the soviet government and moonshine, 1917-1929

EHESS

The Soviet Government and Moonshine, 1917-1929Author(s): Helena StoneSource: Cahiers du Monde russe et soviétique, Vol. 27, No. 3/4 (Jul. - Dec., 1986), pp. 359-379Published by: EHESSStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20170117 .

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HELENA STONE

THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT AND MOONSHINE

1917-1929

"I remember a conversation with an old

time moonshiner who was discussing the

advisability of setting a still in a

community... 'The main thing,' he con

cluded, 'is the people. Air they fur hit

or air they agin hit ?'"

(David W. Maurer, Kentucky moonshine

(Lexington, KY, 1974): 54.)

As is well known, in the early weeks of its existence the

Soviet Republic had to strain itself to the utmost to struggle with the legacy of the accursed past. The Old Regime left behind among other things abundant supplies of alcoholic

beverages. The revolutionary tide reached its peak in the fall

of I917, culminating in the plundering of wine cellars through out the country. V.l. Lenin detected the working of counter

revolutionary forces behind the drunken riots; on December 6,

I917, he wrote to the chief of the political police, F.E. Dzer

zhinskii: "The bourgeoisie commits the most heinous crimes,

bribing the scum of society and the d?class? elements, getting them drunk for pogroms."(l)

The party delegated the task of combatting the bourgeoisie on the alcoholic front to the workers' militia. The Red Guard

codes required members of the Red Guard to be "sober and

loyal to the revolution," and further provided: "The duty of

the Red Guard... includes the struggle with drunkenness so as

not to allow liberty and revolution to drown in wine. "(2)

However, as the workers' militia could not resist the temptation to drink, a special commission under the chairmanship of

V.D. Bonch-Bruevich put an end to the drunken riots through

the generous use of machine guns. (3) In the provinces especially reliable units dealt with the looters of liquor storages in a

similar fashion. (4) To maintain law and order, as well as to promote the

moral regeneration of the people, the Soviet Government decided

to preserve the dry law introduced by the Imperial Government

in August 1914.(5) In the spirit of War Communism the Council of People's Commissars nationalized the liquor industry and

Cahiers du Monde russe et sovi?tique, XXVII (3-4), juil.-d?c. 1986, pp. 359-380.



360 HELENA STONE

declared the existing stock of alcoholic beverages state

property. (6) Whatever the Government's motives and intentions

were, its economic policy led to a dramatic increase in the

production and consumption of alcohol in the country. In early 1918, the village of Staraia Tishanka of the

Voronezh province distilled enough grain daily to supply the ration for a town of nine to twelve thousand people. In

February 1919, the peasants of the Skopin county of the Riazan' province channelled nearly 5,000 poods of grain a day into moonshine. In Siberia 25 million poods was converted into moonshine in the spring of 1918 -

compared to only 12 million forcibly requisitioned and shipped to European Russia in the first half of that year; In the Saratov province home

brewing was endemic. Peasants throughout the country conscious

ly chose to distill grain or feed it to cattle rather than to "make a free gift to the city freeloaders."(7)

Already in the beginning of 1918 Soviet Government agents in the provinces saw that the production of moonshine was a

form of protest against the state monopoly on grain. In

January 1918 the Western Siberia Extraordinary Food Supply Congress declared the bootleggers to be enemies of the revolution for sabotaging the policy of food-supply dictator

ship. (8) The chief of the Lower Volga food-requisitioning army, V.A. Radus-Zenkovich, considered the halting of illicit

distillation his official duty: "Burying the grain surplus |or| wasting it on moonshine or speculation is not te be allowed."(9)

The Chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets and the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, Ia.M. Sverdlov, was convinced that home

brewing presented a political challenge to the Government. He

blamed the distilling of moonshine on the kulaks. On May 20, 1918, Sverdlov told the Central Executive Committee:

"The kulak elements | ... | lur? the poor strata to their side | ... | by inviting them to share in the

profits from moonshine. |...| Entire villages, entire

rural districts are captured by the spirit of

drunkenness. | ... | The Government should impose the strictest punishment for wasting grain, distilling

moonshine, and rising against the Soviet power..." He reasoned: "According to the calculations of the

Commissariat for Food Supply, the Tula, Voronezh, Kursk, Orel, and Tver' provinces have surpluses

amounting to 12 to 15 million poods. This grain is

rapidly distilled into alcohol, moonshine, and all those nasty things that are being served up | ... | to the population for inebriation. |...| If only we could really take inventory of this grain right in the village | ... | our situation would improve very

much."

Sverdlov asked the Central Executive Committee for

"punitive expeditions [ to] be sent from the cities" to stop

homebrewing. ( 10)



THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT AND MOONSHINE 361

The proliferation of moonshine belonged to the vicious circle of problems engendered by War Communism. From 1917 until 1921 the Soviet Government sought to eliminate the market and replace it with a centralized system of food collection and distribution. The penalty for selling grain on the free market was execution. The Government created committees of poor

peasants throughout the country, who, among other things,

gathered intelligence about the amount of food produced by each peasant family, on the basis of which food-requisitioning armies forcibly confiscated everything they regarded as surplus. In response, peasants grew less grain, fed whatever they did

not eat to their livestock, or converted it into alcohol. The

more grain was converted into moonshine, the more grain the

Governement requisitioned. Thus, homebrewing was both a

consequence and a cause of socialist agrarian policies. On December 19, 1919, the Government at last codified its

policy on liquor in a decree that provided:

"The distilling of alcohol, in unlicensed places, from any raw materials, by any method, in any

amount, and of any strength, is punishable by (a) confiscation of the alcohol, raw materials, stills,

and related equipment; (b) confiscation of all of the offender's property; and (c) imprisonment with forced labor for not less than 5 years."

Accessories to a crime and those who bought, stored, or trans

ported moonshine were to receive the same punishment. Persons

who built, transported, or bought stills made of "samovars,

cauldrons, or any other vessels," and those who drank moon

shine or appeared drunk in public were to be imprisoned for not less than one year. (11)

The same decree, however, authorized the state production of alcoholic beverages up to 16 proof, thus representing a quiet retreat from the dry law. Shortly thereafter, a series of

decrees increased the maximum alcoholic content of state liquor. The maximum alcoholic content was raised to 24 proof on

January 3, 1920, to 28 proof on August 9, 1921, and to 40 proof on December 8, 1921.(12) During the same period, the Govern

ment reaffirmed its resolve to punish those who continued to

produce hooch. On January 20, 1920, the Commissariat for

Justice urged provincial executive committees and local

judiciary branches to fight moonshine relentlessly; in October 1920, it instructed the courts to crack down on the crimes that

were thwarting the current food-requisitioning campaign,

particularly the concealment of grain and the distilling of moonshine. (13) In October 1921 the Tsaritsyn province police directed their local branches to "select special responsible persons and endow them with full power to combat | ... | the incessant distilling and consumption of moonshine," and to

"make sure that the guilty are held responsible."(14) Under the New Economic Policy homebrewing did not

abate; on the contrary, it grew at an increasing pace. Raising the maximum alcoholic content of state liquor did not remove



362 HELENA STONE

the incentive to produce moonshine. In 1922 a Pravda corre

spondent informed the readers that about 150 miles from Moscow

in the direction of Volokolamsk "homebrewing thrives. There are

villages where everyone occupies himself with this 'craft '

."(15)

A letter from Khar'kov stated: "Drunkenness in the Ukraine is

growing. Homebrewing has particularly developed owing to the new harvest."(16) In the Briansk area, "the growing sale of

moonshine, having come out from underground, threatens to

assume menacing proportions. [Bootleggersl not only sell at

home, but also travel almost openly to the markets in neighbor

ing villages, so that sometimes the total tax in kind ends up with them instead of with the collecting agency."(17) In the Simbirsk province "the production of moonshine... had assumed

stupendous proportions."(18) In the countryside around Riazan'

virtually every household owned a still for family needs, but

large market suppliers were emerging as well. (19) In the Belebei county near Ufa 1,500 poods of grain were distilled

daily. (20) In the Lipetsk county of the Tambov province 32,482 poods of wheat -

15,000 gold rubles worth - were converted into

57,637 gallons of moonshine between October 1922 and May 1923.(21) Thirteen percent of the Omsk province 1922 harvest

was used for moonshine, while the particularly bountiful Slav

gorod county consumed a whopping 20 percent of its grain in the form of alcohol. (22) According to the Commissariat for Internal Affairs, homebrewing was particularly widespread in

the Saratov, Gomel', Viatka, Penza, Riazan', and Samara

provinces. (23) On the average each village in the Soviet Union converted 200 poods of grain a month into moonshine. (24)

Rural moonshiners brought their goods to the cities. An

observer from the Moscow suburbs wrote: "In every early

morning train the suppliers flow into the city with pitchers (like milk-ladies use), baskets, suitcases, and cleverly covered

buckets. An experienced eye can always recognize them. "(25) Once in the city, the visiting moonshine vendors sneaked into

factories and offered it, bottle by bottle, to the workers. (26) Urban moonshiners, on the other hand, who were well-known

in their neighborhoods, preferred to sell moonshine at their

own homes. Small restaurants, cafes, and shish kebab stands

played a significant role in the marketing of moonshine. In Kashira, in the Tula province, tea-rooms served moonshine in

tea pots. (27) In Briansk moonshine appeared openly on restau

rant shelves as "lemonade in an unsealed bottle." It was

generally served as a dessert. (28) At the Khitrov market in Moscow moonshine could be obtained in any booth by "requesting

'lemonade' and winking at the salesman meaningfully."(29) Article 140 of the 1922 Criminal Code reduced the prison

term for moonshine-related crimes from a uniform five years to

three years for professionals and one year for amateurs. Yet,

despite the ostensible leniency, the Government was about to

launch an offensive against homebrewing. The Commissariat

for Justice addressed the courts:

"From the information arriving from the local organs it can be gathered that the production of moonshine




|... | with intent to sell has become a large scale

enterprise in several areas of the Republic; it

damages national health, causes senseless waste

and spoilage of grain and other foodstuffs, owing to which the struggle | ... | must be decisive and severe..."(30)

Executive committees were encouraged to pass ordinances

punishing behavior not forbidden by the Criminal Code. Thus, the Moscow City Council issued an ordinance prohibiting the

production of moonshine exclusively for home use. (3D Local

ordinances, however, had an important shortcoming: they

generated a large number of appeals. People seemed to feel

that anything not prohibited by the Criminal Code was legal. If no suitable ordinances were on the books, the courts were

instructed to be creative. For example, two men were sentenced

to three years in prison for drinking moonshine in a private home. Although the drinking of moonshine in a private home did not violate the law, the Commissariat for Justice told the court of appeal that the two men, the chairman and a member

of a rural district executive committee, could still be found

guilty of discrediting Soviet authority. (32) In February 1923 the Central Executive Committee had

set up a commission to revise the legislation on homebrewing.

The commission considered reclassifying homebrewing from an

economic crime to a more severely punished counterrevolutionary crime. (33) Although it ultimately left homebrewing in the

category of economic crimes, its deliberation shows that the

Government was aware of the political meaning of moonshine

production. The laws on alcohol were subject to regional interpreta

tion. In October 1921 the Tsaritsyn province police announced that although national legislation "allows the production of

alcoholic beverages up to 28 proof, in fact the sale of these

beverages has not yet been authorized in the Tsaritsyn

province."(34) In the former Far Eastern Republic the reverse

was true: 80 proof vodka, unobtainable elsewhere in the

Soviet Union, was freely sold. As the locals explained to a

traveller: "The Far East is in special circumstances; otherwise

China would have flooded everything with its cheap and lousy contraband 'khana'. People would not drink less yet the money would be flowing abroad. Better for it to stay at home."(35)

The Government tried to shift the moral responsibility for the famine of 1921-1922 to the moonshiners even though the famine was to a great extent the result of its own policies:

"Simultaneously with occasional reports of cases of

starvation, wrote Pravda, in some places people

engage in massive production of moonshine. On the

market in Kirsanov (a famine-stricken county) grain is cheaper than in Tambov."(36)

"Whole villages distill moonshine purposely making their living in this way. A precious product is



364 HELENA STONE

destroyed -

grain... There cannot be a worse crime

now."(37)

"The situation is monstrous. In some places people are still dying of famine, while, for example, in Ivanovo-Voznesensk nearly one thousand stills are

in operation - and almost legally."(38)

The official publication of the Commissariat for Justice, Ezhenedel'nik sovetskoi iustitsii, appealed to the judges:

"Regard each man coming up for trial not only from the point of view of his guilt before the state

authority but also of his guilt before the dying Volga peasants. 'You have found the means to

drink,' the court will say to the accused, 'so in

addition to the punishment, you will find the means to help the starving.'"(39)

Moonshiners indeed paid extra fines in food and money for the benefit of the famine-stricken districts. (40)

Before the beginning of the 1922 harvest season the theme of moonshine had cropped up only occasionally in the press. In Pravda moonshine had figured as an everpresent feature of

provincial and rural life. Correspondents observed homebrewing with resignation, as in a typical report from the Novorzhevsk

county of the Pskov province: "The distilling of moonshine (and it is distilled in almost every village) gradually acquires

a semi-legal character. Unfortunately, the local authorities

turn a blind eye to it and take almost no measures."(41 )

On September 26, 1922, Pravda launched a shock campaign

against homebrewing; one of its largest sections, "The worker's

life", was dedicated exclusively to drunkenness and moonshine.

The headline appealed to the workers: "Uncover the moonshiners

who distill the poison! Scrape them out of their contemptible burrows!... Write the truth about them to your Pravda!" And

further, in large letters: "The struggle against moonshine is

the workers' cause" and "The bootlegger is a parasite of the

working class. Merciless war against him!" By October, "The

worker's life" featured almost daily a subsection entitled "The

struggle with moonshine." The response came in ' an avalanche.

On October 13, 1922, the editors informed their readers: "People write us about moonshiners, about drunkenness so much that

the whole newspaper would not be enough to print all their letters. They write from all districts, from all corners of

Moscow. "(42) One reader felt that focused propaganda would be

sufficient to eliminate homebrewing: "Our Party has more than

once shown its power and ability to implant in the brains of

the toiling masses the necessary attitude to this or that

phenomenon, and there is no reason to doubt its strength or ability this time."(43) Others favored collective responsibility as the solution: in the countryside, the village soviets were




to be held responsible for the local peasants' homebrewing; in the cities, the chairmen of the house committees, or all the inhabitants of an apartment building where moonshine was

discovered, were to answer for their neighbors' crimes. (44) On November 2, 1922, a front page article spelled out the Government's main concern: "Can we count on seeing on the

market the surplus of the harvest which, according to cal

culations, should remain in the peasants' possession this

year or is moonshine going to devour it? Would it not be better to return to the state sale of vodka if we are not able

to struggle against moonshine?"

In order to uproot the archaic attitudes and implant the

proper ones in the minds of the toiling masses the Commissariat for Justice asked the courts in June 1923 "to organize some show trials, mostly in the rural districts and the counties, so

that these trials could have significant propaganda effect on the peasantry, among whom homebrewing is particularly

widespread. "(45) The Ukrainian Central Executive Committee

granted the Ukrainian Commissariats for Justice and Internal Affairs "extraordinary rights" to be used in the liquidation of moonshine. (46) On December 29, 1922, the Soviet Government created an incentive system whereby the fines collected from moonshiners were paid directly to those involved in the collection: police officers received 50 percent, while informers and local executive committees each received 25 percent. The

right to a share of the fines collected was extended to the officers of the Criminal Investigation Department in March 1923 and to those of the Main Political Administration (GPU)

Transportation Department in June 1923.(47) To speed up the

judicial process, the Presidium of the Council of People's Judges set up special moonshine courts in the Krasnopresnenskii, Sokol'nicheskii, and Zamoskvoretskii districts in Moscow. (48)

The battle to eradicate moonshine from Soviet life

proceeded at a breathtaking pace. In the last five months

of 1922 the Moscow police made 10,740 moonshine-related searches. In the first ten days of January 1923, at the peak of the campaign, they conducted 1,846 such searches; in

April -

1,334; in May - 1,004. Between August 1922 and April

1923, 74 percent of all police searches in Moscow were

moonshine-related; between January and April of 1923 -

81.5

percent. (49) Massive arrests and confiscations of stills were

reported from Rostov-on-Don, Astrakhan', Penza, Kursk,

Borisoglebsk, Krasnoiarsk, Pskov, Krasnodar, and Bezhetsk. (50) The struggle was particularly intense in the Arkhangel, Gomel', Penza, Petrograd, Riazan', Samara, Saratov, and Viatka

provinces. (51) In the first half of March 1923 the police arrested 13,748 moonshiners and confiscated 25,114 gallons of

liquor nationwide. (52) The number of moonshine-related cases

heard in the courts of the Russian Federal Republic rose from 94,000 in 1922 to 191,000 in 1923.(53)

To the chagrin of the authorities, the shock campaign soon reached the point of diminishing returns. Moonshine-related

crimes as a fraction of all crimes in Moscow fell from 28.9 per cent in 1922 to 15.1 percent in 1924.(54) Even as the police



366 HELENA STONE

increased the number of searches, the percentage that produced evidence of homebrewing declined from 56.8 percent in

September 1922 to 34.5 percent in April 1923.(55) The toilers were

learning to conceal their means of production and the

products of their labor.

While the campaign made moonshine less conspicuous in

Moscow, the rural bootleggers were not in the least intimidated.

In 1924 moonshine-related crime still constituted 30.7 percent of all court cases in the Tatar Republic, while in Kirghizia officials frankly admitted that their battle was hopeless. (56)

On December 3, 1924, the maximum alcoholic content was

raised once again, this time to 60? proof. (57) Predictably, the measure had no effect. In 1925 the courts throughout the

country were still flooded with oceans of moonshine brought in for evidence. The Commissariat for Justice begged the police to use smaller bottles as samples. (58) All efforts to eliminate

moonshine amounted to no more than a drop in the bucket.

The anti-moonshine campaign failed for several reasons.

In February 1923 the Moscow province Attorney General asked the police not to arrest the moonshiners belonging to the

following categories:

"Workers employed in the factories and plants and

their wives, if the factory committee or some other

group guarantees their behavior. |... | The unemployed who produced and sold moonshine for the first time, in a state of extreme poverty. |... | Any person f...| having a permanent address in a given area who

is tied to it by family and property."(59)

This list included every major group involved in the traffick

ing of moonshine.

When penalties were meted out, approximately 30 percent of the moonshine offenders were sentenced to fines, 30 percent to forced labor without incarceration, and 30 percent to

confiscation of property. The remainder were sentenced to

serve time in prison. In 1925, for example, 47,121 moonshine

offenders were imprisoned. (60) Those who received a prison term usually served less

than one year. (61) Moonshiners along with courterrevolutionaries

were excluded from the 1922 amnesty; (62) however, it is im

probable that many moonshiners actually completed their full terms. Given the Government's shock campaign method of

struggling against crime, it is likely the moonshiners were

quietly paroled to make room for the next wave of inmates. (63)

Penitentiary space was too valuable to be given away on a

long-term basis.

The fines imposed for homebrewing did not seriously affect the offenders. Not only was the impact of the fines

significantly reduced by the rampant inflation, the fines were

rarely paid in full. On September 16, 1924, the Central Executive Committee authorized a fine of up to 500 rubles for a violation of article 140 (g) of the Criminal Code. Ordinarily the police were able to collect a maximum of 5 rubles. (64)




Every week the Moscow police sent crime reports and evidence to the courts, the moonshiners were fined and released, and

the cycle began all over again. In the countryside, at the

peak of the campaign, fines went as high as the price of a

horse, but the rest of the time rural authorities preferred to keep the fines low, (65) probably so as not to excessively antagonize the peasants.

Punishment by forced labor without imprisonment proved virtually unenforceable; with urban unemployment near 20 per cent labor exchanges could hardly give jobs to convicts. The

eviction of the moonshiners' families and the confiscation of

their property was ultimately the most effective form of

punishment. (66)

Corruption was also to blame for the failure to stop the

flow of moonshine. In the cities, policemen on the take

routinely tipped off moonshiners about upcoming searches so

that by the time the officers arrived to conduct the search

they found only empty vessels smelling of moonshine. The distinctive odor, however, could not be used as evidence of

production or sale. (67) Mere mortals, the men charged with

liquidating the illicit liquor frequently succumbed to its

temptations. A special commission operating in the Kursk

province was known for drinking and selling the moonshine

it confiscated. (68) Pravda reported that in the Riazhskiicounty of the Riazan' province "as soon as the police or any other

authority smell moonshine smoke (the odor is strong) they immediately arrive at the scene of the crime. There they drink, chase it down, take a couple of bottles to keep them company on the way back (the number of bottles depends on the amount

of mash used), and consider their mission accomplished."(69) Sometimes the authorities simply refused to leave as long

as

there was something to drink. On one occasion, reported Krokodil, "a regiment was sent from Izhevsk to struggle

against moonshine and did not come back. The second regiment did not return either. A special regiment was dispatched."(70)

In the spring of 1925, an outside observer described the

state of affairs in Poshekhon'e:

"Moonshine flows like a river. |...| The struggle

against it is minimal. How can the rural district

authorities struggle against it if they drink them

selves into a stupor? The police confiscate stills,

vessels, barrels, cauldrons, and buckets and turn

them over to a committee for mutual aid, which

sells them back to the moonshiners for pennies."(71)

Policemen with common sense must have known they had no chance of winning the battle against moonshine their

superiors wanted them to wage. Consequently, from time to

time they showed less zeal than their bosses counted on. In

the village of Mastopovka in the Penza county the shock

campaign manifested itself in an announcement that moonshiners

could voluntarily turn in their stills. (72) The citizens of

Mastopovka appreciated this laid-back approach to enforcing



368 HELENA STONE

the orders from above. Realizing that the local authorities needed something to show for their efforts to eradicate hooch, the peasants brought in all their hopelessly broken distilling equipment. Presumably the campaign was declared a success

and the village was left in peace for a while. Even sincere attempts to reeducate the public backfired.

In one village the activists put up black shields of disgrace with the names of homebrewers inscribed on them. The display, however, merely served as an advertisement. (73)

Who distilled moonshine? Ezhenedel'nik sovetskoi iustitsii

reported that 70 percent of the convicted moonshiners were

peasants, 12 to 15 percent were workers, and 3 percent were

petty vendors. (74) In February 1923 Pravda wrote: "In the cities the producers of moonshine were mostly widows, the

disabled, petty market vendors, and the so-called unemployed thrown out of the Soviet institutions... ."(75) The Moscow city courts categorized the convicted moonshiners by occupation as

follows: (76)

Jan.-Oct. 1922 Jan.-Feb. 1923 May 1923 % % %

workers 28.4 29 19.5

unemployed 32 28 25 no definite

occupation 8.5 7 32.5 housewives 16.8 white-collar officials

- 10 6.9

petty vendors 7.7 7 8.7 intellectuals, students

- 5

household servants -

14

craftsmen - -

2.4

peasants - -*

4.8

military personnel - - 0.2

total 93.4 100 100

The high percentage of the unemployed and of persons without a definite occupation among the moonshiners undoubtedly reflects the staggering rate of urban unemployment in the

first half of the 1920's. Pravda wrote that in order to eliminate moonshine in the cities the Government should either alleviate

unemployment or provide adequate support for the unemploy ed. (77)

In the countryside the professional moonshiners tended

to be the village poor. In the Tver' province the most destitute

had to distill hooch to make ends meet; as a Red Army soldier's widow explained to the court, she had resorted to

homebrewing because she needed the money to pay her taxes. (78) A survey conducted in the Kostroma province in 1924 showed that 23.3 percent of the known moonshiners were poor peasants,

70.9 percent were middle peasants, 2.3 percent were kulaks,

and the remaining 3.5 percent were non peasant rural




inhabitants (read: local Soviet officials). (79) Most peasants converted their own surplus grain into alcohol; however, the

poorest made their living by distilling their neighbors' grain for wages.

Pravda described the rural moonshiners as "kulaks,

middle peasants, rural migrant workers in the cities, and, of

course, petty vendors. "(80) It wrote of urban bootleggers wearing diamonds and buying houses in the country with their

profits. It ruefully reported that in Mytishchi only moonshiners could afford to pay for electricity while the law-abiding toilers lived in the dark. (81) Occasionally, bootleggers did make a killing. For example, in February 1923 in Moscow a bottle costing 2 to 3 rubles to produce sold for 7 to 10 rubles. (82) In July 1923 in the Tver' province ingredients costing 100 million rubles were made into moonshine which was

sold for 900 million rubles. (83) However, as a rule, the

distilling of liquor merely enabled the moonshiners to subsist. In 1923 a commission of the Central Committee of the

Communist Party set out to discover what the village was

really like by travelling through the Nikol'skaia rural district of the Kursk province. It focused its attention on the typical features of rural life, among which the distilling of liquor occupied a prominent place. The commission questioned 600

people about their attitudes toward moonshine. The overwhelming

majority considered it a legitimate part of their lives. The

only group that condemned moonshine was the sectarians -

although there is no evidence that they consumed any less of

it than the Orthodox. (84) Most peasants emphasized liquor's healing qualities, its traditional role in religious rituals and

holidays, and that it helped people relax after a hard day's work. One man put it most succinctly: "Moonshine is a healing drink and its destruction is barbarism. "(85) The commission felt that such answers reflected the ignorance and stupidity of

the peasants. (86) Most people interviewed approached moonshine as a

morally neutral topic. They felt that while it might be legit imate for the Government to struggle against moonshine, they had no obligation to cooperate. One man remarked: "Do not

rely on the peasants in your battle against moonshine; do it

yourselves." (87) Another said: "To destroy moonshine it is

necessary for the authorities themselves not to drink; then

they can try to persuade the peasants not to drink."(88) Until

such time all exhortations about the evils of drinking would

be perceived as a pure hypocrisy. The peasants saw the issue

as a conflict of interests, not a war between good and evil.

Another group of answers revealed what the head of the

commission called "the class meaning of moonshine."(89) They

emphasized moonshine as a valuable exchange commodity: "It

is easier to hire neighbors for moonshine." "For money no one

will help, but for moonshine - everyone." "If I need to move

lumber 1 have to pay 30 poods of grain or 2 buckets of moon shine. "(90) (Two buckets of moonshine could be produced from

only four poods of potatoes). "A peasant needs moonshine or

vodka, does not matter which. For example, if one needs to



370 HELENA STONE

build a house one can never find workers; but if there is

vodka, or moonshine, like now, you treat the neighbors to it, and the house is soon ready." Some peasants conceded that

distilling moonshine was bad, but argued that it was "desirable to have the state sell alcoholic beverages, without which it is difficult to manage a farm, when one needs the help of the

neighbors. "(91) In the eyes of the commission moonshine

"proved" the existence of capitalist relations in the country side. It enabled the rural bourgeoisie to depress wages and

appropriate a greater share of surplus value. Those who used

moonshine for this purpose were kulaks.

The Central Committee commission had one consolation.

The distilling of moonshine in an odd way validated the Government's anti-religious propaganda: having observed the

process of evaporation and condensation at close hand, the

peasants no longer believed in the divine origin of clouds and rain.(92)

In the Nikol'skaia rural district of the Kursk province moonshine was thought to play a crucial role in the resurgence of capitalism by allowing kulaks to exploit other peasants' labor. In the Goritskaia rural district of the Kimry county of the Tver' province moonshine was found to promote capitalist relations in a different way: it became the key commodity in the trade between town and country. Most outsiders who visited

the Goritskaia rural district during the First World War were bootmakers from Kimry who came to exchange boots for grain. Between 1918 and 1920 a pair of boots went for 3 to 4 poods of rye, but in 1921 the price began to rise. By August 1923 the same pair cost 15 poods of rye. The peasants compensated for the high price of boots by selling moonshine to the boot

makers, who had always been famous for their love of hard

liquor.(93) A peasant from the Goritskaia rural district, P. Pavlov,

described the transition from small scale to market production in a poem entitled "The history of moonshine." The poem is

written in the form of a dialogue between a peasant named

Nazar and his wife Nastasia. Pointing at a moonshine vessel,

Nastasia tells Nazar:

"- You ought to sell it in town. - But you know how strict the authorities are about

it! - You have a lot of acquaintances, sell it to them, no one will ever know! -

Oh, Nastasia, I'm afraid! What if they catch me

with it? -

Well, the first time around they are not too strict.

So what, you'll just give them some of it! Go, I am

telling you, and I'll make some more here...

Nazar vacillated for a long time; at last he was

ready; he took the moonshine, sold it in Kimry and

bought some things. Nazar really pleased his wife:

he brought her some fabric for a skirt. -

Oh, thank you, darling, at last you listened to




me. You see! And you were afraid! I told you -

and you were so stubborn!

'If there is a high demand for it,' said Nastasia,

'you should take moonshine there regularly, once

a week; be more confident! '

Nazar replied: 'Too bad 1 didn't think of it before now! If I had made the effort earlier by now we would be drinking tea with sugar every morning and every evening!'"(94)

The technology of moonshine production was simple. A still could be put together from common household appliances, although occasionally the most unlikely objects were used, such as a baptismal font or "equipment from the State Mint. (95)

According to Pravda, a typical model was made of two heavy cauldrons: one was filled with fermented mash and hung

over

a fire, the other served as a lid. The evaporating alcohol

escaped from the cauldrons through a long coiled tube which

passed through a bucket of cold water or snow. The condensed

liquid dripped into a vessel from the end of the tube. (96) In the early 1920's moonshine was 80 to 100 proof and

sometimes caused alcoholic poisoning owing to a high level of fusel oils. (97) By 1923 rural homebrewers had learned to distill

high quality liquor of 140 to 160 proof. They achieved this by using distilled liquor as the base for a second distilling process. In 1925, when the state stores finally began to sell 80 proof vodka (nicknamed "Rykovka" in honor of Soviet Premier

Rykov who was quite fond of booze), many felt that moonshine

compared favorably to it. (98) The variety of moonshine recipes was astonishing. In 11'f

and Petrov's novel Zolotoi telenok (The golden calf), two Prohibition-ridden Americans travelled to the Soviet Union in search of the perfect moonshine recipe. They obtained a number

of them, including one that featured a wooden stool as the

main ingredient. Most recipes, however, were less exotic; they

usually combined cereals, yeast, and potatoes in different

proportions. (99) Moonshiners had to consider not only flavor but also the yield, i.e. the amount of liquor produced from a

given quantity of mash. The most common recipe in the mid

1920's called for 1.5 poods of potatoes, 8 pounds of flour, 6 pounds of malt, and some yeast. The ingredients yielded 2.5 gallons of liquor. (100)

Even while the anti-moonshine campaign raged, the

Government was considering bringing vodka back. Some econo

mists wistfully recalled that in 1913 the Russian Government had received 433 million rubles in revenue from the sale of vodka and insisted that its return would bring back financial

solvency. They pointed out that the revenue from the sale of

liquor (180 million rubles in 1924-1925) was irreplaceable. (101) On the other hand, the Financial Committee of the Supreme National Economic Council called for the dismantling of the

liquor industry altogether because it was too costly. The

Committee suggested that it would be cheaper to buy alcohol for medical, industrial, and military purposes abroad.



372 HELENA STONE

The discussion in high circles put hope in the hearts of the toilers. On September 13, 1922, Pravda reported that the

capital was rife with rumors of the impending return of vodka:

"'Did you know that the Presidium of the Moscow

City Council decided to reintroduce the monopoly? At a closed meeting? They'll announce it in a few

days....' A day later it 'turns out' that the

question about the monopoly was discussed not at

all by the Presidium, but at a closed meeting of the Moscow Committee of the Ail-Russian Communist

Party. 'These communists voted for it by a

majority! '

The next day - silence about the Moscow

Committee: the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets (again at a closed

session!) decreed to reintroduce the monopoly. 'The old Kalinin himself raised up his arms and

said: "Can't help it, brother. We've got to do

it!.(102)

Trotsky spoke out against vodka in his usual fiery style:

"The revolution has inherited the liquidation of the vodka monopoly as a fact; it has adopted this fact for considerations of highly principled order. Only after the seizure of power by the working class

does the state struggle against alcoholism - cultural

-educational and prohibitive -

acquire all its

historical importance. | ... | To develop, strengthen,

organize, and complete the anti-alcoholic regime in

the country of reborn labor - that is our task. Our

economic and cultural successes will advance as the

alcoholic content falls. There can be no con

cessions." (103)

Stalin later reminisced more soberly about the Govern

ment's dilemma:

"What is better: the yoke of foreign capital or the introduction of vodka - that was the question facing us. Naturally, we opted for vodka because we

believed and continue to believe that if we have to

get a bit dirty for the sake of the victory of the

proletariat and of the peasantry - we will take this

extreme measure in the interest of our cause."(104)

And so it happened. Effective from October 1, 1925, the Government raised the maximum alcoholic content to 80

proof. (105) Vodka arrived in the stores on October 5, four days later than scheduled. (106) The military draft fell on the first

days of the month and the Government thought the customary farewell parties would be less destructive without it. Moon

shine-related crimes were reclassified as minor infractions and

removed from the authority of criminal courts. (107) The




Government tacitly admitted it lacked the manpower to fight homebrewing. The return of the 80 proof vodka - the pre-war norm -

marked the end of the peaceful reconstruction period. Moonshine disappeared from the pages of Pravda and

Ezhenedel'nik sovetskoi iustitsii but it did not vanish. Urban workers switched their allegiance to the official vodka (108) but moonshine remained the most widely consumed form of

liquor. In 1927 it still comprised 80 percent of the alcohol drunk by the people of the Soviet Union. (109) During the

grain procurement crisis of the late 1920's homebrewing was

again briefly brought to public attention because of its un

usually high level. One of the leading economists of the 1920's, Albert Vainshtein, calculated that in both 1922 and 1923 50 million poods (about 902,000 tons) of grain or 8 percent of the grain that could have been available for the market ended

up as moonshine. (110) Nicolas Werth writes that in 1927 91.5 million poods (1,650,000 tons) or 15 percent of the marketable rye alone was illegally distilled into liquor. (Ill) Moshe Lewin thinks the production of moonshine doubled between 1924-1925 and 1927-1928.(112) In 1927 almost half of all police reports about crime in the countryside concerned the discovery of stills. (113) Drunkenness assumed such gigantic proportions as to alarm the chief of the Main State Political Administration (OGPU) himself, V.R. Menzhinskii. (114) The Main Bureau of

Statistics estimated that the country consumed a quarter of a

billion gallons of moonshine in 1927.(115) However, official estimates were based on the amount of grain that was expected to but did not appear on the market. Since moonshiners

frequently used potatoes rather than grain as the main

ingredient, the actual amount of moonshine produced must

have exceeded the official figure. (116) The reintroduction of vodka was the last in a series

of decisions based on the mistaken assumption that a small

gesture of good will would suffice to reduce the amount of

moonshine produced in the country. Although the maximum

alcoholic content of state liquor was raised several times, the

production of illegal liquor continued to grow. The prohibition of vodka in 1914 may have given the original impetus to

homebrewing, but by 1918 the state requisitioning of grain was the dominant reason for moonshine production.

The flood of moonshine in the 1920's cannot be adequately explained by reference to "the national character." In the

first place, as a constant factor it could not possibly account

for a change. Moreover, there is reason to doubt the tradition

ally accepted notion of the peasants' perpetual drunkenness.

In fact, before 1914 the peasants drank far less alcohol per capita than did the urban population. (117) Under the New Economic Policy excessive drinking in the countryside was

found not among the peasants but among the "rural intelli

gentsia," i.e. the petty Soviet officials. A contemporary Soviet

researcher suggested that the delicate mental constitution of

the low-level bureaucrats made them psychically vulnerable to

the horrors of the civil war. As a result they resorted to

intemperate drinking in greater numbers than did the coarser



374 HELENA STONE

but more stable peasants. (118) There is, of course, another

explanation: unlike the peasants, the paper pushers did not

labor from sunrise to sunset. They had a guaranteed income

and the leisure time to get drunk. In the regions where rural families had traditionally

derived a substantial portion of their income from migrant labor, production of moonshine for the urban market partly

compensated for the lack of jobs in the cities. (119) But this does not account for homebrewing in the regions where migrant labor was not common.

One could see homebrewing as another instance of the

peasants' general reversion to home production in the 1920's.

This, however, does not explain the fluctuation in the amount

of moonshine produced in different years. There is only one plausible explanation for the epidemic

of moonshine in the 1920's. A direct relationship existed between the output of moonshine and the disparity in the

prices of agricultural and industrial products. Whenever the

gap widened, as it did in 1922-1923 and in 1927-1928, the volume of moonshine grew. If 1913 prices are taken as a base

of 100, in October 1922 the industrial and agricultural price indexes stood at 140 and 101, respectively. The gap between the two indexes opened widest in September 1923: 273 to 90.(120) This meant that it took three times as much grain to buy a

given consumer good as it had in 1913. However, if grain was converted into moonshine, the terms of trade became more even.

Moonshine could be sold for several times more than the grain from which it was produced.

From the Government's point of view, the problem of the

gap between the industrial and agricultural prices was further

compounded by the existence of the private sector. In the state

and cooperative markets the Government, being the purchaser of grain, fixed the grain prices at a low level. In private

trade, grain sold for a great deal more, and the difference

between the state and free market prices kept growing. Private

agricultural prices were 30 percent higher than the state prices in July 1927, 80 percent higher in July 1928, and twice as

high in July 1929.(121) Naturally, peasants sought to maximize their income by selling grain on the free market, while the

Government, equally naturally, steadily moved toward elimi

nating the bothersome private sector altogether. As the state

authorized private markets were shut down, peasants converted

their grain into a highly sought-after, nonperishable, and

easily stored product: alcohol. Only collectivization put an

end to the distilling of moonshine on a grand scale.

Stanford University, Stanford, 1986.

1. lu. Tokarev, "Dokumenty narodnykh sudov (1917-1922)," in S.N. Valk,. ed., Voprpsy istoriografii i istochnikovedeniia

SSSR (Moscow, 1965): 153.




2. V. Startsev, "Ustavy rabochei Krasnoi Gvardii Petro

grada," in ibid.:219.

3. V.D. Bonch-Bruevich, Vospominaniia o L?nine (Moscow,

1969): 151, 171. 4. V.S. Poznanskii, V.I. Lenin i sovety Sibiri, 1917-1918

(Novosibirsk, 1977): 66. 5. Sobranie uzakonenii 1914, 248/2348, Sept. 5, 1914. 6. Ibid., 1918, 82/866, Oct. 26, 1918; ibid., 1919, 3/42,

Feb. 10, 1919; ibid., 1920, 73/337, Aug. 26, 1920. 7. 1 pood equals 36.11 pounds. M.l. Davydov, Bor'ba

za khleb (Moscow, 1971): 75; V.P. Dmitrenko, "Nekotorye itogi obobshchestvleniia tovarooborota v 1917-1920 gg.," Istoricheskie

zapiski, 79: 228; V.S. Poznanskii, op. cit.: 82, 88-89; V.A.

Radus-Zenkovich, Stranitsy geroicheskogo proshlogo (Moscow,

1960): 37-38, 40. 8. V.S. Poznanskii, op. cit.: 55.'

9. V.G. Bulatskii, Radus-Zenkovich - revoliutsioner,

publitsist (Minsk, 1980): 46. 10. Ia.M. Sverdlov, Izbrannye proizvedeniia (Moscow,

1957) 2 : 213-216. 11. Dekrety sovetskoi vlasti (Moscow, 1975) 7 : 35-36. 12. Ibid.: 35; Sobranie uzakonenii 1921, 60/413, Aug. 9,

1921; ibid., 1921, Dec. 8, 1921. 13. NKIu, Tsirkuliarnye rasporiazheniia, 1920, n? 1/6

and n? 28. 14. Biulleten' NKVD, 2 (Nov. 23, 1921): "Po administra

tivno-organizatsionnomu upravleniiu. Obrabotka informatsion

nykh materialov s mest."

15. Pravda (June 16, 1922): "V medvezh'em uglu." 16. Ibid. (Sept. 30, 1922): "P'ianstvo vnov' podnimaet

golovu." 17. Ibid. (Oct. 6, 1922): "P'ianstvo v Brianskom okruge." 18. Ibid. (Oct. 26, 1922): "Samogonka

v tserkvi."

19. Ibid. (Sept. 18, 1923): "Kak zhivet derevnia." 20. Ibid. (Feb. 22, 1923): "Po Sovetskoi Federatsii. Bor'

ba s samogonom." 21. Bednota (June 22, 1923): "Prestupnyi uezd", cited

in Pravda (July 1, 1923): "Chertova skliannitsa i lipetskii p'ianitsa."

22. Pravda (Apr. 4, 1923): "Bor'ba s samogonom." 23. Ibid. (Mar. 7, 1923): "Khronika. Bor'ba s samogon

shchinoi."

24. Ibid. (Feb. 20, 1923): "Na temy dnia." 25. Ibid. (Oct. 13, 1923): "Bor'ba s samogonshchinoi." 26. Ibid. (Jan. 5, 1923): "Del? samogonnye." 27. Ibid. (Oct. 6, 1922): "Po Sovetskoi Federatsii. Sovre

mennyi gorodok." 28. Ibid. (Aug. 16, 1922): "Eshche raz o p'ianstve";

ibid. (Oct. 6, 1922): "P'ianstvo v Brianskom promyshlennom okruge."

29. Ibid. (Oct. 13, 1922): "Bor'ba s samogonshchinoi." 30. Ezhenedel'nik sovetskoi iustitsii (hereafter Ezh.sov.

iust.) (June 14, 1922), circular n? 113; Ezh.sov.iust. (Sept. 8, 1922), circular n? 77.



376 HELENA STONE

31. Ezh.sov.iust., n? 24-25 and n? 31-32.

32. Ezh.sov.iust. (May 20, 1922): "Iz deiatel'nosti NKIusta."

33. Pravda (Feb. 24, 1923): "VTsIK i bor'ba s samogo nom."

34. Biulleten' NKVD, 2 (Nov. 23, 1921): "Po administra

tivno-organizatsionnomu upravleniiu. "

35. Boris Kozharinov, "Po Dal'nemu Vostoku," Novyi mir,

11 (Nov. 1925). 36. Pravda (Feb. 11, 1922): "Pir vo vremia chumy." 37. Ibid. (Mar. 4, 1922). 38. Ibid. (Feb. 13, 1923). 39. Ezh.sov.iust. (Feb. 12, 1922): "Bor'ba s golodom." 40. Ezh.sov.iust., n? 12 (1922): "Na bor'bu s golodom." 41. Pravda (Feb. 26, 1922): "V medvezh'em uglu." 42. Ibid. (Oct. 13, 1922): "Bor'ba s samogonshchinoi." 43. Ibid. (Feb. 6, 1923): "K bor'be s samogonshchi

kami."

44. Ibid. (Mar. 4, 1922): "Po Sovetskoi Federatsii"; ibid. (Oct. 21, 1922): "Bor'ba s p'ianstvom"; ibid. (Feb. 20, 1923): "K voprosu o bor'be s samogonkoi."

45. Ezh.sov.iust. (June 14, 1923), circular n? 113; Pravda (July 6, 1923): "Sud. Samogonshchina"; ibid. (Aug. 3, 1923): "Sud. Samogonshchina."

46. Ibid. (June 9, 1922): "Po soiuznym respublikam. Telegrammy. VTsIK v bor'be s samogonom."

47. Sputnik sovetskogo iurista (Jan., 1923), n? 678; (Feb. 1923), n? 614; (Mar., 1923), n? 1136; (Apr., 1923),

n? 602. Sobranie uzakonenii 1923, Dec. 29, 1922 and 57/559,

June 28, 1923. 48. O. Kniazev, "Dva mesiatsa raboty osobykh kamer

narodnogo suda po delam o samogonshchikakh

v Moskve," Prole

tar skii sud, 2-3 (Nov.-Dec, 1922). 49. Pravda (Feb. 20, 1923): "K voprosu o bor'be s

samogonom;" Ezh.sov.iust. (Jan. 30, 1923): "Khronika. Bor'ba

s samogonkoi;" Ezh.sov.iust. (Sept. 29, 1923): "Khronika.

Bor'ba s samogonom v Moskve i gubernii za mai 1923 goda;" Ezh.sov.iust. (Aug. 3, 1923): "Khronika. Iz itogov bor'by s

samogonom v Moskve i Moskovskoi gubernii." 50. Pravda (Feb. 15, Mar. 1, Mar. 2, Mar. 8, 1923):

"Bor'ba s samogonom." 51. Ezh.sov.iust. (Sept. 20, 1923): "Na mestakh. V Ar

khangel'skoi gubernii;" Ezh.sov.iust. (Mar. 27, 1923): "Khro

nika. Bor'ba s samogonkoi;" Ezh.sov.iust. (Nov. 10, 1923):

"God bor'by s prestupnost'iu v Petrograde."

52. Pravda (Mar. 7, 1923): "Khronika. Bor'ba s samo

gonshchinoi." 53. A. Uchevatov, "K voprosu o sviazi alkogolizma s

khuliganstvom," in V.N. Tolmachev, ed., Khuliganstvo i khuli

gany (Moscow, 1929): 141. 54. Ibid. 55. Ezh.sov.iust. (Aug. 3, 1923): "Khronika. Iz itogov

bor'by s samogonom v Moskve i Moskovskoi gubernii."

56. D. Rodin, "Obshchii obzor dannykh perepisi zakliu




chennykh," in A.G. Beloborodov, ed., Sovremennaia prestupnost'

(Moscow, 1927): 82; Ezh.sov.iust. (May 27, 1925): "Po avto

nomnym respublikam. Ispravitel' no-trudovaia politika NKlu

Tatar SSR;" Ezh.sov.iust. (1925): "Po avtonomnym respublikam. Rabota prokuratury Kirgizskoi SSR."

57. Ezh.sov.iust. (May 10, 1925): "0 razreshenii vydelki i prodazhi..., December 3, 1924."

58. Ezh.sov.iust. (Apr. 18, 1925), circular n? 76. 59. Ezh.sov.iust. (Feb. 13, 1923): "Khronika. Razgruzka

mest zakliucheniia."

60. Proletarskii sud, 1 (Oct., 1922): "Doklad o deiatel'. nosti SNS i narsudov g. Moskvy i gubernii za 1922 g.;" Pravda (Feb. 18, 1923): "0 samogonke i samogonshchikakh;" A. Gert senzon, Bor'ba s prestupnost'iu v RSFSR (Moscow, 1928): 36.

61. D. Rodin, art. cit. : 13.

62. Sobranie uzakonenii 1922, 64/819, Nov. 2, 1922. 63. E. Shirvindt, "Udarnye kampanii v svete vsesoiuznoi

perepisi po mestam zakliucheniia," in A.G. Beloborodov, ed.,

op. cit.

64. Ezh.sov.iust. (July 10, 1925): "Konferentsiia po delam, presleduemym v administrativnom poriadke."

65. A.M. Bol'shakov, Derevnia 1917-1927 (Moscow, 1927): 344-345; Pravda (July 13, 1922): "Militsiia boretsia s samo

gonshchikami." 66. V.G. Bulatskii, op. cit. : 46.

67. Pravda (June 9, 1923): "Samogonshchiki, ne robei;" Ezh.sov.iust. (Sept. 29, 1923): "0 samogone, potrebiteliakh ego i aktsiznykh narusheniiakh."

68. Pravda (May 21, 1922): "Mtsenskie potemki;" ibid. (Feb. 14, 1923): "P'ianyi potop."

69. Ibid. (Sept. 18, 1923). 70. Krokodil (Mar. 4, 1923): "0 tekh, kto ne vernulsia." 71. L. Grigorov, "Sovremennoe Poshekhon'e," Novyi mir,

7 (July 1925): 139, 144, 149; Krokodil, 23 (June 1925): "Iz Tul'skoi gubernii" and "Pylkii predsedatel': iz Orlovskoi gu

bernii;" ibid., 33 (Sept., 1925): "Zakoldovannyi krug;" N. Ko lokolov, "V glushi. Ural'skie rudniki," Novyi mir, 8 (Aug., 1925): 135.

72. Pravda (Dec. 7, 1922): "Dobrovol'naia iavka samo

gonshchikov." 73. Krokodil (Feb. 18, 1923): 603. 74. Ezh.sov.iust. (Aug. 3, 1923): "Khronika. Iz itogov

bor'by s samogonom v Moskve i Moskovskoi gubernii." 75. Pravda (Feb. 20, 1923): "K voprosu o bor'be s

samogonkoi." 76. Proletarskii sud, 1 (Oct., 1922) and 2-3 (Nov.-Dec.

1922): "Doklad o deiatel'nosti SNS i narsudov g. Moskvy i

gubernii za 1922 g.;" Pravda (Feb. 18, 1923): "0 samogone i

samogonshchikakh;" Ezh.sov. iust. (Sept. 29, 1923): "Khronika.

Bor'ba s samogonom v Moskve i gubernii za mai 1923 goda."

77. Pravda (Feb. 20, ^1923): "Na temy dnia;" ibid.

(Jan. 11, 1923): "Del? samogonnye. Po-bibleiskomu;" E. Shir

vindt, art. cit. : 7; Ezh.sov.iust. (Aug. 3, 1923): "Khronika.

Iz itogov bor'by s

samogonom v Moskve i Mosk. gubernii."



378 HELENA STONE

78. A.M. Bol'shakov, op. cit. : 341.

79. A.M. Bol'shakov, Derevnia posle Oktiabria (Lenin

grad, 1925): 272; Ezh.sov.iust. (Apr. 25, 1925): "Prestupnost' v derevne."

80. Pravda (Feb. 20, 1923). 81. Ibid. (June 25, 1922): "Nuzhno uniat' samogonshchi

kov;" ibid. (Feb. 24, 1923): "Bor'ba s samogonshchinoi;" ibid.

(Mar. 9, 1923): "Elektrifikatsiia samogonshchikov." 82. Ibid. (Oct. 5, 1922): "Bor'ba s samogonshchinoi;"

ibid. (Jan. 5, 1923): "Del? samogonnye;" ibid. (Feb. 17, 1923): "Bor'ba s samogonkoi."

83. A.M. Bol'shakov, Derevnia 1917-1927, op.cit. : 340. 84. la. Iakovlev, Derevnia kak ona est'. Ocherki Nikol

skoi volosti (Moscow, 1923): 108. 85. Ibid. : 109-110. 86. Ibid. : 109. 87. Ibid. : 110. 88. Ibid. : 109-110. 89. Ibid. : 106. 90. Ibid. : 107. 91. Ibid. 92. Ibid. : 8. 93. A.M. Bol'shakov, Derevnia 1917-1927, op. cit. : 339. 94. Ibid. : 339-340. 95. Pravda (Aug. 17, 1922): "Rabochaia zhizn'. Master

osobykh del." 96. Ibid. (June 16, 1922): "V medvezh'em uglu;" ibid.

(Feb. 6, 1923): "Po Sovetskoi Federatsii. Zakholust'e." 97. la. Iakovlev, op. cit. : 111.

98. Pravda (Sept. 18, 1923): "Kak zhivet derevnia;" Krokodil (Aug. 19, 1923): "Pro diadiu Nefeda-samogonoveda ;

"

A.M. Bol'shakov, Derevnia 1917-1927, op. cit. : 346.

99. Nicolas Werth, La vie quotidienne des paysans russes de la r?volution ? la collectivisation (1917-1939) (Paris, 1984) : 154-155.

100. A.M. Bol'shakov, Derevnia 1917-1927, op. cit. : 340.

The amount of potatoes is given as 1.5. mera and is difficult

to convert precisely since a mera is a measure of volume equal to the volume occupied by a pud (weight) of grain.

101. A. Gertsenzon, op. cit. : 134-235; Pravda (Sept. 8,

1922): "Nuzhno li sokhranit' vinokurennuiu promyshlennost' ;" ibid. (Sept. 4, 1922): "Eto ne proidet."

102. Ibid. (Sept. 13, 1922): "Po staroi, po Nikolaevskoi." 103. L.D. Trotsky, "Vodka, tserkov' i kinematograf,"

ibid. (July 12, 1923). 104. I.V. Stalin, Sochineniia (1946-1951), 9: 192. 105. Ezh.sov.iust. (Sept. 21, 1925): "0 proizvodstve

spirta i spirtnykh napitkov i torgovle imi. August 28, 1925." 106. A. Uchevatov, art. cit. : 135.

107. A. Gertsenzon, op. cit. : 18-19.

108. A.M. Bol'shakov, Derevnia 1917-1927, op. cit. : 346.

109. Walter D. Connor, "Alcohol and Soviet society," Slavic Review, 30 (Sept. 197*1): 572.

110. A.L. Vainshtein, ed., Khlebnye tseny i khlebnyi




rynok (Moscow, 1925)': 21, 28. 111. N. Werth, op. cit. : 155-156. 112. Moshe Lewin, Russian peasants and Soviet power:

a study of collectivization (Evanston, 111. 1968): 32. 113. N. Werth, op. cit. : 156.

114. Michal Reiman, Die Geburt des Stalinismus (Frank furt/Main, 1979) : 142.

115. N. Werth, op. cit. : 155-156.

116. A.L. Vainshtein, ed., op. cit. : 21, 28; N. Werth,

%op. cit. : 155-156.

117. A.L. Vainshtein, Oblozhenie i platezhi krest ' ianstva

v dovoennoe i revoliutsionnoe vremia (Moscow, 1924) : 140-141, 14-15.

118. A.M. Bol'shakov, Derevnia 1917-1927, op. cit. : 343. 119. Ibid. : 341. 120. TsSU, Itogi desiatiletiia Sovetskoi vlasti v tsifrakh

1917-1927 (Moscow, 1927) : 412. 121. Naum Jasny, The socialized agriculture of the USSR

(Stanford, 1949) : 207.



the soviet government and moonshine, 1917-1929

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