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Staff Ride Study Manual

The Southern Campaign of the

American Revolution

May 1780 – Sept 1781

The Battle of Kings Mountain Oct 7, 1780

The Battle of Cowpens Jan 17, 1781

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Command History Office U.S. ARMY SOLDIER SUPPORT INSTITUTE

FORT JACKSON, SOUTH CAROLINA

January 2017

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The Southern Campaign of the American Revolution

May 1780-September 1781

The Battles at Kings Mountain and Cowpens

TABLE OF CONTENTS

BATTLE OF KINGS MOUNTAIN

Freedom’s Warriors: Patriot Insurgents at the Battle of Kings Mountain (Stephen E. Bower) . . . . . . . . . 5

Historical Statement Concerning the Battle of Kings Mountain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

First Person Accounts of the Battle of Kings Mountain

The Affair at King’s Mountain, 7th October 1780 (J. Watts de Peyster) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 The Battle of Kings Mountain (General Joseph Graham) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 First-hand account of the Battle of King's Mountain (Benjamin Sharp) . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 A Statement of the proceedings of the Western Army, from the 25th of September, 1780

to the reduction of Major Ferguson (Campbell, Shelby, Cleveland) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

Royalist Account of the Battle of King's Mountain, 30 Jan 1781 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

BATTLE OF COWPENS

The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour (LTC John Moncure) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

The Campaign in the Carolinas, 1780-1781 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 The Unexpected Event: Annihilation at the Cowpens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 After Action Reports

BG Daniel Morgan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81 COL Andrew Pickens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 LTC John Eager Howard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 MAJ Samuel Hammond . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86 MAJ Joseph Mc Junkin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 MAJ Thomas Young . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89 CPT Henry Connally . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90 LT Thomas Anderson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 SGM William Seymour . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92 James Kelley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92 Cornett James Simmons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 PVT James Collins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94 PVT Henry Wells . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94 LTC Banastre Tarleton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 LT Roderick Mackenzie . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97 Alexander Chesney . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99

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General Correspondence

Continental Army . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100 British Army . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106

Historical Statement Concerning the Battle of Cowpens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110

SPECIAL TOPICS

Leadership Lessons from the Past: The Ability to Inspire Greatness Transcends Time (Anne Midgley) . . . 123 Tactics and Weapons of the Revolutionary War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128 Tactics in the Battle of Kings Mountain (National Park Service) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131 Financial Management

Pay Department (Colonel A. B. Carey) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134 Mutiny of the Pennsylvania Line (Michael Shellhammer) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137

Human Resource Management Adjutant’s General’s Department (Brevet Major General James B. Fry) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143

Instructions for Adjutants (Frederick William Baron von Steuben) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146

Personnel Replacements prior to the U.S. Civil War (Leonard L. Lerwill) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147 Supplying Washington’s Army (Erna Risch) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164

APPENDICES

A. Doctrinal Concepts and Principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178

B. Order of Battle Battle of Kings Mountain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186 Battle of Cowpens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187

C. Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190

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Freedom’s Warriors:

Patriot Insurgents at the Battle of Kings Mountain1

"In the Annals of both Ancient and Modern History Presbyterianism and Rebellion,

were twin-Sisters sprung from Faction, and their Affection for each other, has ever

been so strong, that a separation of them never could be effected. What KING has ever

reign'd in Great-Britain, whose Government has not been disturb'd with Presbyterian

Rebellions, since ever they were a People?"

Isaac Hunt

Through a Looking Glass for Presbyterians,

or a brief examination of their Loyalty, Merit, and other

Qualifications for Government, etc.

17642

In September 1780 during the Southern Campaign of the American Revolution, the British Army began

moving north in hopes of extending British occupation from South Carolina into the adjoining colony of North

Carolina. On 7 September, Major Patrick Ferguson arrived at Gilbert Town, Rutherford County, North Carolina, and

issued the following threat to members of enemy partisan forces that had been driven from South Carolina and into

the relative security of the western mountains. If they did not, wrote Ferguson, “desist from their opposition to the

British arms, and take protection under his standard, he would march his army over the mountains, hang their leaders,

and lay waste to their country with fire and sword.” Ferguson paroled a captured rebel and had him go spread the

message among his comrades in hiding.3

Flush with victory and seeming success, British leaders like Ferguson believed the hard fighting in South

Carolina was over and that only mop up operations remained. Shielding British commander General Lord Cornwallis’

left flank on the move into North Carolina, Ferguson’s force included a Ranger Battalion of “Provincial Regulars”

from New York and New Jersey and several members of Loyalist militia units raised in the South.4 Excepting

Ferguson, a Scot serving in the British army, all of them were Americans. His ultimatum to the partisan insurgents in

and over the mountains was intended to give a defeated enemy the opportunity to throw down their arms, declare their

allegiance to the King, or suffer the unbearable consequences. Since investing the city of Charleston, South Carolina,

1 Stephen E. Bower, Command Historian, U.S. Army Soldier Support Institute, Fort Jackson, South Carolina; paper presented at

the Conference of Army Historians, 6-10 August 2007.

2 Isaac Hunt, “Through a Looking Glass for Presbyterians, or a brief examination of their Loyalty, Merit, and other Qualifications

for Government, etc.” (Philadelphia, 1764), 8-9; quoted in Charles H. Lincoln, The Revolutionary Movement in Pennsylvania:

1760-1776 (Philadelphia: Ginn and Company, 1901), 104; Kevin Kenny, The Paxton Boys and the Destruction of William Penn’s

Holy Experiment (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 186-187. Hunt, a Philadelphia lawyer and son of an Anglican

Priest, became an ardent Loyalist during the American Revolution writing pamphlets supporting the crown and deriding the

revolutionaries in the colonies, an activity that eventually led to his arrest and imprisonment. Following the war, he moved to

England where he became an Anglican minister in his own right. See Virtual American Biographies,

www.famousamericans.netisaachunt/.

3 Lyman C. Draper, Kings Mountain and its Heroes: History of the Battle of Kings Mountain, October 7th, 1780, and the Events

Which Led to It (Cincinnati: P.G. Thomson, 1881), 169; J. D. Bailey, Commanders at Kings Mountain, (Greenville, SC, A. Press,

1980), 97; John Buchanan, The Road to Guilford Courthouse: The American Revolution in the Carolinas (New York: John Wiley

and Sons, 1997), 208.

4 Patriot leaders reported that British official returns for 7 October found in Ferguson’s camp after the Battle of Kings Mountain

gave an enemy strength of 1,125 men. Combined British losses in the battle, however, were reported at 1,104; The Provincial

Corps lost 19 killed, 35 wounded, and 68 prisoners; Loyalist forces lost 206 killed, 128 wounded, and 648 prisoners. See

Historical Section of the Army War College, Historical Statements Concerning The Battle of Kings Mountain and The Battle of

Cowpens South Carolina (U.S. Government Printing Office: Washington, 1928), 31; William Campbell, Isaac Shelby, Benjamin

Cleveland, Official Report, A State of the Proceedings of the Western Army, from the 25th of September, 1780 to the reduction of

Major Ferguson, and the army under his command; included in Draper, Kings Mountain and its Heroes, 523

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in May 1780, the British had captured or destroyed two American armies, established a series of military outposts or

base camps throughout South Carolina, defeated or chased into hiding leading militia leaders and their units, and

persuaded hundreds of partisan warriors to accept parole and quit the war. Who would have disputed Ferguson’s

assessment of events?

Exactly one month later, however, he would lie dead on the battlefield at Kings Mountain, his body, according

to one account, riddled with eight musket balls several of which may have found their target after he was already

dead.5 Partisan soldiers would strip him of his clothing and silver whistles he had used to direct the battle while others

may have returned to Ferguson’s body later in the day to urinate on his naked corpse. In his history of the Southern

Campaign, British Lieutenant Colonel Banastre Tarleton inferred the same when he wrote that patriot soldiers “used

every insult and indignity, after the action, towards the dead body of Major Ferguson.”6 John Buchanan, author of The

Road to Guilford Courthouse: the American Revolution in the Carolinas, doubts the urination story since little

evidence exists to support the allegation. However, he does concede that patriot soldiers were fully capable of such a

thing. After all, these were the same people who, on the march to Gilbert Town with 698 captured enemy prisoners,

had to be told by their commander, Colonel William Campbell of Virginia, “to restrain the disorderly manner of

slaughtering and disturbing the prisoners.” Campbell later failed to hold off a group of North and South Carolina

partisans who selected 36 of the prisoners, all Loyalist militia from North Carolina, neighbors and mortal enemies of

their accusers, and placed them on trial for previous offenses that included among other things robbery, house burning,

and assassination. All 36 were convicted and nine of them were hanged from a large oak tree. The lives of the

remaining 27 were spared only after their executioners became sick of their task. The living might have wished to

have died alongside their hanged comrades, since on the long march to Salem, North Carolina, patriot soldiers

deliberately withheld food and water from their prisoners, executed more than one of them who attempted escape, and

cut and stabbed others repeatedly for failure to keep up.7 Supposing for a moment that Ferguson’s body did reek of

urine on the evening of 7 October, it is not too far off to suggest that the British cause in the south, if not the war,

began spiraling downward immediately after these citizen-soldiers, members of the patriot insurgency, pulled up their

britches and began contemplating a time when they might have another opportunity to relieve themselves on other

dead enemy soldiers. Deep animosity only begins to describe how these people felt toward the British and their loyal

American friends who during the previous five months had succeeded in stoking a smoldering fire of bitter anger and

resentment that literally burned within them.

In the Southern Campaign of the American Revolution there is no battle more irregular than the one fought

at Kings Mountain on October 7, 1780. The patriot force that fought there was a consolidation of militia units from

North and South Carolina, Georgia, Virginia, and southeastern Tennessee, people who inhabited the western most

settlements of the American colonies. The battle culminated in a military expedition conceived at the local level by a

group of men who voted essentially to march against Ferguson’s Loyalist force and annihilate it. More aptly described

as a posse of armed and angry citizen soldiers, the Kings Mountain patriots were a hastily organized group of

backwoods Americans who had temporarily suspended their rights as individuals for the higher overarching purpose

of extinguishing a perceived threat to their freedom and the well-being of their families. Composed of soldiers who

did not think it odd to have elected their commander only hours before the battle, it was a group committed to a short-

term spontaneous eruption of violence that once concluded would allow them to get back to the serious business of

working their land, raising their children, and building upon the foundations of the frontier communities to which they

belonged.

Many of these people would not have participated in the battle had it not been for Ferguson’s threat to extend

the war among them. Up until this time they had been virtually isolated from its violence. They might not have

understood the causes of war or the reasons for which it was being fought, but they did understand Ferguson’s threat

5 Robert D. Bass, Ninety-Six: The Struggle for the South Carolina Backcountry, (Orangeburg, SC: Sandlapper Publishing, 1978),

266; Pat Alderman, One Heroic Hour at Kings Mountain, (Johnson City: The Overmountain Press, 1990), 38; Draper, 275.

6 Banastre Tarleton, A History of the Campaigns of 1780 and 1781 in the Southern Provinces of North America (London: T.

Cadell, 1787), 165.

7 Buchanan, The Road to Guilford Courthouse, 234-240; Colonel Campbell’s General Orders, Oct. 11, 1780, see Draper, Kings

Mountain and its Heroes, 531; Walter Edgar, Partisans and Redcoats, The Southern Conflict that Turned the Tide of the

American Revolution, (New York: William Morrow, 2001), 119.

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as cause for action.8 Thought to be purely defensive in nature, the march towards Ferguson and the ensuing battle was

a unified response to an external enemy that threatened to take from them their lives, families, property, and by

extension their right to freely worship their Protestant God. It was a battle that attached to no military strategy or did

it fit into anyone’s well thought out plan of operation. It is not too much to say that the event was purely coincidental

coming at a point in the War for Independence and against a foe whose defeat would permanently cripple British

operations in the South.

The Battle of Kings Mountain followed a summer of unprecedented violence in South Carolina as the British

army and their Loyalist allies unleashed a campaign of retribution and revenge against individuals and families that

had been in rebellion against the Crown since 1775. Until the British had transferred the bulk of their army and the

seat of the war to the southern colonies in the spring of 1780, rebellion in the South had been directed at neighbors

expressing loyalty to King George III and Indian tribes choosing to support the British cause. For the most part, it had

been a civil war characterized by American on American violence. The introduction of British regular forces into the

Southern theater suffused new energy into the King’s cause and with their British sponsors Loyalists saw it as an

opportunity to settle old scores. Following Major General Benjamin Lincoln’s surrender of the Continental Army at

Charleston on May 12, 1780, British Generals Sir Henry Clinton and Lord Charles Cornwallis immediately began

moving their forces into the interior of South Carolina. British operations were dependent on the recruitment of a

sufficient force of loyal Americans to occupy the series of outposts that eventually extended up the coast from

Charleston to Georgetown, and into the backcountry through Camden, Ninety-Six, and Augusta, Georgia. Patrick

Ferguson played no small part in British operations that aimed to destroy the spirit of rebellion among the partisan

population.9 Clinton sent him to the outpost at Ninety-Six with the express mission of recruiting, organizing, and

training Loyalist soldiers to secure the backcountry, protect Loyalist families and communities, and engage in active

operations against the partisan enemy forces still active in the area.10

The Southern War in 1780

Most often described as a remorseless political struggle between Whigs and Tories, those who supported the

rebellion (Whigs) and those who opposed it (Tories), the Revolutionary War in the South after the British occupation

of South Carolina in 1780 certainly became that and more.11 However convenient it has become to divide the

contestants into these two broad political categories, they hardly speak to the moral or psychological foundation of

political choices that southern Americans or, for that matter, the British and their American allies did make.12 Helpful

in this regard is the derivation of the terms themselves. In their original usage, Whig and Tory referred to religious

divisions that distinguished dissenting Scottish and Scotch-Irish Presbyterians from the Catholic and Anglican

8 Historical Section of the Army War College, 70th Congress, 1st Session House Document No. 328, “Historical Statements

Concerning The Battle Of Kings Mountain And The Battle Of The Cowpens, South Carolina," United States Government

Printing Office, Washington, 1928.

9 Buchanan, The Road to Guilford Courthouse, 202-203; John S. Pancake, The Destructive War: the British Campaign in the

Carolinas, 1780-1782 (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2003), 68-69; David Lee Russell, The American Revolution in

the Southern Colonies (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, 2000), 153.

10 Ninety-Six is located on an old Indian trading route due north of Augusta, Georgia, in Greenwood County, South Carolina.

Prior to the American Revolution, Fort Ninety- Six had been built to protect the backcountry settlers from warring Indian tribes.

During the war, it was the major British outpost in the backcountry of South Carolina used to suppress partisan military activity

in Georgia and the northwestern region of South Carolina.

11 For an informative discussion of Whig and Tory as those terms related to the Southern conflict, see Michael Scoggins’ The

Day it Rained Militia: Huck’s Defeat and the Revolution in the South Carolina Backcountry, May –July 1789 (Charleston: The

History Press, 2005), 15-16. As political terminology, Whig and Tory predated the American Revolution first appearing in late

17th Century England to describe the two principal political factions that divided over the continuing rule of Catholic King James

II. The issue came to a head in 1688 with Tories favoring retention of the King, honoring James’ hereditary right to rule, while

the Whigs, the dissenters in this case, favored deposing him and inviting his Protestant daughter Mary and husband William of

Orange to rule in his place. The “Glorious Revolution” eventuating in the ascendancy of William and Mary was considered a

victory for the Whigs. Transposed onto the war in America, the terms were habitually used to denote those for (Tories) and

against (Whigs) the continuing rule of King George III. See Historical Outline of Restoration and 18th-Century British Literature,

http://mason.gmu.edu/~ayadav/ historical%20outline/whig% 20and%20tory.htm, 2 October 2009.

12 Too often, suggests John Patrick Diggins, historians have concentrated on American political ideas while slighting “the religious

convictions that often undergirded them,” especially the Calvinist convictions of “resistance to tyranny, original sin, and the

corruptibility of man, labor, and the calling as means to salvation.” See Diggins, The Lost Soul of American Politics: Virtue, Self-

Interest, and the Foundations of Liberalism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 7.

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establishments in England and Ireland.13 While they adequately describe the political war in the south, the terms,

particularly after the British occupation of South Carolina in spring 1780, also capture the essence of a religious war

that pitted in large part Presbyterians and their dissenting disposition against the British establishment and their loyal

American allies. As such it became the latest link in a chain of events stretching back to the beginning of the 17th

Century and the Scottish-Presbyterian insistence they be allowed to pursue their own relationship with God free from

the crown and the hierarchy of Episcopal or Catholic church officials. The long history of Presbyterian resistance to

British political and religious authority had produced a people schooled in dissent, if not rebellion, and openly

suspicious and distrustful of King and Parliament. Of course, British and Tory alike were also a part of the long-

running narrative that portrayed Scotch-Presbyterians as an obstinate and unyielding people all too willing to fight for

their religious liberty. In fact, the Presbyterian idea of liberty was so tightly bound to their long-standing struggle to

free themselves from Britain and the established church that it was almost impossible to separate their politics from

their religion.

The southern war in the summer and fall of 1780 was largely a war against the Presbyterian Church and its

representative people, the Scotch and the Scotch-Irish who had migrated first from the lowland areas of Scotland in

the 16th century to Northern Ireland, and then to the colonies in America throughout the 18th century. Most of them

had come first into Pennsylvania and then migrated down the Shenandoah Valley to settle in the western areas of

Virginia, North and South Carolina. While in Ireland the Scotch-Irish maintained close ties with the Presbyterian

Church in Scotland by frequent back and forth travel of ministers. Surrounded by a largely hostile Catholic

population in Ireland, they were barred from holding political office and required by Catholic-leaning monarchs in

England to pay tithes to the Anglican Church. A flagging Irish economy was only one among other incentives that

induced them to migrate to the colonies. As colonists, they had come to view America and then American

Independence “as deliverance from a Great Britain that they detested.” 14

Many of them migrated to America as part of larger communities or congregations. In some cases, entire

Presbyterian congregations were led to American shores by their ministers. The Scotch-Irish tended to settle in

“clusters of farmsteads” patterned after the clannish, family-related villages or “clachans” they had left behind in

Ireland. Clachans developed around the Presbyterian Kirk or meetinghouse. For example, Bethel, Bethesda,

Beersheba, and Bullock’s Creek Presbyterian Churches served the Scotch-Irish communities in the New Acquisition

District of South Carolina during the American Revolution. By the beginning of the war, the North and South Carolina

backcountry had an estimated 143,000 settlers. Historian James Leyburn counted “a few Swiss and Welch, large

number of Germans, but more Scotch-Irish than all the others put together.”15

During the Revolutionary War in the southern colonies, Presbyterians were guilty of treason by virtue of

association. In a war where it was often hard to sort enemies from friends, Presbyterians became primary targets for

the British because they were easier to identify; or so said Charles Woodmason, Anglican missionary to the colonies

who believed the backcountry of the Carolinas occupied by “a Sett of the most lowest vile crew breathing-Scot-Irish

Presbyterians from the North of Ireland . . . the worst Vermin on Earth . . . ignorant, mean, worthless, beggarly . . .

enemies to Christ and his Cross. . . . the Refuse of Mankind," who lived "wholly on Butter, Milk, Clabber and what

in England is given to Hogs and Dogs." Like many of his countrymen, Woodmason believed the Scot-Irish to be a

13 The terms originally carried strong sectarian (religious) associations, Tories being associated with “High Church sentiments”

(including preservation of the privileges and exclusions of the established Church) and Whigs being associated with

“latitudinarianism and Protestant Dissent." For most established Anglicans, Whig meant Presbyterian while moderate

Presbyterians used the term to stigmatize their extremist brethren, the “Covenanters.” However, Presbyterianism in general

having made the point of separating itself from popery or prelacy became over time closely identified with religious

nonconformity drawing derision as “West Country Whigs,” in reference to the area of Scotland from where they came, and the

more exotic “Wild Whiggamores.” See Scottish Studies Foundation, Electric Scotland.com, “Bonnie Scotland, The Whig

Country,” www.electricscotland.com/ art/ bonnie/ bonnie11. htm, 15 October 2009; Mark Nixon,"Whigs and Tories (1678-

1914),” The Literary Encyclopedia, www.litencyc.com/ php/stopics. php?rec=true&UID=1203; www.britannica.co.uk/

britannica_browse/t/ t54.html; Dictionary.com, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/Whig; Historical Outline of Restoration

and 18th-Century British Literature.

14 H. Tyler Blethen and Curtis W. Wood Jr., Ulster and North America: Transatlantic Perspectives on the Scotch-Irish,

(Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1997), 15-23; James G. Leyburn, The Scotch-Irish: A Social History, Chapel Hill,

University of North Carolina Press, 1962), 99-107, 157-159; Ron Chepesiuk, The Scotch-Irish: From the North of Ireland to the

Making of America (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, 2000); 93-114; John Ferling, Almost a Miracle: The American

Victory in the War of Independence, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 452.

15 John Solomon Otto, The Southern Frontiers, 1607-1860 (New York, NY: Greenwood Press, 1989) 55-56;“York County South

Carolina,” Encyclopedia, www.tutorgig.com/ed/York_County, South Carolina, 28 Oct 2009; Leyburn, The Scotch-Irish: A Social

History, 213.

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lesser breed of people whose itinerant preachers traversed the countryside poisoning their minds, “instilling

Democratical and Commonwealth Principles . . . . Embittering them against the very name of Bishops, and all

Episcopal Government and laying deep their Republican Notions and Principles – Especially that they owe no

Subjection to Great Britain – That they are a free People.”16 There is no reason to doubt Woodmason’s assessment of

backwoods Presbyterians. In all likelihood, hard life in the American wilderness had made them even less responsive

to British authority than they had been in Scotland and Ireland.

British and Loyalist soldiers during the summer and fall of 1780 roamed the backcountry of the Carolinas

targeting the King’s enemies plundering their properties; appropriating livestock, grain, and other necessities to

sustain British troops; and burning churches and homes on the basis of religious affiliation and the discovery of

unauthorized versions of the Bible. One historian of the Revolution estimated that at least fifty Presbyterian

churches and places of worship, as well as numerous Presbyterian homes, were destroyed by British soldiers during

the war.17 Anglicans on whole were loyal subjects of the king and Presbyterians and other religious dissenters

were traitorous enemies. Presbyterianism, observed W. P. Breed “was prima facie evidence of guilt. A house that

had a large Bible and David’s Psalms in meter in it was supposed, as a matter of course, to be tenanted by rebels."

In most cases, British troops were, of course, correct in their assumptions. On a few occasions they were not. In

his informative study of Religion and Politics in Colonial South Carolina, John Wesley Brinsfield, suggests that

British soldiers using such measures of engagement often “created enemies out of people who had previously been

loyal to the crown but opposed to the Church of England.” In modern parlance, loyal subjects of the king often

became innocent victims of religious profiling by British soldiers.18

It was no coincidence that at least six of the militia colonels at Kings Mountain were elders in the Presbyterian

Church, and the good majority of the men who fought with them were drawn from Presbyterian settlements west of

the Catawba River. Seven members of the Kennedy family, Scotch-Irish Presbyterians from Union County, South

Carolina, fought at the Battle of Kings Mountain including Captains Robert and Thomas Kennedy and relatives

William, William Jr., John, Daniel and Moses.19 They were what can be called religious insurgents reared in the

Calvinist tradition, suspicious of authority in general and particularly so when it stretched from a British monarch who

threatened to abridge their rights and their hard-earned freedom to worship God in the Calvinist-Presbyterian tradition

of their ancestors. The Reverend William Martin, who led five shiploads of Presbyterians from Belfast, Northern

Ireland to Chester County, South Carolina in 1772, is a case in point. Imprisoned for “preaching rebellion from the

pulpit,” Martin was hauled before Lord Cornwallis where he told the British general that King George “was bound to

protect his subjects in the enjoyment of their rights. Protection and allegiance go together, and where the one fails the

other cannot be exacted. The Declaration of Independence is but a reiteration of what our Covenanting fathers have

always maintained.”20

The Covenanting fathers of whom Martin spoke were Protestant supporters of the Scottish Covenant of

1638, a national protest against attempts by the English King Charles I to introduce the Anglican “Book of

Common Prayer” and the Episcopal system of government to the Church of Scotland. Sixty thousand Scottish

Presbyterians signed the “National Covenant” in protest over what seemed like the reintroduction of Catholicism

into the life of the largely Protestant nation. Upon assuming the English throne in 1660, Charles II, following his

father’s hard line, repudiated Scotland’s national covenant, removed 400 non-conforming ministers from their

churches, and replaced them with officials of the Anglican Church. Charles also imposed an Oath of Allegiance

that bound the taker to uphold the supremacy of the English king in all religious and civil matters. The Oath created

16 Richard Hooker, editor, The Carolina Backcountry on the Eve of the Revolution: The Journal and Other Writings of Charles

Woodmason, Anglican Itinerant, (Chapel Hill, N.C.: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1953), 14 - 62, 240-241.

17 W.P Breed, Presbyterians and the Revolution (Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication, 1876), 106; Howe, The History

of the Presbyterian Church in South Carolina, vol. 1, 483-485.

18 Breed, Presbyterians and the Revolution, 97; John Wesley Brinsfield, Religion and Politics in Colonial South Carolina,

(Easley, SC: Southern Historical Press, 1983), 131-132.

19 J.D. Bailey’s, Commanders at Kings Mountain, contains short biographies of the Presbyterian leadership at Kings Mountain;

Breed, Presbyterians and the Revolution, 83; White, Southern Presbyterian Leaders, 150-153; 518-520; Howe, The History of

the Presbyterian Church in South Carolina, vol. 1, 518-520; Sam Thomas, “The 1780 Presbyterian Rebellion and the Battle of

Huck’s Defeat,” Culture and Heritage Commission, York County, SC, www.sciway3.net/clark/revolutionarywar/1780-

Huck_noframes.html, Oct 23, 2009; Billy Kennedy, The Scots-Irish in the Hills of Tennessee, (Belfast, Northern Ireland:

Causeway Press, 1995), 159.

20 Martin quoted in Howe, The History of the Presbyterian Church in South Carolina, vol. 1, 501; White, Southern Presbyterian

Leaders, 158; Scoggins, The Day it Rained Militia, 30-31.

10

an immediate political crisis in Scotland since to take it put one in violation of the Scottish Covenant where all

had declared "the Lord Jesus Christ [to be] the only King and Head of his Church."21

To circumvent English authority and the Anglican Church, Presbyterians began worshipping informally

in houses, barns, and often out in open. After 1666, the British army, given lists of Scots not attending Anglican

services, literally began dragging individuals to church and quartering soldiers in Scottish homes until the residents

felt compelled to comply with the law. At the Battle of Rullion Green in December 1666, the British army put

down a popular uprising among Covenanters. One hundred Covenanters were killed on the field of battle, 300 died

attempting escape, and another 120 were taken prisoner and marched to Edinburgh. At Edinburgh, the prisoners

were charged with treason and rebellion, found guilty and sentenced to be hanged. English officials hung as many

as ten at a time from the same scaffold, dismembered their bodies and placed the pieces on public display as a

warning to their Presbyterian brethren.22

After the British massacre of Continental

troops at the Waxhaws on May 29, 1780, Reverend

Martin thought he saw similarities between the

treatment of Presbyterians in Scotland and what

people of the church were beginning to experience

in America. From his pulpit in Rocky Creek, he

pleaded with his congregation to take up arms

against the British. Go to the Waxhaws, he

exclaimed. “Go see the tender mercies of Great

Britain!” At the Waxhaws meeting house, “you

may find men, though still alive, hacked out of the

very semblance of humanity; some deprived of

their arms, some with one arm or leg, and some

with both legs cut off. Is not this cruelty a parallel

to the history of our Scottish fathers?”23 Had he

survived the Battle of Kings Mountain, Patrick

Ferguson had intended on spending the night in

nearby Bethel Presbyterian Church, “leave it in

ashes by day-light . . . and be on the east side of the

Catawba before nightfall."24

The Making of an Insurgency

In all likelihood these people would have faded into the background of the American Revolution had it not

been for what Walter Edgar calls “a series of incredibly stupid blunders by the British.”25 Within weeks after the fall

of Charleston hundreds of partisan soldiers thinking all was lost began approaching British authorities seeking parole

with the idea of going home and sitting out the remainder of the war. Andrew Pickens, Presbyterian elder and one of

21 James A. Wylie, , Protestantism in Scotland, The History of Protestantism (New York: Cassell & Company, Limited,

1878), Vol. 3, Book 24, 586-589; P. Hume Brown, Scotland: A Short History, (Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1908), 260-261.

22 Ibid.

23 Martin quoted in Elizabeth Fries Lummis Ellet, Domestic History of the American Revolution (New York: Baker and Scribner,

1850), 179 -180.

24 Ferguson quoted in R.A. Webb, History of the Presbyterian Church of Bethel (Privately Printed: Bethel Presbyterian Church,

1938), 13. Bethel Presbyterian Church is one of the so-called "Four B" churches (all Presbyterian) in York County South

Carolina that were centers of the earliest Scotch-Irish communities in the border region separating South and North Carolina. The

other three included Bethesda, Beersheba and Bullock’s Creek Presbyterian Churches. See the “History of York County,”

excerpted from "Historical Properties of York County, South Carolina," York County Historical Commission, 1995.

25 Edgar, Partisans and Redcoats, 54. Edgar, I assume, believes the British should have acted otherwise based upon certain

considerations for the enemy they were facing. Indeed, it is pretty clear the British did know their enemy. It is also clear that it

did not make any difference to them. Clinton and Cornwallis’ strategic policy and tacit endorsement of excessively punitive and

often arbitrary military operations against the backcountry Presbyterians were guaranteed to offend, alienate, and finally mobilize

them to take up arms against an enemy with whom they were all too familiar.

Battle of Waxhaws

May 29, 1780

11

the principle militia leaders in South Carolina, is a leading example. He and several of his men took parole and headed

home to the Long Canes District of South Carolina. The terms were simple. In return for the promise to quit the war,

the British offered protection, amnesty, and safe passage back home.

Pickens may have abandoned the cause completely had it not been for General Clinton’s proclamation of 3

June 1780 abrogating the initial terms of surrender and branding him an enemy of His Majesty the King. Under the

new terms, Pickens, former partisans, and suspected partisan sympathizers had the choice of taking an Oath of

Allegiance to the king and agreeing to take up arms against friends and former comrades or “be treated as rebels and

enemies to their country.” Partisan soldiers had 17 days to decide. After June 20, the offer would be revoked and those

not taking the oath would be considered as before, enemies of the king. Offering no middle ground, Clinton’s decree

in effect forced neutrals and former partisans to pick a side. General Cornwallis, Clinton’s second in command, put it

precisely. “In a civil war, there is no admitting of neutral characteristics, and . . . those who are not clearly with us

must so far be considered against us.” Those refusing to declare their allegiance, Cornwallis thought, needed “to be

disarmed, and every measure taken to prevent their being able to do mischief.”26 Given such a choice, Presbyterians

in the Carolina backcountry were the most unlikely group of people in the colonies to submit to an oath of this kind.

Pickens, for one, refused to take it. He objected to it on three counts; one, it violated the original terms of

parole; two, it forced him to war against his friends, and, three; by implication, forced submission to the Church of

England and compromised his right to freely practice his Presbyterian faith. Others who took the Oath soon discovered

that it was no guarantee of protection from Loyalist neighbors with whom they had been warring since the beginning

of the conflict. In December 1780, British Major James Dunlap heading a column of dragoons and Loyalists swept

through the Ninety-Six district of South Carolina plundering and destroying the property of suspected and avowed

rebels, Pickens’ among them. Shortly thereafter, Pickens made it known to the British that he was under no further

obligation to honor the conditions of his parole. He and his former troops went back on the campaign trail as part of a

reinvigorated effort to resist the British occupation.27 Until Clinton’s June 3 proclamation, speculated Lieutenant

Colonel Rawdon, British commander at Camden, the majority of people in the backcountry districts, “tho’ ill disposed

to us were not in arms against us.” Afterwards, he continued, “nine out of ten of them are now embodied on the part

of the Rebels.”28

Coupled with the simmering resentment caused by Clinton’s revised parole policy came news of the

American defeat at Waxhaws. British Lieutenant Colonel Banestre Tarleton with a combined cavalry and infantry

force of 270 men had decimated a regular Continental Army force of about 350 Virginians under the command of

Colonel Abraham Buford. After giving chase for more than two days, Tarleton finally caught up with Buford’s column

on the afternoon of May 29 just east of the Catawba River near the North Carolina border at a place called the

Waxhaws. Despite stopping en route to burn militia leader Thomas Sumter’s home and barns, carrying a crippled and

disagreeable Mrs. Sumter into the yard to watch, Tarleton covered 105 miles in 54 hours.29 Tarleton offered Buford

the chance to surrender, but Buford rejected the offer, saying he would defend himself “to the last extremity.” As it

turned out, many of Buford’s men upon being overwhelmed by Tarleton’s cavalry would be forced to do exactly that.

The facts have been disputed ever since, but most reasonable people believe at least some irregularities on the part of

British dragoons and infantry took place after the fight ended and after Buford’s soldiers presented a white flag of

surrender. Some argue a massacre. Tarleton, himself, suggests the same when he reported that the breaking of Buford’s

line was followed by what he called a “slaughter” precipitated by avenging British cavalry who believed he had been

killed in the opening charge when his horse was shot from beneath him. The thought of having lost their commanding

officer, wrote Tarleton, “stimulated the soldiers to a vindictive asperity not easily restrained."30

Buford’s surgeon Dr. Robert Brownfield confirmed the worst of Tarleton’s account several years later in an

1821 letter appended to William Dobein James’s A Sketch of the Life of Brig. Gen. Francis Marion and a History of

26 Sir Henry Clinton, The American Rebellion: Sir Henry Clinton’s Narrative of His Campaigns, 1775-1782, (New Haven: Yale

University Press, 1954), 181; Edward McCrady, The History of South Carolina in the Revolution, 1780-1783 (New York: Russell

& Russell, 1902), 550-553; Franklin and Mary Wickwire, Cornwallis: The American Adventure, 2 vols., (Boston: Houghton-

Mifflin Company, 1970), vol. 1, 174-175.

27 Alice Noble Waring, The Fighting Elder: Andrew Pickens (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1962), 40-42;

Thomas J. Fleming, Downright Fighting, The Story of Cowpens (Washington: U.S. Department of the Interior, 1988), 34-35, 60-

61; McCrady, The History of South Carolina in the Revolution, 20-21.

28 Rawdon to Cornwallis, July 7, 1780, cited in Pancake, The Destructive War: the British Campaign in the Carolinas, 1780-

1782, 89.

29 Edgar, Partisans and Redcoats, ftnt 40.

30 Tarleton, A History of the Campaigns of 1780 and 1781, 27-31.

12

His Brigade. After refusing to give quarters, stated Brownfield, British soldiers went over the ground covered with

prostrate American soldiers “plunging their bayonets into every one that exhibited any signs of life, and in some

instances, where several had fallen over the other, these monsters were seen to throw off on the point of the bayonet

the uppermost, to come at those beneath.” According to Brownfield, the slaughter went on for about fifteen minutes

and became “a scene of indiscriminate carnage never surpassed by the ruthless atrocities of the most barbarous

savages.”31 Added to Tarleton’s estimate that the actual fighting lasted only “a few minutes,” Brownfield’s fifteen

minutes suggests the whole affair was over in less than half an hour. During the short thirty minute engagement, 75

percent of Buford’s 350 soldiers were either killed or wounded, a casualty rate that far exceeds the worst battles of the

American Civil War fought 80 years later over the course of hours and sometimes days and with weapons superior to

the muskets and sabers used in the Revolutionary era.32 Tarleton became a marked man after Waxhaws. Held to

account for the inexcusable and merciless deeds that became characteristic of revolutionary conflict in the

backcountry, “Bloody Ban” became the person every one learned to hate, his name synonymous with a ruthless enemy

who offered no quarter and therefore deserved none.

The Battle of Waxhaws took place in the heart of the Presbyterian settlement in the Carolina backcountry,

and it left a deep and abiding impression on the people who lived there. In the waning moments of the Battle of Kings

Mountain, partisan soldiers could be heard shouting out to their fellows “Give them Buford’s Play” which was to say

that Loyalist survivors of the battle were to be subjected to the same treatment that Tarleton had meted out to Buford’s

Continental troops at the Waxhaws.33 The same could be heard in the wake of the American victory over Tarleton’s

troops at the Battle of Cowpens three months later.34 After helping his mother nurse the wounded at the Waxhaws

Presbyterian meeting house where his family attended church, thirteen-year old Andrew Jackson left home to join

Major William R. Davie’s band of partisan warriors.35

The imposition of Clinton’s loyalty oath and the British resort to the excessively violent reduction of lingering

resistance in South Carolina precipitated what British officers called the “Second Revolution” or the resurgence of

rebellion in the Carolina backcountry.36

Identifying Friends and Enemies

During the week following Clinton’s 3 June proclamation British commanders in the backcountry began

circulating its terms among the people and mobilizing Loyalist militia units to assist in subduing the few partisan

militia forces that continued to resist the occupation. Loyalists set up camp at Alexander’s Old Field, an old militia

muster ground in Chester County, and began, as one partisan recalled, “to plunder everybody suspected of disloyalty,

taking horses & cattle and household goods also all the grain and forage as it was needed to supply the British cavalry.”

Loyalist troops also began moving among the Presbyterian settlements at Fishing Creek and Rocky Creek, home to

Reverend Martin and his Covenanters, distributing notices summoning them to Alexander’s Old Field “to give their

names as loyal subjects of King George, and receive British protection.”37 To break up Loyalist operations in the area,

31 William Dobein James, A Sketch of the Life of Brig. Gen. Francis Marion, and A History of his Brigade (1821), Appendix,

"Letter from Dr. Robert Brownfield to the author."

32 For example at the Battle of Antietam on September 17, 1862, where the fighting lasted from dawn to dusk and more men were

killed or wounded than on any other day of the Civil War, the losing Confederate army suffered 26 percent casualties. Exact

figures of American casualties at Waxhaws were 113 killed, 150 wounded, and 58 captured. See Edward McCrady, The History

of South Carolina in the Revolution, 1775-1780, 519-524.

33 Draper, Kings Mountain and Its Heroes, 282, 550; McCrady, The History of South Carolina in the Revolution, 800; Edgar,

Partisans and Redcoats, 119; Buchanan, The Road to Guilford Court House, 233; Army War College, "70th Congress, 1st

Session House Document No. 328, Historical Statements Concerning The Battle Of Kings Mountain And The Battle Of The

Cowpens, South Carolina," 31.

34 Lawrence E. Babits, A Devil of a Whipping: The Battle of Cowpens (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press,

1998), 127.

35 One year later on April 10, 1781, Loyalist troops from Camden under Major John Coffin torched the Waxhaws Presbyterian

Church and plundered the properties of local residents. See Peter N. More, World of Toil and Strife: Community Transformation

in Backcountry of South Carolina, 1750-1805 (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2007), 72; Howe, The History of the

Presbyterian Church in South Carolina, Vol. 1, 536-537; Robert V. Remini, Andrew Jackson and the Course of American Empire,

1767-1821 (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), 14-17.

36 Robert Stansbury Lambert, South Carolina Loyalists in the American Revolution (Columbia: University of South Carolina

Press, 1987), 125-148.

37 Sources quoted in Scoggins, The Day It Rained Militia, 52-53.

13

John McClure and William Bratton led partisan attacks on Alexander’s Old Field on 6 June and two days later at

Mobley’s Meeting House.

Learning that McClure and Bratton were using the Fishing Creek Presbyterian Church as their base of

operations, Lieutenant Colonel George Turnbull, British commander at Rocky Mount, ordered Captain Christian

Huck, a Loyalist lawyer from Philadelphia, north from Rocky Mount to the Fishing Creek settlement to hunt them

down. Huck took with him a detachment of Tarleton’s Legion dragoons and a detachment of mounted Loyalist militia

under the command of Major James Ferguson.38

Hearing of Huck’s approach, McClure and Bratton and their men had retreated from the area along with

Reverend John Simpson, pastor of the Fishing Creek community. It was Sunday June 11 and Huck had planned on

catching them at worship with the entire congregation. Riding toward the Simpson property, Huck’s soldiers shot and

killed William Strong, a young boy whose only apparent sin was that he was carrying or as some say reading a Bible

at the time. Mrs. Simpson, hearing the shots, gathered up her four children and hurried them away from the house

where she hid in a nearby orchard. Not finding anyone at home, Huck proceeded to loot and burn the parsonage to

include the Reverend Simpson’s extensive library.39

The following day a crowd gathered at William Hill’s ironworks in the New Acquisition District located to

the north of the Fishing Creek settlement. The district was bounded by North Carolina on the north and the Waxhaws

District to the east.40 Having migrated from Northern Ireland in 1762, Hill had opened his iron furnace in 1775.

Originally, a center of production for agricultural implements, the iron works were converted in 1776 by their owner

to produce cannon balls, ammunition, guns, and among other things popular cast-iron firebacks inscribed with the

words “Liberty or Death.” Farmers living within a fifty mile radius were as dependent on Hill’s properties for their

livelihood as their owner.41

Lord Rawdon, British commander at Camden, had sent a commissioner to the Ironworks to persuade the

New Acquisition people to accept the terms of pardon. Saying he was “empowered to take their submissions and

give paroles and protections to all who choose to become British subjects,” Rawdon’s commissioner went on to

declare that the Continental Congress had abandoned the Carolinas and that George Washington and his army had

gone into hiding. William Hill stood up to object to what he called lies and deceptions and reminded those present

that “we had all taken an oath to defend and maintain the independence of the State.” After his forceful enunciation

of prior principles, Hill reported “visible animation in the countenance of the citizens and their former state of

despondency visibly reversed, and the poor Commissr [sic], was obliged to disappear . . . for fear of the resentment

of the audience.” Hill then used the moment to move the crowd into electing two colonels and organizing militia

companies. They elected Hill and Andrew Neel colonels then chose “all other of their officers to form into

companies etc. We then formed into a camp and erected the American standard. And as soon as this was known

there were men both of the states of Georgia and South Carolina adding daily to our numbers that we soon became a

respectable body.”42 Hill’s New Acquisition militia unit would join Thomas Sumter’s larger band of partisans and

would be among the group of South Carolinians who fought at Kings Mountain. Similar gatherings were taking place elsewhere in the region. At Bullock’s Creek Presbyterian Church in the

southwestern corner of the New Acquisition District, militia leader Colonel John Thomas, Jr., addressed a crowd of

partisan soldiers asking the same question that many others throughout the colony were asking themselves. “Shall we

join the British or strive to gain the noble end for which we have striven for years past,” Thomas asked? “Shall we

declare ourselves cowards and traitors, or shall we pursue the prize, Liberty, as long as life continues?” Fellow militia

leader Major Joseph McJunkin followed Thomas’ oration by repeating the question, “shall we pursue liberty or give

38 Ibid., 62-63, 65-66.

39 Huck’s terrorization of Mrs. Simpson and her children is told in McCrady, The History of South Carolina in the Revolution,

1775-1780, 591-600 and retold in Buchanan, The Road to Guilford Courthouse: The American Revolution in the Carolinas, 112-

113; Edgar, Partisans and Redcoats: The Southern Conflict that turned the Tide of the American Revolution, 58-60; and Howe,

The History of the Presbyterian Church in South Carolina, vol. 1, 509-512. Scoggins offers the latest rendition of the story in The

Day It Rained Militia, 65-70.

40 The New Acquisition District was located in north central South Carolina. It shared a border with North Carolina and took in

the area where current day York, Cherokee, Chester, and Lancaster counties come together.

41 Salley Jr., ed., Colonel William Hill’s Memoirs of the Revolution, 8; McCrady, The History of South Carolina in the

Revolution, 1775-1780, 592-93; Bailey, Commanders at Kings Mountain, 202; Scoggins, The Day it Rained Militia, 82; Edgar,

Partisans and Redcoats,39.

42 A.S. Salley Jr., ed., Colonel William Hill’s Memoirs of the Revolution, (Columbia, SC: Historical Commission of South

Carolina, 1921), 6-7. McCrady, The History of South Carolina in the Revolution, 1775-1780, 588-590.

14

up?” McJunkin reported that “hats flew upward and the air resounded with the clapping of hands & shouts of defiance

to the armies of Britain and the foes of Liberty.”43

Captain Ben Land attempted to muster a partisan unit of Covenanters from Reverend Martin’s Rocky Creek

congregation in Chester County. Unfortunate for Land was the fact that a squad of Huck’s dragoons got wind of the

gathering and surprised Land’s troops, killing him and scattering the rest. The dragoons proceeded two miles up the

road to a local blacksmith shop where once again they were able to surprise a handful of partisans in the process of

getting their horses shod. One partisan was killed during the encounter. The Loyalist raid into the Rocky Creek

community on or about 12 June was also the occasion upon which Reverend Martin was arrested, taken from his

home, and carried off to Camden where he was imprisoned.44

Countering the Insurgency

Within a week following the dismissal of Rawdon’s emissary at Hill’s ironworks Turnbull sent Huck into

the New Acquisition with orders to destroy the place. Turnbull wrote Lord Cornwallis saying he had taken the liberty

of ordering Huck to destroy the ironworks, “the property of Mr. Hill, a great Rebell.” Turnbull hoped Huck’s party

would “do something towards Quieting our Frontier.”45 The British commander admitted targeting local Presbyterians

whom he called “the Greatest Skum of the Creation” and who he credited with keeping “the candle of rebellion”

burning in the backcountry. Major McJunkin recalled the situation similarly. In his memoirs written after the war, he

remembered Turnbull sending Huck “to punish the Presbyterian inhabitants of that place, which he did with a

barbarous hand, by killing men, burning churches, & driving off the ministers of the gospel to seek shelter amongst

strangers.”46

On 18 June Huck and company destroyed Hill’s ironworks and the entire of William Hill’s possessions to

include his home, gristmill, sawmill, and slave cabins. They also made off with all 90 of his slaves, some of whom

later became servants to Turnbull’s officers at Rocky Mount. While Cornwallis and Huck thought “the dispersion of

a party of rebels who had assembled at an iron-work” a leading factor ending “all resistance in South Carolina,”

Presbyterian elder John Miller of Rutherford County North Carolina thought it a time for prayer. “Good Lord,” prayed

Miller, “if ye had na’ suffered the cruel tories to burn Belly Hell’s iron-works, we would na’ have asked any maire

favors at thy hands.” Among the favors to which Miller alluded included subsequent patriot victories at Kings

Mountain where “we kilt the great Gineral Ferguson and took his whole army . . . and “the ever memorable and

glorious battle of the Coopens where we made the proud Gineral Tarleton run doon the road helter skelter.” The

destruction of Hill’s properties was a serious setback to the revolutionary cause in the backcountry and was not well

received among Hill’s Presbyterian neighbors. Few if any of them in the New Acquisition District where Hill’s

property laid in ruins took the Oath and offers of British protection.47

In July, Turnbull again ordered Huck to wade into nearby Presbyterian communities to press residents into

taking the Oath of Allegiance and to intercept partisan leaders who were returning home with expectations of recruiting

additional soldiers from among their friends.48 John McClure, William Hill, and William Bratton were high on Huck’s

list of rebel leaders whom he hoped to visit. He immediately called unnecessary attention to himself when he rounded

up a group of local men and declared that “if the Rebels were thick as trees, and Jesus Christ himself were to command

them he would defeat them.” The crowd composed mostly of older men, was forced to walk back to their homes after

Huck’s soldiers confiscated their horses. All were appalled by Huck’s insults and blasphemous tirade. Huck’s public

performance, said William Hill, made an impression on these men raising “their courage under the belief that they

43 Reverend James Hodge Saye, Memoirs of Major Joseph McJunkin, Revolutionary War Patriot, (Greenwood, SC Index Journal,

1925), excerpt cited in Scoggins, The Day it Rained Militia, 73.

44 Ibid.

45 Turnbull quoted in Buchanan, The Road to Guilford Courthouse, 113; Ltr, Turnbull to Cornwallis, reprinted in Scoggins, The

Day it Rained Militia, 78.

46 Turnbull and McJunkin, quoted in Scoggins, The Day it Rained Militia , 63, 70-71; “Reminiscences of the Revolutionary War

Related by Joseph McJunkin,” July 18, 1837.

47 Scoggins, The Day It Rained Militia, 80-85; Cornwallis quoted in Buchanan, The Road to Guilford Courthouse, 113; Elder

John Miller quoted in Howe, The History of the Presbyterian Church in South Carolina, vol. 1, 512-513.

48 Lambert, South Carolina Loyalists in the American Revolution, 128-129; Ltr, Lieutenant General Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry

Clinton, July 15, 1780, reprinted in Tarleton, A History of the Campaigns of 1780 and 1781, 123-124.

15

would be made instruments in the hand of Heaven to punish the enemy for his wickedness and blasphemy.” It was

said of Huck that he never missed an opportunity “to curse Bibles and Presbyterians.”49

On July 11, Huck’s detachment arrived at the McClure home. Captain McClure was not there but he did find

his wife Martha, son James, and son-in-law Edward Martin. The two men had been melting down pewter and casting

it into musket balls. Huck declared James and Edward traitors and condemned them to be hung at sunrise the following

day. When Huck demanded the location of her husband, Mrs. McClure told him he was in Thomas Sumter’s camp. In

disgust, Huck then grabbed the family Bible and threw it into the fire. Mrs. McClure’s matron attempted to rescue it

only to be struck by one of Huck’s officers with the flat of his sword. Taking the two men prisoner, Huck plundered

and destroyed the McClure property and moved down the road to the William Bratton residence where he terrorized

Martha Bratton and her six-year old son. He threatened to kill her if she did not reveal her husband’s location and

probably would have had it not been for the intervention of a fellow officer. Three local men who were visiting the

Bratton plantation were placed under arrest and condemned to die the next morning along with the other two prisoners

from the McClure household.50

Accounts differ over how word of Huck’s presence in the district reached Thomas Sumter’s camp and other

local partisans but it did and it did not take long for them to react. A partisan force composed of approximately 250

men, most of who were from the eight Presbyterian Congregations in York and Chester Counties was on Huck’s trail

almost from the start.51 Led by McClure and Colonels Bratton, Hill, Neel, and Lacy, they descended upon Huck’s

soldiers who had moved down the road from the Bratton place and were encamped at Williamson’s plantation on the

morning of July 12. Like they would do at Kings Mountain, the partisans completely surrounded their adversary and

attacked from all sides. Taken completely by surprise as they were climbing out of their bedrolls, the British were

never able to mount a successful defense against their attackers. After rushing from the Williamson home to join the

fight, Huck mounted his horse and attempted to rally his people only to be shot in the head and killed. With Huck

surely dead on the ground his soldiers began throwing down their weapons and begging for quarter. Others took to

the woods only to be tracked down by the partisans. The Americans mounted their horses, said Colonel Lacy, and

“pursued the flying Loyalists for thirteen or fourteen miles, wreaking vengeance and retaliating for their cruelties and

atrocities.”52

Many of the British injured attempted to gain cover in the woods only to die later of their wounds. Colonel

Hill reported “many carcasses found in the woods some days later.” The battle lasted about an hour. Of Huck’s 115

soldiers, Tarleton wrote that only twenty-four escaped injury, death, or capture, a nearly 80 percent casualty rate.53

The British defeat was about as thoroughly merciless as the one Tarleton had administered to Buford’s force at the

Waxhaws.

Events such as Huck’s Defeat and others that followed in the summer and fall of 1780 moved British

Brigadier General Charles O’Hara, deputy to Cornwallis, to declare that the partisan enemy was given to a wantonness

“unheard of before.” On the whole, he thought they constituted a depraved species of humankind “beyond every curb

of religion, & Humanity.” Moreover, they had succeeded in terrorizing the King’s friends who in great measure had

49 Salley Jr., ed., Colonel William Hill’s Memoirs of the Revolution, 9; Bailey, Commanders at Kings Mountain, 203; Joseph

Gaston, cousin to Captain John McClure, quoted in Scoggins, The Day it Rained Militia , 52. Huck’s hatred of Presbyterians

may have been acquired at least in part through his friendship with Mr. Issac Hunt, a Philadelphia lawyer who mentored Huck in

the legal profession prior to the beginning of the war. As a Loyalist and pamphleteering supporter of the crown against

revolutionary America, Hunt held Presbyterians in Philadelphia and elsewhere primarily responsible for fueling the fires of

rebellion in the colonies. Both Hunt and Huck suffered at the hands of Philadelphia patriots who harassed them both mentally and

physically for their Loyalist views and their unabated public opposition to the rebellion. Hunt was later imprisoned while Huck

escaping charges of “high treason” fled Philadelphia for New York where he joined the British army receiving a captain’s

commission in 1778. See ftnt 1 and Scoggins, 215-218.

50 McCrady, The History of South Carolina in the Revolution, 1775-1780, 594-595; Bailey, Commanders at Kings Mountain,

202-203; Ellet, Domestic History of the Revolution, 190-191.

51 Michael Scoggins provides the demographics of partisan soldiers that fought at “Huck’s Defeat.” See The Day it Rained Militia

205-242.

52 M.A. Moore, Sr., The Life of General Edward Lacy (Spartanburg, SC: Douglas, Evins & Co, 1859) 9-10.

53 McCrady, The History of South Carolina in the Revolution, 1775-1780, 594-599; Salley Jr., ed., Colonel William Hill’s

Memoirs of the Revolution, 10; Tarleton, A History of the Campaigns of 1780 and 1781, 121; Scoggins, The Day it Rained

Militia, 109-142.

16

abandoned the country. The few who had remained in their homes lived “in hourly expectation of being murdered, or

stripped of all their property.”54

Patriot insurgents emboldened by Huck’s Defeat or the Battle of Williamson’s Plantation continued to

degrade British regular and Loyalist units for the remainder of July and into the month of August. The event also

sparked an increase in the recruitment of partisan soldiers. Loyalist numbers, on the other hand, began to dwindle as

it was becoming apparent that British protection left much to be desired.55 Morale was further heightened by the

approach of an army of Continental regulars under the command of Major General Horatio Gates. All that would

change, however, during the third week of August when Gates, leading a combined force of Continentals and militia,

marched headlong into General Cornwallis’s British army just outside of Camden, South Carolina. At the Battle of

Camden on August 16, 1781, Cornwallis succeeded in neutralizing yet another American army sent south to lead the

resistance against the British. Gates fled the scene on horseback long before the battle ended, riding as fast as his horse

would take him to the American headquarters in Hillsboro, North Carolina. In the days and weeks that followed, the

remains of his army would follow him there.

Two days after Camden, organized resistance in the backcountry was dealt a near-death blow as Tarleton

surprised Thomas Sumter’s partisans at Fishing Creek, South Carolina, and successfully disintegrated the force that

had been such a thorn in Cornwallis’s side. Sumter, half-naked and asleep under a wagon when the British attacked,

barely managed to escape. Riding bareback on a draft horse he had cut loose from a wagon, Sumter rode off into the

54 Wickwire and Wickwire, Cornwallis: The American Adventure, 2 vols., vol. 1, 170-171; Ferling, Almost a Miracle, 457.

55 Ibid., 456-459; Buchanan, The Road to Guilford Courthouse, 185; Edgar, Partisans and Redcoats, 142-145.

Huck’s Defeat:

Battle of Williamson’s Plantation

12 July 1780

17

woods and toward Charlotte where he eventually found protection among Colonel William R. Davie’s partisans.56 He

was, as described by his biographer, “a brigadier general without a servant, soldier, or vestige of a brigade.”57

With Sumter on the run, Cornwallis shifted his attention to Francis Marion, the notorious “Swamp Fox”

and, after Sumter and Pickens, the one remaining militia leader standing between the British and complete

subjugation of South Carolina. Marion had been particularly active in August attacking British lines of

communication and supply that stretched between Charleston and Camden. On August 28 Cornwallis directed

Major James Wemyss to sweep through the "Country from Kingstree Bridge to the Pedee, and return by the

Cheraws," the object of which was to “disarm in the most rigid manner all persons that you cannot depend on, and

punish the concealment of Arms and ammunition with the total demolition of their plantations.” Wemyss had

orders to hang all inhabitants of the area who had broken enrollment agreements with local Loyalist units and had

joined Francis Marion’s band of partisan rebels. In the event the number of captured rebels proved too great,

Wemyss was to use discretion in determining which were to hang and which were to be recipients of the King’s

“mercy.” All others suspected of disloyalty to the King were “to have their property entirely taken from them, or

destroyed; and themselves taken prisoners of war."58

The Williamsburg District through which Wemyss was to march was under the control of Marion’s

militia, an area that Cornwallis admitted was “in an absolute state of Rebellion.” Almost all of Marion’s soldiers

resided in the area and with few exceptions were members of local Presbyterian congregations.59 Major John

James, one of Marion’s principle subordinates, actually raised the troop unit that eventually came under Marion’s

leadership. James, a recognized leader of the community and one of the founding elders of the Presbyterian Church

at Indiantown, took the initiative of mobilizing area militia after being told by a British officer that the King’s

pardon for him and his neighbors was conditional based upon their willingness “to take up arms in his cause.”

After telling the officer that “the people he represents would scarcely submit on such conditions,” James and his

antagonist fell into a heated argument that ended with James knocking him to the floor with the chair he had been

sitting on. Before the British soldier had time to recover, James had mounted his horse and made his escape into

the woods.60

Knowing what lay ahead for the King’s enemies, James returned home and immediately began raising a

partisan militia force from among his friends and neighbors. He then made request to Major General Horatio Gates

prior to Gates’ devastating defeat at Camden, for an officer to take command of a brigade he had raised “among the

Scotch-Irish of Williamsburg Township.” Gates, as the story goes, assigned Francis Marion to the command with

orders to seize the Santee River crossings below the British outpost at Camden with the aim of severing enemy

communications with Charleston.61

Although not one himself, Francis Marion did share the religious convictions of his Scotch-Irish neighbors

of Williamsburg District. Having descended from a family of French Huguenots or “French Presbyterians” as they

were often called, Marion and his fellow Huguenots who served under him came from a long line of religious

56 Davie was one of the principle militia leaders of units organized from the “seven churches” of Mecklenburg County North

Carolina, the area in around Charlotte. After the war, Davie would represent North Carolina as a delegate to the Constitutional

Convention and serve as governor of the state. He was the nephew of William Richardson, Presbyterian minister and founding

minister of the Waxhaws Presbyterian Church in South Carolina. Davie spent much of his youth in the Waxhaws area and when

he died on November 29, 1820, was buried in the Old Waxhaw Presbyterian Churchyard in northern Lancaster County, SC. See

White, Southern Presbyterian Leaders, 145-150.

57 Tarleton, A History of the Campaigns of 1780 and 1781,113-115; Anne King Gregorie, Thomas Sumter (Columbia, SC: R.L.

Bryan Company, 1931), 101-102; Robert D. Bass, Gamecock, The Life and Campaigns of Thomas Sumter (New York: Holt,

Rinehart and Winston; 1961), 84-85.

58 Cornwallis to Wemyss, August 28, 1780; cited Robert Bass, Gamecock: The Life and Campaigns of General Thomas Sumter,

(New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1961), 89.

59 W. S. Fleming, “Scotch-Irish Settlers in South Carolina, and Their Descendants in Maury County, Tennessee,” included in The

Scotch-Irish in America: Proceedings of the Scotch-Irish Congress at Columbia, Tennessee, (Cincinnati: Robert Clark, 1889), 202-

203.

60 Cornwallis to Clinton, August 6, 1780; quoted in Wickwire and Wickwire, Cornwallis: The American Adventure, 171;

Southern Presbyterian Review (Columbia, SC: I.C. Morgan Publisher, Vol. VIII, 1855), 141-143; Howe, The History of the

Presbyterian Church in South Carolina, vol. 1, 413, 480-481; White, Southern Presbyterian Leaders 154-155.

61 George F. Scheer, American Heritage, “The Elusive Swamp Fox,” April 1958, Vol. 9, Issue 3. William Dobein James, A

Sketch of the Life of Brig. Gen. Francis Marion, and A History of his Brigade (Morristown, NJ: Digital Antiquaria, 2004) http://

books.google.com/books, 26-27.

18

dissenters who had endured persecution in their native France for holding religious beliefs contrary to the

established Roman Catholic Church.62 Further, through much of their early history in South Carolina, they were

held in disrepute by their British neighbors; first, because they were French; and, second, because they chose to

separate themselves from the general population around them. In the second case, William Gilmore Simms thought

they reminded him of the “English Puritans.” For this, continued Simms, they were subjected “to various political

and social disabilities, and so odious had they become to their British neighbors” that the governor of the colony felt

“compelled to deny them representation in the colonial Assembly.”63 For certain, Marion understood and shared

their commitment to “liberty or death.”

Wemyss moved out of Kingstree on September 5 with a column of about 400 soldiers that included the 63d

Foot and an unspecified number of Loyalists attached to his main body.64 The search and destroy operation eventually

covered an area seventy miles long and fifteen miles wide. Two weeks into the operation, Wemyss reported to

Cornwallis that he had been trailing Marion, but had not been able to catch him. The people, he continued, were all

“concerned in rebellion & most of them very deeply." Almost all the homes were deserted, and the local Loyalist

population was “discouraged and apathetic.” Finally, he had "burnt and laid waste about 50 houses and Plantations,

mostly belonging to People who have either broke their Paroles or Oaths of Allegiance, and are now in Arms against

us."65 At the center of the desolation was the Presbyterian Church at Indiantown which Weymss burned for its part in

sowing “sedition” among the people.66 Weymss may have been wrong about some things, but he was right about

Presbyterian Churches. They, indeed, had become “sedition shops” whose clergy were guilty of preaching rebellion

among the people who attended them.

Although Weymss could have executed any number of suspected parole violators and supporters of Marion’s

partisans, he hung only one person, Adam Cusack who operated a ferry over Black Creek. One account suggests

Cusack, a martyr to the patriot cause, was arrested after refusing to ferry British soldiers across the creek. In due time,

he was tried by court martial, convicted, and hanged while his prostrate wife and children begged Wemyss to spare

his life.67 Wemyss told another story. He admitted to the destruction of “much property,” but took great satisfaction

in the fact that only one man suffered death. He justified it on the grounds that Cusack was a deserter from the British

navy and was known “for cruelty and persecution of every Loyalist in that part of the Country.” Wemyss also charged

Cusack with the attempted murder of “an officer of the loyal militia” from whom he had stolen “a valuable horse.”

According to Wemyss, Cusack was a deserter, murderer, horse thief, and scourge to his Loyalist neighbors. Most

62 While this paper is primarily about the “Presbyterian Rebellion” in the Carolinas, the rebellious of South Carolina did include a

number of French Huguenots that had fled France under King Louis XIV’s threat of imprisonment or death unless they converted

to Roman Catholicism. To speed the process, Louis ordered his soldiers to march upon their communities where they terrorized

the inhabitants and burned their churches. Many Huguenots sailed from France to Charleston in the late 17th Century, establishing

communities to the north and west of that city along the Cooper and Santee Rivers. Huguenots were Protestants who, like

Scottish Presbyterians, had adopted the doctrine and teachings of Protestant reformer John Calvin and were persecuted in their

native land for their dissenting religious beliefs. See Henry Alexander White, Southern Presbyterian Leaders (New York: Neal

Publishing, 1911), 23-24; J.G. Craighead, Scotch and Irish Seeds on American Soil: The Early History of the Scotch and Irish

Churches, and their Relations to the Presbyterian Church of America, Chapter IX, “Immigration to America,” (Philadelphia:

Presbyterian Boards of Publication, 1878); www.libraryireland.com/ ScotchIrishSeeds/ IX.php, October 21, 2009; George Howe,

The History of the Presbyterian Church in South Carolina, 2 volumes, (Columbia, SC: Duffie and Chapman, 1870), vol. 1, 100-

101.

63 William Gilmore Simms, Life of Francis Marion (Philadelphia: G.G. Evans Publisher, 1860), 14.

64 White, Southern Presbyterian Leaders, 155-156; Howe, The History of the Presbyterian Church in South Carolina, vol. 1,

483-484; McCrady, The History of South Carolina in the Revolution, 1775-1780, 641, 700-701, 747-748; Buchanan, The Road to

Guilford Courthouse, 184-186; Msg, Henry William Harrington to Horatio Gates, September 17, 1780; included in Colonial and

State Records of North Carolina at docsouth.unc.edu/csr/index.html/document/csr14-0523, 6 November 2009.

65 Wemyss to Cornwallis, September 30, 1780, cited in Lambert, South Carolina Loyalists in the American Revolution Lambert,

129-130; Russell, The American Revolution in the Southern Colonies, 308.

66 McCrady, The History of South Carolina in the Revolution, 747-748; Howe, The History of the Presbyterian Church in South

Carolina, vol. 1, 483.

67 A South Carolina historical marker erected near the site by the Darlington County Historical Commission in 2002 tells the

story. It is located on Highway 15/40 just outside Society Hill, SC. See Alexander Gregg, History of the Old Cheraws

(Columbia: The State Company, 1905), 303-304; James, A Sketch of the Life of Brig. Gen. Francis Marion, 58.

19

likely, the last indiscretion sealed his fate.68 Hero to the cause or villainous traitor, Cusack died a gruesome death at

the hands of the British occupiers and few in the district would not soon forget it. In his recording of these events,

Henry Alexander White believed the British had “regarded the war in this region as a war against Presbyterians.” For

his part, Weymss, the “burner of churches” and other things, became despised almost as much as Banestre Tarleton.69

Towards the Battle of Kings Mountain

When Patrick Ferguson issued his 7 September threat from Gilbert Town he was tracking a partisan militia

force from North and South Carolina under the command of Colonel Charles McDowell that had defeated a larger

Loyalist force at Musgrove’s Mill in Laurens County, South Carolina. Upon hearing of Gates’ defeat at Camden and

aware of Ferguson fast approaching from his rear, McDowell began a rapid retreat northward toward North Carolina.

McDowell’s troops marched continuously for two days and nights eating nothing but peaches and green corn as they

moved. Excessive fatigue, reported William Hill, “eventually broke down every officer so that their faces & eyes

swelled & became so bloated in appearance as scarcely to be able to see.”70 After successfully evading Ferguson,

many of them returned to their settlements in the mountains of western North Carolina, southeastern Tennessee, and

the border region of Virginia.

Samuel Phillips, the prisoner whom Ferguson paroled to deliver the message, happened to be the cousin of

one of the Musgrove’s Mill victors, Colonel Isaac Shelby. The message went straight to Shelby who had retreated

from South Carolina to his home in the mountainous border region separating western North Carolina from Virginia.

Before McDowell’s force had scattered, Shelby had raised the possibility of reuniting and going on campaign against

Ferguson and ridding themselves of his Loyalist force once and for all. After reading Ferguson’s message, he began

mobilizing the “over mountain men” of Tennessee, Virginia, and North Carolina to go after the brash Scotchman who

was threatening to bring the war to their doorstep.

On September 25, nearly one thousand “Over Mountain” men gathered at Sycamore Shoals on the banks of

the Watauga River in southeastern Tennessee.71 The following day Samuel Doak, Presbyterian minister to the people

of the Watauga settlement, sent them off to war with prayer, beseeching the “God of Battle” to avenge the slaughter

of his people, confounding those “who plot for our destruction,” and “exalt themselves against liberty and justice and

truth.” Finally, Doak prayed for the strength of the biblical Gideon and the same “Sword of the Lord” Gideon had

used to cut down his Midianite enemies.72

On the way to their appointment with Ferguson, the Over Mountain men were joined by partisan militia from

South Carolina to include soldiers under the command of William Hill, Edward Lacy, and James Williams. David

Ramsay in his history of South Carolina called them true volunteers, people “embodied to check the invader of their

own volition, without any requisition from the Governments of America or the officers of the Continental Army."

Their motivation was perhaps best expressed by sixteen-year old James Collins, already a veteran of Huck’s defeat.

Ferguson, wrote Collins, “seemed to threaten the destruction of the whole country. The Tories were flocking to his

standard from every quarter, and there appeared very little safety for us; but as God would have it a patriotic party

sprang up.” Collins was among the group from South Carolina that fell into the rear of the Over Mountain men, “took

their trail, and pushed on till we overtook them [Ferguson] without being intercepted.”73

At one point they numbered more than 1800 soldiers. For fear of losing Ferguson, they cut their number to

910 of their best horsemen and hurriedly fell upon his trail with the rest following behind as quickly as possible.74 The

vanguard arrived at Kings Mountain about three o’clock in the afternoon on October 7. The plan of attack called for

68 Wemyss' transcription of Cornwallis's orders of Aug. 28, 1780, with his P.S. added. Cited in Marg Baskin, Oatmeal for the

Foxhounds, May 5, 2009.

69 White, Southern Presbyterian Leaders, 155-156. Edward McCrady, The History of South Carolina in the Revolution, 1775-

1780, (New York: Russell and Russell, 1901), 747-48.

70 Salley Jr., ed., Colonel William Hill’s Memoirs of the Revolution, 26.

71 Bailey, Commanders at Kings Mountain, 97-98; Buchanan, The Road to Guilford Courthouse, 208-214.

72 The Reverend Doak’s entire sermon and prayer is found in Pat Alderman, One Heroic Hour at Kings Mountain, (Johnson City,

Tennessee: The Over Mountain Press, 1990), 21.

73 David Ramsay, History of South Carolina from Its First Settlement in 1670 to the Year 1808, 2 vols, (Charleston: David

Longworth, 1809), vol. 1, 217-218; James Potter Collins, Autobiography of a Revolutionary War Soldier, (New York: Arno

Press, 1979), 258; from the 1859 publication edited by John M. Roberts.

74 McCrady, The History of South Carolina in the Revolution, 1775-1780, 782-784; “Historical Statements Concerning the Battle

of Kings Mountain and the Battle of Cowpens South Carolina,” 20; Buchanan, The Road to Guilford Courthouse, 222-223.

20

the patriots to surround Ferguson’s 1,125 soldiers and attack about 20 yards straight up a heavily wooded and rocky

slope into Ferguson’s encampment at the top of the mountain. Shaped much like a human foot, the mountain top

measured only 120 yards long and at its widest point 60 yards. From the extremely narrow heel, the mountain top

widened as one moved to the northeast toward the ball of the foot and Ferguson’s encampment. It was terrain perfectly

suited for the unconventional tactics of partisan warriors. Despite Ferguson’s boast that “God Almighty” could not

drive him from the top of the mountain, his troops were posted on terrain that terribly complicated the use of the

bayonet and the close-order, open-field tactics in which they had been trained.75

The Battle of Kings Mountain

Although Colonel William Campbell from Virginia had been chosen to command the combined patriot force,

the nature of the terrain made that impossible as each subordinate commander was assigned to assault a specific sector

of the mountain. In fact, Colonel Isaac Shelby prior to the battle advised the men to not “wait for the word of

command. Let each of you be your own officer . . . . If in the woods give them Indian play; advance from tree to tree,

pressing the enemy and killing and disabling all you can.” Patriot Thomas Young remembered being told that with

the firing of the first gun for “every man to raise a whoop, rush forward, and fight his way as best he could.” When

Isaac Shelby’s men let loose with a series of Indian-like war whoops, Captain Abraham De Peyster, British second in

command, thought he had heard the same sounds at the Battle of Musgrove’s Mill. He leaned towards Ferguson and

with a worried tone told him, "These things are ominous--these are the damned yelling boys."76 Attacking from all

sides, the patriot force against heavy fire and repeated bayonet attacks from Ferguson’s Ranger Battalion moved

steadily up the slope of the mountain. Each time the Rangers assaulted down the slope into Campbell, Shelby, or

Williams’ troops, the partisans would retreat for cover, regroup, and renew the attack all the while using their superior

marksmanship to kill or wound the enemy.

Inside the ever-tightening ring of partisan warriors, Loyalist militia began raising white flags of surrender

only to have them knocked down by Ferguson who, in a last desperate attempt to turn the tide, tried to break the patriot

line. Astride his white horse and dressed in a checkered hunting shirt he presented an inviting target. James Collins

reported that “fifty rifles must have been leveled at him at the same time; seven rifle balls had passed through his

body, both his arms were broken and his hat and clothing literally shot to pieces.” Undisputed is the claim that partisan

soldiers continued to fire into the hapless crowd of Loyalist soldiers even after Captain De Peyster had presented the

white flag of surrender. Colonel Shelby described the scene in disturbing detail. “It was sometime before a complete

cessation of the firing on our part could be affected. Our men who had been scattered in the battle were continually

coming up and continued to fire, without comprehending in the heat of the moment what had happened; and some

who had heard that at Buford’s defeat, the British had refused quarters . . . were willing to follow that bad example.”77

Colonel Campbell finally gained control of the situation but not before knocking down the rifle of one of his own

men, exclaiming, “for God’s sake, don’t shoot! It’s murder to kill them now.” He then began running among his

soldiers shouting, “Cease firing! For God’s sake, cease firing.” Lieutenant Anthony Allaire, Ferguson’s adjutant, wrote

in his diary that the battle “continued an hour and five minutes, but their numbers enabled them to surround us.” The

North Carolina militia “seeing this, and numbers being out of ammunition, gave way, which naturally threw the rest

of the militia into confusion.” Of the Provincial regulars to which he was attached, Allaire indicated that “all were

killed and wounded but twenty.” A more detailed accounting suggested that 157 of Ferguson’s force were killed, 163

wounded, and 698 were taken prisoner. The partisans lost 28 killed and 62 wounded.78

Losing the Initiative: British Withdrawal from North Carolina

Things went from bad to worse for Cornwallis as the annihilation of Ferguson’s army at Kings Mountain

forced him to revise his plans. Holed up in Charlotte at the time of the battle, he realized Ferguson’s defeat had all but

ruined whatever chance he had of raising a sufficient Loyalist force with which to subdue the people of North Carolina.

To compound matters, British soldiers discovered the counties around Charlotte, thickly populated with Scot-Irish

75 Ibid., 230-231; Wickwire, Cornwallis: The American Adventure, vol. 1, 210-211; Edgar, Partisans and Redcoats, 118.

76 Shelby quoted in Bailey, Commanders at Kings Mountain, 131; Thomas Young, “Memoir of Thomas Young, a Revolutionary

Patriot of South Carolina,” Orion 3, October 1843, 86; De Peyster quoted in Bailey, Commanders at Kings Mountain, 418.

77 Buchanan, The Road to Guilford Courthouse: 232-233; Collins, Autobiography of a Revolutionary War Soldier, 215; Bailey,

Commander’s at Kings Mountain, 422-423; Shelby quoted in Buchanan, The Road to Guilford Courthouse, 233.

78 McCrady, The History of South Carolina in the Revolution, 1775-1780, 803; Buchanan, The Road to Guilford Courthouse,

235-236; Anthony Allaire, Diary of Lieut. Anthony Allaire of Ferguson’s Corps: Memorandum of Occurrences during the

Campaign of 1780, entry for Saturday, 7th; reprinted as an Appendix to Draper, Kings Mountain and its Heroes.

21

Presbyterians, to be, as Tarleton described them, “more hostile to England than any others in America.” The partisans,

continued Tarleton, had succeeded in severing all communication “between the Kings troops and the Loyalists in the

other parts of the province. No British commander could obtain any information in that position upon which to base

future operations.” With his army weakened by fever, and subjected to continual harassment by partisan forces in the

countryside surrounding Charlotte, Cornwallis decided to retreat back into South Carolina.79

Upon departing Charlotte on October 14 an army guide, described by British Lieutenant Roderick McKenzie

as a “Presbyterian fanatick from Glasgow,” led them down the wrong road and left them in the middle of the night to

wander the hills and ravines of the border area of the Carolinas. Slowed also by constant rain that had turned the roads

to mud, the troops went the distance without food or shelter and under the continual attack of North Carolina partisans

that took every opportunity to ambush forging parties and stragglers. Cornwallis became a victim of the fever as did

Major George Hanger and five of his fellow officers. Of the six, only Hanger survived losing so much weight that his

bones split his skin. Fifteen days later Cornwallis marched into Winnsboro, South Carolina where he and his troops

would rest and recuperate in the weeks to follow. John Buchanan concluded in his history of the Southern Campaign

that if the retreat from North Carolina was not a nightmare for Cornwallis, it surely turned out to be a “bad dream.”80

The Battle of Kings Mountain ended British hopes of quelling rebellion in the southern colonies. After Kings

Mountain the British were never able to regain the war’s initiative successfully seized after capturing Charleston the

previous spring. In 1781 beginning with the Battle of Cowpens, a combination of confident partisans and regular

Continentals under Major General Nathaniel Greene would so severely deplete Cornwallis’ troop strength that the

British commander would be forced to abandon the Carolinas altogether. Rather than withdraw from North back into

South Carolina a second time, Cornwallis after the Battle of Guilford Courthouse in March 1781 led his army north

into Virginia where combined American and French ground and naval forces surrounded him at Yorktown and forced

his surrender on October 20, 1781.

On Horse Thieves, Presbyterians, and Freedom

Lieutenant Anthony Allaire, one of Ferguson’s Provincial regulars from New York, was among the 698

prisoners forcibly marched northward into North Carolina by Colonel Campbell and his partisans following the Battle

of Kings Mountain. Compared to the southern Loyalists who made up the majority of the prisoners of war and who

suffered most from their captors, Allaire thought he was treated reasonably well. On Sunday, October 29, patriot

Colonel Benjamin Cleveland invited Captain De Peyster, his officers, and men to attend a Presbyterian Church service

in Bethabara, North Carolina. Allaire recorded the event in his diary. Cleveland, wrote Allaire, “marched the militia

prisoners from their encampment to the town, and halted them; and sent an officer to our quarters to acquaint us as

they were waiting for us. We then ordered our men to fall in; marched to the front of the prisoners; the whole then

proceeded on to a height about half a mile from the town. Here we heard a Presbyterian sermon, truly adapted to their

principles of the times; or, rather, stuffed as full of Republicanism as their camp is of horse thieves.81 It was special

treatment Allaire probably could have done without.

One of Allaire’s horse thieves who lost his life at the Battle of Kings Mountain was Colonel James Williams,

the Presbyterian elder from the Little River community of Laurens County, South Carolina. Williams was mortally

wounded in the closing moments of the battle as a cease fire was being arranged.82 The following year as the war

began to wind down, two of his sons who had been with him at Kings Mountain and at his side when he died, were

murdered by the notorious Loyalist William “Bloody Bill” Cunningham who had returned from exile to avenge

previous humilities heaped upon him by his former neighbors. On 19 November 1781,"Bloody Bill" surprised a group

of James Williams’ former comrades at Hayes Station, South Carolina. After trapping them in a house and setting it

on fire, Cunningham accepted their surrender with the promise they would be treated as prisoners of war. He spared

the women and children and a former associate for past favors, and then proceeded to hang the rest, eighteen-year old

Captain Daniel Williams among them. Thinking he was to be spared, Daniel’s fourteen-year old brother, Joseph,

exclaimed “Oh, brother, Daniel, what shall I tell mother?” Bloody Bill was said to have then run Joseph through with

79 Tarleton, History of the Campaigns of 1780 and 1781, 159-160; White, Southern Presbyterian Leaders, 149-151.

80 Roderick Mackenzie, Strictures on Lt. Col. Tarleton's History of the Campaigns of the 1780 and 1781 in the Southern

Provinces of the North America (London: R. Faulder, 1787), 49; Major George Hanger, marching with Cornwallis confirms

Mackenzie’s account of the Presbyterian guide. Instead of “Presbyterian fanatic,” Hanger refers to the guide as a treacherous

Presbyterian “scoundrel.” See Hanger, An Address to the Army; In Reply to Strictures, by Roderick M’Kenzie (Late Lieutenant in

the 71st Regiment), on Tarleton’s History of the Campaigns of 1780 and 1781 (London: James Ridgeway, 1789) 62; Buchanan,

The Road to Guilford Courthouse, 242-243; McCrady, The History of South Carolina in the Revolution, 1775- 1780, 809-811.

81 Allaire, Diary of Lieut. Anthony Allaire of Ferguson’s Corps, entry for Sunday, 29th.

82 Bailey, Commanders at Kings Mountain, 296-297.

22

his sword, saying “You shall tell her nothing, you damned rebel suckling.” After hanging Daniel and the others,

Cunningham and his fellow Loyalists hacked many of the lifeless bodies into pieces.83

In Joseph Johnson’s biographical sketches of Revolutionary War patriots, James Williams is described as “a

Presbyterian, and, like all of that faith, his religion placed him on the side of freedom.”84 Quite obviously, the cost of

such freedom for some was unbearably high. For the Williams family and other Presbyterians who paid the cost, they

fought as if life without it was not worth living. Freedom for these people was as much a religious principle as it was

political, and was not about being released from restraint to do as one chose, or even about tolerance for other beliefs,

but about the dictates of conscience and submission to restraints that only their Protestant God could impose.85

Amid the euphoria of America’s declared independence in 1776, William Hill circulated a petition among

his fellow Presbyterians in the New Acquisition District urging the South Carolina General Assembly to make the

disestablishment of the Church of England a part of the new state constitution. Hill who would lose most of his earthly

possessions to the war called it the “grand question,” perhaps the leading principle of independence upon which the

new constitution would be based. The Reverend William Tennant who put the motion before the General Assembly

recommended that it become the “foundation article” of the new constitution. Tennant pleaded with his fellow

assemblymen to “let the day of justice dawn upon every rank and order of man in the State. . . . That there shall be no

establishment of one religious denomination of Christians in preference to another. . . . Yield to the mighty torrent of

American freedom and glory.”86 Whatever the outcome of the war and its meaning for generations to come, for the

partisan warriors fighting at Kings Mountain its origins went back to the fact that the British government had long

opposed the principle and the people who had chosen to order their lives by it.

83 Judge J. B. O’Neal, ‘Biographical Sketch of William “Bloody Bill” Cunningham,’ Southern Literary Journal and Magazine of

Arts, Vol. 4, No. 1, July 1838, 40-45; Draper, Kings Mountain and its Heroes, 468; Bailey, Commanders at Kings Mountain,

322-323.

84 Bailey, Commanders at Kings Mountain, 321; Joseph Johnson, Traditions and Reminiscences, Chiefly of the American

Revolution in the South: Including Biographical Sketches, Incidents and Anecdotes, (Charleston: Walker & James, 1851), 494.

85 Presbyterians could be as religiously bigoted and intolerant of other sects as any of the established churches of the time.

Charles Woodmason, the itinerant Anglican minister who traversed the pre-revolutionary Carolina backcountry in hopes of

drawing its people back into the orderly purview of the Episcopal Church, suffered constantly from the insults and humiliations

of Scotch-Irish Presbyterians to whom he tried to minister. However, he discovered they were as much or perhaps more intolerant

of other believers than they were of him and his Anglican faith. “A Presbyterian,” Woodmason observed, “would sooner marry

ten of his Children to Members of the Church of England than one to a Baptist.” Hooker, The Carolina Backcountry on the Eve

of the Revolution, 80.

86 Salley Jr., ed., Colonel William Hill’s Memoirs of the Revolution, 30; McCrady, The History of South Carolina in the

Revolution, 1775-1780, 207-209; Howe, The History of the Presbyterian Church in South Carolina, vol. 1, 370-372. For a

thorough discussion of the disestablishment of the Anglican Church in South Carolina see Brinsfield. Religion and Politics in

Colonial South Carolina, 104-134.

23

BATTLE OF KINGS MOUNTAIN

70TH CONGRESS, 1ST SESSION HOUSE DOCUMENT No. 328

HISTORICAL STATEMENT CONCERNING THE BATTLE OF KINGS MOUNTAIN

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON

1928

PART I

THE SUBJUGATION OF South Carolina

The Battle of Kings Mountain, South Carolina, occurred on the 7th day of October, 1780, and resulted in the

defeat of Lieutenant Colonel Ferguson, who commanded the royal forces, and the loss of his command, not one man

escaping from the battle field. The thoroughness of the disaster, and the death of the brave and highly trusted leader,

was by far the most serious blow to which the British forces operating in the Southern Provinces had been subjected.

The immediate effect upon Cornwallis was to put an end, for the time being, to the further subjugation of the Province

of North Carolina. His contemplated advance from Charlotte Town to Salisbury was menaced by a new and unheard

of enemy—the men under Campbell, Shelby, Sevier, and others—who came from the region of the mountains, and

the back, waters that flow to the west; from places so remote and unknown to the British leaders as to be almost

mythical. This avenging horde made necessary a hasty revision of Cornwallis's plans following Kings Mountain,

which resulted in his immediate withdrawal to the South, and the concentration of his main army, detached posts, and

flanking parties, into positions capable of rendering mutual assistance.

These hardy men of the Blue Ridge and Alleghenies, of deep religious convictions, were accustomed to the

hardships and independence of a pioneer life, and in their mountain homes in the highlands and the backwaters they

but seldom were concerned [Page 2] with affairs beyond their borders or interfered with by Crown or colony. When

Ferguson approached their kingdom and threatened to invade their lands and lay waste their country with "fire and

sword," and to "hang their leaders," he aroused their indignation and anger to such a degree that they determined to

rid the country forever of this enemy, who menaced their independence and the safety of their homes and families.

Had Cornwallis and his leaders known more about these mountain and backwater men, they would have carefully

avoided all military and punitive measures which might tend to draw them from their mountain fastnesses to enroll

amongst the enemies of the King.

The causes of the Revolution were but little known to many of these pioneers beyond the Blue Ridge. They

were concerned in the establishment of their homes, breaking the soil of their new settlements, and wringing a

livelihood from it; and with their rifles securing much of their sustenance. They sought the seclusion of the western

waters; and in the valleys of the Holston, the Watauga, and the Nolichucky, found freedom in the exercise of their

religion. Had the western covering force of Cornwallis's army, as it advanced into the Province of North Carolina,

confined its activities, to the plains and lowlands east of the Blue Ridge, and had not Ferguson from Gilbert Town

uttered his threat of fire and sword and the hangman's noose, these mountain men would probably have remained in

their homes, and but few of them would have joined with those who were in rebellion against the King.

The Battle of Kings Mountain was fought by men on both sides whose bravery should be a matter of pride

to all posterity. The troops commanded by Ferguson were Americans, or persons who had come to the Provinces prior

to the Revolution. His command consisted of about 125 picked officers and men, taken from several regular battalions

raised in New York and New Jersey, and formed into a temporary Provincial Corps. These men were Loyalists, and

they gave their services to the Crown with the same high sense of duty which prompted their brothers and neighbors

to rebel against [Page 3] further domination by Great Britain. Supplementing the Provincial Corps was a greater

24

number of Tory militia, enrolled in the Carolinas. Their services were offered for a variety of reasons; some because

of their belief that the government of the mother country should continue, others because of expediency so that their

lands and possessions might be given the protection of the British flag, still others-served as soldiers of fortune under

the flag which they believed would be successful, and a small number were influenced by a base desire to rob and

plunder under the license usually associated with partisan warfare.

Under the confederated leaders, who commanded at Kings Mountain, were a few refugees from the lowlands,

some small groups from the counties east of the mountains, and a large number of mountain and backwater men whose

independence was being threatened by an alien invader? In answering the call to embody under their local leaders,

there existed the definite understanding among these mountain men that they were going into the lowlands to fight,

and that they would not return to their homes until they, or Ferguson, had been defeated.

At Kings Mountain the defenders used the bayonet and the rifle until their losses made surrender of the

survivors inevitable. The attackers faced bullet and bayonet, and responded with an expert use of the rifle, with which

they were familiar, due to their frequent stalking of game and Indians. The mountain men were not accustomed to the

bayonet, but they were expert in taking cover behind rocks and trees. Ferguson was confident that his position rendered

him secure against any untrained and unorganized horde which might attack him. His Provincial Corps were trained

in the use of the bayonet and were commanded by competent leaders. The militia had received some limited training

in the art of war, and were provided with long hunting knives to be attached to their rifles, in lieu of the bayonet. Their

marksmanship was not as effective as was that of the mountain men, as conditions of life in the lowlands were not

such as to make their daily existence dependent upon accurate use of the rifle. Ferguson was a trained soldier, an able

leader, and, together with Tarleton, one of Cornwallis's most valuable lieutenants.

In both the Carolinas there was a large number of citizens, and probably a majority, whose sympathies at one

time and another in 1780 were with the Royal Government. They believed that a rebellion could not, and should not,

succeed. In commenting on the internecine warfare carried on without cessation, General Greene wrote on the 23d of

May, 1781, more than five months after he had assumed command of the Southern Department:

The animosity between the Whigs and Tories of this State renders their situation truly deplorable.

There is not a day passes but there are more or less who fall a sacrifice to this savage disposition.

The Whigs seem determined to extirpate the Tories and the Tories the Whigs. Some thousands

have fallen in this way in this quarter, and the evil rages with more violence than ever. If a stop

cannot be put to these massacres, the country will be depopulated in a few months more, as

neither Whig nor Tory can live.

The Battle of Kings Mountain was not an isolated action; it was the high spot of 1780 in the South. The

surrender of Charleston, the defeat of the American forces at Camden on the 16th of August, of Sumter two days later,

the many engagements of lesser importance, all added prestige to the royal cause, resulting in the complete subjugation

of Georgia and South Carolina. Cornwallis had advanced as far as Charlotte Town in North Carolina and was preparing

to move his headquarters to Salisbury, when the unexpected blow delivered by the mountain men at Kings Mountain

brought to an immediate end the thought of further conquest and made necessary the withdrawal of the British forces

into South Carolina and the assumption of a defensive role for several months thereafter. Therefore, to have an

intelligent understanding of the Battle of Kings Mountain and its effect upon the southern campaign of 1780, it is

necessary to know something of the movements of the King's forces from the time Charleston was invested.

The British land forces in America were commanded by Sir Henry Clinton, whose official title was "General

and commander in chief of His Majesty's forces in the several Provinces in America [Page 5] on the Atlantic, from

Nova Scotia to west Florida, inclusive." Vice Admiral Mariot Arbuthnot commanded the fleet, and Lord Cornwallis,

who had been designated by Whitehall as second in command to Clinton, held a dormant commission giving him the

rank of general in America, only, should an unforeseen accident happen to the commander in chief.

In the latter part of 1779 the Americans made an unsuccessful attempt to recover Savannah from the British,

and following this failure the French fleet, which supported the move, departed for the West Indies. Clinton and

Arbuthnot now considered the time propitious to make another attempt against Charleston, with the idea of occupying

the Carolinas, giving support to the Tories and popularizing the Crown cause. Furthermore, such a move would result

in curtailing colony traffic with Europe by way of the Chesapeake. Upon completion of their plans, the amphibious

expedition under Clinton and Arbuthnot sailed from its base, New York, December 26, 1779. Charleston Harbor was

occupied, siege laid to the city, and on the 12th of May General Lincoln surrendered the town and its garrison.

Upon the capitulation of Charleston, Clinton considered that the Major effort in the subjugation of the Province had

been accomplished, and that, with this showing of the power of the Crown, most of the inhabitants would join the

loyal cause. It would be necessary, of course, to occupy the country with a considerable land force, and thereby give

25

protection to loyal sympathizers, but it was thought that the British regular force under his command would be largely

augmented by Tory militia, who would aid in keeping the revolutionists suppressed.

Cornwallis commanded in the field, and on May 17 had a force of regulars to the number of 2,542 rank and

file, which Clinton believed would be sufficient, when augmented by militia, to subjugate South Carolina and continue

the campaign into North Carolina. At the same time Cornwallis was advised that in view of the [Page 6] importance

of his mission, troops were not to be stinted, and he was offered, by Clinton, any that he might desire from the garrisons

of the several forts. For the initiation of the campaign, his array was to be augmented by the light infantry and the

Forty-second Regiment, with the understanding that they were to be returned to Clinton as soon as they could be

spared, as his contemplated operations to the northward would be cramped without them. Cornwallis was of the belief

that he had sufficient regular forces to eventually control all the territory from the Floridas to Virginia, and on the 18th

of May wrote Clinton that he would regret to see left behind any part of the troops destined for use elsewhere, and

unless considerable reinforcements of Continentals should come from the northward to join the revolutionists, he

would not need more assistance. He suggested that the publication of intelligence by Clinton that he and Arbuthnot

were moving to the Chesapeake would probably stop off, on those waters, any reinforcements intended for the

Carolinas. In case Clinton learned before sailing to the north that enemy reinforcements were well on their way,

Cornwallis asked that his command be increased by some five or six hundred British or Hessians. It will be noted later

that at this time Washington and Congress were preparing Maryland and Delaware troops, under De Kalb, to march

to the South, and that, by resolution of Congress, these two States were transferred to the Southern Department.

On May 20 the light infantry and the Forty-second Regiment, promised to Cornwallis to supplement his

forces temporarily, marched to Monks Comer and reported. At this time both the commander in chief and Cornwallis

were hopeful that South Carolina would offer but little resistance to complete subjugation, although there was, in

Clinton's mind, a measure of doubt, for he knew that the entire success of the campaign would depend upon whether

or not "'the temper of our friends in those districts is such as it has always been represented to us."

The time arrived when Clinton and the fleet could no longer delay departure for the north. La Fayette had

returned to America [Page 7] on April 27, with the promise of his Government that a French fleet and army would

follow him in a short time. Information of this early augmentation of the enemy forces reached Arbuthnot and Clinton,

and they deemed it advisable to assemble the fleet and troops at New York, and for the time being make no move

against the Chesapeake. Cornwallis was instructed that after he had finished his southern campaign of subjugation,

and by his presence and show of force convinced the people that it was to their best interests to maintain allegiance to

the Crown, he was to leave in the South such forces as he might consider necessary to dominate the territory, and send

the remainder to the Chesapeake to assist in the operations which were to be undertaken there as soon as Clinton was

relieved of the apprehension of a superior fleet and the season was far enough advanced to permit of campaigning in

that climate. It was supposed at the time that the move to the Chesapeake could be undertaken in September or the

early part of October. Cornwallis was to command the troops which would be concentrated for this operation.

From his headquarters in the field, Cornwallis corresponded with loyalists in North Carolina, informing them

of his hopes for the prompt subjugation of South Carolina and advising with them as to what immediate militant acts,

if any, they should engage in. It was not desired that any partisan of the King should become very active in the field

at this time, for fear that the rebels would likewise become embodied and produce a situation inimical to the success

of his army when it approached the border of the Province. However, if the loyalists considered themselves a match

for the Whigs, and were determined to rise without further delay, he promised all the assistance in his power, by

incursions of light infantry and furnishing ammunition. It soon became evident that this hopeful view of any early

conquest was not to be realized, for there were many questions of supply and transportation to be arranged before the

army could move far from its base, and matters of civil administration to be adjusted, so that the government of the

territory in rear of the royal army would offer safety to the troops.

Cornwallis had established his headquarters at Camden while Clinton and Arbuthnot were still at Charleston.

On their departure, June 5, for New York, the responsibility for the campaign, and the safety of the loyalists and Tories

in the occupied territory, rested upon Cornwallis solely. He arranged for the enrollment of militia under the British

flag, for the organization and functioning of civil administration, and modified the proclamations issued at Charleston

by Clinton and Arbuthnot June 1, and that of Clinton the 3d, so that greater protection would be given those who were

loyal to the Crown and more severe punishment meted out to those in rebellion; and at the same time provided for the

needs of his army. His command of 4,000 regular troops and a few Provincials had not only to occupy several

important posts widely distant from each other, but from their numbers maintain in the field a force of sufficient

strength to withstand local partisans and oppose rein, forcing troops marching from the north. Posts were established

from the Peedee to the Savannah to awe the disaffected and encourage the loyal inhabitants, and measures were taken

to raise some Provincial Corps and to establish a militia, as well for the defense as for the internal government of

South Carolina.

26

In the district of Ninety Six, which was viewed as the most populous and powerful in the Province, Lieutenant

Colonel Balfour, assisted by Major Ferguson, who had been appointed inspector general of militia by Clinton, formed

7 battalions of militia of about 4,000 men, which organizations were so regulated that they could furnish 1,500 men

at short notice for the defense of the frontier, or for any other home service. In addition to the militia, a Provincial

Corps of 500 men was commissioned to be raised under command of Lieutenant Colonel Cunningham.

Other battalions of militia were formed along the extensive line—Broad River to Cheraws—but they were

in general either weak, or not much to be relied on for their fidelity." The refugees who were now returning to their

native country, were organized into the First South Carolina Regiment.

A Provincial Corps, to consist of 500 men, was put in commission, to be raised between the Peedee and

Wateree, under the command of Major Harrison. In order to protect the raising of this corps, and to awe this large tract

of disaffected country the Seventy-first Regiment and a troop of dragoons under Major McArthur were posted at

Cheraw Hill on the Peedee. Other small posts were likewise established in the front and on the left of Camden, at

which place the main body of the army was posted, and which was considered a fairly healthy place for the troops.

Having made the above arrangements, and everything wearing the face of tranquility and submission, Cornwallis set

out on the 21st of June for Charleston, leaving the command of the troops on the frontier to Lord Rawdon, who was,

after Brigadier General Patterson, the commandant at Charleston, the next in rank in the southern district.

It was about this time that Cornwallis changed the instructions previously given his friends in the northern

Province relative to their rising in aid of the Crown. He now considered it ill advised to march his army through North

Carolina before the harvest, and took strong measures to induce impatient partisans not to rise until after the crops had

been gathered, and under no conditions to act until he advised them that the time was propitious.

On June 30 he wrote to Clinton that with the capitulation of Ninety Six, and the dispersion of a party of rebels

who had assembled at an ironwork on the northwest border of the Province, there was an end to all resistance in South

Carolina. He reported the forces of the enemy in North Carolina as about 100 militia under General Caswell, 400 or

500 militia at or near Salisbury under General Rutherford, and 300 Virginians in that neighborhood under Porterfield.

The force which gave him the most concern, however, was 2,000 Maryland and Delaware troops under Major General

Baron De Kalb.

Now that the strongholds in the northwest part of South Carolina were in his possession, Cornwallis thought

he could leave this Province in security, and march about the beginning of September with a body of troops into the

back part of North Carolina, "with the greatest probability of reducing that Province to its duty." Having in mind

Clinton's instructions that troops which could be spared later would be used at a probable early date on the Chesapeake,

Cornwallis wrote in regard to his contemplated move into North Carolina:

I am of opinion that (besides the advantage of possessing so valuable a Province) it would prove

an effectual barrier for South Carolina and Georgia; and could be kept, with the assistance of

our friends there, by as few troops as would be wanted on the borders of this Province, if North

Carolina should remain in the hands of our enemies.

This hopeful view of the situation, based largely upon the success of the royal arms up to this time, was soon

to be shattered. While Cornwallis was still at Charleston his intelligence reported that Sumter, with about 1,500 militia,

was advancing from the north as far as the Catawba settlement, and that many disaffected South Carolinians from the

Waxhaw and other settlements on the frontier, whom Lord Rawdon at Camden had put on parole, were availing

themselves of the general release of the 20th of June, and joining Sumter. It was also reported that De Kalb's army

was continuing its movement south, followed by 2,500 Virginia militia. Cornwallis informed Clinton of these

developments in a letter of July 14, stating:

The effects of the exertions which the enemy are making in these two Provinces, will, I make no

doubt, be exaggerated to us. But upon the whole there is every reason to believe that their plan is

not only to defend North Carolina, but to commence offensive operations immediately; which

reduces me to the necessity, if I wanted the inclination, of following the plan which I had the honor

of transmitting to your excellency in my letter of the 30th of June, as the most effectual means of

keeping up the spirits of our friends and securing this Province.

The plan referred to by Cornwallis was the occupation of North Carolina, and holding it as the frontier of the southern

district.

The work of supplying the base at Camden with salt, rum, regimental stores, arms, and ammunition was

under way, so that a further advance of the army beyond that point would be safe, guarded. Due to the distance of

transportation and the excessive heat of the season, the work was one of infinite labor, requiring considerable time.

Then, too, the several actions in which his forces had been engaged made Cornwallis more and more doubtful as to

27

the value of his militia. He wrote to Clinton that dependence upon these troops for protecting and holding in South

Carolina, in case of an advance of his army into North Carolina, was precarious, as their want of subordination and

confidence in themselves would make a considerable regular force always necessary for the defense of the Province,

until North Carolina was completely subjugated.

The plan of campaign of the Crown forces to the north contemplated using Ferguson's corps, augmented by

militia of the Ninety Six district who were being trained by Ferguson, as a left covering force to advance to the borders

of Tryon County, now Rutherford and Lincoln, paying particular attention to the mountain regions in securing

protection for the advance of the main body from Camden. Lieutenant Colonel Cruger, who commanded at Ninety

Six, was to remain there with his corps. Innes, with the remainder of the militia of that district, was to guard the

frontier, which would require careful attention, as there were many disaffected, and many constantly in arms. The

continued advance southward of the American troops previously reported in North Carolina was known to Cornwallis.

While still in Charleston, on August 9, he received an express from Camden informing him that General Gates,

accompanied by Caswell and Rutherford, was approaching with every appearance of an intent to attack Lord Rawdon,

who had assembled several regiments on the west branch of Lynches Creek. These troops were more or less sickly,

particularly the Seventy-first Regiment, the two battalions of which had not more than 274 men under arms. On the

6th Sumter had attacked the British post at Hanging Rock, where the infantry of the Legion and Governor Browne's

corps were posted. He had been repulsed, but not without difficulty. These accounts alarmed Cornwallis, and he

proceeded from Charleston to join the army in the field. At the same time he wrote to Clinton:

If we succeed at present, and are able to penetrate into North Carolina, without which it is

impossible to hold this province, your Excellency will see the absolute necessity of a diversion in

the Chesapeake, and that it must be done early.

Cornwallis reached Camden on the 13th of August. Gates's command had approached very close, and on the

morning of the 16th the two armies met and fought the Battle of Camden, resulting in the defeat of Gates. Following

this victory, Cornwallis determined upon the destruction or dispersion of the corps under Sumter, as it might prove a

foundation for assembling the routed army, and on the morning of the 17th he detached Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton

with the Legion cavalry and infantry, and the corps of light infantry, in all about 350 men, to pursue and attack Sumter.

Orders were also sent to Lieutenant Colonel Turnbull and Major Ferguson, on the Little River, to put their corps in

motion immediately, and on their side to pursue and attack the same enemy. Tarleton was successful in surprising

Sumter on the 18th at Fishing Creek, near the Catawba.. The latter, with a corps of about 800 men, was escorting 250

prisoners and a large quantity of stores, artillery, and ammunition. Sumter himself escaped, though with difficulty, but

his whole corps was killed, taken, or dispersed.

In writing of the Battle of Camden, Cornwallis stated that above 1,000 were killed and wounded, and about

800 taken prisoners; that his army captured 7 pieces of brass cannon, all the enemy ammunition, wagons, a great

number of arms, and 130 baggage wagons; "in short, there never was a more complete victory." The British loss was

reported as 300 killed and wounded, chiefly of the Thirty-third Regiment and the Volunteers of Ireland. Among the

Americans wounded were Major General Baron De Kalb and Brigadier General Rutherford. Baron De Kalb died of

his wounds. In a letter to Lord Germain written August 21, Cornwallis said that on arriving in Camden the night of

the 13th, he found there Lord Rawdon's [Page 13] entire force, except a small detachment under Lieutenant Colonel

Turnbull, which fell back from Rocky Mount to Major Ferguson's posts of the militia at Ninety Six, on Little River.

I had my option to make, either to retire or attack the enemy, for the position at Camden was a

bad one to be attacked in, and by General Sumpter's advancing down the Wateree, my supplies

must have failed me in a few days.

These two decisive engagements, following so closely upon each other, brought deep despair to the

revolutionists and great elation to the victors. In Cornwallis's letter to Lord Germain referred to above and written five

days after Camden and three days after the defeat of Sumter, he declared that the rebel forces were dispersed and that

internal commotions and insurrections in the Province would now subside. He stated that he had given directions to

inflict exemplary punishment on some of the most guilty, in hopes to deter others in future "from tampering with

allegiance, with oaths, and with the lenity and generosity of the British Government." The orders of Cornwallis were

that all inhabitants of the Province who had submitted, and later took part in the revolt against the King, should be

punished with the greatest vigor, imprisoned, and their property taken or destroyed. He ordered in the most positive

manner that every militiaman who had borne arms under him, and afterwards joined the enemy, should be immediately

hanged. Cruger, who commanded at Ninety Six, was directed to take the most vigorous measures to extinguish the

rebellion in his district, and to obey in the strictest manner the directions given relative to the treatment of the country.

28

It will be seen later how the execution of these instructions in the region of the Blue Ridge and Alleghenies resulted

in the mountain men swarming from their homes to defend their freedom and independence.

Now that no further opposition to the advance into North Carolina existed, on the morning of the 17th of

September Cornwallis dispatched messengers into that Province with directions to his friends there to take arms and

assemble immediately, and to seize the most violent people and all the military stores and magazines belonging to the

rebels, and to intercept all stragglers from the routed army. He promised to march without loss of time to their support.

Much to Cornwallis's disappointment, however, the people of the northern Province were not as prompt in rising as

he had hoped. Their inclinations were held in check due to the large number of revolutionists whom they had observed

marching to the south to oppose the royal forces, and they preferred to await the arrival of the British Army in their

neighborhood before taking an open stand. Cornwallis was hopeful that Clinton would start, at an early date, the

contemplated move to the Chesapeake, thereby relieving the situation on his northern front. He wrote to him that next

to the security of New York, the operations in the Chesapeake were one of the most important objects of the war.

About this time Major Wemyss was sent with a detachment of the Sixty-third Regiment, mounted, some

refugees, Provincials, and militia, to disarm in the most rigid manner the country between the Santee and Peedee, and

to punish severely all those who submitted or pretended to live peaceably under his majesty s Government since the

reduction of Charleston, and who had later revolted. Cornwallis himself ordered several militiamen to be executed,

who had voluntarily enrolled and borne arms under the British flag and afterwards revolted to the enemy.

Plans were made to move the first division of

the army into North Carolina by way of Charlotte

Town and Salisbury, about September 6 or 7. The

second division would follow in about 10 days with

convalescents and stores. A more prompt move

following the successes at Camden and Fishing Creek

could not be made, due to the number of sick and

wounded, and the want of transport. The advance was

started on the 8th and Charlotte Town reached the 26th

of September.

During September Ferguson operated in

Ninety Six and from there moved into what had been

Tryon County, North Carolina, accompanied by about

800 militia collected from the neighborhood of Ninety

Six. Protection was to be given to the friends of the

Crown, who were supposed to be numerous in that

locality, and it was intended that he should pass the

Catawba River and endeavor to preserve tranquility in

the rear and flank of the army. It was while on this duty

that the loss of his entire command occurred at Kings

Mountain on the 7th of the following month. Without

some knowledge of Cornwallis's campaign in South

Carolina, and from thence into North Carolina as far

as Charlotte Town, the necessity for his immediate

retirement from the Northern Province, following

Kings Mountain, would not be understood. It is now

necessary to refer to the group of leaders and the troops

which they commanded, who succeeded, so

unexpectedly and so decisively, in dealing this

staggering blow to Ferguson, and in compelling

Cornwallis to place his army on the defensive.

PART II GATHERING OF THE PATRIOTS—THE BATTLE

It will be recalled that following the defeat of General Gates at Camden on the 16th of August, Cornwallis issued

immediate instructions to his two flying groups under Tarleton and Ferguson, to pursue Colonel Sumter, who,

following the dispersion of Gates's forces, had the only organized corps of patriots in South Carolina. These

instructions, together with detailed information of the magnitude of the defeat of the troops under Gates, reached

Ferguson on the 19th. Immediate preparations were made to comply with the orders, and at 7 in the evening Ferguson

put his column in motion. At that moment an express arrived from Colonel Innes, who was on his way from Ninety

MAJ Patrick Ferguson British Commander

Battle of Kings Mountain

29

Six to join Ferguson, informing him that he had been attacked at Musgrove Mills, on the Enoree River on the 18th,

with severe loss, and asking for support, as his militia had deserted him. Ferguson altered his plans and marched in

the direction of Innes, crossing the Broad at sunrise.

The troops which had engaged the Loyalists and Tories on the Enoree were commanded by Colonels

Williams, Shelby, and Clarke. Following this success, a move against Cruger, commanding at Ninety Six, was

contemplated, but just at this time word was received of the defeat of the patriots at Camden two days before, and

following a council of the commanders it was decided to rejoin McDowell's corps. Due to the nearness of Ferguson,

the much northward, encumbered by prisoners, was one of many difficulties, and it was with great relief that Williams's

party rejoined McDowell's corps in the mountains at Gilbert Town, to which point the latter had retired. Here the

seriousness of the cause of the patriots was discussed. It was thought that Ferguson would immediately advance to

overtake them, and further withdrawal into the mountains seemed expedient. It was proposed by Shelby and Sevier,

who were from the counties of North Carolina where the waters flowed to the westward, and now part of Tennessee,

that the troops should disband, and all return to their homes to raise an army of volunteers to defeat Ferguson, or any

other leader who might operate along the eastern slopes of the Blue Ridge. This proposition received general support,

and Shelby and Sevier, with their followers, departed for their backwater homes, and word was sent to the leaders of

Wilkes and Surry Counties to embody their followers and prepare for a rising.

This was a period of great distress to the patriotic cause throughout the entire State. It was only the mountains

that furnished refuge for those who still refused to accept British sovereignty, and a number of refugees, especially

those who had borne arms against the King, were seeking protection within their barriers. Following the quick

withdrawal of Colonel Williams and his confederated command from Musgrove Mills, Ferguson made no effort to

pursue him. His marches from day to day were short, and on the 23d of August he left his command to go to Camden

to confer with Cornwallis, rejoining his troops September 1, with the news that his Provincial Corps were to be

separated from the army and act on the frontier with the militia. During the following week he marched to the

northward, and on the 7th of September his command crossed into North Carolina, and he, with about 50 of the

American volunteers and 300 militia, proceeded to Gilbert Town, to surprise a party of patriots who were reported

there. On the following day the remainder of the command moved to the Broad, where on the 10th their commander

rejoined them.

While Ferguson was at Gilbert Town he paroled one of his prisoners and sent him into the mountains with a

message to the leaders there, "that if they did not desist from their opposition to the British arms, and take protection

under his standard, he would march his army over the mountains, hang their leaders, and lay their country waste with

fire and sword."

The effect of this message was to augment the determination of the mountain leaders to get together their

men with all speed possible and march against their hated enemy. The magnitude of their undertaking was fully

appreciated, especially as many of these mountain settlements were of but recent creation, and the inhabitants not very

numerous, and without security from the Cherokees, except such as was furnished by their own trusty rifles.

As the adjacent territory of Virginia was equally interested in stopping the advance of this hostile invader, cooperation

and assistance of the Washington County troops was sought. Early in September the County lieutenant, Col. Arthur

Campbell, was in Richmond, and in an interview with the Governor of Virginia was informed of the measures about

to be taken to retrieve the misfortunes of the troops under Gates and Sumter. He returned to his western home imbued

with the idea of the part his militia should take in the ensuing campaign, and at once showed a willingness and desire

to cooperate in the undertaking that Shelby, Sevier, and others were engaged in.

Ferguson's withdrawal southward from Gilbert Town on the 10th of September was for the purpose of

rejoining the main part of his command, which had taken a stand on the Broad to keep a lookout for a reputed body

of Georgians who were approaching. The following morning he put his assembled command in motion, and on the

12th led a small party to the head of Cane Creek in Burke County, in pursuit of McDowell and his refugee followers,

who were on their way over the mountains to seek shelter pending the assembly of the various County regiments that

were to move against Ferguson. A slight skirmish resulted, but McDowell's force was able to extricate itself and

continue its retirement with but few losses. The pursuit was continued on the 15th and 16th to the banks of the

Catawba, where, at Quaker Meadows, was the home of the McDowells, but the pursuers arrived too late, as the

refugees were well on their way into the mountains.

In the ensuing week Ferguson campaigned from the Catawba to the Second Broad, and on the 23d entered

Gilbert Town for the second time. The following day was busily occupied in receiving 500 of the inhabitants of the

contiguous territory, who came in to profess their allegiance to the King. It was on this day that intelligence was

received from Colonel Cruger of an action which had just occurred at Augusta and to which reference will be made,

as it had a decided bearing upon Ferguson's future plans.

30

Early in September Colonel Clarke assembled a body of troops and marched to attack the British post at

Augusta. He reached his destination on the 14th and found that the commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Browne,

with the assistance of some friendly Indians, had taken a position in a fort about 3 miles from Augusta. Clarke invested

the position for five days, when he retired upon the approach of Cruger, who had hastened with assistance from Ninety

Six, upon learning of the danger to this frontier post. It is known that Cruger's message to Ferguson informing him of

these events reached the latter at Gilbert Town on the 24th, five days after Clarke withdrew from the vicinity of

Augusta to fall back upon the protection of the mountains. This retirement placed him between Cruger and Ferguson,

and Cruger asked the latter to cooperate with him in cutting Clarke off before he could reach a retreat in the mountains.

With this plan in view, Ferguson left Gilbert Town on the 27th and moved to the Broad, and then to the Green River

to await in the vicinity of their junction further intelligence of Clarke. By the 30th, however, Ferguson knew that his

efforts to intercept Clarke on his return to the mountains were unsuccessful, as the latter had taken another route. In

the meanwhile Cruger found that the pursuit of Clarke would carry him too far from Ninety Six, and as he was

responsible for its safety, he returned to that post. At this time Ferguson was in possession of the definite information

of the advance of the army of mountain men, who had started their march from Watauga on the 26th.

Reference has been made to the retirement of Col. Charles McDowell from his home, with his band of soldiers

and refugees. He reached the shelter of the backwaters with a force of 160 men from Burke and Rutherford Counties.

To this rendezvous on the Sycamore Flats, bordering the Watauga, about 2½ miles southwest of the present town of

Elizabethton, Col. Arthur Campbell sent his brother-in-law, Col. William Campbell, with 200 militia from Washington

County, Va. Later on he led to the same place an additional force of 200 men who joined the first group. It was

necessary for Col. Arthur Campbell to return to the County under his jurisdiction and take measures to protect it from

the invasion of hostile Indians. Shelby, at the head of 240 men from Sullivan County, and Sevier, with an equal number

from Washington County, N. C., joined at the designated meeting point on the Watauga on the 25th of September.

David Ramsey, in his history of South Carolina, written in 1808, said that "hitherto these mountaineers had only heard

of war at a distance, and had been in peaceable possession of that independence for which their countrymen on the

seacoast were contending." They embodied to check the invader of their own volition, "without any requisition from

the Governments of America or the officers of the Continental Army." Each man set out with a knapsack, blanket,

and gun. All who could obtain horses were mounted; the remainder afoot. There is a tradition that before starting out

on the journey from which many would never return, the Scotch-Irish Presbyterian clergyman of the settlement

invoked a blessing and besought divine protection and guidance for the army.

The highway of their great adventure followed the only roadway connecting the backwater country with the

eastern slopes of the Blue Ridge in North Carolina. Leaving Sycamore Flats, the column marched up Gap Creek to its

headwaters in Gap Creek Mountain, and there turned eastward and then south, following around the base of Fork

Militia gathering at Sycamore Shoals

Watauga River / East Tennessee

31

Mountain to Toe River, and on up that stream to one of its tributaries. Here the route continued in a southerly direction

until the top of the mountain was reached, between Roan High Knob and Big Yellow Mountain. From the mountain

top, descent was made along Roaring Creek to the North Toe River. It is stated in the diary of Ensign Robert Campbell

that the mountains were crossed and descent to the other side was started before camp was made for the night. Snow

was encountered in the highlands, for an elevation of 5,500 feet was reached in this march. On the top of the mountain

there was found a hundred acres of beautiful tableland, and the troops were paraded, doubtless for the purpose of

seeing how they were standing the march, which was about 26 miles to this point. Campbell's diary states that the

second night—that of the 27th—they rested at Cathey's plantation. This is placed by Draper at the junction of Grassy

Creek and North Toe River. The diary does not mention the camping place of the 28th. On this day McDowell, who

had previously left the column to go to his home in Rutherford County, returned with such information as he had been

able to secure relative to the movements of Ferguson. The night of the 28th a council of officers was held, at which it

was agreed that an experienced officer was needed to take command of all separate County units. It was decided that

Colonel McDowell should convey a message to General Gates, asking that General Morgan or General Davidson be

sent to them to take over the command.

Tradition has it that on reaching Gillespie Gap the troops divided, one group, including Campbell's men,

moving south to Turkey Cove, the others going easterly to the North Cove on the North Fork of the Catawba. Ensign

Campbell's diary gives the information that the fourth night, the 29th, Campbell's men rested at a rich "Tory's," and

this place has been identified as being in Turkey Cove. The following day the men who had camped at North Cove

marched southeast down Paddy Creek, while those from Turkey Cove marched southerly down the North Fork and

then easterly down the Catawba. The two forces joined on the banks of the Catawba near the mouth of Paddy Creek,

and continued down the Catawba to Quaker Meadows, the home of the McDowells, where camp was made, after a

march of about 27 miles for the southern column and about 23 for the northern. During the five days which had elapsed

since leaving Sycamore Flats, about 80 miles had been covered.

Here the marching column of 1,040 men was joined by Colonel Cleveland with the men from Wilkes and

Major Winston with the men from Surry, 350 in all, making a combined strength of 1,390. The time was now

opportune for Colonel McDowell to depart for General Gates's headquarters, with the request of the several colonels

that a general officer be designated for the command, and after turning his regiment over to his brother, Maj. Joseph

McDowell, he departed on this mission the 1st of October.

We left Ferguson on September 30, at which time he had given up hopes of cutting off Clarke's force. His

camp was at Step's plantation, 12 miles from Denard’s Ford of the Broad River. Being aware that the gathering hordes

of the enemy were either at a concentration point east of the Blue Ridge or approaching it, Ferguson wrote to Cruger

on the 30th informing him of this new threat, and suggested that it would be well if the district of Ninety Six called

out more of its militia.

The following day Ferguson began his withdrawal from the vicinity of the mountains. He marched to

Denard’s Ford, where he camped, and issued his last appeal to the inhabitants of the region to join the militia serving

under the King. As it is typical of the inflammatory proclamations put forth by both Whig and Tory during this period

of violent passions it is here given:

Denard’s Ford, Broad River,

Tryon County, October 1, 1780.

Gentlemen: Unless you wish to be eat up by an inundation of barbarians, who have begun by

murdering an unarmed son before the aged father, and afterwards lopped off his arms, and who

by their shocking cruelties and irregularities, give the best proof of their cowardice and want of

discipline; I say, if you wish to be pinioned, robbed, and murdered, and see your wives and

daughters, in four days, abused by the dregs of mankind-in short, if you wish or deserve to five

and bear the name of men, grasp your arms in a moment and run to camp. The backwater men

have crossed the mountains; McDowell, Hampton, Shelby, and Cleveland are at their head, so

that you know what you have to depend upon. If you choose to be degraded forever and ever by a

set of mongrels, say so at once, and let your women turn their backs upon you, and look out for

real men to protect them.

PAT FERGUSON,

Major, Seventy-first Regiment.

Ferguson continued his march at 4 o'clock in the afternoon of the 2d, proceeding 4 miles, then forming fine

of action and lying on his arms all night. The following morning he got under way at an early hour, and after a long

32

march down the Broad, halted for the night at Tate's plantation, 1 mile after crossing Buffalo Creek. These three

marches brought Ferguson's command 38 miles nearer Charlotte Town and Cornwallis than was his camp of

September 29 and 30. From Tate's plantation, where he remained until 4 O'clock the morning of the 6th, to Charlotte

Town was 50 miles. In this position he could feel sufficiently close to the main army to be reinforced from it should

the necessity arise. At the same time further intelligence would be received of the route taken by the mountain men,

and their probable intentions; and a reply to his letter of September 30 could be awaited. Cruger's reply, which was

dated October 3, was probably received at Tate's plantation, and doubtless prompted Ferguson to leave that camp and

take up a position from which to offer battle. This letter was found on Ferguson's body, and as it was somewhat

mutilated, its complete contents is not known. Nothing in the letter indicated that Cruger was going to take any

immediate action. He said:

I don't see how you can possibly [defend] the country and its neighborhood that you [are] now

in. The game from the mountains is just what I expected. Am glad to find you so capitally

supported by the friends to government in North Carolina. I flattered myself they would have been

equal to the mountain lads, and that no further call for the defensive would have been [made] on

this part of the Province. I begin to think our views for the present rather large.

Cruger evidently believed that Ferguson had a difficult situation to face, but that he was equal to the

emergency, and, without doubt, this was Ferguson's opinion also. At this time he knew the mountain men were in the

vicinity of his camp site of September 30, 28 miles away, and that a day's march of those who were mounted would

bring the enemy upon him, so in going to "Little King Mountain," as Allaire designates the place, on the 6th, and

taking up a position which was most favorable for defense, and remaining there for 24 hours before the enemy came

in sight, Ferguson acted with deliberation and with full intent to engage in battle, did the enemy take the initiative.

The "Little King Mountain" position was about 36 miles from Charlotte Town, and had Ferguson desired to avoid

battle with the mountain men, he could have marched on the morning of the 7th halfway to army headquarters.

The letter which Ferguson wrote to Cornwallis October 6, in which he said, "I am on my march towards you,

by a road leading from Cherokee Ford, north of Kings Mountain. Three or four hundred good soldiers, part dragoons,

would finish the business. Something must be done soon. This is their last push in this quarter," is indicative of the

subordinate commander whose duty it is to keep his superior informed of the forces opposed to him, and, when the

enemy is in such strength as to be a serious menace, to suggest that reinforcement would insure a more certain success.

In this letter Ferguson mentioned that "they are since joined by Clarke and Sumpter." Ferguson had the mistaken idea

that Clarke, on his withdrawal northward from Augusta to the mountains, had joined the mountain men. Some of the

men of Sumter's command, under Colonel Williams, did join about this time, as will be noted later.

When the mountain men left their rendezvous on the Catawba October 1, they marched to the southward, up

Silver Creek, past Pilot Mountain, and from thence down Cane Creek in the direction of Gilbert Town. Although the

several organization commanders had sent to Gates for an officer to command, it was considered unwise to continue

further without coordinated leadership, and on this day a conference was held which resulted in the selection of

Colonel Campbell to command all the groups, until a general officer should arrive. The command was intrusted to the

colonel of the Virginia regiment to prevent dispute were an attempt made to name a leader from the North Carolina

colonels.

On the 2d the march was continued toward Gilbert Town, from which Ferguson had departed five days

previous. Continuing on to the south, the Cowpens were reached on the 6th, the march being directed toward Ninety

Six, as it was thought Ferguson was falling back in the direction of Cruger. At the Cowpens Col. James Williams, of

South Carolina, with 400 men, joined. This new party was made up largely of groups of Sumter's men from South

Carolina, under Colonels Hill and Lacey, of men from Lincoln County under Graham, Hambright, and Chronicle, and

a small number embodied by Colonel Williams in North Carolina. On the 2d of October Williams had written to

General Gates that with a force of 450 horsemen he was in pursuit of Ferguson, and that he expected to join the

mountain men in the accomplishment of this purpose. Colonel Campbell was informed by the new arrivals that the enemy lay encamped somewhere near the

Cherokee Ford of the Broad River, and plans were made for immediate pursuit. A council of the principal officers was

held, and it was decided to select 900 of the best horsemen and leave the weak horses and footmen to follow as fast

as possible.

Time was pressing, and the necessity for immediate action great, for if Ferguson continued his withdrawal in

the direction of Charlotte Town another day's march, he would be so near the main army that to engage him would be

a most hazardous enterprise. As soon, therefore, as the selected group was formed, the command mounted, and at 8

o'clock started on its long night ride, which the next day was to terminate in the encounter so eagerly sought.

33

Cherokee Ford of the Broad was crossed early in the morning, and the march continued along the northeast

road topping the ridge between Buffalo and Kings Creeks. Information was received from several people as to

Ferguson's line of march the day before, and finally as to the mountain top on which his camp was established. This

camp site could best be reached by way of the main highway running from North Carolina in a southeast direction to

Yorkville, S. C., so the eager patriots hastened their march to gain this road, passing Antioch Church and Ponders

Branch, and stopping on the way only long enough to gain additional information. When the highway was reached,

the column turned southeast, and after crossing Kings Creek began the gradual ascent of the rugged hills which lay

between the creek and the enemy's position. An uncomfortable rain had added to the weariness of the sleepless

marchers, but about noon the weather cleared, the sun shone with grateful warmth, and the nearness of the quarry

added zest to the chase.

About a mile from Kings Creek the road passed between two slight knobs, and as the patriots emerged from

the bottom of the ravine between these knolls, they found themselves upon a small plateau, overlooking to the

southeast a sharp ravine, the far side of which terminated in a ridge, part of which was a hundred feet higher than the

plateau, and on which Ferguson stood and offered battle. The broadside silhouette of the ridge was visible about 700

yards away, but the tree-covered slopes hid its occupants from view.

Continuing along the highway to the southeast for several hundred yards, to a point where the plateau

terminates and the road begins its descent into the ravine, a better view of Ferguson's position was obtained. Beyond

this point the column could not proceed until definite plans for the attack had been determined upon. The

characteristics of the mountain on which Ferguson was making his stand were known to several of Campbell's

command, and this information imparted to his leaders. While halted in the position which they had now reached, with

the mountain occupied by the enemy in sight, the plan of battle was finally agreed upon. They could see a ridge about

600 yards long, the general direction of which extended north 52º east. The highest point of the ridge was near its

southwest end, from which point, toward the southwest, there was a gradual dropping off of 20 feet to a very narrow

hogback, then a widening out of the terrain into a gently sloping, narrow plateau, which extended due north to the

place where the column had debouched from the ravine between the two knobs.

From the highest point of the ridge, along its crest to the north, east, there was a gradual descent for 400

yards, then a very sharp drop to the highway. The northern face of the ridge descended to a stream which flows into

Clarks Fork. The south face of the mountain was unknown to the leaders, except as described by those familiar with

its features. From them it was learned that another stream led from the south of the mountain, and that several slight

spurs projected from the ridge to the east and southeast, which gradually flattened out into comparatively level ground.

The plan of attack decided upon was to surround the mountain and trap its defenders in a band of fire,

constantly decreasing in diameter as the mountain sides were scaled. To accomplish this maneuver, the command was

divided into four parts, which were to be led in four columns abreast to the place from which the separate columns

would proceed to their respective positions. The interior columns were composed of the men from Virginia and from

Sullivan County, Campbell leading his men in the right column and Shelby his men in the left. The right flank column

was made up of men from Surry, the Nolichucky, and Burke; Major Winston being at the head of the column, followed

by Colonel Sevier. The detachment commanded by Major McDowell was joined to Sevier's command. The left flank

column was composed of the men from Wilkes and those who joined the preceding day from the two Carolinas under

Colonel Williams. Major Chronicle was at the head of this column, followed by Colonel Cleveland. The senior officer

who accompanied the Lincoln County men into action was Lieutenant Colonel Hambright, but he waived his right to

command in favor of Major Chronicle. The right and left flank columns were about the same strength, and each

equaled that of the two regiments constituting the interior columns. In this order the several columns proceeded from

the plateau into the bottom of the ravine north of the mountain. Here the right and the two interior columns halted,

dismounted, tied their horses to trees and bushes, and left a small group of men in charge. The left column continued

its march around the east point of the mountain, thence southwestwardly, to its position.

Shelby's men were deployed in the vicinity of the highway, from which position they were to attack the

eastern extremity of the ridge. Campbell was on Shelby's right, along the bed of the stream. These two regiments were

first in position, and had the most difficult terrain on their front, due to the sharpness of the slope and the height of the

crest. Beyond Campbell, on his right, was McDowell, and then Sevier. The deployment of the latter was along the

stream line leading up to the narrow hogback just southwest of the highest elevation of the ridge.

When the units in the left column reached their positions south of the mountain, they dismounted and formed

fine, with Winston, at the head of the column, connecting with the right of Sevier at the hogback. On the right of

Winston was Chronicle, then Cleveland, with Williams between Cleveland and Shelby. All of the commanders

cautioned their men to hold their fire until near the enemy, and to reform their ranks, if broken, and renew the fight.

Appeal was made to their patriotism and love of liberty, although this was not necessary, as every man went into battle

resolved to fight as long as life lasted.

34

Ferguson's Provincials and militia were formed on the summit of the ridge, which varied in width from 30 to

60 yards. His camp and wagon train were established here also. The crest was comparatively level within the narrow

confines indicated, and free from trees. Rock outcroppings provided a limited amount of cover for firing positions.

Pickets had been placed in the direction of approach of the enemy, to give warning of his presence.

The attack started at 3 o'clock, with the driving in of the covering forces. The center of the patriot army, under

Campbell and Shelby, was the first to engage the enemy. The Virginia and Sullivan County men advanced up the

steep slopes, taking cover behind rocks and trees, with a fair field of fire, as the underbrush was not thick. Their attack

was sustained for about 15 minutes while the flank groups proceeded to their several positions, when the fire became

general around the entire mountain. The groups then closed in, and Campbell's and Shelby's men almost reached the

enemy lines, but here they were met by Ferguson's Provincial Corps, and at the point of the bayonet driven down the

mountain. Their officers bravely rallied them, however, and under cover of rocks and trees the enemy fire was

returned. The Provincials now in turn fell back before the sure marksmanship of the mountain men, and were pursued

to the top of the crest, where a second time they resorted to the bayonet, and again forced the retirement of Campbell's

and Shelby's men, but only to the point where, from behind cover, they had time to reload their rifles, and by their

deadly fire stop the onrush of the enemy and compel their return once more to the ridge top.

When pressure of the right and left wings began to be felt by Ferguson, new dispositions had to be made of

his forces to meet the situation. The parts of the encircling band composed of the men of McDowell and Sevier on the

north, and of Williams, Cleveland, Chronicle, and Winston to the south of the mountain, closed in toward the crest of

the ridge, and on its southwest extremity the enemy was cleared from the summit, and forced in a northeasterly

direction into a huddled group.

About this time Campbell's and Shelby's men succeeded in gaining the portion of the ridge on their front,

driving all before them, back into the group that the closing of the wings was compressing. The defenders of the

35

mountain were now in sore straits. The losses among the Provincial Corps were heavy. These troops had fought with

great heroism, but their numbers were too few to win alone. The Tory militia endured the contest as long as was to be

expected of them. Ferguson's survivors were surrounded by an enemy fiercely determined to fight for complete

victory. It was evident that nothing could be done to better the situation and snatch victory from defeat, and Ferguson

determined to cut his way through the band of fire and escape. He, with several of his officers, made this desperate

move, but was shot from his horse and killed instantly. Captain De Peyster, the second in command, bravely continued

the fight for a brief time, but the confusion was so great, and his compact group of followers such a vulnerable target,

that further resistance was suicidal, and a white flag was shown.

It was some time before the firing could be stopped. Units had become disorganized and intermingled during

the fierce conflict, and all firing did not cease at the time De Peyster surrendered his command. Then, too, there were

some who refused quarter to many of the Tories who asked for it, in retaliation for the treatment which they heard had

been accorded Buford's command at the Waxhaw on May 29. To the cry, "Buford's play," many of the wounded were

hurried into oblivion. The total number of Tories killed and wounded in this action was 334, and of this number 206

were reported killed.

The battle lasted an hour and five minutes. The report of this engagement, prepared by Colonels Campbell,

Shelby, and Cleveland, and submitted to General Gates between three and four weeks after the battle, stated that the

official provision returns for the 7th of October, found in camp, gave an enemy strength of 1,125 men. The losses

given in the report for the Provincial Corps were 19 killed, 35 wounded, 68 prisoners; total, 122. The Tory losses were

206 killed, 128 wounded, 648 prisoners; total, 982. The combined totals give a strength on the battle field at the time

of the action of 1,104, as no one escaped. In addition to Colonel Ferguson, the Provincial Corps had one captain killed;

and among the Tories, two Colonels and three captains loft their lives, and one major was wounded. The losses in the

patriot army, as given in the report, were 28 killed and 62 wounded, a total of 90. The Virginia regiment suffered the

heaviest losses. Campbell's command had 13 officers killed or mortally wounded. The Lincoln County men lost their

leader, Major Chronicle, and Colonel Williams received wounds from which he died the following day. The booty

captured included 17 baggage wagons and 1,200 stand of arms.

A defeat so overwhelming as that suffered by Ferguson's command is rare in warfare. His position on Kings

Mountain was selected after mature deliberation. The top of the mountain was just large enough to serve as a battle

ground for his command and to provide space for his camp and wagon train. Water was near and plentiful. The advance

of the attackers would be impeded by the slopes of the mountain. When attacked he could expect that retreat would

be rendered hazardous by flanking or encircling detachments, a condition he desired, as his militia would be put to the

necessity of fighting instead of fleeing. A better position on which to make a stand and fight could not have been

found.

That he underestimated the valor of the mountain men is unquestionable. Their reputed superiority in

numbers did not deter him from offering battle, otherwise he would have continued his march on the 7th in the

direction of Charlotte Town. But had he known that these crusaders from the mountains would stand and fight with a

fierceness heretofore unexperienced in his southern campaign, he would have been more discreet and less valorous.

His epitaph, written by his brother officers and published in the New York Gazette of February 14, 1781, rings with

affectionate praise and admiration for his many admirable qualities as a man and soldier.

The leaders of the patriots, and the men whom they commanded, were honored with the thanks of their several

legislatures; and the thanks of Congress were given in a resolution of the 13th of November, as follows:

Resolved, That Congress entertain a high sense of the spirited and military conduct of Colonel Campbell, and the

officers, and privates of the Militia under his command, displayed in action of the 7 of October, in which a complete

victory was obtained over superior numbers of the enemy, advantageously posted on King's Mountain, in the state of

North Carolina; and that this resolution be published by the commanding officer of the southern army, in general

orders.

36

MAGAZINE OF AMERICAN HISTORY

Vol. V DECEMBER 1880 No. 6

THE AFFAIR AT KING'S MOUNTAIN

7th OCTOBER, 1780

By

J. WATTS DE PEYSTER

THE principal object of this article is to present in new but true colors the prominent features of this battle;

delineations novel, although authentic, because contrary to narratives hitherto given as correct. The chief facts are

these:

1st. The fall of Ferguson did not determine the battle. He was not killed at tire end of the action, as always

hitherto represented, but "early in the action," and, therefore, his second in command and successor must have some

credit for the protracted resistance instead of being held amenable to the charge of having surrendered as soon as his

superior was slain, and the responsibility devolved upon him. He had gone through pretty much all of the previous

receiving and giving of hard knocks, and had been shifted like a shuttle from one point of impact to another, wherever

danger threatened, again and again, throughout the whole engagement, and he continued to fight on until, as his

subordinate subsequently testifies (Charlestown, 30th January, 1781), "Captain de Peyster, on whom the command

devolved, seeing it impossible to form six men together, thought it necessary to surrender to save the lives of the brave

men who were left." "We lost, early in this action, Major Ferguson, of the 71st Regiment." Ferguson's obituary notice

in Rivington's Royal Gazette (New York), 24th February, 1781, begins: "On the death of Maj. Patrick Ferguson, who

was killed early in the action at King's Mountain, South Carolina." Another letter, dated

Charlestown, 4th March, 1781, written by an officer who also was in the battle, says, "after our misfortune in losing

Major Ferguson, the command devolved on Captain de Peyster; he behaved like a brave, good officer, and disputed

the ground as long as it was possible to defend it." Finally, General Lenoir ("Wheeler's North Carolina," 105), who

was a Captain with Major Winston's command, writing to correct "accounts of that battle [King's Mountain] which

are very erroneous," states, Colonel Ferguson had seven or eight bullets shot through him, and fell some time before

the battle was over."

If General Graham, in his plan of the battle, locates correctly the spot where Ferguson fell, it is not unlikely

that he was shot down in repelling one of the effective charges at the west end of the summit, opposing the advance

of the left under Cleveland. It is conceded on all sides that Ferguson might have burst through the American forces

when his lieutenant drove their first attack down the slope in the direction of Tarleton and Cornwallis, as the latter

advised him to do. Shortly after Major Winston came into the right, and the circle was complete.

2nd.There was no corps of British Regulars in the fight. but those called "Regulars" were a detachment of

selected troops from the" Provincial Corps” or "Brigade" of American Loyalists, and Ferguson was "territorial"

Brigadier. Like Hanging Rock and other severe collisions, King's Mountain was a fight altogether between Loyal and

Whig Americans, not between British, proper, and Colonists.

3d. Instead of the British outnumbering the Americans, the latter were to the British as 1 3·4 to 1; as 1310

(Shelby) to 1370 (calculation) to 908 (Allaire) to 960 (Stedman), or to 850 (Warren), or to 960 (Davidson, \V. N. C.

103); perhaps the Whigs were fully twice as many as the Loyalists, 1900 to 950.

4th. With the exception of the 100 Provincials, Regulars, or "Veteran Volunteers," the British were all green

troops or militia.

5th. The Americans -Were not green militia, properly so speaking, but men acclimated to battle, seasoned by

life-long service to fighting. In order to understand the importance of the battle of King's Mountain-the decisive battle

of the Revolutionary War at the South, and, perhaps, the decisive result everywhere-it is necessary to consider the

preceding events, their bearing upon this engagement and its influence upon what followed.

The defeat of Camden was a terrible blow to the colonies. No disaster was so unexpected. None was followed

by such lasting consequences. It left Cornwallis in the center of the new State the master of the situation; and if Clinton

had given him a few more troops, or the British Government had followed the advice of every general of ability and

poured reinforcements in at once and at critical points, the South would have been irretrievably lost. The Southern

States were always the vulnerable point of the Union, and it was in this quarter Washington expected an invasion

37

when made Lieutenant General, and preparing against hostilities on the part of the French. Cornwallis had with him

a man remarkable for spirit, ability and courage, Patrick Ferguson, Junior, or Second, Major of the Seventy-first

Regiment Highlanders. He possessed many of the qualities which ennoble a soldier. He was temperate in his habits,

magnanimous in his disposition, fearless in danger, and manly at all times. Such was the confidence reposed in him

by Cornwallis that he conferred upon him a Brevet of Lieutenant-Colonel; constituted him a "local" or "territorial"

Brigadier-General of militia; confided to him an independent command and allowed him to select his subordinates

and troops. His mission was to insure the submission of the western part of the two Carolinas, embody the Loyalists,

organize and discipline them, sweep away the partisan corps and guerillas which endangered communications, utilize

the resources of the country, and, in fine, act as his chief's left arm in the effectual subjugation of the outlying territory.

Ferguson had already won considerable reputation in the German wars, and at an early age, before he came

out to America in 1777. He brought with him his own invention, the first breech-loading rifle ever used by regular

troops in actual battle, combining a number of improvements deemed of comparatively very recent discovery or

application. These rifles, constructed upon this principle, were issued to a picked body of men, who, at the

Brandywine, 11th September, 1777, astonished the American sharpshooters by the superiority of their aim and the

rapidity of their fire. In this battle Ferguson had his right arm shattered, and lost the use of it so as to become in reality

the "one-armed devil" that he is represented as having been during his service, elsewhere, and to the South. Ferguson

had been uniformly successful in every operation confided to him. He distinguished himself at the siege of Charleston

(29th March-12th May, 178o), and in the operations subordinate thereto, especially at Monk's Corner and Lanneau's

Bridge, in connection with Tarleton. American writers on these events do not 'stint the praise so justly due to his

military capacity. They style him "the celebrated Ferguson."

The animosity aroused by Ferguson's penetration so deep into their fastnesses, and his manifest intention of

sparing no exertions to restore the authority of the king, inspired the hardy element, which dwelt amid the Alleghenies,

to unite with their friends to crush out one who seemed to be the most dangerous common enemy. It is usual and

popular to attribute the general irritation against Ferguson to his own severity and the outrages committed by his

followers. This is totally inconsistent with the language used about him by local historians. It is needless to dwell on

his intrepidity, for that he was utterly fearless is acknowledged by every one: likewise his extraordinary ability. If

anyone to whom he was nearest and dearest desires to see his praises set forth in the strongest language they need only

resort to Ramsey and to Wheeler.

Patrick Ferguson was no ordinary man. General Davidson styles him "the Great Partisan;" General Lenoir"

the celebrated Colonel Ferguson." His rank in 1780 has occasioned considerable controversy. In different works and

on different occasions he is styled "Major," "Colonel" and "General." This is easily explained. He held the "line"

commission of Second Major in the Seventy-first Regiment ("White") Highlanders; was "breveted" Lieutenant-

Colonel; is addressed as Colonel, a few days before he fell, by Colonel Cruger in the latter's last communication to

Ferguson from"96" and held the "local" rank of Brigadier General of Militia. The English have a variety of military

titles which are unknown and unrecognized in other services, especially our own; "local," or "territorial," is one of

these; "temporary," another; there are five or six.

Shortly after Sir Henry Clinton returned to the North and Cornwallis succeeded him in command at the South,

Patrick Moore, against the instructions of Cornwallis, placed himself at the head of a strong body of Loyalists from

Tryon (afterward Lincoln) County, N. C. He was successful in recruiting his corps throughout the region between the

Catawba and the Alleghenies. As the British advanced northwards, Moore marched toward them, and established

himself at an old post (such as is generally known at the West to this day as a fort) which had been built years

previously by General Williamson on the Pacolet River, one of the feeders, from the Northwest, of Broad River, which

it joins at the present village of Pinckneyville. Here he was attacked by Colonels Sevier, Shelby and Clarke, and

surrendered to them the 20th (Lee, 22d) June, 1780. This premature rising against the advice of Cornwallis, was a

movement he ever after greatly deplored.

The sufferings experienced by the Loyalists of North Carolina wore out their patience. They assembled again

under Colonel Samuel Bryan, and marched into South Carolina. Those who escaped Major Davies and Colonel Sumter

were present in the battle and constituted a portion of the army victorious at Camden, 16th Aug.,

1780. Previous to these occurrences, near the border line of the Carolinas, Ferguson, with his "Flying Corps" or

column, had been ranging the country between the Wateree, or Catawba, and the Saluda Rivers, gradually drawing

nearer to North Carolina. Even to indicate the different movements which ensued would be almost equivalent to

writing a complete history of the operations in South Carolina during the "Battle Summer" of 178o. Suffice it to say

that these "insults" of the mountain men induced Cornwallis to select the spirited, active and intelligent Ferguson to

follow the invaders into their own districts, embody the Loyalists, and occupy the strongest suitable positions in the

interior. Colonel Ferguson possessed qualities peculiarly adapted to win the attachment of the marksmen of Western

South Carolina.

38

To a corps of originally 150, but soon reduced by disease and hardship to 100 picked men, Provincial regulars

(armed with his rifles), he soon succeeded in attaching about 1,300 or more hardy natives, until, as he advanced his

command increased to over 2,000 men, besides a small squadron of horse. To watch and harass this expedition Colonel

McDowell sent Colonels Shelby and Clarke with 6oo picked mounted riflemen. Instead of awaiting an attack Ferguson

pressed forward after Clarke, and his advance struck, if it did not surprise, the latter at the Green Spring, in the

Spartanburg District, South Carolina, on the 1st August. Clarke got off as quickly as possible, and justly so, because

he was greatly outnumbered. This mishap did not damp the spirits of the Americans, and five days afterwards Sumter

attacked the British post at Hanging Rock, or Rich's Mountain, where, on the 6th August, occurred one of the most

obstinately contested engagements of the Revolution. The fight lasted four hours. It was a conflict, pure and simple,

between the native Whigs and Tories, or Loyalists-not a regular soldier was present-and the former were defeated. On

the 15th August, Sumter surprised the redoubt which covered the Wateree Ford. Here he gained a little success which

his enormous preponderance of force rendered inevitable. Next day, the 16th, is the date of the catastrophe at Camden.

This disaster for the Americans has already been sufficiently considered. Before its extent and effect had

become generally known, McDowell had achieved a remarkable triumph on the 19th August at Musgrove's Mills, on

the Enoree River. It was a triumph, but, nevertheless, one of the merest side issues, since the destruction of the main

army at Camden rendered it of no consequence. It was won by the same tactics as were afterwards applied at King's

Mountain, and yet, strange to say, the British and Loyalists seemed stupidly blind to their fatal efficacy. The British

depended on their discipline, their manhood and the bayonet. The Americans took to the trees, shunned anything like

personal encounters, and while safe under cover, shot down their enemies one by one, just as the Indians of the present

day slaughter our troops at the West. Undoubtedly they were right to do so; but if the British had discarded their

intrepidity and followed a similar plan of military killing, the Muse of History would have had a different story to tell.

It was a repetition of Braddock's defeat in 1755, of Oriskany in 1777. At this time, Ferguson lay between the different

lines of these incursions. As soon as he received intelligence of the disaster of his friends on the Enoree, he swooped

like an eagle upon Clarke, who retreated as fast as his horses could carry him away. The flight towards the mountains

lasted two days and the intervening night, without any stop for refreshments. The pursuit was equally vigorous. Major

de Peyster, with a strong body of mounted troops from Ferguson's column, pursued closely until late on the evening

of the second day after the action at Musgroye's Mills, and did not draw rein until excessive fatigue and the fearful

heat of the season and region broke down both men and horses.

Family tradition places Captain Frederic de Peyster, aged 21, of Fanning's King's American Regiment of

New York Loyalists, at the head of these pursuers; and it is said· that a similar assignment to detached duty preserved

him from the catastrophe at King's Mountain. It may have been, however, his elder brother, Abraham, aged 27, who

was Ferguson's second-in-command. This appears to be an appropriate place to explain how Ferguson got to the spot,

King's Mountain, where his career was brought to such a sudden termination. After his victory at Camden and the rout

of Sumter, Cornwallis, with his main body, moved due north (east of the Catawba), to the Wax haws, the scene of the

previous slaughter of Buford's command by Tarleton, and thence to Charlotte, eighteen miles eastward of King's

Mountain, intending to proceed on to Salisbury, some forty miles to the northeast again. West of the Catawba lay the

route of Tarleton's Legion and the Light Infantry. Cooperating with Tarleton, Colonel Turnbull was stationed with his

New York Volunteers in conjunction with Ferguson's corps of Loyalists, on Little River.

After the failure of Colonel Elijah Clarke's attempt upon Augusta 14th-19th September, Ferguson was ordered by

Cornwallis to attack the Americans on their retreat, and cooperate with Colonel Cruger, who was in command at

Ninety-Six, seventy miles north of Augusta, and about one hundred miles south of Gilbert Town, whitherward, as was

supposed, Clarke was retreating. "Cruger, after gaining some advantage, found the pursuit would carry him too far

from Ninety-Six, to which place he judiciously returned. Ferguson unfortunately adhered to the plan of continuing on,

striking at Clarke and his associates, and thought the direction which they had taken towards Gilbert was perfectly

consonant with his ulterior purposes. The object Clarke arrived at was to form a communication with many

detachments of his friends who were approaching; or, if the superiority or advanced situation of Ferguson

prevented that intention, to join Colonel Sumter on the borders of South Carolina."

It was to break up the “Personnel and Materiel' which led to such expeditions as that of Clarke and nourished

them, that Ferguson was ordered into northwestern South Carolina. His mission was also to organize, arm,

and discipline the Loyalists. On the 18th August, 178o, an assemblage of these were attacked and defeated by Colonels

Williams, Shelby and Clarke, near Musgrove's Mills, on the Enoree River, about where the present lines of the

Spartanburg and Union districts touch that of Laurens. Ferguson was not far off, and he sent a detachment to overtake

the victors. These came to grief, but the Americans, well aware of Ferguson's energy, fled, or retreated with a speed

resembling flight, "pursued closely until late in the evening of the second day after the action, by Major de Peyster

and a strong body of mounted men from Ferguson's army. These became so broken down by excessive fatigue, in hot

weather, that they despaired of overtaking the Americans and abandoned the pursuit." The same authority at another

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place remarks: "The detachment under Ferguson, as has been already seen, had been for several weeks on the left of

the main army watching the movements of McDowell, Sevier, Shelby, Sumter, and William, and Clarke and Twiggs.

His second in command, De Peyster, pursued hard and fast after the mountain men as they retired, after their victory

at Enoree, to their mountain fastnesses. Ferguson himself, with the main body of his army, followed close upon the

heels of De Peyster, determined to retake the prisoners or support his second in command, if he should overtake and

engage the escaping enemy. Finding that his efforts were fruitless, Ferguson took post at a place then called Gilbert

Town, near the present Rutherfordton, in North Carolina. From this place he sent a most threatening message by

Samuel Philips, a paroled prisoner, that if the officers west of the mountains did not lay down their opposition to the

British arms, he would march his army over, burn and lay waste their country and bang their leaders.

It has always been believed, and so is stated in histories that the nucleus or kernel of Ferguson's force at

King's Mountain who did all the fighting there were British regulars. This is so far from being the case that it can be

clearly shown that those who are termed British regulars were Loyal American Volunteers, picked out as a rule, from

three (two New York and one New Jersey) Loyal battalions. There were, undoubtedly, one or two British regular

officers present, selected for peculiar qualities which adapted them to the service in hand, and there may have been

individual British regular soldiers incorporated for their Proficiency as marksmen. As at Oriskany-the turning point

of the war and the bloodiest action for the numbers engaged at the North-so at King's Mountain-the turning point of

the war and the deadliest for the numbers who actually fought in it at the South-the conflict was one between

Americans-Americans drilled to fight as regular soldiers, and Americans instinctively trained to bushwhack as

guerrillas. While the event at King's Mountain was exactly the reverse of the immediate issue at Oriskany, the course

and consequences of both were the same -- the discomfiture of the British plans of conquest, and a rapid ebb, which,

owing to foreign intervention, never knew a flood corresponding to the previous high-tide.

Those who, writing in the interest of truth, have striven to divest the stories of the Revolution of the myths

which envelop them like an atmosphere, have always maintained that Ferguson's corps has been invariably

exaggerated both as to numbers and efficiency, and the force of his opponents diminished to satisfy the popular craving

for the marvelous triumph achieved by undisciplined backwoodsmen and mountaineers over regulars and oppressors.

The fact is Ferguson did not know from day to day what numbers he did have in camp. This statement is attested by

a disinterested military witness. His strength fluctuated in accordance with the hopes, fears or passions of the

population favorable to the Royal cause. No real general, endowed with ordinary judgment, has ever placed any

reliance in Militia. Washington is emphatic in regard to their unreliability if not absolute worthlessness, and he is

corroborated by a number of our own best, as well as observant French officers who served with him.

It is a great error to suppose that this body of 3,000 American Whigs the number reported by General Davidson writing

of the assemblage at Gilbert Town, 10th October, 1780-were new to the exigencies and dangers of battle. Their fighting

qualities could not be regarded as otherwise as respectable by professional soldiers, except those whose judgments

were bounded by the narrowest horizon and distorted by senseless prejudice. These mountain and valley men had been

born and had grown up in an atmosphere of danger. From their earliest years they had breathed in powder-smoke, if

not in actual set battles, in more perilous struggles with fierce wild beasts and adversaries like the Indians, as dangerous

in their ferocity and more so in the union of cunning, weapons and combination. Many of them had been acclimated

to something like regular war by engagements, skirmishes and collisions with loyal uprisings and regular forces. They

were of totally different and far better stuff than the militia who threw down their arms after a single scattering

discharge, or without firing at all, and fled from Camden, leaving their regular comrades to certain destruction. If they

were not regular soldiers they were brave men and stalwart adversaries, and

if they did not understand the tactics of the Continentals, they had tactics of their own which suited the region in which

they had to operate. The tactics of the associated Whig Colonels, whoever suggested and whatever inspired them,

were unexceptionable, and as applied by Cleveland, worthy of the stratagem of Hannibal, which implies the highest

commendation. They were far superior to those of Ferguson. From what few facts are known of his plans, except

through an unfortunate result, his simply seemed to be, "Imitate my own and my Provincials' contempt of death and

our devotion. Remember this, and show yourselves men." The British tactics were those of the Romans, complete in

the valor that dies fighting but does not conquer the aggregated craft and courage of men skilled in the use of firearms.

The aspect of the storm clouds portending a veritable cyclone, gathered upon the neighboring mountains,

was too indicative not to have an effect upon even such a fearless man as Ferguson. It seems to have demoralized the

Loyalists of this section. His circular letter to overcome its effects and their timidity, of the 1st October, breathes an

indignation and contempt which alone could have induced an elegant gentleman to pen such a scathing appeal, in the

roughest Saxon, to even tepid manhood. He broke up his camp at Gilbert Town after sending out these missives, and

sent two messengers to Cornwallis at Charlotte to reveal his own critical situation, and to ask for a reinforcement.

Three days after, on the 4th, he marched southward over the main branch of Broad River to the Cow Pens. On the 5th

he wheeled to the left, or east, marched to Tates, since Dears (Davis's Ferry), re-crossed the Broad River, and camped

40

about a mile above. On the 6th he marched about fourteen miles, and pitched his camp on an eminence now known

as King's Mountain,

Here a question presents itself which is insoluble to the closest scrutiny and analysis. From Gilbert Town to

Charlotte, by a road distinctly marked on Tarleton's map, was less than fifty miles, and from Gilbert Town by the route

Ferguson followed was seventy miles, and looking at the system of roads laid down on the maps of the period, it would

seem to have been almost as easy to proceed direct to Charlotte as to make the circuit that he did. The Americans did

not reach Gilbert Town until the 4th October. Ferguson's retreat emboldened them and hastened their pursuit. They

followed exactly the route he took, and they did not overtake him until the afternoon of the 7th. This shows he had

over five days start of them, which at the rate he marched would have carried him into Charlotte, or brought him

within the reach of the helping hand of Cornwallis. There are only two explanations for Ferguson's movements. Either

he expected to be reinforced by Tory organizations, or he did not know the extent of the force about to overwhelm

him. The latter alternative contradicts received opinions, and is the best proof that he acted in accordance with a plan

which he considered judicious-a plan which he carried into the grave with him.

The epithet Tories bas been used immediately above for the first time because if the large parties of Tories

who were collecting along the route passed over by the Americans had been true-hearted Loyalists, they would not

have left Ferguson in the lurch to perish in the trap into which he had been lured by delusive promises of support. At

the Cow Pens, 6th October, the Whigs were informed that a. body of 600 Tories were assembled at Major Gibbs', four

miles to their right, and would join Ferguson the next day. On the morning of the 7th, Ferguson was within 15 or 20

miles of these Tories, and if they had simply followed up the Americans as the latter followed Ferguson, they could

have fallen upon the rear of the Americans, captured or stampeded their horses and taken the associated Whig Colonels

in the very act. Judging from the few known facts of which historians are in possession, such Tories deserved the

epithet with which Cleveland stigmatized them in his battle-speech.

Before entering upon a description of the battle, this appears to be the proper point at which to settle the

numbers engaged. General Davidson, (Gates papers.) wrote that 3,000 men were assembled at Gilbert Town on the

1st October. Ramsey says "scarce a single gunman remained that day, 25th September, at his own house." The first

rendezvous had been at Watauga on the 25th September. This place is beyond the Stone Mountains, in the present

state of Tennessee, further to the northwest of Gilbert Town than the latter is west of Charlotte. This proves that there

was no force between Ferguson and Cornwallis on the 1st October, nor for three days afterwards, to militate against a

safe retreat to Charlotte. Ferguson was not afraid of the "mountain men," but he knew that he did not have numbers

sufficient to cope with the force nor the kind of force which was marching against him. Like any wise commander he

fell back on his supports, and they proved the veriest Pharaoh's reeds.

How many men did Ferguson actually have? McKenzie says that his militia constituted "a fluctuating body,

whose numbers could not be depended on as they increased or diminished, with the report of the day." Allaire's

estimate foots up 906 or 907, which agrees more closely with the majority than the factitious calculation founded on

the ration-return, so often quoted, 1125.

In regard to the American Whigs, their organization and march, there are a number of clear indications which

concur to establish the correctness of Ramsey's account. The first spontaneous assemblage of the improvised column

of backwoodsmen and their associated colonels was at the Sycamore Shoals, or Watauga, on the Watauga River, then

in the northwest corner of North Carolina, or now over the border in Northeastern Tennessee, on the 25th September.

The associated Whig forces consisted of Colonel Shelby's 240 from Sullivan County, then in the northwest

corner of North Carolina now in East Tennessee; of Colonel John Sevier's (Xavier's) 240 men, from Washington

County, then in northwest North Carolina, now a part of East Tennessee; of Colonel Charles McDowell's 160 refugees

from Burke and Rutherford Counties, western North Carolina, who had fled before the Loyalists to the western waters

across the mountains; and of Colonel William Campbell's command, 400 men, from Washington County, south

southwest portion of Virginia, bordering on Tennessee. This made 1040 mounted riflemen. On the 26th, these began

their march, passing along the valley of Gap creek, and encamped the first night at Talbot's Mill. "The staff was

incomplete; rather, there was no staff; no quartermaster, no commissary, no surgeon, no chaplain.

As in all their Indian campaigns, being mounted and unencumbered with baggage, their motions were rapid. Each

man, each officer, set out with his trustworthy Deckhard on his shoulder. “A shot pouch, a tomahawk, a knife, a

knapsack and a blanket, completed the outfit. At night, the earth afforded him a bed, and the heavens a covering, the

mountain stream quenched his thirst; while his provision was procured from supplies acquired on the march by his

gun.' Some beeves were driven in the rear, to furnish subsistence while in the settlements, but they impeded the rapidity

of the march, and, after the first day, were abandoned. After passing the mountain, the troops, sparing the property of

the Whigs, quartered and subsisted upon the Tories.' On the 27th they continued on, following Bright's Trace across

the Yellow Mountain, almost due north of Gilbert Town. At the foot of the Alleghenies, proper, 16 to 18 miles distant

from Gilbert Town, they were joined on the 30th by Colonel Benjamin Cleveland and Major

41

Jacob Winston with 350 to 400 men, from Wilkes and Surrey Counties, Northwestern North Carolina.

From the 1st to 3d October no movement was made. Ramsey says because the weather was so wet. Here

Colonel Campbell was selected to command, to avoid entrusting the office to Colonel McDowell, because the latter

as considered as "too far advanced in life and too inactive for the command of such an enterprise as we were then

engaged." Colonel Campbell was made the leader at the suggestion of Shelby to reconcile difficulties, "not on account

of any superior talent or experience he was supposed to possess." Colonel Charles McDowell then turned over his

command to his brother, Major Joseph McDowell, and set out to communicate the condition of things to General

Gates, and consult with him, here, on Green River, or at Gilbert Town, Wednesday, 4th October, the American forces,

according to Davidson, formed a conjunct body, consisting of 3,000; from this body were selected 1,6oo good horse,

who immediately went in pursuit of Colonel Ferguson, who was making his way to Charlotte." Colonel Shelby says,

"On the next night, 5th, (?) it was determined, in the council of officers, to pursue him unremittingly with as many of

our troops as could be well armed and well mounted, leaving the weak horses to follow on as fast as they could. We

accordingly started about light next morning with 910 men thus selected. Continuing diligently our pursuit all that

day, we were joined at the Cowpens on the 6th by Colonel John Williams, of S. C., and several field officers, with

about 400 men."

Mark this; it is most important testimony from the highest authority and determines that the American

numbers, were from 1310 to 1370 in the fight, because at the Cow Pens the 910 selected out of the first aggregate

were joined by 6o men from Lincoln County, west of Gilbert Town, in North Carolina, and about 400 under Colonel

John Williams from the Spartanburg District, then embracing the whole circumjacent country of South Carolina,

which furnished the guides whose pilotage had as much to do with Ferguson's defeat as any other cause. Although

referred to in several other places, it may be well to mention here that Williams is said to have had in his pocket a

commission as Brigadier General from Governor Rutledge of South Carolina and that he it is, not Campbell (according

to Allaire) whom the British considered as commanding against them on the 7th.

For the last thirty-Six hours of the pursuit the Americans did not dismount but once. This was at the Cow

Pens. About 12 m., of Saturday the 7th, the advance guards met some unarmed men who had just quitted Ferguson,

and from them his position was accurately ascertained. The rain, which had poured down all the previous morning

ceased shortly after noon, and the sun shone out brightly. A council of war was held, dispositions made for the attack,

and its course determined, to surround their enemy and attack him on all sides simultaneously.

Then the riflemen mounted, and without breaking their fast or taking any rest, moved on to assume their

stations around the fatal hill. Within a mile of the Loyalist position, a messenger was arrested bearing a dispatch from

Ferguson to Cornwallis, urging the latter to hurry forward reinforcements. This paper is said to have stated the number

under the command of Ferguson. What number did it mention? What became of the paper? Why has it never been

textually quoted? It would settle the disputed question of the British force.

The King’s Mountain range extends northerly and southerly about sixteen miles with several lateral spurs.

The highest peak of this system might be recognized in Crowder's Knob, crowning a northeasterly radiation in North

Carolina, while the most prominent summit in the opposite direction at the end of a southeastern rowel is Henry's

Knob, north by west of Yorkville, in South Carolina. Although the elevation of King's Mountain, proper, is given at

1,500 feet above the sea level, that portion of the ridge on which the battle was fought, about a mile and one half south

of the dividing line between North and South Carolina, does not rise more than 100 feet above depressions drained by

adjacent streams.

At the very outset, in describing the battleground, a difficulty occurs. According to Map XII., accompanying

Marshall's Life of Washington, and likewise the beautiful map attached to Tarleton's history of his campaigns of 1780-

1, there is a road or wagon-track distinctly laid down on the first, leading from the Cow Pens, by the Cherokee Ford,

to Ramsour's Ferry, and thence to Charlotte; on the second from the Cherokee Ford-the Cow Pens, where Morgan

routed Tarleton is omitted-to Tryon, half way to Ramsour's (Ransower's?) and thence by the Great Tuckesege

(Togaseechee) Ford, of the Catawba, to Charlotte, eighteen miles to the southeast, where Lord Cornwallis lay with the

main body of the British army. From Clarke's Fork of (Buffalo?) Creek (Lossing calls it "Kings" Creek, which, if

correct, would solve a multitude of difficulties), which is shown on the plan to the eastward of Ferguson's right, the

ascent is almost imperceptible to the group or series of greater or lesser undulations among which the collision

occurred. These hills, gravelly, sparsely strewn with a few small boulders, are covered with bard and soft wood, some

grand trees, but mostly a smaller growth of post-Oaks, laurel and sorrel. The large trees stand far apart, and even the

lesser ones are not close together, so that they present scarcely any impediments to the movements of troops. The big

trees afforded excellent cover for riflemen, who, stealing from one to another, found in them admirable temporary

screens (blindages) or mantlets to protect their approaches. In fact they might be compared to the huge shields of

which the English archers-the sharpshooters of the period prior to the introduction of firearms-availed themselves for

protection while clearing the works of a besieged place of their defenders. Lossing, who saw it many years ago, justly

42

observes "it was a strange place for an encampment or a battle; and to one acquainted with that region, it is difficult

to understand why Ferguson and his band were there at all." This is a most logical conclusion, and the artist's sketch

reveals the locality, which would seem to be the very last which a professional soldier would select whereon to make

a stand against a preponderating force of the best marksmen in the world.

The whole fighting was done within an area of less than half that of Madison Square, (N. Y. city,) and some correct

idea of it may be had by supposing that the American Whigs occupied the surrounding houses and picked off the

British Loyalists in the open square from the windows, until, finally, when the troops in the square were pretty much

killed, disabled, or demoralized, the Whigs made a simultaneous rush from the houses and captured the remainder.

The cleared area or bare summit of the King's Mountain range, "a narrow, stony ridge" on which Ferguson pitched his

camp, has an outline not unlike that of an Indian paddle witb the end of the blade pointing south of west; "the shadow

of the timber at half-past one P. M. ranging with its median line."

Colonel Shelby states that the Loyalists were encamped on an eminence called King's Mountain, extending

from east to west, which on its summit was about 500 or 6oo yards long and 6o or 70 broad." These bearings must be

correct, because they reconcile contradictions, and explain why Ferguson fronted as he did, which would be

inexplicable if his line of battle faced as General Graham would make it, according to the shadow. Graham sets down

the length of Ferguson's encampment [line (?)] at 80 poles (1,300 feet), which does not contradict Shelby. After an

examination of perhaps one hundred authorities, it is still extremely difficult to reconcile many of the particulars. It is

most consistent, however, to believe that Ferguson's line fronted southerly and easterly, with his camp on the left,

occupying pretty much the open space from 1,170 to 1,320 feet in length and some 210 feet in width. If such is not

the case the American report goes to water. Still, in justice to a soldier of so much ability as Ferguson is admitted by

friend and foe to have been, the selection of the battle ground must have been due to some good reason. It is very

likely that be chose an open place that he might have the militia under complete and constant

supervision, fearing that if he fought in the woods his new levies might instantly or quickly dissolve under a hot fire

if not under his own eyes or those of his trusted subordinates, "in whom," [as in their immediate commanders],

McKenzie assures us, ''perfect confidence might on all occasions be placed." As to the militia the same

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contemporaneous authority is far less complimentary. He says that in the course of this campaign, Ferguson had "from

one to two thousand militia, a fluctuating body, whose numbers could not be depended on as they increased or

diminished with the report of the day.” No one would dare question the fact that many of these Loyalists were

animated by the highest sentiments of honor and duty, but what could have been the principles of the majority, when

Colonel Martin Armstrong, in command in Surrey County, in North Carolina, and in charge of those captured at King's

Mountain 7th October, in writing to General Gates on the 7th November, states "the Torie prisoners all enlisted into

the Continental Service, excepting a Small number, which the Justices have committed to Halifax, there being but a

few of the British." Such sudden conversions, or perversions, would indicate very little constancy, unless they

transferred their services to the enemy, with the intention of deserting as soon as possible again, and so get home and

rid of military service altogether.

Why Ferguson made such an eccentric retreat is easily explained. The approach of the associated Colonels

frightened the Loyalists. Instead of joining Ferguson in the numbers expected they left him and went home. Conscious

that his force was too weak to stem the approaching torrent, he marched southwards, having every reason to believe

that he would be joined, day after day, by bodies of Loyalists already assembled in arms. One body of 600 was within

a few miles of him when he fought his last battle, and yet did not hasten to his assistance. These might have fallen

upon the flank and rear of the Americans whilst fully occupied with Ferguson, just as the Prussians took Napoleon in

flank and rear at Waterloo. The only excuse for their inaction is to believe that they were infected by the recollection

of the fate of Boyd's men at Kettle Creek in 1779, of Moore's Loyal levies at Ramsour's Mills, and those of Bryan at

the Catawba in midsummer, 1780. At, or near, the Cow Pens which is not more than fifty miles north of Ninety-Six,

Ferguson received the letter, found on his dead body, from Cruger, dated at “96,” 3d October, giving him to understand

that he could expect no assistance from that quarter. This communication is a curious one. It shows that Cruger, at all

events, if none others, comprehended the situation. It disillusioned Ferguson. Hitherto he had been falling back to the

south; he now wheeled off to the northeast towards Cornwallis at Charlotte. This new route gave him a double chance

of support, since Tarleton was operating in the intermediate district, and the victorious Americans retreated at once

for fear that Tarleton would fall upon them with a fury which nothing as yet had stayed, and with a sabre which knew

no mercy.

Ferguson is charged with being afraid of the force pursuing him whereas, in a private communication to his

commander, he expresses almost contempt for the very adversaries from whom he was said to be fleeing. Ferguson

failed from over-confidence, not the want of it. Everything goes to show that his militia did not fulfill his expectations.

It is pretty well established by the concurrent testimony on both sides that all the real fighting was done by the 70 to

100 Provincial regulars, and the pick to the Tories or Loyalists.

About 3 P. M. the Americans, having dismounted and secured their horses out of gunshot and left them under

a sufficient guard, advanced to the attack in three columns, under the guidance of men who knew every inch of the

ground, on nine or ten different routes, as clearly laid down in the plan, "As hunters round a hunted creature draws.”

The idea that Ferguson could have cut his way through and escaped seems very fallacious. A body of infantry,

encumbered with baggage, could scarcely expect to escape or elude the pursuit of superior numbers of mounted

riflemen, on hardy horses, without any encumbrance whatever. Had Ferguson as soon as he knew that he was followed

up so closely and in force, he might have saved his men. Still, such a retreat would have been little better than a flight,

and its effect except as regards his own personal safety, which a man of his character would not take into account-

must have been almost as disastrous for the cause which he represented as the defeat which did ensue.

In the absence of reliable information, and its disappearance or destruction through lapse of time, it is but

equitable to believe that Ferguson bad good reasons for every step of the course he pursued, Unquestionably he had a

professional soldier's contempt for all militia, and it was through striking on this" rock of offense" that his bark was

so injured that it foundered in the storm that followed. Of one fact, which might have exercised an important influence

upon his decision to stand or retreat, he could not have known. The mounted riflemen who "fought the battle were

fasting and almost famished." Consequently, as the country could not have afforded provisions, they would have had

to break up in a few hours more to obtain the necessaries of life. One day's respite would have carried Ferguson to

Charlotte where Cornwallis lay in force. Davidson says that Ferguson was making his way to this point. Unfortunately

for him he did not respect his adversaries sufficiently to allow their approach to hurry his march until it was too late.

Ferguson's Provincial regular detachment, some seventy disciplined infantry, were on his right. The only way

to account for his deployment is to believe that from the manner in which his adversaries showed themselves at

different points, he could not make out from what quarter he might expect the principal attack. Therefore, he faced in

the direction in which the mass of the enemy was first distinguishable. With the controversy as to who exercised

command among the Americans this article has nothing to do. Popular history, almost always incorrect, assigns it to

Campbell. The only discoverable statement on the British side, reads as if the British considered that Brigadier-General

Williams enjoyed it, and that it devolved on Campbell after he was mortally wounded. The Shelby Papers, published

44

in this Magazine, embodying affidavits, certainly make Shelby the prominent figure, and place Campbell in a very

unfavorable light. Whoever issued the preliminary order was alive with soldierly instinct. One more laconic and at the

same time apposite has scarcely ever been given. "Tie up Overcoats, pick touch holes, fresh prime, and be ready to

fight.” As Cleveland's subsequent speech to his immediate command, the American extreme left, was as pertinent as

this order, and as splendid a specimen of authenticated battle oratory as can be found, it is only fair to credit him with

the inspiration of the Spartan order for battle.

According to" the statement which has generally been adopted," Colonel Cleveland led off the dance, and

Lossing, who says he copied from the original report among Gates' Papers, and furnishes fac similes of signatures,

places Benjamin Cleveland first, Isaac Shelby second, and William Campbell last. The writer's copy of this document

reverses that arrangement. Whatever was Cleveland's rank he seems to have been the animating spirit of just as to

Shelby is due the credit of originating the plan of the campaign, and to have been the author of "that great partisan's

miscarriage." Immediately after he encountered a picket of the enemy he delivered the following spirited and sagacious

address to his men, pertinent to the occasion, and so full of common sense that it fits every other of a similar character:

"My brave fellows, we have beat the Tories, and we can beat them again. They are all cowards; if they had the spirit

of men they would join their fellow-citizens in supporting the independence of their country. When you are engaged,

you are not to want (wait?) for the word of command from me. I will show you by my example how to fight; I can

undertake no more. Every man must consider himself an officer, and act from his own judgment. Fire as quick as you

can, and stand your ground as long as you can. When you can do no better, get behind trees, or retreat; but I beg you

not to run quite off. If we are repulsed, let us make a point of returning and renewing the fight; perhaps we may have

better luck in the second attempt than in the first. If any of you are afraid, such shall have leave to retire, and they are

requested immediately to take themselves off."

Shelby gives the strength of each attacking column in the following words: " The right wing or column was

led by Colonel Sevier and Major Winston, together with Major McDowell's command, which bad been considerably

augmented during the march; the left by Colonels Cleveland and Williams; and each of these wings was about as

strong as Campbell's regiment (400] and mine [240] united composing the centre. Three times 400 plus 240 makes

1,920 which justifies the Loyal Lieutenant Anthony Allaire's opinion of the vast superiority of the Whig Americans,

and other statements to the same effect." Honest Shelby likewise admits: "This (the quasi-official] report, however,

omits to mention Colonel McDowell's command had been considerably augmented during the march" by men who

had formerly belonged to it.

Mrs. Mercy Warren, who enjoyed great opportunities to learn the truth, whose "History of the Revolution"

was "long considered a standard authority," uses an expression which can mean nothing else than that the British were

swarmed out; "though the British commander exhibited the valor of a brave and magnanimous officer, and his troops

acquitted themselves with vigor and spirit. The Americans, who in great numbers surrounded them, won the day."

Whether Campbell did or did not lead his immediate men, but supervised, is not clear, or whether Shelby

commenced the movement, ascending the eastern end of the mountain to attack Ferguson's left. The firing soon became

so heavy in this quarter that Ferguson brought over from his right, a portion of his Provincial regulars under de Peyster

his second in command, and with these, supported by some of the Loyalist militia, who had previously whittled down

the handles of their butcher knives so that they could be inserted in the muzzles of their rifles and serve as bayonets,

made a brisk charge, which pushed Shelby and Campbell and McDowell, who came to their assistance on the left,

down the mountain. At this juncture the American left column under Cleveland ascended the hill and engaged the

British right where Ferguson himself was present. This portion of his line was protected in a measure by the baggage

wagons and some slight defences hastily constructed. These were of no avail, because while the elevation on which

the British line was formed secured the Americans from any chance whatever of suffering from the cross-fires of their

friends on either side of it, the British were exposed to being hit by shots coming in from every quarter, so that if they

attempted to shelter themselves from the bullets of one American column, they were immediately subjected to the

danger of being killed by shots raining in from the opposite direction. Ferguson, subjected to pressure on his right,

immediately recalled his second in command from his left, and the latter retraced his steps lengthwise the ridge under

a galling fire from the South Carolinians under Williams. Then with the whole of his Provincial regulars, he drove the

Americans to the west foot of the hill. As yet Ferguson, enveloped on the east, front and west, had experienced no

disturbance in the rear, and some critics assert that he might have escaped in this direction on the road to Charlotte. It

is not likely that the brave officer who had already repulsed every assault upon his position would have abandoned it

without a further attempt for victory. This outlet, however, was almost immediately closed. Major Winston, who on

starting, had the longest detour to make, became so far separated from the columns, next to his left, by the intervention

of a steep hill that he lost sight and hearing of them while thus uncertain, he was hailed and directed to dismount and

ascend the hill. Expecting to encounter the British on this hill he did so, but before his men had advanced two hundred

paces from their horses they were again hailed and directed to return to their animals, mount them, and push on because

45

the enemy were a mile beyond. Thereupon they ran back to their horses, threw themselves into their saddles, and rode

like fox-hunters on full run through the woods, until they came in upon the left rear of the British, where they were

originally intended to fall in and complete the envelopment. "Nothing," says the narrator, "but the interposition of

Divine power could have conducted the said right-hand column to so great advantage." Thus Winston, the last to come

into position, "Flow'd in, and settling, circle all the lists” and so “From all the circle o£ the hills, death sleeted in upon

the doomed.”

Shelby, always clear and honest, admits that the Americans were repeatedly repulsed by the British and

driven down "the mountain; that in the succession of repulses and attacks, and in giving succor to the points hardest

pressed, much disorder took place in the Whig ranks and confusion. There is just as much confusion in the various

accounts both as to when Ferguson was killed and where he fell. Colonel Shelby says Ferguson was killed about one

hundred yards down the western end of the mountain. General Graham, in his drawing made on the spot, locates the

place where the British commander fell, on the summit, directly opposite the South Carolina regiment of Williams, so

that it is very likely that the two may have fallen near together (as sometimes averred), but not at the same time.

Ramsey, quoting Foster, describes Ferguson as riding "from one end of his line to the other, encouraging his men to

prolong the conflict. With desperate courage he passed from one exposed point to another of equal danger. He carried

in his wounded band [his left arm had been shattered at the Brandywine and was almost helpless) a shrill sounding

silver whistle, whose signal was universally known through the ranks, was of immense service throughout the battle,

and gave a kind of ubiquity to his movements."

"Rushing from one regiment to another, encouraging some and directing others, Major Ferguson performed

prodigies of valor, when he was shot by an American rifleman, and Captain Abraham de Peyster of 'The King's

American Regiment'-a Tory from New York-took the command. After the action had raged for an hour and five

minutes the enemy raised a white flag, and surrendered themselves at discression." There is no direct proof that Captain

de Peyster himself even at the last, raised the flag. Shelby simply remarks, a white flag was soon after [the final Whig

charge or closing in] hoisted by the enemy, "without adding in what quarter or by whom. Toward the last part of the

action, which must have been some time after Ferguson had fallen, de Peyster, who had moved to and fro like a shuttle,

determined to make one more bold attempt to wrest success from the menaced wreck. His fierce and gallant charge

drove the Americans down the eastern slope of the mountain in a retreat which was so rapid that there was great danger

of its becoming a rout. By this time, Lieutenant Allaire says, that out of the "seventy [Provincial regulars] (exclusive

of 20 who acted as Dragoons and 10 who drove wagons, etc., when we marched to the field of action) all 'were killed

and wounded but twenty and those brave fellows were soon crowded into a heap by the militia," just as the frightened

crew of a ship in a desperate situation will gather around their captain, and thus impede and neutralize the efforts of

those who remain cool and are willing to "try, try again."

In examining and comparing the testimony, it is clear that the Whigs lost a great many more than was

reported. The statement of the associated Colonels reads twenty-eight killed and sixty wounded; in General Lenoir's

corrected account he says·~ there were not near so many of the enemy [British] wounded as were of the Whigs, about

forty of whom afterwards died of their wounds.'' Lieutenant Allaire mentions 123 wounded altogether, which,

weighing Lenoir's language, would justify an estimate of British killed and died, 120, wounded, 123; Whigs killed

and died, 68, wounded, over 150. The Provincial, who was prisoner, and whose account was afterwards printed,

remarks, "I was pleased to see their [the Whig] loss superior to ours." This corresponds almost exactly with Shelby's

account, that when the Americans could be rallied and turned in overwhelming force upon the scanty few who had

held them in check so gallantly, and, considering the circumstances so long, the British Provincial regulars and what

Loyalists stood up to the work retreated the whole length of Ferguson's first deployment to the western extremity of

the bare crest, where his camp had been originally pitched. Here on the level the horizontal volleys of the Provincial

regulars first began to tell, when the American Whigs got up on to the plateau. It is admitted by friend and foe that not

one of the Loyalists escaped; if so, Allaire's calculation of force, 906 or 908, proves itself, and Stedman corroborates

it 960, Warren makes it only 850. It was not a battle, it was a battue; a slaughter, parallel in circumstances, but not as

to numbers, with the destruction of Roland and his corps in the defile of Roncesvalles, overwhelmed by the missiles

of adversaries who shunned every attempt at an encounter hand to hand.

Our people have always put too much reliance in militia, that is, militia proper, for if men have been subjected

to real discipline and gone through a baptism of fire, they become soldiers whatever may be the title applied to them;

but then militia, in the accepted sense of the word is a misnomer. Colonel Cruger, as gallant an officer as ever drew a

sword, wrote to Ferguson only four days before he fell: "I flattered myself they [the Tory militia] would have been

equal to the mountain lads, and that no further call for the defensive would have been on this part of the Province. I

begin to think our views for the present rather large. We have been led to this, probably, in expecting too much from

the militia."

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Not one of the British force escaped the catastrophe. It had been completely enveloped, and not a man could

extricate himself from the coil. The victors remained upon the field the night after the battle; the next day, the 8th,

was Sunday. The dead were buried at dawn, but not all; one at least was left to the birds and beasts of prey. Colonel

Hanger wrote that the body of Colonel Ferguson was treated with every indignity and left above ground. If it was

interred where his grave is indicated on the plan of General Graham, it may have been by some of his sorrowing men,

since the severely wounded who could not march were left on the field, and the only surgeon carried off a prisoner.

A much more detailed statement was prepared, but space, justly could not be conceded to it. With time,

however, this article will be expanded into a volume, with original letters and various interesting collateral testimonies.

Thus complete, it will be worthy of the interesting subject, and constitute a memorial to the unfortunate brave.''

The Battle of Kings Mountain

By

General Joseph Graham

Published in The Southern Literary Messenger, September 30, 1845.

The following account of the battle of King's Mountain is a copy of the original paper, drawn up by the late General

Joseph Graham, father of the present governor of North Carolina, of Lincoln County, North Carolina, the County in

which the site of the battle is located. The accompanying plan of the battle is a copy by a young lady of Carolina from

the original taken by Gen. Graham on the ground. This graphic account, given by an uninterested individual, of the

battle that led to the retreat of Cornwallis, then on his advance through Carolina, may afford interesting information

to your reader, that love to dwell upon the scenes of the Revolution.

After the defeat of Gen. Gates and the army under his command, on the 16th of August 1780, and the defeat of

Gen. Sumpter, two days afterwards, near Rocky Mount, by Col. Tarleton, the South was almost entirely abandoned to

the enemy. Most of the troops, both officers and man, who had escaped from Gates' defeat, passed through Charlotte,

N.C., where most of the militia of Mecklenburg County were assembled in consequence of the alarm. The regular

troops chiefly passed on to Hillsboro, where Gen. Gates finally established his headquarters. William L. Davidson,

who had served as Lieutenant Colonel of the regulars in the Northern army, was appointed Brigadier General of the

militia in the Salisbury District, in the place of Gen. Rutherford, who was taken prisoner at Gates' defeat. He formed

a brigade and encamped on McAlpin's creek, about 8 miles below Charlotte, and in the course of two or three weeks,

was reinforced by Gen. Sumner, (a continental officer), but having no regulars to command, he took command of the

militia from the counties of Guilford, Caswell, Orange &c.

After Gates' defeat, the attention of Lord Cornwallis was chiefly occupied with burying the dead, taking care of the

wounded, and forwarding, under suitable guards, the great number of prisoners he had taken to the city of Charleston,

and regulating the civil government he was establishing in S. Carolina, and examining the state of the posts occupied

by his troops on the Congaree, Ninety- Six, and Augusta. By the 1st of September, he had his arrangements made, and

detached Col. Ferguson over the Wateree with only 110 regulars, under the command of Capt. De Peyster, and about

the same number of Tories, but with an ample supply of arms and other military stores. His movements were at first

rapid, endeavoring to intercept the retreat of a party of mountain men, who were harassing the upper settlement of

Tories in South Carolina. Failing in this, he afterwards moved slowly, and frequently halted to collect all Tories he

could persuade to join him. He passed Broad river, and before the last of September encamped at a place called

Gilbertstown, within a short distance of where the thriving village of Rutherfordton now stands.

His forces had increased to upwards of men. On his march to this place, he had furnished arms to such of his new

recruits as were without. The greater part of them had rifles but to a part of them he had them to fix a large knife they

47

usually carried, made small enough at the end for two inches or more of the handle to slip into the muzzle of the rifle,

so that it might occasionally used as a bayonet.

Although Col. Ferguson failed to overtake the detachment of mountain men alluded to, he took two of them

prisoners, who had become separated from their comrades. In a day or two he paroled them, and enjoined them to

inform the officers on the Western waters, that if they did not desist from their opposition to the British arms, and take

protection under his standard, that he would march his army over the mountains, hang their leaders and lay the country

waste with fire and sword.

Col. Charles McDowell, of Burke County, on the approach of Ferguson with so large a force had gone over the

mountains to obtain assistance and was in consultation with Col. John Sevier and Col. Isaac Shelby what plan should

be pursued when the two paroled men spoken of arrived and delivered their message from Col. Ferguson. It was

decided that each of them should use his best efforts to raise all the men that could be enlisted, and that their forces

when collected, should meet on the Watauga, [sic] on the 25th of September. It was also agreed, that Col. Shelby

should give intelligence of their movements to Col. William Campbell of the adjoining County of Washington in

Virginia, with the hope that he would raise what force he could and cooperate with them. They met on the Watauga

the day appointed, and passed the mountain on the 30th of Sept., where they were joined by Col. Benjamin Cleveland

and Major Joseph Winston, from Wilks [sic] and Surry counties.

On examining their forces, they were found to number, as follows:

From Washington County, Virginia, under Col. W. Campbell, 400

From Sullivan County, North Carolina, under Col. Isaac Shelby, 240

From Washington, North Carolina, under Col. John Sevier, 240

From Burke and Rutherford counties, N. C., under Col. Charles McDowell 160

From Wilks and Surry counties, North Carolina, under Col. Benj. Cleveland and Major James Winston, 350

Col. Ferguson, having accurate intelligence of the force collecting against him, early on the 4th of October ordered

his men to march, and remained half an hour after they had started, writing a dispatch to Lord Cornwallis, no doubt

informing him of his situation, and soliciting aid. The letter was committed to the care of the noted Abraham Collins

(since of counterfeit memory) and another person by the name of Quin with injunctions to deliver it as soon as possible.

They set out and attempted to pass the direct road to Charlotte, but having to pass through some Whig settlements,

they were suspected and pursued, and being compelled to secrete themselves by day and travel by night, they did not

reach Charlotte until the morning of the 7th of October, (the day of the battle.) Col. Ferguson encamped the first night

at the noted place called the Cowpens, about 20 miles from Gilbertstown. On the 5th October, he crossed Broad river,

at what is now called Deer's Ferry, 16miles. On the 6th he marched up the Ridge Road, between the waters of King's

and Buffalo Creeks, until he came to the fork turning to the right, across King's Creek, and through a gap of the

mountain towards Yorkville, about 14 miles. Then he encamped on the summit of that part of the mountain to the

right of the road, where he remained until he was attacked on the 7th.

When the troops from the different counties met, at the head of the Catawba river, the commanding officers met,

and finding that they were all of equal grade, and no general officer to command, it was decided that Col. Charles

McDowell should go to Head Quarters, supposed to be between Charlotte and Salisbury, to obtain Gen. Sumner or

Gen. Davidson to take the command. In the meantime, it was agreed that Col. William Campbell, who had the largest

regiment, should take the command until the arrival of a general officer, who was to act according to the advice of the

Colonels commanding, and that Major Joseph McDowell should take the command of the Burke and Rutherford

regiment, until the return of Col. McDowell.

Shortly after these measures were adopted, intelligence was received that Col. Ferguson had left Gilbertstown, and

it was decided that they would march after him, by that place, and on their way received evidence that it was his design

to evade an engagement with them. On the evening of the 6th of October, the Colonels in council unanimously

resolved, that they would select all the men and horse fit for service and immediately pursue Ferguson until they

should overtake him, leaving such as were not able to go, to come after as fast as they could. The next evening, the

selection was made, and 910 men, including officers, were marched before, leaving the others to follow.

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They came to the Cowpens, where Ferguson had camped on the night of the 4th, and there met Col. Williams, of

South Carolina, with near 400 men, and about 60 from Lincoln County, who had joined them on their march, under

Col. Hambright and Major Chronicle. After drawing rations of beef, the whole proceeded on, a little before sunset,

taking Ferguson's trail towards Deer's Ferry, on Broad river. Night coming on, and being very dark, their pilot got out

of the right way, and for some time they were lost; but before day light they reached near to the ferry, and by direction

of the officers, the pilot led them to the Cherokee ford, about a mile and a half below, as it was not known but the

enemy might be in possession of the Eastern bank of the river. It was on the morning of the 7th, before sunrise, when

they crossed the river, and marched about two miles, to the place where Ferguson had encamped on the night of the

5th.

There they halted a short time, and took such breakfast, as their wallets and saddle bags could afford. The day was

showery, and they were obliged to use their blankets and greatcoats to protect their arms from wet. They passed on a

dozen of miles without seeing any person; at length, they met a lad, in an old field, by the name of Fonderin, about

twelve or fourteen years of age, who had a brother and other relations in Ferguson's camp, and who was directly from

it, within less than three miles. A halt was ordered, and the Colonels met in consultation. Several persons knew the

ground well on which the enemy was encamped, agreeable to the information given by the boy of their position. The

plan of battle was immediately settled, that the force should be nearly equally divided, and one half would take to the

right, cross over and occupy the South-East side of the mountain, and that the other should advance to the North-

Westside, and that each division would move forward until they formed a junction, when all should face to the front,

and press upon the enemy up the sides of the mountain. Orders were given to prepare for battle, by laying aside every

encumbrance, examining well their arms and guarding against alarm. The orders were speedily obeyed, and they

moved forward over King's Creek, and up a branch and ravine, and between two rocky knobs, which when they had

passed, the top of the mountain and the enemy's camp upon it, were in full view, about 100 poles in front. Here they

halted, and tied their horses, leaving the necessary guard with them. It was now 3 o'clock in the afternoon.

The enemy's camp was to the right of the road, 70 or 80 poles in length, and on the summit of the mountain, which

at this place runs nearly North-East and South-West: (the shadow of the timber at half-past one P. M., ranges with it.)

The troops were led on In the following order: To the right, Major Winston, Col. Sevier, Col. Campbell, Col. Shelby

and Major McDowell To the left, Hambright, Col. Cleveland, and Col. Williams, of South Carolina. Each division

moved off steadily to the place assigned them in the order of battle. Some of their regiments suffered much under the

galling fire of the enemy, before they were in a position to engage in the action. Some complaints began to be uttered,

that it would never do to be shot down without returning the fire. Col. Shelby replied, "Press on to your places and

then your fire will not be lost."

The men led by Shelby and McDowell were soon closely engaged, and the contest from the first was very severe.

Williams and Cleveland were soon in their places, and with the utmost energy engaged the foe. Ferguson, finding that

the end of his line was giving way, ordered forward his regulars and riflemen, with bayonets, and made a furious

charge upon Shelby and McDowell, charging down the mountain some 200 yards. A united and destructive fire soon

compelled him to order his party back to the top of the mountain. To ward off the deadly attack from Col. Williams,

Ferguson again charged with fury down the mountain. When Shelby's men saw this, they raised the cry, "come on

men, the enemy is retreating." They rallied by the time Ferguson returned from the charge against the South

Carolinians, renewed their fire with great resolution. Ferguson again charged upon Shelby but not so far as before.

Col. Williams' men, in turn, called out, "the enemy is retreating, come on men."

At this stage of the action, Hambright and Winston had met, and a brisk fire was poured upon Ferguson's men all

around the mountain. As he would advance towards Campbell, Sevier, Winston and Hambright, he was pursued by

Shelby, McDowell, Williams and Cleveland. When he would turn his forces against the latter, the former would press

on in pursuit. Thus he struggled on, making charges and retreats, but his left was rapidly losing ground. His men were

rapidly falling before the skillful aim and unbending courage of the Whigs. Even after being wounded, he fought on

with courage. He made every effort that could be done by a brave and skillful officer, according to his position. At

length he was shot dead, and his whole command driven up into a group of 60 yards in length, and not 40 in width.

The British officer, Captain De Peyster, who took the command, ordered a white flag to be raised, in token of

surrender, but the bearer was instantly shot down. He soon had another raised, and called out for quarter. Col. Shelby

demanded, if they surrendered, why did they not throw down their arms? It was instantly done. But still the firing was

continued until Shelby and Sevier went inside the lines and ordered the men to cease. Some who kept it up, would

49

callout, "give them Beaufort's play." Alluding to Col. Beaufort's defeat by Tarleton, where no quarters were given. A

guard was placed over the prisoners and all remained on the mountain during the night.

The party which led the left wing under Col. Hambright, suffered very much, having to pass very difficult ground to

reach their place of destination, and within 80 yards of the enemy's marksmen. Col. Hambright was wounded, and

Major Chronicle was killed. Col. Williams, of South Carolina, a brave and efficient officer, was also killed. The loss

of the Whigs was not exactly ascertained, but believed to be about 30 killed and 50 wounded. The enemy had about

150 killed and all the rest taken prisoners.

On the morning of the 8th, a court-martial was held, several of the prisoners who were found guilty of murder and

other high crimes, were sentenced to be hanged. About twenty were executed. At the forks of the branch where Major

Chronicle and Captain Mattocks were buried, a monument was erected. On the East side is the following inscription:

"Sacred to the memory of Major William Chronicle and Captain John Mattocks, William Robb and John Boyd, who

were killed at this place on the 7th October, 1780, fighting in defense of America." Inscribed on the Western side

of said monument, facing the battle ground: "Col. Ferguson, an officer of his Britannic Majesty, was defeated and

killed at this place, on the 7th of October, 1780."

First-hand account of the Battle of King's Mountain

Benjamin Sharp

Militiaman from Washington Co. Virginia.

"As well as I can remember, sometime in August, in the year 1780, Col. McDowell of N. Carolina, with three

or four hundred men, fled over the mountains to the settlements of Holstein and Watauga, to evade the pursuit of a

British officer by the name of Ferguson, who had the command of a large detachment of British and Tories. Our militia

speedily embodied, all mounted on horses, the Virginians under the command of Colonel William Campbell, and the

two western counties of North Carolina (now Tennessee) under the Colonels Isaac Shelby and John Sevier, and as

soon as they joined McDowell, he recrossed the mountains and formed a junction with Colonel Cleveland, with a fine

regiment of North Carolina militia. We were now fifteen or eighteen hundred strong, and considered ourselves equal

in number, or at least a match for the enemy, and eager to bring them to battle; but Colonel McDowell, who had the

command, appeared to think otherwise, for although Ferguson had retreated on our crossing of the mountains, he kept

us marching and counter-marching for eight days without advancing a step towards our object. At length a council of

the field-officers was convened, and it was said in camp, how true I will not pretend to say, that he refused in council

to proceed without a general officer to command the army, and to get rid of him, the council deputed him to General

Green, at headquarters, to procure a general. Be this as it may, as soon as the council rose Colonel McDowell left the

camp and we saw no more of him during the expedition.

As soon as he was fairly gone the council reassembled and appointed Colonel William Campbell our

commander, and within one hour we were on our horses and in full pursuit of the enemy. The British still continued

to retreat, and after hard marching for some time, we found progress much retarded by our footmen and weak horses

that were not able to sustain the heavy duty. It was then resolved to leave the foot and weak horses under the command

of Captain William Neil, of Virginia, with instructions to follow as fast as his detachment could bear. Thus

disencumbered we gained fast upon the enemy. I think on the seventh day of October, in the afternoon, we halted at a

place called the Cow Pens, in South Carolina, fed our horses and ate a hearty meal of such provisions as we had

procured, and by dark mounted our horses, marched all night and crossed the Broad River by the dawn of the day, and

although it rained considerably in the morning, we never halted to refresh ourselves or our horses. About twelve

o'clock it cleared off with a fine cool breeze. We were joined that day by Colonel Williams, of South Carolina, with

several hundred men who informed us that they were just from the British camp, that they were posted on the top of

King's Mountain, and that there was a picket-guard on the road not far ahead of us. These men were detained least

they should find means to tell the enemy of our approach, and Colonel Shelby, with a select party undertook to surprise

50

and take the picket; this he accomplished without firing a gun or giving the least alarm, and it was hailed by the army

as a good omen.

We then moved on and as we approached the mountain the roll of the British drum informed us that we had

something to do. No doubt the British commander thought his position was a strong one, but the plan of our attack

was such as to make it the worst for him he could have chosen. The end of the mountain to our left descended gradually

to a branch; in front of us the ascent was rather abrupt and to the right was a low gap through which the low road

passed. The different regiments were directed by guides to the ground they were to occupy, so as to surround the

eminence on which the British were encamped; Campbell's to the right, along the road; Shelby's next to the left of

him; Sevier's next, and so on till last the left of Cleveland's to join the right of Campbell's, on the other side of the

mountain at the road.

Thus the British major found himself attacked on all sides at once, and so situated as to receive a galling fire

from all parts of our lines without doing any injury to ourselves. From this difficulty he attempted to relieve himself

at the point of the bayonet, but failed in three successive charges. Cleveland, who had the farthest to go, being bothered

in some swampy ground, did not occupy his position in the line until late in the engagement. A few men, drawn from

the right of Campbell's regiment, occupied this vacancy; this the British commander discovered, and here he made his

last powerful effort to force his way through and make his escape; but at that instant Cleveland's regiment came up in

gallant style; the colonel, himself, came up by the very spot I occupied, at which time his horse had received two

wounds, and he was obliged to dismount. Although fat and unwieldy, be advanced on foot with signal bravery, but

was soon remounted by one of his officers, who brought him another horse. This threw the British and Tories into

complete disorder, and Ferguson seeing that all was lost, determined not to survive the disgrace; he broke his sword,

and spurred his horse into the thickest of our ranks, and fell covered with wounds, and shortly after his whole army

surrendered with discretion. The action lasted about one hour, and for most of the time was thick and bloody.

I cannot clearly recollect the statement of our loss, given at the time, but my impression now is that it was

two hundred twenty five killed, and about as many, or a few more, wounded; the loss of the enemy must have been

much greater. The return of the prisoners taken was eleven hundred and thirty three, about fifteen hundred stand of

arms, several baggage wagons, and all their camp equipage fell into our hands. The battle closed not far from sundown,

so that we had to encamp on the ground with the dead and wounded, and pass the night among groans and

lamentations."

A Statement of the proceedings of the Western Army

25th of September, 1780, to the reduction of Major Ferguson,

and the army under his command87

On receiving intelligence that Major Ferguson had advanced as high up as Gilbert Town, in Rutherford

county, and threatened to cross the mountains to the Western waters, Col. William Campbell, with four

hundred men from Washington county, of Virginia; Col. Isaac Shelby with two hundred and forty men

from Sullivan county, North-Carolina, and Lieutenant-Col. John Sevier, with two hundred and forty men

from Washington county, North-Carolina, assembled at Watauga on the 25th of September, where they

were joined by Col. Charles McDowell, with one hundred and sixty men from the counties of Burke and

Rutherford, who had fled before the enemy to the Western waters.

We began our march on the 26th, and on the 30th, we were joined by Col. Cleveland, on the Catawba River,

with three hundred and fifty men from the counties of Wilkes and Surry. No one officer having properly a

87 Virginia Gazette, 18 Nov 1780, King's Mountain and Its Heroes: History of the Battle of King's Mountain, October 7th, 1780,

and the Events Which Led to It by Lyman C. Draper, Cincinnati, 1881, pp. 522-24.

51

right to the command-in-chief, on the 1st of October, we despatched an express to Major General Gates,

informing him of our situation, and requested him to send a general officer to take command of the whole.

In the meantime, Col. Campbell was chosen to act as commandant till such general officer should arrive.

We reached the Cow Pens, on the Broad River, in South Carolina, where we were joined by Col. James

Williams, on the evening of the 6th October, who informed us that the enemy lay encamped somewhere

near the Cherokee Ford of Broad River, about thirty miles distant form us. By a council of the principal

officers, it was then thought advisable to pursue the enemy that night with nine hundred of the best

horsemen, and leave the weak horses and footmen to follow as fast as possible. We began our march with

nine hundred of the best men about eight o'clock the same evening, marched all night, and came up with

the enemy about three o'clock P.M. of the 7th, who lay encamped on the top of King's Mountain, twelve

miles north of the Cherokee Ford, in the confidence they could not be forced from so advantageous a post.

Previous to the attack, in our march the following disposition was made:

Col. Shelby's regiment formed a column in the centre on the left; Col. Campbell's another on the right; part

of Col. Cleveland's regiment, headed by Major Winston and Col. Sevier's, formed a large column on the

right wing; the other part of Col. Cleveland's regiment composed the left wing. In this order we advanced,

and got within a quarter of a mile of the enemy before we were discovered. Col. Shelby's and col.

Campbell's regiments began the attack, and kept up a fire on the enemy while the right and left wings were

advancing forward to surround them. The engagement lasted an hour and five minutes, the greatest part of

which time a heavy and incessant fire was kept up on both sides. Our men in some parts where the regulars

fought, were obliged to give way a small distance two or three times, but rallied and returned with additional

ardour to the attack, and kept up a fire on the enemy while the right and left wings were advancing forward

to surround them. The engagement lasted an hour and five minutes, the greatest part of which time a heavy

and incessant fire was kept up on both sides. Our men in some parts where the regulars fought, were obliged

to give way a small distance two or three times, but rallied and returned with additional ardour to the attack.

The troops upon the right having gained the summit of the eminence, obliged the enemy to retreat along

the top of the ridge where Col. Cleveland commanded, and were there stopped by his brave men. A flag

was immediately hoisted by Captain Dupoister, the commanding officer, (Major Ferguson having been

killed a little before,) for a surrender. Our fire immediately ceased, and the enemy laid down their arms--

the greater part of them loaded--and surrendered themselves to us prisoners at discretion. It appears from

their own provision returns for that day, found in their camp, that their whole force consisted of eleven

hundred and twenty-five men, out of which they sustained the following loss:--Of the regulars, one Major,

one captain, two lieutenants and fifteen privates killed, thirty-five privates wounded. Left on the ground,

not able to march, two captains, four lieutenants, three ensigns, one surgeon, five sergeants; three corporals,

one drummer and fifty-nine privates taken prisoners.

Loss of the tories, two colonels, three captains, and two hundred and one privates killed; one Major and one

hundred and twenty-seven privates wounded and left on the ground not able to march; one colonel, twelve

captains, eleven lieutenants, two ensigns, one quarter-master, one adjutant, two commisissaries, eighteen

sergeants and six hundred privates taken prisoners. Total loss of the enemy, eleven hundred and five men

at King's Mountain.

Given under our hands at camp,

WILLIAM CAMPBELL,

ISAAC SHELBY,

BENJAMIN CLEVELAND

52

Royalist Account of the Battle of King's Mountain 30 Jan 178188

January 31, 1781

I think the last letter I wrote you was from Fort Moultrie, which I left a few days after.

We marched to a place called Ninety Six, which is about two hundred miles from Charleston; we lay

there about a fortnight in good quarters, after which we proceeded to the frontiers of South Carolina, and

frequently passed the line into North Carolina, and can say with propriety, that there is not a regiment or

detachment of his Majesty's service, that ever went through the fatigues, or suffered so much, as our

detachment.

That you may have some faint idea of our suffering, I shall mention a few particulars.

In the first place we were separated from all the army, acting with the militia; we never lay two nights in

one place, frequently making forced marches of twenty and thirty miles in one night; skirmishing very

often; the greatest part of our time without rum or wheat flour—rum is a very essential article, for in

marching ten miles we would often be obliged to ford two or three rivers, which wet the men up to their

waists. In this disagreeable situation, we remained till the seventh of October, when we were attacked by

two thousand five hundred Rebels, under the command of Gen. Williams.

Col. FERGUSON had under his command eight hundred militia, and our detachment, which at that time

was reduced to an hundred men. The action commenced about two o'clock in the afternoon, and was very

severe for upwards of an hour, during which the Rebels were charged and drove back several times, with

considerable slaughter.

When our detachment charged, for the first time, it fell to my lot to put a Rebel Captain to death, which I

did most effectually, with one blow of my sword; the fellow was at least six feet high, but I had rather the

advantage, as I was mounted on an elegant horse, and he on foot. But their numbers enabled them to

surround us and the North Carolina regiment, which consisted of about three hundred men.

Seeing this, and numbers being out of ammunition which naturally threw the rest of the militia into

confusion, our gallant little detachment, which consisted of only seventy men, exclusive of twenty who

acted as dragoons, and ten who drove wagons, etc., when we marched to the field of action, were all

killed and wounded but twenty, and those brave fellows were soon crowded into an heap by the militia.

Capt. DePEYSTER, on whom the command devolved, seeing it impossible to form six men together,

thought it necessary to surrender, to save the lives of the brave men who were left.

We lost in this action, Maj. FERGUSON, of the Seventy-first regiment, a man strongly attached to his

King and country, well informed in the art of war, brave, humane, and an agreeable companion—in short,

he was universally esteemed in the army, and I have every reason to regret his unhappy fate.

We lost eighteen men killed on the spot—Capt. RYERSON and thirty-two Sergeants and privates

wounded, of Maj. FERGUSON's detachment. Lieutenant M'GINNIS of ALLEN's regiment, Skinner's

brigade, killed; taken prisoners, two Captains, four Lieutenants, three Ensigns, one Surgeon, and fifty-

88 (Extracted from King's Mountain and Its Heroes: History of the Battle of King's Mountain, October 7th, 1780, and the Events

Which Led to It. Lyman C. Draper, Cincinnati, 1881, pp. 516-517)

53

four Sergeants and privates, including the wounded, wagoners, etc. The militia killed, one hundred,

including officers; wounded, ninety; taken prisoners about six hundred; our baggage all taken, of course.

The Rebels lost Brig.-Gen. Williams, and one hundred and thirty-five, including officers, killed; wounded

nearly equal to ours.

The morning after the action we were marched sixteen miles, previous to which orders were given by the

Rebel Col. Campbell (whom the command devolved on) that should they be attacked on their march, they

were to fire on, and destroy their prisoners. The party was kept marching two days without any kind of

provisions. The officers' baggage, on the third day's march, was all divided among the Rebel officers.

Shortly after we were marched to Bickerstaff's settlement, where we arrived on the thirteenth. On the

fourteenth, a court martial, composed of twelve field officers, was held for the trial of the militia

prisoners; when, after a short hearing, they condemned thirty of the most principal and respectable

characters, whom they considered to be most inimical to them, to be executed; and, at six o'clock in the

evening of the same day, executed Col. MILLS, Capt. CHITWOOD, Capt. Wilson, and six privates;

obliging every one of their officers to attend at the death of those brave, but unfortunate Loyalists, who

all, with their last breath and blood, held the Rebels and their cause as infamous and base, and as they

were turning off, extolled their King and the British Government.

On the morning of the fifteenth, Col. CAMPBELL had intelligence that Col. TARLETON was

approaching him, when he gave orders to his men, that should Col. TARLETON come up with them, they

were immediately to fire on Capt. DePEYSTER and his officers, who were in the front, and then a second

volley on the men. During this day's march the men were obliged to give thirty-five Continental dollars

for a single ear of Indian corn, and forty for a drink of water, they not being allowed to drink when

fording a river; in short, the whole of the Rebels' conduct from the surrender of the party into their hands

is incredible to relate. Several of the militia that were worn out with fatigue, and not being able to keep

up, were cut down, and trodden to death in the mire.

After the party arrived at Moravian Town, in North Carolina, we officers were ordered in different

houses. Dr. JOHNSON (who lived with me) and myself were turned out of our bed at an unseasonable

hour of the night, and threatened with immediate death if we did not make room for some of

CAMPBELL's officers; Dr. JOHNSON was, after this, knocked down, and treated in the basest manner,

for endeavoring to dress a man whom they had cut on the march.

The Rebel officers would often go in amongst the prisoners, draw their swords, cut down and wound

those whom their wicked and savage minds prompted. This is a specimen of Rebel lenity—you may

report it without the least equivocation, for upon the word and honor of a gentleman, this description is

not equal to their barbarity. This kind of treatment made our time pass away very disagreeably.

After we were in Moravian Town about a fortnight, we were told we could not get paroles to return within

the British lines; neither were we to have any till we were moved over the mountains in the back parts of

Virginia, where we were to live on hoe cake and milk; in consequence of this, Capt. TAYLOR, Lieut.

STEVENSON and myself, chose rather to trust the hand of fate, and agreeable to our inclinations, set out

from Moravian Town the fifth of November, and arrived at the British lines the twentieth.

From this town to Ninety Six, which was the first post we arrived at, is three hundred miles; and from

Ninety Six to Charleston, two hundred, so that my route was five hundred miles. The fatigues of this jaunt

I shall omit till I see you, although I suffered exceedingly; but thank God am now in Charlestown in good

quarters.

54

The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour

By Lieutenant Colonel John Moncure

Combat Studies Institute U.S. Army Command and General Staff College

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-6900

55

THE CAMPAIGN IN THE CAROLINAS,

1780-1781

When [the British Commander, Sir Henry] Clinton sailed south, he hoped, as a preliminary step to

the eventual subjugation of the colonies, to secure the broad base of operations denied him and his

predecessors farther north. The campaign plan was simple enough. Operating from a secure base at

Savannah, Georgia, Clinton would seize the key port of Charleston and then destroy the isolated pockets of

resistance in the upcountry. The French fleet had the potential to disrupt communications from Charleston

to Savannah, New York, and England, but this threat had yet to be realized since the fleet's arrival in

American waters. As was the case throughout the war, the Americans reacted to British initiatives.

Consistent with Washington's overall strategy, militia units harassed the British until regulars could hurry

south to counter the threat.

The campaign that ensued in the Carolinas was characterized, on the one hand, by rapid movement

of light troops, either regular or militia, and, on the other, by brutal guerrilla warfare of rebel and Tory

bands. While both armies contained regular troops, terrain and tactics dictated the predominance of light

fighters.1 The Carolinas counted but two cities in the eighteenth century, Georgetown and Charleston.

Beyond these ports, scattered settlements formed a loose network of frontier civilization having little in

common with the coastal aristocracy. The river network in South Carolina flowed generally southeast from

the rugged hills around modern-day Spartanburg to the inhospitable swampland along the coast. The major

water arteries-the Savannah, Santee, and Great Pedee Rivers-afforded rapid movement of supplies and

troops by small boats only, and the vast pine woods in between could only be traversed slowly and

painstakingly (see map 2).

Main armies were intended for decisive action on the battlefield, but getting them to it was a

Herculean task. The baggage customary in an eighteenth-century army encumbered it on the march. An

infantry regiment such as the 7th Royal Fusiliers, with an establishment of 477 men, required four wagons

and sixteen horses by regulation and probably hired more on campaign.3 A 12-pounder artillery piece

weighed 3,200 pounds and required a team of twelve horses to pull it. Even Tarleton's light baggage became

an issue as he raced to meet Morgan in the winter of 1780-81.4

Sir Henry Clinton Morgan

Lord Charles Cornwallis

56

On both sides, partisans who enrolled in provisional or militia companies could reasonably be

expected to move as quickly as light infantry-which in many ways, they were. These units were raised

because both sides suffered from too few regulars, and because the militia tradition was already well-

established in the colonies. Since the partisans were not part of a regular establishment, commanders could

not rely on their presence at a time of crisis. 5 And because the iron discipline and restraint customary in

European armies of the day was foreign to these stubbornly independent frontiersmen, they were more

likely to commit the sort of excesses forbidden (if still too often practiced) by regulars. The South Carolina

militia, having seen action against Indians before and during the Revolution, had long been accustomed to

unfettered brutality. Their traditional tactics were the ambush and the raid; their tools were rapid movement,

terror as a psychological weapon, and rapid analysis of intelligence gained from scouts and spies. In

accomplishing their mission to suppress Tory sentiment, they tended to use their customary methods. 6 One

participant remarked that, when the army left, "it was now almost Fire & Faggot between Whig & Tory,

who were contending for ascendancy continued so till the 15th or 20th of May [1781]."7 Reprisal and

retaliation followed as passions became enflamed, and the conflict in the south resembled more a civil war

than fighting according to the rules of organized warfare.

57

From the summer of 1778, the war in the north became a stalemate; the armed might of Great

Britain had managed to secure the city of New York, while the Hudson highlands and New Jersey remained

firmly in American hands. Using the only advantage he had, the Royal Navy, Clinton took his army south

where it could range through a supposedly friendly countryside without fear of detachments being

ambushed by Washington's Continentals. By the time Clinton moved south, Savannah had been taken, and

Prevost's St. Augustine garrison had moved north to assist in the recapture of Georgia. Clinton saw

Charleston as the logical target: Charleston was the seat of the colony, and its seaport facilities would be

essential as a command and control and logistics base for the eventual subjugation of South Carolina, the

taking of which would assist Prevost's efforts in Georgia. Lincoln, commanding the strong defenses that

Brigadier General William Moultrie had successfully defended in 1776, unwisely concentrated his 5,000

troops in the city against the seaborne threat. Clinton arrived with 6,000 troops on 11 February 1780,

delaying until 7 March to erect batteries on the Ashley River opposite the city. Finally reinforced by 4,000

additional troops, Clinton isolated the defenders by land and sea and snipped Lincoln's line of

communications by sending Banastre Tarleton thirty miles up the Cooper River to crush a small band of

American militia there. Over a month into the siege, Lincoln surrendered his force-including the entire

Continental establishment of North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia. This may have been the greatest

blow to the American cause in the war. 8

With Charleston a secure logistics base, Clinton was able to send detachments to destroy the

remaining opposition in the region. Tarleton, who had already proved himself to be an aggressive, ruthless,

and decisive cavalry leader, chased down the rebels. Because the militia bands traveled light and were

elusive, Tarleton's force was tailored to move faster than its opponents could run. The main component of

his force was the Legion, an 800-man Loyalist force of light infantry and cavalry. In May 1780, Tarleton

caught Colonel Abraham Buford's militia at Waxhaws and destroyed them, earning the frightening

sobriquet "Bloody Tarleton."9 With this success, Clinton returned to New York, hoping to catch

Washington, now weakened from sending reinforcements south. Clinton appointed his deputy Cornwallis

to sweep away the remaining detachments of partisans, secure the loyalty of South Carolina, and plan a

campaign into North Carolina.10 Cornwallis chased the remaining rebel bands, led by such heroes as

Francis Marion and Thomas Sumter, into the swamps and backcountry. With the rebels on the run, long-

suppressed Tories began to take their revenge. The rebellion in South Carolina, far from subsiding, became

a vicious civil war.

As the British swept away the opposition, the Continental Congress reacted with alarm and sent

more Continentals to the theater. Major General Baron de Kalb, one of a group of foreign adventurers and

idealists drawn to the American conflict, was the first commander to come south to apply a tourniquet to

bleeding Carolina. The Continental Congress felt, however, that it was inappropriate for a foreigner to

command a theater of the war. Against the advice of Washington, de

Kalb was replaced by Gates who was considered to be the victor of Saratoga.

Gates assumed command of about 4,200 Continentals and militia on 25 July 1780. Driven by local

pressure to boost sagging morale and to preempt a British invasion of North Carolina, he immediately

seized the initiative. When intelligence reports indicated that Cornwallis had left a detachment at Camden,

Gates hurried his Continentals and militia there. In his haste, he almost overlooked his cavalry which-

surprisingly, considering the strength and reputation of Tarleton's force-he held as inconsequential in any

case. As one sympathetic historian has observed, Gates intended to occupy breastworks and force an

outmaneuvered British contingent to assault them. Thus, cavalry may have seemed unnecessary to him. I2

In any event, the Americans arrived bone tired and hungry only to discovered that that Cornwallis had

returned. On 16 August, an inferior force of 2, 200 British regulars scattered the North Carolina and Virginia

militia and then outflanked the Delaware and Maryland regulars, killing their commander, de Kalb. Gates

fled the field with the militia, discrediting himself in the process. Two days later, Tarleton defeated Sumter’s

South Carolina militiamen, killing 150 patriots and wounding another 300.

58

Having defeated both Gates and Sumter, Cornwallis had reason to believe that South Carolina was

safe-but only for the time being. Clinton had left Cornwallis considerable latitude in his prosecution of the

war. He had instructed only that South Carolina, and Charleston in particular, be safeguarded at all costs.

Cornwallis, for his part, saw the invasion of North Carolina as the only way to achieve Clinton's objectives.

To guarantee his recent successes, Cornwallis determined to move boldly into North Carolina. Sending a

small detachment to Cape Fear to establish a closer logistics base, he continued his march north toward

Charlotte and the main rebel army and directed Major Patrick Ferguson on a raid against partisans in the

west. At King's Mountain in October 1780, Ferguson's Loyalists met partisans who had come down from

the Tennessee hills. There, Ferguson was surrounded and his men killed at long range by accurate rifle fire

from marksmen hidden in the woods below. This first setback for the British caused Cornwallis to retire

from Charlotte to Winnsboro, centrally located to enable him to cover South Carolina while he waited for

Major General Alexander Leslie, sent south by Clinton, to arrive. Together, he thought, his and Leslie's

troops could clear the Carolinas of rebels.

The victory at King's Mountain was not enough to save Gates' sullied reputation. He was relieved

in December by Nathaniel Greene who had always been Washington's selection for command m the south.

Greene was a pudgy thirty-eight-year-old Quaker from Rhode Island. By most accounts, he was disavowed

by the Society of Friends for having raised a company of militia in 1774. In fact, he and acquaintances had

visited "a place in Connecticut of Publick Resort [a tavern] where they had No Proper Business." He was

subsequently suspended.14 He was not selected for captain by the men because, as a consequence of a limp,

he cut a poor figure of an officer. Humbly, he served in the ranks until, in 1775, he was selected by the

colonial assembly to command its contingent to the Continental Army. He fought alongside Washington

in every major action, earning his commander's highest regard. Greene confronted a mixed situation in the

south: the conditions were desperate, morale in the army was low, and his predecessor had failed miserably;

but, on the positive side, he had free rein and the financial authority and moral support of Congress to

restore the army, and he held the unlimited confidence of the commander in chief. Nonetheless, he

approached his task cautiously. To Congress, Greene wrote, "He [Greene] is conscious of his deficiencies,

but if he is clothed with proper powers and receives the necessary support, he is not altogether without

hopes of prescribing some bounds to the ravages of the enemy."16 Despite the reputation he earned in the

Carolinas, Nathanael Greene was a cautious, conservative commander.17

The new commander of the Southern Department managed to assemble just over 1,000

Continentals and militia of Gates' command. 18 The task Washington had assigned him was formidable.

Five days after arriving in Charlotte, he wrote, "Nothing can be more wretched and distressing than the

condition of the troops, starving with cold and hunger, without tents and camp equipage."19 He addressed

his formidable energy to the spirit of his army, creating in his headquarters an impression of determination

and purpose. He appointed a new slate of staff officers, inspected formations, prepared to move the army,

hanged a deserter, and demanded greater exertions from his commissary.

Although outnumbered, Greene recognized his advantages at once and sought to capitalize upon

them. With large (if scattered) numbers of militia and sympathizers in the west, he could keep well informed

of Cornwallis' whereabouts. This asset enabled him to deviate from accepted rules of war. Although he

could not defeat Cornwallis, he could nibble away at the British army, avoid destruction of his own force,

and simultaneously attend to the dire logistical imperatives that overshadowed his operational plans. 21 To

compensate for the lack of forage in Charlotte, he made the often-criticized decision to move his army to

Cheraw where Colonel Tadeusz Kosciuszko had found adequate supplies.2 This movement could have

telegraphed the wrong message to patriots in the western Carolinas, as Cheraw Hill was farther from

Cornwallis than Charlotte. However, Greene, by sending a detachment under Morgan into South Carolina,

sought to make Cornwallis divide his forces as well.23 Logistical considerations played an important role

in the planning and outcome of the campaign. Difficulties in foraging may have forced Greene to seek a

plan that allowed him to disperse his force sufficiently. While he realized Morgan's precarious position, he

believed that intelligence gained from local patriots would keep Morgan sufficiently informed to avoid

being surprised and to allow the army to combine quickly enough to defeat whatever force Cornwallis sent

after him.

59

In his operational directive of 16 December 1780, Greene told Morgan to conduct a prudent

campaign designed to call attention to itself. The order contained four critical components. First, Morgan

was to raise such militia as could be found, in particular those led by brigadier generals Thomas Sumter

and William Davidson (the latter of North Carolina). Second, he was to protect patriot settlements west of

the Catawba River and "spirit up the people." Third, he was "to annoy the enemy in that quarter [the west]."

And, finally, should Cornwallis snap at the bait, Greene directed Morgan to move to join with the main

army. Paramount in the plan was the survival of Morgan's forces. The directive was clear and precise in its

provisions yet gave the experienced Virginia rifleman adequate room for interpretation as the campaign

developed.

Morgan's actions indicate clearly his method of achieving Greene's intent. Marching about fifty-

five miles, he moved into South Carolina on 21 December 1780, arriving on the Pacolet River at Grindal

Shoals on Christmas day (see map 3). There he encamped his army.24 To shelter his men from the

elements, he directed that huts be constructed. From this base, he sent raiding and foraging parties into the

countryside to raise the western counties and attract Cornwallis' attention. Meanwhile, he sent word to

Colonels Andrew Pickens and Sumter to join him. Lieutenant Colonel William Washington, with almost

300 horsemen, attacked Hammond's Store, killing and wounding about 150 Tories.25 Colonel Hays of the

South Carolina militia took fifty men to Fort William, where he chased the Tory garrison away and burned

the fort. Reports of these forays led Cornwallis to fear for the safety of Ninety Six, which he considered to

be the cornerstone of his defenses in the western part of the colony. Contrary to the impression left us by

numerous authors.26 Morgan was not a prey to be cornered on the Broad River by the huntsman Tarleton;

Morgan was boldly teasing the British into a rash move.

For the first time in the southern campaign, and as a consequence of the British disaster at King's

Mountain, the Americans had gained the initiative in the south. Now, Cornwallis could not direct his entire

army against either wing of Greene's force without exposing Charleston to attack or the western region to

intimidation. In response to Morgan's foray into western South Carolina, Cornwallis directed his forces in

three prongs, moving (in theory) within a day's march of each other toward the irritating rebels. Leading

was Cornwallis' favorite, Tarleton.27 Bringing up the heavy troops, artillery, and baggage, Cornwallis

would march up the east bank of the Broad

River with over 3,300 troops. Leslie would hurry to join the army with his 1,500 men. Tarleton's light force,

leading the army, would fix the enemy, after which the regulars would destroy him. As the British forces

marched only one day from each other, enemy contact with any prong could result in friendly forces coming

to its support. The additional advantages of moving on separate axes were logistical. Parallel routes would

reduce the length of the column and thus minimize the time required for the trail element to reach the front

as it deployed for battle. Also, smaller columns would be easier to feed.

The British plans went awry almost immediately. Cornwallis' army soon became uncoupled as

Tarleton moved with the swiftness his formation afforded him, and Leslie became mired in the swamps.

Swollen rivers slowed the movement of all the columns. Additionally, Cornwallis lacked the urgency

required of him to catch Morgan. 28 Although he urged Tarleton to ever greater exertions, his own

movements portray a sense of frustration, perhaps at the slowness of his baggage-laden columns. Perhaps

he assumed incorrectly that the swollen rivers that blocked him were a barrier to Tarleton as well. He also

dallied, hoping that Leslie, who had landed in Charleston on 14 December, might catch up. But the dashing

cavalry officer Tarleton saw no impediment; he swam his horses across the rivers and made rafts for the

troops. While Cornwallis hoped Tarleton could fix and destroy Morgan, he knew the main army would be

powerless to help.

In early January, both Tarleton and Cornwallis were within twenty four-hours march of each other

and placed generally between Morgan on the Pacolet River and Greene at Cheraw Hill. On 7 January,

Tarleton's baggage caught up to him at Briarly's Creek, in the company of 200 recruits of the 7th Regiment,

50 dragoons, and a second 3-pounder. Hearing reports of reinforcements joining Morgan, Tarleton applied

for and received permission to retain the escort.29 But the swollen rivers plagued Cornwallis' march and

inhibited combination by the two commanders. Thus, Cornwallis failed to control Tarleton in a coordinated

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move that would have combined the three formations against Morgan. Cornwallis' otherwise reasonable

calculations violated the fundamental requirement that components of an army be synchronized.

Morgan also found the going difficult. He complained that "Forage and provisions are not to be

had." And yet he feared the consequence of leaving the country in search of more hospitable campaigning

grounds. Greene authorized him to seek provisions as far south as Ninety Six, which put even greater

distance between their two forces.31 Without realizing it, Greene, by this direction, may also have led

Cornwallis to fear for the safety of Loyalists in the area, thus causing the British general to spur on Tarleton

to find Morgan.32 Tarleton may have believed, from information he received from spies, that Morgan

intended to threaten Ninety Six.33

Even more startling than the logistical concerns in Morgan's correspondence is his plainspoken fear

for the survival of his force. 34 Two days before the meeting at the Cowpens, Morgan wrote to Greene that

he would be unable to fight because of the size of Tarleton's detachment, accurately estimated at between

1,100 and 1,200 men. He knew of Tarleton's whereabouts and believed himself to be the quarry. He

informed his commander that he had only 340 volunteers from three states and doubted their reliability in

a battle. With the Continentals and Virginians, his force numbered over 900 on that date. Then, as now, a

deployed force in defensive positions has the advantage over an attacker. 35 Thus, Morgan must have

weighed the reputation of his opponent and the British troops very highly. Certainly, the reverses at

Waxhaws and Camden had tempered the judgment of the American leaders, while the patriot victory at

King's Mountain was dismissed as an aberration.

Lamenting his inability to control the militia and decrying his numbers, Morgan told his superior

that he possessed inadequate strength for "attempts you have hinted at."36 Greene did not direct Morgan in

writing to fight a pitched battle. His clear instructions regarding the British forces were that, should

Cornwallis move on Greene, Morgan should rejoin the main army or strike the flank or rear of the British

columns. The only clear implication in the letter was that Morgan should avoid battle, which is precisely

what Morgan wanted to do. Perhaps Greene and Morgan had discussed in Charlotte the possibility that

Morgan would be the target. Perhaps Morgan lost his nerve. From his subsequent behavior, the former

seems more likely.

Tarleton had no such misgivings. Sometimes called "The Green Dragoon" or "Bloody Banny," he

had assumed the identity of the English gentry-warrior class. Cecil Woodham-Smith describes that group:

War was an aristocratic trade, and military glory reserved for nobles and princes.

Glittering squadrons of cavalry, long lines of infantry, wheeling obediently on the

parade ground, ministered to the lust both for power and for display. Courage was

esteemed the essential military quality and held to be a virtue exclusive to

aristocrats. Were they not educated to courage, trained, as no common man was

trained, by years of practice in dangerous sports? They glorified courage, called it

valour, saw war in terms of valour as the supreme adventure.37

The Tarletons were not members of this social elite, but they were a family of substance. A great

grandfather outfitted and commanded one of Oliver Cromwell's warships. Tarleton's father was a successful

Liverpool businessman, Jamaica plantation owner, and slave trader. 38 Banastre Tarleton entered Oxford

with his elder brother in 1771, and he remained there until the death of his father in 1773. With an

inheritance of £5,000, he left Oxford to study law. This subject appears not to have interested him; after

two years of idling in gaming salons he purchased a cornetship in the 1st Regiment of Dragoon Guards.

The post cost his mother £800.

The choice of regiments indicates young Tarleton's character. Cavalry represented the concepts of

glory, courage, and chivalry that inhabited the aristocratic world to which he aspired-that of the knight in

shining armor. Not only that, but the King's Dragoon Guards was the senior line cavalry unit and one of the

more prestigious regiments of the army. Tarleton, however, was no mere parade ground dandy. When an

opportunity came for service in America, he arranged to be posted to the 16th Light Dragoons. Although

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cavalry, these were field troops scorned by the status-conscious. They were light, agile men mounted on

polo ponies, organized and equipped to maintain constant contact with the enemy, hunt them down, and

hold them for the regulars to kill. The 16th was raised in 1759 after a successful experiment three years

earlier.40 The regiment deployed in the fall of 1775.

In America, Tarleton distinguished himself almost immediately. At Princeton, his men captured

Lee 41-the young dragoon personally escorting his prisoner to Lord Cornwallis. Tarleton not only caught

Cornwallis' eye, his success also led the patriotic citizenry of Liverpool to elect him captain of .their

volunteer company. Campaigning in New Jersey gave Tarleton greater notoriety after his horsemen cruelly

subdued the rebellious population. With the passing of command from Howe to Clinton in 1778, shakeups

in the staff resulted in Tarleton being named brigade major. It was Major Tarleton in command of the 17th

Light Dragoons who charged at Monmouth, causing Lee's withdrawal and subsequent disgrace.42 Grateful

for the part the impetuous cavalryman played was the British commander, Cornwallis. Tarleton fully

embraced H. Lloyd's offensive doctrine: "No army conquers merely by resisting: you may repel an enemy;

but victory is the result of action."43 Upon the creation in August 1778 of a mixed light regiment of green-

clad English, Scottish, and Loyalist volunteers, the officer selected to command it was Tarleton, now

promoted to lieutenant colonel at the age of twenty-six. He could attribute his meteoric rise to feats of valor

alone; neither wealth nor family connections (he had none) influenced his status. The lesson was clear:

courage and resolve were rewarded; indeed, they were a vehicle for social mobility.

As Tarleton hunted the ragtag Americans, his greatest problem was to get to Morgan before the

latter could cross the Broad River and rejoin the main American army (see map 4). Tarleton did not consider

defeat a possibility, although he expected Cornwallis would meet him, leaving the issue without doubt. He

believed his commander was moving, albeit more slowly, to support him. Indeed, he suggested gently that

Cornwallis hurry to King's Mountain. He also expected the third prong of the army, Leslie's, to be within

supporting distance. A report of the presence of American artillery-the consequence of an American ruse

in which logs were attached to wagon wheels and paraded in front of Colonel Ridgely's or Rugely's) Tory

garrison on 28 November 1780-concerned him, but Cornwallis assured Tarleton in a letter dated 2 January

1781 that this information was incorrect.45 Tarleton's instincts told him to pursue as quickly as he could;

his commander urged the same.

Tarleton finally found Morgan-or, more accurately, Morgan allowed himself to be found-at

Hannah's Cowpens, a location known well to locals and therefore an appropriate rallying point for militia

speeding to Morgan's assistance. Within an hour, Cornwallis had lost the most effective and mobile force

available to him. Although Morgan had won a decisive tactical victory, he still faced a far superior, if

slower, force under Cornwallis. Morgan hurried his small band of veterans back across the Broad River to

North Carolina, Greene, and safety (see maps 5, 6, and 7). Still possessing most of his strength and

determined to see the campaign through, Cornwallis followed Morgan and Greene north, attempting in vain

to destroy the rebel force. The chase sapped British strength, even as Greene gathered supporters from

heartened Carolinians. By early spring, Greene's force had swollen to 4,300, while the British army had

dwindled to about 2,000. Although Greene sought to avoid combat, he could not resist the opportunity

Cornwallis presented him. He turned to meet his hunter at Guilford Court House on 15 March.

Cornwallis won the battle but failed to destroy Greene's army. He also failed to rally significant support

from colonists in the region.

Cornwallis continued to follow Greene for two weeks but the campaign had failed. Leaving

Lieutenant Colonel Rawdon in command of British troops in South Carolina, Cornwallis marched to

Wilmington and then Yorktown. Continued fighting in the Carolinas failed to alter the course set at King's

Mountain and the Cowpens. Battles were won and lost by each side, yet none was decisive. The outcome

of the war in the south was, in large measure, a consequence of the operational plans of the contesting

commanders. Clinton, and in his stead Cornwallis, saw the campaign as a series of opportunities: success

at Savannah could be secured by moving on Charleston; complete control of South Carolina could be gained

by threatening North Carolina. In each case, the British commander's objectives became broader as his

assets dwindled in a hostile country. In contrast, Greene's objective was to boost the morale of colonists

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sympathetic to the American cause. This objective did not require open battle. While he assured the survival

of his own army, he raised the militia to assist in the whittling down of his opponent's forces. In the

eighteenth century, battles occurred only when both commanders determined to stand and fight. In the vast

wildernesses of the south, Greene could rest fairly assured that Cornwallis could not comer him. Thus, the

American campaign plan, simple and mindful of the situation in the theater of war, permitted tactical

commanders (including Greene) to err on the battlefield without altering substantially the course of the war

in the south.

NOTES I. Weigley, Army, 69-73. For a detailed analysis, see also Jae Weller, "Irregular but Effective: Partisan Weapons Tactics in

the American Revolution, Southern Theater," Military Affairs 21, no. 3 (1957):118-31. 2. For a discussion of South Carolina society, see Robert Stansbury Lambert, South Carolina Loyalists in the American

Revolution (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1987), 4-9; M. F. Treasy, Prelude to Yorktown: The Southern

Campaign o/Nathanael Greene, 1780-1781 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1963), 3-12.

3. Five wagons were delivered to the regiment in May 1777. See Curtis, British Army, 187, 188.

4. See Tarleton-Cornwallis Letters 7-10, Appendix D, 175-77. Citations without titles refer to primary sources reproduced

in the appendix of this volume.

5. See Appendix B, for example, the loose organization described in Sexton's memoir, 100. 6. See Clyde R. Ferguson, "Functions of the Partisan-Militia in the South during the American Revolution: An

Interpretation," in Higgins, Revolutionary War, 239-58. 7. Guyton memoir, 132.

8. For a detailed description of the siege, see Sir Henry Clinton, The American Rebellion, ed. William B. Willcox (New

York: Archon Books, 1971), 157-72. See also John C. Cavanaugh, "American Military Leadership in the Southern

Campaign: Benjamin Lincoln," in Higgins, Revolutionary War, 101-31. 9. The engagement is sometimes referred to as "Buford's Defeat." Most historians describe the action as a massacre, as

Tarleton apparently ordered or condoned the killing of Americans under a white flag, in an act thereafter described as

"Tarleton's Quarter." However, Virginia pension records show that a substantial number of Americans, though wounded,

survived the battle and were paroled or discharged. Given the passions aroused by this sort of war, some excesses are

likely to have occurred; however, at some point, the killing must have stopped short of massacre.

10. Ira D. Gruber, "British Southern Strategy," in Higgins, Revolutionary War, 228. See also Clinton, Rebellion, 190, 191.

11. De Kalb remained to command the Continentals in the Southern Army. 12. Paul David Nelson, "Major General Horatio Gates as a Military Leader: The Southern Experience," in Higgins,

Revolutionary War, 142. Nelson is more critical of Gates in "Horatio Gates in the Southern Department, 1780: Serious

Errors and a Costly Defeat," North Carolina Historical Review 50 (1973):256-72.

13. In a letter of 6 August 1780, Cornwallis wrote: "It may be doubted by some whether the invasion of North Carolina

may be a prudent measure. But I am convinced that it is a necessary one and that, if we do not attack that province, we

must give up both South Carolina and Georgia and retire within the walls of Charleston." See Clinton, Rebellion, 448.

14. Dederer, Straw, 62, n. 9.

15. John S. Pancake, This Destructive War: The British Campaign in the Carolinas 1780-1781 (University: University of

Alabama Press, 1985), 127; Theodore Thayer, Nathanael Greene: Strategist of the American Revolution (New York:

Twayne, 1960); Elswyth Thane, The Fighting Quaker: Nathanael Greene (New York: Hawthorn Books, 1972). For

fulsome praise, see the description by Alexander Garden, Greene's aide, in Anecdotes of the Revolutionary War in America

(Charleston, SC: A. E. Miller, 1822), 76-84.

16. Greene to the president of Congress, Philadelphia, 27 October 1780, cited in George Washington Greene, The Life of

Nathanael Greene, vol. 3 (New York: Hurd & Houghton, 1871), 35-36.

17. This is also the conclusion of Dennis Michael Conrad, who analyzed Greene's generalship in "Nathanael Greene and

the Southern Campaign," Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1979.

18. The first returns included 2,307 men, of whom 1,482 were fit for duty; only 949 were Continentals. These and ninety

cavalry and sixty artillery comprised the army. In a letter Greene wrote to Lafayette, he complained that his "whole force

fit for duty that (were) properly clothed and properly equipt (did) not amount to 800 men." Greene to Lafayette, 29

December 1780, cited in Greene, Life, vol.3, 70.

19. Jared Sparks, ed., Correspondence of the American Revolution, vol. 3 (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1853), 166.

Compare Lawrence E. Babits' figures in "Greene's Strategy in the Southern Campaign, 1780--1781," in Adapting to

Conditions War and Society in the Eighteenth Century, ed. Maarten Ultee (University: University of Alabama Press,

1986), 136-37.

20. See Greene, Life, vol. 3, 68-82; Thayer, Greene, 293; see Seymour memoir, Appendix B, 102.

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21. Babits observes that "throughout the Southern campaign, Greene acted as if he were still the quartermaster general

who had brought order to the supply of the Continental Army under Washington," in "Campaign," 148.

22. Since the maneuver produced the desired results, historians more often raise their eyebrows at Greene's boldness;

however, they invariably remark on the violation of the principle. See, for example, James Boone Bartholomees, "Fight

or Flee: The Combat Performance of the North Carolina Militia in the Cowpens-Guilford Court House Campaign, January

to March, 1781," Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1978; George F. Scheer and Hugh F. Rankin, Rebels and Redcoats (New

York: The World Publishing Company, 1957), 425, 426. See also Greene-Morgan Letter 2, 212.

23. For a discussion of Greene's operational concept, see Weigley, War, 29-36. See also Edwin C. Bearss, The Battle of the

Cowpens (Washington, DC: Office of Archeology and Historical Preservation, U.S. Department of the Interior,

1967), 1. The original suggestion that Morgan conduct a raid was put forward by North Carolina militia General William

Davidson in a letter dated 27 November 1780. See Chalmers Gaston Davidson, Piedmont Partisan: The Life and Times of

Brigadier-General William Lee Davidson (Davidson, NC: Davidson College Press, 1951), 98.

24. For descriptions of the march, see Appendix B, Captain Kirkwood's diary, 97, 114; Captain William Beatty's diary, 99;

Sergeant Major Seymour's journal, 102-4.

25. See Appendix B, Hammond memoir, 96; Seymour memoir, 102; Everhart memoir, 104; Copeland memoir, 105; Dial

memoir, 106; Guyton memoir, 108.

26. See Richard M. Ketchum, "Men of the American Revolution XVI: Daniel Morgan," American Heritage 27 (1976):97;

David Schenck, North Carolina 1780-1781 (Raleigh, NC: Edwards and Broughton, 1889), 203-4. R. Don Higginbotham,

in a biographical sketch of Morgan, writes, "Morgan, falling back toward the border of the Carolinas, made a stand against

Tarleton at the Cowpens." See "Daniel Morgan," American Military Leaders, ed. Roger J. Spiller (New York: Praeger,

1989), 219. See also Conrad, "Greene," 103. Higginbotham’s more detailed explanation in Daniel Morgan, Revolutionary

Rifleman (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1961), 130-31, portrays a more accurate picture of the events.

27. Cornwallis sent Tarleton the order to move on I January 1781. See Tarleton campaign narrative, Appendix B, 112-15.

28. By contrast, Ira D. Gruber portrays Cornwallis as "a confident, gregarious man, filled with energy, and capable of

acting decisively even rashly." "Britain's Southern Strategy," in Higgins, Revolutionary War, 213.

29. See Cornwallis-Tarleton Letters 7 and 8, Appendix D, 175-76. Tarleton had requested the baggage only on 4 January;

see Cornwallis-Tarleton Letter 7, 175-76.

30. See Appendix B, Seymour for a description of the conditions of the troops, 102.

31. See Greene-Morgan Letter 3, Appendix D, 163-64.

32. See Cornwallis-Tarleton Letters 1 and 4, Appendix D, 112-13, 174.

33. See Cornwallis-Tarleton Letters 1 and 4, Appendix D, 112-13, 174.

34. See Greene-Morgan Letter 4, Appendix D, 164-65.

35. Writing from his observations a scant two decades after the battle of the Cowpens, the great military theorist Carl von

Clausewitz wrote, "We maintain unequivocally that the form of warfare we call defense not only offers greater probability

of victory than attack, but that its victories can attain the same proportions and results," On War, ed. and trans. Michael

Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 392.

36. See Appendix D, Greene-Morgan Letter 8, 15 January, 169-70.

37. The Reason Why (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1960), 1.

38. For more details of Tarleton's background, see Robert D. Bass, The Green Dragoon (Columbia, SC: Sandlapper

Press, 1972), 11-31.

39. Until the nineteenth century, commissions in the British Anny were reserved for those who could afford them, in the

belief that the monied classes were schooled for the hardships of military service and were more likely to possess the

courage required for it. The cost, £800, may have been a bargain; the same position in the Horse-Guards cost £1,200. The

annual pay of a comet of dragoons was only £255. See Curtis, British Army, 158, 159.

40. R. Money Barnes, A History of the Regiments & Uniforms of the British Army (London: Seeley Service & Co.,

1964), 38, 66. The first known light cavalry in modem Europe were Magyar volunteers. Similar formations were in use in

European armies by the end of the seventh century, the English adopting them only with reluctance because of their

irregular origins. See David Chandler, The Art of Warfare in the Age of Marlborough (New York: Hippocrene Books,

1976), 37-41; John W. Fortescue, A History of the 17th Lancers (London: Macmillan, 1895), 5, 6. For comparison, see

Christopher Duffy, The Army of Frederick the Great (New York: Hippocrene Books, 1974), 98-102.

41. Ironically, as an officer in the British Ariny, Charles Lee had actually served in the 16th Light Dragoons in Portugal.

See Bass, Dragoon, 20.

42. Of his decision, Lee said, "If the British cavalry [Tarleton] had vigorously pushed on our right, they might have turned

our flank, taken us in reverse, and we had been lost." Bass, Dragoon, 45.

43. From H. Lloyd, Continuation of the History of the Late War in Germany Between the King of Prussia and the

Empress of Germany and Her Allies, Part 2 (London: S. Hooper, 1781), 145. George Hanger, one of Tarleton’s protégés

quotes this passage to refute the criticism of Lieutenant Roderick Mackenzie that Tarleton was too precipitate in his attack

of Morgan's force. See An Address to the Army in Reply to the Strictures by Roderick Mackenzie (London: James

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Ridgway, 1789), 123.

44. See Kirkwood's diary, Appendix B, 97; See Anderson's diary, Appendix C, 139; Kelley's diary, 142.

45. See Cornwallis-Tarleton Letter 4, Appendix D, 139.

46. See William R. Trotter, "Advantage Found in Retreat," Military History 6 (December 1989):38-43; George W. Kyte,

"Victory in the South: An Appraisal of General Greene's Strategy in the Carolinas," North Carolina Historical Review 37 (July 1960):321-47.

47. Lord Rawdon had been close friends with Tarleton since their days at University College, Oxford, in 1771. See Bass,

Dragoon, 13.*

The Unexpected Event: Annihilation at the Cowpens1

In 216 B.C. on the Italian peninsula at Cannae, the great Carthaginian commander Hannibal,

his back to the Aufidus River, met a Roman army almost twice the size of his own under consuls

Aemilius and Varro. In a day-long scene of carnage, the Carthaginians hacked and speared to death

70,000 Romans at a cost of 5, 700 of their own men. 2 The double envelopment at Cannae has become

the classic example of the elusive battle of annihilation, the solution to the dangers of protracted,

expensive, and exhausting wars of attrition. The concept of the envelopment so dazzled a chief of the

Prussian General Staff that he designed, on a massive scale, an operations plan to recreate it and titled

his essay on military history Cannae.3 While Schlieffen's plan, as modified by his successor, failed to

achieve the desired result in western Europe in 1914, Generals Paul von Hindenburg and Erich

Ludendorff did encircle and destroy a Russian army at Tannenburg the same year.

But for those examples, the only important double envelopment resulting in annihilation

occurred in the backwoods of South Carolina at the Cowpens in 1781. The American victor certainly

had military experience, but even compared with many of his contemporaries, much less Hannibal, he

must be called an amateur. Should Morgan rank with Hannibal as a great captain, or did happenstance

lead to an outcome the American commander did not intend? Would either reputation suffer if it were

known that each commander seized a rare opportunity as it presented itself?

The Cowpens may be one of the most important battles ever fought on American soil from the

standpoint of the tactical lessons one can learn from it. Far from a slugfest, the Cowpens featured both

commanders as they maneuvered their troops expertly in an attempt to achieve decisive results

(although, obviously, only one succeeded). Moreover, it stands as a superb laboratory for analysis of

the psychological factor in war, an opportunity to study the psychological makeup of the British and

American commanders and the morale of their troops. In addition, it highlights the differences in

discipline and morale between regular soldiers and militia. But, like Cannae (and, for that matter,

Tannenburg), the battle had little effect on the war. Never will the Cowpens be more than a fascinating

footnote in military history, as its effect was merely to nudge along the thrust of the campaign that had

been so decisively affected (as we know in hindsight) by the far less interesting battle at Kings

Mountain.

At forty-four, Lieutenant Colonel Daniel Morgan was older than many other senior officers in

the Continental Army. He had served as a wagoner for Major General Edward Braddock during that

officer's ill-fated expedition into western Pennsylvania in 1755. After Morgan raised one of the first

rifle companies authorized by Congress, his distinguished behavior in action resulted m his promotion

to colonel. Later, he felt unrecognized as others were promoted ahead of him and in a pique resigned

his commission.4 Upon hearing that his old commander from Saratoga had been badly beaten at

Camden, however he hurried south and was surprised to be greeted not only by Gates' replacement but

by orders promoting himself to brigadier general.5

A better commander could not have been chosen for the foray into South Carolina. Morgan

was a commander of proven courage, and he had an uncanny understanding of the psychology of

soldiers and a firm grasp of tactical principles. An imposing six feet in height and of great physical

70

strength, he also bore a large scar on his cheek that spoke volumes of his bravery.6 During his weeks

in South Carolina, he followed Greene's directive scrupulously, husbanding his forces and drawing

Tarleton ever closer. By the middle of January, he had played out his hand. Tarleton was determined

to catch Morgan before the latter could cross the Broad River and before the little American army

could swell with militia reinforcements. On the night of 15 January, Tarleton crossed the Pacolet River

and surprised some of Morgan's pickets in their camp with the alarm “Brother Ben is coming!" Morgan

moved most of his command to Burr s Mill on Thicketty Creek.7 Greene had expected Morgan to

harass the enemy, "to fall upon the flank or into the rear of the enemy" as the situation dictated;

Tarleton, however, instead moved to force a decision. Morgan could flee, demoralizing his troops and

exposing them to piecemeal destruction, or he could test his strength against the Green Dragoon in

pitched battle.

Morgan chose to fight. Violating the strict letter of his original instructions, he had several

advantages that amended the circumstances envisioned in their writing. First, he chose the ground,

giving him the advantage of an ambusher. Second, he knew by reputation the methods-and therefore

the weaknesses---0fhis opponent. Third, allowing Tarleton the time to close the gap between the two

armies gave the Americans an opportunity to assemble on a battle site of Morgan's choosing, prepare

their positions, rest, and eat before the contest of the following day. Tarleton's troops would have none

of these advantages. Greene sent Morgan a letter on 13 January that implied Morgan had permission

to fight the battle.

Morgan's force was ideally suited to the task. Greene had assigned Morgan remnants of the

Continental Line and Virginia state troops under the able Lieutenant Colonel John Eager Howard, as

well as Lieutenant Colonel William Washington's 3d Continental Light Dragoons.8

Hannah's Cowpens, Morgan's choice for his battle arena, was a typical landmark in western

South Carolina, used for grazing herds by local farmers and frontiersmen bringing their cattle to

market. Here the militia had rallied several months earlier before joining Ferguson at King's Mountain.

Relatively flat open ground sparsely scattered with red oak and pine, 9 the site was ideal for grazing

BG Daniel Morgan LTC Banastre Tarleton

71

cows or fighting European-style battles. From the direction the British must come (northwest along

Mill Gap Road), a single trail opened into a narrow plain that sloped gently but unevenly uphill to the

center of the pens. About 200 meters in width where the British would form up, the field widens to

about 250 meters at its highest point (about a 990-foot elevation) and, continuing along the trail, tapers

slightly as the ground falls toward the banks of the Broad River some eight kilometers beyond. 10 As

the British would see it, the field generally sloped downward to the right (or north) flank. In the

northeast comer of the field, a ravine divided the northern side, running parallel to and just behind the

Continental Line.

On 16 January, Morgan marched his small army to Hannah's Cowpens, arriving there about

sundown. The move not only allowed him to select the ground of his choosing,11 it also placed him

farther away from Cornwallis and the danger of encirclement and gave outlying detachments time to

gather for the battle. Years later, Morgan gave yet another explanation for his choice of the site:

I would not have had a swamp in the view of my militia on any consideration; they would have

made for it, and nothing could have detained them from it. As to covering my wings, I knew my

adversary, and was perfectly sure I should have nothing but downright fighting. As to retreat, it

was the very thing I wished to cut off all hope of. I would have thanked Tarleton had he surrounded

me with his cavalry. It would have been better than placing my own men in the rear to shoot down

those who broke from ranks. When men are forced to fight, they will sell their lives dearly; and I know that the dread of Tarleton's cavalry would give due weight to the protection of the bayonets,

and keep my troops from breaking as Buford's regiment did. Had I crossed the river, one half of

the militia would immediately have abandoned me.12

Although a number of accounts accept this explanation, it seems unlikely. The Continentals had been

surrounded at Camden and were destroyed. Furthermore, Morgan's instructions at the time anticipated

their removal from harm's way. Furthermore, the Broad River, six miles to the northwest, was too

distant to serve as either a barrier to fleeing militia or an anvil for pursuing cavalry. The ground was

optimal for Tarleton's cavalry, as the British commander noted, although it sloped gently upward

toward the American position. The greatest virtue of the field for the Americans was that several

detachments (including that of Washington, who was at Wofford Iron Works reshoeing his horses)

could join Morgan without fear of getting lost.14 This factor may have been decisive in the choice of

the site.

Morgan sent a message to Sumter to join him there as quickly as possible. Hearing the call to

arms, militia came from miles around.15 The night gave Morgan time to prepare his men for combat

the next day, and the skilled leader made the most of his opportunity. Allowing his troops to prepare

physically-cleaning their weapons, eating, and so forth-he walked among them to prepare them

emotionally for the horrors of eighteenth-century battle. Major Thomas Young of South Carolina wrote

that Morgan showed a keen sense of how to command militia: "He went among the volunteers, helped

them fix their swords, joked with them about their sweet-hearts, told them to keep in good spirits, and

the day would be ours." Morgan realized that militiamen behaved in battle not as a reaction to years of

discipline and drill but based on the enthusiasm of the moment. In his encouragement to the volunteers,

Morgan linked their performance in battle to the values all young men hold, telling them, "Just hold

up your heads, boys, three fires, and you are free, and when you return to your homes, how the old

folks will bless you, and the girls kiss you, for your gallant conduct."16 He cajoled those whose

enlistments had expired to remain for the battle. 7 On the morning of the fight, he rhetorically included

them in the decision to meet the dreaded horsemen of Tarleton, asking the South Carolinians, "Shall

we fight or fly?"18 More than jovial banter, Morgan deliberately sought to raise the spirits of soldiers

whose behavior in battle varied directly with their morale. Any army suffers emotionally and

physically as it withdraws before the enemy; this small American army was ripe for their commander's

message.

72

Before first light, Morgan laid out his plan to meet Tarleton. Some accounts suggest that he

addressed the entire force. 19 While "en[flaming] the courage" of his men certainly sounds like

something Morgan would do, that he should address more than 1,000 soldiers (in the dark) seems

almost impossible. Indeed, Major Samuel Hammond describes the meeting in which the order was read

and claimed that only Colonel Andrew Pickens, Colonel McCall, Major Jackson, and he were present.

Probably this order related specifically to the actions of militia troops, as neither Howard nor

Washington were in attendance. Major Joseph McJunkin, however, tells us that first Morgan and then

Major Jackson (who had been present at the war council) spoke to the militia. Nonetheless, all

reminiscences of Morgan's words that night and the following morning verify that they stirred the

warlike spirit of the troops. Most likely, Morgan explained his detailed plan to key lieutenants, drew

up what officers and soldiers were reasonably available, and exhorted them to be courageous, leaving

detailed instructions to battalion officers.

Morgan's plan was beautiful in its simplicity. Counting that Tarleton would behave

impetuously as he had in other actions, the Virginian designed his force to behave like a shock absorber.

He would deploy his army facing southeast. Eight hundred meters in front of them, Mill Gap Road

opened onto the field. Riflemen, accurate to 300 meters, would man the skirmish line from behind the

scattered trees to pick off British officers and then retire into the main militia line. 20 As the British

continued their advance, the militia would fire three volleys (the "three fires" Young recalled and retire

from the field around the left flank of the Continentals. Morgan hoped that such of Tarleton's force as

remained could be defeated by the American regulars and Virginia militia, all under the operational

control of Howard.22 In any case, as withdrawal of the militia was part of the plan, the scheme of

maneuver would not be disturbed, and the regulars would not be unnerved (as they had been at

Camden) or even disappointed when it occurred. Morgan rightly feared the large contingent of British

horse. He gathered up all available horses and called for volunteers to augment Washington's 3d

Continental Light Dragoons. Most of the forty-five additional men came from McCall's South Carolina

State Troops. He held this force in reserve, behind the gully to the left rear of his line but available for

rapid deployment to any endangered sector of the battle.

Exactly what troops deployed that morning, and where, remains uncertain. Fortunately,

Morgan and Hammond give us detailed descriptions of the American deployment supplemented by

fragmentary observations by other witnesses.2 While the accounts of the three officers do not agree in

every detail -- or agree exactly with other statements regarding the deployment -- they can be blended

into a coherent picture. Clearly the Continental Line (consisting of the remnants of Maryland and

Delaware regulars) were the centerpiece of the army. They formed in two ranks, covering about 200

yards.24 Howard differed with his commander on the location position of the Virginia militia

supplementing the main defense: while Morgan remembered Tate on the right, Howard recalled years

later that Tate's company was on the left with that of Triplett. Howard was certainly in a better position

to know (as he commanded that portion of the troops), but Morgan's account was written shortly after

the battle. Because the Continentals were flanked on both sides by Virginians (Howard tells us Wallace

was on the right, Triplett and, Tate on the left), Morgan might well have confused the two groups.

Less easy to identify is the position held by the militia commanded by Colonel Pickens.

Sergeant Major William Seymour tells us militia were 200 yards in front of the Continental Line, while

McJunkin says 150 yards. However, Morgan reported only that Pickens' volunteers from North

Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia "were situated to guard the flanks."25 Major Hammond, who,

reconstructed the order Morgan gave the night before the battle, claims that Pickens deployed to

Howard's left flank, while Major Triplett deployed to his right. Young of South Carolina confirms that

Pickens' flank was anchored on the left of a ravine. Probably Pickens' men were not directly in front

of Howard but centered on his left flank. Wallace's Virginia militia, who could easily have been

confused with Triplett's men of the same state, may have seemed (to Hammond who was farther

forward with the skirmish line) to have been even with Pickens.

73

Scattered behind trees about 150 yards

in front of Pickens' men were the line of

skirmishers. While accounts differ as to who

commanded them, Hammond may be accepted

as the authority, as his account is so detailed,

and he was actually among them. He tells us

that the skirmishers were led, from right flank

to left, by Majors Cunningham, McDowell,

Hammond himself, and Donnolly. It was these

men who would fire the first shots of the battle.

In front of the skirmish line, perhaps several

miles ahead in the wood line, were posted

Captain Inman's pickets on horseback to warn

the army of the of the British force.26

Behind the Continental Line, Morgan posted his reserves. Commanding the 3d Continental

Light Dragoons and some of McCall's men, Washington poised for contingencies about 100 yards

behind the left flank of the army.27 Hammond mentions a Main Guard positioned behind Pickens and

commanded "as at present by Colonel Washington's cavalry," without identifying it further. No other

diarist mentions such a force, and even Hammond's sentence concerning it is vague. Perhaps Hammond

was describing the rallying point for the militia after they concluded their portion of the battle. If so,

he may be telling us that as the militia streamed to the rear, they would fall under the command of

Washington, at least until Pickens could regain control of them. It was a bitter cold morning, and the

soldiers slapped their hands to keep warm as they waited in the dark for the British troops to arrive.

No evidence remains of the time the engagement began; not even the sun would signal the onslaught

on this overcast day.28 Only the adrenaline that must have coursed through them could have kept the

raw recruits and seasoned veterans of "Tarleton's Quarter" at their psychological peak for the last hour

of darkness before the coming challenge.29

Tarleton's men had been marching hard through the thick underbrush of Thicketty Creek since

0300. Their commander could sense the presence of his opponent, having taken his camp on the Pacolet

River only the previous evening at 2200. His intuition was confirmed by the capture of several of

Captain Inman' s pickets shortly before dawn. Tarleton, who believed the Americans had marched that

night and turned at bay with the swollen river to their backs, was eager to press his attack. As the

British broke out of the underbrush, the light company of the Prince of Wales' American Regiment,

Legion infantry, and 7th Fusiliers in turn deployed two deep, each rapidly falling in to the left of the

unit that preceded it on the march, while the advanced guard of dragoons pushed back the remaining

pickets.31 According to Tarleton, he then directed his line to remove their packs and to file to the right

until the flank force (Prince of Wales' Americans) faced its counterpart directly. Lieutenant Roderick

Mackenzie portrays a far more hurried onrush without the careful preparation Tarleton describes. 32

While the truth cannot be known, such leisurely alignments in a battle with so much activity, but which

lasted only an hour, is difficult to imagine. 33 From an interview with eyewitnesses, Major George

Hanger claims Tarleton halted the troops for "near half an hour, and made them throw their knapsacks

and blankets to render them lighter for action."34 However quickly they formed, the British found

themselves facing an enemy 300 to 400 yards to their front, deployed and holding their fire.

COL Andrew Pickens Militia Leader at the Battle of Cowpens

74

Accounts of the sequence in the action at the Cowpens differ little and then mostly because of

the perspective of the narrator. From the Continental Line, the battle appears to have begun with

artillery fire from the two small guns Tarleton had placed in front of his formation.35 This scenario is

reasonable, as the guns had the greatest range of any weapon present, and the British could draw first

blood outside the range of the Americans. However, several militiamen claimed first honors for their

unit, naming John Savage, who was killed later that morning, as the marksman who brought down "a

gayly dressed officer."36 In his report to Greene, Morgan confirms this general scenario, crediting the

first shot to Major Charles McDowall's and Major John Cunningham's skirmishers. Tarleton does not

discuss the first shot but states that, after the suppression of fire from raw recruits in the 7th Infantry,

his line advanced. The skirmishers performed as expected: they aimed carefully at the deployed British,

causing at first some return fire from green fusiliers and a reply by the 3-pounders. After sniping from

behind cover at officers, they withdrew back into the main militia line commanded by Pickens.

Tarleton believed in momentum and, seeing the sharpshooters withdraw, ordered a general

advance to smash the Americans. The entire British line moved forward shouting as they went 37 and

the militia braced to meet the shock. Recognizing in advance that the performance of the militia was

important to the outcome of the day, Morgan had positioned himself among them. To bolster their

courage, he shouted over the gunfire, "They gave us the British halloo, boys, give them the Indian

halloo, by God," and cheered the men as they fired individually38 at the oncoming red- and green-

coated enemy.39 The more disciplined return fire from the British appears, from the casualty figures,

not to have caused great impact among the militia. Perhaps, as Mackenzie argues, the exertions made

by the British troops to meet Morgan took their toll that day. Additionally, among the line opposing

Pickens were recruits of the 7th Fusiliers, the Legion infantry (many of whom had been impressed from

75

among troops captured at Camden).40 and a small number of the Prince of Wales' Americans. Thus,

the British line, which could be expected to behave like regular troops, might not have produced the

same results as a seasoned, well-drilled European unit. In any case, the rebels fired between two and

five rounds each and withdrew around the main defenses to their rear.

According to Morgan's scheme, the militia were to withdraw around Howard's left formation

and regroup. In fact, they streamed around both flanks but mostly around the left.41 Tarleton saw an

opportunity in this apparently precipitate flight and sent the fifty cavalrymen, placed earlier on the right

flank, against the retreating militia in front of them.42 Apparently, this chase led the British cavalry

behind Howard's left flank, to be repulsed only when Washington, waiting 100 yards behind that flank,

parried their thrust on his own initiative.

Having vanquished the militia, Tarleton pressed his advantage. Along with the general advance

of his line, he ordered up the 71st Highlanders and the reserve cavalry on his left flank and the Legion

cavalry on his right. He chose the left instinctively but with good reason: the 71st was waiting in reserve

behind his left (opposite Howard's right flank), and the Continental Light Cavalry had already

demonstrated its ability to protect Howard's other flank. By threatening the American left with cavalry

again, Tarleton obviously sought to fix the attention of Washington there, thus making him unavailable

where the British commander sought a decision, on Howard's right. Why did the Legion cavalry

accompany the 71st? Tarleton ordered them to "incline to the left, and to form a line, which would

embrace the whole of the enemy's right flank." He then tells us, however, that the infantry moved on

but the cavalry balked.43 Nonetheless, Tarleton at that moment demonstrated several qualities for

which he became well known. His tactical prowess was generally impressive: he manifested that sharp

eye for opportunity essential for the successful tactical leader. But if Lieutenant Mackenzie is correct

and the reserves were not yet disentangled from the Thicketty Creek underbrush, the Green Dragoon

also showed a blind eye to the limits of his troops' abilities, the same weakness that had resulted in his

men's exhaustion on the field that morning.

From his position in the Continental Line, Howard could see the general advance of the British

line and the highlanders moving up rapidly on his flank. To prevent this fresh unit from overwhelming

him, he sent word to the Virginians on his right to refuse the flank. Had Wallace correctly understood

and executed his superior's intent, he would have held his left fast to the Continental Line, acting as a

hinge, and swung the remainder of his company rearward 45 degrees like a huge door. Whatever the

cause of the misunderstanding, Wallace's men did not execute the maneuver as Howard intended.

Rather, they faced about and began marching directly to the rear.

Company commanders in the Continental Line misinterpreted Wallace's actions and, believing that

they had failed to hear the order for a general withdrawal, followed suit. Only this action prevented a

fatal gap from developing in the line between Wallace and the regulars. Morgan observed this

development with alarm and rode immediately to Howard, demanding an explanation. Howard,

obviously, had none. When Howard pointed out, however, that the regulars were withdrawing in good

order, Morgan regained his composure and picked a spot 80 to 100 yards to the rear where he wished

the line to reform.44

The unplanned withdrawal of the Continental Line had two consequences immediately

important to the outcome of the battle. First, it caused the British to believe the Americans were on the

run. Second, and as a consequence of the first, the British lost their balance, as if the resistance were

suddenly removed from someone pushing a load. Believing the American regulars to be in full retreat,

they lunged forward for the kill, in the process losing the force derived of disciplined drill. Suddenly

the American line faced about again, their weapons loaded, and delivered a withering volley -- Morgan

calls it "a fortunate volley"45 -- into the face of the startled British barely thirty meters away.46 The

combination of sudden discovery that the battle was now in jeopardy and the agony of being

surrounded by large numbers of horribly wounded comrades was devastating to the relatively

inexperienced British troops. Regulars, raw recruits, and Tory volunteers reeled back in panic and

76

disarray. Howard recognized the opportunity before him and ordered his men to press home with their

bayonets.

At this moment, separate decisions led to the envelopment for which the battle has become

famous. Washington now parried the fixing attack on the American left flank and moved forward, past

Triplett's flank and behind the right flank of the now crumbling British line. Almost simultaneously,

Pickens' militia, which had regrouped behind the Continental Line, appeared on the American right,

sweeping around behind the other British flank. Was their reappearance part of a contingency plan

preconceived by Morgan? If so, he deceived the militia when he promised them freedom after the

"three fires." McJunkin says only that Howard ordered a charge, and the militia returned "left and

right"; Major Young is no more specific.47 Hammond, so precise in his details, makes no mention of

any such plan. Only Private James Collins tells us that Morgan himself appeared among the militiamen,

still recovering from their recent deliverance from a cavalry charge, to exhort them to rejoin the

battle.48 We must conclude that the return of the militia was the consequence of the initiative of a

commander-which one, we may never know. 49 Both Pickens and Morgan were close enough to have

ordered the maneuver. Either Howard or Washington, already

in the operation, could have sent a runner to Pickens with a plea for his support. In any case, surely

Pickens would have led the counter-attack personally.

Pressed by bayonet-wielding Continentals to their front, Washington's cavalry on their right

and rear, and Pickens' militia on their left and rear, the British crumbled quickly. As Tarleton describes

the scene5 "an unaccountable panic extended itself along the whole line." Unable to flee, pockets of

men surrendered. Gunners manning the two 3-pounder cannon resisted longest. Determined to fight to

the death, the artillerymen were convinced by Howard to surrender their guns; he then prevented the

men from being slaughtered. 51 Veterans disputed who received whose sword that hectic morning.

Colonel Pickens vaguely recalls that "every officer of that Regiment

[the 7lst] delivered his sword into my hand."52 Howard also remembers being given one of those same

swords. In any case, the entire infantry of Tarleton's command had become prisoners or were dead.

77

In a vain effort to retrieve the day, Tarleton attempted to rally his horsemen. Washington had

beaten them twice that day; most left the field precipitately. Nonetheless, the Green Dragoon, ever

audacious, took fifty loyal troopers-most of them regulars from the 17th Light Dragoons-again into the

fray where, once again, they were repulsed. This engagement effectively ended the Battle of the

Cowpens. The battle ended, but its most famous moment remained for the postscript. As Washington

and his men chased down Tarleton and his fifty gallant paladins, Tarleton turned at bay several hundred

yards away from the scene of triumph and surrender, and Washington and Tarleton crossed swords

during the sort of heroic melee expected of cavalrymen. The Virginian may well have been killed were

it not for the sure aim of a black soldier who shot one of Washington's assailants. 53 Although

Washington's cavalry pursued Tarleton vigorously for twenty-two miles, 5 they were unable to capture

him or his little band, but the whole of his baggage was either destroyed or captured.

As the gun smoke cleared, the scene must have seemed horrible. In that small field, ten British

officers and more than 100 other ranks lay dead and more than 200 wounded.55 By comparison, the

American toll was mercifully light: 10 to 12 killed and 50 to 60 wounded.56

There were also more than 500 tired, hungry, and frightened British prisoners, now being disarmed

instead of killed (as they had been led to believe). The total loss to the British numbered about 850.

Even the victors must have looked unsightly. Not yet nine o'clock, the Americans had overcome the

collective effects of fatigue, cold, and the fear that accompanies uncertainty in the face of combat. But

it was over; all that remained was collecting the prisoners for transport to safety in Virginia and

movement of the army to rejoin Greene.

The small battle on that cold gray morning in January 1781 did not alter the outcome of the

war or even the course of the campaign in the south. It did continue the momentum created by the

victory over Ferguson's Loyalists at King's Mountain, and it showed the population in the western

regions that Tarleton (and, even better, British regulars) could be beaten. The value of the Cowpens as

an object of study lies in the tactical arena and the human drama of the participants.

From available evidence, it seems clear that Morgan understood the temperament of his

opponent. He lured Tarleton across the Broad River away from Cornwallis. Morgan's army was too

small to grapple with the British unaided, so he kept enough distance from Tarleton until he could rally

the militia. To maximize the potential of his militia, Morgan deployed his little force to entice Tarleton

to attack, while compensating for the potential of Tarleton's cavalry to disrupt his own army. The

several counterattacks Washington conducted to parry British attempts to flank him demonstrate his

understanding of the proper use of reserves and cavalry. No evidence leads us to conclude that Morgan

anticipated or planned the double envelopment. On the other hand, someone had recognized the

advantage of reemploying the militia, who must have believed they had done their part already. The

only person who could have directed Pickens to counterattack was his commander, Morgan. Even if

he did not direct the attack that sealed the fate of the British, Morgan's plan for the battle permitted

sufficient flexibility in his men to react to the uncharacteristic collapse of spirit among the red-coated

regulars. Daniel Morgan justly deserves the honors accorded him, not for a brilliant Hannibalesque

maneuver but for his keen insight into the mind of his opponent and his men and for the construction

of a plan that allowed for the unexpected.

NOTES 1. Extract from Lord Cornwallis' letter to Sir Henry Clinton, 18 January 1781, as cited in Clinton, Rebellion, 485.

2. These are Polybius' figures. Polybius, Histories, iii, 107. Livy says 45,000 Romans and 2,700 Carthaginians, Livy, The

War with Hannibal, trans. Aubrey de Selincourt, ed. Betty Radice (Baltimore, MD, I 968), 149. Historians dispute the

actual numbers, but their ratios are about the same in all accounts.

3. Generalfeldmarschall Graf von Schlieffen, Cannae (Berlin: E. S. Mittler, 1913). The great German historian Hans

Delbriick calls it "a brilliant, unusual victory," History of the Art of War within the Framework of Political History, trans.

78

Walter J. Renfroe, Jr., vol. 1 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1975), 331. For a thorough discussion of this connection,

see Jehuda L. Wallach, The Dogma of the Battle of Annihilation (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1986). Wallach argues that

Schlieffen's "obsession with the enemy's annihilation by means of encirclement" and his failure to understand Clausewitz

led to the Germans' defeat in World War I. 4. Alexander Garden, Greene's aide de camp, suggests that Morgan's failure to be promoted may have been a consequence

of Gates' jealousy at the accolades paid to Morgan's rifle regiment by Burgoyne, Anecdotes, 58.

5. William Waller Edwards, "Morgan and his Riflemen," William and Mary Quarterly, 1st ser., 23 (October 1914):73-105.

After the war, Morgan served in the U. S. Congress. See Bailey, Heroes, 9-23. For a fine biography of the American

commander, see Higginbotham, Morgan.

6. Bartholomees says he was 5 feet 10 inches tall, "Fight or Flee," 102. A most colorful description can be found in

Appendix C, in the Neel memoir, 144.

7. See Martin memoir, Appendix B, 104.

8. Washington, of no significant relation to the commander in chief, fought throughout the war with distinction.

Transferred to the cavalry after being wounded at Trenton, he fought under Lincoln in South Carolina and skirmished with

Tarleton at Ashley Ford and Rantowle's Bridge, Garden, Anecdotes, 68.

9. Hammond says red oak and hickory, while Thomas says mostly pine. See memoirs, Appendix C, 131, 145.

10. See also Major Hammond's description of the battle site, Appendix C, 131. Numerous accounts of the battle imply that

the Americans deployed with their backs to the Broad River. Nothing could be further from the truth. See Burke Davis,

The Cowpens-Guilford Courthouse Campaign (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippencott, 1962), xii; Scheer and Rankin, Rebels, 429;

Michael D. Mahler, "The 190th Anniversary-The Battle at Cowpens," Military Review 51, no. I (January 1971):57-58.

11. A local patriot, Dennis Tramel, walked the ground with Morgan. See Appendix B, Tramel memoir, 101.

12. William Johnson, Sketches of the Life and Correspondence of Nathanael Greene, vol. 1 (Charleston, SC: A. E. Miller,

1822), 376.

13. See Tarleton memoir, Appendix E, 188.

14. For example, see Christopher Hibbert, Redcoats and Rebels (New York: W. W. Norton, 1990), 302. See discussion in

Bartholomew, "Fight or Flee," 115.

15. See Appendix B, Gresham memoir, 99; and Seymour memoir, 102. Because of Morgan's attention to security, not all

of the militia were able to participate, Harden memoir, 105.

16. See Young memoir, Appendix B, 96.

17. See Moore memoir, Appendix B, 110.

18. See McJunkin, Apppendix C, 133.

19. See Howard, Appendix C, 126; and McJunkin, 133.

20. This tactic was customary for light troops and considered very effective in disrupting the continuity of massed

formations. In 1757, the celebrated French commander and theorist Marshal Saxe wrote, "a single fire from one of these

irregulars perfected in his business, will in general do as much execution, as ten from any other ... ,"Field-Marshal Count

Saxe, Reveries or Memoirs upon the Art of War (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1971), 38. By comparison, muskets were

accurate only from 80 to l00 meters; however, they could be fired twice as rapidly as rifles. For a discussion of

Revolutionary War weaponry, see Davis, Cowpens, 13-15; Harold L. Peterson, The Book of the Continental Soldier

(Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole, 1968), 23-57

21. According to Howard, "they fell into our rear, and part of them fell into the rear of my right flank ... ,"memoir,

Appendix C, 126. By implication, then, the flank around which Howard expected them to withdraw was his left. John

Baldwin, of McDowell's command, claimed later that they were to withdraw around both flanks. John Thomas

remembered the militia plan to move around the right flank. See pension applications, 145.

22. Howard was born in Baltimore County in 1752 and served with the Maryland Line throughout the war. He fought at

White Plains, Germantown, and Monmouth before moving south in 1780. After Camden, he was the ranking Continental

officer in the south, Bailey, Heroes, 38-43.

23. The discussion that follows relies on evidence from Morgan, Howard, Hammond, McJunkin, Young, Anderson,

Sergeant Major Seymour, and Private Thomas, all from Appendix C.

24. A Prussian infantry battalion, elbow to elbow, three ranks deep (with the front rank kneeling), occupied a front of 150

yards, Steven Ross, From Flintlock to Rifle Infantry Tactics, 1740-1866 (Rutherford, NJ: Fairleigh Dickenson University

Press, 1979), 25. The Continental Line, however, preferred two lines of men standing about three yards apart, Ernest W.

Peterkin, The Exercise of Arms in the Continental Infantry (Alexandria Bay, NY: Museum Restoration Service, 1989), 10-

11.

25. See Morgan report, Appendix C, 122.

26. See Mackenzie calls these men vedettes, Appendix C, 151. See Young memoir, 148.

27. See Appendix C, Hammond memoir, 135.

28. Numerous chroniclers report that the battle began at sunrise, but none mention the sun. On the other hand, Captain

Connally of North Carolina remembered the day being "cold but inclined to be rainey," 176. Thus, morning twilight

79

would have begun about an hour earlier. Clouds benefited the Americans, who would otherwise have had the early

morning sun in their eyes. Lieutenant Anderson describes the British forming before sunrise, Appendix C, 139.

29. General Morgan reported that scouts told him about an hour before daylight that the British were within five miles of

his position and heading in his direction and that he deployed accordingly. Lieutenant Anderson, Appendix C, memoir

139, confirms the report. The British could not have marched five miles through the Thicketty Creek underbrush in one

hour, but both time and distance are estimates here.

30. Here I follow Bartholomew's interpretation of the description, "Fight or Flee," 123. Tarleton received a report that the

Broad River ran parallel to Morgan's rear. See Tarleton, Appendix C, 148.

31. The British trimmed their line from three to two ranks in depth, at least in part because their experience in America led

them to accept the risk in exchange for increased firepower. The practice was the subject of hot debate in British military

circles, E. M. E. Lloyd, A Review of the History of Infantry (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1976), 187

32. Compare Tarleton memoir, Appendix C, 148, with Mackenzie memoir, Appendix E, 191.

33. All other evidence being equal, I prefer to follow Mackenzie, who had less to gain by condemning Tarleton than the

cavalryman had to lose by being condemned.

34. Sir George Hanger, who served with the cavalry of the British Legion, published a stirring defense of Tarleton in 1789.

While Hanger's arguments brings caution to our acceptance of Lieutenant Mackenzie's account, we must keep in mind that

Hanger was not present at the Cowpens and, as a legionnaire, would be inclined to loyalty to the man who made his

organization famous, Hanger, Address, 92-93. Hanger also served with Hessian troops in the war and retired a major

general in the Hessian service, Johann Ewald, Diary of the American War: A Hessian Journal, trans. and ed. Joseph P.

Tusten (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1979), 412.

35. See Anderson memoir, Appendix C, 139; and Dial memoir, Appendix B, 106. These guns were accurate to 800 meters,

Davis, Cowpens, 16.

36. See McJunkin, Appendix C, 133. Young quotes Lieutenant Colonel Farr of the South Carolina militia as claiming he

directed Savage to fire the shot, Appendix C, memoir, 135. See also Bailey, Heroes, who maybe quoting Young, 191; and

Bobby Gilmer Moss, The Patriots of the Cowpens (Greenville, SC: Scotia Press, 1985), 96, 256-57.

37. Howard remembered the British line made a great deal of noise to intimidate the Americans, Appendix C, 126.

Anderson noted in his diary that "three Huzzas" came from the British line, Appendix C, 139. 38. Morgan's report to

Greene states that the militia fired "by regiments." The actual term for volley firing is "by platoons" organized deliberately

to keep an incessant fire on the enemy. Probably Pickens' men executed the first volley on command. Given the state of

training and organization and the conflicting reports of the number of rounds expended, it is more likely that the militia

fired most of their rounds without command. For a discussion of eighteenth-century firing methods, see Ross, Flintlock,

25, 26. See also Thomas memoir, Appendix C, 145.

39. See Young memoir, Appendix C, 135.

40. See Chesney memoir, Appendix C, 163; and E. Alfred Jones, ed., The Journal of Alexander.Chesney (Ohio State

University), 90-91.

41. See Baldwin memoir, Appendix C, 154; and Thomas memoir, 145.

42. See McJunkin memoir, Appendix C, 133, on the incident at this moment concerning rifleman Joseph Hughes and the

already noted John Savage.

43. See Tarleton memoir, Appendix C, 148.

44. See Morgan, Howard, and Thomas memoirs, Appendix C, 122, 126, 145..

45. See Morgan, Appendix C, 122. Howard·remembered it as a "destructive fire," 126-31.

46. See Howard memoir, Appendix C, 126; and Thomas memoir, 145. Lieutenant Anderson claims the range of the British

was only ten to fifteen meters, 151.

47. See McJunkin and Young memoirs, Appendix C, 133, 135.

48. See Collins memoir, Appendix C, 145.

49. A 1928 study of the battle suggests that Morgan was in the rear rallying the militia when he saw the Continentals

beginning to withdraw. This study cites no authority for the claim, Historical Statements Concerning the Battle of King's

Mountain and the Battle of the Cowpens, South Carolina (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1928), 68.

Lynn Montross echoes this scenario in "America's Most Imitated Battle," American Heritage 7, no. 3 (1956):37. Bailey

and Alice Noble Waring claim Pickens acted on his own initiative, Heroes, 29; and The Fighting Elder: Andrew Pickens,

1739-1817 (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1962), 48. Kenneth Roberts describes North Carolina militia

lieutenant, Joseph Hughes, as corralling the men as they attempted to scamper away, in The Battle of the Cowpens: The

Great Morale Builder (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1958), 89-90.

50. See Tarleton memoir, Appendix C, 148.

51. Cannon, like regimental colors, were considered to be trophies of war, to be guarded and sought with great zeal. To

lose either was a disgrace. See Howard memoir, 126.

52. See Pickens memoir, Appendix C, 125.

53. See Kelley, Appendix C, 142. The soldier's name was Ball. See Garden, Anecdotes, 69.

54. See Simmons memoir, Appendix C, 143.

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55. Morgan reported these numbers to General Greene shortly after the battle, memoir, Appendix C, 122.

56. See Morgan memoir, Appendix C, 122; and Fortescue, 17th Lancers, 58. Seymour reports thirty-five killed and

wounded; he may have been referring to the Continentals only, memoir, 153. Compare Tarleton's estimates of the

casualties, memoir, 160.

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After-Action Reports

Brigadier General Daniel Morgan. Morgan sent this letter to his superior, General Nathanael

Greene, as his after-action report of the battle. Note that Morgan only sent his report two days after the

battle.

Camp on Cain Creek on Pedee Camp near Cain Creek

Jan 19th, 1781

Dear Sir: The troops I have the honor to command have gained a complete victory over the

detachment from the British Army commanded by Lieut.-Col. Tarleton. The action happened in

the 17th inst., about sunrise, at the Cowpens. It, perhaps, would be well to remark, for the honor

of the American arms, that although the progress of this corps was marked with burning and

devastation, and although they waged the most cruel warfare, not a man was killed, wounded, or

even insulted, after he surrendered. Had not the Britons during this contest received so many

lessons of humanity, I should flatter myself that this might teach them a little. But I fear they are

incorrigible.

To give you a just idea of our operations, it will be necessary to inform you that, on the 14th

inst., having received certain intelligence that Lord Cornwallis and Lieut. Col. Tarleton were both

in motion, and that their movements clearly indicated the intention of dislodging me, I abandoned

my encampment at Grindall's Ford on the Pacolet, and on the 16th, in the evening, took possession

of a post about seven miles from the Cherokee Ford, on the Broad river. My former position

subjected me at once to the operations of Cornwallis and Tarleton, and in case of a defeat my

retreat might easily have been cut off. My situation at Cowpens enabled me to improve any

advantage that I might gain and to provide better for my security should I be unfortunate. These

reasons induced me to take this post, at the risk of its wearing the face of a retreat.

I received regular intelligence of the enemy's movements from the time they were first in

motion. On the evening of the 16th inst., they took possession of the ground I had removed from

in the morning, distant from the scene of action about twelve miles. An hour before daylight one

of my scouts returned and informed me that Lieut. Col. Tarleton had advanced within five miles

of our camp. On this information, I hastened to form as good a disposition as circumstances would

admit, and from the alacrity of the troops, we were soon prepared to receive them. The light

infantry, commanded by Lieut. Col. Howard, and the Virginia militia under the command of Major

Triplett, were formed on a rising ground, extended a line in front. The third regiment of dragoons,

under Lieut. Col. Washington, were posted at such a distance in their rear, as not to be subjected

to the line of fire directed at them, and to be so near as to be able to charge them should they be

broken. The volunteers from North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, under the command of

the brave and valuable Col.Pickens, were situated to guard the flanks. Maj. McDowall, of the

North Carolina volunteers, was posted on the right flank in front of the line, one hundred and fifty

yards; and Maj. Cunningham, of the Georgia volunteers, on the left, at the same distance in front.

Colonels Brannon and Thomas, of the South Carolinans, were posted on the right of Maj.

McDowall, and Cols. Hay and McCall, of the same corps, on the left of Maj. Cunningham. Capts.

Tate and Buchanan, with the Augusta [Virginia] riflemen, to support the right of the line.

The enemy drew up in single line of battle, four hundred yards in front of our advanced corps.

The first battalion of the 71st regiment was opposed to our right, the 7th regiment to our left, the

infantry of the legion to our centre, the light companies on our flanks. In front moved two pieces

of artillery. Lieut. Col. Tarleton, with his cavalry, was posted in the rear of the line.

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The disposition of battle being thus formed, small parties of riflemen were detached to skirmish

with the enemy, upon which their whole line moved on with the greatest impetuosity, shouting as

they advanced. McDowall and Cunningham gave them a heavy and galling fire, and retreated to

the regiments intended for their support. The whole of Col. Pickens' command then kept up a fire

by regiments, retreating agreeably to their orders. When the enemy advanced on our line, they

received a well-directed and incessant fire. But their numbers being superior to ours, they gained

our flanks, which obliged us to change our position. We retired in good order about fifty paces,

formed, and advanced on the enemy, and gave them a fortunate volley, which threw them into

disorder. Lieut. Col. Howard observing this, gave orders for the line to charge bayonets, which

was done with such address that they fled with the utmost precipitation leaving their fieldpieces

in our possession. We pushed our advantage so effectually, that they never had an opportunity of

rallying, had their intentions been ever so good.

Lieut. Col. Washington, having been informed that the Tarleton was cutting down our riflemen

on the left, pushed forward, and charged them with such firmness, that instead of attempting to

recover the fate of the day, which one would have expected from an officer of his splendid

character, broke and fled.

The enemy's whole force were now bent solely in providing for their safety in flight-the list of

their killed, wounded, and prisoners, will inform you with what effect. Tarleton, with the small

remains of his cavalry, and a few scattered infantry he had mounted on his wagon horses, made

their escape. He was pursued twenty-four miles, but owing to our having taken a wrong trail at

first, we could never overtake him.

As I was obliged to move off of the field of action in the morning, to secure the prisoners, I

cannot be so accurate as to the killed and wounded of the enemy as I could wish. From the reports

of an officer whom I sent to view the ground, there were one hundred non-commissioned officers

and privates, and ten commissioned officers killed, and two hundred rank and file wounded. We

now have in our possession five hundred and two non-commissioned officers and privates

prisoners, independent of the wounded, and the militia are taking up stragglers continually.

Twenty-nine commissioned officers have fell into I have paroled: the privates I am conveying by

the safest route to Salisbury.

Two standards, two fieldpieces, thirty-five wagons, a travelling forge, and all their music are

ours. Their baggage, which was immense, they have in a great measure destroyed.

Our loss is inconsiderable, which the enclosed return will evince. I have not been able to

ascertain Col. Pickens loss, but know it to be very small.

From our force being composed of such a variety of corps, a wrong judgment may be formed

of our numbers. We fought only eight hundred men, two-thirds of which were militia. The British,

with their baggage-guard, were not less than one thousand one hundred and fifty, and these veteran

troops. Their own officers confess that they fought one thousand and thirty-seven.

Such was the inferiority of our numbers that our success must be attributed, under God, to the

justice of our cause and the bravery of our troops. My wishes would induce me to mention the

name of every sentinel in the corps I have the honor to command. In justice to the brave and good

conduct of the officers, I have taken the liberty to enclose you a list of their names from a

conviction that you will be pleased to introduce such characters to the world.

Maj. Giles, my aid, and Capt. Brookes, as brigade-major, deserve and have my thanks for their

assistance and behavior on this occasion. The Baron de Gleabuch, who accompanies Major Giles

with these dispatches, served with me as a volunteer, and behaved in such a manner as to merit

your attention.

I am sir, your obedient servant,

Daniel Morgan

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Our loss was very inconsiderable, not having more than twelve killed and about sixty wounded.

The enemy had ten commissioned officers and upwards of one hundred rank and file killed, two

hundred rank and file wounded, and twenty-seven officers and more than five hundred privates which

fell into our hands, with two pieces of artillery, two standards, eight hundred stand of arms, one

travelling-forge, thirty-five wagons, ten negroes, and upwards of one hundred dragoon horses.

Although our success was complete, we fought only eight hundred men, and were opposed by

upwards of one thousand British troops.

Colonel Andrew Pickens. Pickens was born in 1739 in Pennsylvania and emigrated with his family to

South Carolina as a boy. When war erupted in 177 5, Pickens declared for the rebel cause and was present

at the fighting in 1776 at Ninety Six fort. He commanded the South Carolina militia at the Cowpens. He

was an-extremely popular officer with local troops, having recently won a skirmish against British,

Tories, and Indians at Kettle Creek. He sat at the Constitutional Convention and was elected to Congress

in 1794. This brief description of the Cowpens is extracted from a letter Pickens wrote in 1811 to Henry

Lee, who was compiling a history of the campaign in the south.

Pendleton District 28th Aug. 1811

Dr. Sir,

Your favor of the 3rd alto I have read, & in answer to some of your interrogatories, I can answer

pretty correctly; others being of a more delicate nature ought not to be too highly coloured-

[The next four pages describe Pickens' childhood and his service in the war until the Cowpens

campaign. Unfortunately, he assumed that Lee knew the story of the battle, thus depriving

generations of his eyewitness account, except for this brief remark.]-

You know the particulars of the battle of the Cowpens-That part of the 71st which was there

surrendered to me & I believe every officer of that Regiment delivered his sword into my hand-I see

in a publication, the life of the late Genl Jackson of Georgia, by a Judge Carlton of Savannah, that

Major McCarthur [sic] of the 71st Regiment delivered his sword to him-I think Jackson never told

him so-Major McCarthur surrendered to me, some distance from the battlefield & delivered his

sword to me-Jackson acted with me at that time as Brigade Major-I sent back to Genl Morgan, by

Major Jackson, Major McCarthur, with the sword-When I met Col Washington with his cavalry in

pursuit of Tarleton, I ordered Jackson who was brave & active, to return as quickly as possible with

as many mounted militia as he could get-We pursued with Coln Washington 22 miles & made

prisoners of several of Tarleton's rear [guard] but could not bring him to action. We did not get back

to the battle ground till the next morning & overtook Genl Morgan with the prisoners, in the night

at Gilbert's Town [near Rutherfordton, North Carolina]- Next day Genl Morgan ordered me to take

charge of the prisoners & take them per rout, while he with the Infantry [sic] under Coln (John)

Howard & Coln Washington's cavalry took the lower rout, to draw Lord Cornwallis after him-We

all got safe over the Catawba River & joined again at Sherral's ford (on the Catawba) after a grueling

march of four days with the prisoners - Most of the other scenes of the war at that time & in that

quarter are known to you therefore it would be superfluous to dwell upon them ....

Lieutenant Colonel John Eager Howard. Howard commanded the Continentals in Morgan's army.

General Greene's aide, Alexander Garden, described Howard admiringly as having every requisite for the

perfection of the military character-patience, judgment, intrepidity, and decision. Howard wrote these two

excerpts sometime after the battle, to correct inaccurate reports of it and answer questions about it.

Morgan was careful to address the officers and men, to inspire confidence in them. As to what

Morgan has since said, "I would not have had a swamp in the view of the militia"- I do not think it

deserves any consideration. They were words used in conversation, without any definite meaning. I

am positive that Triplett and Tate were on my left. Major M'Dowell was of North Carolina. I do not

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think there was such an eminence; there was a slight rise in the ground; nor was Washington's horse

posted behind it, but on the summit; for I had a full view of him as we retreated from our first

position.

Seeing my right flank was exposed to the enemy, I attempted to change the front of Wallace's

company, (Virginia regulars) in doing it, some confusion ensued, and first a part, and then the whole

of the company commenced a retreat. The officers along the line seeing this, and supposing that

orders had been given for a retreat, faced their men about, and moved off. Morgan, who had mostly

been with the militia, quickly rode up to me and expressed apprehensions of the event; but I soon

removed his fears by pointing to the line, and observing that the men were not beaten who retreated

in that order. He then ordered me to keep with the men, until we came to the rising ground near

Washington's horse; and he rode forward to fix on the most proper place for us to halt and face about.

In a minute we had a perfect line.

The enemy were now very near us. -Our men commenced a very destructive fire, which they

little expected, and a few rounds occasioned great disorder in their ranks. While in this confusion, I

ordered a charge with the bayonet, which order was obeyed with great alacrity. As the line

approached, I observed their artillery a short distance in front, and called to Captain Ewing, who

was near me, to take it. Captain Anderson (now General Anderson, of Montgomery county,

Maryland) hearing the order, also pushed for the same object, and both being emulous for the prize,

kept pace until near the first piece, when Anderson, by placing the end of his spontoon forward into

the ground, made a long leap which brought him upon the gun, and gave him the honour of the prize.

My attention was now drawn to an altercation of some of the men with an artillery man, who

appeared to make it a point of honour not to surrender his match. The men, provoked by his

obstinacy, would have bayonetted him on the spot, had I not interfered, and desired them to spare

the life of so brave a man. He then surrendered his match. In the pursuit, I was led towards the right,

in among the 71st, who were broken into squads, and as I called to them to surrender, they laid down

their arms, and the officers delivered up their swords. Captain Duncanson, of the 71st grenadiers,

gave me his sword, and stood by me. Upon getting on my horse, I found him pulling at my saddle,

and he nearly unhorsed me. I expressed my displeasure, and asked him what he was about. The

explanation was, that they had orders to give no quarter, and they did not expect any; and as my men

were coming up, he was afraid they would use him ill. I admitted his excuse, and put him into the

care of a sergeant. I had messages from him for some years afterwards, expressing his obligation for

my having saved his life.

Their artillery was not thrown into the rear, but was advanced a little at the head of the line, and

was taken as I have mentioned. Washington did not encounter the artillery. He moved to the left

from our rear, to attack Tarleton's horse, and never lost sight of them until they abandoned the

ground. Major M' Arthur very freely entered into conversation, and said that he was an officer before

Tarleton was born; that the best troops in the service were put under "that boy" to be sacrificed; that

he had flattered himself the event would have been different, if his advice had been taken, which was

to charge with all the horse, at the moment we were retreating.

The 1st question you propose is: When my regiment fell back at the battle of the Cowpens, was

it by my order for the purpose of extricating my flanks or was it occasioned by the fire of the enemy?

A. It was not occasioned by the fire of the enemy. The militia were formed in front of me, and the

moment the British militia [the Legion] formed their line they shouted and made a great noise to

intimidate, and rushed with bayonets upon the militia who had not time, especially the riflemen to

fire a second time. The militia fell into our rear, and part of them fell into the rear of my right flank

where they afterwards renewed the action. The British advanced until my regiment commence firing.

I soon observed, as I had but about 350 men and the British about 800, that their line extended much

further than mine particularly on my right [word "flank" crossed out], where they were pressing

forward to gain my flank.-To protect that flank, I ordered the company on my right to change its

front so as to oppose the enemy on that flank. Whether my orders were not well understood or

whether it proceeded from any other cause, in attempting this movement some disorder ensued in

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this company which rather fell back than faced as I wished them. The rest of the line expecting that

a retreat was ordered, faced about and retreated but in perfect order. At this moment Genl. Morgan

rode to me and ordered me to retreat to Washington's horse about 100 yards, and there form.-This

retreat was accidental but was very fortunate as we thereby were extricated from the enemy. As soon

as the word was given to halt and face about the line was perfectly formed in a moment. The enemy

pressed upon us in rather disorder, expecting the fate of the day was decided. They were by this time

within 30 yards of us with two field pieces; my men with uncommon coolness gave them an

unexpected and deadly fire. Observing that this fire occasioned some disorder in them I ordered a

charge which was executed so promptly that they never recovered. When I came up to the two pieces

of artillery which we took, I saw some of my men going to bayonet the man who had the match. He

refused to surrender it, and I believe he would have suffered himself to have been bayoneted, if I

had not rescued him rather than give up his match.

I can account for the retreat but I suppose it would not be necessary to introduce the matter into

your history, and as it may involve the character of an officer I wish it to be forgotten; however, I

will state the fact and you may make what use you please of it-This company on my right were

Virginians, commanded by Capt. Wallace who some time previous had formed a connexion with a

vile woman of the camp, and the infatuation was so great that on guard or any other duty he had this

woman with him and seemed miserable when she was absent. He seemed to have lost all sense of

the character of an officer. He was in this state of mind at the time of the action. As well as I can

recollect Morgan afterwards reprimanded him severely & forced him to break off the connexion. As

soon as we joined the army he was ordered to join his regiment and at Guilford was killed. It was

generally said by the officers that he distinguished himself in that action as if determined to retrieve

his character.

Question 2nd. Was the fire which I gave, after this circumstance & before I charged bayonet,

before or after the charge made by Colo. Washington, & was his charge mainly on the British

cavalry, or had he reached the infantry before they were thrown into disorder? An. The militia all

rode to the ground and their horses were tied in the woods in the rear of my left flank about the time

of our retreat, a large body of British cavalry passes round my left flank and pursued the flying

militia to their horses. Washington observing this charged them. As well as I can recollect this charge

was made at the same moment that I charged the infantry, for as soon as we got among the enemy

& were making prisoners I observed the enemy's cavalry retreating the way the[y] had advanced, by

our left flank, and Washington in pursuit of them and he followed them some distance-You will

observe by this statement that Washington's charge had no connexion with mine as his movement

was to the rear in a quite different direction.

I will take this opportunity of mentioning a fact which you may notice or not. Washington had

given positive orders to his men to fire a pistol. In the pursuit he had got a head of his men, perhaps

30 yards. Three of the British officers observing this wheeled about and made a charge at him. The

officer on his right was raising his arm to cut at him when a sargent [sic] came up and made a stroke

at this officer which disabled his arm. The officer on the left ["was preparing" is crossed out] at the

same moment was preparing to make a stroke at him when a boy, a waiter, who had not the strength

to wield a sword, drew his pistol and shot and wounded this officer, which disabled him. The third

person, who Washington thinks was Tarleton, made a thrust at him which he parryed. This person

then retreated 10 or 12 steps and wheeled about and fired a pistol which wounded Washington's

horse.

In Tarleton's account of this action it is stated that a party of Americans had pushed down the

road some distance and had taken the baggage and that a part of Tarleton’s horse charged them &

retook the baggage. We had a German a volunteer who had been in the Hussars in Europe. He called

himself the Baron Glaubeck but turned out to be an imposter-He met with some five or six militia

men well mounted had pushed down the road and got a head of Tarleton’s horse and had taken the

baggage which he was obliged to leave and the baggage was destroyed by this body of Tarleton's

horse. [Howard's marginal note here says: "Tarleton says that 14 officers & 40 men charged

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Washington's horse and drove them back to the ... This is not correct. This affair checked

Washington's pursuit, but he did not fall back."]

Question 3rd At Guilford did Colo Gunby command the same regiment which was at the

Cowpens & was you with him or on the flanks with Washington or Lee? Answer. The Maryland

line consisted of 7 regiments about half full when we marched into Carolina. After the actions of the

16th and 18th of August 1780 what men we had left were formed into two regiments and the

supernumerary officers sent home.-The Maryland troops with me at the Cowpens were picked out

of the two regiments. I had also a company of Virginians under Capt Wallace, as before stated, and

two companies of Virginia Militia or volunteers, one commanded by Capt Tripolet [sic] from

Fauguhar, the other by a capt Tate from Rockbridge or one of the western Counties. Tate joined us

again afterwards and was with Lee at Guilford, where he was wounded and I believe died of his

wounds.

When we joined Genl. Greene's army at Guilford before the retreat into Virginia, my light

infantry were augmented, but before the action at Guilford we were ordered to join our respective

regiments, and then I acted as Lt. Colo. under Gunby.

In the book I have mentioned there is a correct plan of the ground and different positions of the

troops in the action at Guilford. If I thought you had this book I would refer to it and could describe

the situation in a few words.

There was a new regiment (Regiment Extraordinary) sent out from Maryland which had been

raised by the state, and it was thought that the officers had been more favored than the officers of

the old regiments. It joined us a few days before the action and there were such jealousies among

the officers that Genl Greene sent all the new officers home, and made a new arrangement of the

two regiments. This was at the time my light infantry joined their regiments. The most of the new

men were thrown into the second regiment which was very deficient of officers.

Major Samuel Hammond. Hammond commanded the left flank militia line at the Cowpens. A native of

Virginia, Hammond moved with his father's family to South Carolina in 1779: As he had military

experience, he was commissioned and fought in a number of skirmishes prior to joining Morgan. His

account is important as the only recreation of Morgan's operations order for the Cowpens. After the battle,

Hammond remained in South Carolina under the command of Colonel Pickens.

On the evening of the 16th of January 1781, General Morgan encamped near a place called

the Cowpens. The author of these remarks, being then out with a detachment, did not join the camp

until 8 o'clock in the evening, when he was informed by the general, that he intended to give the

enemy battle the next morning, if he should press hard upon him. The ground on which the troops

were placed was a small ridge, crossing the road at nearly right angles. A similar ridge nearly parallel

with this, lay between three hundred and five hundred yards in his rear. The valley between was

made by a gentle slope; was, of course, brought within range of the eye; passing from one to the

other ridge, the land was thickly covered with red oak and hickory with little if any underbrush. The

valleys extending to the right of the general's camp, terminated in a small glade or savanna.

Orders had been issued to the militia, to have twenty-four rounds of balls prepared and ready

for use, before they retired to rest. A general order, forming the disposition of the troops, in case of

coming to action, had also been prepared, and was read to Colonels Pickens and McCall, Major

Jackson and the author of these notes, in the course of the evening. No copy was ever afforded to

either of these authors, before the battle, and the author of these notes has never since seen them,

but in the course of the same evening he made the following notes upon them, then fresh in his

memory, and which was shown to Major Jackson and Colonel McCall, and approved by them as

correct as far as they went. To show those concerned what would be their stations, the author drew

out a rough sketch of the position set forth in the general order, and after the action, the rough sketch

of the enemy's position was added. No perfect or accurate sketch of the enemy's position was ever

drawn: this was only taken by the eye, not with mathematical instruments; and yet no opportunity

87

has been afforded of correcting it. Nevertheless, this gives you a still better idea of the affair, than

could be obtained without it.

The order commenced in substance thus:

As the enemy seems resolved to force us into action, the numbers and spirit of this little band

of patriot soldiers seems to justify the general in the belief that they may be met with confidence,

defeated and driven back. To prepare for which, the following order will be observed:

The front line will be composed of that part of Colonel McCall's regiment of South-Carolina

State troops, who have not yet been equipped as dragoons, under the command of Major Hammond;

the Georgia volunteers, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Cunningham, and the North Carolina

volunteers, under the command of Major McDowal. Colonel Cunningham will take post on the right,

Major McDowal on the left of the line, southwest of the road, upon the rising ground beyond the

valley in front, three hundred to three hundred and fifty yards in rear of this cantonment or camp,

with the left resting upon the road. Major Hammond will take post on the left of the road, in line

with Colonel Cunningham; supported on the left by Captain Donoly, of the Georgia refugees.

The second line will be composed of the continental regiment of Maryland troops,

commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Howard; on the left of the second line, falling back one hundred

yards in its rear, a continuation of the second line, or third line, will be formed, advancing its left

wing towards the enemy, so as to bring it nearly parallel with the left of the continental troops, upon

the second line. The Virginia militia, commanded by Major Triplet, with the South-Carolina militia,

commanded by Captain Beaty, will form to the right of the second line; the left nearly opposite to

the right of the second line, one hundred yards in its rear; the right extending towards the enemy, so

as to be opposite to or parallel with the second line. The main guard will hold its present position,

and be commanded as at present by Colonel Washington's cavalry, with such of Colonel McCall's

regiment of new raised South-Carolina State troops, as have been equipped for dragoons, will be a

reserve, and form in the rear of Colonel Pickens beyond the ridge, one or two hundred yards, and

nearly opposite the main guard, north of the road.

This is not meant as a correct report of the general order, but as nearly so as the memory,

influenced by such events, could be expected to retain. The sketch annexed will give you a further

illustration of the important event.

Major Joseph McJunkin. McJunkin wrote this, advertised as a memoir, although it seems more to be a

fanciful history of the campaign. Major McJunkin served as an officer in Pickens' militia. A Pennsylvanian

by birth, he moved with his family to South Carolina in 1755.

When Morgan was apprised of Tarleton's approach he fell back a day's march from his position

on the Pacolet. He perhaps doubted the propriety of giving battle at all. His force was considerably

inferior to that arrayed against him. The officers and men comprising the entire body of his militia

were almost wholly unknown to him except by report. He could not know what confidence to place

in their skill and courage. A retrograde movement was necessary to enable him to call in scattered

detachments. On the night of Jan. 16 the last of these joined him some time after dark. He now had

his entire force and the question must be decided, "Shall we fight or fly?" The South Carolina Militia

demanded a fight. Their general could, from past experience and common fame, command their

courage in their present position, but let them cross Broad River and he would not answer for their

conduct. Here the final decision is to risk battle. The Cols. Brandon and Roebuck, with some others,

had the special charge of watching Tarleton's movements from the time he reached the Valley of the

Pacolet. They sat on their horses as he approached and passed that stream and counted his men and

sent their report to headquarters. They watched his camp on the night of the 16th until he began his

march to give battle. Morgan appears to have had the most exact information of everything

necessary.

On the morning of the 17th he had his men called up. He addressed them in a strain well

adapted to enflame their courage. Major Jackson of Georgia also spoke to the militia. The lines

88

formed and the plan of battle disclosed. Three lines of infantry were drawn across the plain. First

the regulars and some companies of Virginia militia are posted to where the final issue is expected.

In front of these the main body of militia under Gen. Pickens are drawn up at the distance of 150

yards. Still in front of these at a distance of 150 yards a corps of picked riflemen is scattered in loose

order along the whole front.

The guns of the vedettes [a screen of mounted troops], led by Capt. Inman, announce the

approach of the foe, and soon the red coats stream before the eyes of the militia. A column marches

up in front of Brandon's men led by a gayly dressed officer on horseback. The word passes along

the line, "Who can bring him down?" John Savage looked Col. Farr full in the face and read yes in

his eye. He darted a few paces in front, laid his rifle against a sapling, a blue gas streamed above his

head, the sharp crack of a rifle broke the solemn stillness of the occasion and a horse without a rider

wheeled from the front of the advancing column. In a few moments the fire is general. The

sharpshooters fall behind Pickens and presently his line yields. Then there is a charge of the dragoons

even past the line of regulars after the retreating militia. Numbers are cut down.

Two dragoons assault a large rifleman, Joseph Hughes by name. His gun was empty, but with

it he parries their blows and dodges round a tree, but they still persist. At the moment the assault on

Hughes began John Savage was priming his rifle. Just as they pass the tree to strike Hughes he levels

his gun and one of the dragoons tumbles from his horse pierced with a bullet. The next moment the

rifle carried by Hughes, now literally backed over, slips out of his hands and inflicts such a blow

upon the other dragoon that he quits the contest and retires hanging by the mane of his horse.

Soon, however, the militia are relieved from the British dragoons by a charge of the American

light horse. The British cavalry are borne from the field. Meanwhile the British infantry and the

regulars under Col. Howard are hotly engaged; the fight becomes desperate. Howard orders a charge,

the militia comes back, and fall in right and left. The British line is broken, some begin to call for

quarters, the voice of Howard is heard amid the rush of men and clangor of steel: "Throw down your

arms and you shall have good quarters."

One battalion throws down their arms and the men fall to the earth. Another commences flight,

but Washington darts before them with his cavalry and they too ground their arms. In the conclusion

of this foray you might have seen Major Jackson of Georgia rush among the broken ranks of the 71st

Regiment and attempting to seize their standard, while they are vainly trying to form by it; _you

might have seen Col. Howard interposing for the relief of his friend when entangled among his foes.

At the end of the strife you might have seen the same young man, Major McArthur, the commandant

of the British infantry, to Gen. Morgan and receiving the General's thanks for the gallantry displayed

on the occasion. You might have seen some five or six hundred tall, brawny, well clad soldiers, the

flower of the British Army, guarded by a set of militia clad in hunting shirts "blacked, smoked and

greasy."

The plain was strewn with the dead and dying. The scattered fragments of the British Army

were hurrying from the scene of carnage. Washington hastily collected his cavalry and dashed off

in pursuit of Tarleton. He was preceded, however, by a party that started with a view of taking

possession of the baggage wagons of the enemy. The victory was complete.

The militia engaged in this battle belonged to three States, the two Carolinas and Georgia.

Two companies from Virginia were present, but were in line with the Maryland Regiment under

Howard. The North Carolina militia were led by Major McDowell. The Georgia militia were under

the immediate command of Majors Cunningham and Jackson; the Captains were Samuel Hammond,

George Walton, and Joshua Inman. Major Jackson also acted as Brigade Major to all the militia

present. The South Carolina militia were directed by Gen. Pickens. The Colonels were John Thomas,

Thomas Brandon, Glenn Anderson, and McCall; the Lieutenant Colonels, William Farr and

Benjamin Roebuck; the Majors, Henry White and Joseph McJunkin; Captains, John Alexander,

Collins, Elder, Crawford, with Lieuts. Thomas Moore and Hugh Means . . .

On the night before the battle forty-five militia soldiers were enrolled as dragoons and placed

under the command of Col. McCall and annexed to Washington's cavalry. These officers and men,

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in the respective commands, were far from being tyros in the art of war. They were marksmen and

had generally been in the war from the commencement. In regard to the conduct of Major McJunkin

on this testimony of those who acted under him and with him is to this effect: That he exhibited

undaunted courage in action and contributed largely in bringing the militia in order to the final onset

by which the battle so honorably terminated.

Major Thomas Young. Young, an officer of the South Carolina Militia who had fought at King's

Mountain, here describes his observations of the Battle of the Cowpens. He appears to have served in

McCall's cavalry.

Our pickets were stationed three miles in advance. Samuel Clowney was one of the picket

guards, and I often heard him afterwards laugh at his narrow escape. Three of Washington's dragoons

were out on a scout, when they came almost in contact with the advanced guard of the British army;

they wheeled, and were pursued almost into camp. Two got in safely; one poor fellow, whose horse

fell down, was taken prisoner. It was about day that the pickets were driven in.

The morning of the 17th of January, 1781, was bitterly cold. We were formed in order of battle,

and the men were slapping their hands together to keep warm-an exertion not long necessary.

The battle field was almost a plain with a ravine on both hands, and very little under growth in

front or near us. The regulars, under the command of Col. Howard, a very brave man, were formed

in two ranks, their right flank resting upon the head of the ravine on the right. The militia were

formed on the left of the regulars, under the command of Col. Pickens, their left flank resting near

the head of the ravine on the left. The cavalry formed in rear of the centre, or rather in rear of the

left wing of the regulars. About sun-rise, the British line advanced at a sort of trot, with a loud halloo.

It was the most beautiful line I ever saw. When they shouted, I heard Morgan say, "They gave us

the British halloo, boys, give them the Indian halloo, by G_"; and he galloped along the lines,

cheering the men, and telling them not to fire until we could see the whites of their eyes. Every

officer was crying don't fire! for it was a hard matter for us to keep from it.

I should have said the British line advanced under cover of their artillery; for it opened so

fiercely upon the centre, that Col. Washington moved his cavalry from the centre towards the right

wing.

The militia fired first. It was for a time, pop-pop-pop-and then a whole volley; but when the

regulars fired, it seemed like one sheet of flame from right to left. Oh! it was beautiful! I have heard

old Col. Fair [Lieutenant Colonel William Farr] say often, that he believed John Savage fired the

first gun in this battle. He was riding to and fro, along the lines, when he saw Savage fix his eye

upon a British officer; he stepped out of the ranks, raised his gun-fired, and he saw the officer fall.

After the first fire, the militia retreated, and the cavalry covered their retreat. They were again

formed and renewed the attack, and we retired to the rear. They fought for some time, and retreated

again-and then formed a second line. In this I can hardly be mistaken, for I recollect well that the

cavalry was twice, during the action, between our army and the enemy. I have understood that one

of the retreats was ordered by mistake by one of Morgan's officers. How true this is I cannot say.

After the second forming, the fight became general and unintermitting. In the hottest of it, I saw

Col. Brandon coming at full speed to the rear, and waving his sword to Col. Washington. In a

moment the command to charge was given, and I soon found that the British cavalry had charged

the American right. We made a most furious charge, and cutting through the British cavalry, wheeled

and charged them in the rear. In this charge, I exchanged my tackey for the finest horse I ever rode;

it was the quickest swap I ever made in my life!

At this moment the bugle sounded. We about half formed and making a sort of circuit at full

speed, came up in the rear of the British line, shouting and charging like madmen. At this moment

Col. Howard gave the word "charge bayonets!" and the day was ours. The British broke, and

throwing down their guns and cartouch boxes, made for the wagon road, and did the prettiest sort of

running!

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After this Major Jolly and seven or eight of us, resolved upon an excursion to capture some of

the baggage. We went about twelve miles, and captured two British soldiers, two Negroes, and two

horses laden with portmanteaus. One of the portmanteaus belonged to a paymaster in the British

service, and contained gold. Jolly insisted upon my returning with the prize to camp, while he

pursued a little farther. I did so. Jolly's party dashed onward, and soon captured an armorer's wagon,

with which they became so much engaged that they forgot all about me. I rode along for some miles

at my leisure, on my fine gray charger, talking to my prisoners, when, all at once I saw coming in

advance, a party, which I soon discovered to be British. I knew it was no time to consider now; so I

wheeled, put spurs to my horse, and made down the road in hopes of meeting Jolly and his party.

My horse was stiff, however, from the severe exercise I had given him that morning, and I soon

found that they were gaining upon me. I wheeled abruptly to the right into a cross road, but a party

of three or four dashed through the woods and intercepted me. It was now a plain case, and I could

no longer hope to engage one at a time. My pistol was empty, so I drew my sword and made battle.

I never fought so hard in my life. I knew it was death anyhow, and I resolved to sell my life as dearly

as possible.

In a few minutes one finger on my left hand was split open; then I received a cut on my sword

arm by a parry which disabled it. In the next instant a cut from a sabre across my forehead (the scar

from which I shall carry to my grave,) the skin slipped down over my eyes, and the blood blinded

me so that I could see nothing. Then came a thrust in the right shoulder blade, then a cut upon the

left shoulder, and a last cut (which you can feel for yourself) on the back of my head-and I fell upon

my horse's neck. They took me down, bound up my wounds, and placed me again on my horse a

prisoner of war.

When they joined the party in the main road, there were two Tories who knew me very well-

Littlefield and Kelly. Littlefield cocked his gun, and swore he would kill me. In a moment nearly

twenty British soldiers drew their swords, and cursing him for a d . . .d coward, for wanting to kill a

boy without arms and a prisoner ran him off. Littlefield did not like me, and for a very good reason.

While we were at Grindall Shoals with Morgan, he once caught me out, and tried to take my gun

away from me. I knocked him down with it, and as he rose I clicked it, and told him if he didn't run

I'd blow him through. He did not long hesitate which of the two to choose.

I asked Kelly not to tell the British who I was, and I do not think the fellow did. Col. Tarlton

sent for me, and I rode by his side for several miles. He was a very fine looking man, with rather a

proud bearing, but very gentlemanly in his manners. He asked me a great many questions, and I told

him one lie, which I have often thought of since. In reply to his querry whether Morgan was

reinforced before the battle? I told him "he was not, but that he expected a reinforcement every

minute." "He asked me how many dragoons Washington had." I replied that "he had seventy, and

two volunteer companies of mounted militia-but you know they won't fight." "By G_d!" he quickly

replied, "they did to-day, though!"

Captain Henry Connally. Connally volunteered at the request of the governor of North Carolina to

command a combined company of draftees and men who had enlisted for eighteen months or who had

joined for the duration. This excerpt describes his part of the action and the weather during the battle.

... in December just before Christmas Gen Nathanil [sic] Greene from the north took command of

us all. This was in 1780. We all by his proclamation and the orders of our Governor was placed

under his command and assembled at Charlotte, from then this applicant was placed under Col

Washington and marched to S Carolina to Augusta and Ninety Six, after marching in a southern

direction for several days news came that Tarleton was after us. We were all now under Gen.

Morgan, and a terrible conflict ensued at the Cowpens between Tarletons men and the army under

Gen Morgan, at the "Cow Pens" Here the Americans were victorious and took a great many military

stores & cannons baggage and six or seven hundred british and tory prisoners This was in January,

1781 it was cold weather but inclined to be rainey during the battle the company which belonged to

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this applicant was placed under a Col Howard on the extreme right flank of the division and this

applicant commanded a company in the action our company when just about to catch up our horses

which was tied about four hundred paces in the rear of the line of Battle fell upon us with great fury

but we was fortunately relieved by Washington’s legion that hastened to our assistance after the

engagement we all formed a junction with Gen. Greene.

Lieutenant Thomas Anderson. Anderson compiled a journal of his service in the Delaware Regiment

from 1780 to 1782. This extract describes the Cowpens campaign and battle. In many instances, the entries

match verbatim those of Captain Kirkwood, of the same regiment, as if, perhaps, they had been dictated.

The important difference, of course, is in his detailed description of the action of 17 January 1781.

Nov 4, This day Genl Morgans Light Infantry With Col Washington's Cavalry March'd down toward

Rudgeley's Within 13 miles of Camden to reconiter [sic] the Enemy and return'd to camp

On the 9th Inst March' d 100

22d This day the Maryland Division arrived here,

"27 The army under the Comd ofGenl Gates march'd to Charlotte to Huts

"28 Received Orders to hold ourselves in readyness to March at a moments warning Accordingly

left Our tents Standing with all our Sick behind and March'd to 12 Mile Creek This creek is the line

between North and South Carolina from thence We march' d to the Hanging Rock, Where the

Infantry remain' d Whilst Col Washington With his Cavalry Went down to Col. Rudgely's and With

the deception of a Pine top took the Garrison Consisting of One Coln, One Major, three Captains,

four Lieuts, One hundred rank and file, From thence Retum'd to Camp with the Prisoners and arrived

On the 2nd Decbr (100 miles)

Dec 6th Genl. Greene took Command of the Southern army in the rom of Genl Gates Who was

recall' d.

"17 march' d to Charlotte ( 15 miles)

"21st Was join'd With two Compys from the Maryland line Commanded by Capts Dobson, &

Anderson and March'd to Biggers Ferry on the Catawba river. (15 miles) Crossed the River and

march'd. (5 miles); March'd (16 miles); March' d ( 13 miles); March'd (8 miles)

Jany 1781 March' d ( 10 miles); March'd to the Cowpens (12 miles)

7th. Before day Reced Information that Col Tarlton Was Within Five Miles of us With a Strong

Body of Horse and Infantry Whereon We got up and put Ourselves in Order of Battle by day Light

they Hove in Sight Halted and Form'd the Line in Full View as We had no artillery to annoy them

and the Genl not thinking it prudent to advance from the ground We had form' d, We look' d at each

other for a Considerable time, about Sunrise they began the attack by the Discharge of two pieces

of cannon and three Huzzas advancing briskly On our riflemen that Was posted in front Who Fought

Well Disputing the ground that Was between them and us, Flying from One tree to another at last

being forst [sic] to give ground they fell back in Our rear the Enemy Seeing us Standing in Such

good Order Halted for Some time to dress their line Which Outflanked ours Considerably The [sic]

then advanced On boldly under a Very heavy fire until they got Within a few yards of us but their

line Was So much longer than ours the turn' dour Flanks Which Caused us to fall back Some

Disstance The Enemy thinking that We Were broke set up a great Shout Charged us With their

bayonets but in no Order We let them Come Within ten Or fifteen yards of us then give them a full

Volley and at the Same time Charged them home. They not expecting any

Such thing put them in Such Confusion that We Were in amongst them With the Bayonets Which

Caused them to give ground and at last to take to the flight But We followed them up so Close that

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they never Could get in Order again untill We Killed and took the Whole of the Infantry Prisoners,

At the Same time that We Charged, Col Washington Charged the horse Which Soon gave Way We

followed them ten miles but not being able to Come up With them Returned back to the field of

Battle that night and lay amongst the Dead & Wounded Very Well pleased With Our days Work

March this day 20

Jan 18, March' doff With the prisoners for the Catawba River arrived at it On the 23d Inst being,

(100 miles)

Febry 1st The Enemy under the Comd of Earl Cornwallis Crossed the River below Where Genl

Davidson With Some of the South Carolina Militia Was posted, Killed the Gen! and Some of the

men Which Caused us to March for Salisbury for fear that the [sic] Would get between us and our

army Which Was on the Way for Guilford We arrived at Col Locks before day every step up to our

Knees in Mud it rained On us all the Way (30 miles).

Sergeant Major William Seymour. Seymour served in the southern campaign and at the battle of

the Cowpens. The following is excerpted from his Journal. [Preceding this account the author

described the campaign leading to the battle.

Next day being the seventeenth January, we received intelligence a while before day, that Colonel

Tarleton was advancing in our rear in order to give us battle, upon which we were drawn up in order

of battle, the men seeming to be all in good spirits and very willing to fight. The militia were

dismounted and were drawn up in front of the standing troops on the right and left flanks, being

advanced about two hundred yards. By this time the enemy advanced and attacked the militia in

front, which they stood very well for some time till being overpowered by the superior number of

enemy they retreated, but in very good order, not seeming to be the least bit confused. By this time

the enemy advanced and attacked our light infantry with both cannon and small arms, where meeting

with a very warm reception they then thought to surround our right flank, to prevent which Captain

Kirkwood with his company wheeled to the right and attacked their left flank so vigorously that they

were soon repulsed, our men advancing on them so very rapidly that they soon gave way. Our left

flank advanced at the same time and repulsed their right flank, upon which they retreated off, leaving

us entire masters of the field, our men pursuing them for the distance of twelve miles, insomuch that

all their infantry was killed, wounded, and taken prisoners.

This action commenced about seven o'clock in the morning and continued till late in the afternoon.

In the action were killed of the enemy one hundred and ninty men, wounded one hundred and eighty,

and taken prisoners one Major, thirteen Captains, fourteen Lieutenants, and nine Ensigns, and five

hundred and fifty private men, with two field pieces and four standards of colours. Their heavy

baggage would have shared the same fate, if Tarleton, who retreated with his cavalry, had not set

fire to it, burning up twenty-six wagons. This victory on our side can be attributed to nothing else

but Divine Providence, they having thirteen hundred in the field of their best troops, and we not

eight hundred of standing troops and militia.

The troops against us were the 7th or Royal English Fuzileers, the First Battalion of the 7lst, and the

British Legion, horse and foot. The courage and conduct of the brave General Morgan in this action

is highly commendable, as likewise Colonel Howard, who at all times of the action rode from right

to left of the line encouraging the men; and indeed all the officers and men behaved with uncommon

and undaunted bravery, but more especially the brave captain Kirkwood and his company, who did

that day wonders, rushing on the enemy without either dread or fear, and being instrumental in taking

a great number of prisoners.

Our loss in the action were one Lieutenant wounded, and one Sergeant, and thirty-five killed and

wounded, of which fourteen were of Captain Kirkwood's Company of the Delaware Regiment.

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James Kelley. Kelley who served with Washington's cavalry, rendered this account of the battle when

he applied for veteran's benefits in 1835.

... he returned to Camden county - in a very short time he volunteerd under Col. Washington. they

did not rendizvous [sic] at any particular place-there was but 2 or 3 volunteerd when he did-

Washington had about 300 horse at that time-Declarant was a horseman & found his own horse he

cannot recollect the name of his captains there was with Washington Col Howard & Col Pickens-

all the men he thinks amounted to 300. We marched to a garrison called Rugeleys occupied by

tories and some British-we got a pine log & Hacked it to look as much like a cannon as possible &

put it on an old pair of Wagon wheels & run it up near the fort & sent in a Flag & Col Rugeley (a

Tory) surrendered the garrison. [?]marched on to the [sic] join Genl. Morgan & did join him at the

place where the battle of the Cowpens was fought & but a few days before said battle-Declarant

fought under Col Washington in said battle The battle ground was part in the woods & part in an

old field-the militia were in front & the regulars in the rear Washington and his men on the wing-

They barely got formed before Tarlton made his charge-the militia soon run-the British began to

cut down the militia very fast & Washington & Howards men charged [?] & with the regulars of

Morgan soon routed the British - Col. Washington & two or three men pursued Tarlton or 15 miles

& he [Kelley] understood that during this chase Washington would have been killed by one of the

British but that one of Washington's men shot the fellows arm off & Washington made a hack at

Tarlton & disabled Tarltons fingers & glanced his head with his sword and took a good many

prisoners. Morgan took the prisoners on towards Virginia . . . .

Cornett James Simmons (3d Dragoons). Simmons made this statement in support of Sergeant

Lawrence Everhard's petition for a pension 1803. Apparently his statement was taken by a clerk who

experienced difficulty maintaining the first person; both "I" and "you" refer to Simmons.

That about the dawn of day on the 17th of January 1781, you selected Sergeant Everhart from your

Regiment and ten men, whom you sent to reconnoitre Lt. Colonel Tarleton’s Army. The advanced

guard of this army were mounted as we understood, and believed, on some of the fleetest race horses

which he had impressed from their owners in this Country, and which enabled them to take Sergeant

Everhart and one of the men-but the other ten men returned, and gave you information of the

approach of the enemy.

Immediately after the Battle of the Cowpens commenced, you will recollect that your first charge

was made on the enemy's Cavalry, (who were cutting down our Militia) and when, after a smart

Action, you instantly defeated, leaving in the course often minutes 18 of their brave 17th Dragoons

dead on the spot, and whom you will recollect were deserted by Colo. Tarleton's Legeonary Cavalry.

The former wore a uniform of red and buff, with Sheep Skin, on their caps; the latter wore a Uniform

of Green with black facings. In pursuit of their Cavalry you overtook their Artillery, whom you

immediately made prisoners, but the Drivers of the Horses who were Galloping off with 2-3

pounders, you could not make Surrender until after Repeated Commands from you, you were

obliged to order to be Shot; after securing these field peices [sic], your third Charge was made on

the right wing of their Army Composed of their Legeonary [sic] Infantry, intermixed with the

Battallion of the Brave 71st (under the Command of Major McArthur,) and who, under the Operation

of a Universal panic, (having been successfully charged on the left of their Army by our friend Col.

Howard) instantly surrendered; immediately after Securing the Prisoners your 4th Charge was in

pursuit of their Cavalry, who finding they could no longer Keep Everhart a Prisoner, Shot him with

a Pistol, in the head, over one of his eyes, (I cannot remember particularly which) being then

intermixed with the enemy, Everhart pointed out to me the man who shot him, and on whom a just

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Retaliation was exercised, and who by my order, was instantly Shot, and his horse as well as I can

recollect, was given to Everhart, whom I ordered in the rear to the Surgeons. It was at this period

after the Action that we sustained the greatest loss of Men, Lt Bell having previously taken off with

him in pursuit of the Enemy, on our left nearly a fourth part of your Regt. The enemy were obliged

to retreat, and were pursued by you 22 Miles taking several prisoners, and wounded. To the best of

my recollection Sergeant Everhart was so disabled by his wound that he was discharged from you,

and he retired from the Army.

Private James Collins. Collins served in the South Carolina militia during the campaign in the

south. It was not long until it became necessary for us to seek safety by joining Morgan, who was encamped

at the Cowpens, but we were not permitted to remain long idle, for Tarleton came on like a thunder

storm, which soon put us to our best mettle. After the tidings of his approach came into camp,-in the

night,-we were all awakened, ordered under arms, and formed in order of battle by daybreak. About

sunrise on the 17th January, 1781, the enemy came into full view. The sight, to me at least, seemed

somewhat imposing; they halted for a short time, and then advanced rapidly, as if certain victory.

The militia under Pickins and Moffitt, was posted on the right of the regulars some distance in

advance, while Washington's cavalry was stationed in the rear. We gave the enemy one fire, when

they charged us with their bayonets; we gave way and retreated for our horses, Tarleton's cavalry

pursued us; ("now," thought I, "my hide is in the loft;") just as we got to our horses, they overtook

us and began to make a few hacks at some, however, without doing much injury. They, in their

haste, had pretty much scattered, perhaps, thinking they would have another Fishing creek frolic,

but in a few moments, Col. Washington's cavalry was among them, like a whirlwind, and the poor

fellows began to kneel from their horses, without being able to remount. The shock was so sudden

and violent, they could not stand it, and immediately betook themselves to flight; there was no time

to rally, and they appeared to be as hard to stop as a drove of wild Choctaw steers, going to a

Pennsylvania market. In a few moments the clashing of swords was out of hearing and quickly out

of sight; by this time, both lines of the infantry were warmingly engaged and we being relieved from

the pursuit of the enemy began to rally and prepare to redeem our credit, when Morgan rode up in

front, and waving his sword, cried out, "Form, form, my brave fellows! Give them one more fire

and the day is ours. Old Morgan was never beaten." We then advanced briskly, and gained the right

flank of the enemy, and they being hard pressed in front, by Howard, and falling very fast, could not

stand it long. They began to throw down their arms, and surrender themselves prisoners of war. The

whole army, except Tarleton and his horsemen, fell into the hands of Morgan, together with all the

baggage. After the fight was over, the sight was truly melancholy. The dead on the side of the British,

exceeded the number killed at the battle of King's Mountain, being if I recollect aright, three

hundred, or upwards. The loss, on the side of the Americans, was only fifteen or sixteen, and a few

slightly wounded. This day, I fired my little rifle five times whether with any effect or not, I do not

know. Next day after receiving some small share of the plunder, and taking care to get as much

powder as we could, we (the militia) were disbanded and returned to our old haunts, where we

obtained a few day's rest.

Private Henry Wells. Wells was a soldier in the Delaware contingent of the Continental Line and

fought at Trenton, Germantown, and the Brandywine. His description seems a bit fanciful.

In the Spring of 1780 Col. Hall Still commanded my Regt. and Capt. McKennan my Company, we

were marched into South Carolina . . . .We left the encampment at Camden [sic] in the winter. I

think about the 1st of January 17 81 and marched towards the Cow Pens. An express had come for

Genl. Marion aboutt [sic] the time of our leaving Camden and he and most of his cavalry left us.

We pursued our march under our old officers until within about one and a half days before we

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arrived at the "Cowpens" when we fell in with the brave Col. Morgan and his party, and he

assumed command of the detachment and Col. Washington was Second in Command. Our whole

force at this time numbered something less than 900 men a greater proportion of whom were

militia & less than 100 horse. By this time our Delaware Rigiment [sic] were reduced at least one

half-Some died on the field. Some fell by disease-and Some died from hard treatment while

prisoners-Two of my Cousins [sic] fell into the hands of the enemy at Camden, and died from the

Severity of their treatment-the other lived to be exchanged, but he returned with a Shattered

Constitution. A few days after our junction with Col Morgan having halted for a day or two we fell

in with a much Superior force of the enemy, at the Cowpens under Col. Tarleton. He outnumbered

us with infantry and he had three or four times as many Cavalry Yet notwithstanding our great

disparity of force we came of [sic] victorious, having killed and wounded between 4 and 500 men

and taken 500 prisoners. The result of this victory is mainly owing to the Skill and bravery of Cols.

Morgan & Washington, for who could refuse to follow, & fight for such leaders-The total loss of

the Americans in this engagement, in killed & wounded, was considerably under 100 men I think

not more than fifty-The Battle commenced about 10 or 11 Oclock A. M. and continued 'til late in

the evening. At the onset we were much alarmed by the Superiority of the Enemy in numbers, but

the powerful and trumpet-like voice of our Commander drove fear from every bosom, and gave

new energies to every arm. During the day, at every turn we Seemed to gain new advantages.

Washington & Morgan knew how to turn every circumstance to good account--:they were a host

within themselves - after the Battle was over it was reported in the Camp that Some Stray fingers

were found on the field which were Said to being to Col. Tarleton. The Bayttle was fought about

the middle of January 1781. Col. Tarleton was hard run by a small detachment of American horse

and barely escaped being taken prisoner. It was generally agreed in the Camp that Tarleton could

easily have been Shot by those in pursuit of him, but their object was to take him alive. In this

fight I was struck across the left shoulder by one of Tarleton's Troopers, With his Sword with Such

Violence, that the colar [sic] of my coat, my vest and my Shirt, were each cut through, and the

flest & skin Sleightly [sic] scratched and bruised so much so that there was a considerable not

[sic] or welt on my Sholder for a number of days,- The prisoners taken in the engagement were

Sent into the interior of the Country. (The name of the place I do not now recollect) and a part of

the troops were Sent to guard them, the ballance [sic] of us went into winter quarters, and

remained near the Cowpens . . . .

Lieutenant Colonel Banastre Tarleton. Tarleton describes the movement of his troops to the

battlefield, his analysis of the terrain, enemy dispositions, and course of action, and the deployment of his

forces.

Accordingly, at three o'clock in the morning on the 17th, the pickets being called in, the British

troops, under the command of Lieutenant colonel Tarleton, were directed to follow the route the

Americans had taken the previous evening, and the baggage and waggons were ordered to remain

upon the ground till daybreak, under the protection of a detachment of each corps. Three companies

of light infantry, supported by the legion infantry, formed the advance; the 7th regiment, the guns,

and the 1st battalion of the 71st, composed the center; and the cavalry and mounted infantry brought

up the rear. The ground which the Americans had passed being broken, and much intersected by

creeks and ravines, the march of the British troops during the darkness was exceedingly slow, on

account of the time employed in examining the front and flanks as they proceeded. Before dawn

[Thicketty ] creek was passed, when an advanced guard of cavalry was ordered to the front. The

enemy's patrole approaching, was pursued and overtaken: Two troops of dragoons, under Captain

Ogilvie, of the legion, were then ordered to reinforce the advanced guard, and to harass the rear of

the enemy. The march had not continued long in this manner, before the commanding officer in

front reported that the American troops were halted and forming. The guides were immediately

consulted relative to the ground which General Morgan the occupied, and the country in his rear.

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These people described both with great perspicuity: They said that the woods were open and free

from swamps; that the part of Broad rjver, just above the place where King's creek joined the stream,

was about six miles distant from the enemy's left flank, and that the river, by making a curve to the

westward, ran parallel to the rear.

Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton having attained a position, which he certainly might deem

advantageous, on account of the vulnerable situation of the enemy, and the supposed vicinity of the

two British corps on the east and west of Broad river, did not hesitate to undertake those measures

which the instructions of his commanding officer imposed, and his own judgment, under the present

appearances, equally recommended. He ordered the legion dragoons to drive in the militia parties

who covered the front, that General Morgan's disposition might be conveniently and distinctly

inspected. He discovered that the American commander had formed a front line of about one

thousand militia, and had composed his second line and reserve of five hundred continental light

infantry, one hundred and twenty of Washington's cavalry, and three hundred back woodsmen. This

accurate knowledge being obtained, Tarleton desired the British infantry to disencumber themselves

of everything, except their arms and ammunition: The light infantry were then ordered to file to the

right till they became equal to the flank of the American front line: The legion infantry were added

to their left; and, under the fire of a three-pounder, this part of the British troops was instructed to

advance within three hundred yards of the enemy. This situation being acquired, the 7th regiment

was commanded to form upon the left of the legion infantry, and the other three-pounder was given

to the right division of the 7th: A captain, with fifty dragoons, was placed on each flank of the corps,

who formed the British front line, to protect their own, and threaten the flanks of the enemy: The 1st

battalion of the 71st was desired to extend a little to the left of the 7th regiment, and to remain one

hundred and fifty yards in the rear. This body of infantry, and near two hundred cavalry, composed

the reserve. During the execution of these arrangements, the animation of the officers and the alacrity

of the soldiers afforded the most promising assurances of success.

The dispositions being completed, the front line received orders to advance; a fire from some of

the recruits of the 7th regiment was suppressed, and the troops moved on in as good a line as troops

could move at open files: The militia, after a short contest, were dislodged, and the British

approached the continentals. The fire on both sides was well supported and produced much

slaughter: The cavalry on the right were directed to charge the enemy's left: They executed the order

with much gallantry, but were drove back by the fire of the reserve, and by a charge of Colonel

Washington's cavalry. As the contest between the British infantry in the front line and the

continentals seemed equally balanced, neither retreating, Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton thought the

advance of the 71st into line and a movement of the cavalry in reserve to threaten the enemy's right

flank, would put a victorious period into the action. No time was lost in performing this manoeuvre.

The 71st were desired to pass the 7th before they gave their fire, and were directed not to entangale

[sic] their right flank with the left of the other battalion. The cavalry were ordered to incline to the

left, and to form a line, which would embrace the whole of the enemy's right flank. Upon the advance

of the 71st, all the infantry again moved on: The continentals and back woodsmen gave ground: The

British rushed forwards: An order was dispatched to the cavalry to charge: An unexpected fire at

this instant from the Americans, who came about as they were retreating, stopped the British, and

threw them into confusion. Exertions to make them advance were useless. The part of the cavalry

which had not been engaged fell likewise into disorder, and an unaccountable panic extended itself

along the whole line. The Americans, who before thought they had lost the action, taking advantage

of the present situation, advanced upon the British troops, and augmented their astonishment. A

general flight ensued. Tarleton sent directions to his cavalry to form about four hundred yards to

the right of the enemy, in order to check them, whilst he endeavoured to rally the infantry to protect

the guns. The cavalry did not comply with the order, and the effort to collect the infantry was

ineffectual: Neither promises nor threats could gain their attention; they surrendered or dispersed,

and abandoned the guns to the artillery men, who defended them for some time with exemplary

resolution. In this last stage of defeat Lieutenant colonel Tarleton made another struggle to bring his

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cavalry to the charge. The weight of such an attack might yet retrieve the day, the enemy being much

broken by their late rapid advance; but all attempts to restore order, recollection, or courage, proved

fruitless. About two hundred dragoons forsook their leader, and left the field of battle. Fourteen

officers and forty horse-men were, however, not unmindful of their own reputation, or the situation

of their commanding officer. Colonel Washington's cavalry were charged, and driven back into the

continental infantry by this handful of brave men. Another party of the Americans, who had seized

upon the baggage of the British troops on the road from the late encampment, were dispersed, and

this detachment retired towards the Broad river unmolested. On the route Tarleton heard with infinite

grief and astonishment that the main army had not advanced beyond Turkey creek: He therefore

directed his course to the south east, in order to reach Hamilton's ford, near the mouth of Bullock

creek, whence he might communicate with Earl Cornwallis.

The number of killed and wounded, in the action at the Cowpens, amounted to near three

hundred on both sides, officers and men inclusive: This loss was almost equally shared; but the

Americans took two pieces of cannon, the colours of the 7th regiment, and near four hundred

prisoners.

Lieutenant Roderick Mackenzie. Mackenzie published this letter. He was An officer of the 71st

Highlanders and witness to the battle.

The defeat of the British detachment at Cowpens, which I informed you would be the subject of

this letter, has been variously represented by different authors; it is a point, however, in which they

all agree, that at a particular stage of the engagement the whole of the American infantry gave way,

and, that the legion-cavalry, though three times the number of those of the enemy, contributed

nothing to complete their [the American] confusion.

Ramsey states this action as follows, Volume II, page 196: [Ramsey here notes the two field

pieces, five-to-four superiority in infantry, and three-to-one superiority in cavalry, and describes the

deployment (in two lines) of Morgan's troops. He describes the retirement of American militiamen,

who were then rallied by their officers.].

The Marquis de Chastellus, in his Travels in North America, accounts for the defeat thus: [de

Chastellux' describes Morgan's two "wings" of infantry, one of which that officer commanded to

wheel to the right, retreat thirty to forty paces, and recommence firing, and credits this maneuver

with the victory].

The Annual Register for 1781 gives the following account: [Herein is described the withdrawal

of the militia to lure the British infantry into a deadly fire from the second line]. Our author

[Tarleton] is so materially concerned, as the principal agent of this scene of ruin, that an impartial

account is not to be expected from him; his statement of his own conduct on that day, if authentick,

would do honour to the immortal Frederick [the Great, of Prussia]!

The Marquis's exposition of the defeat, in spite of his assertion, that it has the sanction of General

Morgan, is flimsy and erroneous. The editor of the Annual Register has been deceived;

consequently, of these several accounts, that given by Doctor Ramsey deserves more attention.

I was upon the detachment in question, and the narrative which I now offer has been submitted

to the judgment of several respectable officers, who were also in this action, and it has met with their

intire [sic] approbation.

Towards the latter end of December, 1780, Earl Cornwallis received intelligence that General

Morgan had advanced to the westward of the Broad River, with about one thousand men. Two-thirds

of this force were militia, about one hundred of them cavalry, the rest continentals. His intention

was to threaten Ninety Six, and to distress the western frontiers. To frustrate these designs,

Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton was detached with the light and legion-infantry, the fusiliers, the first

battalion of the 71st regiment, about three hundred and fifty cavalry, two field pieces, and an

adequate proportion of men from the royal artillery; in all near a thousand strong. This corps, after

a progress of some days, arrived at the vicinity of Ninety Six, a post which was then commanded by

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Lieutenant Colonel Allen. An offer of reinforcement from that garrison was made to Lieutenant

Colonel Tarleton. The offer was rejected; and the detachment, by fatiguing marches, attained the

ground which Morgan had quitted a few hours before: This position was taken about ten o'clock on

the evening of the 16th of January. The pursuit re-commenced by two o'clock the next morning, and

was rapidly continued through marshes and broken ground, til day light, when the enemy were

discovered in front. Two of their videttes were taken soon after; these gave information that General

Morgan had halted, and prepared for action; he had formed his troops as described by Ramsey, in

an open wood, secured neither in front, flank, nor rear. Without the delay of a single moment, and

in despite of extreme fatigue, the light-legion infantry and fusiliers were ordered to form in line.

Before this order was put into execution, and while Major Newmarsh, who commanded the latter

corps, was posting his officers, the line, far from complete, was led to the attack by Lieutenant

Colonel Tarleton himself The seventy-first regiment and cavalry, who had not as yet disentangled

themselves from the brushwood with which Thickelle [Thicketty ] Creek abounds, were directed to

form, and wait for orders. The military valour of British troops, when not entirely divested of the

powers necessary to its exertion, was not to be resisted by an American militia. They gave way on

all quarters, and were pursued to their continentals: the second line, now attacked, made a stout

resistance. Captain Ogilvie, with his troop, which did not exceed forty men, was ordered to charge

the right flank of the enemy. He cut his way through their line, but, exposed to a heavy fire, and

charged at the same time by the whole of Washington's dragoons, was compelled to retreat in

confusion. The reserve, which as yet had no orders to move from its first position, and consequently

remained near a mile distant, was now directed to advance. When the line felt "the advance of the

seventy-first, all the infantry again moved on: the continentals and backwoods-men gave ground:

the British rushed forwards: an order was dispatched to the cavalry to charge. This order, however,

if such was then thought of, being either not delivered or disobeyed, they stood aloof, without

availing themselves of the fairest opportunity of reaping the laurels which lay before them. The

infantry were not in condition to overtake the fugitives; the latter had marched thirty miles in the

course of the last fortnight; the former, during that time, had been in motion day and night. A

number, not less than two-thirds of the British infantry officers, had already fallen, and nearly the

same proportion of privates; fatigue, however, enfeebled the pursuit, much more than loss of blood.

Morgan soon discovered that the legion-cavalry did not advance, and that the infantry, though well

disposed, were unable to come up with his corps; he ordered Colonel Washington, with his dragoons,

to cover his retreat, and to check the pursuit. He was obeyed; and the protection thus afforded, gave

him an opportunity of rallying his scattered forces. They formed, renewed the attack, and charged

in their turn. In disorder from the pursuit, unsupported by the cavalry, deprived of the assistance of

the cannon, which in defiance of the utmost exertions of those who had them in charge, were now

left behind, the advance of the British fell back, and communicated a panick to others, which soon

became general: a total route ensued. Two hundred and fifty horse which had not been engaged, fled

through the woods with the utmost precipitation, bearing down such officers as opposed their flight:

the cannon were soon seized by the Americans, the detachment from the train being either killed or

wounded in their defence; and the infantry were easily overtaken, as the cause which had retarded

the pursuit, had now an equal effect in impeding the retreat: dispirited on many accounts, they

surrendered at discretion. Even at this late stage of the defeat, Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton, with no

more than fifty horse, hesitated not to charge the whole of Washington's cavalry, though supported

by the continentals; it was a small body of officers, and a detachment of the seventeenth regiment

of dragoons, who presented themselves on this desperate occasion; the loss sustained was in

proportion to the danger of the enterprise, and the whole body was repulsed.

Whether in actions of importance, or slight skirmishes, I everywhere can trace exaggerated

accounts of this author's prowess. On his retreat after the above defeat, he says, page 218, "Another

party of the Americans, who had seized upon the baggage of the British troops on the road from the

late encampment, were dispersed." Earl Cornwallis, in his dispatches to the Commander in Chief,

writes, that "Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton retook the baggage of the corps, and cut to pieces the

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detachment of the enemy who had taken possession of it; and after destroying what they could not

conveniently bring off, retired with the remainder, unmolested, to Hamilton's Ford." And the Annual

Register for 1781 says, that our author "had the fortune of retaking the baggage, the slender guard

in whose custody it was being left cut to pieces." All these misrepresentations have originated from

one and the same source; the fact however stands thus:

A detachment from each corps, under the command of Lieutenant Fraser of the 7lst regiment

(who was afterwards killed at York Town), had been left at some distance to guard the baggage;

early intelligence of the defeat was conveyed to this officer by some friendly Americans; what part

of the baggage could not be carried off he immediately destroyed, and with his men mounted on the

waggon, and spare horses, he retreated to Earl Cornwallis unmolested; nor did he, on this occasion,

see any of the American horse or foot, or of the party then under our author's directions. This was

the only body of infantry that escaped, the rest were either killed or made prisoners. The dragoons

joined the army in two separate divisions; one arrived in the neighborhood of the British

encampment upon the evening of the same day, at which time his Lordship had the mortification to

learn the defeat of his detachment; the other, under Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton, appeared the next

morning.

I am, etc.

Alexander Chesney. Chesney was a Tory who lived in the vicinity of the Cowpens. Chesney enlisted

in the Loyalist militia in June 1780 and fought in a number of skirmishes. He was wounded with

Ferguson at King's Mountain. He led a company of militia and served as a guide to Tarleton at the

Cowpens.

Tarleton came into Ninety-Six district to go in quest of General Morgan [January 1781] and sent to

the garrison for guides acquainted with Morgan's situation which was then convenient to my house on

Pacholet [sic]; I joined Col Tarleton and marched to Fair-forest having failed to get intelligence of

Morgan's situation he sent me out [January 16] to endeavour to do so and make mills grind for the Army:

when I reached the Pacholet river I swam my horse over a private ford not likely to be guarded, leaving

the man behind me to go on more quietly & reconnoitre the same. I found the fires burning but no one

there, on which I rode to my father's who said Morgan was gone to the Old-fields about an hour before;

my wife said the same and that they had used or destroyed my crop & took away almost everything. I

immediately returned to Col Tarleton and found he had marched to the Old fields. I overtook them before

10 o’clock near the Cowpens on Thickety Creek where we suffered a total defeat by some dreadful bad

management.

The Americans were posted behind a rivulet with Riflemen as a front line and Cavarly [sic] in the rear so

as to make a third line; Col Tarleton charged at the head of his Regiment of Cavalry called the British

Legion which was filled up from the prisoners taken at the battle of Camden; the Cavalry supported by a

detachment of the 71st Regt under Major McArthur broke the Riflemen without difficulty, but the

prisoners on seeing their own Regt opposed to them in the rear would not proceed against it and broke;

the remainder charged but were repulsed-- this gave time to the front line to rally and go in from the rear

of their Cavalry which immediately charged and broke in the rear of the 7lst (then unsupported) making

many prisoners: The rout was almost total. I was with Tarleton in the charge who behaved bravely but

imprudently the consequence was his force disperced [sic] in all directions the guns and many prisoners

fell into the hands of the Americans.

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GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE

1. Continental Army. Major General Nathaniel Greene assumed command of the Southern

Army from General Horatio Gates in December 1780. These letters between Greene and

Morgan (whom he appointed in Letter 1 to command the expedition that met Tarleton a month

later at the Cowpens) demonstrate both Morgan's anxiety and Greene's optimism.

Letter 1:

To Brig. Genl. Morgan

Sir-

You are appointed to the command of a corps of Light Infantry, a detachment of militia, and Lt. Col.

Washington's Regiment of Light Dragoons. With these troops you will proceed to the West side of the

Catawba river, where you will be joined by a body of Volunteer Militia under the command of Brig. Genl.

Davidson of this State, and by the militia lately under the command of Brig. Genl. Sumter. This force, and

such others as may join you from Georgia, you will employ against the enemy on the West side of the

River, either offensively or defensively as your own prudence and discretion may direct, acting with

caution, and avoiding surprizes by every possible precaution. For the present I give you the entire command

in that quarter, and do hereby require all Officers and Soldiers engaged in the American cause to be subject

to your orders and command. The object of this detachment is to give protection to that part of the country

and spirit up the people-to annoy the enemy in that quarter- collect the provisions and forage out of the way

of the enemy, which you will have formed into a number of small magazines, in or near the position you

might think proper to take. You will prevent plundering as much as possible, and be as careful of your

provisions and forage as may be, giving receipts for whatever you take to all such as are friends to the

independence of America Should the enemy move in force towards the Pedee, where this Army will take a

position, you will move in such direction as to enable you to join me if necessary, or to fall upon the flank

or into the rear of the enemy as the occasion may require. You will spare no pains to get good intelligence

of the Enemy's situation, and keep me constantly advertised of both your and their movements. You will

appoint for the time being a Quarter Master, Commissary and Forage Master, who will follow your

instructions in their several lines.

Confiding in your abilities and activity, I entrust you with this command, being persuaded you will

do everything in your power to distress the enemy and afford protection to the country.

Given under my hand at Charlotte, this 16th of December 1780.

Nath. Green

Letter 2:

Camp on the Cheraws, on the east side of the Pedee

Dec. 29th, 1780

Dear Sir: We arrived here the 26th inst., after a very tedious and disagreeable march, owing to the badness

of the roads and the poor and weak state of the teams. Our prospects with regard to provisions are mended,

but this is no Egypt. I have this moment received intelligence that Gen. Leslie has landed at Charleston, and

is on his way to Camden. His force is about two thousand, perhaps something less. I am also informed that

Lord Cornwallis has collected his troops at Camden. You will watch their motions very narrowly, and take

care and guard against a surprise. Should they move in force this way, you will endeavor to cross the river

and join us. Do not be sparing of your expresses, but let me know as often as possible of your situation. I

wish to be fully informed of your prospect respecting provisions, and also the number of militia that has

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joined you. A large number of tents and hatchets are on the road. As soon as they arrive you shall be

supplied. Many other articles necessary for this army, particularly shoes, are coming on.

I am, sir, your most obedient servant,

Nathanael Greene

Letter 3:

This letter informs Morgan of the arrival of General Leslie and suggests that Morgan is the object of the

British movements.

Camp Hicks's Creek, on Pedee, Dec. 30th, 1780.

Dear General: I inclose you a number of letters, by a sergeant of Lieut. Col. Washington's regiment,

which I hope will arrive safe. We are at present in a camp of repose, and the general is exerting himself,

and everybody else, to put his little army in a better condition. Tents in sufficient numbers for a larger

army than ours, are coming from Philadelphia; they are expected to arrive early in January. We also

expect a number of shoes, shirts, and some other articles essentially necessary.

Col. Marion writes the general, that General Leslie landed in Charleston, with his command, on the

20th inst., and that he had advanced as far as Moncks's Corner. You know Lord Cornwallis has collected

his force at Camden-probably they mean to form a junction, and attempt to give a blow to a part of our

force while we are divided, and most probably that blow will be aimed at you, as our position in the

centre of a wilderness is less accessible than your camp. I know your discretion renders all caution from

me unnecessary; but my friendship will plead an excuse for the impertinence of wishing you to run no

riskof a defeat. May your laurels flourish when your locks fade, and an age of peace reward your toils in

war. My love to every fellow soldier, and adieu.

Yours, most truly,

O. H. Williams

Letter 4:

In this letter, General Morgan interprets British movements differently from Williams.

Camp on Pacolet Creek, Dec. 31st 1781

Dear General: After an uninteresting march, I arrived at this place on the 25th of December. On the 27th,

I received intelligence that a body of Georgia tories, about two hundred and fifty in number, had

advanced as far as Fair Forest, and were insulting and plundering the good people in this neighborhood.

On the 29th, I dispatched Lieut. Col. Washington, with his own regiment and two hundred militia horse,

who had just joined me, to attack them. Before the colonel could overtake them, they had retreated

upwards of twenty miles. He came up with them next day, about twelve o'clock, at Hammond's store-

house, forty miles from our camp. They were alarmed and flew to their horses. Lieut. Col. Washington

extended his mounted riflemen on the wings, and charged them in front with his own regiment. They fled

with the greatest precipitation, without making any resistance. One hundred and fifty were killed and

wounded, and about forty taken prisoners. What makes this success more valuable, it was attained without

the loss of a man. This intelligence I have just received by the Baron de Glaubec, who served in the

expedition as a volunteer. To guard against any misfortune, I have detached two hundred men to cover the

retreat of the fortunate party. When I obtain a more particular account, I shall transmit it to head-quarters,

and recommend those men who have distinguished themselves on this occasion.

The militia are increasing fast, so that we cannot be supplied in this neighborhood more than two

or three days at farthest. Were we to advance, and be constrained to retreat, the consequence would be

very disagreeable; and this must be the case should we lay near the enemy, and Cornwallis reinforce,

which he can do with the greatest facility. General Davidson has brought in one hundred and twenty men,

and has returned to bring forward a draft of five hundred more. Col. Pickens has joined me with sixty.

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Thirty or forty of the men who came out with him have gone into North Carolina to secure their effects,

and will immediately repair to my camp.

When I shall have collected my expected force, I shall be at a loss how to act. Could a diversion

be made in my favor by the main army, I should wish to march into Georgia. To me it appears an

advisable scheme but should be happy to receive your directions on this point, as they must be the guide

of my actions. I have consulted with General Davidson and Col. Pickens, whether we could secure a safe

retreat, should we be pushed by a superior force. They tell me it can be easily effected by passing up the

Savannah and crossing over the heads of the rivers along the indian line. To expedite this movement,

should it meet with your approbation, I have sent for one hundred swords, which I intend to put into the

hands of expert riflemen, to be mounted and incorporated with Lieut. Col. Washington's corps. I have also

written to the quarter-master to have one hundred packsaddles made immediately-should be glad if you

would direct him to be expeditious. Packsaddles ought to be procured, let our movements be what they

may, for our wagons will be an impediment, whether we attempt to annoy the enemy or provide for our

own safety. It is incompatible with the nature of light troops to be encumbered with baggage. I would

wish to receive an answer to this proposition as soon as possible. This country has been so exhausted, that

the supplies for my detachment have been precarious and scant ever since my arrival, and in a few days

will be unattainable; so that a movement is unavoidable. At my particular request, Col. Malmady has been

so obliging as to undertake the delivery of these dispatches. He will be able to give you a just idea of our

situation and prospects.

I have the honor to be, &c.,

Daniel Morgan

N. B.-Should this expedition be thought advisable, a profound secrecy will be essentially

necessary, as you know the soul of the enterprise. Col. Lee's corps would ensure its success.

D.M.

Letter 5:

Camp on Pacolet, Jan. 4, 17815

Dear Sir: As soon as I could form a just judgment of your situation and prospects, I dispatched Col.

Malmady to give you the necessary information, and I flatter myself he has done it to your satisfaction. The

account he brings you of Lieut. Col. Washington's success at Hammond's store is as authentic as any I have

been able to collect. It was followed by some small advantages. Gen. Cunningham, on hearing of

Water's defeat, prepared to evacuate Fort Williams, and had just marched out with the last of his garrison,

as a party, consisting of about forty militia horsemen under Col. Hays, and ten dragoons under Mr.

Simmonds, arrived with an intention of demanding a surrender. The enemy's force was so superior to theirs,

that they could effect nothing more than the demolition of the fort. Sensible of the importance of guarding

against surprise, I have used every precaution on this head. I have had men who were recommended as

every way calculated for the business, continually watching the motions of the enemy; so that unless they

deceive me, I am in no danger of being surprised.

I have received no acquisitions of force since I wrote you; but I expect in a few days to be joined

by Cols. Clark's and Twigg's regiments. Their numbers I cannot ascertain. The men on the north side of

Broad river I have not yet ordered to join me; but have directed their officers to keep notice. I intend these

as a check on the enemy, should they attempt anything against my detachment. My situation is far from

being agreeable to my wishes or expectations. Forage and provisions are not to be had. Here we cannot

subsist, so we have but one alternative, either to retreat or move into Georgia. A retreat will be attended

with the most fatal consequences. The spirit which now begins to pervade the people, and call them into

the field, will be destroyed. The militia who have already joined will desert us, and it is not improbable but

that a regard for their own safety will induce them to join the enemy. I shall wait with impatience for your

directions on the subject of my letter to Col. Malmady, as till then my operations must be suspended.

I am, sir, truly yours,

Daniel Morgan

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Letter 6: This letter responds to Morgan's letter of the 31st. Camp South Carolina, at Kurshadt's Ferry,

east side of Pedee, Jan. 8th, 1781.

Dear Sir: Col. Malmady arrived here yesterday, with your letter of the 31st December. Nothing could have

afforded more pleasure than the successful attack of Lieut. Col. Washington upon the tories. I hope it will

be attended with a happy influence upon both whig and tory, to the reclaiming of one, and the

encouragement of the other. I wish you to forward to me an official report as soon as possible, that I may

send it to the northward.

I have maturely considered your proposition of an expedition into Georgia, and cannot think it

warrantable in the critical situation our army is in. I have no small reason to think, by intelligence from

different quarters, that the enemy have a movement in contemplation, and that in all probability it will be

this way, from the impudence of the tories who are collecting in different quarters, in the most inaccessible

swamps and morasses. Should you go into Georgia, and the enemy push this way, your whole force will be

useless. The enemy having no object there but what is secure m their fortifications, will take no notice of

your movement, but serve you as General Prevost did General Lincoln, oblige you to return by making a

forward movement themselves; and you will be so far in the rear that you can do them no injury. But if you

continue in the neighborhood of the place you are now at, and they attempt to push forward, you may

interrupt their communications with Charleston, or harass their rear, both of which will alarm the enemy

not a little.

If you employ detachments to interrupt supplies going to Ninety-six, and Augusta, it will perplex

the enemy much. If you think Ninety-six, Augusta or even Savannah can be surprised, and your force will

admit of a detachment for the purpose, and leave you a sufficiency to keep up a good countenance, you

may attempt it. But don't think of attempting either, unless by surprise, for you will only beat your heads

against the wall without success. Small parties are better to effect a surprise than large bodies, and the

success will not greatly depend upon the numbers, but on the secrecy and spirit of the attack.

I must repeat my caution to you to guard against a surprise. The enemy and the tories both will try

to bring you into disgrace, if possible, to present your influence upon the militia, especially the weak and

wavering. I cannot pretend to give you particular instructions respecting a position, But somewhere

between the Saluda and the north branch of Broad river appears to be the most favorable for annoying the

enemy, interrupting their supplies, and harassing their rear, if they should make a movement this way.

If you could detach a small party to kill the enemy's draft horses and recruiting cavalry, upon the Congaree,

it would give them almost as deadly a blow as a defeat. But this matter must be conducted with great secrecy

and dispatch. Lieut. Col. Lee has just arrived with his legion, and Col. Green is within a few days' march

of this, with a reinforcement.

I am, dear sir, truly yours,

Nathanael Greene

Letter 7: Greene wrote this letter to Morgan to answer his letter of the 4th. Camp on the Pedee Jan. 13th,

1781

Dear Sir: I am at this moment favored with your letter of the 4th inst. Col. Malmady also delivered me

your dispatches of the 31st of December, which I answered on the 8th inst., wherein I informed you that I

cannot think an expedition into Georgia eligible at this time. Since I wrote you I have received letters

from Virginia, informing me of the arrival of Gen. Phillips, with a detachment of 2,500 men from New

York. This circumstance renders it still more improper for you to move far to the southward. It is my wish

also that you should hold your ground if possible; for I foresee the disagreeable consequences that will

result from a retreat. If moving as far as Ninety-six, or anywhere in the neighborhood of it, will contribute

to the obtaining more ample supplies, you have my consent. Col. Tarleton is said to be on his way to pay

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you a visit. I doubt not but he will have a decent reception and a proper dismission. And I am happy to

find you have taken every proper precaution to avoid a surprise. I wish you to be more particular

respecting your plan and object in paying a visit to Georgia. Virginia is raising 3,000 men to recruit this

army.

I am, &c.,

Nathanael Greene

Letter 8: Camp at Burr's Mill on Thicketty Creek, 15 January 1781.

Dear General: Your letters of the 3rd and 8th instant, came to hand yesterday just as I was preparing to

change my position, was therefore obliged to detain the express until this evening. The accounts I have

transmitted to you of Lieutenant Colonel Washington's success, accord with his opinion. The number

killed and wounded on the part of the tories must depend on conjecture, as they broke on the first charge,

scattered through the woods and were pursued in every direction. The consequences attending this defeat

will be fatal to the disaffected. They have not been able to embody.

Sensible of the importance of having magazines of forage and provisions established in this

country, I have left no means in my power unassayed to effect this business. I dispatched Captain Chitty,

(whom I have appointed as commissary of purchases for my command), with orders to collect and store

all the provisions that could be obtained between the Catawba and Broad rivers. I gave him directions to

call on Colonel Hill, who commands a regiment of militia in that quarter, to furnish him with a proper

number of men to assist him in the execution of this commission, but he, to my great surprise, had just

returned without effecting anything. He tells me that his failure proceeded from the want of the

countenance and assistance of Colonel Hill, who assured him that General Sumpter directed him to obey

no orders from me, unless they came through him.

I find it impracticable to procure more provisions in this quarter than is absolutely necessary for our

own immediate consumption: indeed it has been with the greatest difficulty that we have been able to

effect this. We have to feed such a number of horses that the most plentiful country must soon be

exhausted. Nor am I a little apprehensive that no part of this state accessible to us, can support us long.

Could the militia be persuaded to change their fatal mode of going to war, much provision might be

saved, but the custom has taken such deep root that it cannot be abolished.

Upon a full and mature deliberation, I am confirmed in the opinion that nothing can be effected by

my detachment in this country which will balance the risks I will be subjected to by remaining here. The

enemy's great superiority of numbers and our distance from the main army, will enable Lord Cornwallis

to detach so superior a force against me, as to render it essential to our safety to avoid coming to action;

nor will this always be in my power. No attempt to surprise me will be left untried by them, and situated

as we must be, every possible precaution may not be sufficient to secure us. The scarcity of forage makes

it impossible for us to be always in a compact body; and were this not the case, it is beyond the art of man

to keep the militia from straggling. These reasons induce me to request that I may be recalled with my

detachment; and that General Davidson and Colonel Pickens may be left with the militia of North and

South Carolina and Georgia They will not be so much the object of the enemy's attention, and will be

capable of being a check on the disaffected, which is all I can effect. Colonel Pickens is a valuable

discreet, and attentive officer, and has the confidence of the militia. My force is inadequate to the attempts

you have hinted at. I have now with me only two hundred South Carolina and Georgia, and one hundred

and forty North Carolina, volunteers. Nor do I expect to have more than two-thirds of these to assist me,

should I be attacked, for it is impossible to keep them collected.

Though I am convinced that were you on the spot, the propriety of my proposition would strike

you forcibly; should you think it unadvisable to recall me, you may depend on my attempting everything

to annoy the enemy, and to provide for the safety of the detachment. I shall cheerfully acquiesce in your

determinations. Col. Tarleton has crossed the Tyger at Musgrove's Mill; his force we cannot learn. It is

more than probable we are his object. Cornwallis, by last accounts, was at the cross-roads near Lee's old

place. [As a result of last-minute intelligence, Morgan added] We have just learned that Tarleton's force is

from eleven to twelve hundred British.

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I am, dear general,

Truly yours,

Daniel Morgan

Letter 9:

Camp on Pedee, Jan.19th, 1781.

Dear Sir: Your favor of the 15th was delivered me last evening about 12 o'clock. I am surprised that Gen.

Sumter should give such an order as that you mention to Col. Hill, nor can I persuade myself but that there

must be some mistake in the matter; for though it is the most military to convey orders through the principal

to the dependents, as well from propriety as respect, yet this may not always be convenient, or even

practicable; and therefore to give a positive order not to obey, was repugnant to reason and common sense.

As the head was subject to your orders, consequently the dependents are also. I will write Gen. Sumter on

the subject; but it is better to conciliate than aggravate matters, where everything depends so much upon

voluntary principles, I wish you to take no notice of the matter, but endeavor to influence his conduct to

give you all the aid in his power. Write to him frequently, and consult with him freely. He is a man of great

pride and considerable merit, and should not be neglected. If he had given such orders, I am persuaded he

will see the impropriety of the matter and correct it in the future, unless personal glory is more the object

than public good, which I cannot suppose is the case with him, or any other man who fights in the cause of

liberty.

I was informed of Lord Cornwallis' movement before the receipt of your letter, and agree with you

in the opinion that you are the object. And from his making so general a movement, it convinces me he

feels a great inconvenience from your force and situation. Gen. Leslie has crossed the Catawba to join him.

He would never harness his troops to remove you, if he did not think it an object of some importance; nor

would he put his collective force in motion if he had not some respect for your numbers. I am sensible your

situation is critical, and requires the most watchful attention to guard against surprise. But I think it is of

great importance to keep up a force in that quarter; nor can I persuade myself that the militia alone will

answer the same valuable purposes as when joined by the continental troops.

It is not my wish you should come to action unless you have a manifest advantage and a moral

certainty of succeeding. Put nothing to the hazard. A retreat may be disagreeable, but it is not disgraceful.

Regard not the opinions of the day. It is not our business to risk too much our affairs are in too critical a

situation, and require time and nursing to give them a better tone. If General Sumpter and you could fix a

plan for him to hold the post which you now occupy, and he to be joined by the militia under General

Davidson, and you with your force and the Georgia and Virginia militia, to move towards Augusta or into

that quarter, I should have no objection, provided you think it will answer any valuable purpose, and can

be attempted with a degree of safety. I am unwilling to recall you if it can be avoided, but I had rather recall

you than expose you to the hazard of a surprise. Before we can possibly reach you I imagine the movements

of Lord Cornwallis and Colonel Tarleton will be sufficiently explained, and you obliged to take some

decisive measures. I shall be perfectly satisfied if you keep clear of misfortune; for though I wish you

laurels, I am not willing to expose the common cause to give you an opportunity to acquire them. As the

rivers are subject to sudden and great swells, you must be careful that the enemy do not take a position to

gain your rear, where you can neither retreat by your flanks or front. The Pedee rose twenty-five feet last

week in thirty hours. I am preparing boats to move always with the army; would one or two be of use to

you? They will be put on four wheels, and made to move with little more difficulty than a loaded wagon.

General Davidson is desired to receive orders, and in conjunction with Gen. Sumter, to consult with

you a plan for a combined attack upon one of the divisions of Lord Cornwallis's army, and also respecting

your movements into Georgia.

I am, with great esteem, &c.,

Nathanael Greene

106

2. British Army. This exchange of letters includes all available correspondence between

Cornwallis and Tarleton written during the latter's movement to the Cowpens.

Letter 1: Cornwallis discovered that Morgan's army had entered South Carolina in mid-December 1780.

He dispatched this letter to inform Tarleton of the development.

Wynnesborough, Dec. 18th, 1780

Dear Tarleton,

Lord Rawdon has received intelligence, which, however, he does not credit, that Morgan's Corps and the

Cavalry had passed the Catawba. I have sent out everybody that I could engage to go, but the friends here

are so timid & stupid that I can get no intelligence. I have heard nothing from 96, but a man who came

here from Broad River says that Gen'l Cunningham has beat Clarke and wounded him mortally.

I shall be glad to hear a confirmation of this. I apprehend we must first dislodge Lacey etc. from

Turkey Creek & then march up the West Side of Catawba to some of the fords above Tuckaseege. I wish

you would take pains to inform yourself as thoroughly as possible of the state of the roads, Provisions,

forage, Mills, etc. I hear a good account of the Recruits in general. I hope to march from here with 3500

fighting men barring those I mentioned to you upon the frontier. Lord Rawdon very readily agreed to

undertake Watson so we shall be relieved of that plague.

I trust you will make every possible shift rather than go much further back, as I should in that

case be uneasy about McArthur, and as soon as you have been able to get information about the Country,

I should be glad to see you to talk over our march.

I am Dear Tarleton

Very Sincerely Yours

Cornwallis

Letter 2: Cornwallis sent two letters to Tarleton on 26 December 1780. They express the concern

Cornwallis felt about Morgan's movements and hint at the urgency of defeating him before the French

could cut British lines of communications between Wilmington and Charleston.

[To Tarleton]

A man came this morning from Charlotte town; his fidelity, however, very doubtful; he says, that Greene

marched on Wednesday last toward Cheraws, to join General Caswell, and that Morgan, with his infantry

and one hundred and twenty-four of Washington's light horse, crossed Bigger's ferry, on Thursday and

Friday last, to join Lacey. I expect more intelligence before night, when you shall hear from me again.

Letter 3:

[To Tarleton]

l sent you the reports of the day. First, Morgan and Washington have passed Broad river; secondly, a brig

from Cork says, that a packet had arrived there from England, and that accounts were brought, that six

regiments were under orders for embarkation, supposedly to be destined for Carolina; thirdly, and worst

report of all, if true, that one thousand French are got into Cape Fear, who will probably fortify

themselves at Wilmington, and stop our water communication with Charles town with provisions;

fourthly, that an embarkation was taking place, under General Phillips, from New York, said to be

destined for the Cheaspeak. Lord Rawdon mentions, that by a letter from M'Kinnon to England, he is

afraid that the accoutrements for the 17th Dragoons are coming up by the slow process of General Leslie's

corps. Try to get all possible intelligence of Morgan.

Letter 4: In this letter to Tarleton dated Wynnesborough, 2 January 1780, seven o'clock a.m., Cornwallis

directs aggressive pursuit and discounts the report that Morgan's force has artillery.

107

Dear Tarleton,

I send Haldane to you last night, to desire you would pass Broad river, with the legion and the first

battalion of the 71st, as soon as possible. If Morgan is still at Williams', or anywhere within your reach,

I should wish you to push him to the utmost: I have not heard, except from M' Arthur, of his having

cannon; nor would I believe it, unless he has it from very good authority: It is, however, possible, and

Ninty-Six is of so much consequence, that no time is to be lost.

Yours sincerely,

Cornwallis

Let me know if you think that the moving of a whole, or a part of my corps, can be of use.

Letter 5: In this exchange of letters (5 and 6), Tarleton asks his commander for information and

reinforcements; Cornwallis replies with speculation and assurances that troops are forthcoming.

[To Cornwallis]

Somers Plantation

Jan'y 3 1/2 past 6 a. m.

My Lord,

I am well here-I move directly toward Manses Mill a proper course as I have no intelligence

I have the Honor to be if the 7th or 71st Battalion was at Byerly's it would be well.

Your Lordships

Most Devoted Serv't

Ban. Tarleton

Letter 6

[To Tarleton]

I received yours of this morning. I suspect the enemy are retired. If so, I would lose no time. Which side

of Broad River do you think it best for you to march? The 7th regt are ordered to Byerly's. Be quite sure

that 96 is safe. 7th reg't will take your old gun to Ninety-Six.

Letter 7: In this letter of 4 January 1781 to Cornwallis, Tarleton reports that presence of Morgan and

proposes how to prevent an attack on Ninety-Six.

[To Cornwallis]

Morse's Mill

Jan'y 4 2 p.m.

Morgan, with upwards of one thousand two hundred men, being on this side of the Broad river, to

threaten Ninty Six, and evade your lordship's army whenever you may move, I beg leave to offer my

opinion how his design may be prevented. I must draw my baggage, the 71st and legion's are deposited at

my old camp, to me. I wish it to be escorted by the 17th light dragoons, for whom horses are ready; by the

yagers, if to be spared; and by the 7th regiment. The 7th I will send, as soon as I reach Ennoree, with the

field piece, to Ninty Six. My encampment is now twenty miles from Brierley's, in a plentiful forage

country, and I can lay in four days flour for a move.

When I advance, I must either destroy Morgan's corps, or push it before me over the Broad river,

towards King's mountain. The advance of the army should commence (when your lordship orders this

corps to move) onwards for King's mountain. Frequent communication by letter can pass the Broad river.

I feel myself bold in offering my opinion, as it flows from zeal for the public service, and well-grounded

enquiry concerning the enemy's designs and operations. I have directed Captain M'Pherson, the bearer of

this letter, who is going on the recruiting service, to deliver a letter to Lieutenant Munroe, whom I left at

my camp, to bring up my baggage, but no women. If your lordship approves of this plan, Captain

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M'Pherson may give my order to Lieutenant Munroe to escort to me three puncheons of rum, and some

salt; and, upon their arrival, I will move.

I have the Honour to be Your Lordships Most Devoted Serv't

Ban. Tarleton

Letter 8: In this letter and the next (Letter 9), Cornwallis responds to Tarleton 's request to chase Morgan

across the Broad River.

January 5, 1781

Dear Tarleton,

I received your letter sent yesterday 7 o'clock a. m. I have ordered the baggage of your Corps to Byerley's

Ferry, under the care of the 7th Regt. I propose marching on Tuesday next. You will continue to

correspond with me, keeping on my left Flank, either on the east or west of Broad River, as you will

judge best according to the intelligence you may receive. McArthur will of course march with you.

Yrs.

Cornwallis

Letter 9:

Dear Tarleton,

Wynnesborough, January 5th, eight o'clock P. M.

Since I wrote to you this morning, I received yours, dated yesterday, two P.M. You have exactly done

what I wished you to do, and understood my intentions perfectly. Lest my letter of this morning should

miscarry, I repeat the most material paragraph. Your baggage is ordered to Brierley'ss under care of the

seventh regiment. I propose to march on Sunday.

Yours sincerely,

Cornwallis

Letter 10:

To Colonel Tarleton, 6 January:

I received yours of yesterday. You will see that some parts of your wishes are already anticipated. I am

that you have already received three of the Q'r, Master Genl's waggons at Byerleys. I sent another two

loaded with rum and salt; you will easily conceive that we have not many to spare. I shall march on

Monday & direct my course for Bullock Creek. Leslie will march on Tuesday by the river road for the

same place. I approve of your proposal relative to the 7th reg't. I shall send orders to the comm'g officer

accordingly.

Letter 11:

Dear Tarleton,

McAlister's Plantation

January 8th, 1781 7 P.M.

I have just received yours, 7th January, three o'clock P. M. I shall remain here tomorrow, march to cross

roads on Wednesday, halt Thursday, and reach Bullock's creek meeting house Saturday.

I have no news.

Yours very sincerely,

Cornwallis

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Letter 12:

Dear Tarleton,

M' Alister's, January 9, 1781

Three P.M.

Nothing new since yesterday; some of Washington's cavalry, who had been escorting prisoners to

Charlotte town, returned over Broad river. I have taken every means in my power to find out Morgan's

movements, and whether he repasses Broad river. I received yours January 8th.

Yours very sincerely,

Cornwallis

Letter 13:

Dear Tarleton,

Bull Run, Jan'y 14th, 1780, 10 P. M.

I received yesterday morning your letter dated Duggins, Indian Creek, Jan'y 11th, S a. m. By report

however of the man who brought it I conceive it ought to have been dated Jan'y 12 as he assures me that

he left you on Friday morning. I shall march tomorrow to the head of Tardy River & the next day to

Hillhouse near Bullock Creek Meeting House. Leslie is at last got out of the swamps & reached this day

the neighborhood of Rocky Mount. I have not heard of Morgan's moving, but conclude he will now cross

Broad River, as I hear it has fallen very much.

Yrs. sincerely

Cornwallis

Letter 14:

To Colonel Tarleton, from Hillhouse Plantation on Turkey Creek, 16

January 1781:

I have not heard from you since the 11. I fear Morgan has too much the start of you. I have ordered meal

to be ground & propose marching in three or four days to Beatty's Ford. Leslie will join me tomorrow or

Thursday.

Letter 15: This was Tarleton's last letter to Cornwallis before the battle.

My Lord

Pacolet Jan'y 16th

8a.m.

I have been most cruelly retarded by the waters. Morgan is in force and gone for Cherokee Ford.

I am now on my march. I wish he could be stopped.

I have the Honor

to be Your most Devoted Serv't

Ban. Tarleton

Letter 16: Cornwallis apparently lost no confidence in his brash young field commander because of his

defeat at the hands of Morgan.

Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton,

You have forfeited no part of my esteem as an officer, by the unfortunate event of the action of the

seventeenth instant; the means you used to bring the enemy to action, were able and masterly, and must

ever do you honor; your disposition was unexceptionable; the total misbehavior of the troops could alone

have deprived you of the glory which was justly your due.

Lord Cornwallis

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BATTLE OF COWPENS

70TH CONGRESS, 1ST SESSION HOUSE DOCUMENT No. 328

HISTORICAL STATEMENTS CONCERNING THE BATTLE OF COWPENS

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON

1928

Part I

BRITISH PLANS

TARLETON SENT AFTER MORGAN

The Battle of the Cowpens was the second serious disaster which occurred to the British Army, operating in

the Southern States, during the 1780-81 campaign. Following the capitulation of Charleston on May 12, 1780, all of

South Carolina was in a condition of subjugation within a few months, and in September British headquarters were

moved to Charlotte Town, N. C. Prior to this Lieutenant Colonel Ferguson had been detached, with a small force of

Provincials, to organise the militia and operate on Cornwallis’s flank. On the 7th of October his entire command was

lost at Kings Mountain. Following this disaster the British field army was withdrawn more than 60 miles to

Wynnesborough, and there remained on the defensive while awaiting information relative to the rehabilitation of

Gates's army, now commanded by Greene; and in coordinating plans with the commander in chief, General Clinton,

particularly with reference to the use of the troops under General Leslie, which were sent from New York to Virginia.

Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton, the only officer remaining after Ferguson's death used by Cornwallis for the command

of roving troops, was sent into the district north of Ninety Six to oppose General Morgan, and somewhat later

Cornwallis resumed his march northward. Tarleton and Morgan met at the Cowpens, on the 17th of January, and in a

battle noted for the unusual tactics adopted by the Americans, the British were defeated, with heavy losses, by a force

inferior in numbers, a considerable portion of which was militia.

The relation of the Cowpens to the southern campaign in 1780-81 can be understood only through a

knowledge of the purposes of the two army commanders, Greene and Cornwallis, during the period following Kings

Mountain. After General Clinton's departure from Charleston for New York on June 5, 1780, he conducted

correspondence with Cornwallis relative to operations contemplated in the Chesapeake. In October General Leslie

was given command of about 2,000 regulars, and sailed from New York to establish posts on the western tributaries

of the Chesapeake, near its mouth. The letter of instructions from Clinton, given him before his departure, directed

him to proceed to those waters and make a diversion in favor of Cornwallis, who, it was expected, would be, at the

time of his arrival, in central and western North Carolina. The instructions suggested that he proceed up the James

River and destroy enemy magazines at Petersburg, Richmond, and elsewhere, and finally establish a post on the

Eksabeth River at Portsmouth, but that under any conditions he was to communicate as soon as possible with

Cornwallis and act under his orders.

A copy of the instructions under which Leslie was to act was received by Cornwallis about the 24th of

October, at which time he was withdrawing from Charlotte Town, and the possibility of carrying out at this time any

plan of joint action in Virginia was very remote. Lord Rawdon, who commanded, due to the illness of Cornwallis,

immediately dispatched a letter to Leslie, advising him of the defeat of Ferguson, with its consequent augmentation

of defection in both the Carolinas, and of the necessity of the British Army remaining within supporting distance of

Ninety Six and Camden until a more favorable moment arrived for the resumption of the offensive. From the

circumstances related in his letter, Lord Rawdon expressed the fear that the two armies were too far apart to render

Leslie's cooperation very effectual.

111

Although the British commander in chief had signified to Cornwallis that he was at liberty to give Leslie any

direction for further cooperation which might appear to him expedient, Cornwallis was loath at this time to instruct

the latter to bring his troops to South Carolina. He feared that should he withdraw this force from the

Chesapeake, he might interfere with other purposes, unknown to him, to which Clinton had destined these troops.

Rawdon therefore informed Leslie in October that "Lord Cornwallis thinks himself obliged to leave you at liberty to

pursue whatsoever measures may appear to your judgment best for his majesty's service and most consonant with the

wishes of the commander in chief." In conclusion Rawdon informed Leslie that should his knowledge of Clinton's

desires prompt him to make a trial upon North Carolina, a movement up Cape Fear River to Cross Creek was the most

likely, at this time, to prove effectual. The general situation in the South was similarly described by Rawdon in a letter

to Clinton of the 29th of October, wherein was stated the intention of not definitely ordering Leslie to the Cape Fear,

as Clinton might have other plans with which such a move would interfere.

When Leslie learned of General Cornwallis's desire that he quit the Chesapeake and move up the Cape Fear

to Cross Creek, knowing that Clinton had no ulterior purpose in keeping him in Virginia, he immediately planned to

make this change and sent dispatches to Clinton on the 7th of November informing him of the new arrangement. This

met with the entire approval of the commander in chief. A second letter from Lord Rawdon, written on the 31st of

October, wherein he reiterated in a more urgent manner the wishes of Cornwallis in the matter, was probably the

deciding factor in prompting compliance by Leslie.

Cornwallis established his camp at Wynnesborough in November. It was evident from the correspondence

conducted with Leslie that he could make no move until he knew where the latter would establish himself, as his plans

for the winter would depend upon this knowledge. The success of the Americans at Kings Mountain had done much

to overcome the depression in the South, following the defeat at Camden, and partisan forces were active on both

flanks of the British Army. Colonel Marion operated between the Santee and Peedee, and from this locality threatened

communications and supplies for the post at Camden, and the army at Wynnesborough. Sumter and his subordinate

leaders were active west of the Broad, threatening Ninety Six. Furthermore, the British had intelligence that General

Morgan, with Washington's cavalry and a body of Continental infantry, was advancing toward Lynches Creek, with

Camden as their objective.

Early in November Tarleton had been sent east of the Wateree, and on his arrival at Camden, finding no

reason to expect an attack upon that place by General Morgan, proceeded down the east bank of the river against

Marion. The two forces met on the 10th, but Marion, realising he was outnumbered, retreated. During the pursuit an

express arrived from General Cornwallis, sent from Wynnesborough the preceding day, directing Tarleton to lose no

time in returning, as Cornwallis was "under the greatest anxiety for Ninety Six." The circumstance which occasioned

this unexpected order was the predicament into which Major Wemyss, at the head of 40 of Tarleton's dragoons, and

the mounted Sixty-third, had gotten. He was operating along the Broad, and learning that Sumter with about 300 men

was nearby, undertook to surprise him by a night attack. The British entered Sumter's camp by surprise, but instead of

dismounting and securing the enemy arms, they remained mounted. Sumter's men recovered from their surprise, got

their arms, engaged the enemy, wounded Wemyss, and as the second in command did not now his plans, the British

withdrew.

Cornwallis's letter of recall to Tarleton written on the 9th was followed by another on the 10th, and a third

on the 11th of November, so urgent was he that Tarleton appear in the territory of the Broad to retrieve the situation,

and fearful that the other letters might not have gotten through. In the letter of the 11th he said: “I wish you would get

three legions, and divide yourself into three parts. We can do no good without you. I trust to your coming immediately,

unless you see something more materially pressing. Tarleton hastened his return to army headquarters at

Wynnesborough, and from thence continued southwestwardly across the Broad, to locate and engage Sumter, who

was approaching Ninety Six. There followed the fight at Blackstocks on the 20th of November, wherein General

Sumter was wounded. Following this action Tarleton withdrew to Brierly’s Ferry on the Broad. It was with much

gratification that Cornwallis learned of Sumter's wound, for he wrote, "he certainly has been our greatest plague in

this country."

The recovery of Cornwallis from his illness during the withdrawal from Charlotte Town, and the successes

attendant upon Tarleton's efforts in the field, stimulated a desire to renew offensive warfare, and in November he

decided to bring Leslie's force to Charleston, as cooperation with him even at the distance of the Cape Fear River

would be attended with many difficulties. Leslie arrived in Charleston on the 13th of December, where orders awaited

him to march up country with 1,530 men, to join Cornwallis as soon as possible. The British plan of campaign for the

winter of 1780-81 was for the main army to penetrate into North Carolina, leaving South Carolina in security against

any probable attack. Offensive operations were to be started about the middle of January. The line of march was to be

by the upper, or western, roads in preference to lowland routes, because fords were more frequent above the forks of

the rivers, and the passage of the army could be less easily obstructed. Furthermore, General Greene being on the

112

Peedee, and there being few fords in any of the great rivers of this country below their forks, especially in the rainy

season, a penetration north, by way of Salisbury, would probably meet with much resistance by Greene's army.

Cornwallis was the more induced to prefer the western route, as he hoped to destroy or drive out of South Carolina

the corps commanded by General Morgan, which, it will be noted later, was sent into the region of the Broad and

Pacolet, during the latter part of December, to threaten the valuable district of Ninety Six. There was hope, also, that

by rapid marches the British main army would get between Greene and Virginia, and by that means force the

Americans to fight without receiving any reinforcements from that State, or, failing in this, to oblige Greene to quit

North Carolina with precipitation, and thereby encourage the friends of the Crown to make good their promises of a

general rising to assist the British commander in reestablishing the Royal Government.

While Tarleton lay on the Broad, following the fight at Blackstocks, it became known to the British that

General Morgan and Colonel Washington had been detached from Charlotte Town on December 20th and had

proceeded across the Broad in the direction of Ninety Six, which post was viewed by Cornwallis as the most sensitive

of all under his command. On the 30th of December Cornwallis advised Tarleton of this threat, and on the 1st of the

following month sent his aide with orders that Tarleton should cross the Broad with his corps of Cavalry and Infantry

of 550 men, the First Battalion of the Seventy-first, consisting of 200 men, and one 3 pounder, to counteract the

designs of General Morgan, by protecting the country and compelling him to repass the Broad. The

danger of Morgan's presence west of the Broad was felt so acutely by Cornwallis that the day after he dispatched his

aide with this message to Tarleton, he wrote an additional admonition: If Morgan is still at Williams's, or anywhere

within your reach, I should wish you to push him to the utmost; I have not heard, except from McArthur, of his having

cannon; nor would I believe it, unless he has it from very good authority; it is, however, possible, and Ninety Six is of

so much consequence, that no time is to be lost. Let me know, if you think that the moving the whole, or any part of

my corps, can be of use.

On the receipt of this letter Tarleton immediately directed his course to the westward, leaving his baggage

behind, but he had not proceeded more than 20 miles from Brierley’s Ferry before he was satisfied that Morgan was

nowhere near Fort Williams and that for the time being Ninety Six was not threatened. He therefore decided to camp,

bring up his baggage, and make certain recommendations to Cornwallis relative to the ensuing campaign, as was

called for in the latter's letter of the 2d. Tarleton wrote on the 4th asking that his baggage be forwarded under escort of

the Seventeenth Light Dragoons, the Yagers, and the Seventh Regiment. "When I advance, I must either destroy

Morgan's corps," he said, "or push it before me over Broad River, toward Kings Mountain.

The advance of the army should commence (when your lordship orders this corps to move) onward for Kings

Mountain. Frequent communication by letter can pass the Broad River." It is to be noted that at this time Tarleton and

Cornwallis occupied interior positions, separated less than 24 hours in messenger service, while

Morgan and Greene lay beyond them in opposite directions, and from 5 to 10 days apart by messenger.

On the 5th of January Cornwallis approved the suggestions relative to combined action as mentioned in

Tarleton's letter of the day before, and informed him that the Seventh Regiment was escorting his baggage to Brierley’s

Ferry, and that he, Cornwallis, proposed marching on January 7. Two hundred men of the Seventh Regiment, who

were mostly recruits and designed for the garrison at Ninety Six, 50 dragoons of the Seventeenth Regiment, and a 3-

pounder, brought the wagons from Brierley’s Ferry to camp. Upon the arrival of the baggage and reinforcing troops,

Tarleton crossed Indian and Duncan Creeks, and on his advance received accounts of the increase of Morgan's corps,

which induced him to halt his march and request permission of Cornwallis to retain the Seventh Regiment. This request

having been granted, on the 12th he continued his course to the westward in order to discover the most practicable

fords, and the Enoree and Tiger were passed on the 14th, above the Cherokee Road. That evening Tarleton obtained

information that Morgan was on the Pacolet, guarding all the fords. In the meanwhile Cornwallis's march northward

had not been made in accordance with his plans, as the junction of Leslie's command had been much retarded by high

waters, and it was not until the 14th that "Leslie is at last out of the swamps," at which time Cornwallis was at Bull

Run.

On the 15th Tarleton made a reconnaissance of Morgan's dispositions covering the fords of the Pacolet, and

that evening a feint was made to cross high up the river. The morning of the 16th this course was altered, as it was

now known that Morgan had withdrawn from the Pacolet, and a passage was secured within 6 miles of the hostile

camp. The British continued their march for several miles, and halted in some log huts to rest and reconnoiter Morgan's

whereabouts. Tarleton intended to post his troops behind the huts in case Morgan showed an inclination to attack him

in this position. In his narrative he says that the camp afforded a plentiful supply of half-cooked provisions, left by the

Americans that day. Patrols and spies were dispatched to observe the Americans during the night, and dragoons

followed until dark, when they were ordered back to the main body. Early in the night the patrols reported that Morgan

had withdrawn to Thicketty Creek, and that several groups of partisans were en route to join him. Tarleton determined

to push ahead promptly for the purpose of engaging Morgan before he could effect a passage of the Broad, and before

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his numbers were too greatly augmented. Accordingly at 3 o'clock on the morning of the 17th the pursuit was resumed.

The wagons and baggage of his train were left in camp under the protection of a small detachment from each corps.

Part II

AMERICAN PLANS

MORGAN SENT WEST OF THE CATAWBA

The disaster which befell the American Army at Camden on the 16th of August resulted in Congress passing a

resolution on the 5th of October ordering General Washington to direct a court of inquiry to be held on the conduct of

Major General Gates, as commander of the southern army, and to appoint his successor. Washington designated Maj.

Gen. Nathanael Greene, second in command in the main army, and an officer whose ability, loyalty, and capacity for

command were fully appreciated by the commander in chief. On the receipt of instructions from General Washington

and Congress, Greene proceeded south, stopping in Philadelphia to confer with Congress, and in the several States on

his way, which were immediately concerned in furnishing men and supplies for the Southern Department. He desired

to acquire a knowledge of the military situation therein, and plan for the regular support and subsistence of his

command in provisions, forage, and transportation.

Before leaving Philadelphia he wrote to Washington that his first object would be to equip a flying army of

800 horses and 1,000 Infantry. Greene held the services of Cavalry and mounted Infantry in high regard, the contrary

view being entertained by the officer whom he was to relieve. Lieut. Col. Henry Lee was one of the officers whom he

desired to conduct partisan warfare, which he knew would constitute an important factor in his campaigns.

General Greene reached Charlotte Town, where Gates's headquarters were now established, on the 2d of December,

and on the following day the latter issued his final order to the troops, turning the command over to General Greene.

While traversing Maryland, Virginia, and North Carolina, wise and energetic measures had been taken by Greene, in

consultation with the State authorities, to insure that cooperation and assistance would be forthcoming.

A survey of his troops at once confirmed his previous knowledge of their needs for food, clothing,

transportation, and shelter, as learned from Gates's reports on these matters, and his attention to the correction of these

deficiencies was incessant and laborious. His ability as a quartermaster was in no wise inferior to his worth as a

commander in the field, and the detailed manner in which he directed the betterment of conditions is a high tribute to

his general efficiency. The logistics of supply were carefully covered in his many instructions for the surveys of all

possible water routes, the construction of bateaux, the listing of animals and wagons for transportation, and for the

operation of mills, ironworks, and other utilities.

Pending improvement in his numbers, and augmentation in the necessary supplies, the army was to remain

inactive. The country around Charlotte Town had been depleted so thoroughly of food and forage that on the 8th of

December Greene wrote to Colonel Kosciusko to examine the country along the Peedee for a distance of 20 or 30

miles south of Little River, for a good position for the army. During this enforced period of combat inaction and

rehabilitation, intelligence of the enemy was most essential, particularly in view of the many rumors that Cornwallis

was to be reinforced by way of the Cape Fear, or through Charleston. For this work troops that were well mounted

and extremely mobile were necessary, due to the great distance covered, and Marion, who operated in the eastern part

of South Carolina, was selected for this duty. On the 4th of December a letter of instructions was sent to this officer

by Greene directing him to continue partisan warfare, thereby harassing the enemy and preserving the tide of sentiment

among the people as much as possible in favor of the patriotic cause. Upon Marion he would depend for early

information of reinforcements arriving in Charleston, or departing therefrom to join Cornwallis. To secure this

information, and other that might be necessary, Marion was to employ spies and organise an intelligence service.

The unhappy condition of the southern army is pictured in a letter written to Washington on the 7th of December,

wherein Greene says:

Nothing can be more wretched and distressing than the condition of the troops, starving, with cold

and hunger, without tents and camp equipage. Those of the Virginia line are literally naked, and

a great part totally unfit for any kind of duty, and must: remain so until clothing can be had from

the northward.

The magnitude of the work confronting Greene in his responsibility for the retention of the Southern States in the

Confederation and the earnestness with which he engaged in his labors, will be understood by reading the seven

lengthy letters written by him on the 6th and 7th of December to Baron von Steuben, who was in Virginia under his

command, General Washington, General Knox, the President of Congress, the Board of War, Governor Nash, and

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Governor Jefferson.

After two weeks of arduous attention to a multitude of details, report having been received in the meanwhile

from Kosciusko of a favorable site for the army on the Peedee, the troops were put under marching orders on the 16th,

but due to heavy rains the march was postponed until the 20th. The route followed was by way of Wynnesborough to

Haley’s Ferry, thence to the position selected on the east bank of the Peedee, opposite to Cheraw Hill, which was

reached on the 26th. General Greene called his new location a "camp of repose," adding in this connection, in a letter

to Washington written on the 28th of December, "no army ever wanted one more, the troops having totally lost their

discipline." General Greene was fortunate in his selection of officers to surround him, and part of his success in the

South must be attributed to these capable leaders and administrators. There were Von Steuben, Lee and his legion,

which joined on the Peedee early in January, Williams, Morgan, William Washington, Howard, Carrington, Davie,

and the partisan leaders, Sumter, Marion, Pickens, and others, all highly reputed as leaders in their several lines of

activities, imbued with a spirit of loyalty for their commander, and possessed of an unquenchable determination to

attain the independence of their country.

Before departing from Charlotte Town, General Greene arranged to send General Morgan with an

independent command to operate along the tributaries of the Broad and Pacolet, threatening the British post at Ninety

Six and the left of Cornwallis's army. During the great depression which existed in the South after the defeat of Gates

at Camden, and while the British were triumphantly advancing to Charlotte Town, Morgan had returned to active duty

in the Army and joined Gates at Hillsborough in September. Congress appointed him a brigadier general on the 13th

of October. The duty to be performed by Morgan's command was so far removed from Greene's headquarters, with

the British Army between, that detailed instructions were prepared for his guidance:

Camp Charlotte, December 16, 1780.

You are appointed to the command of a corps of light infantry of 320 men detached from the Maryland line,

a detachment of Virginia militia of 200 men, and Colonel Washington's regiment of light horse, amounting to

from sixty to a hundred men. With these troops you will proceed to the west, side of the Catawba River, where

you will be joined by a body of volunteer militia under command of General Davidson of this State, and by the

militia lately under command of General Sumter. This force and such others as may join you from Georgia,

you will employ against, the enemy on the west, side of the Catawba, either offensively or defensively, as your

own prudence and discretion may direct — acting with caution and avoiding surprises by every possible

precaution. For the present, I give you the entire command in that quarter, and do hereby require all officers

and soldiers engaged in the American cause to be subject- to your orders and commands.

The object of this detachment is to give protection to that part of the country and spirit up the people—to

annoy the enemy in that quarter—to collect the provision and forage out of their way—which you will have

formed into a number of small magazines in the rear of the position you may think proper to take. You will

prevent plundering as much as possible and be as careful of your provisions and forage as may be, giving

receipts for whatever you take to all such as are friends to the independence of America.

Should the enemy move in force toward the Pee Dee, where the army will take a position, you will move in

such a direction as to enable you to join me if necessary, or fall upon the flank, or into the rear of the enemy,

as occasion may require. You will spare no pains to get good intelligence of the enemy's situation and keep me

constantly advised of both your and their movements. You will appoint, for the time being, a commissary,

quartermaster, and forage master, who will follow your instructions in their respective lines. Confiding in your

abilities and activity, I entrust you with this command, being persuaded you will do everything in your power

to distress the enemy and afford protection to the country.

Given under my hand at Charlotte this 16th December, 1780.

To Brig. Gen. Morgan. Nath. Greene

Morgan's command of approximately 600 men left Charlotte Town on the 21st of December, reaching the Catawba

that evening, and the following morning crossed the river at Biggers Ferry. From thence the march led to Cane Creek,

and the following day, the 24th, the Broad was crossed, and on the 25th camp was made on the north bank of the

Pacolet, at Grindalls Ford. Here Morgan was joined, a few days later, by a party of mounted militia under

Colonel Pickens and Major McCall. Early in December General Greene had given orders to General Davidson, of

North Carolina, to join Morgan with militia gathered from that State, when the latter had crossed the river; but the

British authorities incited the Cherokee Indians to ravage the western settlements, and the men of Burke, Rutherford,

Washington, and Sullivan Counties were engaged in safeguarding their homes. Davidson did arrive in Morgan's camp

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on the Pacolet toward the end of December with 120 men, but returned at once to North Carolina for the drafts that

had been ordered to assemble in the district of Salisbury.

On the 27th of December Morgan received intelligence that a body of Georgia Tories, about 250 in number,

had advanced as far as Fair Forest, and were committing depredations in that region. For the purpose of routing them

he sent Washington's dragoons, and 200 mounted militia under Major McCall, on the 29th. The hostile force was

about 20 miles from Grindalls Ford, in the direction of Ninety Six. The enemy withdrew on the approach of

Washington's command, but after a hard march of 40 miles they were encountered the next day at Hammonds

Storehouse, and dispersed with great loss. Although at considerable distance from supporting troops, and within range

of Ninety Six and Wynnesborough, Washington proceeded to march against a British post called Fort Williams, on

the road from Wynnesborough to Ninety Six, and about 15 miles northeast of the latter place. General Cunningham,

who was in charge of the Tory militia in this region, evacuated the fort, and Washington perceived the wisdom of

retracing his steps to the Pacolet. In the meanwhile Morgan detached 200 men to cover the withdrawal of Washington's

command, to guard against any misfortune that might occur to it. At the time of reporting the success at Hammonds

Storehouse, Morgan wrote to Greene on the 31st that the militia were coming in fast, and suggested that when he had

collected his force he desired to march into Georgia, if the main army could, at the time, make a diversion against

Cornwallis. To expedite this movement, should it meet with the approval of General Greene, he had sent for 100

swords, which he intended putting into the hands of expert riflemen, to be mounted and incorporated with

Washington's corps. He said, "It is incompatible with the nature of light troops to be encumbered with baggage," and

called for 100 packsaddles to replace wagon transportation, where necessary or desirable.

Morgan remained on the Pacolet to await a reply to his letter of the 31st of December covering the foregoing

suggestion, but developments were now so rapid that it became impossible to give further serious thought to a march

on Georgia. Greene knew that Leslie was advancing on Camden, at which place a strong post had been established

under Lord Rawdon, and in replying on the 8th of January to Morgan's letter which reached him the 7th, he did not

think an expedition into Georgia was "warrantable in the critical situation our Army is in." "Should you go into

Georgia, and the enemy push this way, your whole force will be useless." Greene intimated to Morgan that by

remaining where he was he was favorably situated to interrupt communications with Ninety Six and Augusta, and to

harass the enemy rear should Cornwallis attempt to push forward. He was cautioned to attempt no major enterprise,

unless by surprise, "for you will only beat your heads against the wall without success." As a further warning, Greene

added: "I must repeat my caution to you to guard against a surprise."

Before receiving from General Greene a reply to his letter of December 31, Morgan wrote the former again

on January 4, as to the difficulties of obtaining forage and provisions in the vicinity of his camp, and declared the

necessity either to move into Georgia or retreat. He had spies watching the enemy and did not consider himself in

danger of being surprised. Greene replied to this communication on the 13th with the advice that Morgan hold his

present ground, as a retreat would discourage the militia, and informed him that "Colonel Tarleton is said to be on his

way to pay you a visit." This letter did not reach its destination before the action at the Cowpens.

On the 14th of January Morgan learned that Tarleton had crossed the Tiger at Musgrove Mill, and he prepared

to change his position in the direction of the Broad. Leaving detachments to observe the fords over the Pacolet, the

army was put in motion on the 15th, and that evening camped at Burrs Mills on Thicketty Creek. It was on this same

day that Tarleton reached the Pacolet and reconnoitered the crossings. His strength was estimated by

Morgan to be from 1,100 to 1,200 men. Continuing his retirement on the 16th, the Cowpens were reached, where

small parties joined during the night, and the spirit of the camp was strong for fight. Morgan doubtless viewed this

augmentation of strength and the high spirits of the men as a favorable omen, and determined to offer battle the

following day. The proposed plan of deployment was explained to the several leaders, particular attention being given

to the part the militia, whom Pickens was to command, would take in the battle. For the purpose of strengthening

Washington's Cavalry, 45 militia were selected for their ability as horsemen and rifle shots, armed with sabers,

provided with suitable mounts, and attached to the dragoons.

Part III

DEPLOYMENT OF TROOPS -- THE BATTLE

The place where General Morgan established his camp the night of the 16th was near the intersection of the

Mill Gap Road and the road from the present city of Spartanburg running northeast into North Carolina, and crossing

the Broad River at Island Ford. Many roads of more recent construction now traverse this territory, but during the

Revolutionary period they were few in number. The Mill Gap Road crossed the Broad at Cherokee Ford and ran

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northwestwardly through the present town of Gaffney, into the mountains far to the west. Its course followed generally

the tops of ridges, thereby avoiding the crossing of creeks and rivers. The road from Spartanburg to North Carolina

now runs through Chesnee, but in olden days it crossed the Mill Gap Road about 3 miles southeast of Chesnee. Morgan

made camp in a wooded ravine having a stream of water running through it, which lay north of the Mill Gap Road,

and about a thousand yards northwest of the cabin of Robert Scruggs, which was visited by Lossing in 1849.

The position selected for the action lay on both sides of the Mill Gap Road, just south of the camp. The

ground is slightly undulating, and at the time was covered with scattered trees of red oak, hickory, and pine. Being

used for the gracing of cattle, there was but little, if any, underbrush. Two very slight elevations top the ridge along

which the Mill Gap Road runs, and these were selected as the lines of deployment for the American troops.

The main position was on the elevation just south of the ravine, in which camp was established. To its front

for 300 yards there is a scarcely perceptible slope downward; beyond this the slope is greater, dropping off into a

shallow ravine 700 yards from the main position. To the rear of the main position, and just west of the camp site, is

an elevation slightly higher than that of the main position. This ridge continues across the road in a south and southwest

direction, but at a slightly less elevation. From either ridge the terrain between the two was visible under and through

the trees. The ground offered no cover for either the attack or the defense, except such as was furnished by the trees.

The flanks of both armies were exposed, as the terrain was favorable in all directions for the operation of mounted

troops. The ravine in which Morgan camped and one on the opposite side of the road offered but little interference

with the movement of foot or mounted troops. Morgan's plan of battle was to use the Maryland Continentals and the

Virginia Militia (of worth equal to the Continentals, as many had served in previous campaigns) in his main position

on the summit of the southernmost ridge and astride the Mill Gap Road.

Washington's dragoons to the number of 80, augmented by the 45 militia under McCall, were the main

reserve, posted in rear of the northernmost ridge, where ground cover was sufficient to protect them from hostile

observation and fire and sufficiently near "as to be able to charge the enemy, should they be broken." The militia were

to form an interrupted line on the flanks in front, which position was to be held only temporarily, when they were to

withdraw and reform on the flanks of the main position after reorganization had been effected and lend what assistance

they could as an additional reserve.

At this time Howard's Maryland and Delaware Continentals consisted of 237 men. They were placed on the

left of the line, astride the Mill Gap Road. To their right were Captain Beatie's and Major Triplett's companies of

Virginia Militia, under the command of the latter, and totaling about 100 men. Captains Tate and Buchanan, with

about 100 of the Augusta riflemen of Virginia, supported the right of the line. In the advanced position, which was to

be abandoned early in the fight, were about 308 militia from North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, under

Colonel Pickens. These troops were situated to guard the flanks. Major McDowell, of the North Carolina Volunteers,

was posted on the right flank, 150 yards in front of Howard's line. Major Cunningham, of the Georgia Volunteers, was

on the left flank, at the same distance in front of Howard's line. To the right of Major McDowell were posted the South

Carolina Volunteers under Colonels Brannon and Thomas. To the left of Major Cunningham was posted the remainder

of the South Carolina Militia, under Colonel Hays and Major Hammond. The latter commanded Major McCall's

regiment, he being with Colonel Washington.

From Pickens's line of militia small parties of riflemen were sent 150 yards farther to the front to skirmish

with the enemy. McDowell commanded those in the right sector of the skirmish line and Cunningham those in the left

sector. Patrols covered the front and flanks to give warning of Tarleton's approach. Tarleton broke camp at 3 o'clock

in the morning, determined to engage the Americans before they could cross the Broad, or in case they made an early

march and continued their withdrawal, to strike them when astride the river. The baggage and wagons were to remain

in camp, under protection of a detachment from each corps, until daybreak. The advance guard consisted of three

companies of light infantry, supported by the legion infantry. The main body comprised the Seventh Regiment, the

two 3 pounders, and the First Battalion of the Seventy-first Infantry. The cavalry and mounted infantry brought up the

rear. The march was slow, due to the ground being broken by creeks and ravines, and the necessity for careful

reconnaissance on the front and flanks. Before dawn a screen of cavalry was placed on the front, soon after which

contact was made with the American patrols, when Tarleton ordered two troops of dragoons to reinforce the advance

guard and harass the rear of the enemy.

In due course of time the advance guard reported that the Americans were forming, and the native guides

with Tarleton described their position as in an open woods, free from swamps, with the Broad parallel to their rear.

Tarleton viewed the enemy's situation as one vulnerable to attack, particularly in view of his superiority in

cavalry, and the inability of a defeated force to escape beyond the Broad. Furthermore, the supposed nearness of

Cornwallis and the assumed superiority of his regulars over the large percentage of militia with Morgan made it seem

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apparent that success should be attended with no great loss to his command. His total strength, including the

detachment left to guard the baggage, was about 1,000.

The dragoons in the advance guard drove in the hostile covering forces along the Mill Gap Road, thereby enabling

Tarleton to proceed far enough to inspect the deployment of Morgan's army. It is probable that his estimate of the

strength of the opposing forces was considerably less than the total of 1,920 mentioned later in his narrative. Even

though he believed that he was opposed by about 500 Continentals, 120 cavalry, 1,000 militia, and 300 backwoods'

men, he probably ignored the two latter groups, and considered himself superior in quality to the American

Continentals and cavalry, who made a force much smaller than his regulars.

Prior to deploying the infantry were directed to discard all surplus equipment and retain only their rifles and

ammunition. The light infantry then filed to the right, into a position opposite to Morgan's militia, with their right

flank extending as far as the left of the militia. The legion infantry were added to the left of the light infantry, and a 3

pounder placed in the line between the two commands. This force was instructed to advance within 300 yards of the

enemy. When this position was reached, the Seventh Regiment formed upon the left of the legion infantry, and the

other 3 pounder was given to the right division of the Seventh. A captain, with 50 dragoons, was placed on each flank

of the line, to protect its flanks and threaten those of the enemy. The First Battalion of the Seventy-first Regiment

formed 150 yards in rear of the left flank of the Seventh, and constituted, together with about 200 legion cavalry, the

reserve.

The British deployment being completed at about 8 o'clock, Tarleton ordered his troops to attack. The whole

line moved with the greatest impetuosity, shouting as they advanced. The Americans responded with Indian war cries

of equal intensity, and held their fire until the enemy closed to effective rifle range, when the frontline skirmishers

under Cunningham and McDowell gave them a "heavy and galling fire, and retreated to the regiments intended for

their support." Tarleton's infantry suffered but little from this fire and continued their approach to Pickens's line, which

"kept up a fire by regiments, retreating agreeably to their orders." Still the British line suffered but little, and now it

71st Scottish Highlanders Battle of Cowpens

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approached the Continentals and the Virginians under Howard. Here, according to Morgan, they received a "well-

directed and incessant fire." Tarleton says "the fire on both sides was well supported, and produced much slaughter."

The British advance was temporarily checked.

At this time Tarleton sent the troop of dragoons on the right of the line to harass that portion of the militia

which had fallen back to the left of Pickens's line, and at the same time ordered forward his reserve. The First Battalion

of the Seventy-first was directed to pass the left of the Seventh before delivering its fire. The reserve cavalry and the

troop on the left of the line were ordered to incline to the left and form a line which would embrace the whole of the

American right flank. When the battalion of the Seventy-first was in position, the entire British line moved forward.

Tarleton now had about 750 infantry in line, supported by two guns, and was opposed by less than 450 infantry in

Howard's line. Whether or not the militia, which had withdrawn to the two flanks of Howard's line, could be later

assembled and used in the fight could not at this time be determined. Those who had withdrawn to the left rear of the

main position were charged by the troop of dragoons from the right of Tarleton's line and were being cut down, when

Washington countercharged with his cavalry, supported by some infantry fire, and relieved the situation in that quarter.

It was evident to Howard that with the enemy reserve brought into action his right flank was exposed, and he ordered

the flank company to change front to the right. In doing this some confusion ensued, and first a part and then the whole

of the company commenced a retreat. The officers along Howard's line seeing this, and supposing that orders had been

given for a retreat, faced their men about and moved off. Morgan, at this time, was engaged in reforming the militia,

and was surprised to observe the Maryland and Delaware Continentals, who had fought so valiantly at Camden, in

apparent retreat. He quickly rode over to Howard to inquire into the situation and his apprehensions were quieted

when Howard, pointing to the line, observed that "men were not beaten who retreated in that order." Morgan then

ordered Howard to continue retiring his line until the rising ground to the rear was reached, and rode back to select

the position on which the line was to halt and face about.

LTC Howard (left) and BG Morgan (right) on horseback leading Virginia militia and the Delaware and Maryland Continentals

against the British Infantry attack

119

The halt and change of front was effected without mishap, and although this retreat resulted from

misunderstanding, it was very fortunate, as Howard's units were thereby extricated from a position wherein they

doubtless would have been defeated with heavy losses.

So certain were the British that victory was at hand that they pushed forward to close in on the retreating

force with the bayonet, and an order was dispatched to the cavalry on the right to charge. Not more than 30 yards

separated them from the Americans, when the latter unexpectedly halted and changed front, and again confronted

them with a deadly volley, which stopped the British in their tracks and threw them into great confusion. Lieutenant

Colonel Howard observing this, gave orders for the line to charge bayonets, which was done with such address, that

they fled with the utmost precipitation, leaving their field pieces in our possession. Some of the militia which had

withdrawn to Howard's right were reformed and participated in the rout.

Further exertions to make the British infantry advance were useless. Nor could Tarleton's cavalry strike, for

it was at the moment when they were prepared to charge the retreating line that Howard halted and faced his command

about, and the panic which seized the British infantry extended to the cavalry also, and a general flight ensued. Tarleton

sent directions to his cavalry to form about 400 yards to the right of the enemy, whilst he endeavored to rally the

infantry to protect the guns.

The cavalry did not comply with the order, and the effort to collect the infantry was ineffectual; neither

promises nor threats could gain their attention; they surrendered or dispersed, and abandoned the guns

to the artillerymen, who defended them for some time with exemplary resolution.

In this last; stage of defeat, Tarleton in his narrative says that he made a final struggle to bring his cavalry to the

charge, but all attempts to restore order proved fruitless. “About 200 dragoons forsook their leader and left the field

of battle. “

He was able to rally a group of 14 officers and about 40 horsemen, and with these engaged the cavalry of Washington,

who in the latter stage of the fight were adding to the general confusion of the enemy by passing around Howard's

right and charging into the broken ranks of the enemy. The contest between the two mounted groups was short lived,

and Tarleton fled from the field, the action having lasted about 50 minutes. He directed his course to the southeast in

order to reach Hamilton Ford, near the mouth of Bullock Creek, where he might communicate with Cornwallis, who

had not advanced beyond Turkey Creek. A part of Washington's command pursued scattered groups of the enemy

cavalry for some distance, returning to camp late that night.

The British losses, as reported by General Morgan in a letter dated the 19th of January, were 10 officers and

100 noncommissioned officers and privates killed; 200 rank and file wounded; 502 noncommissioned officers and

privates prisoners, independent of the wounded, and 29 commissioned officers prisoners. This totals approximately

BG Morgan rallying the Militia

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841, and is somewhat in excess of the entire British infantry and artillery personnel in the battle. The losses in the

legion cavalry were not heavy, and that night and the next day 200 of their scattered numbers rejoined Tarleton. The

spoils of war included 2 standards, 2 field pieces, 800 stand of arms, 100 dragoon horses, and 35 wagons. The baggage

which had been left in camp was in a great measure destroyed by its guard before they fled.

Cornwallis’s return of troops shows the following changes in the organizations under Tarleton's command:

Jan. 15 Feb. 1

Seventh Regiment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Seventy-first Regiment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

First Battalion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Light Company . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

British Legion

167

249

69

451

936

. . . . . . .

. . . . . . .

. . . . . . .

. . . . . . .

174

174

In addition to the foregoing, Tarleton had about 40 men of the Seventeenth Dragoons and a detachment of artillery to

man the two 3 pounders. The American losses were inconsiderable, there not having been more than 12 killed and

about 60 wounded. Tarleton attributed his defeat to the bravery or good conduct of the Americans; to the loose manner

of forming which had always been practiced by the King's troops in America; or to some unforeseen event, which

may throw terror into the most disciplined soldiers or counteract the best-concerted designs.

He held the opinion that commanding officers in the Army, who were unfortunate in action, should be subject

to the same rules which governed the Navy, to the effect that a court-martial would inquire into the merits of the case.

Influenced by this thought, some days after the action Tarleton "required Earl Cornwallis's approbation of his

proceedings, or his leave to retire till inquiry could be instituted to investigate his conduct." To this demand

Cornwallis replied in a letter of the 30th of January:

You have forfeited no part of my esteem as an officer by the unfortunate event of the action of the

17th. The means you used to bring the enemy to action were able and masterly, and must ever do

you honor. Your disposition was unexceptionable; the total misbehavior of the troops could alone

have deprived you of the glory which was so justly your due.

Part IV

COMMENTS AND CONCLUSIONS

It is difficult to understand General Morgan's reasons for accepting battle at the Cowpens, unless his personal

characteristics for bravery and daring and his superior qualities as a leader of militia explain the matter. The

instructions which he received before leaving Charlotte Town were that he was to act offensively or defensively, as

his prudence and discretion might direct, but that he was to conduct operations with caution and avoid surprises. When

he effected his withdrawal from the Pacolet in the face of Tarleton's approach he halted for the night of the 15th at

Burrs Mills, on Thicketty Creek, and sent to Greene the last letter written prior to the battle. At this time he had no

thought of an early encounter. He reported that Tarleton had crossed the Tiger at Musgrove Mill with a force of 1,100

or 1,200, and that his command was probably Tarleton's objective. He suggested to General Greene that his detachment

be recalled and that General Davidson and Colonel Pickens be left with the militia to check the disaffected in that

region. He realized that, due to his distance from the main Army, Cornwallis might detach a force against him so

superior as to render it essential to his safety to avoid an engagement. He wrote:

Upon a full and mature deliberation, I am confirmed in the opinion that nothing can be

effected by my detachment in this country which will balance the risks I will be subjected

to by remaining here.

General Greene replied to this letter on the 19th of January, at which time he was unaware that an engagement had

occurred, to the effect that it was of great importance to keep a force in that quarter, for which duty the militia alone

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would not answer. He realised that the movements of Cornwallis and Tarleton had the appearance of being directed

against Morgan, and told him:

I do not wish you should come to action unless you have a manifest superiority, and a

moral certainty of succeeding. Put nothing to the hazard. A retreat may be disagreeable,

but not disgraceful. Regard not the opinions of the day. It is not our business to risk too

much. Our affairs are in too critical a situation, and require time and nursing to give them

a better tone.

Upon his further withdrawal to the Cowpens on the 16th, where additional militia joined, and with the

knowledge that Tarleton was closely pursuing and was now but one short march away, Morgan decided that evening

to stand and fight. The decision once made, however much its wisdom may be questioned, there can be no doubt about

the enthusiasm and thoroughness with which he prepared for the coming day. A plan of action was determined upon,

and his commanders informed. The role for the militia was such that under a slight baptism of fire, it was hoped much

of their fear would be dissipated, and that they would remain on the battlefield for later participation in the contest.

Appeal was made to their loyalty, their manhood, and their prowess with the rifle. There was no question but what

Washington's dragoons, Howard's Continentals, and Triplett's Virginians would do their full duty. The men were able

to rest during the night, and after the morning meal leisurely took up their designated positions.

Not much praise can be given for the position selected, except that the slope in front of Pickens impeded, to

some extent the advance of Tarleton's weary ranks, and the hill in rear offered cover for the cavalry reserve. In all

directions the terrain was open to attack from both infantry and cavalry, and Morgan doubtless knew that the cavalry

of Tarleton's legion far outnumbered Washington's dragoons. What superiority he believed to be possessed by the

troops under Howard over the infantry of Tarleton cannot be explained other than on the grounds that he hoped his

own courage great enough to cause his men to do the seemingly impossible. In planning for the militia under Pickens

to hold their line for but a brief time, and then retire, it would be with the assumption that the British would not have

lost heavily by the time they reached the main line. On this line the fate of the day would be determined, and Howard's

strength was less than 450 men. Tarleton's strength at this stage of the action would probably be 750 infantry,

outnumbering Howard about 2 to 1.

It appeared to the British, when Howard's line fell back, that victory was at hand, and so it would have been,

had the line been composed of men less inured to battle than were the Continentals of Maryland and Delaware. There

was no delay or hesitation when the order to halt, face the enemy, and fire, was given, and there then occurred in a

moment a scene of dumbfounded surprise, confusion, and panic seldom witnessed in battle. The outcome resulted in

one of the most gloriously unexpected victories of the Revolutionary War. The heroes of the Cowpens could worthily

stand shoulder to shoulder with those of Kings Mountain. Under a resolution of Congress passed March 9, 1781, the

thanks of the United States were given to Brigadier General Morgan, and the officers and men under his command,

"for their fortitude and good conduct, displayed in the action at the Cowpens." The resolution further provided that a

gold medal be presented to General

Morgan, silver medals to Lieutenant Colonels Washington and Howard, and a sword to Colonel Pickens.

In writing to the President of Congress on the 17th of February, General Washington said:

General Morgan's signal victory over Colonel Tarleton with the flower of the British Army

reflects the highest honor upon our arms, and I hope at least be attended with this advantage, that

it will check the offensive operations of the enemy until General Greene shall have collected a

much more respectable force than he had under his command by the last accounts from him. I am

apprehensive that the Southern States will look upon this victory as much more decisive in its

consequences than it really is, and will relax in their exertions. It is to be wished that the gentlemen

of Congress who have interests in those States would remove such ideas, if any such should be

found to exist, and rather stimulate them to redouble their efforts to crush an enemy, pretty

severely shaken by the two successful strokes upon Ferguson and Tarleton.

Cornwallis employed the day following the battle in effecting a junction with Leslie's command and in

collecting the remains of Tarleton's corps, and on the 19th hastened in pursuit of Morgan, hoping to be able to engage

him and recover the prisoners before Morgan and Greene could effect a junction. A part of the army, without baggage,

made great exertions to come up with Morgan, but the celerity of his movements and the swelling of numberless

creeks rendered their efforts useless, and he reached the Catawba on the 23d of January.

Cornwallis therefore assembled his army on the 25th of January at Ramseur’s Mill, on the South Fork of the

Catawba, and as the loss of his light troops could only be remedied by the activity of the whole corps, he employed

two days in collecting flour, and in destroying superfluous baggage and wagons, and then resumed the pursuit.

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In writing to Lord Germain on the 17th of March, Cornwallis said that —

The unfortunate affair of the 17th of January was a very unexpected and severe blow; for,

besides reputation, our loss did not fall short of 600 men. However, being thoroughly sensible

that defensive measures would be certain ruin to the affairs of Britain in the Southern Colonies,

this event did not deter me from prosecuting the original plan.

Tarleton in his narrative, commenting on the two disasters which the British suffered in South Carolina, said that the

fall of Ferguson at Kings Mountain was a catastrophe which put an end to the first expedition into North Carolina,

and that the Battle of the Cowpens overshadowed the commencement of the second expedition. This comment taken

in conjunction with the above-mentioned apprehension of General Washington, "that the Southern States will look

upon this victory as much more decisive in its consequences than it really is," briefly summarizes the result of the

Battle of the Cowpens. The effect at the time was to hearten greatly the patriotic cause and to distress the British Army

and their Tory sympathizers beyond measure. It was the second link in the chain of events, soon to be followed by

others, which finally led to the surrender of Cornwallis's army at Yorktown.

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Leadership Lessons from the Past:

The Ability to Inspire Greatness Transcends Time89

Great generals are scarce. There are few Morgans to be found.

—Nathanael Greene

A cold winter morning in January 1781 in a cow pasture in the South Carolina backcountry became the

setting for one of the most unexpected—and pivotal—battles of the American War for independence. In less than an

hour of intense fighting, Daniel Morgan, in command of the American rebel forces, decisively trounced his opponent,

Banastre Tarleton. His victory became known as the American Cannae, for it was the only case of double envelopment

in the war. Morgan, with a personal grudge to bear against the British, led a motley mix of Continental soldiers,

cavalry, and militia against one of the most feared commanders in the British Army. Morgan’s success was due in

large part to his personal leadership.

The essential characteristics of a great leader transcend time; the qualities of an exceptional leader that

motivates men to achieve seemingly impossible tasks or to triumph over what appear to be insurmountable odds are

on display in leaders as diverse as George Washington, Winston Churchill, and Brigadier General Daniel Morgan of

the Continental Army. The same characteristics that brought out the best in the men under Morgan’s command at the

Battle of Cowpens on 17 January 1781 are still effective in the twenty-first century and include the capability to inspire

others through a combination of vision, foresight, drive, and adaptability.

It is worthwhile to compare the leadership qualities of Morgan and his adversary at the Battle of Cowpens,

British Lieutenant Colonel Banastre Tarleton. Before doing so, it is important to define the scope of their command

responsibilities and identify which characteristics were most appropriate for that level of authority. Both Morgan and

Tarleton were field commanders; neither man was responsible for policy or overarching strategy, the province of

political leaders and senior generals.

As field commanders, each man was responsible for a limited level of strategic leadership and for “tactical

acumen,” which is defined as “the capability to employ one’s forces in a manner that destroys the enemy’s ability to

wage war.” To succeed in this realm, the leader must clearly understand and communicate goals and objectives and

create a sense of vision and mission for

his men that ensures they understand the purpose of the actions called for and the end results to be attained. It is critical

that the leader gather and act upon sufficient knowledge of his enemy, the prospective battlefield terrain, and his own

resources. The leader must prepare as best he can for the conditions he is likely to face in battle and evidence the

adaptability and creativity needed to meet challenging and ever-changing conditions. The successful leader translates

goals into understandable and achievable objects for his men and does so in such a manner that takes into account

their potential as well as their limitations—he takes the measure of the men under his command and assesses both

their strengths and weaknesses. Above all, the leader must inspire trust; men will follow a leader who demonstrates

integrity, courage, clear thinking, and who has established a reputation for success. With these standards in mind,

pausing for a brief character sketch of both Morgan and Tarleton is in order. By January 1781, Morgan was forty-four

years old and had the benefit of an extensive and varied career as a wagoner, soldier, and military leader.

As a young man, he participated in the French and Indian War as a teamster serving under British Major

General Edward Braddock during Braddock’s ill-fated 1755 campaign against the French and their Native American

allies. At some point during that earlier war, Morgan gained a cause for his personal hatred of the British; he lashed

out in anger at a British officer and in return, received what was then common punishment for such an indiscretion—

he was severely whipped. Morgan carried the marks of the lash the remainder of his life.

When the simmering dispute between Great Britain and her thirteen mainland American colonies broke into

armed rebellion on 19 April 1775, the outburst was largely confined to Massachusetts. However, radical Whig

89 Anne Midgley, “Leadership Lessons from the Past: The Ability to Inspire Greatness Transcends Time,” Saber and Scroll;

Volume 4; Issue 1, Winter, 2015.

124

elements in the other provinces quickly galvanized support for the beleaguered colony. Militia from other New

England provinces raced to assist those already in Massachusetts to surround and besiege the British troops quartered

in Boston. Control of the massed militia exceeded the capabilities of the Massachusetts Provincial Congress—and it

soon reached out to the men of the Second Continental Congress gathered in Philadelphia for aid. Congress responded

by voting to provide funds for the troops and by establishing a structure to govern them, including appointing George

Washington as Commander in Chief of the nascent Continental Army. Congress also issued a call for companies of

“expert riflemen;” Morgan responded with alacrity, traveling the region near his home in Virginia to raise marksmen.

Morgan and his Virginia riflemen played a significant role in several major Revolutionary War battles,

including the rebel invasion of Canada in 1775-1776 and the pivotal Battle of Saratoga in 1777. Early in the war

Morgan was reckless and extremely aggressive; in the battle to seize Quebec, he almost singlehandedly drove back

the enemy from Quebec’s Lower Town. His headlong attack stalled when he was overruled by other officers and

forced to await reinforcements. The moment lost, Quebec was saved for Britain as the British reinforced their weak

defensive position and held off the Americans. By 1781, Morgan was already a legend as a fighter and a captain of

men in battle, a man whose mettle had been tested. However, his health was failing him, he suffered from severe

attacks of sciatica and at the time of Cowpens, even riding his horse at a walk was a pain-filled experience for him.

In 1781, Tarleton was in some ways a younger Morgan although he came from a vastly different social

background and upbringing. Like Morgan, he was headstrong and aggressive; he did not, however, have the benefit

of Morgan’s years of experience. The son of a wealthy merchant family, he had been raised in affluence and was well

educated. He purchased a commission as a Cornet in April 1775 and swiftly rose through the ranks. At the age of

twenty-four, Tarleton was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel of the British Legion, a Loyalist regiment raised in New

York.

France entered the conflict as an American ally shortly after the Battle of Saratoga, which saw British General

John Burgoyne surrender almost six thousand men to the victorious Americans. France’s entry significantly changed

the nature of the war; Britain was stretched to the breaking point to defend her home islands against possible attack,

to protect her rich West Indies islands and her colonial holdings in India and Canada, as well as her strategic positions

on Minorca and Gibraltar.

Britain re-evaluated her strategy to reclaim the American colonies and looked to the southern colonies, especially

South Carolina and Georgia, seeking to regain a foothold. The British were enamoured of the idea that a substantial

Loyalist population existed in the South and that galvanizing Loyalist support could provide them with men and

matériel to overwhelm the southern rebels. The British Loyalist strategy and their Southern Campaign became the

central focus of Britain’s plan to win the war. The initial results of the British campaign in the South were spectacular.

Charleston—the largest and wealthiest city in the South—fell to the British in early May 1780 after a land and sea

siege, which devastated Major General Benjamin Lincoln’s Continental Army and militia forces. Virtually Lincoln’s

entire command was trapped in the city and, in surrendering, gave up thousands of men and enormous amounts of

weapons and supplies.

In the clean-up efforts after that overwhelming victory, British commander General Charles Lord Cornwallis

sent Tarleton to capture a small American rebel force that had been en-route to aid Lincoln’s besieged Charleston

troops. Tarleton and his men caught up with Colonel Abraham Buford and his Virginia Continentals at the Waxhaws

on 29 May 1780, after a furious race to cut them off from their intended retreat to North Carolina. In the pursuit,

Tarleton pushed his men ferociously, covering over one hundred miles in less than fifty-five hours. During the fierce

fight that followed, Tarleton’s horse was shot out from under him—just as the Americans tried to surrender. Thinking

that their commander had been cut down, his men went berserk and bayoneted the Continental soldiers mercilessly,

despite their pleas for quarter. As a result of that battle, Tarleton became one of the most infamous and vilified British

officers of the American Revolutionary War. His gruesome victory fed the rebel propaganda machine and soon

propagated a new rallying cry for the rebels—“Tarleton’s quarter,” which came to mean no quarter for the British and

Loyalist troops.

The incident illustrates that while Tarleton was effective at leading men into battle, as a relatively young and

inexperienced commander he sometimes lost Cornwallis, was cognizant of the damage caused by the behavior of

Tarleton’s men to Britain’s ability to win the “hearts and minds” of the southern colonists and frequently cautioned

Tarleton to exert greater control. Cornwallis sternly warned Tarleton, “I must recommend it to you in the strongest

manner to use your utmost endeavors to prevent the troops under your command from committing irregularities.”

However, Cornwallis thought highly of Tarleton, describing him as “indefatigably laborious and active, cool and

intrepid in action, discerns as by intuition, seizes rapidly, and improves with skill the short, but favorable and decisive

moments of victory.” Tarleton had leadership talent indeed, but his overall effectiveness was hampered by personality

qualities which may or may not have been honed and brought under control through additional age and experience.

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It was the newest commander of the Southern Continental Army who set the events in motion that quickly

led to the Battle of Cowpens. The fourth commander of the Southern Army, Major General Nathanael Greene,

assumed control of a much-reduced and demoralized army on 2 December 1780 at Charlotte, North Carolina, replacing

General Horatio Gates—a commander whose folly led to the Patriot loss at the Battle of Camden on 16 August 1780.

Like Lincoln’s loss at Charleston, Gates’s debacle at Camden cost the rebel cause in the South dearly; it left as many

as eight hundred of the Continentals and rebel militia dead and another thousand taken prisoner.

One of Greene’s first decisions was a surprise move—on 16 December 1780, he split his meager force,

sending Morgan out with some of the best troops in the Southern Army and ordering Morgan to “proceed to the West

side of the Catawba river, where you will be joined by a body of Volunteer Militia.” Greene commanded Morgan to

“employ [his force] against the enemy on the West side of the River, either offensively or defensively as your own

prudence and discretion may direct, acting with caution, and avoiding surprises by every possible precaution.” Greene

stipulated that Morgan and his men were to “give protection to that part of the country and spirit up the people—to

annoy the enemy in that quarter—collect the provisions and forage out of the way of the enemy.”

Greene’s move forced Cornwallis to respond in kind; he did so by dispatching Tarleton “with his corps of cavalry and

infantry, of five hundred and fifty men, the first battalion of the 71st [Highlanders] consisting of two hundred, and

two three pounders [small artillery] to counteract the designs of General Morgan, by protecting the country, and

compelling him to repass [the] Broad river.” Cornwallis directed Tarleton to chase Morgan down, and finding him, to

push in to “the utmost.”

True to form, Tarleton set off after Morgan—pushing his men swiftly toward his target. Tarleton wakened

his troops in the pre-dawn hours, reportedly at 2:00 a.m. daily, and again took up the pursuit. Morgan and his men

were aware of Tarleton’s chase; one of Morgan’s men described Tarleton’s advance as an approaching thunderstorm.

The speed of Tarleton’s advance limited Morgan’s options. He had to find a suitable place to take a stand.

Morgan and his adversary, Tarleton, shared some of the same qualities; however, several of the characteristics

that clearly set Morgan apart as a resourceful leader were not evidenced by Tarleton. Both Morgan and Tarleton knew

the value of acquiring significant intelligence about his adversary; Tarleton “hourly received accounts of the increase

of Morgan’s corps,” as local militia answered Morgan’s call to join his men. In his report to his superior, Greene,

Morgan stated “I received regular Intelligence of the Enemy’s Movements from the Time they were first in Motion.”

Both men knew the importance of choosing the type of terrain most likely to provide tactical advantage. In Morgan’s

assessment, his “situation at the Cowpens enabled me to improve any Advantages I might gain, and to provide better

for my own Security, should I be unfortunate.” Tarleton reported that his guides were consulted about the ground

Morgan had chosen and what lay to his rear and that they “described both with great perspicuity.” Each leader put

forth significant efforts to gain the knowledge necessary to prepare for battle. A key difference between the two leaders

was the way that each prepared the men that they were to lead into battle.

Morgan and his infantry commander, Lieutenant Colonel John Eager Howard, one of the most acclaimed

officers in the Continental Army, together with the militia officers on hand, personally rode the Cowpens field to

become as familiar as possible with the terrain. Morgan then designed a battle plan that took advantage of the slight

elevation changes and that set up three battle lines; the first to be made up of riflemen, a breed of men that Morgan

knew well. These sharpshooters were instructed to aim for “the men with the epaulets,” as Morgan knew that bringing

down his opponent’s officers would cause confusion in the ranks.

Morgan’s second battle line would be composed of militia. While Morgan understood that militiamen were

frequently unreliable in battle, he also knew how to set the men up for success. Throughout the night of 16 January,

militiamen responded to Morgan’s call and came into his camp. Morgan spent the night moving from campfire to

campfire to welcome the militia and to tell the nervous men what he expected of them. Morgan joked and quipped

with the men, calming and inspiring them. Historian John Buchanan related that Morgan even raised his shirt to show

the scars he had received from his scouring at the hands of the British years before. He gave them specific instructions

to get off two rounds of fire, then to withdraw. Morgan was well aware that Tarleton and his men would perceive the

withdrawal as a sign that they had routed the militia and would charge

in to destroy them, as this was Tarleton’s standard battle tactic—one from which he seldom strayed. However, rather

than running down panicked militia, Morgan intended that Tarleton would race into a trap, for Morgan’s third battle

line was composed of his best men—Maryland and Delaware Continentals, led by the formidable Howard. Morgan

held in reserve his ultimate surprise, Continental dragoons commanded by Colonel William Washington together with

mounted militiamen, who were concealed from Tarleton’s initial view by a slight dip in terrain elevation.

While Morgan had thought out his battle plan well, its success depended upon the courage of his men to

execute it. Morgan did his utmost to prepare his troops mentally and physically for the battle ahead. He ensured that

his men were well fed and rested; he personally saw to it that every man understood the role that he was to play in the

coming fight and exactly what was expected of him. Morgan reassured his militia and strengthened their resolve; he

126

appealed to the competitive nature of his sharpshooters by calling out “Let me see . . . which are the most entitled to

the credit of brave men, the boys of Carolina or those of Georgia.” Morgan inspired trust among the men; he did not

ask more of his men than he himself was willing to provide. To instill both hope and courage in his men, he spent the

night before battle moving about the camp to speak with the men. For the militiamen, especially, he set forth a vision

of life beyond the battle ahead, promising that Washington’s cavalry would protect them and that if they fulfilled their

task honorably, they would return to their homes and to the blessings of the old folks and the kisses of the girls “for

your gallant conduct.” Morgan’s men were as well prepared physically and psychologically as their commander could

make them; only the morning would tell if it were enough to withstand Tarleton.

Tarleton’s advance followed his familiar

pattern and he approached Morgan’s camp in his

typical style—pushing his men hard. Once again they

roused at 2:00 a.m. and made a tiresome four hour

march before arriving at Cowpens. Neither well-fed

nor rested, Tarleton’s troops faced Morgan and his

well-prepared men. Morgan’s measures had stripped

Tarleton and his men of a key advantage: the element

of surprise. In previous engagements, the furious pace

that Tarleton set for he and his men often caught their

prey off-guard; this was not the case at Cowpens. Yet

Tarleton had the advantage of well-seasoned troops

under his command. Tarleton’s lack of leadership

finesse showed in his reliance on “one maneuver, the

head-on, slam-bang assault.” Thrown off balance by

Morgan’s preparations, Tarleton did not adjust. He

threw his men into battle before they were organized

and prepared. As his plans disintegrated around him,

Tarleton called on his reserve—his own Legion

dragoons, men he had personally led into numerous

battles. Tarleton’s own men “forsook their leader, and

left the field of battle.”

Morgan’s personal leadership, his planning

and preparation sealed the victory. He was able to lead

a combined group of Continentals and militia together

successfully, in a manner that recognized both the

strengths and weaknesses of the militia and set them

up for success. Tarleton, though he had the better

tactical weapon at his command in the person of the

British regulars, failed to adjust to the circumstances

on the battlefield and could not meet the challenges he

faced from Morgan’s tactical genius. The leadership

exercised by Daniel Morgan makes the Battle of

Cowpens memorable and leads to its use even today

by the United States Army as a case study for concepts

of leadership on the battlefield.

Notes 1. “The Battle of Cowpens,” Cowpens National Battlefield, National Park Service, accessed February 15, 2015,

http://www.nps.gov/cowp/historyculture/the-battle-of-cowpens.htm.

2. Stanley D. M. Carpenter, “British Strategic Failure in the Southern Campaign, 1778-1781.” Naval War College Paper, 2008, 6.

3. Don Higginbotham, Daniel Morgan: Revolutionary Rifleman (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1961), 4-5.

4. John Ferling, Almost a Miracle: The American Victory in the War of Independence (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 37-43;

Higginbotham, Daniel Morgan, 22-23.

5. John Buchanan, The Road to Guilford Courthouse: The American Revolution in the Carolinas (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.,

1997), 276-288; Thomas Fleming, “The Battle of the Cowpens,” Military History, supplement America’s Great Battles, 1775-2002 (2002):

19, accessed August 27, 2012, http://search.proquest.com/docview/212663878?accountid=8289.

6. Buchanan, Road to Guilford Courthouse, 60-61.

127

7. John S. Pancake, This Destructive War: The British Campaign in the Carolinas, 1780-1782 (Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama

Press, 1985), 32-35, 63-66.

8. Ibid., 70-71.

9. John Ferling, Almost a Miracle: The American Victory in the War of Independence (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), p 437;

Buchanan, Road to Guilford Courthouse, 63, 68.

10. Anthony J. Scotti, Brutal Virtue: The Myth and Reality of Banastre Tarleton (Bowie, Maryland: Heritage Books, Inc., 2002), 19-20.

11. Pancake, This Destructive War, 103-107.

12. Nathanael Greene to Daniel Morgan quoted in Theodorus Bailey Myers, ed., Cowpens Papers: Being Correspondents of General

Morgan and the Prominent Actors (Charleston: The News and Courier, 1881), 9-10.

13. Banastre Tarleton, A History of the Campaigns of 1780 and 1781 in the Southern Provinces of North America (London: Printed for T.

Cadell, 1787), 212, accessed February 14, 2015, http://archive.org/details/historyofcampaig00tarl.

14. Ferling, Almost a Miracle, 481.

15. Tarleton, A History of the Campaigns.

16. Daniel Morgan, “Letter to Nathanael Greene, January 19, 1781, Battle of Cowpens,” TeachingAmericanHistory.org, Ashbrook Center

at Ashland University, accessed August 28, 2012, http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/index.asp?document=886.

17. Morgan, “Letter to Nathanael Greene.”

18. Tarleton, A History of the Campaigns, 215.

19. W. J. Wood, Battles of the Revolutionary War: 1775-1781 (Chapel Hill: Algonquin Books of Chapel Hill, 1990) 217-218.

20. Ibid., 217.

21. Buchanan, The Road to Guilford Courthouse, 317.

22. Historians differ on the number of shots that Morgan directed the militia to fire before pulling back from Tarleton. In brief research,

the author noted a number stating “two” while several others said “three.” While not an exhaustive list, those stating “two shots” were John

S. Pancake, This Destructive War: The British Campaign in the Carolinas, 1780-1782 (1985; repr., Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama

Press, 1992), 135; John Buchanan, The Road to Guilford Courthouse: The American Revolution in the Carolinas (New York: John Wiley

& Sons, Inc., 1997), 317; W. J. Wood, Battles of the Revolutionary War: 1775-1781 (Chapel Hill: Algonquin Books of Chapel Hill, 1990),

217; Christopher Ward, The War of the Revolution (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1952), 757; Robert Middlekauff, The Glorious

Cause: The American Revolution, 1763-1789 Rev. ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 479; Don Higginbotham, The War of

American Independence: Military Attitudes, Policies, and Practice, 1763-1789 (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1971), 366; while

those that stated three were John Ferling, Almost a Miracle: The American Victory in the War of Independence (New York: Oxford

University Press, 2007), 481; Lawrence E. Babits, A Devil of a Whipping: The Battle of Cowpens (Chapel Hill: The University of North

Carolina Press, 1998), 55; Thomas Fleming “The battle of Cowpens” Military History, suppl. America’s Great Battles, 1775-2002 (2002),

20; Lt. Colonel John Moncure "The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour,” Combat Studies Institute (January 1996), 38,158; and

Benson Bobrick, Angel in the Whirlwind: The Triumph of the American Revolution (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997), 429. Given that

the time to re-load was not insignificant—the differences noted are surprising.

23. Wood, Battles of the Revolutionary War, 217-218.

24. Buchanan, Road to Guilford Courthouse, 320.

25. Wood, Battles of the Revolutionary War, 219.

26. Ibid., 219-220.

27. Pancake, This Destructive War, 133.

28. Wood, Battles of the Revolutionary War, 221, 225.

29. Lieutenant Colonel John Moncure, The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour, Combat Studies Institute, U. S. Army Command and

General Staff College, January 1996.

128

Tactics and Weapons of the

Revolutionary War

Weapons and tactics are interdependent. When one changes the other changes. The main weapons of the

American Revolution were the muzzle loading flintlock musket, its attached bayonet, and the cannon.

Secondary weapons were the rifle and pistol, swords and other cutting weapons. By far, the most common

weapon was the smoothbore flintlock musket, of a large caliber, .62 to .75 inch bore, or equal to 16 to 11

gauge shotguns.

A musket has no rifling to spin the ball. It is "smooth bored" and will shoot both ball or shot, or a

combination of the two. The firearms of the period used black powder. Black powder leaves fouling behind

when fired. For this reason, the balls used by the military were undersized, so that the troops could quickly

seat the next load down the barrel. The British musket, (the Brown Bess), was 75 caliber and they used a

69 caliber ball. The French musket (the Charleville), supplied to the Americans, was 69 caliber and fired a

65 caliber ball. They were long barreled (about 42 inches) and could mount a long triangular shaped bayonet

on the barrel. The bayonet was an important part of the musket system. The length of the musket, with the

long bayonet, was also designed to be used to defend against horsemen. By forming a rectangle or square

with men facing outward with their bayonets, horsemen could not ride among them. Cavalrymen were

considered the equal of 3 to 5 men on foot, because of their mobility. The bayonet replaced the pike as the

means of defending against cavalry, and was the close range weapon.

The armies used paper cartridges to speed the loading process and reduce the risk of loose powder being

around sparking guns. A wooden dowel about the diameter of a ball was used as a former to make paper

tubes. Into this a ball and the proper amount of black powder was put, and it was sealed, usually by being

tied with string.

To load, a soldier opened his cartridge box, grabbed a cartridge, bit off the end to expose the powder, and

poured a small amount into the pan of the lock, closed the pan, dropped the cartridge (powder first) into the

barrel, removed his rammer, rammed it home, returned his rammer, and then "made ready" to shoot by

cocking his lock, and "presenting" or pointing, his piece to the enemy. There were no sights, just the bayonet

lug near the muzzle. The soldier just looked down the barrel. Soldiers were expected to be able to fire a

shot every 15 seconds for at least 4 minutes before needing to slow down because of the fouling in the

barrel.

Since the ball is undersized, and the paper cartridge is just dropped into the barrel, the ball might come out

spinning as the gases behind it escaped unevenly. It might spin in any direction, and fly like a curve ball or

be thrown slightly to any side. After 75 yards it was very hard for a soldier to deliberately hit a man sized

target.

To compensate for inaccurate shooting, the men fired volleys, sending a mass of balls toward the enemy,

some of which should hit. In order to fire volleys in unison, they formed into units of two or three ranks

(lines) deep, shoulder to shoulder. The unit would operate like a machine, led by an officer (assisted by his

non-coms), who would give the orders to load, fire and maneuver. Units could turn their lines, form into

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columns or squares, advance or turnabout at the direction of their officers. Early in the war, the Americans

did not have a universal system. Each state or even regiment had their own, making command by generals

harder. The Americans also did not practice large unit-Brigade or larger-drills early in the war.

The tactics of the day called for each unit to form next to its neighbor, forming a line across the battlefield

(not necessarily a straight line, or an unbroken one). They would both defend and attack in these formations,

which gives them the name of linear tactics.

The tactics were not designed to shoot down the enemy until he gave way, but to break up his organized

lines so that your side could then march forward, in cohesive, organized and linear fashion, and charge with

the bayonet. A disorganized unit cannot stand against an organized bayonet charge. Each unit tried to break

the unity of the enemy formation so it could charge with the bayonet. Charged units, if not able to organize

themselves, would give way if possible - or die spitted.

Muskets could be fired as fast as every 15 seconds, or 45 shots per minute. It took a sense of timing to be

able to drive a charge home while the enemy was reloading and unable to fire and break up your lines.

Rifles, while much more accurate than muskets, also were loaded much slower. It would take almost 30

seconds, and sometimes a minute or more, to reload a rifle. In that time they were often charged with the

bayonet, and since rifles were not equipped with bayonets, riflemen usually had to yield to musket men.

Early in the war, the Americans had a shortage of bayonets. When France joined the war, they supplied

muskets with bayonets, and the other accoutrements - uniforms, cartridge boxes, etc, alleviating the

Americans shortage of arms and bayonets. The French provided a hundred thousand muskets and bayonets

during the war.

CANNON

Cannon were considered the queens of the battlefield. Infantry unsupported by cannon usually lost if the

enemy had cannon. American Militia units were known for not standing up against British units with cannon

support, since they rarely had any of their own.

The Muzzle loading cannon used were smoothbores, and smaller than used in later wars. Most were 3, 4 or

6 pound guns, mounted on wooden carriages with large wheels. Some 3 pound guns had iron legs to stand

on and were called "grasshoppers". Larger guns of 12 pounds were sometimes used in the field, and even

larger guns were mounted in fortifications and ships.

The cannon fired either solid ball, various small shot, or sometimes shells. Shells are a hollow iron ball

filled with black powder and fitted with a fuse. The shot used could be buckshot, musket balls or grape

shot, which are larger iron or lead balls about 1 inch in diameter.

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Cannon had a range of several hundred yards. A 3 pounder ranged about 800 yards with solid shot, and 2

hundred yards with grape shot, maximum. At close range, loaded with shot, it could destroy an enemy

company.

It is a myth that the Americans won by using cover, while the dumb British stood in the open in ranks to be

shot by the hidden Americans. Both sides fought primarily in the open, in formation. When von Steuben

took over training at Valley Forge, he put a single standard and methodology into the American army, so

they could work better together. They then became a match for the British on the open ground in every

respect. The Americans had been hampered by various methods and commands of maneuver, with little

large scale drill. Von Steuben changed that, setting a single standard and training the army to use it, and the

Americans proved their ability to use these techniques at the Battle of Monmouth. Instead of a regimental

way, or state way, there was only the ARMY way. One method, one way to issue the order.

Certainly on occasion the Americans used cover, hiding behind trees and rock walls. The start of the war at

Lexington and Concord is a prime example, and the New Jersey Militia, used it well also, both being

examples of partisan warfare. Most battles of armies were fought using linear tactics. Even most partisan

battles were fought using some form of linear tactics- they would fire volleys, and often stood in lines. Both

sides used cover when they could. The slow rate of fire made maneuver important, so units fought and

moved in lines, even in woods, so they could protect against bayonet charges.

Flintlock Pistol

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Tactics in the Battle of Kings Mountain90

The Kings Mountain battleground ridge is approximately 600 yards long and is shaped somewhat like a

large footprint. The crest of the ridge ranges from 60 yards to 120 yards wide. Because of the thin layer

of soil, the crest had few trees. However, the steep slopes of the ridge possessed large trees and

boulders which provided cover for the Patriots as they ascended the ridge. . . .

The tactics of the two militia forces used in the Battle of Kings Mountain were different from those used

in other decisive battles of the American Revolution. In practically all of the major battles of the

American Revolution, European type warfare was waged. Put in a few words, European warfare of the

eighteenth century consisted of two or three linear lines converging on one another across an open

field. On a series of commands these infantry lines, armed with smoothbore flintlock muskets and

bayonets, would at about 80 or 100 yards from the enemy load, aim, and fire. After two, three, or

sometimes four volleys of musket fire the battle would be decided by the bayonet in hand-to-hand

combat. The army that did not retreat and held the field was considered the winner.

Artillery pieces of various sizes were an important part of many battles. The opposing infantry would

very often be moving forward into the face of murderous cannon fire. Cavalry troops would be used to

attack the enemy flanks. At times they would be used in head-on attacks. Many variations of cavalry and

artillery tactics were used, depending often on the terrain. The tactics used at the Battle of Kings

Mountain differed from European type warfare in several ways.

Both armies were primarily made up of militia. The only professional soldiers present at this battle were

Major Patrick Ferguson and the 125 Provincial forces. Ferguson was an officer in the British army and

the only British-born participant in the battle. Both militias were made up of Americans. It was a battle

of Patriots versus Loyalists. Another difference in this battle from other battles of this war was that

there was neither artillery nor cavalry present. The most important difference of the battle was that the

Patriot militia was armed with the long rifle, a very accurate, long-range weapon that was slow to load

and no bayonet could be attached. It took about one minute to load, aim, and fire the rifle. The long rifle

was not meant for this eighteenth century type warfare of hand-to-hand combat. The Patriots, however,

used it to defend themselves from Indian attacks and other frontier dangers. Mostly, though, the long

rifle had been used as a hunting weapon to feed their families.

The Loyalist militia, under the command and tutelage of Major Patrick Ferguson, had been trained in

eighteenth century warfare tactics. They were armed with smoothbore flintlock muskets and had been

taught how to load, aim, and fire as a unit. He taught the use of bayonets. Because many of these

militiamen did not have bayonets, they used whittled-down butcher knives jabbed into the ends of their

musket barrels. Alongside the Loyalist militia were about 125 Provincials from the King’s American

Rangers, the Queen’s Rangers, and the New Jersey Volunteers. The total strength of the Loyalist force

90 Tactics in the Battle of Kings Mountain, National Park Service, https://www.nps.gov/common/uploads/ teachers/

lessonplans/Reading%20-%20Tactices%20in%20the%20Battle%20of%20Kings%20Mountain.pdf, accessed 4 January 2017.

132

was about 1100. Around 200 of the Loyalist militia were out foraging the day of the battle, so the

available strength at the time of the battle was around 800 Loyalist militia and 100 Provincial troops.

The Patriot militia, made up of men from southwest Virginia, northeast Tennessee (then part of North

Carolina), North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, had pursued Patrick Ferguson and his Tory force

from western North Carolina. They bivouacked on October 6 at Cowpens, about 33 miles from Kings

Mountain. This group of mainly frontiersmen was under the command of Colonel William Campbell who

had been elected by the various militia units as the overall commander. They had discovered that the

Tory militia was camped on top of a small ridge of the Kings Mountain Range. They knew that the ridge

was about 6 miles from the principal elevation called the “Pinnacle.” The leaders were familiar with the

terrain of the ridge and the surrounding area because some of the men had used the ridge as a hunting

camp. With this information they selected the most able men with the best horses to ride all night in the

rain through rough terrain until they reached the Tory encampment.

The strategy was to dismount near the ridge

and move in on foot, surrounding the Tory

encampment. They were aware that the Tory

fire would be somewhat inaccurate since they

would be firing downhill. Every man was

ordered to go into battle resolved to die. The

idea was to hit the enemy from all sides, sap the

enemy strength, and gain the crest of the ridge.

With the enemy completely surrounded, they

would continue to reduce the ground held by

the Tories until they surrendered or were killed.

Patrick Ferguson, having trained his militia in

European type warfare, decided to defend the

ridge with the bayonet. He was so comfortable

with his position that he prepared no

breastworks from the available trees. Ferguson

declared that, “God Almighty could not drive

him from it.” He evidently felt that the cold

steel of the bayonet would defeat the

backwoodsmen. After several volleys of musket

fire the Loyalists pushed down the ridge in

bayonet charges. These charges were executed

primarily by the Provincial troops and the best-

trained militiamen. It is possible that the Tory

commander thought that after several bayonet

charges, these lightly trained Patriot militiamen

would retreat in wild disorder and flee from the

area. The field would then be his, and according

133

to eighteenth century warfare, the Tory militia

would be the victor.

As it turned out, the Patriot strategy proved to be the winning strategy. Had the battle been fought on

an open field, perhaps the outcome would have been different. It is also possible the 200 Tories who

were out foraging during the battle could have tipped the scales in favor of the Tories. The battle lasted

one hour and five minutes and was a devastating blow to the British military strategy in the South. It

was, as Sir Henry Clinton stated in his accounts of the American Revolution, “the first link in a chain of

evils that followed each other in regular succession until they at last ended in the total loss of America.

134

PAY DEPARTMENT

By

Colonel A. B. Carey 91

The earliest legislation creating a Pay Department, is the resolution of the Continental Congress, in session

at Philadelphia, Pa., June 16, 1775, as follows:

Resolved, "That there be one Paymaster General, and a Deputy under him, for the Army, in a separate

department; that the pay for the Paymaster General himself be one hundred dollars per month, and

for the Deputy Paymaster under him, fifty dollars per month."

James Warren, of Massachusetts, was elected Paymaster-General, by Congress, on July 27, 1775.

By resolution of January 9, 1776 the Deputy Paymaster-General was authorized to appoint two Assistant

Paymasters, and it was required that all the troops of the Northern Department be paid in person by him or

his assistants.

Colonel Warren's resignation was accepted by Congress on the 19th of April 1776, and on the 27th William

Palfrey, of Massachusetts, then aide-de-camp to General Washington, was appointed by Congress

Paymaster-General of the. Army, and on June 12, Ebenezer Hancock was appointed Deputy Paymaster-

General for the Eastern Department.

Congress on the 9th of July, 1776, resolved: "That Mr. Palfrey, late aide-de-camp of General Washington,

have the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel in the Continental Army," and on the 16th a regimental paymaster for

each regiment was provided at a salary of $26 2/3 per month, and by resolution of October 10th, regimental

paymasters were to have "the rank of First Lieutenants and rations as Captains."

Deputy Paymaster-Generals were appointed by Congress for Virginia and Pennsylvania on July 11, 1777,

and for Georgia on August 6th. On the 20th the pay of the Paymaster-General was increased to $150, and

that of the Deputy under him to $75 per month. By the resolution of August 28th, the Deputy Paymaster-

Generals of the Northern, Eastern and Southern Departments were empowered to appoint assistants when

necessary. On May 27, 1778, Congress resolved, "That the paymaster of a regiment be chosen by the

officers of the regiment out of the captains or subalterns, and appointed by warrant issued by the

Commander-in-chief, or the commander in a separate department." They were required to take charge of

the clothing for the troops, and to distribute the same. By resolution of January 21, 1779, Congress directed

that the Paymaster or Deputy Paymaster-General should provide an office near headquarters, and on May

29th, the Paymaster-General was required to keep his office in the place where Congress should, from time

to time, hold its sessions. Authority was given for the employment of clerks, directions for keeping regular

books; and, in general terms, the duties of the office were defined. A Deputy Paymaster-General was

91 Colonel A.B. Carey, “Pay Department,” included in The Army of the United States Historical Sketches of Staff

and Line with Portraits of Generals-in-Chief, Theophilus F. Rodenbough and William L. Haskin (New York:

Maynard, Merrill, and Company), 1896.

135

authorized, by the same resolution, for the army under the immediate command of General Washington.

On November 12, 1779, Congress granted the sum of $20,000 to Paymaster-General William Palfrey, as a

further compensation for past services, and allowed the Paymaster-General salary at the rate of $14,000 per

annum until further order of Congress. Colonel Palfrey had filled the office of Paymaster-General since

April, 1776. "During this period he had exhibited such proofs of his talents for business, fidelity and

devotedness to the cause of his country, that, on the 4th of November, 1780, he was elected Consul General

from the United States to France, an office at this time of much consideration, as it involved the duties of

making extensive purchases of military and other supplies for the country, and an examination and

settlement of all the accounts in which the United States were concerned with public and private agents in

Europe, and which had been multiplying and accumulating since the commencement of the war.

"He sailed for France, but the vessel in which he took passage was lost at sea, and everyone on board was

supposed to have perished."*

Colonel Palfrey was succeeded as Paymaster-General by John Pierce, of Connecticut, who was elected to

the office by Congress on January 17, 1781.

General officers had been empowered by Congress to draw warrants on the Paymaster-General for payment

of troops under their command. On a report from the Secretary of War, to whom was referred a plan of the

Paymaster-General for the better regulation of the pay of the army, Congress, on April 8, 1782,

Resolved, "That as all returns necessary to check the accounts of pay and rations, and to give full

information of public issues of clothing and stores, are lodged at the War office, the Secretary of War

is hereby empowered and directed to issue his warrants on the Paymaster-General, in favor of each

regimental paymaster, for the pay and rations which shall appear, on adjustment of their accounts to

be due to the regiments respectively, and to the head of each department, for the pay and rations due

to such department; that the accounts for the pay and rations of each regiment, and of each department

in the army, from January 1, 1782, shall be made out at the end of every month, and be transmitted

to the War Office for examination and warrants:

"That the manner of making the payments, of keeping the accounts, and the returns of the regimental

paymasters be regulated by the Secretary of War:

"That the Paymaster-General shall pay on the warrants of the Secretary of War, from such monies as

shall be put into his hands for the pay and rations of the troops, and to the orders of the Commander-

in-Chief, or officer commanding the Southern army, from such monies as shall be placed in his

disposal for contingencies.

Resolved, "That all resolutions heretofore passed empowering general officers to draw warrants on

the Paymaster-General, except that empowering the officer commanding the Southern army, be, and

the same are hereby repealed."

Resolved, "That there be one Deputy-Paymaster for the Southern army:

"That there shall be one assistant allowed to the Paymaster-General, who shall do the duties of a

clerk:

"That the Paymaster-General be, and he is hereby, authorized to appoint his deputy and his assistant:

"That the Paymaster-General immediately give bonds with two sureties, to the Superintendent of

Finance, in the sum of $15,000, for the faithful performance of his office."

The Paymaster-General was authorized, on May 16th, to appoint a Deputy-Paymaster to reside with the

main army.

The Revolutionary army was disbanded on the 3d of November, 1783, in pursuance of a proclamation

issued by Congress on the 18th of October previous. On April 1, 1785, Congress resolved that 700 troops

were necessary for the protection of the north-western frontier, and on April 12, 1785, specified the number

which should be furnished by certain States, and provided that a lieutenant should act as Paymaster.

136

The resolve of Congress of the 20th of October, 1786, increased the number to 2040 non-commissioned

officers and privates. The army was fixed by the resolve of October 3, 1/787, at

1 regiment of Infantry, 8 companies.

1 battalion of Artillery, 4 companies.

Paymaster-General John Pierce had been continued in service settling his accounts, and as commissioner

for settling the accounts of the army. The two offices were united by resolution of Congress of March 23,

1787, as follows:

Resolved, "That the services and duties of Paymaster-General be, and hereby are, united with those

of Commissioner of Army Accounts." John Pierce died in August, 1788.

137

MUTINY OF THE PENNSYLVANIA LINE

by Michael Schellhammer92

“I despise my countrymen. I wish I could say I was not born in America. . . . The insults

and neglects which the army has met with from the country beggars all description.”

LTC Ebenezer Huntington (1780)

Deputy Paymaster

Connecticut Line, Continental Army

When the soldiers of the Pennsylvania Line mutinied most of them had not been paid in almost a year. A

year. I challenge anyone to work any job, let alone endure the harsh life of a Continental soldier that long

without pay and not want to kick the bosses to the curb. And the lack of pay was only one of their

complaints. So I’ll go out on a limb and say that the soldiers definitely had legitimate gripes. How that fits

in with military professionalism becomes apparent after the whole picture is clear.

The story began in November, 1780, when the Continental Army went into winter quarters in camps that

were dispersed in New York, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey. The Pennsylvania Line occupied log huts,

used the previous winter by the Connecticut Line, on Mount Kemble near Morristown, New Jersey. Major-

General Arthur St. Clair, the senior officer of the line, furloughed in Philadelphia, a practice not uncommon

for senior officers. The 2,473 Pennsylvania officers and men at Mount Kemble comprised eleven regiments

of infantry and one of artillery.

The winter was mild and the huts were about as comfortable as log huts can be, but clothes, food, and pay

were in short supply. In mid-December, Brigadier-General Wayne, who was not yet nicknamed “Mad

Anthony,” wrote to Joseph Reed, President of Pennsylvania’s Supreme Executive Council, “we are reduced

to dry bread and beef for our food, and to cold water for our drink. . . . Our soldiery are not devoid of

reasoning faculties, . . . they have now served their country with fidelity for near five years, poorly clothed,

badly fed, and worse paid; of the last article, trifling as it is, they have not seen a paper dollar in the way of

pay for near twelve months.”[1] Wayne hounded the Executive Council for uniforms and Philadelphians

collected both money and winter clothing, but no relief reached the men by the end of December.

Another major issue arose because the Executive Council planned to consolidate several regiments of

Pennsylvania Line effective January 1, 1781. Many soldiers had enlisted in 1777 under the somewhat

confusing terms of “for three years or the duration of the war.” Focusing on the first clause, “for three

years,” some soldiers believed that the reorganization would conclude their enlistments. But the regimental

officers focused on the second clause, “or the duration of the war,” and denied the soldiers’ requests for

discharge.[2]

92 Michael Schellhammer, “Mutiny of the Pennsylvania Line,” Journal of the American Revolution, January 14, 2014; https://allthingsliberty.com/2014/01/mutiny-pennsylvania-line/, accessed January 4, 2017.

138

Knowing that his men were getting fed up with the situation, the possibility of a mutiny could not have

been far from Wayne’s mind. Mutiny was punishable by death under Congress’s Articles of War, but

soldiers still chose to rebel against their higher authorities to protest harsh conditions or enlistments. The

Continental Army had suffered mutinies since its inception, and Wayne himself faced down two mutinies

at Ft. Ticonderoga in 1777. But most uprisings involved small groups of soldiers and were easily dealt

with. Wayne sensed trouble, and instead of furloughing at a more comfortable location as he sometimes

did, this year he stayed with the men at Mount Kemble.

However, nobody forecasted the magnitude of what was coming on January 1, 1781. It was a clear day and

not very cold, “a fine morning. . . the day spent in quietness,” recalled Captain Joseph McClellan of the 9th

Pennsylvania.[3] It was Gen. Wayne’s thirty-sixth birthday, but he declined a dinner invitation with a local

prominent civilian because he needed to manage the regimental reorganization. The officers of the 10th

Pennsylvania held one last dinner together before their unit was broken up. The soldiers received a half-

pint of liquor and at about 8:00 PM, troops of the 11th Pennsylvania “began to huzza and continued for

some time,” according to Capt. McClellan. Officers quieted the men without incident.[4]

The soldiers were in their huts at about 9:00 PM when another disturbance began among the men of the

11th Pennsylvania. Lieutenant Enos Reeves of the 2nd Regiment investigated and found men gathering in

small groups, whispering, and running about. It is not clear what sparked the men to such action, nor is it

clear if they even planned to mutiny. But some musket firing began and a skyrocket went into the air. Then

soldiers began pouring out of their huts with their muskets and equipment. “I immediately found it was a

mutiny,” wrote Lt. Reeves, and he and other officers tried, but failed, to keep the troops in their huts.[5] The

column of now mutinous soldiers moved down the line of huts, seized four cannons, fired muskets into the

air, and called for more men to join them. Many soldiers hid in their huts until the tumult passed. Mutineers

forced the men of the 2nd Pennsylvania to join at bayonet point and fired a few cannon shots over the ranks

of the 5th and 9th Regiments to convince them to join the revolt. While the main group of mutineers

gathered (or coerced) men, others seized horses, wagons, tents, and provisions. Some officers made

fruitless attempts to gain control. In the 4th Regiment, a captain formed a group of soldiers to reclaim the

artillery, but the men refused his order to charge. Captain Adam Bettin lunged at one mutineer with his

spontoon and the man shot him dead. Two other officers were wounded and more received lesser injuries

in the melee. About 1,500 soldiers joined the mutiny, which was over half of the Pennsylvania Line and

by far the biggest uprising in the Continental Army yet.

According to Lt. Enos Reeves, Gen. Wayne, Colonel Richard Butler and a party of senior officers arrived

at the scene on horseback. Wayne and Butler tried to speak to the men to identify their grievances to no

avail. Some of the mutineers fired a musket volley over Wayne’s head, and he opened his coat and told

them, “if you mean to kill me, shoot me at once, here’s my breast.” The soldiers replied that they intended

no harm to their officers, “two or three individuals excepted,” and moved to depart the camp.[6] Wayne

tried to halt them again, but the troops announced their intention to march to Philadelphia for redress on

their pay, clothing, and enlistments. In a regulation-perfect column of platoons under the command of their

sergeants, the mutineers took the road south towards Princeton. “The men went off very civily,”

remembered Lt. Reeves, but he added with a touch of scorn, “to what might have been expected from such

a mob.”[7]

Unlike the previous mutinies, the size of this one presented more than disciplinary problems. The

Continental Army could ill afford to have so many soldiers exit the ranks. Worse, for all the American

commanders knew, the mutinous group could “turn Arnold” and join the British forces that were only about

20 miles away near New York City. Wayne sent two officers speeding to Philadelphia to alert Congress

and the Executive Committee and dispatched an aide-de-camp to inform General Washington, who was at

the army camp at New Windsor, New York. In his return letter, Washington approved of Wayne’s actions

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and directed him to identify the mutineers’ grievances for Congress to address. Washington was also

concerned that the mutiny could spread to other units and stayed put to keep a lid on things at New

Windsor.[8]

Wayne, Butler, and Col. Walter Stewart shadowed the column on the road south. On January 3 the soldiers

reached Princeton, New Jersey and set up an orderly camp. A “Board of Sergeants” of one man from each

regiment presented Wayne with their main complaints; 1) that eligible soldiers be discharged, 2) the soldiers

should receive all their pay due in hard cash, and 3) they receive decent clothes and provisions. Wayne

considered the demands reasonable but told the sergeants that only civil authorities had the power to address

the issues.

On January 6, Pennsylvania’s Joseph Reed arrived at Maidenhead, now known as Lawrenceville, six miles

south of Princeton and began meeting with Wayne and the Board of Sergeants. A special committee of

Congress, appointed to oversee negotiations, went to Trenton. The Pennsylvania Line’s senior officer, Gen.

St. Clair, cancelled his furlough and took command of the soldiers at Mount Kemble that did not join the

mutiny. Reed, Wayne and the Board of Sergeants negotiated over the next few days, sometimes testily. For

one thing, Wayne and Reed clashed over their respective roles. And according to Reed, the president of

Board of Sergeants, John Williams of the 2nd Pennsylvania, was “either very ignorant and illiterate, or was

drunk,” and communications with the Board was sometimes confusing.[9] The fiery Wayne was not known

for his patience, and his sympathy for the mutineers wore thin.

The British also got involved. General Sir Henry Clinton learned about the mutiny on January 3 and sent

three men to skulk into the camp at Princeton “with offers of protection and pardon and full liquidation of

all their demands” in return for their allegiance. [10] Clinton also moved Hessian grenadiers and jagers to

Staten Island to march into New Jersey if an American vulnerability developed. The mutineers were having

140

none of it; they captured one operative, John Mason, and his guide, James Ogden, and held them prisoner

during the negotiations.

On January 8 Reed and the Board reached an agreement; a committee would review the enlistment of each

soldier and discharge those eligible. Also, the men would receive proper uniforms as well as warrants for

their back-pay that Pennsylvania would honor as soon as it could raise the money. The next day, the

mutineers marched to Trenton to begin executing the settlement’s provisions. The mutiny was over, but

not fully resolved by a long shot – more on that later.

The mutiny was a wake-up-call to the Pennsylvania Line on its lack of professionalism, but the offenders

were the officers, not the enlisted soldiers. Except for the violence on January 1, the mutineers conducted

themselves with an impressive level of discipline. They kept a strict military camp at Princeton and gained

the support of the local population. The soldiers also promised to fight under Wayne in the event of an

enemy attack. And as soon as the negotiations ended the sergeants handed Mason and Ogden over to the

Congressional committee, an act that Gen. Washington called, “an unequivocal and decided mark of

attachment to our cause.”[11]

The big problem was that the regimental officers in the Pennsylvania Line followed some pretty poor

leadership habits. At Princeton Reed learned that the men held “a strong aversion to many of their former

officers,” Wayne and the brigade commanders excepted.[12] The overseeing Committee of Congress also

reported that the soldiers anger was “chiefly against some of their own officers and complained of fine

deception in their enlistments,” and recommended “the inferior officers” receive leadership instruction to

“temper severity with mercy” “(though both statements were crossed out of their final

report).[13] Historian Charles Royster concluded in A Revolutionary People at War that the regimental

officers in the Pennsylvania Line imitated Gen. Wayne’s “gaudiness, arrogance and harshness” but failed

to emulate his genuine care and respect for the soldiers. The result was years-long hostility between the

officers and men that flared into mutiny.[14]

Put yourself in the shoes of the soldier. You haven’t been paid in months. Without too much complaint

you’ve endured at least three years of brutal battles, harsh discipline, and deplorable conditions. You and

your family need money. Then the planned reorganization leads you to believe that your three year

enlistment is up. But your own officer, the same one who has treated you poorly over the past three years,

says “Sorry. You actually enlisted for the entire war, so stick around. And don’t forget to clean the latrines

tomorrow.”

I’m joking here. All of the officers were certainly not deadbeats. They served courageously in the same

battles, harsh conditions and the lack of pay along with the men, and many surely took great care of their

soldiers. The mutiny genuinely shocked and insulted many officers. And the soldiers, who were no saints,

were probably guilty of reading their enlistments exactly the way they wanted to. The government of

Pennsylvania was responsible for clothing and paying the soldiers, so that body also bears some

responsibility for the circumstances that led to mutiny. Overall, the collective leadership of Pennsylvania

allowed conditions to become so bad, so unendurable, that over a thousand men chose mutiny and a possible

death sentence as their only recourse to get what they thought they deserved.

Now let’s see how all the parties finally settled the mutiny. The former mutineers arrived at Trenton on

January 9. Over the next week a committee reviewed enlistments, taking the men at their word about their

enlistment dates, and discharging soldiers who claimed eligibility. The soldiers also received shirts, shoes,

blankets, woolen overalls and fifty Pennsylvania shillings, the equivalent of a month’s pay. Almost the

entire Pennsylvania Line went on furlough for sixty days. None of the mutineers received punishment. At

the end of January Wayne reported to Washington the discharge of 1,220 soldiers, leaving the Pennsylvania

141

Line with 1,180 sergeants and privates.[15] Washington thought that some of the men lied to get out

early.[16] Recruiting efforts began soon and many men re-enlisted for a bounty of nine Pennsylvania

shillings.

A court-martial convicted Gen. Clinton’s emissaries Mason and Ogden of spying and sentenced them to

death. Mason was a Loyalist freebooter toughened to the risks of war and accepted his fate. Ogden, on the

other hand, was only a Loyalist citizen who Mason hired as a guide, and he was stunned that the court found

him guilty of any crime. On January 11, near Summer Seat, Pennsylvania, across the Delaware River from

Trenton, they both swung from nooses made of rope unwound from a horse collar and thrown over a tree

limb. The hanging site was at a crossroads and their bodies turned in the cold wind for days afterward,

visible to all who rode by.

What lessons the military and civilian leadership learned from the mutiny is unclear. The state of

Pennsylvania and Congress strived throughout the spring of 1781 to raise money, but could only pay the

men with state money that was about 1/7 the value of specie. Wayne prepared his men to take the field in

March, but he still had to harangue Pennsylvania for money, and he told Washington “the same supineness

and torpidity that pervades most of our civil councils have prevented any part of the troops from

moving.”[17] Some things never change.

In May some of Wayne’s men mutinied again, and this time the consequences were brutal. But that’s

another story.

[1] Wayne to Joseph Reed, December 16, 1780, Life and Correspondence of Joseph Reed, Military Secretary of

Washington, at Cambridge, Adjutant-general of the Continental Army, Member of the Congress of the United States,

and President of the Executive Council of the State of Pennsylvania, (William B. Reed, ed., Philadelphia, Lindsay

and Blakiston, 1847 ), 316.

[2] Robert K. Wright Jr., The Continental Army, (Washington, D.C., Center of Military History, 1983, reprint,

2000), 163; and Carl Van Doren, Mutiny in January: The Story of a Crisis in the Continental Army now for the first

time fully told from many hitherto unknown or neglected sources both American and British, (New York: Viking

Press, 1943), 35.

[3] “Diary of the Revolt of the Pennsylvania Line, January, 1781,” in Pennsylvania Archives, Second Series, Volume

XI, (Harrisburg: Lane S. Hart, State Printer, 1880), 631.

[4] Diary of the Revolt of the Pennsylvania Line, 631.

[5] Letter 143, “Extracts from the Letter-Books of Lieutenant Enos Reeves, of the Pennsylvania Line (continued),”

John B. Reeves, ed., The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, Vol. 21, No. 1 (1897), 73.

[6] Letter 144, Letter-Books of Lieutenant Enos Reeves, 73-74.

[7] Letter 145, Letter-Books of Lieutenant Enos Reeves, 75.

[8] Washington to Wayne, January 3, 1781, The Writings of George Washington, Volume 21, accessed January 5

2014, via: http://web.archive.org/web/20110220004025/http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/etcbin/toccer-

new2?id=WasFi21.xml&images=images/modeng&data=/texts/english/modeng/parsed&tag=public&part=66&divisi

on=div1.

[9] Reed to the Committee of Congress, January 8, 1781, Life and Correspondence of Joseph Reed, 329.

[10] Sir Henry Clinton, The American Rebellion: Sir Henry Clinton’s Narrative of His Campaigns, 1775-1782, with

an Appendix of Original Documents, William B. Willcox. ed., (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1954), 241.

[11] Washington to Nathaniel Greene, January 9 – 11 1781, Writings of George Washington, Vol. 21, accessed

January 7 2014 via: http://web.archive.org/web/20110220004533/http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/etcbin/toccer-

new2?id=WasFi21.xml&images=images/modeng&data=/texts/english/modeng/parsed&tag=public&part=94&divisi

on=div1

[12] Reed to the Committee of Congress, Life and Correspondence of Joseph Reed, 320, 323.

[13] Journals of the Continental Congress,1774-1789, Volume XIX, January 1 – April 23, 1781, (Washington,

Government Printing Office, 1912), 80, 83.

142

[14] Charles Royster, A Revolutionary People at War: The Continental Army and American Character, 1775-1781,

(University of North Carolina Press, 1979), 304.

[15] Wayne to Washington, January 28, 1781, George Washington Papers at the Library of Congress, accessed

January 4 2014 via: http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage?collId=mgw4&fileName=gwpage074.db&recNum=756

[16] Washington to St. Clair, February 3, 1781, Writings of George Washington, Vol. 21, accessed January 9 2014

via: http://web.archive.org/web/20110220011058/http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/etcbin/toccer-

new2?id=WasFi21.xml&images=images/modeng&data=/texts/english/modeng/parsed&tag=public&part=191&divis

ion=div1

[17] Wayne to Washington, March 19, 1781, George Washington Papers at the Library of Congress, accessed

January 9 2014 via: http://memory.loc.gov/mss/mgw/mgw4/075/1000/1074.jpg

143

Adjutant General’s Department

By

Brevet Major General James B. Fry 93

On the 15th of June 1775, George Washington was elected General and Commander-in-chief. It was

resolved (by the Continental Congress, June 16th) "that there be appointed for the American Army two (2)

major-generals, with pay $166 per month, eight (8) brigadier-generals and one (1) adjutant-general, with

pay $125 per month." Horatio Gates, Esq., (of Virginia, late major, British army) was chosen adjutant-

general June 17th, and it was resolved "that he shall have the rank of brigadier-general." His commission

was signed by President Hancock, on the 19th of June.

On July 17, 1775, Congress resolved "that the convention at New York be desired to recommend to

General Schuyler a proper person for a deputy adjutant-general or brigade major for the Army in the New

York department." Subsequently, on September the 14th, Congress resolved "that Edward Flemming, Esq.,

be appointed deputy adjutant-general for the Army in New York or Northern department, with the rank of

colonel, and that the President make out a commission for him accordingly, and forward the same the first

opportunity." On November 8th, Congress approved General Schuyler's appointment of Captain David

Dimon to be brigade major and ordered him a commission accordingly. Meanwhile the major-generals, on

assuming command in separate departments, and the division commanders in the "Continental" Army

before Boston, had, from the necessity of the case, to designate suitable persons to perform the functions

of deputy adjutant-general or brigade major. By resolution of July 19th, Congress provided that " it be left

to General Washington, if he thinks fit, to appoint three (3) brigade majors, and commission them

accordingly."

The pressure of events, during this year, made it necessary to recognize in the continental or "regular"

establishment such officers as had been raised with the troops in the several colonies by the provincial

conventions, or councils of safety, for limited periods. These resolutions were of similar tenor to the

resolutions of November 4th, which directed "the President to sign blank commissions, and that the

conventions, or, in their recess, the councils of safety for South Carolina and Georgia, respectively, fill

them up with the names of such officers as they may think proper, and return a list thereof to the Congress."

The adjutant-general and deputy adjutants-general were commissioned to those offices, respectively, as

well as many of the earlier appointments of brigade majors. The office of brigade major had come into

existence early in the history of the constitutional Britisharmy. The officer filling it was detailed from the

93 Brevt Major General James B. Fry, “The Adjutant General’s Department,” included in The Army of the United

States Historical Sketches of Staff and Line with Portraits of Generals-in-Chief, Theophilus F. Rodenbough and

William L. Haskin (New York: Maynard, Merrill, and Company), 1896.

144

officers of the line, receiving, usually, increased pay and allowances. His functions were similar to those of

the acting assistant adjutant-general of the present day. The Army had but one adjutant-general who was at

general headquarters. Deputy adjutants-general performed like services at subordinate army headquarters,

and corps and wing headquarters. On the 30th of March, 1776, Congress resolved "that each brigadier-

general when on command be empowered to appoint a brigade major." It was resolved, June 17th, that

"General Washington be directed to send General Gates to Canada," and, on September 16th, that "the

appointment of all officers, and filling up of all vacancies (excepting general officers) be left to the

Government of the several States, * * * that all officers be commissioned by Congress." On the 5th of June,

Lieutenant-Colonel Joseph Reed, of Pennsylvania, aide de-camp to the General-in-chief, was elected

adjutant-general. Reed appears to have resigned about January 22, 1777, and Brigadier-General Arthur St.

Clair acted as adjutant-general until his promotion to major general, February 19, 1777, when Colonel

George Weedon, of Virginia, performed the duties, although promoted to brigadier-general February 27,

1777. On the 20th of February it was resolved that "the President (of Congress) write to Major-General

Gates and inform him that it is the earnest desire of Congress that he should resume the office of adjutant

general, and that his present rank and pay shall be continued." General Washington, from Headquarters

Morristown, March 10th, also wrote to Gates, then at Philadelphia, to the same effect, but the latter declined,

being then in a separate command. On the 26th of March it was "ordered that the President acquaint General

Washington that Congress expects the office of adjutant-general to be filled up by a speedy appointment of

a person of abilities and unsuspected attachment to these United States, and recommended Colonel William

Lee to his consideration for this purpose." Congress, by Resolution of September 27, 1776, had already

given Washington the power, for six months, "to displace and appoint all officers under the rank of

brigadier-general, and to fill up all vacancies in every other department in the American Army." General

Washington, in a letter to Colonel Timothy Pickering, of Salem, Massachusetts (late colonel Essex County

Regiment), dated March 30, 1777, offered him the position "vacant by reason of the resignation of Colonel

Reed, and the power of appointing a successor resting with me." When Washington wrote to Pickering,

offering him the appointment of adjutant-general, he enclosed a letter to Lee (who had been recommended

for the position by Congress) offering it to him-the letter to Lee to be forwarded, in case Pickering should

decline. Pickering did decline and sent the letter to Lee, who reported at Washington's headquarters.

Pickering, however, subsequently reconsidered the matter, and determined to accept, whereupon Lee

yielded his claims. On the 5th of January, 1778, Congress proceeded to the election of an adjutant-general

in the room of Colonel Pickering, who was called to the Board of War by Resolution of November 7, 1777,

and the ballots being taken, Colonel Alexander Scammel of the New Hampshire Continental Line was

unanimously elected adjutant-general. Pickering, however, continued to perform the duties until January

13, 1778, when Scammel assumed them. On the 17th of May, 1779, it was resolved that "the adjutant-

general of the Army of the United States be allowed the same rations as a brigadier-general; that he be

permitted to engage two assistants and one clerk." On the 22d of June it was resolved that "the adjutant-

general for the time being be also assistant inspector general."

On the 8th of January, 1781, Brigadier-General Edward Hand of Pennsylvania was elected adjutant-

general to succeed Scammel, who had been appointed colonel of the 1st New Hampshire Regiment Infantry,

Continental Line, a position he did not long occupy as he was mortally wounded by a Hessian cavalryman

in front of Yorktown, Virginia, September 30, 1781, and died a prisoner of war October 6, 1781. On the 1st

of August, 1782, it was resolved that "the adjutant-general be appointed by Congress from the general

145

officers, colonels, lieutenant-colonels commandant, or lieutenant-colonels in the Army. * * * He shall have

two assistants and one clerk to be appointed by himself and approved of by the Commander-in-chief. The

assistants shall be majors or captains of the Army. * * * That there shall be as many deputy adjutants-

general, of the rank of field officers, as there may be separate armies in the United States that consist of one

or more divisions, to be appointed occasionally by the commanding officer of such army, whose names

shall be returned to the commander-in-chief for his approbation. * * *

"The deputy adjutants-general shall appoint each one assistant, of the rank of major or captain, who

shall be approved of by the commanding officer under whom they serve.

* * * * * * * *

That there be one major of brigade to each brigade in the armies of the United States, whether of

cavalry, artillery, or infantry, who shall be appointed by the Commander-in-chief, or commanding officer

of a separate army, as occasion may require, upon the recommendation of the adjutant-general or deputy

adjutant-general as the case may be.

* * * * * * * *

"These regulations shall take effect on the 1st day of January next, and from thenceforth all acts,

resolutions, pay and appointments heretofore made in any wise respecting the department of adjutant-

general and brigade majors shall cease and are hereby repealed." On the 31st of December it was resolved

that "Brigadier-General Hand be and is hereby continued in the office of adjutant-general." He retained the

office until almost all of the Revolutionary Army was disbanded on November 5, 1783, in pursuance of a

proclamation issued by Congress on the 18th of October previous.

From the disbandment of the Army, 1783, until the act of March 3, 1791, there was no regular

adjutant-general (or brigade major as it was sometimes called), and no authority for the commissioning of

such an officer. On October 31, 1784, from headquarters 1st American Regiment, Fort Pitt, Ensign

Ebenezer Denny, of this regiment (late of 1st Pennsylvania, Continental Line), was appointed adjutant, he

having acted as such from August 12, 1784.

146

Instructions for Adjutants

The adjutant is to be chosen from among the subalterns, the field officers taking care to nominate one

the most intelligent and best acquainted with the service. He must keep an exact detail of the duty of

the officers and non-commissioned officers of his regiment, taking care to regulate his roster in such a

manner as not to have too many officers or non-commissioned officers of the same company on duty

at the same time.

He must keep a book, in which he must every day take the general and other orders, and forward them

to the commanding officer of the regiment, who having added those he thinks necessary for the

regiment, the adjutant must assemble the first sergeants of the companies, make them copy the

orders, -and give them their details for the next day.

He must attend the parade at the turning out of all guards or detachments, inspect their dress, arms,

accoutrements and ammunition, form them into platoons or sections, and conduct them to the general

or brigade parade.

When the regiment parades for duty or exercise, he must count it off, and divide it into divisions and

platoons, and carry the orders of the colonel where necessary. The adjutant is to receive no orders but

from the field officers and officer commanding a battalion.

On a march he must ride along the flanks of the regiment, to see that regularity is observed, and must

pay attention to the sergeant in the rear, that he brings up all stragglers.

On the arrival of the regiment in camp, his first care is to form and send off the guards and when the

tents are pitched, he must immediately order out the necessary number of fatigue men to dig the vaults

or sinks, and open communications where necessary. He will then form the detachments for wood,

water, and other necessities.

He must be constantly with the regiment, ready to receive and execute any orders that may come; nor

must he go from his tent without leaving an officer to do his duty or directions where he may be found.

Frederick William Baron von Steuben

Revolutionary War Drill Manual

1794

147

PERSONNEL REPLACEMENTS PRIOR

TO THE U.S. CIVIL WAR94

Origin and Meaning of the Term

The Dictionary of United States Army Military Terms defines a replacement as an "individual assigned or

destined for assignment to fill a vacancy in an organization." Under the terms of this definition, everyone

who enters the military service comes in as a replacement. Many become replacements several times during

their military careers. Those who fill units being formed, or who go to units that have not previously

received men to fill the vacancies involved, are designated "filler replacements"; those who fill places

vacated by others are known as "loss replacements." The term "replacement system" is comparatively new,

not having been used before World War I; but the problem is old because military forces have always

required replacements.

The history of the replacement system in America goes back to the early settlements along the Atlantic

coast which developed into the original 13 colonies. The earliest forces that were formed in America were

modeled after the European armies of the time. The highest organized units were battalions or regiments—

the two terms frequently being used interchangeably. Staff organization was simple, consisting mainly of

quartermasters responsible for supply and adjutants responsible for the publication of orders.

The organization of the armies progressed as tactics changed, reforms frequently being inspired by defeat

and disaster. Formations changed from the hollow square to the mass, then to the line of musketeers, and

finally to an extended line of skirmishers. Infantry came to be regarded as the most useful arm in open

engagements, cavalry was developed for its capabilities of shock and pursuit, and artillery became more

and more essential for attacks on fortified positions. Armies were specializing, and, as they did so, staff

operations, including those having to do with the procurement and assignment of men, became more

complicated.

Like many other military practices, replacement procedures developed along separate lines in the standing

armies of Europe and the Militia units. England's Militia companies underwent regular drill and inspections

but, in contrast with the Regular forces, were subject to a minimum of centralized control. Lords lieutenant

in each county commanded the Militia units, and all eligible men, in succession, were required to undergo

fixed terms of active service. Limitations on foreign service by Militia troops were partially removed in

1757 by a measure which empowered the King to call the Militia into his service in case of danger.

Militia companies frequently came to the assistance of the King's troops, but when the people were in

conflict with the king, the Militia was more likely to support the people. For this reason, monarchs often

were reluctant to authorize Militia. Conflicts between Federal and State military control continued for many

years. Because the Militia was close to the people, it recognized the principle of universal military service

to a greater extent than prevailed in the standing armies, which sometimes were made up of mercenaries.

In the United States, Militia units became State rather than Federal military organizations.

The United States Regular Army, before World War I, made no distinction between the recruiting service

and the replacement system. For this reason, the early peacetime history of the Regular Army replacement

practices is to be found in the records of the recruiting service. They show the gradual separation of the

function of procuring men from the functions of classifying, training, and assigning them. In times of war,

Regular Army practices have been modified as a result of calling State and volunteer troops into Federal

94 Excerpted from LTC Leonard L. Lerwill, The Personnel Replacement System in the United States Army

(Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army), 30 August 1954.

148

service. Today the agencies that procure personnel are not the same agencies that are responsible for the

replacement of personnel. Recruiting officers, selective service boards, and other agencies bring individuals

into the service. After recruits are inducted, they pass through the classification centers, training camps, and

embarkation depots that make up the replacement system. From the viewpoint of the soldier coming into

the Army, the replacement system is merely a "placement system." The prefix neither adds nor detracts

from the meaning of the word.

The First British Regulars in America The First British Regular Troops stationed in America consisted of a mixed battalion of the First and

Coldstream Guards that came to Virginia to suppress the rebellion of 1677. The next unit, a company that

arrived in 1686, was quartered in Boston. The demobilization of the British Army after the treaty of Aix-

la-Chapelle in 1748 created "mobs" of unemployed in England, and some 4,000 former soldiers with their

families crossed the Atlantic and founded the city of Halifax to better their economic conditions.

During the French and Indian Wars, large numbers of these veterans joined Militia companies, rangers, or

other irregular units. Some of these same men later were taken into the British regular forces in which they

fought during the Revolutionary War. After the government in London learned of Gen. Edward Braddock's

defeat on the Monongahela in July 1755, the War Ministry appointed Jacque Prevost, a Swiss officer, to

raise a four-battalion regiment of provincials in America. Prevost with 40 German officers arrived in

America on 15 June 1756, and recruited the Royal Americans, many of whom were Pennsylvania Germans.

A British Army experiment foreshadowed the recruit depots which were developed into important training

units 100 years later. In 1760, each of the regiments on active service abroad detailed two companies of

infantry and a troop of cavalry to remain at home on recruiting duty. If successful this plan would have

made unnecessary the return of recruiting officers to England. The effort apparently was not successful

because within a short time the depot companies returned to their regiments.

Drafts on military organizations in England proved more effective in strengthening regiments abroad;

during the Seven Years War, many English units served only as reservoirs from which replacements were

drawn. The British formed few new regiments during the early part of the Revolutionary War. Recruits

were used to bring understrength companies to war footing and to form new companies which were added

to old regiments. When the first of the new regiments was formed in 1778 the King reluctantly gave

permission for the prospective colonel to sell commissions, a practice known as raising men for rank,

because he feared every nobleman who raised a regiment would seek commissions and other favors for

unqualified relatives.

George III also realized that the new regiments took men who were needed in the old regiments. He said:

"An old regiment, composed of good officers and noncommissioned officers, will bear a great

augmentation, and 3 months fit it for service, but a new raised corps will require at least a year to be trained

for actual service." The Royal Manchester, Royal Liverpool, and Royal Edinburgh regiments were formed

in 1779 by the community efforts of the cities from which they took their names. The city officials

nominated the officers. Regiments too depleted to continue in service were broken up and their men

transferred to other regiments, low in strength. Members of one regiment sometimes were drafted to fill

another regiment. In that event the remaining officers and noncommissioned officers usually went on

recruiting duty in an attempt to reconstitute their units.

Sometimes soldiers forcibly resisted transfers: a detachment of 200 men under Maj. James Johnston at Leith

in 1779 fired on mutineers belonging to the 31st, 42d, and 7lst Regiments to force them into the 83d

Regiment, due to sail for America. Units serving in America were filled by enlisting men in the Colonies

when possible. The British met with recruiting difficulties in some localities, but in other places they were

successful. The commander of a Royal Battalion in America reported in 1760 that his unit was

understrength, but said he could get no recruits because the local residents preferred the large bounties

provincial authorities offered for service in the home militia regiments. During the Revolution, Oliver

149

Delancey, a New York Loyalist who undertook to raise three battalions for the British, was commissioned

a brigadier general. Courtland Skinner, of Jersey, received similar rank when he attempted, without much

success, to raise five battalions.

The Colonial Military Forces

The Militia system in America gradually became a recognized military organization with separate units in

each colony, but with no central command above the colony. The American Militiaman retained his frontier

independence. In Massachusetts, for instance, the right to elect officers was expressed by law in 1658, and

other colonies had similar regulations. Although the principal of compulsory military service was written

into the law, actual service usually was voluntary, and it was often necessary to conduct recruiting drives

among the enrolled Militia members to obtain filler replacements for units about to go on active service.

Since the campaigns usually were short, units did not have to be kept up to strength for very long.

An influential resident who desired a military command could be assured the support of the local authorities

if he could show the signatures of enough men who were willing to enlist to make up a unit. If he had

exercised care in the selection of these men he could be reasonably certain they would vote for him in their

company election. Instructions issued to recruiting officers required each captain "by beat of drums or

otherwise" to raise 30 men; each lieutenant to raise 18 men; and each ensign to raise 12 men.

Captains were required to continue their recruiting until their companies were full; those who failed might

lose their commissions. The command of a unit often fell upon a subaltern until the commander obtained

the required number of recruits. Age limits ranged from 16 to 50. Men under 5 feet 4 inches were

unacceptable unless they were "well made, strong, and active." Those who had "old sores" or were “subject

to fits" were rejected. Immediately after a man agreed to enlist and was accepted he was sent to a place of

rendezvous where he took the oath of enlistment. It was there that he was examined and given his first

instructions, but a second physical examination was given when he was mustered into his unit.

These rendezvous points had some features similar to the replacement camps of later years. Qualified

noncommissioned officers taught the men the "new platoon way of exercising" and supervised practice

shooting at targets. After 20 or more recruits had arrived at a rendezvous point, the group was drawn up in

a military formation and marched under a sergeant or an officer to the companies for which the men had

enlisted. Twenty-five men were considered too many for a noncommissioned officer; when more than that

number were to be moved, an officer took command.

George Washington's experiences while an officer in the Virginia Colonial forces provide some of the best

recorded examples of the methods used to provide replacements in American armies before the Revolution.

After several weeks of recruiting, Washington assembled at Alexandria, Va., by 20 March 1754, a group

of 75 fillers for the expedition into the Ohio Valley. Nearly 50 of these men had been enlisted by

Washington personally, an accomplishment the Virginia House of Burgesses took into consideration when

it later elevated the young officer to the grade of lieutenant colonel. Two companies, totaling approximately

120 men, on 2 April 1754, started on the expedition which culminated in the capitulation of Washington

and his troops at Fort Necessity on 4 July 1754.

Inducing men to enlist was not the only problem that confronted Washington. He soon received complaints

which have long been familiar to officers connected with replacements. A large number of his recruits could

not readily adapt themselves to military service. Many who joined his command were described as "loose,

idle persons, quite destitute of house and home." Home owners, who made more capable soldiers, were

not attracted to the military service. Even men living farther west who were more exposed to the ravages

of war disliked to take up arms. In October 1755, Washington wrote that he was unable to induce the Ohio

settlers, many of whom were in flight from the intruding French, "to lodge their families in a safe place and

join the militia companies." The men refused to stir, choosing to die with their wives and children rather

than fight alongside their neighbors for the protection of their homes.

150

Some of the officers on recruiting duty were admonished for having been "out 6 weeks or 2 months without

getting a man; spending their time in all the gayety of pleasurable mirth." Others were reprimanded for

exceeding their authority by using improper methods such as "forcibly taking, confining, and torturing those

who would not otherwise enlist." Washington believed that laxity within the military organization aroused

contempt on the part of the public, which in turn was reflected by greater insolence and laziness on the part

of officers and men. He recognized public opinion as an important factor in filling vacancies in units.

The failure of the expedition to the Ohio in 1754 made necessary the immediate reconstruction of the

colonial forces in Virginia and presented a new replacement problem that was all the more serious because

the officers, many of who had been unable to collect expenses incurred in previous recruiting, were reluctant

to engage in that duty again.19 The difficulties were intensified by Braddock's defeat in July of the

following year. On 2 August 1755, Washington called together the Virginia officers to consider what

actions they should take to stimulate recruiting. Little more than a month later, Washington took command

of the Virginia regiment and started a recruiting program intended to bring its strength to 1,200 men formed

into 16 companies.

By 9 January 1756, the full number of companies had been formed, but all were understrength and they

still were understrength when the drive ended in March.

The House of Burgesses then voted a draft which was intended to bring the strength of the Virginia regiment

to 1,500 men, but men were called for only 7 months' service. Those who could pay £10 were exempt from

the draft and the result was that few men were added to the active companies. The forfeitures were not used

to stimulate enlistments because they went into the Virginia general fund rather than the recruiting fund.

Washington disapproved the section of the law which prohibited ordering drafted men outside of Virginia.

He also criticized what he described as "ill-judged economy shown in the raising of men," and blamed the

colony for "attempting to evade the expense until the blow is struck, then running into an expense of rushing

militia into service. These, after an age, as it were, is spent in assembling them, come up, make a noise for

a time, oppress the inhabitants, and then return, leaving the frontiers unguarded as before."

A later Virginia law impressed vagrants, but these miscreants were found to lower the standards of

discipline, increase the desertion rate, and add to the troubles of the military commanders. Desertions

caused many of the vacancies for which Washington was seeking replacements. Some deserters were

hanged under the provisions of the mutiny bills, which were passed annually by Parliament and which

prescribed death as the penalty for desertion.

When preparations for operations against Fort Duquesne started in April 1758, Washington was directed to

expand the companies of the Virginia regiment to 100 rank and file, thus coming face to face with a

replacement problem which has appeared in nearly all wars— that of increasing the strength of peacetime

units for wartime service.

Washington's problem was further complicated by his inability to retain drafted men later than December

of that year. The regimental commander sent all the officers he could spare on recruiting duty, engaging

some of the most popular of the "country gentlemen" to help raise this force. The Virginia House of

Burgesses delayed for so long the authorization of the funds (each recruit received a bounty of $10) that

Washington for a time feared the expense would come out of his own pocket. Although the order to march

came before the recruiting campaign was completed, nearly 1,600 men from Virginia took part in this

expedition to the Ohio along with 1,200 Highlanders, 350 Loyal Americans (both British military units),

about 2,700 provincials from Pennsylvania, and smaller numbers from Maryland and North

Carolina.

Washington realized that if he could enlist the Indians as allies he might require fewer men in the active

Militia. Both the British and the French had augmented their fighting forces by using Indians as guides,

scouts, or as other assistants. Washington declared that men would fight on unequal terms, but he added

that the French generally were able to outbid the British in dealing with the Indians.

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On his trip to the Ohio in 1754 he had urged the Half-King, an Indian chief of the Six Nations, to support

the British. When the fortune of war turned against the French, the Indians shifted their favor. Washington

believed that this desertion of the Indians led the French to abandon Fort Duquesne in 1758.

American Distrust of Standing Armies The American colonists disapproved of standing armies. They remembered the British Army's lifetime

enlistments, the press gangs that seized vagrants off the streets, the judges who released convicts on

condition they would join the Army, and other abuses commonly practiced to obtain men for military

service. An anonymous English writer expressed this sentiment in a 1697 political pamphlet that declared:

"Whether our enemies shall conquer us is uncertain. But whether a standing army will enslave us, neither

reason nor experience will suffer us to doubt."

British officers used harsh punishments to maintain discipline among the numerous unruly outcasts in their

companies. Conditions improved in popular wars, such as the Spanish conflict of 1739, when recruits were

so plentiful the officers could pick their men; during other years, when the major portion of the British

Army came from outcasts and criminals, no amount of flogging could reduce the desertion rate or check

the insubordination.

The American colonists regarded regular military service as a thing to be avoided, but, in contrast to their

distrust of regular troops, they, like most Englishmen, looked upon the Militia as a bulwark of freedom.

The conduct of the British Regular troops in America did not change this sentiment. The British practice of

billeting troops in private homes, for instance, added to the ill feelings and brought protests from

householders.

British use of mercenary troops during the Revolution was unpopular, not only in the Colonies they were

fighting against, but also in England and in some of the German states which furnished the men. The first

of these mercenaries arrived in Canada and New York during the summer of 1776. British treaties with the

minor German states provided for 30 marks payment for each man, one-third to be paid 1 month after the

execution of the treaty, the balance within 2 months. Each man wounded, captured, or otherwise made

unserviceable obligated the British for the additional payment of a similar amount.

Two months' pay was advanced to each man on enlistment. The first replacements from Germany for the

units in America came in August 1781 when 2,988 arrived. Another group came during the summer of

1782. During the war, approximately 30,000 Germans were sent to America: 17,000 from Hesse-Cassel,

2,000 from Hesse-Hanau, 6,000 from Brunswick, and the remainder from the smaller states. After 1782,

Great Britain was unable to obtain additional troops from Germany.

The Continental Congress on 26 May 1784 reaffirmed American opposition to standing armies when it

resolved ". . . standing armies in time of peace are inconsistent with the principles of republican government,

dangerous to the liberties of a free people, and generally converted into destructive engines for establishing

despotism." This distrust of a standing army was an important factor in the development of the American

military system because it resulted in the States retaining control over manpower to an extent which

interfered with operations of the Regular Army.

The Continental Army Although the American colonies had started some significant military preparations as early as 1745, acting

independently at first but later in some unison, there was no comprehensive plan for raising men or

maintaining units in the field at the outbreak of the Revolutionary War. George Washington's remark to the

Virginia House of Burgesses in the spring of 1774, "I will raise 1,000 men, subsist them at my own expense

and march myself at their head for the relief of Boston," indicates that the colonists generally underrated

their enemy and had little idea of what a conflict with Britain would mean in regard to troops required,

length of service, or provisions for keeping units at effective strength.

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The minutemen who responded to the call to arms at Concord and Lexington were following a tradition

more than 100 years old, but it was the tradition of men who fought one day and returned home the next.

The Militia at Boston was not organized for extended service. New regiments had to be called out for the

siege of the city. The Second Continental Congress, after convening in Philadelphia on 19 May 1775, took

over the Army and gave the command to Washington. Upon reaching Cambridge in July, the new

commander found men "going and coming about as they pleased." Massachusetts had sent about 1,200

troops, many boys or deserters; New Hampshire had raised 3 regiments totaling about 1,200; Connecticut

had sent 6 regiments, or 2,300; and Rhode Island had contributed 3 regiments of 8 companies each.

Washington estimated his force at 14,500 able-bodied men. All enlistments for the troops around Boston

were due to expire 31 December 1775. A council of general officers on 8 October 1775 recommended that

the Army ought to consist of not less than 20,372 men, formed into 26 regiments (exclusive of riflemen and

artillery), each regiment to number 728 men, officers included. The units then in service differed in

organization, some regiments having 11 companies, some 10, others 8.

The authorized strength of these regiments varied from 590 to 1,000 men. This council also suggested that

men should be engaged for 1 year, or until December 1776, adding that they could be discharged sooner if

the military necessity for their services ceased before that date. General orders of 22 October 1775 called

upon all "brave men and true patriots" willing to serve beyond their terms of enlistment to consider

themselves engaged until the last day of December 1776 and called for a report of the number who would

remain. At least a third of the officers indicated they would not continue. Washington declared that the

attitude of these officers discouraged the men. Reenlistments were difficult to obtain because few men

recognized any obligation to stay. Some left camp to work on their farms; others went to work on farms

belonging to their officers or found employment elsewhere. Officers generally lived outside the camp, some

in houses several miles distant.

The men shifted from one company to another as suited their fancy. Efforts to adjust strengths of units by

reorganizations usually failed because men from different communities frequently refused to associate with

one another. Soldiers who had elected their officers contended they were not bound to serve under other

officers. Washington finally overcame all of these difficulties. During the winter of 1775-76, he replaced

his entire Army while living under the guns of the enemy, an accomplishment which probably has never

been equaled by any other commander. But this recruiting of an entirely new force did not end the need

for replacements. Men were required for new organizations including a "train of the artillery" and cavalry.

Washington's experience with some of his first cavalry troops indicates the difficulty officers were having

in starting civilians on their way to become good soldiers, a task which in later years was to be a major

function of replacement installations. The first cavalry units formed during the Revolution, "light

dragoons," whose members were farmers mounted on rough country horses, did not meet with a very cordial

reception when they arrived at the camp near Boston. The Commander in Chief had expected this group of

about 500 to relieve some of his manpower shortages, but when they refused to do guard duty or fatigue,

Washington, afraid they would undermine the morale of the remainder of his troops, sent them home. His

action was criticized by many who believed 6 weeks of training would have brought the rough frontiersmen

into shape.

As recruiting for the Continental Army got under way, recruiting parties were sent from each regiment, the

colonels being admonished to select "active and vigilant recruiters who stood high in the esteem of the

people in the districts in which they were to solicit." These officers were under State regulations while on

recruiting duty. Each State selected a general place of rendezvous where recruits assembled. The

Commander in Chief of the Army sent officers to these points to conduct physical examinations and the

States were called upon to replace all men who were rejected. Each recruit, after being attested before a

peace officer, a general officer, a judge advocate, or deputy judge advocate, was required to sign enlistment

papers which stated length and conditions of service, the bounty, and other requirements "fairly written at

length without erasure or interlineation so as to prevent all ambiguity, doubt, or dispute."

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Recruiting officers were prohibited from exchanging or discharging men after enlistment papers had been

signed. Training was supposed to start as soon as the men were enlisted, but training facilities and competent

instructors seldom were available at the rendezvous points. Names of the men who assembled in the

rendezvous points were entered on muster rolls. Officers were appointed to conduct parties of recruits to

the units to which they were assigned. They were instructed to send recruits to the regiments as soon as 8

or 10 men were available. These officers carried with them muster rolls for the recruits in their parties.

Rendezvous points sent weekly rolls to State authorities. Recruit rolls specified, in separate columns, the

name, age, size, trade or profession, place of nativity, place of residence, time of enlistment or draft, term

of service, bounty, clothing, and such other information as was required by military regulations.

Recruits received sixpence a day for subsistence from the time they were recruited until they marched for

the camps. They were paid one penny per mile for the distance from their homes to the camps of the

regiments they joined. Drummers and fifers, supposedly boys from 15 to 18 years of age, were enlisted

separately until December of 1781 when it was found that many of the musicians were more able,

physically, than some of the men doing heavy duty. Thereafter, drummers and fifers were selected from the

ranks.

Upon their arrival in camp, the recruits frequently were permitted to select the regiment from their State in

which they desired to serve, the only restriction being that they would not be assigned to regiments which

had no vacancies. As 1776 drew to a close, the Continental Congress Committee on Safety, which had an

important role in the control of the Army, realized that the 1-year enlistments, which had appeared so

promising at the beginning of the year, would not fulfill the military requirements. The Continental

Congress proposed that men be enlisted for the duration of the war. A resolution adopted 27 December

1776 stated: ''that General Washington be empowered to use every endeavor, by giving bounties and

otherwise, to prevail upon the troops, whose time of enlistment shall expire at the end of this month, to stay

with the Army so long after that period as its situation shall render their stay necessary."

A similar situation developed each year. Many men would not enlist in the Continental Army for the

duration of the war while it was possible for them to enlist in the Militia for shorter periods. On 23 January

1779, the Continental Congress again urged the Commander in Chief to "enlist for the continuation of the

war all Continental troops not expressly engaged for that period." Washington never overcame the

disadvantage arising from the continuous turnover of men in his battalions due to short enlistments.

A recommendation which Washington submitted in July of 1777 proposed that the States divide their

territory into recruiting districts and appoint managers in each district. These district managers would have

appointed civilian recruiting officers and would have supervised efforts to apprehend deserters. The

Continental Congress did not take favorable action on this suggestion and it was not carried out by any of

the States. Had it been adopted it might have relieved the Army of many of its recruiting burdens.

The Continental Congress, lacking the executive power necessary to order either the recruiting or the

drafting of men, resorted to calls on the State executives, urging them to order Militia officers on recruiting

duty. The Commander in Chief could detach from his force officers for recruiting duty and he frequently

did so, but such details reduced his effective strength. Recruiting officers sometimes were criticized for

improper conduct. The Continental Congress on 14 April 1777 asked each State to investigate all officers

who were attempting to enlist men within its borders. On 5 August 1777, the

Continental Congress complained that several of the States had permitted interference with Washington's

recruiting officers. In February of 1779, the battalions of the Continental Army were so short of men that

the Continental Congress called upon the States to draft, for a 9-month period, enough men to bring the

organizations up to strength.

The States refused to invest Congress with the power to requisition men or provisions, retaining those

powers for themselves. Consequently, each State could decide for itself the extent to which-it would comply

with the draft request. In 1780, Virginia passed a law to draft every fifteenth man on the militia rolls and

other States adopted various measures for the drafting of men. The 1779 reorganization of the Army

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provided that there would be a fall reenlistment campaign which was to be completed by 1 October of each

year. At the conclusion of this reenlistment drive, the Commander in Chief would notify the Continental

Congress of the number of men necessary to fill the battalions from each State, listing the number who

would be needed to replace estimated losses as of April, June, and September. The States would then be

called upon to raise, by draft or otherwise, the number of men requested. These plans provided for an

additional year-end levy to bring all units up to strength at the beginning of the year, with the men called

under this levy to serve for a full year. This plan would have provided Washington with the men he needed

if the States had fulfilled their parts.

But the Continental Congress imposed no penalties on the States which failed to fill their quotas;

consequently the plan never operated successfully. On 28 October 1780, each regiment was given four

supernumerary officers: a recruiting officer, an adjutant, a quartermaster, and a paymaster. The assignment

of permanent recruiting officers to regiments reduced the need for detaching line officers for recruiting

duty. When the scene of operations shifted to the South in 1780, many soldiers had such short periods to

serve that it was not considered worthwhile to send them with the main body of the Army. Furloughs,

lasting as long as 3 months, were offered in an effort to induce these men to reenlist, but few responded.

Many who remained behind when the main Army moved into Virginia were discharged before their terms

expired to save provisions.

During the spring of 1781, the Continental officers placed special stress on the training of recruits. New

men were instructed without arms during the first 8 days after they joined their organizations. The large

proportion of recruits made it necessary for officers of all ranks to devote part of their time to training, since

Baron Frederick W. A. von Steuben, The Inspector General, believed the training of recruits was a task for

officers, not for sergeants or corporals. Under Steuben's orders, the captains and lieutenants of the

Continental Army were kept busy giving instruction to the new arrivals in camps. During an inspection,

when a colonel was observed giving instruction to a single recruit, Steuben remarked, "I thank God for

that!"

After the British captured most of the Virginia troops at Charleston that State undertook to raise 5,000 men

to serve for 18 months to replace the losses. Since the colonels of the 2d, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, and 11th

Regiments had escaped capture, recruits were assigned to those units in the order of their numerical

sequence, beginning with the lowest, giving each regiment up to 504 men.

The Militia as a Source for Continental Replacements The American Militia at the beginning of the Revolutionary War had a potential strength of about 200,000

men, plenty of arms, and some ammunition. It had a few officers who had gained experience by fighting

the French and the Indians. Its men knew little about drill, but they were familiar with firearms. They were

dispersed throughout the country so that a considerable force could have been raised in any community,

and they had determination and fortitude.

Militiamen were useful as light skirmishers, but were difficult to use in sustained attack. They could hit,

then vanish. Also, they could vanish before the blow was struck, to the chagrin of their generals.

Washington was familiar with the many problems arising from the use of Militia, and when he took

command at Boston he was determined to find a solution. The Continental Army, which had its roots

in the shifting sands of the State forces but which promised to grow into the solid trunk of an integrated and

united central force, was the answer the Commander in Chief gave to the country.

The transition was not easy. There were almost unsurmountable difficulties blocking a central army. Neither

officers nor men were willing to assume obligations superseding their allegiance to their home States. Most

of them regarded the Continental Congress as a very uncertain source for supplies, rations, pay, or

promotions. Many feared this "new modeling" would destroy the Army. Washington had to overcome this

state of mind before he had any success with a unified force.

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Washington recognized the Militia of the several States, constituting all the men of military age, as the

manpower reservoir upon which he would have to draw. The records do not reveal any attempt to interfere

with State authority over the Militia. He intervened only after the men he had asked for failed to arrive and

then only to chide the authorities for their failure. The Continental Army had plenty to do without taking

over the recruiting of men, then considered a State function. Nevertheless the Continentals had to do some

recruiting.

The Continental Congress first called for 26 battalions for 1776, each State to furnish a given quota. On 16

September the number was raised to 88 and in December the Congress asked for 16 battalions of infantry,

to be raised by the country at large, bringing the year's total, with 3 other irregular battalions, to 107. The

States responded to these calls by placing active Militia units on duty and tending them to Boston where

they were taken into the Continental Army. Few States furnished their full quota of battalions. Many

battalions left recruiting details behind to solicit volunteers from men on the Militia rolls because they had

departed at little more than half strength.

Volunteers for the Continental Army for 1776 generally were enlisted for 1 year; later the usual enlistment

period was for 3 years or the duration of the war. The Militia of the States were engaged in continuous

recruiting campaigns in their efforts to fill their units and make up for losses. Few were successful. The

indifferent success of the States in raising their quotas confronted Washington with another problem. He

indicated the solution on 23 January 1777: "The progress in raising recruits for the new army being very

slow, I have applied . . . for ten regiments of Militia to continue in service until the first of next April."

Deficiencies in the battalions of the Continental Army were made up by calling Militia units which became

a part of the Continental Army for short periods, usually 3, 6, or 9 months. During the greater part of the

war, these calls were made by the Continental Congress after it received recommendations from the Army,

but for a short time Washington had the power to make direct calls upon the States for Militia units.

The short-term Militia units, upon their arrival in the camp, became the targets for intensive recruiting

drives by officers of the Continental Army. Bounties were offered to the soldier who extended his service

and to the officer who persuaded him to do so. A general order issued from the Headquarters at Cambridge

on 9 February 1776 said: "If the Militia who are ordered into camp should incline to enter the Continental

Army, they are immediately to join the regiment they enlist into and are from that day to be struck from the

Militia rolls." Many Continental soldiers were obtained in this way. Recruiting efforts were intensified in

units which had been ordered out for brief periods and in those which were nearing the end of their service.

In August 1776, Washington advised his officers: "Taking men from the four or five months' Militia will

not answer our present necessity, as it will not add to the number in service; but of the militia which is only

ordered for a few days or weeks, you have an undoubted right to take such as have a mind to enlist with

you."

Practically all infantry in the Continental Army was made up of State Militia battalions taken in as units.

Even the battalions recruited at large were carefully credited to State quotas. Recruiting at large caused

confusion and for that reason seldom was used. Most of the newer cavalry and artillery units were raised

under special authority of the Continental Congress, some not being credited to any State. This was also

true of groups like Lt. Col. Henry Lee's battalion of Light Dragoons, the German battalion, the two Canadian

regiments, and other irregular units. There were frequent disputes among the States over credit for these

organizations.

The critical shortage of men caused Congress on 3 June 1777 to authorize a flying camp of 10,000 men

commanded by Brig. Gen. Hugh Mercer. The plan was to collect the armed inhabitants into a large reserve

without enrolling them by means of regular enlistments. Such a reserve was needed to protect New Jersey

and Philadelphia while Washington's attention was centered on New York. The strength of the flying camp

probably never exceeded 3,000; the transitory nature of its population reduced its military value. A number

of regimental commanders asked permission to send recruiting parties to the flying camp but were refused

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by Washington who feared enlisting men from a floating population such as the camp contained would

confuse State quota records. The flying camp was discontinued after the British left New York.

Washington, who was convinced of "the impracticability of raising our complement of men by voluntary

enlistments," urged the States to draft men by calling on "each town . . . for a proportionate number of

recruits." Many of the States drafted men, the procedures differing in accordance with various Militia

statutes. Generally, drafted men were permitted to hire substitutes. In some States two Militiamen could be

excused if they hired one substitute. Washington also urged State authorities to prevent accumulation of

recruits in rendezvous points. He directed them to combine detachments for the different regiments, sending

men forward as soon as a sufficient number were available.

But many Militia units did not go to the Continental Army. Instead, they functioned under State direction,

some in cooperation with Washington's troops, others on independent missions. Washington protested when

New Jersey raised several battalions for its own defense before it provided the Continental Army with

troops that had been requested, warning that such practices jeopardized, the common defense. The weakness

of the Continental Army replacement system was inherent in the loose organization under which the

Continental Congress recommended quotas but had no power to discipline States that failed to meet quotas.

Washington wanted each State to furnish its assigned number of battalions, then send forward enough men

to keep them at prescribed strength. The Militia units provided the States with the organization necessary

to have carried out this plan. Insofar as it failed, the failure was due to negligence within the States and the

inability of Congress to exercise central supervision.

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In 1780, Washington said: "Had we formed a permanent Army in the beginning, which by the continuance

of the same men in service, had been capable of discipline we never should have had to retreat with a

handful of men across the Delaware." He added: "We have had a great part of the time two sets of men to

feed and pay, the discharged men going home, and the levies coming in." Imperfect as was the execution

of the Revolutionary War replacement plan, it furnished the men to keep the Continental Army in action.

Washington attempted to correct the deficiencies by improving the organization and functioning, not by

changing the system.

Factors Affecting Replacement Requirements

Desertions

The personnel replacement rate is determined by losses to the service so long as the authorized strength of

an Army remains constant. An organization which loses few men needs -few replacements and an efficient

unit is likely to keep more men than an inefficient one. For this reason, administration may become a

replacement factor.

Early in the Revolution, officers of regiments and brigades knew little about the internal administration of

their organizations. Contractors who received commissions on the total cost of what they furnished had

slight interest in economy. The enlisted men did not receive much more than food and clothing. The

Continental Congress, which generally could supply only what it had purchased abroad with borrowed

money, urged the States to supply and equip their troops. The Middle and Northern States, containing more

manufacturing establishments, could provide more than the agricultural South. Lack of central control

permitted some States to furnish more than others thereby engendering jealousy and discontent and

increasing the desertion rate.

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Not all desertions were prompted by lack of supplies or camp discomforts. There were some who intended

to reenlist and collect another bounty. At Ticonderoga, in 1778, a man was shot after being convicted of

seven desertions, each followed by a reenlistment for which he had collected a bounty. Others intended to

take advantage of Lord Howe's offer, first of $16 and later of $24 to Continentals coming over to the British

forces. Washington admitted to the Continental Congress on 3 May 1777 that the British offer had a bad

effect on the American soldiers, especially those not born in America.

There were frequent changes from one army to the other, men serving wherever it appeared most profitable.

Nearly all who surrendered and returned to the service were pardoned under proclamations similar to the

one of 24 October 1777, which offered a full and free pardon to all who returned by the first of the following

January. Similar proclamations were issued on 10 March 1779 and 29 August 1780. After several such

offers Washington decided that little good came from them and that chronic deserters regarded amnesty

proclamations as a matter of course.

British newspaper propaganda encouraged desertions from the American forces. For example, an article in

the Philadelphia Evening Post said drafted men would be retained for the full duration of the war. This was

branded by general orders published at Valley Forge Headquarters on 23 April 1778 as false and misleading

and as having been inspired by the enemy in an effort, to influence soldiers to desert and to keep others

from entering the service.

Substitutes

Washington was not opposed to substitutes; he believed it was better for a private individual to hire a soldier

than for the State to collect taxes or issue new currency to pay bounties. The practice became widespread

with many old soldiers offering themselves and frequently waiting for high pay. Maj. Gen. John de Kalb

believed it was bad for the Regular regiments because it prevented them from enlisting men. Few would

join Continental battalions while the substitutes hired by rich citizens could get enormous bounties for a

"two months walk" as the short enlistments in the Militia were called.

Enlistment of Negroes

In May 1775, the Massachusetts Committee of Safety opposed admitting slaves to the Army. A similar

position was taken by the council of general officers in October 1775. Washington, noting in a general order

that a number of free Negroes desired to enlist, gave recruiting officers authority to accept them adding that

he would lay the matter before Congress. In 1778, Massachusetts voted to raise a regiment of Negroes,

Mulattoes, or Indians, the sergeants and all higher officers to be white. Connecticut also authorized the

raising of Negro troops; New Hampshire freed slaves after they had served 3 years, but the enlistment

bounties went to former owners, and a Rhode Island regiment of slaves received praise for action on 29

August 1778 against Hessian troops. The slavery system, in some instances, retarded enlistments because

the slave owners feared that if they entered the military service and left their homes their slaves might

revolt.

Health and Hospitalization

The health of the Army, the hospitalization of the troops, and the method of return to duty after

hospitalization have always had an important bearing on replacements. During the Revolution soldiers who

were ill in camps which lacked medical facilities were permitted to go to their homes. After their recovery,

they sometimes were slow to return. On 21 May 1781, the Commander in Chief took notice of this situation

by ordering commanding officers of regiments and corps to insert advertisements in the newspapers

"requiring such of their men as are sick or absent . . . to join their respective corps or give information where

they are and the cause of their detention within a reasonable time on pain of being treated as deserters." All

absent officers not on public duty and all soldiers on furlough were ordered to join their regiments.

Regimental officers were prohibited from releasing patients from the hospitals, such releases being valid

only when ordered by the senior surgeon or director of the hospital.

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Surgeons who released convalescent patients on furloughs were ordered to furnish certified copies of the

furlough papers to commanding officers of the corps or brigade to which the patients belonged. The medical

committee of the Continental Congress in 1777 consulted with Washington on "causing such of the troops

of the Army as have not had the smallpox to be inoculated." An order on 22 April authorized Dr. James

Tilton "to repair to Dumfries, in Virginia, there to take charge of all the Continental soldiers who are or

should be inoculated." Thus began a practice which later became an important procedure in replacement

installations.

Replacement of Officers

Many officers who came into the Continental Army at the beginning of the war expected temporary service

in a short conflict, and they did not, at first, pay much attention to their compensation. As the conflict

dragged on they found commissioned service offered few advantages and involved many hardships. Some

resigned declaring their pay did not meet their needs. But there were times when the

Continental Congress was besieged by persons who wanted commissions.

The Congress issued all commissions for the Continental Army, generally appointing as field officers those

who previously had been selected by the States in which they resided.85 In 1776, Congress advised the

State authorities that it would be better for them to consult with the generals before appointing or promoting

officers, thereby giving the military commanders some choice. The Commander in Chief appointed a

committee of officers and vested in them authority to recommend dismissal of supernumerary officers who

were regarded as unqualified. Military authorities could fill vacancies so created by promotion of other

officers from the same States as the officers dismissed, first notifying the State executives who usually

submitted recommendations.

Military commissions were filled out at the War Office and attested by the Secretary after which they were

presented to the President of Congress for his signature. After the President signed a commission it was

returned to the War Office and registered. The commission was valid as soon as the seal was affixed by the

Board of War. Promotions in the Continental Army were regimental to the grade of captain; from captain

to brigadier general they were in the line of the State; above brigadier general they were in the line of the

Army at large. Many resignations from officers were blamed on irregular promotions. There were

complaints that promotions were not always rewards for merit.

Washington noted that even when officers admitted they had gained promotion through favoritism they did

not abandon their claim to the higher position. Washington told Congress that the officers should be

adequately provided for, adding that he had found that impoverished officers displayed an apathy and

neglect of duty which spread to all ranks. The Continental Congress, which always found it difficult to raise

money, tried to make up for inadequate pay by promising pensions of half pay for life to be supplemented

with parcels of public land. Dissatisfied officers looked with longing at the fortunes which they thought

were being made by merchants and tradesmen. In an effort to increase officer morale, Congress arranged

to sell clothing at low prices and authorized extra rations, usually of poor quality.

Rivalry between Continental and Militia officers sometimes interfered with the filling of vacancies. On 20

May 1777, general orders were published directing battalion and brigade commanders to settle such

disputes whenever possible and in each case to make full reports to higher commanders. Those disputes

which could not otherwise be resolved were brought before a board of officers which in November 1777

submitted recommendations to Congress specifying the relative ranks of the field officers.

A board of general officers in 1778 decided officers holding Continental commissions ranked over those

having State commissions so long as the regiment of the latter continued in the State establishments; but

when such regiments became Continental the officers were entitled to receive Continental commissions.

Promotions in the artillery and cavalry were made in the ranks at large without regard to States, but the

States clung tenaciously to their rights to make appointments and promotions in the infantry.

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In an effort to prevent an accumulation of officers of unduly high rank, staff officers and aides-de-camp

were appointed from the line except in the office of the Commander in Chief, which needed men with

special qualifications and took them wherever they could be found. Although there were frequent warnings

against giving commissions to officers who could not obtain recruits to fill their units, Washington

cautioned that "commissions in the new Army are not intended merely for those who can enlist the most

men." Lieutenants and junior officers sometimes were accused of lukewarm recruiting efforts because they

thought failure to enlist quotas might cost the company commanders their positions, thereby opening the

way for promotions.

Even after the Continental Army had discarded the Militia practice whereby the men elected their company

officers, many of the officers remained dependent upon the good will of their men who, if they disliked

their superiors, might- refuse to reenlist. Many soldiers, especially those from New England, had little

acquaintance with discipline and tended to regard themselves as socially equal or superior to their officers.

Officers whose commands depended upon the whims of their men were not likely to insist upon distinctions

of rank. Some officers went so far as to pool their pay with their men, all taking an equal share. Militiamen

sometimes recalled their officers. In one such instance, a first lieutenant had asked the members of his New

Jersey platoon if they would excuse him from parade. His request was refused and a private was elected to

take the lieutenant's place.

Few capable artillery or engineer officers were available to the Continental Army, but replacing unqualified

Americans with qualified foreigners was not easy. Washington was embarrassed by the large number of

foreign officers who sought commissions, many of them giving exaggerated statements of their abilities.

Not all were as valuable as Lafayette, von Steuben, or De Kalb. Some of the first Frenchmen who applied

received high rank as a means of promoting the alliance with France. Those coming later expected similar

treatment. Speaking of the many Frenchmen who were pressing their claims in 1788, Washington said:

"Their ignorance of our language and their inability to recruit men are unsurmountable obstacles."

American representatives in Europe finally were instructed to make no promises of any kind regarding

commissions.

The Corps of Invalids

Revolutionary authorities were anxious to make use of men who had been partially disabled while serving

in the Army but were still capable of useful work. The Board of War of the Continental Congress, on 21

April 1777, reported in favor of an 8-company Corps of Invalids, and the Congress, on 16 July 1777,

approved the organization and named Col. Lewis Nicola as its commander. In addition to giving

employment to officers, noncommissioned officers, and enlisted men who had been wounded but could still

work, the corps was to provide a "school for young gentlemen previous to their being appointed to the

marching regiments." This school apparently would have had some similarity to the replacement training

centers of later years, but the records do not indicate that it functioned.

Newspaper advertisements informed former soldiers released on half pay that if they were capable of

garrison duty they could report to the nearest Continental field officer, join the corps, and be restored to full

pay. Discharged hospital patients and others unable to do full duty were transferred from the regiments.

Corps officers were selected for their ability as instructors, and subaltern instructors were required to study

mathematics in off-duty periods to increase their value as teachers. Each officer was asked to donate one

day's pay each month to buy military texts. Some of the officers were placed on recruiting duty. Men they

enlisted were to receive instruction in military duties before going to regiments, but the records do not

indicate the recruiting part of the plan was successful. The members of the corps spent most of their time

doing guard duty.

General orders of the Army dated 7 August 1779 reminded regimental commanders that it had been found

prejudicial to the service to discharge soldiers who were capable of doing duty with the Invalids. All

discharges for physical reasons were declared void unless they contained a military surgeon's certificate

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stating that not only was the discharged man incapable of performing field service, but also that he was

unable to serve in the Corps of Invalids.

Since the States retained a portion of the control over the Invalids, Washington complained in 1781 that he

could not issue orders to some of the companies on duty in Philadelphia and Boston." The Governor of

Connecticut wanted control over the services of members of the corps from that State, but a committee

report to Congress said the records did not show the places of enlistment for all the men. Congress objected

to returning men to control of the States from which they had enlisted because it feared that to do so would

break up the corps and disorganize the units to the extent that they would be unable to perform any useful

service. The extent of State and Federal control over the Corps of Invalids was a subject of contention

throughout the life of the corps.

Replacements for the Light Infantry

The Continental Army in 1775 contained 12 companies of riflemen, 8 from Pennsylvania and 2 each from

Maryland and Virginia, which were employed as light infantry. The theory regarding the employment of

light infantry had developed along with the evolution of military tactics which had brought a shift from

solid battle lines to skirmisher formations. Light companies had appeared in most of the armies of Europe.

The British in America had learned from Braddock's defeat on the Monongahela and had formed light

companies into three battalions, forming a light corps. Washington had these developments in mind when

he looked upon his motley assortment of soldiers and wondered what could be done to keep his straggling

battalions up to strength.

Recruiting from the Militia was his principal source of replacements, but it had proved a very uncertain

source. The Commander in Chief concluded that if he could not have all of his Army at full strength the

next best thing would be to have a part of it at full strength. He therefore decided to provide replacements

for a part of his force at the expense of the remainder of his force. Each Continental Army battalion became

a replacement pool for its light infantry company, which never was permitted to fall below authorized

strength. The modern idea, in which a replacement company becomes a pool for a larger unit, is a reversal

of Washington's practice.

On 28 August 1777, an order drafted 9 officers and 109 enlisted men, including noncommissioned officers,

from each of the brigades and directed that they be formed into a light infantry corps, replacing the previous

companies of riflemen broken up during the winter. This corps was placed under the command of Brig.

Gen. William Maxwell. In the battle of Brandy wine, 11 September 1777, the Light Infantry, retreating

from the vicinity of Chester after the British turned the American flank, followed the main body of the

Army and collected the wounded and stragglers.

The Light Infantry was in reserve at the battle of Germantown, 4 October 1777. Soon after that engagement

the corps disbanded. During the winter of 1777, Congress appointed a committee to go to Valley Forge and

discuss with Washington the future organization of the Army. Although the regiments were at such low

strength that they could scarcely stand a draft of men without reducing them to mere companies,

Washington had made up his mind that he would recommend the formation of a corps of light infantry to

serve during the coming summer. He wanted an organization similar to the light infantry corps in the

campaigns of the previous year. Officers being considered for the command included Col. Daniel Morgan,

Col. Richard Butler, and Maj. Lewis Morris, Jr., all of whom had served under General Maxwell.

Col. Henry Beekman Livingston, who requested a command, was promised consideration. Assignment to

the Light Infantry was considered a mark of distinction. Baron von Steuben, who arrived at Valley Forge

in February 1778, had had experience with light infantry in Gen. Johann von Mayr's "Free Battalion," a part

of the army of Prince Henry of Prussia. When the time came to reconstitute the light infantry corps in

preparation for the fighting during the summer of 1778, Washington made use of Von Steuben's knowledge.

The committee that visited Valley Forge accepted Washington's recommendation, and the Continental

Congress, on 27 May 1778, decreed that each battalion of infantry "shall consist of nine companies, one of

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which shall be of Light Infantry; the Light Infantry to be kept complete by drafts from the battalion, and

organized during the campaign into a corps of Light Infantry." Colonel Morgan held the command during

the summer of 1778 and those officers who had the highest standing were assigned to serve under him.

Commanders of the battalions made periodic reports showing vacancies in the ranks. The reports, indorsed

by the light infantry commander, were sent to the commanding officers of the brigades who immediately

sent the number of men required to keep the light corps at its designated strength. Battalion commanders

were directed to be particularly careful in their choice of men for the light infantry companies. A general

order pointed out, "The honor of a regiment and that of its light company are intimately connected." The

light companies were required to be prepared to move on the shortest notice and were excused from all

duties except camp or quarters guard. During the winter, when the Army was inactive, the light infantry

companies were disbanded and the men went back to their parent units, but in the spring, as soon as plans

for the summer campaign started, the companies again were constituted. At the close of the 1778 campaign,

the officers and men of the light corps were returned to their respective regiments about 1 December.

Light infantry companies were drawn out of the Virginia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania battalions on 12

June 1779 in preparation for the campaigns of that year, but were not taken from the Connecticut battalions

until 11 July. On 1 July 1779, Washington placed Brig. Gen. Anthony Wayne in charge of the Light

Infantry, and the new commander took over the four battalions which had been assembled under Colonel

Butler at Fort Montgomery.

Colonel Morgan, disappointed because the command had been given to another, offered his resignation to

Congress on 18 July 1779. It was not accepted. The corps was given the mission of opposing any move the

enemy might make, and the remaining battalions were drawn together as rapidly as possible. General

Wayne was directed to engage trusty persons to go within the enemy lines as spies.

The new Light Infantry commander stressed the importance of dress and appearance. Washington promised

that the troops in the light companies would receive a good supply of clothing, but at the same time pointed

out that morale might suffer if the light infantryman received preferential treatment in comparison with

others.

On 16 July 1779, two weeks after General Wayne's appointment, the Light Infantry, attacking with fixed

bayonets and unloaded muskets, surprised the sentries at Stony Point, N. Y., in a night operation and

Baron Von Steuben drilling troops at Valley Forge Winter 1777-1778

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captured the fort. On 30 November 1779, the members of the Light Infantry were instructed to return to

their respective regiments, but to be ready to form again within one day's notice. Before all the companies

had broken up, the order was countermanded—it had been decided that some of the units should remain in

position while there was any threat from the British in New York. All were returned to their respective

battalions by 15 December.

Orders to constitute the corps of light infantry for the campaign of 1780 were issued 16 July 1780, but

because it was necessary to reduce the strength of the companies they were formed with 1 captain, 1

lieutenant or ensign, 3 sergeants, 1 drum, 1 fife, and 20 rank and file. The men selected were "of a middle

size, active, robust and trusty." The first 20 in each company were old soldiers, but recruits were added later

as the companies were increased to 42 men. The corps assembled for a grand parade and was inspected by

The Inspector General and his assistants, who rejected any man they considered unfit. By 1 August,

Washington had determined that the corps would play an important part in the campaign against New York,

and he offered the command to Maj. Gen. Marie Joseph Marquis de Lafayette, who took over from Brig.

Gen. Arthur St. Clair on 8 August. The two brigades of light infantry were formed into a division which

served as the advance corps of the Army.

On 26 November 1780, the corps of light infantry was dissolved and the troops returned to their respective

regiments. The Commander in Chief expressed his thanks to the Marquis de Lafayette and to the officers

and men under his command for their excellent order and soldierly disposition, but he regretted there had

been no opportunities that year for the marquis and his corps to make use in combat of their ardor.

The order to form the light infantry companies for the campaign of 1781 was issued 1 February, in contrast

to the late date of the previous year. Washington again called upon regimental commanders to exert

themselves "to make a judicial choice for the formation of the companies." An assistant inspector general

reviewed each company and rejected all men not considered suitable, an indication of the importance which

con Steuben placed on the corps. The principle of rotation generally was followed in the appointment of

officers, and many new names appeared on the list of battalion and company commanders.

Each regiment with more than 225 rank and file fit for duty, including those on furlough, gave a full ninth

of its total strength, instead of 25 men as had been required the previous year. By 15 February, the light

infantry companies were increased to 55 men. Regiments which had been under 225 contributed their

proportionate number as they were increased in strength. It was necessary to keep State lines distinct, and

the Commander in Chief prohibited assignment of men belonging to one State into regiments assigned to

the quota of another State.

The effectiveness of this system was demonstrated in the attack on two redoubts of the enemy line during

the siege of Yorktown on the night of 14 October 1781. The American Light Infantry under the Marquis de

Lafayette attacked on the right while a detachment of French Grenadiers and Chasseurs commanded by

Major General the Baron Viomenil attacked on the left. The troops advanced under fire from the enemy

without returning a shot and used their bayonets to capture the outer positions from which they were able

to enfilade the enemy's lines. The British garrisons at Yorktown and Gloucester surrendered 19 October

1781.

The achievements of Washington's Light Infantry indicate that a skillful commander, by the judicious

distribution of replacements, may strengthen that part of his force which is to carry the burden of the action.

The Light Infantry formed an advance corps for the Revolutionary Army. Its position was nearest the

enemy. It bore the brunt of the attack and became the rear guard when the Army was forced to retreat. It

had no replacement difficulties because it could draw on the other units for the men it needed. It became a

hard core which sustained the withering Continental Army and gave the Commander in Chief one

organization which always was up to strength.

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SPECIAL STUDIES

SUPPLYING

WASHINGTON'S ARMY

by

Erna Risch

CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY

UNITED STATES ARMY

WASHINGTON, D.C., 1981

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CHAPTER 1

The Continental Army

Posterity would regard as "fiction" the circumstances under which Americans achieved victory in

the War for Independence. So wrote General George Washington as the conflict was drawing to a close.

He thought that future generations would find it hard to believe that the force employed by Great Britain to

subdue the rebels "could be baffled by numbers infinitely less, composed of men oftentimes half starved,

always in rags, without pay and experiencing, at times, every species of distress which human nature is

capable of undergoing." Predominantly agrarian, the colonies could produce sufficient food to support an

army, but a lack of adequate transportation hindered the delivery and distribution of provisions. Some

industry did exist, but this widely scattered small shop and household manufacture was incapable of the

large-scale production needed to meet wartime requirements. When the first shots of war rang out in April

1775, the rebelling colonies, divided among themselves on objectives, had neither an army nor a navy. They

lacked a strong centralized government to direct operations and had no stable currency for financing a war.

How, thus handicapped, could they raise and keep an army in the field for eight years until, with foreign

assistance, they attained victory?

The Continental Army evolved from the militia organization familiar to the colonists. When war

began in the Massachusetts Bay colony in April 1775 the colonists who gathered to confront British regulars

were militiamen. Four days after the battles of Lexington and Concord the Massachusetts Provincial

Congress voted to raise an army of 30,000 men and requested the other New England colonies to join in

this effort. The New England colonies then began the process of forming from their various militias a

volunteer army enlisted for the rest of the year. In June the Continental Congress took over the New England

army besieging Boston and reinforced it with ten rifle companies from Pennsylvania, Maryland, and

Virginia, the first soldiers drawn from outside New England. Congress thereby created the Continental

Army.

The delegates unanimously elected George Washington to be commander of all forces then raised,

or to be raised for the defense of American liberty. To Washington fell the unenviable task of trying to whip

up enthusiasm for reenlistment among the New England troops whose terms of service expired at the close

of that year. From this nucleus he built the Continental Army, but the unpatriotic altitudes he encountered

discouraged him.

Such a dearth of public spirit, and want of virtue and stock-jobbing, and fertility in all the

low arts to obtain advantages of one kind or another, l never saw before and pray God I

may never be witness to again . . , . Could I have foreseen what I have and unlikely to

experience, no consideration upon Earth should have induced me to accept command!

Despite the small number who were willing to enlist - a persistent problem throughout the war - the actual

creation of the Continental Anny was more readily accomplished than its maintenance in the field. Even by

the time the war ended in 1783. Congress had failed to develop satisfactory administrative agencies capable

of providing essential logistical support. Colonial leaders were handicapped by a lack of practical

experience with supply agencies, but they were well aware of the importance of both men and supplies in

military operations. In anticipation of possible conflict with the mother country, they had initiated

preparatory measures directed not only toward the improvement or the militia hut also toward the

accumulation of military stores of' all kinds. However, since few men initially envisaged independence

from Great Britain and engagement in a protracted war, it is doubtful that they appreciated the scope of the

support required by an army.

In the later years of the war, moreover, the enthusiastic support given to the troops besieging Boston

in 1775 was eroded by war-weariness. By the spring of 1781 Washington was in despair.

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Instead of having Magazines filled with provisions, we have a scanty pittance scattered here

and there in the different States. Instead of having our Arsenals well supplied with Military

Stores, they are all poorly provided, and the Workmen all leaving them. Instead of having

various articles of Field equipage in readiness to deliver, the Quartermaster Muster General

. . . is but now applying to the several States to provide these things for the Troops

respectively. Instead of having a regular System of Transportation established upon credit -

- or funds in the Qr. Masters hands to defray the contingent expenses of it we have neither

the one nor the other and all that business; or a great part of it being done by Military

Impress, we are daily and hourly oppressing the people-souring their tempers-and alienating

their affections.

Such prewar supply measures as colonial leaders took were within the framework of their

experience with the militia system. Under that system militiamen reporting for an expedition against the

Indians brought their own arms and accouterments. Their guns might be any kind, from muskets to fowling

pieces, or even none at all. In most colonies the local authorities maintained an emergency supply of powder

and weapons paid for by the towns or counties. Militiamen brought their own provisions as well, for

expeditions were usually of short duration. If accomplishing their objective required more than a few days,

colonial authorities customarily supplemented one or more commissaries, or agents who served only for

the duration of the expedition. The commissary purchased any rations that were needed, but since the

prescribed articles of food could be readily procured, no prior logistical planning was required.

No staff officers were included in the militia organization of any colony, nor were any considered

necessary. Even in an eighteenth century professional army, staff officers existed only in time of war. Their

omission in America from the militia organization did not imply that its officers were unaware of the

positions occupied by staff officers in European armies. Their knowledge of staff organization, however,

came largely from reading. Some colonists serving in the French and Indian War had observed

British staff operations. A few had acquired first-hand experience in the British Army's supply and hospital

operations, but their participation had been limited to duties at the lowest level of the staff departments,

such as acting as a commissary or as a surgeon's mate. Dr. James Craik, who served in the Hospital

Department of the Continental Army during the Revolutionary War had been surgeon to Maj. Gen. Edward

Braddock's expedition, but he appears to have been an exception to the general rule. The colonist more

commonly had served as a surgeon's mate in the British Hospital Department, as Dr. John Cochran had

done in the French and Indian War. He acted as Director of the American Hospital Department during part

of the Revolutionary War. As far as the records show, no colonist ever filled a staff position in the British

Ordnance or Quartermaster's Departments. For the more protracted wars against the French in which the

colonial volunteer forces participated, the British Anny provided the staff planners and staff officers.

As a result of British operations in the French and Indian War, some colonial leaders took an

increased interest in the technical military literature of the day. The most popular textbook in the British

Army was a work written by Humphrey Bland entitled A Treatise of Military Discipline. Washington

acquired a copy in 1755. On his recommendation, southern militia officers thereafter studied Bland.

Washington also obtained and studied an English translation by Captain Thomas Otway of a French study

on the art of war. Timothy Pickering, member of the Board of War and Quartermaster General during the

last years of the Revolution; Henry Knox, Chief of Artillery during the Revolution; and Nathaniel Greene,

military strategist and ablest of the Revolutionary Quartermasters Generals were familiar with Memoirs of

Marshall Saxe. During the Revolutionary War the most popular and widely read work was a British text,

The Military Guide for Young Officers by Thomas Simes. These military works not only familiarized the

colonial leaders with matters of drill, tactics, and organization but also described supply duties of staff

officers and stressed their importance. Captain Otway, emphasizing the role of subsistence supply in

military operations, warned that hunger was more fatal than the sword. Simes cautioned that the staff

properly existed only in time of war; he noted that the Quartermaster General ranked as the first of all staff

officers and described his duties in detail. Staff officers of the Continental Army drew upon such studies,

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their knowledge of the organization of the British Army, and practical experience gained during the initial

campaigns of the Revolutionary War to evolve the supply services.

Appointment of Supply Chiefs

Recognizing the need for staff officers, the Continental Congress on 16 June 1775 promptly

authorized appointment of a Quartermaster General and a Commissary General of Stores and Provisions

for the Continental Army. A few weeks later it also established a Hospital Department, but it did so without

consulting any doctors. Except for the skeletal organization it established for the Hospital Department,

Congress left decisions concerning the nature of the supply departments to the newly appointed supply

chiefs.

The delegates to the Continental Congress acted more slowly in appointing staff officers to handle

ordnance and clothing, though they were at once concerned with the procurement of these supplies. At

Washington's request. Congress in July authorized the appointment of a Commissary of

Military Stores. The latter, however, was simply a field officer responsible for the receipt and issue of

ordnance stores. The Chief of Artillery furnished such ordnance staff support as Washington required.

Congress did not establish other essential parts of an ordnance department until January 1777. Shortly

before that date, it also had authorized, and Washington had appointed, a Clothier General. Throughout this

eighteen-month period Congress neither defined the functions of the supply chiefs nor formulated any

regulatory plan to govern their activities.

The supply efforts of the Continental Congress have generally been dismissed as inept. Its

administrative shortcomings are clear, but supplying the Continental Army was only one of many problems

demanding resolution by a Congress that lacked clear specific powers. It had to raise and train an army,

create a navy, appoint commanders, send diplomats to Europe, regulate commerce, negotiate with the

Indians, and issue paper money to finance military operations. Yet its authority was limited to what the

individual states would permit or what public opinion would support.

It could recommend and even enact measures, but it could not enforce them; their effectiveness

depended upon the voluntary support of the states. Ratification of the Articles of Confederation in 1781 did

not provide a strong executive or a Congress with full power to act."

It is thus not surprising that the Continental Congress, preoccupied with such a variety of problems,

left the details of developing adequate organizations and procedures to supply officers. By 1777, however,

the delegates became imbued with a veritable “rage for reformation" in the wake of increasing complaints

about neglect of the soldiers by the Hospital Department and mounting criticism of the activities of

purchasing commissaries in Pennsylvania and New Jersey. Supply abuses and failures loomed especially

large in the face of defeat suffered by Washington in New York and losses sustained by the Northern Army.

One regulatory measure followed another during the spring of 1777 as the Continental Congress

sought to improve the organization of the supply services meant to eliminate the abuses that had been

uncovered. In the process, functions and duties or the three supply departments established in 1775 were

specifically enumerated and procedures to be followed by their officers were set forth in such minute detail

as to paralyze supply operations. Oddly enough though, Congress had by this time added a Clothier General

and a Commissary General of Military Stores to the staff officers, it did not provide regulatory measures

for their guidance. Congress was thus repeating the procedure that it had followed in establishing the

original staff posts. During the remaining years of the war Congress would repeatedly return to the

reorganization of the supply services.

Gradual Evolution of the War Department

The fact that the Continental Congress initially exercised only a limited amount of supervisory

control over the supply agencies resulted not only from the multiplicity of problems confronting it but also

from the very nature of its organization and the lack of any executive department to exercise control. Such

supervision as Congress did exercise was accomplished through special committees sent to visit the troops.

Temporarily appointed committees usually arrived at headquarters at times of crisis, such as after the

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withdrawal of Washington's army from Long Island in the summer of 1776. These special committees

consulted with General Washington occasionally with boards of officers, and always with the chiefs of the

supply agencies. After receiving a committee's report. Congress took specific supply actions.

As problems confronting Congress became increasingly complex, it soon resorted to the use of

standing committees of delegates to perform certain executive duties. Of particular importance to supply

were two committees established in the fall of 1775. On 18 September Congress created a Secret Committee

of nine members, any five of whom constituted a quorum for conducting business. When its membership

dwindled to two, Congress, on 5 July 1777 established a Commerce Committee, vesting it with the powers

formerly granted to the Secret Committee. These powers had primarily to do with the procurement of

supplies abroad as authorized by Congress. On 29 November 1775 Congress also established the Committee

of Secret Correspondence which later, on 17 April 1777, became the Committee for Foreign Affairs; it was

primarily concerned with diplomatic relations and foreign aid.

While the two committees created in 1775 were partly identical in membership-Robert Morris, for

example, served on both- they were nonetheless distinct. Like some of the other standing committees, such

as the Board of Treasury, they developed into separate departments.

Although the Secret Committee and the Committee of Secret Correspondence were concerned with

procuring supplies abroad and obtaining foreign aid, they had only incidental contact with the chiefs of the

supply services. The Continental Congress, for instance, occasionally directed the Secret Committee to

furnish the Quartermaster General with invoices of arriving cargoes acquired on the governments account.

Without the foreign aid secured by these committees, however, the supply services could not have provided

enough support to keep the Continental Army in the field, nor could the Revolutionary War have been

brought to a successful conclusion. In addition to these two committees, there were other standing

Committees - the Cannon Committee, the Clothing Committee, and the Medical Committee- also engaged

in procurement activities. The Medical Committee, until it was discontinued in 1781, was the only

committee that exercised supervision over a related supply service, the Hospital Department.

Despite opposition to the creation of an executive branch, the Continental Congress gradually

moved in that direction. It took its first step toward establishing a war department when it created a Board

of War and Ordnance on 12 June 1776. Washington had for some time been urging the necessity of a war

office. When informing him of the action taken, John Hancock, President of the Continental Congress,

concluded that “a new and great event in the history of America" had occurred. However, since this first

board consisted of five delegates of Congress, it was little more than another standing committee,

deliberating and reporting to Congress. Inasmuch as the board was responsible, among other duties, for all

the artillery, ammunition, and other military stores of the Continental Army, Congress shortly ordered the

Secret Committee to deliver to the Board of War all ammunition, and other military stores then under its

care or thereafter imported or purchased by it.

Duty on the board proved too onerous for men who were also serving in Congress. Before the end

of 1776 Congress appointed a committee to draft a better plan for conducting its executive business.

Congress, however, delayed action on the report for one reason or another. It was 17 October 1777 before

it resolved to establish a Board of War consisting of three persons who were not members of Congress.

The board's membership underwent some subsequent changes, but its supply duties remained relatively

constant. It was chiefly concerned with keeping accounts of ordnance and all other military stores; storing

and preserving them; laying before Congress estimates of needed stores; and superintending the building

of arsenals, foundries, magazines, barracks, and other necessary public buildings.

Congress appointed former Quartermaster General Thomas Mifflin, and former Commissary

General Joseph Turnbull as members of the revised board. Both were considered to be well informed on

the problems of their respective former supply departments and well qualified to bring about improvements

in their operations. Yet two years elapsed before Congress specifically placed these two supply departments

under the direction of the Board of War on 25 November 1779. Records do not reveal any close supervision

exercised by the Board of War over the Quartermaster's and Commissary Departments even then, and this

action did not eliminate all difficulties in the departments. The board had much more authority over

operations in the Ordnance Department.

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Some fourteen months after bringing the supply departments under the control of the board,

Congress abolished that agency, replacing it with a War Office headed by a Secretary at War. This

development stemmed from ratification of the Articles of Confederation. It was 30 October 1781, however,

before Congress elected Maj. Gen. Benjamin Lincoln to fill the office; he accepted on 26 November. His

duties, initially much the same as those formerly performed by the Board of War, were expanded in April

1782. An executive department with supervisory control over all supply departments had finally evolved,

but by the time Secretary Lincoln took over their supervision, Lord Cornwallis had surrendered at

Yorktown. Though the Continental Army was maintained on a war basis in 1782 as a precautionary

measure, there was no need to provide supplies for active campaigns. Instead, during the closing months of

the Revolutionary War, Secretary Lincoln presided over the reduction of the Army and the liquidation of

the supply services.

Mercantile Capitalism

In developing supply organizations, the colonists had recourse to both their practical experience

and their academic knowledge of British supply agencies. On the other hand, in developing supply

procedures, particularly those essentially in the procurement field, the supply chiefs relied upon the

experience and the knowledge of the colonial merchants. Indeed. Congress sought out merchants to serve

as supply chiefs, and in many instances merchants eagerly sought positions as purchasing agents.

Whether directed by committees in the Continental Congress or by supply officers, procurement

was handled by merchants. In Congress Robert Morris, a Philadelphia merchant, replaced Thomas Willing,

his business partner, as chairman of the Secret Committee and dominated its foreign procurement. The

merchants on that committee included, among others, Philip Livingston and Francis Lewis of New York;

and John Langdon of Portsmouth, New Hampshire; some were also on other procurement standing

committees. In the Continental Army Thomas Mifflin, a Philadelphia merchant, became the first

Quartermaster General, and Jeremiah Wadsworth, the most important Connecticut trader during the

Revolutionary War, served as the Commissary General of Purchases in 1778 and 1779. Not only chiefs of

supply departments but most, if not all of the purchasing deputies were merchants.

The merchant alone had the knowledge, the trade connections, and the necessary credit to handle

procurement. For the most part, his business was a personal venture in which he utilized his personal

connections and took advantage of the mutual patronage they afforded him. Though the corporate form of

business organization was known, it was seldom used in the American colonies on the eve of the

Revolution. Customarily, a merchant directed his own business or entered into a partnership. The firm of

Otis and Andrews, which was active in providing clothing for the Continental troops, and that of Wilting

and Morris, which was deeply involved in filling powder and other supply contracts for the Secret

Committee, are all illustrative of partnership organization during the Revolution. Whether working in

partnership or singly, the merchant was quite likely to be engaged in more than one business. It was also

not unusual for several persons to join their capital and goods in a single project without formal partnership,

the expenses and profits being divided in proportion to investment.

Colonial mercantile business was not characterized by any great degree of specialization. The

merchant's role involved the functions of shipper, banker, wholesaler, retailer, warehouseman, and insurer-

functions which today would be handled by specialized personnel. However, though a merchant might be

able to perform all of these functions, they were recognized on the eve of the Revolution as separate

activities. The individual merchant did not have to perform all of them in order to sell his goods. But could,

for example ship his merchandise in a vessel of another ship owner, consigning it to an agent for sale.

The development of the agent, that is, the commission merchant and broker, was the outstanding

feature of business in the eighteenth century. The agent bought and sold goods on commission for his clients

at home or abroad. He arranged shipment, handled insurance, honored bills of exchange drawn upon him

by his trusted customers, and, in short, did everything he could to promote his clients' interests as if they

were his own. The merchant's most valuable asset was his reputation for honesty and for scrupulous

attention to the details of the business placed in his hands. By 1775 some merchants had become primarily

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commission merchants or brokers, but all important merchants acted as agents for one another. The agent's

commission was a percentage of the gross value of the goods handled.

Long before the Revolution the payment of commissions to purchasing commissaries and

quartermasters had become an established business procedure. Though contracts for providing supplies to

British troops during the French and Indian War were placed with English merchants, the latter had agents

in the colonies to act for them. Provincial troops participating in that war also had to be supplied. For the

attack on Crown Point, for example, Rhode Island appointed a New York merchant as its agent to supply

its troops with food and clothing, negotiate money bills for the province, and sell all produce sent to him as

payment for the colony's account. For this service he received commissions of 5 percent for purchases. 21/2

percent for money, and 71/2 percent for storage and sale.

During the Revolutionary War, the merchants who acted as agents for the Continental Congress

and for the states in the procurement of supplies were paid a commission on the value of their purchases.

They utilized their own credit to obtain supplies and incurred debts for which they were personally liable.

That the payment of commissions opened the way to abuses was a fact initially ignored and subsequently

roundly condemned but never wholly eliminated until Robert Morris, late in the war, introduced the system

of contracts into Continental Army procurement operations.

Common Features of Supply Organization

All of the supply agencies had certain common organizational features. They divided their

organizations into two units. The field units handled primarily the receipt and issue of supplies to the troops.

In consequence, they moved with the troops of Washington's army or with those of a separate army. In

1775 the Commissary and Quartermaster's Departments were the major supply agencies. The first

Quartermaster General, Thomas Mifflin, and the first Commissary General of Stores and Provisions, Joseph

Trumbull, each shaped his field organization to provide support for the three divisions into which

Washington divided his troops in 1775. Backing up the field units were departmental units that procured

and delivered supplies needed by the Continental Army. Initially, these were little more than groups of

merchants who acted as a procurement arm for each supply chief. The functions of these units expanded in

time to include, among other duties, supervision of repair work, production of military items, and

establishment and management of magazines. This expansion occurred rapidly after the main army left

Boston in April 1776. It then became necessary, for example, to appoint a deputy in the Quartermaster's

Department to take care of supplies left behind by Washington's troops. Unlike the field units, the

departmental units developed into fixed subordinate organizations of the supply agencies, administered by

deputies. Within a few months after the troops departed, the assistant quartermaster general assigned to

Boston was being referred to as the deputy of the Eastern Department.

The idea of dividing the country into military departments was a natural consequence of the

establishment of separate armies. When Washington designated Maj. Gen. Philip Schuyler as his head of a

separate army in June 1775, he named Schuyler's area of command the Northern Department. In the

beginning the department was often also referred to as the New York Department, but this title was soon

abandoned. The Continental Congress took no formal action to name either the Eastern or the Northern

Departments, nor did it indicate the area included in each. However, in late February 1776 Congress

formally established two other military departments. The Middle Department included Delaware, Mary

land, New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania. The Southern Department embraced the Carolinas,

Georgia, and Virginia.

The establishment of subordinate departmental units of the supply agencies in each of the military

departments was a feature that the Continental Congress incorporated in the regulations for the supply

departments that it adopted in 1777 and retained for the next three years. As long as military operations

remained limited in the southern states before 1779, these regulations were not applied to the Southern

Department as a whole but only to the Southern District, that is, the state of Virginia. Making a regulatory

measure equally applicable to all military departments, however, had a consequence that Congress probably

had not foreseen. It permitted an expansion of supply personnel out of all proportion to the need. Certainly,

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neither the Eastern Department after the evacuation of Boston nor the Northern Department after the battle

of Saratoga required the same number of personnel as did the Middle Department where continuing active

operations had to be supported. It was 1780 before Congress, in the interest of economy, sharply curtailed

departmental units of the supply agencies in the military departments. This reduction was linked to

congressional action making the states responsible for providing specific supplies-beef, pork, flour, rum,

salt, and forage - to the Continental Army. Reduction of departmental personnel was increased when

Congress later resorted to the use of contracts for such supplies. In the closing months of the war, the supply

services existed for the most part as field units, as they had when first established in 1775, while Robert

Morris as Superintendent of Finance directed procurement and overall supply operations.

Lack of a Stable Currency

The supply departments were dependent on the measures that the Continental Congress instituted

to finance the war. Without adequate funds the supply departments could not procure the supplies and

equipment essential for maintaining an army in the field. Yet the Revolution had begun before any funds

were made available. Except for issuing paper money, bills of credit redeemable at a future date, Congress

had no means to purchase supplies. Paper money "provided the sinews of war in the first five years of the

Revolution." As in other areas, the delegates were following earlier precedents. In reviewing measures

taken to finance the war, a Treasury report in the spring of 1781 noted that the use of paper money "was an

expedient, which was well known, and had often been practiced to good effect in the several colonies" as a

remedy for the chronic insufficiency of the money supply.

The Continental Congress began by issuing 2 million dollars in June 1775, and it increased the

amount to 6 million before the end of the year. Wartime requirements soon demanded additional paper

money. Before the end of 1776 a total of 25 million dollars was in circulation, and further issues followed

rapidly. The necessity to augment the strength of Washington's army by calling out and equipping the

militia had increased expenses, as had the need to replace equipment and supplies lost in the retreat from

Long Island in August 1776. Concerned that such emissions of paper money would result in depreciation,

Congress sought to raise funds by supplementary means. It turned to a lottery and to the sale of government

bonds, then called loan certificates. Neither was sufficiently productive, and Congress was compelled to

issue more paper money.

Congress also resorted to requisitions on the states. Until 1777, the delegates made no effort to

encourage the states to raise funds through taxation. In theory the states had the power to levy taxes, but in

reality they were in no position to do so. They already were issuing paper money to finance their own

wartime expenditures, including equipping their militia. But with Continental paper money beginning to

depreciate, Congress on 22 November 1777 recommended to the states that they raise 5 million dollars in

taxes. This was the first of many requisitions, none of which would yield much in the way of funds for the

Treasury. Entries in the Treasury books reveal that "as long as Congress managed to pay its way with paper

money, it received little financial support from the States." The Continental Congress obtained some foreign

loans, but they provided only a small amount of money before 1780. Moreover, none of that money was

spent within the United States except what was drawn on the American commissioners in Paris to pay the

domestic interest on the loan certificates. The early loans and subsidies from France and Spain were vital,

however, in obtaining war materiel from French arsenals. Both foreign loans and state payments to the

Treasury became important after Cornwallis surrendered at Yorktown. Until then, currency finance had

sustained the war.

Congress was well aware that successful prosecution of the war depended upon maintaining the

value of the Continental currency. In issuing paper money in 1775, the delegates had taken care to support

its value by making each colony responsible for withdrawing from circulation an assigned quota of the total

emission of the Continental paper money. Unfortunately, the states, under the compulsion of their own

needs, returned that paper money to circulation as fast as they could. The Continental dollar began to show

a slight decline in value in the fall of 1776. By early 1778 five paper dollars were worth only about one of

specie.

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Prices rose noticeably in 1778. Little more than two months after assuming the duties of

Quartermaster General, Nathanael Greene in June expressed alarm at the department's expenses. Land

transportation was costly, the Quartermaster General noted, and everything needed by the troops was selling

at enormous prices. He had already drawn on the Treasury for 4 million dollars which, he assured

Gouverneur Morris, "seems to be but a breakfast for the department.” Prices were rising not only as a

consequence of currency depreciation but also as a result of a booming war economy that was causing a

real price inflation. Prices for domestic products and services rose as civilians and military supply agents

competed for them, while the increasing scarcity of foreign goods in the market made all imports expensive.

During the course of the war, prices on the domestic market rose from 50 to 100 percent over those charged

in prewar days in terms of constant money value. They rose many times more in terms of Continental and

state currencies.

Beginning in 1779, the financial situation deteriorated rapidly. Before the end of the year 30 dollars

in Continental money did not have the purchasing power of one specie dollar, the impact on all supply

departments, but particularly upon the Quartermaster's and the Commissary Departments, which had the

largest share or responsibility for procuring supplies and services at the inflated prices in the domestic

market, was severe. They complained that a lack of funds hampered their operations and attributed most of

their difficulties to the depreciation of the currency. The want of "timely supplies of money had delayed

preparations for the campaign of 1779, charged Assistant Quartermaster General Charles Pettit." Had funds

been furnished promptly, he insisted, they could have been used more effectively and would have greatly

lessened the indebtedness of the department. Lack of funds, Greene claimed, deprived the Quartermaster's

Department of opportunities to make contracts or gain credit. His deputies were obliged to employ

innumerable agents to collect supplies from people who would have furnished them gladly if the currency

had been on a more stable footing. Because more agents had to be used to procure supplies, expenditures

were substantially increased, and the Quartermaster's Department consequently was suspected of being

wasteful in its operations. The Commissariat was beset by the same

Difficulties, so much so that Commissary General Jeremiah Wadsworth despaired of keeping the troops

alive.

The Treasury, however, was in no condition to provide the funds requested by the supply

departments. The depreciation of the currency combined with the delay of the states in complying with

requisitions constantly left the Treasury with inadequate funds. John Mathews, a congressional delegate,

was convinced that all embarrassments arose from the backwardness of the states in responding to the

requisitions of Congress. Even when a supply chief received a warrant for funds, the Treasury usually could

give him only part of it, and that weeks after he had received the order. In such a situation money "moulders

away in dribs," lamented Assistant Quartermaster General Pettit, who handled the funds of the department

in 1779. He was unable to provide deputies with adequate funds, though they kept messengers in constant

attendance at his office for the purpose. All purchasing quartermasters and commissaries were much in debt

and hard pressed by their creditors. The deputies pointed out that they would be able to obtain additional

credit only by agreeing to new terms less favorable to the government, that is, by contracting not to fix the

price of purchased articles until the time of payment. It therefore would be to the interest of sellers to raise

prices more rapidly than they might otherwise have done.

Congress was greatly alarmed by the spiraling costs of the supply departments. In 1776 the

expenditures of the Commissary and Quartermaster's Departments totaled 5,399,219 dollars. The following

year they increased to 9,272,524 dollars, and in 1778 they more than quadrupled to 37,202,421 dollars.

These increases were deceptive, Petti maintained, for they reflected the depreciation of the currency; the

sums fell far short of demands and were insufficient “to keep the machine in motion." Whatever the validity

of Pettit's explanation - and some delegates agreed with him-a congressional committee in 1779 reported

that expenditures of the two departments would amount to at least 200 million dollars that year.

As governmental finances virtually collapsed, no explanation found more popular acceptance than

alleged corruption in the supply departments and the payment of commissions to purchasing commissaries

and quartermasters. It was commonly believed that they deliberately offered unnecessarily high prices for

supplies in order to secure large commissions for themselves. Obviously, there were other explanations, not

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the least of which was the close tie between opposition to taxation and the Revolution, a tie that left the

states reluctant to impose and collect taxes or to give that authority to Congress. The progressive

depreciation of the currency eventually spawned the expression "not worth a Continental." Greatly alarmed

by the state of affairs, Congress on 3 September 1779 decided to limit the issue of paper money to 200

million dollars and to halt emissions entirely when that amount was in circulation. Before the year ended,

Congress thrust support of the war on the states by adopting the system of specific supplies.

Supply by Expropriation

From the beginning of the war, the Continental Army in emergencies seized whatever it needed.

Such action gave rise to many claims for compensation. It was not until 1779 that the Continental Congress,

in response to a request from Quartermaster General Nathanial Greene, provided a ruling on such claims.

It then held that all articles commandeered for the use of the troops during marches or encampments were

to be paid for at a rate reflecting their real worth. A clear case of how property was expropriated for the use

of the Army was that of Robert Temple. When the main Continental army lay at Cambridge in 1775,

Temple owned a nearby farm. His orchard was cut down to build abatis; his nursery was cut down to make

fascines; his fences were burnt for fuel; his houses and outhouses were used for barracks; and his walls

were pulled down to get the stone to underpin the barracks. In laying the farmer's case before Congress for

settlement early in 1779, Greene wrote that Temple had a just claim covered by the ruling of Congress. By

the use of his property the government had saved the expense of building barracks and the cost of buying

and hauling wood and stone to the troops.

A far more pervasive expropriation occurred when the Continental Army was supplied by

impressment, a practice common to European armies at the time. Under impressment, supplies needed by

the troops were obtained by an armed force. The officer in charge of the impressment party gave a certificate

to the owner of the seized goods which set forth the amount of money due him. The officer could be either

a supply agent- a quartermaster, commissary, or foragemaster--or an officer of the line assigned to impress

duty. The certificate was a draft which the impressment officer drew upon the supply department normally

responsible for furnishing the goods seized. Large numbers of such certificates were drawn on the

Quartermaster's and Commissary Departments, which were so heavily dependent on domestic procurement.

The supplies they commonly impressed were provisions, forage, teams, and wagons.

The need for transportation gave rise to the first authorization for impressment. On 4 November

1775 the Continental Congress recommended that the legislatures of the New England States empower

Washington to impress wagons, horses, vessels, and other necessities for the transportation or march of his

army. This power was to be delegated to the Quartermaster General. Subsequently, Washington was

authorized to impress goods and services in numerous emergencies. Clearly, Congress believed that an

emergency justified the use of impressment. It later urged that in the use of impressment every possible

attention be paid to the laws of the states and the rights of individuals. When military operations became

centered in the Middle Department and impressment was resorted to with increasing frequency, Congress

requested the states to pass laws authorizing and regulating impressment by the Continental Army.

Washington, however, was a reluctant user of impressment because of the animosity it aroused.

Yet impressment was necessary to keep his army in the field. Seized horses and wagons moved

Washington's troops from New York City in 1776 and permitted provisions to be transported to the troops

at Valley Forge early in 1778. Beginning in 1779 and continuing until the contract system became effective

throughout the country, supply chiefs increasingly had to rely on impressment. As prices skyrocketed with

the rapid depreciation of the currency, they spent such funds as the Treasury granted them almost upon

receipt.

The situation was no different in the Southern Army. When Maj. Gen. Nathanael Greene assumed

command in 1780, he found that the troops would have to live upon the country for there was no money in

his military chest. The Southern Army was usually in that predicament. When Brig. Gen. Anthony Wayne

was ordered to march his detachment to the Southern Department, Congress in May 1781 authorized him

to impress provisions and forage when necessary for his support. By that time the main

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Continental army in New York was also being supported by impressment. Quartermaster General Timothy

Pickering assured his deputy William Keese that a warrant of impress would be the only means for

providing forage to the troops left in that state when Washington moved south against Cornwallis. Nor did

conditions improve for Pickering after Cornwallis surrendered. Early in 1782 when his deputy in Virginia,

Richard Claiborne, complained of his difficulties, the Quartermaster General advised him that all the

deputies were in arrears; it had never been possible to obtain from the Treasury sufficient funds to relieve

them. Pickering himself was similarly handicapped. All Quartermaster business at posts in New York when

Washington's army was there, had been "effected almost wholly by persuasion and impresses." The money

paid for services and supplies was "comparatively but as the dust in the balance."

Pickering could lecture his deputy on operating without funds, but Claiborne was in an impossible

situation. In the course of the Yorktown campaign Governor Thomas Nelson of Virginia had vigorously

and extensively used his authority to impress wagons, horses, tools, and everything else needed by the allied

French and American forces. So oppressive did the burden of impressment become in Virginia that the

inhabitants resisted by every means. Early in January 1782 Virginia enacted a law subjecting to

imprisonment anyone who exercised the right of impressment under any authority other than that of

legislative enactment by the stale. Pickering could not believe the state had taken such action. Certificates

were given not solely for impressed supplies. Frequently, supplies were “freely given to relieve the

necessities of the Army," as the Board of War pointed out in seeking congressional action to regularize

payment of certificates. In all cases the inhabitants, whether they gave their supplies freely or had them

taken forcibly, found difficulty in getting paid for the certificates tendered for their supplies by impressment

officers or by line officers drawing unauthorized certificates on the supply departments. Neither the supply

departments nor the Treasury had funds for redeeming them. "After a tedious circuity of applications, the

holder of a certificate was left unsatisfied. Worse yet, before 1780 certificates carried no interest, and the

sum designated on the certificate for payment declined in real value as paper money depreciated. Public

credit consequently suffered; by 1779 certificates were sold for trifling considerations when persons could

be found who had confidence enough in them to purchase.

With supplies being obtained largely through impressment and owners being compelled to accept

certificates in payment, the state found it expedient to accept such certificates for state taxes levied for

Continental purposes. In the summer of 1780, through the efforts of Pickering. Congress then began issuing

certificates that were stated in specie values and bore interest until paid. In the general financial settlement

after the war, certificate indebtedness was included as part of the federal debt. By that time, however, much

of the debt resulting from certificates issued by Continental supply departments had been absorbed by the

states. The states had themselves issued certificates to obtain supplies. No one can say how many certificates

were issued during the war. E. James Ferguson estimates that those issued by Continental officers must

have approximated in nominal amount, the entire sum of Continental currency.

Phases of Logistical Support

It is clear that the difficulties encountered by all supply departments in supporting the Continental

Army after 1778 stemmed from the deteriorating financial situation. The supply crisis at Morristown in the

winter of 1779- 80, the inability of the supply departments to make preparations for campaigns in the last

years of the war, the fact that the troops continued to live on the verge of starvation in the midst of plenty,

the need to rely on the trickle of supplies obtained by impressment when payment for supplies might have

produced a more than adequate stream of support for the Army- all resulted from the collapse of Continental

finances.

By contrast, the first phase of logistical support from 1775 through 1778 was characterized less by

lack of funds, depreciation, and rising prices- though these were beginning to have their effect before the

end of the period- than by administrative failures stemming from the actions, and at times the inaction, of

the Continental Congress. Its propensity for appointing deputies without delineating their authority or

relationship with their supply chiefs contributed to controversies that hampered supply. In consequence,

when both the Northern Army and the main Continental army were in retreat before the enemy in 1776,

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critical reports of supply deficiencies were laid before Congress. That body itself fled to Baltimore when

the British approached Philadelphia. It was against this background that, early in 1777, Congress turned to

reform and reorganization, particularly of the Commissary Department. After months of investigation that

produced uneasiness among commissaries, if not their complete demoralization, Congress provided for a

reorganization of the Commissariat in the midst of the campaign of 1777. This timing inevitably led to

shortages of rations at Valley Forge.

Three months after the passage of this act Congress was again fleeing from the British, moving this

time from Philadelphia to Lancaster, Pennsylvania. Its mood was one of alarm and dissatisfaction with the

Continental Army and its Commander in Chief. Having stubbornly clung to the act reorganizing the

Commissariat despite growing criticism, Congress now neglected the most important staff post in the Army.

It accepted Thomas Mifflin's resignation as Quartermaster General early in October 1777 and for the next

four months made no effort to find a successor. The breakdown in transportation that contributed so much

to the suffering at Valley Forge could have been avoided or at least mitigated only if there had been vigorous

Quartermaster leadership such as that later demonstrated by Nathanael Greene. This first phase of logistical

support ended with Congress abandoning its reform efforts, failing to take any action to improve the

Clothing Department, approving the appointment of Greene and Jeremiah Wadsworth, respectively as

Quartermaster General and Commissary General of Purchases, and leaving them both free to pursue their

duties. When criticism of these supply departments later led to renewed reform efforts, they were impeded

by the financial breakdown that marked the years after 1778.

Preparations and Sources of Supply

Early in the war the supply departments developed a common approach to preparing for campaigns.

Supply chiefs and their subordinates made preparations for the next year's campaign while the troops lay in

winter quarters. During these months quartermasters had tentage washed, aired, and stored, ready for spring;

tentmakers repaired and made new tents; artificers overhauled boats and mended harnesses; quartermasters

had horses "recruited," that is, fed and cared for to restore them to usefulness in another hard campaign.

The Quartermaster's Department let contracts for a wide variety of articles to be delivered by April or early

May when the new campaign would begin. At the same time men and women made musket cartridges for

the Ordnance Department and artificers repaired and built wagons, repaired arms, and attended to the

numerous items needed by the Artillery. Commissaries were equally busy, having begun their preparations

in the late fall with the butchering of hogs. Under their direction, pork was pickled barreled and deposited

in magazines with other provisions, while barrels and candles were produced by coopers and candle makers.

Washington had to wait for spring to see if the clothing, medical supplies, and ordnance that Congress had

ordered abroad would arrive.

The domestic market provided the first and immediate source of supplies for the Continental Army.

Provisions, forage, wagons, horses, and oxen were all available. In 1775 the colonies could produce some

powder, muskets, and even cannon, but wartime demands quickly made it evident that imports would have

to provide the bulk of the ordnance, ordnance stores, medical supplies, and clothing that the Continental

Anny would need. The Continental Congress turned to the West Indies and Europe for needed supplies.

In the early years of the war such imports were supplemented by the cargoes of ships captured by

privateers and American naval vessels. While besieging Boston in 1775, Washington took it upon himself

to fit out vessels to prey on British supply ships, and they met with considerable success. In the fall of 1775

Massachusetts and some of the other colonies began issuing letters of marque and reprisal to merchantmen.

Under this authority they could make prizes of all enemy ships and cargoes captured at sea. Congress

authorized privateers in March 1776. During the war some 2,000 or more privateers preyed on British

commerce and obtained many needed supplies for the country. Their aggressiveness on occasion led to the

seizure of goods being shipped on the government's account.

American naval vessels captured British supply ships and merchantmen as well as British warships.

The regulations covering such captures were enacted by Congress on 25 November 1775. Congress look

for the public treasury half the value of a prize if it was a warship and two thirds if it was a merchantman.

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This division caused so much discontent among naval personnel- the British government had a long

established policy of not participating in prize money- that Congress modified its position. In October 1776

it gave up its right to any part of a captured warship and claimed only half of the proceeds of captured

merchantmen. Privateers retained all the proceeds of prizes taken by them. Such cargoes were sold either

to private tradesmen or to state or Continental purchasing agents interested in acquiring ordnance, clothing,

or other useful articles.

To handle the prizes brought into American ports, the Marine Committee of Congress appointed

Continental Agents. As soon after a sale as possible, the latter made a just distribution of the proceeds

among the women and men who had captured the prize. The Continental Agents took the share of goods

belonging to the Continental Congress from any merchantman seized by the Navy and forwarded goods

that were needed by the Continental Army to the appropriate supply chief at the direction of the Board of

War.

Size of Continental Forces

Until Charles H. Lesser edited the monthly strength returns of the Continental Army, such

information was not readily available, for returns for the most part were unpublished and scattered in

various manuscript depositories. In consequence, considerable reliance was placed on a report prepared in

1790 by Henry Knox, then Secretary at War until it became suspect. In response to a request from the House

of Representatives, Knox estimated that about 396,000 men had enlisted in the Continental Army and the

state militias from 1775-83. Of these, 232,000 served as regulars in the Continental Army and 164,000 were

members of State militias. His yearly figures on the number of troops enlisted in the Continental Army

were taken from official returns in the War Office, but they cannot be accepted at face value. The data on

militia is even more suspect since it included a conjectural estimate of militia drawn into service. The

strength figures for both the Continental Army and the militia need to be qualified because of the many

short -term enlistments, the repeated reenlistments, and the fragmentary nature of the records. A total

enlistment of 396.000 men during the Revolutionary War has been judged to be far too high. It has been

estimated that of the total population of 200,000 to 250,000 men were of military age, and that less than

half of them, or about 100,000, actually bore arms, frequently under repeated enlistments.

No reliable data exists, but the population of the thirteen colonies has been estimated at from 21/2

to 3 million. Of these inhabitants, perhaps 600,000 were Negroes. The identification by race is not included

in troop strength returns. Generally, the Negro soldier in the Revolution was apt not to be identified by

name in company rolls, being designated instead as "a Negro Man," or "Negro Name unknown." Though

there are no reliable figures available on the number of Negroes in the Army, it has been estimated that

5,000 served "in the patriot forces." An initial policy of excluding Negroes from the Continental Army

soon gave way, under the pressure of manpower deficiencies, to one of accepting their service. Except for

adamant opposition in Georgia and South Carolina, most States, particularly in the

North, enlisted Negroes, especially free Negroes. Though some participated in combat as infantrymen, they

often served in a noncombat capacity as orderlies, wailers, or cooks. Frequently, too, they were assigned to

duties in support of combat operations in the Wagon and Forage Departments, which were created within

the Quartermaster's Department in 1777, and in the Commissary Department.

The army that Washington himself commanded was not large. Taking into account only the number

of men present and for duty, his troops never exceeded 24,000. Only eight times during the war did the

monthly strength figures exceed 20,000. The peak was September 1778 when the total was 23,552. Through

1779 Washington's fighting force ranged in size from 10,000 to 20,000 men, swelled during campaigns by

militia and levies, that is, state troops drafted from the militia and called into Continental service to

strengthen the Continental line. Washington's army dwindled after 1779 to less than 10,000 men and at

times to considerably less than that number. In 1781 when Washington met with the Comte de Rochambeau

to plan allied operation against the British, he estimated that the Continental troops that could take the field

would number 8,250 and could be increased to 10,250. When the allied siege of Yorktown was about to

begin, Washington's army numbered less than 5,000. Even when the troops in the separate armies, on

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detachments, and at various posts are added to the troops in the main army, the total number for whom the

supply agents had to make provision still was not large. Yet they found difficulty in making preparations.

Strength figures for any given period were never firm. Although Congress specified in regulations the

allowances of clothing, rations, forage, and the like to soldiers, officers, and staff personnel, all too often it

inadvertently omitted whole groups from the regulation.

These groups nonetheless had to be supported by the supply agencies. When militia were called

out in a crisis to supplement the strength of the Continental Army, supply officers were greatly handicapped

in their efforts to provide adequate support. To meet recurring emergency needs, they often were compelled

to resort to hurried, improvised measures. Despite the fact that such improvisation was not unusual, they

recognized the advantages-particularly the savings-that would accrue from advance planning.

Unfortunately, they usually lacked the required funds for undertaking it, and Congress by its actions

demonstrated no awareness of the problem. Neither in 1775 nor in later campaigns did Congress or the

states show any appreciation of the fact that supplies could not be obtained on the spur of the moment.

Authority to appoint not only the deputy

quartermaster general but all staff officers

necessary for the Southern Army later was vested

in the commanding general. Congress granted

this authority both to Maj. Gen. Horatio Gates

who replaced Maj. Gen. Robert Howe, then to

Maj. Gen. Nathanael Greene, who succeeded

Gates. General Gates appointed Capt. Joseph

Marbury as his "field quartermaster general."

Greene, thoroughly experienced in supply

operations, appointed Lt. Col. Edward Carrington

deputy quartermaster general for the Southern

Army. Under Carrington's direction the various

branches of Quartermaster activity were

organized to support Greene's operations in the

south.

Lt. Col. Edward Carrington

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APPENDIX A

PRINCIPLES OF JOINT OPERATIONS

Objective: Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and achievable goal.

Offensive: Seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.

Mass: Concentrate the effects of combat power at the most advantageous place and time to produce decisive results.

Maneuver: Place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the flexible application of combat power.

Economy of force: Expend minimum essential combat power on secondary efforts in order to allocate the maximum possible combat power on primary efforts.

Unity of command: Ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander for every objective.

Security: Prevent the enemy from acquiring unexpected advantage.

Surprise: Strike at a time or place or in a manner for which the enemy is unprepared.

Simplicity: Increase the probability that plans and operations will be executed as intended by preparing clear, uncomplicated plans and concise orders.

Restraint: Limit collateral damage and prevent the unnecessary use of force.

Perseverance: Ensure the commitment necessary to attain the national strategic end state.

Legitimacy: Maintain legal and moral authority in the conduct of operations.

MISSION COMMAND Mission command is the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission

orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and

adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations (see Army doctrine on mission

command). Exercised by Army commanders, it blends the art of command and the science of

control while integrating the warfighting functions to conduct the tasks of decisive action. Mission

command has six fundamental principles (see Army doctrine on mission command for detailed

discussion of fundamental principles):

Build cohesive teams through mutual trust.

Create shared understanding.

Provide a clear commander’s intent.

Exercise disciplined initiative.

Use mission orders.

Accept prudent risk.

COMMAND CLIMATE

Command Climate is how members feel about the organization and comes from shared perceptions and attitudes about the unit’s daily functioning. These things have a great impact on their motivation and the trust they feel for their team and their leaders. Climate is generally a short-term experience, depending on a network of the personalities in a small organization. The organization’s climate changes as people come and go (FM 6-22 Leadership, pp. 8-5).

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THE ELEMENTS OF COMBAT POWER

Combined arms maneuver and wide area security, executed through simultaneous offensive,

defensive, stability, or defense support of civil authorities’ tasks, require continuously generating

and applying combat power, often for extended periods. Combat power is the total means of

destructive, constructive, and information capabilities that a military unit or formation can apply at

a given time. Army forces generate combat power by converting potential into effective action.

To execute combined arms operations, commanders conceptualize capabilities in terms of

combat power. Combat power has eight elements: leadership, information, mission command,

movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, and protection. The Army collectively

describes the last six elements as the warfighting functions. Commanders apply combat power

through the warfighting functions using leadership and information. (See figure 3-1.)

THE SIX WARFIGHTING FUNCTIONS

Commanders use the warfighting functions to help them exercise command and to help them

and their staffs exercise control. A warfighting function is a group of tasks and systems

(people, organizations, information, and processes) united by a common purpose that

commanders use to accomplish missions and training objectives. All warfighting functions

possess scalable capabilities to mass lethal and nonlethal effects. The Army’s warfighting

functions link directly to the joint functions.

Figure 3-1. The elements of combat power

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MISSION COMMAND WARFIGHTING FUNCTION

The mission command warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that develop and

integrate those activities enabling a commander to balance the art of command and the science

of control in order to integrate the other warfighting functions. Commanders, assisted by their

staffs, integrate numerous processes and activities within the headquarters and across the force

as they exercise mission command.

Mission command encourages the greatest possible freedom of action from subordinates. While

the commander remains the central figure in mission command, it enables subordinates to

develop the situation. Through disciplined initiative in dynamic conditions within the commander’s

intent, subordinates adapt and act decisively. Mission command creates a shared understanding

of an operational environment and the commander’s intent to establish the appropriate degree of

control. Collaborative engagement among commanders, staffs, and unified action partners helps

clarify the meaning of events or situations embedded in their unique and continually evolving

operational environment. They share information, knowledge, perceptions, and concepts

regardless of physical location.

The art of command is the creative and skillful exercise of authority through decision-making and

leadership. As commanders exercise the art of command, they perform the following tasks:

Drive the operations process through their activities of understanding, visualizing, describing, directing, leading, and assessing operations.

Develop teams, both within their own organizations and with joint, interagency, and multinational partners.

Inform and influence audiences, inside and outside their organizations.

The commander leads the staff’s tasks under the science of control. The science of control

consists of systems and procedures to improve the commander’s understanding and to support

accomplishing missions. The four primary staff tasks are:

Conduct the operations process: plan, prepare, execute, and assess.

Conduct knowledge management and information management.

Conduct inform and influence activities.

Conduct cyber electromagnetic activities.

In addition to mission command warfighting function tasks, five additional tasks reside within the

mission command warfighting function. These tasks are:

Conduct military deception.

Conduct civil affairs operations.

Install, operate, and maintain the network.

MOVEMENT AND MANEUVER WARFIGHTING FUNCTION

The movement and maneuver warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that move

and employ forces to achieve a position of relative advantage over the enemy and other threats.

Direct fire and close combat are inherent in maneuver. The movement and maneuver warfighting

function includes tasks associated with force projection related to gaining a position of advantage

over the enemy. Movement is necessary to disperse and displace the force as a whole or in part

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when maneuvering. Maneuver is the employment of forces in the operational area. It works

through movement and with fires to achieve a position of advantage relative to the enemy to

accomplish the mission. Commanders use maneuver for massing the effects of combat power to

achieve surprise, shock, and momentum. Effective maneuver requires close coordination with

fires. Both tactical and operational maneuver require sustainment support. The movement and

maneuver warfighting function includes the following tasks:

Deploy.

Move.

Maneuver.

Employ direct fires.

Occupy an area.

Conduct mobility and counter-mobility operations.

Conduct reconnaissance and surveillance.

Employ battlefield obscuration.

The movement and maneuver warfighting function does not include administrative movements

of personnel and materiel. These movements fall under the sustainment warfighting function.

FM 3-35 discusses force projection.

INTELLIGENCE WARFIGHTING FUNCTION

The intelligence warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that facilitate understanding

the enemy, terrain, and civil considerations. This warfighting function includes understanding

threats, adversaries, and weather. It synchronizes information collection with the primary tactical

tasks of reconnaissance, surveillance, security, and intelligence operations. Intelligence is driven

by commanders and is more than just collection. Developing intelligence is a continuous process

that involves analyzing information from all sources and conducting operations to develop the

situation. The warfighting function includes specific intelligence and communication structures at

each echelon. The intelligence warfighting function includes the following tasks:

Support force generation.

Support situational understanding.

Provide intelligence support to targeting and information capabilities.

Collect information.

The intelligence warfighting function provides specific intelligence capabilities and communication

structures at each echelon from the national level through the tactical level. These capabilities

and structures include intelligence organizations, systems, and procedures for generating

intelligence reports. They also include products, visualization aides, situational understanding and

awareness products, and other critical information products. Effective communication connectivity

and automation are essential components of this architecture. (FM 2-0 discusses the intelligence

warfighting function.)

FIRES WARFIGHTING FUNCTION

The fires warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that provide collective and

coordinated use of Army indirect fires, air and missile defense, and joint fires through the targeting

process. Army fires systems deliver fires in support of offensive and defensive tasks to create

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specific lethal and nonlethal effects on a target. The fires warfighting function includes the

following tasks:

Deliver fires.

Integrate all forms of Army, joint, and multinational fires.

Conduct targeting.

SUSTAINMENT WARFIGHTING FUNCTION

The sustainment warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that provide support and

services to ensure freedom of action, extend operational reach, and prolong endurance. The

endurance of Army forces is primarily a function of their sustainment. Sustainment determines the

depth and duration of Army operations. It is essential to retaining and exploiting the initiative.

Sustainment provides the support necessary to maintain operations until mission

accomplishment. The sustainment warfighting function includes the following tasks:

Conduct logistics.

Provide personnel services.

Provide health service support.

Logistics. Logistics is planning and executing the movement and support of forces. It includes

those aspects of military operations that—

Design, develop, acquire, store, move, distribute, maintain, evacuate, and dispose of materiel.

Acquire or build, maintain, operate, and dispose of facilities.

Acquire or furnish services.

Although joint doctrine defines it as science, logistics involves both military art and science.

Knowing when and how to accept risk, prioritizing a myriad of requirements, and balancing limited

resources all require military art. Logistics integrates strategic, operational, and tactical support

of deployed forces while scheduling the mobilization and deployment of additional forces and

materiel. Logistics includes—

Maintenance.

Transportation.

Supply.

Field services.

Distribution.

Operational contract support.

General engineering support.

Personnel Services. Personnel services are those sustainment functions related to Soldiers’

welfare, readiness, and quality of life. Personnel services complement logistics by planning for

and coordinating efforts that provide and sustain personnel. Personnel services include —

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Human resources support.

Financial management.

Legal support.

Religious support.

Band support.

PROTECTION WARFIGHTING FUNCTION

The protection warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that preserve the force so the

commander can apply maximum combat power to accomplish the mission. Preserving the force

includes protecting personnel (combatants and noncombatants) and physical assets of the United

States and multinational military and civilian partners, to include the host nation. The protection

warfighting function enables the commander to maintain the force’s integrity and combat power.

Protection determines the degree to which potential threats can disrupt operations and then

counters or mitigates those threats. Protection is a continuing activity; it integrates all protection

capabilities to safeguard bases, secure routes, and protect forces. To ensure maintenance of the

critical asset list and the defended asset list and associated resourcing of fixed sites and forces

against air and indirect fire threats, air and missile defense participates in meetings geared to

protection activities. The protection warfighting function includes the following tasks:

Conduct operational area security.

Employ safety techniques (including fratricide avoidance).

Implement operations security.

Implement physical security procedures.

Provide intelligence support to protection.

Implement information protection.

Apply antiterrorism measures.

Conduct law and order.

Conduct survivability operations.

Provide force health protection.

Conduct chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear operations.

Provide explosive ordnance disposal and protection support.

Coordinate air and missile defense.

Conduct personnel recovery operations.

Conduct internment and resettlement.

METT-TC Mission: The commander’s clear statement of what is to be done and for what purpose. It is a clear

statement of intent and describes the desired end state. It is a concise expression of the purpose of the operation and must be understood two echelons below the issuing commander. . . . It is the single unifying focus for all subordinate elements (FM 3-0, p. 5-61)

Enemy: Commander’s consider the enemy’s disposition, equipment, doctrine, capabilities, and probable courses of action. Intelligence serves the commander directly, informing him of gaps or weaknesses in enemy defenses.

Troops: The number and type of friendly troops available affect the tactical plan. Choosing which units for which types of actions is vital to success and is influenced by the status of the units’ training and the experience of their leaders.

Terrain and Weather: Attacking forces select avenues of approach that permit rapid advance, afford maneuver opportunities to the attacking force, provide cover and concealment, permit lateral shifting of reserves, allow good communications, resist obstruction by enemy obstacles, and orient on key terrain. Commanders exploit weather conditions that affect mobility and concealment.

Time Available: Offensive operations become harder to conduct when the defender has more time to organize the ground and bring up more troops.

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Civilian Considerations: Civil considerations are present throughout offensive operations. Commanders focus their staffs on considerations that may affect mission accomplishment. These factors include care and support for civilians within the AO and the possible effect of refugees on operations and movements. (FM 3-0, p. 5-12 - 5-18).

TENETS OF UNIFIED LAND OPERATIONS Unified land operations describes the Army’s approach to generating and applying combat power in campaigns and operations. A campaign is a series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space (JP 5-0). An operation is a military action, consisting of two of more related tactical actions, designed to achieve a strategic objective, in whole or in part. A tactical action is a battle or engagement, employing lethal or nonlethal actions, designed for a specific purpose relative to the enemy, the terrain, friendly forces, or other entity. Tactical actions include widely varied activities such as an attack to seize a piece of terrain or destroy an enemy unit, the defense of a population, and the training of other militaries to assist security forces as part of building partner capacity. Army operations are characterized by flexibility, integration, lethality, adaptability, depth, and synchronization. FLEXIBILITY. To achieve tactical, operational, and strategic success, commanders seek to demonstrate flexibility in spite of adversity. They employ a versatile mix of capabilities, formations, and equipment for conducting operations. Commanders enable adaptive forces through flexibility, collaborative planning, and decentralized execution. They use mission command to achieve maximum flexibility and foster individual initiative. The capability to act quickly enhances flexibility and adaptability across the range of military operations. The Army requires flexibility in thought, plans, and operations to be successful in unified land operations.

INTEGRATION. Army forces do not operate independently but as a part of a larger joint, interagency, and frequently multinational effort. Army leaders are responsible for integrating Army operations within this larger effort. Integration involves efforts to exercise inform and influence activities with joint, interagency, and multinational partners as well as efforts to conform Army capabilities and plans to the larger concept. Army leaders seek to use Army capabilities to complement those of their joint, interagency, and multinational partners. These leaders depend on those partners to provide capabilities that supplement or are not organic to Army forces. Effective integration requires creating shared understanding and purpose through collaboration with all elements of the friendly force. LETHALITY. The capacity for physical destruction is fundamental to all other military capabilities and the most basic building block for military operations. Army leaders organize, equip, train, and employ their formations for unmatched lethality under a wide range of conditions. Lethality is a persistent requirement for Army organizations, even in conditions where only the implicit threat of violence suffices to accomplish the mission.

ADAPTABILITY. Army leaders accept that no prefabricated solutions to tactical or operational problems exist. Army leaders must adapt their thinking, their formations, and their employment techniques to the specific situation they face. This requires an adaptable mind, a willingness to accept prudent risk in unfamiliar or rapidly changing situations, and an ability to adjust based on continuous assessment. Perhaps equally important, Army leaders seek to deprive the enemy of the ability to adapt by disrupting communications, forcing the enemy to continually react to new U.S. operations, and denying the enemy an uncontested sanctuary, in space or time, for reflection. Adaptability is essential to seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative based on relevant understanding of the specific situation. For example, Army leaders demonstrate adaptability while adjusting the balance of lethal and nonlethal actions necessary to achieve a position of relative advantage and set conditions for conflict resolution within their area of operations. Adaptation requires an understanding of the operational environment. While impossible to have a perfect understanding, Army leaders make every effort to gain and maintain as thorough an understanding as possible given the time allowed. They also use the Army’s information networks to share their understanding. Understanding a specific situation requires interactive learning—intentionally and repeatedly interacting with the operational environment so to test and refine multiple hypotheses. Army leaders expand their understanding of potential operational environments through broad education,

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training, personal study, and collaboration with interagency partners. Rapid learning while in combat depends on life-long education, consistent training, and study habits that leaders had prior to combat.

DEPTH. Depth is the extension of operations in space, time, or purpose. Army leaders strike enemy forces throughout their depth by arranging activities across the entire operational framework to achieve the most decisive result. They do this to prevent the effective employment of enemy reserves, command and control nodes, logistics, and other capabilities both in and out of direct contact with friendly forces. Unified land operations achieves the best results when the enemy must cope with U.S. actions throughout its entire physical, temporal, and organizational depth. Concurrently, Army leaders seek to build depth within their own organizations and operations in space, time, and resources. Employing security forces and obstacles, maintaining reserves, conducting continuous reconnaissance, and managing the tempo of an operation illustrate building depth within the friendly force. Given the Army’s unique capacity for sustained land combat, Army leaders must ensure the resiliency of their organizations—the ability to apply lethal and nonlethal actions relentlessly for extended periods over extended areas—including rear areas, in the face of friendly casualties and a determined, adaptive enemy. Operating in depth makes Army forces resilient over protracted periods, a prerequisite for sustained land combat.

SYNCHRONIZATION. Synchronization is the arrangement of military actions in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at a decisive place and time (JP 2-0). It is the ability to execute multiple, related, and mutually supporting tasks in different locations at the same time, producing greater effects than executing each task in isolation. For example, in a tactical action, the synchronization of intelligence collection, obstacles, direct fires, and indirect fires results in the destruction of an enemy formation. In an operation, the synchronization of forces employed along multiple lines of operations temporarily disrupts the enemy organization and allows for exploitation. Information networks greatly enhance the potential for synchronization by—

Allowing commanders to more quickly understand their operational environments and communicate their intents.

Allowing subordinate and adjacent units to use their common understanding of the operational environment and commander’s intent, in conjunction with their own initiative, to synchronize actions with those of other units without direct control from the higher headquarters.

Information networks do not guarantee synchronization; however, they provide a powerful tool for leaders to use in synchronizing their efforts. Commanders determine the degree of centralized control necessary to synchronize their operations. 34. Although synchronization does not always equate to simultaneity, Army leaders have a clear preference for operations that overwhelm the enemy through simultaneous or near simultaneous actions. When military forces integrate such actions with the actions of interagency and multinational partners, the results can overwhelm the enemy

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Order of Battle

Battle of Kings Mountain

American Forces

Total Force = 1810. For fear of losing Ferguson’s trail, about 1000 of the best horsemen had been sent in hot pursuit. Those who followed behind joined the main force after the battle.

Overmountain Men (1040). Tennessee, Virginia. The men Shelby, Sevier and Campbell mobilize.

North Carolina (370). Winston, Cleveland, and Chronicle

Georgia/South Carolina (400). Major William Candler and 30 volunteers from Georgia had left the main body of their Brigade and joined the Over Mountain men at the Green River. During the battle they were attached to the force commanded by Colonel James Williams of South Carolina.

British Forces

Total Force = 1025. The British Rangers were veterans of the war. However, the NC and SC loyalist militia units were battle inexperienced and in training under the tutelage of Major Ferguson.

Royal Volunteers (125). British Rangers.

South Carolina Militia (700). Ferguson’s army included South Carolina loyalist militia intended to fight alongside the “regular” British Rangers. They had several months of training and he considered them fairly well trained in the British fashion, i.e. Muskets and Bayonets.

North Carolina Militia (200). New militia Units recruited recently upon the invasion of North Carolina. This force was basically new and inexperienced.

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ORDER OF BATTLE

Battle of Cowpens

1. Mackenzie estimated the total British cavalry force at 3 50 troopers. Cornwallis’ troop returns of 15

January 1781 show 451 in the Legion (Walter Clark, State Records of North Carolina, vol. 17 (Goldsboro,

NC: Nash Brothers, 1896), 1009.

2. Adrien Carauna lists the crew for the guns at twelve but they could be operated by as few as three gunners,

Grasshoppers and Butterflies: The Light 3-Pounders of Patterson and Townshend (Bloomfield, Ontario,

1979), 11. The number an estimate; Lawrence Babits states the number is thirty-six, Cowpens Battlefield a

Walking Tour (Johnson City, TN: Overmountain Press, 1993), 15.

3. Cornwallis' troop returns for 15January1781 show 249 men in the lst battalion and 69 in the light company,

as cited in Clark, State Record, vol. 17, 1009. Tarleton says 200, Appendix B, memoir, 112-15.

4. The regimental rolls listed 167 rank and file enlisted and 9 officers, Wheaton, Historical Record of the

Seventh Royal Regiment of Fusiliers (Leeds, 1875), 76; Clark, State Records, vol. 17, 1009).

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5. Mackenzie says the Continental Line was 250, letter, Appendix C, 148-51. Tarleton says 500, memoir, 148-51.

Howard recalls "about 35Q men" but does not specify whether that number included the militia in his line. I am

assuming his number included all those who fell under his operational control for the battle, as depicted here.

Babits shows almost 600 in his order of battle, Cowpens, 55. 6. Beatty is not listed in Moss, Patriots, but his extensive and convincing diary argues otherwise, Beatty memoir,

Appendix B, 99.

7. From Josiah Martin, who counted them on 16 January, memoir, Appendix B, 109. 8. From McJunkin memoir, Appendix C, 133.

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9. Colonel Pickens did not actually command all militia forces. They did, however, serve in his line at the battle.

10. Brandon was born in Pennsylvania in 1741 and moved to South Carolina in 1755. He joined Colonel Thomas'

Spartan Regiment m 1776, rising to the rank of major, Bailey, Heroes, 141-53.

11. Of McCall's command.

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APPENDIX C: Bibliography

Southern Campaign of the American Revolution:

The Battles of Kings Mountain and Cowpens May 1780 - September 1781

Alderman, Pat; One Heroic Hour at King’s Mountain; Johnson City, 1968.

Babits, Lawrence E.; A Devil of a Whipping: The Battle of Cowpens; Chapel Hill, 2001.

Bailey, J.D., Commanders at Kings Mountain, Greenville, 1980.

Bearss, Edwin C., Battle of Cowpens: A Documented Narrative and Troop Movement Maps, National Park Service,

1967.

Bower, Stephen, “Freedom’s Gate: The Southern Insurgency during the American Revolution, 1780-1781,”

unpublished paper, U.S. Army Soldier Support Institute, 2007.

Buchanan, John, The Road to Guilford Court House: The American Revolution in the Carolinas, New York, 1997.

Clark, Murtie, Loyalists in the Southern Campaign of the Revolutionary War. Baltimore, 1981.

Cowpens: Official National Park Handbook; includes Thomas J. Fleming, “Downright Fighting: The Story of

Cowpens, Washington, 1988.

Dameron, J. David, Kings Mountain: The Defeat of the Loyalists, October 7, 1780; Cambridge, Massachusetts,

2003.

Draper, Lyman C. Kings Mountain and its Heroes: History of the Battle of Kings Mountain, Baltimore:

Genealogical Publishing Company, 1967.

Dunkerly, Robert M., The Battle of Kings Mountain, Eyewitness Accounts, Charleston, 2007.

Dykeman, Wilma, With Fire and Sword: The Battle of Kings Mountain, National Park Service, 1978.

Edgar, Walter B., Partisans and Redcoats: The Southern Conflict That Turned the Tide of the American Revolution,

January 7, 2003.

Fanning, David, The Narrative of Colonel David Fanning, New York, 1865.

Graham, James. The Life of General Daniel Morgan of the Virginia Line of the Army of the United States; New

York, 1856.

Haller, Stephen, William Washington, Cavalryman of the Revolution, Bowie, 2001.

Hamilton, J. G. de Roulhac, William Richardson Davie: A Memoir. Chapel Hill, 1907.

____________"King's Mountain: Letters of Isaac Shelby." Journal of Southern History, 1938

Hibbert, Christopher, Rebels and Redcoats: The American Revolution through British Eyes, London, 2001.

Higginbotham, Don, Daniel Morgan: Revolutionary Rifleman, Williamsburg, 1979.

Historical Statements Concerning the Battles of Kings Mountain and Cowpens, U.S. Government Printing Office,

Washington, DC, 1928

Johnson, William. Sketches of the Life and Correspondence of Nathanael Greene . . . in the War of the

Revolution, Vols. 1 and 2. Charleston, 1822.

Roberts, Kenneth, The Battle of Cowpens, Cowpens National Battlefield Park, 1981.

Lambert, Robert Stansbury. South Carolina Loyalists in the American Revolution. Columbia, 1987.

Lumpkin, Henry, From Savannah to Yorktown: The American Revolution in the South (2000)

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Moncur, John, The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour; The Campaign in the Carolinas, 1780-1781

Oiler, John, The Swamp Fox: How Francis Marion Saved the American Revolution, Boston, 2016

Pancake, John S. This Destructive War: The British Campaign in the Carolinas, 1780-1782, Tuscaloosa, 1985.

Morrill, Dan, Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution. Baltimore, 1993.

Moss, Bobby Gilmer, Journal of Capt. Alexander Chesney: Adjutant to Maj. Patrick Ferguson, Blacksburg, 2002.

____________, Uzal Johnson, Loyalist Surgeon, A Revolutionary Diary, Blacksburg, 2002.

Peckham, H: The War for Independence, A Military History, Chicago, 1967.

Roberts, Kenneth. The Battle of the Cowpens: The Great Morale Builder, Garden City: Doubleday & Co., 1958.

Royster, Charles. A Revolutionary People at War: The Continental Army and American Character, 1775-1783,

Chapel Hill, 1996.

Salley, A. S., Jr., editor. Capt. William Hill's Memoirs of the Revolution. Columbia, 1921.

_____________, editor. Documents Relating to the History of South Carolina during the Revolutionary War,

Columbia, 1908.

Scotti, Jr., Anthony J, Brutal Virtue, The Myth and Reality of Banastre Tarleton, Bowie, 2002.

Tarleton, Banastre, A History of the Campaigns of 1780 and 1781 in the Southern Provinces of North America,.

London, 1787.

Thayer, Theodore. Nathaniel Greene: Strategist of the American Revolution, New York, 1960.

Waring, Alice N. The Fighting Elder: Andrew Pickens, 1739-1817; Columbia, 1982.

Weigley, Russell Frank, The Partisan War: The South Carolina Campaign of 1780-1782, Columbia, 1970.

White, Katherine Keogh, The King’s Mountain Men, the Story of the Battle, with Sketches of the

American Soldiers Who Took Par, Dayton, 1924.

Wickwire, Franklin, and Mary Wickwire, Cornwallis: The American Adventure, Boston, 1970.

Williams, Otho Holland, “A Narrative of the Campaign of 1781.” Appendix B in Sketches of the Life and

Correspondence of Nathanael Greene, Vol. I. Charleston, 1822.

Wilson, David K., The Southern Strategy: Britain's Conquest of South Carolina and Georgia, 1775–1780,

Columbia, 2005.