessment.To be successful, Hong Kong would have to berelieved or recaptured,a fleet must be able to operate safely from thisbase, and military forces would have to be available for combinedoperations north of Hong Kong, and possibly for the relief or recaptureof Hong Kong itself.At the time these planswere drafted,between I920and 1931, these requirements did not appear unrealistic.2 By themid-193os, however, the Admiralty was losing confidence that anadvance from Hong Kong would be feasible, or that the fleet couldoperate from this base except under ideal circumstances. To furthercomplicate matters,the admiraltywas also confronted with the prospectthat the scale of combined operationswould be severelycurtailed, if notprecludedaltogether,by ashortageof land and air forces. In light of theseproblems, planners concluded that a progressive advance northwardfrom Hong Kong was no longer realistic.

i. The navy'splansforwarwithJapanwereembodiedintheseriesof WarMemoranda(Eastern)preparedby the plansdivisionoftheAdmiraltyforthe commanders-in-chiefof theprincipalBritishfleets.The firstWarMemorandumwascompletedin I920 (ADMII6/3124), and neweditionswereissued in I923 (ADM II6/3124), 1924 (ADM II6/3125), 1931 (ADM II6/3118), 1933 (ADM II6/3475)and1937 (ADMII6/4393). Eachof these underwentnumerousrevisionsduringits lifetime.

2. This planwasmost fullydevelopedin the WarMemorandum(Eastern)of July1931 (ADMII6/3118).

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2001 THE DETERRENCE OF JAPAN 6iiIn late 1937 the Admiraltyissued a new War Memorandum (Eastern)1which reshapedBritish plans to suit the new strategicenvironment. In

the event that European complications precluded the dispatch of navalforcesat least equal in strength to the Japanesemain fleet, plannersnowconcluded that their strategy would have to be defensive in its initialstages. Hong Kong might serve as the base for an inferior fleet, but itseemed more likely that the fleet would not advancebeyond Singapore.The new plans did not attempt to spell out how an inferior fleet couldprotect British interests in the Far East, but it was expected that theJapanesefleet'sadvantagewould steadily diminish as it moved furtheraway from its bases and approached Britain's.Hence, a slightly weakerBritish force could still meet a Japanesefleet on roughly equal terms inthe vicinity of Singapore.Inside the zone in which the British fleet couldoperate with land-based air support, planners believed that a relativelyweak naval force could provide a reasonable degree of protection forBritish interests. The Admiralty assumed that as long as Singaporeremained secure, it could eventually reinforce the eastern fleet andswitch to an offensive strategy.Ideally, though, naval planners intended to dispatch to Singapore afleet superior or equal in strength immediately hostilities commenced.If this was possible, the 1937 War Memorandum envisaged an offensivestrategy. Under ideal conditions, the fleet would operate fromHong Kong, but planners now hoped that decisive economic pressurecould be inflicted on Japan if British naval forces remained based onSingapore. This important development resulted from a reassess-ment of the means available to exert pressure on Japan. With large-scale combined operations no longer a realistic option, economicpressure began to assume greater prominence in the admiralty'scalculations.The problem of how to inflict this pressurewithout an advance basenorth of Hong Kong, and possibly without Hong Kong itself, wasworked out in 1937 during the preparation of the Joint PlanningCommittee's FarEasternAppreciation.2Whereas the navy'searlierplansassumed that the enemy fleet must be destroyed before a decisiveblockade could be implemented, the Joint Planning Committee nowconcluded that the navy could inflict decisive economic pressurewithout first fighting a fleet action. Working from data supplied by theIndustrial Intelligence Committee, the Joint Planners concluded thatJapan could not make up all of its deficiencies in essential raw materialsfrom the Asian mainland. They calculated that after approximately sixmonths of war, Japan must begin 'importing raw materialsby the longsea routes [across the Pacific ocean] at the rate of at least half a million

I. War Memorandum (Eastern), ADM II6/4393.2. COS UP) 579, 7 May 1937, CAB 53/3I.EHR June Oi


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6I2 THE 'SINGAPORE STRATEGY' AND Junetons a month, if she is not to suffer severe industrial restriction and aconsequent cumulative economic embarrassment.'1

This conclusion appeared to reduce the problems facing Britain tomanageable proportions. Even if Japan'scommunications with Chinaremained relatively secure, which would be the case as long as theJapanesefleet remainedafloat, it now seemed possible that Japanmightbe forced into submission if its trans-Pacifictrade were curtailed. TheJoint Planning Committee believed that Britain could accomplish this,although it might take up to two years, and possibly longer, to do so.This appreciation of Japan's vulnerability to a British blockade wasincorporated directly into the Admiralty's 1937 War Memorandum(Eastern).This document envisagedtwo means to win awar with Japan.The firstwas the traditionalplan of provokinga fleet action so as to openthe prospect of cutting Japan'sshort sea routes to China. This mightproduce a rapid decision, but as ever there was no guarantee that theJapanese would accept battle with superior British forces, while thelikelihood that a fleet action could occur under conditions favourabletothe British declined because of the decreased possibility of operatingfrom Hong Kong or further north. Nevertheless, the possibility stillexisted and the navy intended to grasp at it. The second course was towait foreconomic pressureagainstJapan's'long sea routes'to disrupt theenemy's economy and force its leadersto seek terms.This appearedto bea slower but more certain route.As these strategieswere complementary,they would be pursued simultaneously.After 1936 the Admiraltyalso had to deal with the possibility that Italywould enter a general European war on Germany's side. In 1937 athree-frontwar was regardedby the Chiefs of StaffCommittee [COS] asa threat Britain could not hope to meet. After the Munich crisis,however,this dangerappearedboth possible and imminent. In 1939 theCOS acknowledged that the fleet Britain could send to the Far Eastmight in certain circumstances not only be weaker than Japan's,butsignificantlyweaker.The First Sea Lord,Admiral Sir Roger Backhouse,calculatedthat Britain must retaina forceof no less than six capitalshipsin European waters to contain the German and Italian navies. Thiswould only leave five or six capital ships availablefor the FarEast, andBackhouse assertedthat a force of this size 'againsta JapaneseFleet ofio ships plus her full strength in other classesof ships is not adequate inthe proper meaning of that word.'2Two schools of thought existedon how to dealwith this problem.Thefirst, represented by Admiral Backhouse and Admiral Reginald Drax,who had been brought to the admiraltyto develop offensive war plans,maintained that in the event of a three-front war the navy should

I. Ibid.2. S[trategical] A[ppreciation] C[ommittee], 4, 'Note by the First Sea Lord', 28 Feb. I939, CAB

I6/209.

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2001 THE DETERRENCE OF JAPAN 613concentrate first on knocking out Italy,the weakest of Britain'senemies,while providing only a covering force for the Far East. This suggestionwas unorthodox and controversial. It meant reversingBritain'sprioritiesto favour the Mediterranean over the Far East, and it violated theaccepted tenet that any fleet sent to Singapore must be capable ofmeeting the whole of theJapanesefleet in British-dominatedwaters.Theidea of sending a weak force to meet a strongerone was repugnantto thenavalmind, but Backhouse believed that a fleet-in-being strategywouldallow an 'inadequate' fleet of four or five capitalships to protect Britain'svital interests in the Far East.1 His calculations were later refined byDrax, who suggested that it was only necessary to dispatch a 'flyingsquadron' composed of two fast battleships, two aircraftcarriers,fourlarge cruisers, and nine large destroyers. In an appreciation drafted inMarch 1939, Drax suggested that such a force could provide reasonableprotection to British trade and territory in the Indian Ocean, preventJapan from establishing a base in the region, 'hunt down Japaneseraiding forces of inferior strength',and pose a 'threatto Japan itself andher communications with China'.2Although this scheme was receivedwith some apprehensionthrough-out the navy, the idea of concentrating forcesin the Mediterranean for aknock-out blow against Italy was welcomed in political circles.3Thecabinet's StrategicalAppreciation Committee tacitly accepted that asmall covering force could defend British interests in the FarEast for aprolongedperiodwhen it concluded on 17 April 1939 that 'offensiveoperations in the Mediterraneanagainst Italy offered the best prospectsfor speedy results and should not, therefore, be lightly broken off.'4Thisdecision was not unchallenged. A second school of thought on theproblem of a three-enemy war was representedby Lord Chatfield, theformer First Sea Lord now serving as minister for coordination ofdefence. Chatfield was alarmed by the suggestion that Britain shouldsend only a covering force to defend imperial interests in the FarEast,fearingthat failure to send a strong fleet immediatelywould haveseriouspolitical repercussions, and might ultimately drive Australiaand NewZealand to look to the United States for their protection.5 He alsorejectedthe contention that therewas no possibility of making good onthe pledge to dispatch a fleet in the event of a three-front war.Chatfield failed to convince the committee of his views in April 1939,but byJune the idea of a 'flyingsquadron'had been rejectedby the COS,who now laid down the principle that any fleet sent to the FarEastmust

i. Ibid. SeealsoBackhouse'sminuteof 24 March1939, ADM I/9909.2. 'Compositionof the FarEasternFleet in War,' 15 March1939, DRAX 2/9, Drax Papers,ChurchillCollegeArchives,Cambridge.3.The Mediterraneanin Britishdefenceplanningduringthis period is coveredin LawrencePratt,EastofMalta, WestofSuez(Cambridge,1975).4. SAC6thMtg, 17April1939, CABI6/209.5.SAC2ndMtg, I3 March1939, CABI6/209.

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614 THE 'SINGAPORE STRATEGY AND Junebe able to meet the whole Japanesefleet if it came south. The Admiraltywas in fact the drivingforcebehind this declaration.A new regimeunderAdmiral Dudley Pound was uncomfortable with its predecessor'splansand needed little prompting from Chatfield to revertto a more orthodoxline. In July, Rear-AdmiralTom Phillips, the new deputy chief of thenaval staff, instructed the Admiralty's director of plans to omit allreferences to a 'flying squadron' from the Admiralty'swar plans.1 ArevisedWar Memorandum stated that 'if a force is sent to the FarEast itmust be capable of engaging the main JapaneseFleet under conditionsfavourable to ourselves. In September 1939, this force must include 7capital ships.'2No mention was made of what was to be done if Britishcapital ships were kept in the Mediterraneanand a force this size wasunavailable.Pound believed, however, that a small covering force coulddo no more than securecommunications in the Indian Ocean and deterthe Japanese from major operations in the South China Seas orAustralasianwaters. If the Japanese fleet moved south in strength, heexpected British naval forces to retire from Singaporeand operate fromanother base, probablyTrincomalee.3After September 1939, the Admiralty continued to view the problemof war with Japanin orthodox terms. It believed that a strong fleet wasessential to defend Britain'sFar Eastern interests adequately;and that aweak fleet, if that was all that could be sent, would withdraw into theIndian Ocean if threatenedby superior Japaneseforces. With the fall ofFrance and the entry of Italy into the European conflict in 1940, theAdmiraltyacceptedthat it could not send any fleet to the FarEastfor theforeseeablefuture.4However,during the courseof 1941 the United Statesbegan to increase its naval assistanceto Britain in the Atlantic, and bymid-yearthe Admiraltywas considering the dispatch of naval reinforce-ments to the Far East. In August it concluded that by March 1942 itcould create an eastern fleet consisting of the battleships Nelson andRodney, a battlecruiser, four of the old, unmodernized 'R' (RoyalSovereign)classbattleships,and an aircraftcarrier,togetherwith cruisersand destroyers.In the meantime, Pound believed that moving the 'R'class battleships to the Indian Ocean would deter Japan from sendingany of its capital ships into the area,while the presenceof a battlecruiserand an aircraft carrierwould deter Japanese cruisers from attackingBritish commerce. Pound also suggested that if the government'sprincipal objective was to deter Japan from entering the war at all, thebattleships Nelson and Rodney, a battle-cruiser and an aircraft carriermight be dispatched to Singapore before any other movements took

i. Minute by Tom Phillips, 5 July 1939, ADM 1/9767.2. War Memorandum (Eastern), Section XVI, July 1939, ADM 1/9767. These changes were

approved by both Pound and Phillips. See also revisions in ADM II6/3863.3. See COS 928, 'The Situation in the Far East,' I8 June 1939, CAB 53/50.4. See the COS's 'Far East Appreciation', COS (40) 592 (Revise), IS Aug. 1940, CAB 80/IS.

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2001 THE DETERRENCE OF JAPAN 615place. In the event of war, however, this force would fall back onTrincomalee.1

British naval war planning prior to the dispatch of the Princeof Waleswas thus far from static. Most of the sweeping generalizations whichhave been made about the 'Singaporestrategy'do not hold good for theperiod prior to the mid-1930s, when the admiraltydid expect to send alarge, balanced fleet to Singapore, let alone for the years 1937-41. TheAdmiralty's war plans placed greater emphasis on economic pressurethan sea battles and envisagedthe employment of fleets which ranged,inBritisheyes, from pitifully small to overwhelmingly powerful. Formuchof 1939-41, when the 'Singaporestrategy'was still allegedlyexercisingitsstifling grip on the naval mind, service planners did not count on aneasternfleet operating from Singapore at all. In the decade prior to thePacific war, naval leaders were acutely aware of the difficulties theywould face in a war with Japan. Rather than burying their heads in thesand and clinging to a strategy that all logic should have revealed ashopeless, they lobbied for the resourcesthey needed and re-draftedtheirplans in light of changing circumstances.The opprobrium heaped on the navy'spre-warplanning has made iteasy to suggest a link between those plans and the fate of Force Z.According to Arthur Marder, for example, the dispatch of these ships'goes to show how a strongly rooted mode of thought persistsregardlessof developments'. Paul Haggie contends that the loss of these vessels, 'inpursuit of an obsolete maritime strategy with inadequate resources,wasno chance occurrence but a tragicallyapposite conclusion to Britain'sefforts to defend her position in the Far East.'2These charges fail todistinguish between naval and civilian decision-makers, who are con-veniently lumped together when blame is being assigned. Thus, evenhistorianswho acknowledge that the admiraltyopposed the movementof the Princeof Walesto Singapore still imply that the navy'sother errorswere so serious that it must share in the blame for the disasterwhichfollowed. The navy's critics also assume that in 194I Britain employedtwo capital ships for the purposes for which it had once earmarked anentire fleet. In fact, these ships were sent for entirely different reasons.Neither Churchill nor the Admiraltyconsidered them to be a substitutefor the balanced fleet envisaged in pre-war plans. And while Churchillthought that these vessels might act as a 'flyingsquadron' in the event ofwar,the Admiraltydid not. Pound and Phillips gavethis idea short shriftin the summerof I939 and they had no desire to reviveit in October I94I.The assumption that the navy's pre-war errorswere so serious thatthey must be linked to its initial wartime disasters has also led to thechargethat contempt forJapanesefighting capabilitieswas an important

i. Poundto Churchill,28 July 1941, Churchill, Second World War, III, PP. 769-73; Marder, OldFriends, p. 220.2. Marder, Old Friends, p. 241; Haggie, Britannia, p. 211.

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6i6 THE 'SINGAPORE STRATEGY' AND Junefactor in Britain's'relianceon inadequate military forcesin the Far East,which ended in the shocking fate of Force Z'.1 This claim is alsounfounded. There was indeed a tendency in naval circles during the1930S to underestimate the quality of the Japanesenavy,and in particularits many technical accomplishments and major developments in itstactical thought.2 But while the navy's propensity to underrate itsJapanese opponents undoubtedly resulted in its forces experiencingtacticalsurprisesoff the coasts of Malaya and Indonesia in 1941-2, thereis no link between these mistakes and the placement of weak forces ineasternwaters. Britain did not choose to rely on inadequateforces in thisregion - this was forced upon it by circumstances and the dictates ofgrand strategy.Leading decision-makersregardedthe resourcesavailablefor the FarEastin 194I as being inadequatein the event of war, and ForceZ was never expected to face the full strength of the enemy. In certaincircumstances, planners assumed that they could afford a slight inferi-ority in capital ships at Japan'sselected moment, but only if this couldnot be avoided. If a superior fleet could be sent to the Far East, theAdmiralty always intended that it would be, and it alwaysassumed thatit would requirea force numerically strongerthan the Japanesefleet toadopt an offensive strategy.There was never any question of holdingback battleships out of contempt for Japanese fighting abilities. TheAdmiralty thought that it could accomplish more with relativelyweakforces than it actually provedable to do, but this beliefwas not the reasonwhy only weak forceswere employed.3If the navy escapes responsibility for sending Force Z to Singapore, thesame cannot be said of Britain'scivilian decision-makers,who had a longhistory of employing warships for political purposes in peacetime. Thenavy was the most visible symbol of British power and prestige abroadduring the interwarperiod and there were few in Whitehall who wouldhave questioned the link between navalstrengthand national influence,even if they were not prepared to go as far as Admiral Sir CharlesMadden's claim that the navy was 'the chief sanction of our ForeignPolicy, it is hardly an exaggeration to say that every Foreign Officetelegramis backed by it.'4The routine movements and dispositions of minor warships anddetacied navalsquadronsdid not normallyhave a bearingon greatissues

i. WesleyWark,'InSearchofaSuitableJapan:BritishNavalIntelligencein thePacificbeforetheSecondWorlidWar',Intelligenceand NationalSecurity,I (MayI986), pp. 206-7.2. GeoffreyTill, 'Perceptionsof NavalPowerBetweenthe Wars:The BritishCase',EstimatingForeignMilitar)Power,ed. PeterTowle (London:CroomHelm, I982) and Marder,OldFriends,ChapterXII.3.On the linksbetweenintelligenceassessmentsof Japan,Britishnavalwarplanning,andthedispatchof ForceZ, see ChristopherBell, 'The Royal Navy, War Planningand IntelligenceBetweenthe Wars',Intelligenceand theInternationalSystem,I870-i970, ed. JenniferSiegel andPeterJackson(NewYork:Praeger,200I).4. 'Notes by theFirstSea Lord',5JulyI929, RamsayMacDonaldPapers,PRO30/69/267.

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2001 THE DETERRENCE OF JAPAN 617of peace and war, but it was widely thought that by 'showing the flag' indistant waters these vessels would bolster Britain's national and navalprestige,stimulate trade, and ensure the securityof British interestsandnationals abroad.How to use the navy as a diplomatic tool in peacetimecould be a complicated matter,however,when the disposition of majorfleet units was involved. The Admiralty alwaysregardedits main fleet asthe most effective deterrentto hostile powers and was loathe to disperseits forces for diplomatic effect. As long as foreigners knew that the navycould respondpromptly to an attackon Britishinterests,it assumedthatthe threat was unlikely to materialize. Politicians and diplomatsgenerally shared these views, but were more likely to consider themovement of major warships as a means of sending signals to bothfriends and potential enemies. This was especially true in the case ofJapan.The idea of modifying Japan'saggressivebehaviour by strengtheningBritain'snavalforcesin the FarEast was frequently broachedpriorto theoutbreak of the Pacific war. The matter was first given seriousconsideration in 1937, when a cabinet committee recommended thedispatch of two battleships to the Far East in order to stop Japaneseinterference with British shipping in the region. According to SirAlexander Cadogan, the deputy under-secretary for foreign affairs, 'itwas well known that until capital ships arrived in the Far East nodifference would be made regarding our situation vis-4-visJapan, as atthe moment the Japanese were a first class naval power and we were asecond classnaval power in that area,and the despatch of cruiserswouldmerely improve our prestige locally.'1 Chatfield, the First Sea Lord,strongly opposed the idea, however, on the grounds that such a weakforcewould only invite attackby offeringJapan'apossibility of defeatingthe divided Britishforces in detail'. If capitalshipswere to be dispatched,he insisted that they must be 'in sufficient strength to defeat the fullstrength of the JapaneseNavy'.2The eastward movement of capital ships was proposed again inNovember I938 by Sir Josiah Crosby, the British minister at Bangkok,who felt that such a move would help to 'recover a measure of thatprestige which we have been losing to Siam by comparison with ourmore blatantand brutallyforcefulopponents'. Crosby laterassertedthatwhat was wanted 'in this part of the world is a real sight of the BritishNavy in realforcehere and now, and less of indefinite assurancesthat weshall see it when the time comes.'3 Sir Robert Craigie, Britain'sambassador to Japan, also felt that the dispatch of capital ships 'at this

i. Committee on British Shipping in the Far East, hearafter FES (37) i't Mtg, 8 Sept. I937, CAB27/634.2. FES (37) 4, 'Reinforcement of British Naval Forces in the Far East', memo. by Chatfield,iI Sep. 1937, CAB 27/634.3. Crosby to Foreign Office [FO], 7 Nov. I938 and I7 Feb. I939, FO 37I/23544; minute by Headof M branch,i6 Dec. I938, ADM I/9909.

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6i8 THE 'SINGAPORE STRATEGY' AND Junejuncture would afford a powerful deterrent against Japanese co-operation with the axis Powers.' In his view, the Admiralty'spolicy ofconcentrating its forces in European waters had 'created here a falseimpressionof Britishnavalimpotence in FarEasternwatersbut there isstill time to destroythis impressioneven on the assumption that no morethan three capital ships could be sparedfor the purpose at present.'1Foreign Office officials agreedthat placing capital ships at Singaporein peacetime would provide a powerful deterrentto Japan, but worriedthat this would weaken Britain's position in Europe.2 They onlyapproached the Admiralty after a lengthy memorandum by one of theForeign Office's legal advisors, G. G. Fitzmaurice, argued that even asmall fleet at Singapore could 'produce a very great, and probably adecisive, deterrenteffect', and that such a force could be provided if thefive RoyalSovereign('R') classbattleshipswere not scrappedas plannedin I942-4. These ships were too old to be of much use in Europeanwaters, Fitzmauriceconceded, but they might still have a role to play inthe FarEast:

Toputit at its lowest,it wouldseemthatthesefiveshipswouldbebetterthannothingat Singapore.Ifthe alternativeis to scrapthemaltogether,wouldit notbe betterto keepthemand put themin the FarEastfor whateffecttheycanproduce?At leastwe shouldbeno worseoffthanwe areatpresentwhenwehavenocapitalshipsthere,andwemaybe considerablybetteroff,for . .. theseships[would]produceat leastsomeappreciabledeterrenteffect... 3

The Admiralty'sreactionwas mixed. Backhouse, the new First Sea Lord,accepted that a small force of capital ships 'should be quite capable notonly of looking after itself but also of safeguardingour trade and ourcommunications', but he had 'no use' for the 'suggestionto send out the5 Royal Sovereigns,which are too slow and unsuited for that part of theworld'.4 He also did not think the time was right to send anyreinforcementsto the FarEast given the currentshortageof operationalbattleships and the declining political situation in Europe. Backhouseadmitted that he had 'often thought that we should "show"our Fleetmore than we have done in recent years, but one "crisis"after anotherand our large Capital Ship reconstruction programme has left usnothing to sparein the way of capital ships.... The moral to be drawnfrom the situation we now find ourselves in is that our foreign policyshould be largelygoverned by the strength of the Navy.'5

i. Craigie to FO, 23 March I939, ADM II6/4087.2. Nicholls minute, 23 Jan. I939, FO 37I/23544.3. 'Memorandum respecting the proposal to station a British Battle Squadron permanently at

Singapore', 27 Jan. 1939, FO 371/23544; Documents on British Foreign Policy (London: HMSO,I974) series III, 8, appendix i; R. J. Pritchard, Far Eastern Influence upon British Strategy Towardsthe Great Powers, 1937-39(New York: Garland, I987), pp. 133-7; Haggie, Britannia, pp. I3o-2.

4. Backhouse minute, 24 March 1939, ADM I/9909.5. Backhouseminutes,I6 Feb.,I March,and24 March1939,ADM I/9909.

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200I THE DETERRENCE OF JAPAN 6I9The Admiralty's opposition was once again decisive, but the idea ofmaintaining a small fleet in the Far East continued to appeal to civilian

decision-makerseven after the onset of the Europeanwar. In NovemberI940, for example, R.A. Butler,the parliamentaryunder-secretaryat theForeign Office, suggested that a battlecruiser and an aircraftcarrier atCeylon might be 'useful in connexion with current difficulties in India'and 'strategicallywell placed to reinforce the Far East if the occasionarose .

Meanwhiletheywouldhavea stimulatingeffectuponthe moralenot onlyofcountriessuchasIndo-China,ThailandandtheNetherlandsEastIndieswhicharemostsusceptibleto Japanesepressure,but alsouponthe peopleof Chinaanduponour ownpeoplesin MalayaandBurma.The despatchof theshipswouldalsoheartenAustraliaandNew Zealandandhelpto reassurethemas tothe safetyof their linesof communicationwithAfrica,the MiddleEastandEurope.I

The Australian government also routinely lobbied for the dispatch ofcapital ships to Singapore. In December I940, Sir Robert Menzies, theAustralian Prime Minister, pressed Churchill for the transferof three orfour vessels to Singapore from the Mediterraneanfleet. When Menziesvisited London in March I94I, he again urged the admiraltyto reinforceits naval forces in the Far East. This appeal was renewed in May,following a reduction in American naval strength in the Pacific, andagain in August, when Menzies telegraphed to Churchill that 'an earlydespatch of capital ships east of Suez would itself be [a] most powerfuldeterrent and first step [towardsa fleet of five capital ships].'2Prior to the arrival of this telegram, the British government hadsuccessfully resisted Australian pleas for the dispatch of battleships toSingapore. Churchill justified the risks being run in the region by theneed to concentrate British and Dominion resources on securing thedefeat of Germany and the improbability of war with Japan. The lattercalculation may be attributed in large measure to Churchill's long-standing blind spot to Far-Eastern dangers. As Chancellor of theExchequer during the I920s, Churchill was alreadyinclined to downplaythe Japanese threat to British interests:

A warwith Japan!But why shouldthereby a warwithJapan?I do not believethereis theslightestchanceof it in ourlifetime. .. Japanis atthe otherend oftheworld.Shecannotmenaceourvitalsecurityin anyway.... The onlywaritwouldbeworthourwhileto fightwouldbe to preventan invasionof Australia,and that I amcertainwill neverhappenin any period,eventhe most remote,

i. FarEasternCommittee paper, FE (40) 65, R. A. Butler memo., 'FarEasternSituation', 23 Nov.I940, CAB 96/I.

2. Menzies to Churchill, Dec. I940, cited in Marder, pp. 2I5-20; COS (4I)80(0), 'Despatch ofa Fleet to the Far East', i8 May I94I; Menzies to Churchill, ii Aug. I94I, PRO, Prime Minister'sOffice Papers, hearafter PREM 3/I56/I.EHR June oi


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620 THE 'SINGAPORE STRATEGY' AND Junewhichweor our childrenneedforesee.I am thereforeconvincedthatwarwithJapanisnot a reasonablepossibilityanyreasonableGovernmentneedtakeintoaccount.1

Fifteen years later, as First Lord of the Admiralty, Churchill stillconsidered the Japanese threat both distant and manageable. Duringdiscussions with representativesof the Australian and New Zealandgovernments in November I939, for example, Churchill emphasized thegreat difficulties Japan would face in a siege of Singapore, 'a fortressarmed with five I5-inch guns, and garrisonedby nearly 20 000 men.' Ina memorandum later circulated to the war cabinet, he argued that aslong as a strong British fleet could be dispatched to Singapore,Japaneseoperationsto captureit would be doomed to failure.'It is not consideredpossible,'he concluded, 'that the Japanese,who are a prudent people andreservetheir strength for the command of the Yellow Seas and China,in which they are fully occupied, would embark upon such a madenterprise.' It appearedeven less likely that they would risk an invasionof Australia or New Zealand, an operation more difficult than thecapture of Singapore. Nevertheless, in the event of a serious Japaneseattack developing, he reassuredthe Dominion representativesthat 'ourduty to our kith and kin would take precedence' over Britain'scommitments in the Mediterranean.2As Prime Minister, Churchill's attention remained fixed on the warwith Germany and Italy. He had no intention of denuding theMediterraneanof warshipsexcept in the event of a full-scaleinvasion ofAustralia,and little desire to transfer even modest navalreinforcementsto Singaporeas long as BritainandJapanwere not actuallyatwar.WhenMenzies requestedthe transferof capitalships to Singaporein DecemberI940, for example, he was informed that this could only be done 'byruining the Mediterraneansituation.This I am sureyou would not wantto do unless or until the Japanesedanger becomes far more menacingthan at present.'3 Over six months elapsed before Churchill wouldconsider the transferof capital ships to Singapore.On 25 AugustI94I, thePrimeMinisterinformedtheAdmiraltythatit'shouldbe possible in the near futureto placea deterrentsquadronin theIndian Ocean'. In his view, such a force 'should consist of the smallestnumber of the best ships. We have only to rememberall the preoccupa-tions which are caused us by the Tirpitz . .. to see what an effect wouldbe produced upon the JapaneseAdmiralty by the presenceof a small butvery powerful and fast force in Eastern waters.' Churchill thereforefavoured the dispatch of one of Britain's new King George V classbattleships to serve as the nucleus of a 'formidable, fast, high-class

i. Martin Gilbert, WinstonS. Churchill(London: Heinemann, I976), V, p. 76.2. Visits of Ministers from Dominions, hereafter DMV (39) 8th Mtg, 20 Nov. I939, ADM

I/II062; war cabinet memo., 2I Nov. I939, CAB 6613; ChurchillWarPapers,ed. Martin Gilbert(New York: Norton, I993-2000) I, pp. 40I-3.

3. Churchill to Menzies, 8 Dec. I940, ChurchillWarPapers,II, p. II87-8.EHR June Oi


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200I THE DETERRENCE OF JAPAN 62Isquadron', which he hoped to have operating in 'the triangleAden-Singapore-Simonstown' as earlyas October I94I.

The navy was unenthusiastic about these proposals and insisted onretaining all of its modern battleships in home waters in the event of abreakoutby the powerfulnew Germanbattleship Tirpitz.On 28 August,Pound informed Churchill of the admiralty'splans to createa balancedFarEasternfleet by March I942. Between mid-September I94I and earlyJanuaryI942, four of the unmodernized 'R' class battleships would besent to the Indian Ocean, where they would initially serve as troopconvoy escorts; and between November I94I and mid-January I942,the battleshipsNelson and Rodneyand the battle-cruiserRenown wouldmove to either Trincomalee or Singapore. With the addition of anaircraftcarrier, cruisers and destroyers, these vessels would ultimatelyform a balanced fleet which could be stationed at Singapore. In themeantime, Pound hoped that the presence of heavy ships in the IndianOcean would 'go some way to meet the wishes of Australia andNew Zealand for the FarEast to be reinforced' and deter Japan fromsending battleshipsor largecruisers into the Indian Ocean in the eventof war.Although there was much to be said for these plans, Churchill wasswift to rejectthem. 'It is surely a faulty disposition', he complained on29 August, 'to create in the Indian Ocean a fleet considerable innumbers, costly in maintenance and man-power, but consisting entirelyof slow, obsolescent, or unmodernized ships which can neither fight afleet action with the main Japanese force nor act as a deterrentupon hismodern fast, heavy ships, if used singly or in pairs as raiders.' Moreimportantly,he suggested thatJapanwould be unwilling to contemplatewar with the 'combination now forming against her of the United States,GreatBritain, and Russia,while alreadyoccupied in China'. It was verylikely, he claimed, thatJapan 'will negotiate with the United Statesfor atleast three months without making any further aggressive move orjoining the Axis actively. Nothing would increase her hesitation morethan the appearanceof the force I mentioned, and above all of a K.G.V.This might indeed be a decisive deterrent.'1Churchill was willing to consider the dispatch of capital ships to theFar East in August I94I because the tightening of Anglo-Americaneconomic sanctions against Japan after the occupation of FrenchIndo-China in July I94I had led to a sharp deterioration in relationsbetween the Anglo-Saxon powers and Japan.The temptation for Japanto solve its problems by force of arms was greater than ever, and thepossibility of a Japanese attack could not be ignored. Parallel to this,however, British leaders were confident that active American supportwould be forthcoming in the event of a Japanese attack on British

i. Churchill to Pound, 25 and 29 Aug. I94I, Churchill, Second World War, III, pp. 768-73.EHR June oi


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622 THE 'SINGAPORE STRATEGY AND Juneinterests, and this was expected this to act as a restraint on Japan.1Asearly as April I94I, Churchill had insisted that it was 'very unlikely'that 'Japanwill enter the war either if the United States have come in,or if Japan thinks they would come in, consequent on a Japanesedeclaration of war.' Moreover, he told the fighting services that it 'maybe taken as almost certain that the entry of Japan into the war wouldbe followed by the immediate entry of the United States on our side.'2These views were strengthened in the months prior to August I94I.3From Churchill's perspective, therefore, the time had come to dispatchcapital ships to Singapore: this move would not only mollify theAustralians, but, more importantly, it would send the right signals toboth the United States and Japan.Speedwas therefore an essentialelement of Churchill'sproposals.Themessages exchangedwith the admiraltyat the end of August make clear,however, that the PrimeMinister and his naval adviserswere working toentirely different timetables. Notably, Churchill's memorandum of 29August did not make any referenceto the Admiralty'slong-term goals;itscriticismswere directed solely at Pound's immediate plans to employ thefour 'R'sasconvoy escortsin the Indian Ocean. This move was, from theAdmiralty'sperspective, only an interim measure.Once these ships werereinforced they would have formed the backbone of a fleet which mighthave been expected to engage a large Japanese force under favourableconditions. This mattered little to Churchill, however, because he wasnot looking that far ahead: he wanted capital ships in the Far Eastimmediately. The need for speed also dictated the composition of theproposed reinforcement. If only a small force could be employed in theshort term, then a fast, new battleship would be far more likely toimpress observers than a squadron of old, slow battleships which hadnearly been consigned to the scrapheap only two yearsbefore.The Admiraltywas not persuaded by Churchill'sargument4,and thematter was dropped until September I94I, when it was revived by theForeign Secretary,Anthony Eden. Like Churchill, Eden and the ForeignOffice were optimistic that Japan could be deterred from war. On I2September the Foreign Secretaryinformed Churchill that the Japanesewere 'hesitating', but that their 'better mood has only been broughtabout by the contemplation of the forces that may confront them'.

i. David Reynolds, The Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance 1937-4I (London: EuropaPublicationsLtd,I98I).2. Churchill memo, 28 April I941, PREM 3II5616.3. For example, he informed the COS in July that 'Japan will not declare war upon us at the

present juncture, nor if the United States enters the war on our side.... I do not consider that awarbetween Britain and Japan is likely at the present time. If contrary to the above views Japan shouldattack us, I am of the opinion that the United States would enter the war as the weight upon uswould clearly be too great.' COS (41)I39(0), i6 July I94I, CAB 80/58.

4. Gilbert,Churchill,VI, p. I256; Poundto Churchill,29 Aug. I94I, ADM I99/I934.EHR June oi


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200I THE DETERRENCE OF JAPAN 623Russia,theUnitedStates,Chinaand the BritishEmpire,to saynothingof theDutch,is more than thisprobablyover-valuedmilitarypoweris preparedtochallenge.Ourrightpolicyis, therefore,clearlytokeepupthepressure.... Wewant the Japaneseto feel that we are in a positionto playour handfromstrength.1

Eden and Churchill discussed the Far Eastern situation that day overlunch. According to Eden's diary, 'Winston insisted that we could nowput pressureon Japs.'I agreein the sensethattheyarebeginningto understandtheirisolation,butprocessmusttakea little longer.Nothingcouldhelpit more than arrivalofmodernbattleshipor two at Singapore.We agreedthat 'R' shipssuch asAdmiraltyproposeis aweakcompromise.ItoldhimthatpoliticallyIhadrathernot havethem.Modernbattleship,Carrierand BattleCruiseror nothingweagreed.2

This enthusiasm for naval reinforcements was bolstered by the knowl-edge that the defensive position of the Anglo-Saxon powers in the FarEast was increasing. The transfer of American B-I7 bombers to thePhilippines at this time, together with the gradual increase of British airstrength in Malaya, were seen as significant deterrents to Japaneseaggression.In early October, the desirabilityof impressing the Japaneseby a further show of force was backed up by leading civilian and militaryfigures in the FarEast, who emphasized the 'propagandavalue of evenone or two battleships at Singapore'.3 It was the fall of the Konoyegovernment in Japan, however, that made a decision on naval move-ments critical. On i6 October, Eden warned Churchill that the newJapanesegovernmentwould probably be under the influence of 'extremeelements', but that it should still be possible to deter them from war.'There is nothing yet to show in which direction they will move, if any',he observed. 'But it is no doubt true that the stronger the joint front theA.B.C.D. [America, Britain, China, Dutch] powers can show, thegreater the deterrent to Japanese action.' He therefore advised that the'possibility of capital ship reinforcements to the Far East . . . has nowbecome more urgent, and I should be glad if it could be discussed at theDefence Committee tomorrow afternoon.'4This matter was duly taken up the next day. Over the course of twomeetings5, Pound, Phillips and A. V. Alexander, the First Lord of theAdmiralty, fought to prevent the dispatch of a deterrent squadron

I. Eden to Churchill, 12Sept. 1941, FO 371/27981; Antony Best, Britain, Japan, and Pearl Harbor(London: Routledge, I995), p. I72.2. Eden Diary, i2 Sept. I94I, Papers of the first Earl of Avon, Special Collections Department,University of Birmingham.3. JP(4I)8i6, 'Japan:Our Future Policy', 7 Oct. I94I, annex I, CAB 84/35.4. Eden to Churchill, i6 Oct. I94I, Defence Committee papers, hereafter DO, DO(4I)2I, CAB6913.S. DO(4I)65, I7 Oct. I94I, CAB 69/2; DO(4I)66, 20 October I94I, CAB 69/8.

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624 THE 'SINGAPORE STRATEGY AND Juneincluding the Prince of Walesto Singapore. All of the King GeorgeVswere needed in home waters, they claimed, while the placement of asingle new battleship at Singaporewould do little to deterJapan,whichcould 'easily afford to put four modern ships with any big convoydestined for an attack in Southern Waters'.In their view, the only realdeterrentwas a fleet of at leastsix battleships.Such a force would compelthe Japaneseto detach a largeproportion of their fleet for any southwardadvance, leaving Japan itself exposed to the American fleet at PearlHarbor. The Prime Minister, however, insisted that the immediatedispatch of a fast striking force would be the best deterrent, and was'scathingin his comments on the Admiralty attitude to this matter'.1

Churchill's objections to the use of older ships in the Far Eastremainedunchanged since his exchangewith the admiraltyin August. Alarge force of old, unmodernized battleships could not engage the fullweight of the Japanese fleet, he maintained, nor run away from asuperiorforce. It would also be too slow to catch Japaneseraidersin theIndian Ocean. A fast, powerful capital ship, on the other hand, couldhunt down and destroysuch vessels,and, by its merepresencein the FarEast, tie down a much larger number of Japanese battleships. If theGerman battleship did break out into the Atlantic, Churchill wasconfident that carrier-borneaircraftcould 'slowher up to become a preyfor the heavy metal of our Capital Ships.'Eden also urged the Defence Committee to dispatch a modern ship.Unlike Churchill, however,he did not dwell on the question of what thisvessel might hope to accomplish in the event of war breakingout, butratheron the need to deterJapanfrom entering the warin the firstplace.The dispatch of a 'modern ship, such as the Prince of Wales,to the FarEast would have a far greater effect politically', he argued, 'than thepresence in those waters of a number of the last war's battleships. If thePrince of Waleswere to call at Cape Town on her way to the FarEast,news of her movements would quickly reach Japan and the deterrenteffect would begin from that date.' These argumentswere well receivedby the remainderof the committee and Pound suggested a compromiseby which the Princeof Waleswould proceed immediately to CapeTown,and any furthermovement would be considered in light of the situationprevailingwhen she arrivedthere.This was accepted by the committee.2There is no record of the Prince of Wales'sultimate destination beingreconsidered.This vessel, together with the Repulse,reached Singaporeon 2 December.The destruction of both vessels little more than a week later hasfocused attention on the deliberationsbetweenAugust and October I94Iwhich led to their despatch, and in particularChurchill'sdisagreementswith Pound over questions of naval strategy. What is often

I. Phillipsto Pound,I7 Oct. I94I, ADM I78/322.2. DO(4I)66, 20 Oct. I94I, CAB 69/8.

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200I THE DETERRENCE OF JAPAN 625overlooked, however, is that Churchill was motivated primarily bypolitical considerations.The PrimeMinister was determined to send thePrince of Walesto the FarEast not because he expected it to fight, butbecause he thought that its presencewould make fighting unnecessary.In the process, he overestimated what a modern battleship couldaccomplish in the event of war and the impact it would have on Japanesenaval strategy,but that mistake was not the primaryreason it was sent.Churchill's most influential critic has been Stephen Roskill,whose official history contained the first detailed account of thedecision-making processwhich led to the dispatchof the Princeof Walesand Repulseto Singapore. Roskill glossed over the political considera-tions which motivated the Defence Committee in October I94I andexaggerated the significance of Churchill's shortcomings as a navalstrategist.The firstdraft of TheWarAt Sea, which was in proof form byI953, asserted:

We to day are able to see that, quite apartfrom the fact that it was veryimprobablethat the movementwould successfullyaccomplishits designedpoliticalpurpose,thereareothergroundson whichit mustbe condemned.Fromthe point of view of maritimestrategytherewere, as the NavalStaffrepeatedlyrepresented,graveobjections. . I

This view drew fire immediately.Commodore G. R. G. Allen, the navaladviser for Churchill's memoirs, complained to Roskill that he had'overweighted' the 'strategicalargument' and failed to pay sufficientattention to 'the supreme responsibility of Ministers'.2 The CabinetSecretary,Sir Norman Brook, agreed that 'in the original text of thischapter, "political"reasonswere written down and too much emphasislaid on the strategicproprieties.'Allen and Brook both pressed Roskillto make changes to his text.3 As a result, the most explicit criticismsof the Prime Minister were dropped from the published version.However, Roskill's narrative still revolved around the debate betweenChurchill and the admiralty over naval strategy, rather than politicalconsiderations.Churchill's memoirs, the relevant volume of which had beenpublished three years earlier,did little to help his case. The politicalfactorswhich had motivated the Defence Committee in the autumn ofI94I were not emphasized in this account, yet the Prime Minister'scorrespondence with Admiral Pound in August I94I was publishedin full. This provided further ammunition to those who have arguedthat Churchill was motivated principally by his views on navalstrategy;that he had pressed these views on the Admiralty for months before

i. CAB I03/327.2. Minute by Allen to Churchill, 24 Aug. I953, CAB I03/327.3. Norman Brook to Churchill, 2 Sept. I953, CAB I03/327; also see Brook to Acheson, 23 July

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200I THE DETERRENCE OF JAPAN 627of the Foreign Office, probably carried at least as much weight on thisoccasion as Churchill's.

Churchill'swillingness to use battleshipsto deterJapanfrom war hasalso been attacked. There has been much confusion over how thedeterrentwas expected to work. It is sometimes asserted that this movewas nothing more than a giant bluff - that Churchill believed Japanwould hesitate to declarewar on Britain because it fearedthe ability ofthese two ships to frustrateJapaneseoperations. However, the deterrentvalue of these ships was thought to derive from what they symbolized,rather than what they might do. In I94I Churchill and Eden shared thesame basicviews on the political uses of battleshipsas the diplomats andpoliticians who had urged the dispatch of capital ships to the FarEastbetweenI937 and I94I. In theireyes,evena smallforceof capitalshipscould demonstrate resolve,bolster Britishprestige, reassurefriends, andthreatenpotential enemies. Prior to mid-I94I Churchill had resisted theemployment of capital ships in the Far East because he did not think adeterrentwas necessary.This was no longer the caseduring the latterhalfof I94I, when Churchill, and laterEden, concluded that the presenceofa ship like the Princeof Walesat Singaporewould symbolize Britain'sstillconsiderablenational strength, ratherthan revealthe shortcomings of itspresent naval capabilities. More importantly, it would emphasize theclose relationship that was developing between Britain and the UnitedStates.It should also be remembered that ForceZ was not the only deterrentemployed at this juncture. During the last months of peace in the Pacific,London also strengthened its defences in Malaya, tightened economicsanctions against Japan, and asked the Canadian government toreinforce the hopelessly exposed garrison at Hong Kong. This was allpart of the attempt to create an impression of growing British strengthand resolvein the Far East. But even this was not expected to deter war.Ultimately, it was the combinedstrength of Britain and the United Statesthat was counted on to restrainJapan. British efforts to impress Tokyowere therefore also aimed at the United States. By the summer of I94I,Churchill and the Foreign Office believed they must follow the UnitedStates'slead in matters relating to the Far East.1 Keeping in step withAmerican efforts to deter Japan seemed to offer the best means ofpresenting the sort of united front which would overawe decision-makers in Tokyo, and of encouraging Anglo-American collaboration.Churchill's speech of io November I94I at the Guildhall, whichpromised British support for the United States in event of a Japaneseattack, was also part of this attempt to align British and Americanpolicies in the Far East so closely that both the Americans and the

i. Best, Pearl Harbor, Chapter 8; Christopher Thorne, Allies of a Kind (London: HamishHamilton,I978), PP.7I-4.EHR June oi


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628 THE 'SINGAPORE STRATEGY' AND JuneJapanese would take Anglo-American co-belligerency for granted.1These efforts were not lost on decision-makers in Washington. InNovember I94I, for example, PresidentRoosevelt suggested to Churchillthat Japan might still be deterred by the United States's 'continuingefforts to strengthen our defences in the Philippine Islands, parallelledby similar efforts by you in the Singapore area, which will tend toincreaseJapan'sdistant hesitation'.2Although Churchill skilfully advanced the cause of Anglo-Americancooperation in the FarEast, these efforts failed to avertwar. 'Whydiddeterrence fail? From the Admiralty's perspective the problem wascredibility.BetweenI937 andI94I navalleadersattachedmoreweighttothe capabilitiesof their FarEasternforces than to their symbolic value.They knew that two capitalships could do no seriousharmto Japanandwere just as likely to demonstrate weakness and vulnerability as theywereresolve and strength.This view was justified, but it has little bearingon the question of Japan'sdecision for war, which was not influencedeitherway by the movement of ForceZ, or by any other British measuresin the FarEast.3Americaneffortsto build up a sufficientdeterrentin theFarEast also failed. However, the problem was not 'illogical reasoning',as some have claimed.4Churchill rightlyjudged that the Americanswereserious about standing up to the Japanese, that they were preparedtosupport Britain in the event of war, that Japancould be crushed by theenormous military potential of the United States,and that the Japanesewereawareof these things.The only flawin his reasoningwas one widelyshared by informed British and American decision-makers: thinkingthat Japanwould give in to Anglo-American pressureratherthan begina war it could not hope to win. Japan'sleaderstook a very differentviewof the situation, concluding that war was not only a viable option, butthe best one open to them.The controversyover the dispatch of Force Z was recently given a newtwist by Ian Cowman, who claimed that the Admiraltywas not defeatedover this issue, but actuallyoutmanoeuvred Churchill to further its longterm objectives.5Cowman'sargument stems from the confusion which

I. WarSpeechesof theRtHon WinstonS. Churchill,ed. CharlesEade(London:Cassell,I952), II,pp. IOI-5.2. Rooseveltto Churchill,7 Nov. I94I, ChurchillandRoosevelt:TheCompleteCorrespondence(London:Collins,I984), I, p. 267.3. Japan'sleaderswereawareof Britain'seffortsto strengthenitspositionin the FarEast.At theImperialConferenceof I DecemberI94I, for example,AdmiralNagano,the chiefof theJapanesenavalstaff,notedthatthe'Britishnavyhasrecentlyacquiredreservepowerand is graduallyaddingto its strengthin theOrient.At presenttheyaresendingthe followingintothe IndianOceanarea:two battleshipsforcertain,and four battleshipsless certain.'Naganoalsonotedthe movementofCanadiantroopsto HongKong,but concludedthatthesemeasuresdid'notcallforchangesin thedeploymentof ourforces.It will haveno effecton ouroperations.'Japan'sDecisionfor War,ed.NobutakaIke(Stanford:StanfordUP, I967), pp. 280-I

4. Thorne, Allies of a Kind, p. 4.5. Ian Cowman, Dominion or Decline (Oxford: Berg, I996), and id., 'Main Fleet to Singapore?Churchill, the Admiralty, and Force Z', Journal of Strategic Studies (March I995), 79-83.

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200I THE DETERRENCE OF JAPAN 629arosefollowing the 20 October meeting of the Defence Committee. TheAdmiralty,apparentlyforgetting the compromise by which the PrinceofWalessinitial destination would be Cape Town, immediately preparedfor its transferto Singapore.Churchill, on the other hand, continued tothink that the vessel's ultimate destination was not formally settled.Various mundane explanations have been offered for this discrepancy,such as the admiralty'sneed to ensure that the facilities at Singaporewould be ready to receive capital ships in the event that they weredispatched there.Cowman, however, thinks differently.Having noted the Admiralty'sinterestin using Manila as an advanced fleet baseduring the latter half ofI94I, he concludes that Pound's true objective was to build up a Britishfleet at Manila which could operate north of the Malay barrier.InOctober I94I, the argument goes, Pound decided that the best way tocommit the United States to the defence of British interests in the FarEast was by assigning British naval forces to the defence of Americanpossessions in the region. For this purpose a deterrent squadron atSingaporewas insufficient; nothing less than a full fleet at Manila wouldconvince the Americans that Britain would adequately defend itsposition in the Far East. Since Churchill had previously opposed thedispatch of the 'R' class battleships to Singapore, Pound began tocommit British forces to the defence of Manila, believing that he couldlater use this commitment to force Churchill to approve his plans. Toconceal this scheme, Pound deliberatelyprovoked Churchill by puttingup strong opposition to his cherished goal, the dispatch of the Prince ofWales,a matter of great interest to the Prime Minister, but purportedly'anissueof only conditional concern to the admiralty'.Distracted by thissmoke-screen, Churchill failed to realize what the Admiraltywas doinguntil it was too late to stop it.1Ian Cowman was the first scholar to take the navy's offensive plansseriously and he correctly noted the Admiralty's interest in Maniladuring the latterhalf of I94I. From the Admiralty'sperspective,a Britishfleet at the Philippines was both politically and strategicallydesirable atthis time, as it provided for increased cooperation between the Britishand American navies, and hence a greaterlikelihood of US support inthe event of war. It was also a logical extension of the navy's pre-warplanning. Like the defensive strategy in the most recent War Memoran-dum (Eastern), a relativelyweak fleet operating under land-based aircover in its own waters would protect British interests until moresubstantial forces could be mustered for offensive operations. ThedifferencebetweenI937 andI94I wasthattheAdmiraltynowhopedthatManila would serve as its advance base rather than Hong Kong orBorneo, while the presenceof a US fleet in the centralPacificreduced the

I. Cowman, 'Main Fleet to Singapore?', p. 88.EHR June Oi


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630 THE 'SINGAPORE STRATEGY AND Junelikelihood of a Britishfleet having to face the full might of the Japanesenavy.

Cowman, however, has misrepresented the Admiralty's interest inManila. The few British documents which mention the use of this baseprior to I7 October referonly to the strategicadvantagesfor Britain:theAdmiralty thought a fleet at Manila would be more secure from attackand better placed to interfere with Japan'smaritime communicationsthan a comparable force at Singapore. Cowman correctly noted navalplanners'belief that employing Manila would facilitatethe formulationof joint Anglo-Americanwar plans, but thereis no basisfor his assertionthat political objectiveswere foremost in their minds. And even if theywere, the Admiralty would not have been so naive as to think that thepromise of a Britishfleet at Manila would guaranteeAmerican politicaland military support. Furthermore, if Pound did believe this was apossibility, it is difficult to see why he would have gone to such greatlengths to conceal the far-reachingpolitical implications of his plansfrom Churchill, or havesuddenly felt himself betterqualifiedto navigatethe complex watersof Anglo-American cooperation.Cowman also fails to appreciatethat the Admiralty only began seri-ously to explore the possibility of using Manila after the decision wastaken to send the Princeof Walesto the FarEast. The Americanswere noteven informed that this prospect was under consideration until earlyNovember. It is at this point that Cowman's logic completely breaksdown. If Churchill really was determined to oppose the Admiralty'splans for Manila, he could have vetoed the idea just as easily in Novem-ber as in October, particularlyas the Americans had not yet been for-mally approachedon the matter. Cowman glosses over this critical gapin his argument by suggesting that Churchill could not have disruptedthe Admiralty'splans without jeopardizing the 'delicatestate of Anglo-Americanrelationsata particularlycriticaljuncture'.'Whythis should beis not explained. If the Americans did not know that these plans wereafoot, they could hardlyhave been offended by their cancellation, par-ticularly as they had already told the Admiralty that Manila was notsufficientlydefended to serveas awartime base. Even more damaging toCowman's thesis is the fact that Churchill did not object when theAmericanswerenotified of the Admiralty'splans to build up a fleet there,even though this was the moment when he supposedly discoveredPound's deceit. The suggestion that Churchill did not offer even a mildprotest because he was stunned into silence is unconvincing, to say theleast. Clearly,Churchill himself did not feel he had been deceived.Cowman is also untroubled by the abundance of evidence whichsuggests that the Admiraltywas genuinely anxious to keep the Prince ofWalesclose by in the event of a break-out by the Tirpitz, and that itfeared for the safety of a small, unbalanced force at Singapore.' The

I. See in particular Marder, Old Friends,pp. 239-4L.EHR June OI


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200I THE DETERRENCE OF JAPAN 63IAdmiralty was, in fact, entirely forthrightabout its intentions beforeandduring the Defence Committee meeting of 20 October. It wanted abalanced fleet in the FarEast, and it had concrete plans to produce oneby March I942. After 20 October,Churchilland Pound did havedifferentviews on what was going to happen next, but that is becausetheAdmiralty had by then altered its plans to take account of changedcircumstances.The Prime Minister expected the Prince of Wales and Repulse toproceed to Singapore to serveas a deterrent and the 'R' classbattleshipsto go to the Indian ocean to performescortduties.The Admiralty,on theother hand, realized that Churchill would get his way over the Prince ofWalesand hoped to lessenthe dangerto this vesselby forming a balancedfleet around it at the earliest opportunity. Rather than concealing hislong-term goals from Churchill, Pound reminded him on 20 Octoberthat the 'R's were ultimately to form part of a balanced eastern fleet.With the dispatchof the Princeof Walesin October, this goalwould haveappeared more important than ever. And since the Defence Committeehad expressedno opinion on the movement of the 'R'sto Singapore atsome future date, Pound would have felt himself free to transfer thesevessels, which he began preparing to do in early November.1 OnI2 November he informed the war cabinet that it would be possible tooperate a small fleet of six capital ships along the Malay barrierbyJanuaryI942.2 This fell short of the Admiralty'soriginal goal, but in thecircumstances it was the best that could be managed. Churchill'swillingness to endorse this scheme suggests that his real argument withthe Admiralty in October was whether the Prince of Waleswould goimmediately to Singapore, not what it might do once it was there.Having achieved his goal on 20 October, therewas nothing left to fightabout and he acceded to the movement of further capital ships to theregion.Cowman's elaborate conspiracy theory to explain the movement ofthe Prince of Walesto Singapore even though the Defence Committeehad only agreed to its dispatch as far as Cape Town is less convincingthan the explanation offered by Sir Norman Brook in I953. In amemorandum for the cabinet office's historical branch, Brook notedthat at a meeting like the Defence Committee's of 20 October, ministerswere 'often reluctant to formulate ... a firm conclusion contrary to theviews expressedon one side of the argument, even though it is clear thatthe majorityareagainst that view and that their opinion will in the endprevail.'

i. Poundto AdmiralStark,5 Nov. I94I, Admiraltytelegramto BritishAdmiraltyDelegation,Washington, ADM II6/4877.2. Minutesof the War Cabinet,WM iin Conclusions,iS Nov. I94I, CAB 65/24; Cowman,'Main Fleetto Singapore',93.

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632 THE 'SINGAPORE STRATEGY' AND JuneIt is not uncommonon suchoccasionsfor thechairmanto findsome formulawhichwillallowthemeetingto terminatewithouta specificsurrenderbythoseholdingtheminorityview.And whenthis happensbothsidesusuallyrealizethata decisionhasbeentakenin principleeventhoughthe firmfinaldecisionhas beendeferred.

'Though it cannot be proved,' he concluded, 'when Ministers andthe COS left the Cabinet Room on 20 October, they all knew that the"Prince of Wales"would go on from Capetown to Singaporeunless thesituation changed in the meantime.'"No clear consensus has emerged on where to place blame for thedestruction of Force Z. Churchill has usually been singled out as themain culprit, but the civilian and naval decision-makersof the interwarperiod are now frequentlyheld to sharein a sort of collectiveguilt for thisevent, which is seen as the culmination of yearsof misguided planning.The idea that Britain'snaval leaderswere guilty by association rests onweak foundations. The navy made many mistakes during the twodecades in which it preparedfor war with Japan,but this was not one ofthem. Except for a few months in I939, the Admiralty consistentlyopposed the dispatch of anything other than a balanced fleet to the FarEast. This goal remained unchanged throughout I94I, and if war hadbeen delayedby even a month it might have been achieved. Pound andPhillips had no desire to send a 'flying squadron'to Singapore in I94I,even though the latter attempted to use his ships in this capacity afterwar began.To appreciatewhy the dispatch of capital ships to Singaporewas onthe agenda in October I94I it is necessary to look beyond Churchill'smessageof 25 August to the Admiralty.The presenceof a deterrentforceat Singaporeheld a strong appealfor civilian decision-makersin Britainand Australiafrom at least I937. The idea was raisedover and over againduring the next four years, and took on a life of its own long beforeChurchill suggested it to the Admiralty. When the issue went to theDefence Committee in I94I, the Prime Ministerwas determined to placea modern battleship at Singaporeas soon as possible. His views on whatthis forcemight accomplish in the event of war were unrealistic,but theyare less important than his arguments about its potential impact onJapan'sdecision for peace or war. When Eden reinforced the case forrushing the Prince of Walesto Singapore, the civilian members of theDefence Committee agreed that the political advantagesof this coursewere great enough to 'outweigh objections hitherto advanced by theAdmiralty'.2They might have been preparedto do so even if Churchillhad not challenged the Admiralty'sstrategic arguments. In any event,this decision was mistaken, but not unreasonable.Other measureswere

i. Brook to Acheson, 23 July I953, CAB I03/326.2. DO(4I)66, 20 Oct. I94I, CAB 69/8.

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