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TheStateofNaturalGasPipelinesinFortWorth

ProducedBy

AccufactsInc. “ClearKnowledgeintheOverInformationAge”

RichardB.Kuprewicz 1155N.StateSt.Suite609 President,AccufactsInc. Bellingham,WA98225 (425)836‐4041 (360)543‐5686 kuprewicz@comcast.net http://www.pstrust.org

ProducedFor

October2010

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P.O. Box 3088, Fort Worth, Texas 76113 http://www.fwlna.org Dear Neighbor, As I am sure you are well aware, many of the neighborhoods within Fort Worth have struggled for the past few years with the growing natural gas development in our midst. Drilling is a complex issue, particularly in an urban setting. While gas well drilling can represent a significant economic benefit to many, it also brings with it an increased safety risk to all of us who live in Fort Worth. As many newspaper and television stories have portrayed, trying to understand and measure that increased risk is often difficult and contentious. In the spring of 2009 the Fort Worth League of Neighborhood Associations learned of a new grant program from the U.S. Department of Transportation’s Office of Pipeline Safety. Each grant made up to $50,000 available for local communities to hire independent pipeline expertise to investigate and report on pipeline issues that are of concern to those communities. We applied for, and received, one of those grants to help provide expert, objective information about the safety of the growing number of natural gas pipelines that increasingly crisscross our neighborhoods and our city. The following report is the culmination of this grant effort. We hope you find it informative and helpful in ensuring the safety of the pipelines in your neighborhood and in our city. Sincerely,

Libby Willis President Fort Worth League of Neighborhood Associations

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Sinceearly in2010 thePipelineSafetyTrustandAccufactshavebeendiscussingwithmembersof theFortWorthLeagueofNeighborhoodAssociationstheirconcernsaboutthelevelofurbangasdrillingoccurringinFortWorth,andthelargeexpansionofpipelinesthatwillnaturallyfollow.InAprilwetraveledtoFortWorthandmet Leaguemembers, members of the FortWorth City Council and City staff, representatives of theRailroad Commission of Texas (RRC), state legislators, and representatives from many of the pipelinecompanies.Fromthesediscussions,meetings,areanewsstories,andpubliclyavailableinformationwehavepreparedthefollowingreportonthestateofnaturalgaspipelinesinFortWorth.Drillinginurbanareasposesmanydifficultquestionsincludingimpactstoairandwaterquality,andincreasedrisk to human health and safety. This report focuses solely on the issues associated with the natural gaspipelinesinFortWorth,withaparticularemphasisontheincreasingnumberofpipelinescreatedbytheurbandrilling.The report tries to provide enough information so those not involved with pipelines on a daily basis canunderstand the differences between the different types of pipeline and how they are regulated, operated,maintained andwheremore information is available.We also try to address, from our point of view, thevariousconcernswehaveheardfrompeopleintheFortWorthArea.Inpreparingthisreportweusedagooddealofinformationthatispubliclyavailable,mainlyfromthefederalOfficeofPipelineSafety(OPS)1andtheRailroadCommissionofTexas(RRC).Insomecaseswetriedtoverifypiecesofinformationthatwefoundconfusing,butforthemostpartwetookthisinformationatfacevalue.Inotherwords,iftheRRCwebsitesaysthereisa30inchpipelinewithamaximumallowableoperatingpressureof1200PSIGrunningalongtheeastsideofOldDentonRoadwehaveassumedthatinformationisaccurateenoughforthepurposesofthisreport.Amongthequestionsthisreporttriedtoanswerare:

• WhatarethetypesofnaturalgaspipelinesinFortWorthandhowtolearnthegenerallocations?• Whoregulatesthesitingandsafeoperationofthesepipelines?• Whatarethebasicsafetyrequirementsforconstructing,operatingandmaintainingthesepipelines?• Whatrisksdothesepipelinesposetopublicsafety?• Whatcanbedonetoreducethesepublicsafetyrisksevenfurther?

InthereportyouwillfindanumberofrecommendationsthatvariousagenciesandstakeholdergroupscouldadoptthatwouldmakepipelinesinFortWorthevensafer.Thoserecommendationsinclude:TheU.S.CongressorthefederalOfficeofPipelineSafetyCould:

1. Implementa rulemaking to clarify thepointwhereonshore regulatedgasgathering linesbegin (49CFRPart192.8).Thatpointshouldbedefinedtoensuretherearenounregulatedgaspipelinesoffofwellpadsinclass2,3,or4areas,orother“identifiedsites”wherelargegroupsmaygather.

2. Implement a rulemaking to include all Type A gathering lines (49 CFR Part 192.9) under the fullrequirements of the Integrity Management program (49 CFR Part 192 Subpart O) that currently onlyappliestotransmissionpipelines.

1 The Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) is within the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), which is part of the U.S. Department of Transportation. Often OPS and PHMSA are used synonymously.

ReportSummary

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3. ThefederalOfficeofPipelineSafetyortheRRCshouldundertakeastudytodeterminethebenefitsandrisksofodorizinggatheringlinesinpopulatedareas.Thatstudyshouldataminimumaddresstheconcernofproperinjectionofodorantatmultiplewellsites,howandatwhatconcentrationsheavierthanairgascomponentsmaychangetheneedforodorants,andtheapparentdisconnectbetweentherequirementsfor odorant in Type A gathering lines in populated areas and the various exemptions to thoserequirements,particularlyrelatedtogatheringlinestransportinggasinurbanareas.

TheTexasStateLegislatureCould

4. Make clear that in urban areas pipeline routing using road rights‐of‐way under TxDOT control is anapproveduseas longas it isdoneinawaythatdoesnotconflictwithhighwaysafetyorfutureplannedexpansionofhighways.

5. Considerformingsometypeofpipelinesitingcommissionthatwouldbeindependentfromtheinherentconflictof interest thatpipelineoperatorsor themonetarybeneficiary forwell leasesandrights‐of‐wayagreementsoftenhave.Suchabodycouldbeempoweredtoestablishsafepipelineroutesforhighstresspipelinesinpopulatedurbanareas.

6. FundastudyoftheFortWorthareatodeterminehowmuchduplicatepipelineinfrastructurecouldhavebeen avoided already, and into the future, if those companies drilling in urban areaswere required tomasterplansharedpipelineinfrastructureaspartoftheirwelldevelopmentstrategy.

TheRailroadCommissionofTexas(RRC)Could

7. UsetheirownauthorityonintrastatepipelinesinTexastoadoptrecommendation2above.

8. Amend current rules to allow municipal government to adopt stricter pipeline safety standards onintrastatepipelinesaslongastheyarecompatiblewithstateandfederalregulations.

9. UndertakeastudyoftheproductionpipelinesthatoccurbeforethefirstpointofmeasurementonoroffthewellpadsinFortWorthtodetermineifthosepipelinesareputtingpeopleatthesamelevelofriskasregulated production, gathering and transmission pipelines and therefore need to be under the samepipelinesafetyregulations.

10. MakeitclearintheirrulesthattheexemptionavailableunderTITLE16,PART1,CHAPTER8,SUBCHAPTERA,RULE§8.1(c)(2)willnotbegrantedifitwillallowacompanytooperatepipelinesunderregulationslessstringentthanwhattheRRChasset.

11. Provide clear publicly available documentation regarding their involvement during construction of newintrastatepipelines.Thatdocumentationshouldeitherprovideevidencethattheyhavethe involvementnecessarytocatchthetypesofproblemsidentifiedbyOPS,oraretakingthestepsnecessarytodoso.

12. ThefederalOfficeofPipelineSafetyortheRRCshouldundertakeastudytodeterminethebenefitsandrisksofodorizinggatheringlinesinpopulatedareas.Thatstudyshouldataminimumaddresstheconcernofproperinjectionofodorantatmultiplewellsites,howandatwhatconcentrationsheavierthanairgascomponentsmaychangetheneedforodorants,andtheapparentdisconnectbetweentherequirementsfor odorant in Type A gathering lines in populated areas and the various exemptions to thoserequirements,particularlyrelatedtogatheringlinestransportinggasinurbanareas.

13. Addthecauseoftheexcavation incidentaswellasthefines leviedtothedatabasefields intheirTexasPipelineDamagePreventionQuerysystem.

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14. Reviewandremovemostoftheexemptionsincludedintheirdamagepreventionregulations(TACTitle16,Part1,Chapter18).

15. Createapubliclyaccessibledocketsystemthatwouldincludeallinformationaboutpipelineenforcementcasesandfines. Italsowould includeanyrequestsforexemptionsorwaiversandtheRRCreasoningforgrantingordenyingsuchrequests.

16. Make its incident database available to the public. Instead of just reporting the number of incidentsreported, information about the particular pipeline involved, date, location, damage caused, and causeshouldalsobeprovided.

TheCityofFortWorthCould

17. Usethepowersgrantedthemforprotectingpublicwelfare,andfortheapprovalofwherepipelinescrosspublicpropertyandrights‐of‐ways,toensurethatwheneverfeasible,newnaturalgaspipelinesareroutedin the least populated areas. Thiswould include corridors alongmain roads and railroads, and currentopenspacenotslatedforfutureresidentialorcommercialoccupancyorintenserecreationaluse.

18. Ensure that adequate public discussion of pipeline route selection is included before siting approval isgranted.ThiswouldincludereviewbytheappropriateadvisorycommitteessuchastheGasDrillingReviewCommittee, the Zoning Commission, the Plan Commission, the Parks and Community Services AdvisoryBoard,etc.

19. ScheduleaCityCouncilworksession togetapresentationon the finalPipelinesand InformedPlanningAlliance Report when it is released, and then decide how to proceed to adopt the parts they feelimportant.AtaminimumtheyshouldadopttheConsultationZoneprocessintoCityCode.

20. ReviewtheiremployeetrainingregardingdamagepreventiontoensuretheOneCallsystemisbeingusedbeforeallexcavationandthatsafeexcavationpracticesarefollowed.

21. Makeall pipelinepermit information publicly available online, andensure that themaximumallowableoperating pressure (MAOP), pipe diameter, and potential impact radius distances of all pipelines areprovidedinsuchinformationbeforeapprovalissoughtfromvariouscommitteesortheCityCouncil.

22. Makeallpermittedpipelineroutesavailableonlinebeforeapprovalisprovided.ToensuretheCityisusingitsapprovalauthoritytohelpdevelopsafepipelineroutes,whenapprovalforcrossingofCityrights‐of‐wayorothercitycontrolledpropertyissoughttherouteoftheentirepipelineshouldbeprovidednotjustthelocationwherethepipelinewillcross.

ThePipelineIndustryCould

23. Providetheirexpertiseandcooperation inworkingwiththeCityofFortWorthtoroutepipelines in theleastpopulatedareasfeasible.

24. Makespecific informationaboutpipelineroutes,construction,specifications,operationsand inspectionsoftheirpipelinesavailableontheirwebsites.

TheCitizensofFortWorthCould

25. Learnwherethepipelinesareintheirneighborhoods,andmakesuretheyusetheOneCallsystembeforedigging.Theyshouldlearnwhomtocontactiftheyseesomeoneelsetheybelieveisdiggingwithoutusingthe freeOneCall locateservice,andwhotonotifyandwhatactions to take if theysuspecta release isoccurring.

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26. Continue to review pipeline safety information andmake elected officials, regulatory agencies and thepipelineindustryawareofconcernstheyhaveregardingtheinabilitytoaccesspipelinesafetyinformation.

TheNaturalGasResourceTheBarnett Shale is situated inNorth Texas, and is oneof the largest natural gas reserves in the country.Coveringanareaof5,000squaremiles,productiontakesplacein23countiesfromnearly14,000wells.2Muchof theBarnett Shale gas reserve lies under the FortWorthmetropolitan area. In 2003, theU.S.GeologicalSurveyestimatedthatthisareaheldavolumeof26trillioncubicfeetofrecoverablegas.3TheCityofFortWorthFortWorthisthe17thlargestcityintheUnitedStatesandoverthelastseveralyearshasconsistentlybeenamongthefastestgrowingcitiesinthecountry.WithinFortWorth'scitylimits,anareaof300squaremiles,residemorethan736,200people.4Although drilling for gas in urban areas isnot new, it is unlikely that the extractionactivities in other areas have been of themagnitude of those in the City of FortWorth. There are currently at least 1224producing gas wells in the city, anadditional 450 wells that have beenpermitted, and 64 applications arepending5.Withgasdrillingactivitieslocatedinsuchdensely‐populatedareas,therenaturallyarisesaheightenedpublicawareness of and concerns about the impact of these activities on public safety and health.

2 Railroad Commission of Texas, “Newark, East (Barnett Shale) Statistics updated 12/29/09” http://www.rrc.state.tx.us/data/fielddata/index.php 3 “Barnett Boom Ignites Hunt for Unconventional Gas Resources” January 2007, www.jsg.utexas.edu/news/feats/2007/barnett.html 4 North Central Texas Council of Governments, http://www.nctcog.dst.tx.us/ris/demographics/population.asp 5 City of Fort Worth website, http://www.fortworthgov.org/gaswells/default.aspx?id=50608

Background

TopTen2009BarnettShaleGasOperatorsAccordingtoRRCData

OperatorName GasProduced(MCF)1.DEVONENERGYPRODUCTIONCO,L.P. 70,186,2292.CHESAPEAKEOPERATING,INC. 53,895,5943.XTOENERGYINC. 46,089,1014.EOGRESOURCES,INC. 27,573,5665.QUICKSILVERRESOURCESINC. 17,260,1276.ENCANAOIL&GAS(USA)INC. 11,759,2297.RANGEPRODUCTIONCOMPANY 8,306,2518.CARRIZOOIL&GAS,INC. 6,072,9559.WILLIAMSPROD.GULFCOAST,L.P. 5,958,00410.BURLINGTONRESOURCESO&GCOLP 5,934,708

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TherearefourmaintypesofnaturalgaspipelinesinFortWorth,anditisimportanttounderstandwhatthedifferent types are since they have different safety considerations and are regulated by different agenciesunderdifferentrules.Thefourmaintypes,inorderfromthegaswelltoyourhouse,are:Production Lines: These are the pipes and equipment, normally near the wellhead, used to produce andpreparethegasfortransport.GatheringLines:Thesearethepipelinesthattransportnaturalgasfromaproductionfacilitytoatransmissionline.Ingeneral,higher‐pressuregatheringlinesinpopulatedareasaredesignatedas“TypeA”gatheringlines.MostofthegatheringlinesinFortWorthareTypeA.TransmissionLines:Thesearetherelativelylarger,higher‐pressurepipelinesthatmovegasfromproductionorstoragetowherethegasisdistributedtoourhomesandbusinesses.DistributionLines:Adistributionlineisarelativesmall,lowerpressurepipelineusedtosupplynaturalgastotheconsumer.Adistributionlineisanypartofthedistributionsystem,anetworkofpipesconsistingofmainsandservicelineslocateddownstreamofanaturalgastransmissionline.Thefigurebelowmayhelpmakeallthisclearer.

Two other important distinctions are interstate pipelines compared to intrastate pipelines. Interstatepipelinesrunacrossstateborders,whileintrastatepipelinesdonotcrossstateborders.

WhatKindofNaturalGasPipelinesAreinFortWorth

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Two of the key measurable determinants of the risks a pipeline poses to public safety are the pipeline’slocationandenforcementofthesafetygoverningitsdesign,construction,operation,andmaintenance.

• InterstatePipelines

Ingeneral,thefederalgovernmentcanonlydeterminethesitingof interstategastransmissionpipelines. Ithas no authority over the siting of intrastate gas pipelines, regardless of whether they are production,gathering,transmissionordistributionlines.ThoseintendingtoconstructpipelinesandtheassociatedfacilitiesforuseintheinterstatetransportationofgasmustapplytotheFederalEnergyRegulatoryCommission(FERC)foracertificateofpublicnecessityandconvenienceforsitingofpipelines.ThevastmajorityofnewgaspipelinesbeingproposedfortheFortWorthareaarenotinterstatepipeline,sonofederalagencyisinvolvedinthesiting.• IntrastatePipelines

TheRailroadCommissionof Texas (RRC) generallydoesnothaveauthorityover the sitingof intrastate gaspipelines.Oneexceptionisforthelocationofcertainpipelinesandancillaryequipmentthattransport“sourgas,”whichisgasthatcontainsaconcentrationof100partspermillionormoreofhydrogensulfide—levelstheRRChasdeterminedtobetoxic.In Texas, the siting of most intrastate gas pipelines is left to gas corporations. This is because the TexasLegislaturehasgivensuchcorporationstherightofeminentdomain:thepowertocondemnprivatepropertyforpublicuseuponpaymentofadequatecompensation.Eminentdomainiscommonlythoughtofasagovernmentright.InupholdingtheTexasLegislature’sgrantingof this right to gas corporations, Texas courts have ruled the Legislature made a determination thattransportinggasfromplacesofproductiontoplacesofsaleservesa“publicpurpose.”Through their eminent domain power, gas corporations have broad authority to acquire private land for apublicpurpose.Theirabilitytoacquirepublicpropertythrougheminentdomainismorelimited.The Texas Legislature also granted gas corporations—and gas utilities—the authority to “lay andmaintain”their pipelines on certain public lands andwaters. But generally this authority is not unbridled: to do sorequirestheconsentofanaffectedstateagencyormunicipality.Eventhoughamunicipalityhaslimitedpowertodirectlydictatewhereanintrastategaspipelinecanbesited,amunicipality suchasFortWorthmay indirectly impact the routingofapipeline. It cando this through itsauthoritytoprotectpublichealthandsafetybytheadoptionandenforcementof“policepower”ordinancesand zoning regulations. These are actions that are “necessary to protect health, life, and property and topreservethegoodgovernment,order,andsecurityofthemunicipalityanditsinhabitants.”6Inaddition,theLegislatureallowsamunicipalitytoadoptanordinance“thatestablishesconditionsformapping,inventorying,locating,orrelocatingpipelinesover,under,along,oracrossapublicstreetoralleyorprivateresidentialareaintheboundariesofthemunicipality.”7

6 TexasStatutes,LocalGovernmentCode,§54.004 7 TexasStatutes,UtilitiesCode,§121.202(b)(2)(A)

TheSitingofaGasPipelineinFortWorth

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Usingthesepowers,theCityofFortWorthadoptedOrdinance18449‐02‐2009,whichamendedinitsentiretytheprovisionsoftheCity’sCodepertainingtogasdrillingandoilproduction.IncludedinthisportionoftheCityCodearetechnicalandpermittingrequirementsforgaspipelines.Thepipelinesthataresubjecttotheserequirements include—but are not limited to—production lines, gathering lines and transmission lines,regardlessofwheretheyarelaidinthecity.Under the City’s Code the City’s Gas Drilling Review Committeemust review proposed pipelines before aconstruction permit can be issued for the pipeline. Between the provisions of the City’s Code and therequirement that gas corporations get the consentof themunicipality before they laypipelines across cityownedproperty,theCityhasasignificantindirectabilitytocontrolwherepipelinesareroutedwithinthecitylimits.EminentDomainversusPublicHealthandSafety

TheTexas Legislaturehas createda legalpuzzlewith regard to the sitingof intrastategaspipelines. Ithasgiven gas corporations the right of eminent domain, which would appear to give them the ability to sitepipelinesalmostanywheretheywantonprivatelands.YettheLegislaturehasalsoempoweredmunicipalitiesto protect the public health and safety through ordinances and zoning regulations, which could indirectlyaffectwherethesepipelinesarerouted.Thecourtshavetriedtoreconcilethesegrantsofpowerandtheirdecisionsseemtoturnonthespecificfactsofthecasesbeforethem:dothezoningregulationsdilutetheeminentdomainpowerofthegascorporationanddictatewhereapipelinecanbesited?Ordotheseregulationsmerelyprotectthepublichealthandsafetyfromactivities related to the construction,operation, andmaintenanceof thepipeline? Until this issue isresolved—eitherjudiciallyorlegislatively—gascorporations,municipalities,andthepublicwillnotbeabletoactwithacompleteunderstandingofthelimitsoftheirpowers.

IssuesAroundtheSitingofPipelinesandPolicyRecommendations

Asremarkableasitmayseem,neitherfederalnorstatepipelinesafetyregulationsaddresstheissueofsafelysitingpipelines. Partofthereasonforthisdisconnectisthatpipelinesiting isnotunder the jurisdictionof theagenciescharteredwith theadministrationandenforcementofpipelinesafetyregulations.It is our opinion that wherever possible production, gathering andtransmissionpipelinesshouldbesited in locationsthatare“generallyemptyareas.”Locationssuchasmajorroadwayandrailroadcorridors,andcurrentopenspacenotslatedforfutureresidentialorcommercialoccupancyorintenserecreationaluseshouldbeusedforgaspipelinesas opposed to residential neighborhood settings. The City of FortWorth has special powers associated with public rights‐of‐way,protectionofpublicwelfare,aswellaszoningthatcanallowthemtoencourage such prudent routing. All siting in public areas requires that adequate considerations, such asadequate pipeline depth to handle surface loading in roadways for example, be included in these specificdecisions.Fromourreviewitisnotclearthereisanyentitythatcurrentlyisempoweredandfunctioningtostrategicallyroutepipelinesinthesafestlocationspossible.

“itisnotclearthereisanyentitythatcurrentlyisempoweredandfunctioningtostrategicallyroutepipelinesinthesafestlocationspossible”

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Incitiesitisoftendifficulttodeterminethebestrouteforapipelinegiventhemanycomplicationsandcompetingintereststhatcancomeintoplay.Oftentheincentiveforapipelinecompanymaybethattheshortestpathistheleastexpensive.Whilethisiscertainlyoneconsiderationsomeonealsoneedstoensurethatlongerroutesthatmayprovidegreatersafetytocurrentpopulationsandlessimpacttofuturedevelopmentarealsoconsidered.Pipelines can either leak or rupture, and these two very different types of failure should be considered inchoosingroutesforpipelines.Becauseofthemanytonsofresultinggasreleasedandconsiderably larger potential impact zones associatedwith gas pipeline ruptures, additional care should beexercised in the placement of large diameter, high‐pressure gas pipelines. For gas pipelines capable ofrupture, sites where large groups of unshelteredindividuals may gather, or structures that cannot beeasily evacuated, such as schools, hospitals andfacilitiesthathousetheelderly,shouldbeavoided.8Forpipelinesthatcanrupture,distancingandsitespecificscreening,suchastheprudentplacementoftrees,concrete structures and parking lots, can also play an important role in prudent pipeline placement Thesescreening techniques can buy some survival time by helping to block people from the initial heat flux orcreatingmoredistancebetweenpeopleandapotentialrupture.Inpipelinesitingforleaks,proximityofpipelinestostructureswheregascancollectandbuildup,especiallyifthepipelinesarenotodorized,iscriticallyimportant.Leakinggasthatbuildsupinastructurecanresultinverydestructiveforcesuponignitionanddetonation.Thatiswhyforgasdistributionpipelinesthatcannotavoidproximitytostructures,odorizationofthegasasanearlywarningofleaksismandatory.Becausetransmissionandgatheringpipelinescanalsoleak,odorantinjectionisrequiredincertainhighpopulationareastoassistinleakdetection,buttherearemanyexclusionseveninsuchareas.Asaresult,mosttransmissionandgatheringpipelinemilesdon’tincludeodorant.Inarelatedsitingissue,itisnotuncommon,especiallyincities,forpipelinestoshareacommonright‐ofwaygiven the limited availability of suitable land for such purposes. In such shared pipeline rights‐of‐way it isincumbentonallthoseinvolvedthatcertainpipelineconstruction,operations,maintenance,andemergencyactivitiesbecommunicatedamongstallpipelineoperatorsinthesharedright‐of‐way.AnotherproblemwiththecurrentsysteminTexasthatprovidespipelineoperatorswiththerightofeminentdomainisthattherearemultipleoperatorsandthereislittleincentivetobuildandsharecommonpipelineinfrastructure.Witheachcompany building its own systems the risk is multiplied, with little apparent thought to how to minimizepipelinesthroughsharedfacilities.Our reviewof FortWorthpipelinemaps from theRRC indicates that thevastmajorityofexistingpipelines(althoughcertainlynotall)havebeensitedinthetypesofopenareasthatwerecommend.Theinformationavailable tousduringour reviewdidnotallowus to interpretwhethermuchof this currentopen space isplannedforfuturedevelopment,orthecurrentorfutureintensityofrecreationaluses.Goodplanningwouldcertainly include not just the current use, but the future uses also to avoid foreclosing potential futureplannedusesbysitingpipelinesinsuchplacesnow.

8 Gas distribution pipelines, and low stress production, gathering and transmission pipelines cannot rupture.

“Forgaspipelinescapableofrupture,siteswherelargegroupsofunshelteredindividualsmaygather,orstructuresthatcannotbeeasilyevacuated,suchasschools,hospitalsandfacilitiesthathousetheelderly,shouldbeavoided”

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SitingRecommendations• The City of FortWorth should use the powers granted them for protecting public welfare, and for theapprovalofwherepipelinescrosspublicpropertyandrights‐of‐ways,toensurethatwheneverfeasible,newnaturalgaspipelinesarerouted inthe leastpopulatedareas.Thiswould includecorridorsalongmainroadsand railroads,andcurrentopenspacenot slated for future residentialor commercialoccupancyor intenserecreationaluse.•TheCityofFortWorthshouldensurethatadequatepublicdiscussionofpipelinerouteselectionisincludedbeforeconstructionapproval isgranted.Thiswould include reviewby theappropriateadvisorycommitteessuch as the Gas Drilling Review Committee, the Zoning Commission, the Plan Commission, the Parks andCommunityServicesAdvisoryBoard,etc.• TheStateLegislature,or failing that theCityofFortWorth,maywant toconsider formingsome typeofpipeline siting commission that would be independent from the inherent conflict of interest that pipelineoperatorsorthemonetarybeneficiaryforwellleasesandrights‐of‐wayagreementsoftenhave.Suchabodycouldbeempoweredtoestablishsafepipelineroutesforhighstresspipelinesinpopulatedurbanareas.•TheTexasDepartmentofTransportation(TxDOT)ortheStateLegislatureshouldmakeclearthat inurbanareaspipeline routingusing road rights‐of‐wayunderTxDOTcontrol isanapprovedandencourageduseaslongasitisdoneinawaythatdoesnotconflictwithhighwaysafetyorfutureplannedexpansionofhighways.•TheStateLegislatureshouldfundastudyoftheFortWorthareatodeterminehowmuchduplicatepipelineinfrastructurecouldhavebeenavoidedalready,andintothefuture,ifthosecompaniesdrillinginurbanareaswererequiredtomasterplansharedpipelineinfrastructureaspartoftheirwelldevelopmentstrategy.•ThepipelineindustryshouldprovidetheirexpertiseandcooperationinworkingwiththeCityofFortWorthtoroutepipelinesintheleastpopulatedareasfeasible.

• FederalPowersTheU.S.DepartmentofTransportation, through itsOfficeofPipelineSafety (OPS)establishestheminimumsafetystandardsfortheinterstateandintrastatetransportationofgasbypipelines,aswellasforthe“pipelinefacilities” used in these activities. The term “pipeline facilities” includes pipelines, rights‐of‐way, facilities,buildings,andequipmentusedintransportinggasortreatinggasduringitstransportation.CongressmandatedthatOPSadoptcertainsafetystandards. Amongtheareas inwhichstandardsmustbeadopted are operator qualifications, facility information and documents (for example, emergency responseplansandmapping),andperiodicpipelineinspections.Othermandatedstandardsincludethoseaddressingriskanalysesand integritymanagementprograms forpipeline facilities (other thandistributionpipelines) inhigh‐densitypopulationareas,aswellasaseparateintegritymanagementprogramfordistributionpipelines.All of the mandates vary depending on whether a pipeline is for production, gathering, transmission ordistribution.CongressalsogavePHMSAauthoritytoadoptothersafetystandardsonitsown.Thisdiscretionaryauthorityisextremelybroadandcovers theentirerangeof thepublicsafetyriskareas—except forsiting—relatedto

RegulatingPipelineSafetyPipelineinFortWorth

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pipeline facilities and transportation: design, installation, inspection, emergency plans and procedures,testing,construction,operation,replacementandmaintenance.PHMSA’sminimumfederalsafetystandardsfornaturalgaspipelinesaresetoutinTitle49,Part192 of the Code of Federal Regulations (49 CFR Part 192), which can be found at:http://phmsa.dot.gov/pipeline/regs• StatePowers

ThefederalOfficeofPipelineSafetyhascertifiedTexasashavingavalidpipelinesafetyprogram.BecauseofthiscertificationtheLegislaturehas given regulatory authority over the safety of intrastate pipeline facilities andintrastate pipeline transportation to the Railroad Commission of Texas (RRC).Although the federal government is responsible for setting minimum pipelinesafety standards, Texas can adopt additional or stricter safety standards forintrastate pipeline facilities and intrastate pipeline transportation. However, anyintrastatesafetystandardsadoptedbyTexasmustbecompatiblewiththefederalstandards.Only in a few instances has the RCC imposed requirements beyond the federalregulations that significantly affect intrastate pipeline safety. The additionalrequirementsinclude:

•Clarifiesthebeginningofgatheringlinestothefirstpointofmeasurement•Requiresexcavatorsandpipelineoperatorstoreportalldamagetopipelines

TheTexasRRCpipelinesafetyregulationscanbefoundat:http://info.sos.state.tx.us/pls/pub/readtac$ext.ViewTAC?tac_view=4&ti=16&pt=1&ch=8• MunicipalPowers

TheTexas Legislaturehasexpresslyprohibitedamunicipality fromadoptingandenforcing safety standardsandpracticesoverpipelines regulatedby the federal governmentor theRRC. Bydoing so, the Legislatureseemstohaveimplicitlygivenamunicipalitythepowertoadoptandenforcesafetystandardsandpracticesoverpipelinesthatarenotregulatedbythefederalandstategovernments.The Legislature alsohas expressly stated this prohibitiondoesnotprevent amunicipality fromestablishingconditionsfor“mapping,inventorying,locatingorrelocatingofpipelinesover,under,along,oracrossapublicstreetoralleyorprivateresidentialarea.” This implies that: (1)amunicipalitycanestablishconditions fortheseactivitieswhenthepipelineisregulatedbytheRRC(thatis,anintrastatepipeline);and(2)establishingtheseconditionsdoesnotconstitutetheimpositionofasafetystandardorpractice.•TheCityofFortWorth’sOrdinanceInitsCode,theCityofFortWorthhasadoptedasetofrequirementsfor“CityRegulatedPipelines.”Forexample,alloperatorsofthesepipelinesmust:

Burythesepipelinesatacertaindepth. Bury—duringabackfillofanexcavationforthesepipelines—awarningtapeonefootabovethelinesofutureexcavatorswillbeawareofthepresenceofthepipeline.

NumberofProbableViolationsonNaturalGasPipelinesIdentifiedbytheRRC2001 2,942 2002 3,002 2003 4,352 2004 3,884 2005 2,242 2006 2,563 2007 2,052 2008 2,007 2009 2,100

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Installonthesepipelinesanautomatedpressuremonitoringsystemthatcandetectleaksandshutoffanypipelineorsectionofpipelinethatisleaking9.

There is some ambiguity over what is and isn’t a “safety standard.” If these requirements apply only topipelinesnotregulatedbythefederalgovernmentortheRRC,thenitwouldnotmatterwhetherornottheywereconsideredtobesafetystandardsorpractices:theCitywouldbewithinitsauthoritytoimposethem.ItalsomaybethattheCity’srequirements fallunderthe legislative intenttoprovidecitieswiththeabilitytorequiresystemsfor“mapping,inventorying,locatingorrelocating“pipelines.IfambiguityexistsbetweenwhatthecitybelievesitcanrequireandwhatthepipelineoperatorsintheCitythinktheCitycanrequirethenthelegislatureshouldstepintoclarifythissituation.Thereisnothinginstateorfederallawthatrestrictsacity’sabilitytoaskforincreasedsafetymeasuresaspartoftheirnegotiationsregardingtheuseofcityrights‐of‐wayorotherpublicproperty.WhiletheCitymaynotbe able to require or enforce suchmeasures, cities nationwide have been able to obtain increased safetymeasures throughsuchvoluntary requests,especiallywhensuchsafetymeasuresarewell thoughtoutandsupportedbythepublic.IncreasingPipelineSafetyThroughLandUseandZoningOneareainwhichtheCityofFortWorthhasconsiderableabilitytoincreasepipelinesafetyisthroughtheirland use and zoning authority. Over the past year and a half the Pipelines and Informed Planning Alliance(PIPA), started by the federal Office of Pipeline Safety, has worked todeterminerecommendedbestpracticesthatlocalgovernmentscanuseto ensure greater safety near pipelines. PIPA is made up of over 150representativesfromawidevarietyofstakeholdergroups.ThefinalPIPAreport includes46recommendedpractices,manyofwhichwouldneedtobeadoptedbylocalgovernment.Thosepracticesincludethingslike:

• Consider the potential impact of a pipeline incident in newdevelopment•Ensurepipelinerights‐of‐wayareshownonallrelevantzoning,planning,andpublicworksmaps• Consider the Potential Impact of a Pipeline Incident in theDesignandLocationofNewRoads•IncorporateEmergencyResponsePlansintoLandDevelopment•CreationofConsultationand/orPlanningZonesNearPipelines

Landusepracticesnearpipelineshavethreemajorgoals:

Ensure communication between builders/developers/excavators and pipeline operators soeveryoneknowswhatisplannednearpipelines

Putinplacepracticesthatprotectpipelinesfromconstructiondamage

PutinplacemoreprotectiveplanningandbuildingcodestoprotectpeoplethatlivenearpipelinesTheMunicipalResearchandServicesCenterhasdevelopedanentirewebsitethatcoversthese“planningnearpipelines”issues.Itcanbefoundat:http://www.mrsc.org/Subjects/PubSafe/transpipes.aspx

9 Given the compressibility of gas, Accufacts believes the ability to detect leaks by pressure loss is highly unlikely and probably ineffective in most gas systems.

“OneareainwhichtheCityofFortWorthhasconsiderableabilitytoincreasepipelinesafetyisthroughtheirlanduseandzoningauthority.”

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Regulatoryloopholesbetweenproductionandgatheringpipelines

Federal pipeline safety regulations that define where unregulated production pipelines stop and whereregulatedgatheringlinesstart,arelessthanclear,potentiallyallowingforlargeunregulatedpipelinesinurbanareas. To the RRC’s credit they have clarified and expanded the federal definitions to include under theirpipeline safety regulations all gas pipelines after “the first point ofmeasurement.” Since the RRC requiresmeasurementoneachwellpad,thisexpandeddefinitionshouldputunderregulationallpipelinesleavingwellpads.While many production and gatheringpipelinesarenotaslargeastransmissionpipelines, there are currently some inFort Worth as large as 24 inches indiameter with maximum allowableoperating pressures similar totransmission pipelines. Additionalconsiderations are warranted given thecapabilityof pipelinesof this size to releasemany tonsof gasupon rupture. Currently thesepipelines areexempt from federal Integrity Management rules that require some form of pipe quality inspection at aminimumofeverysevenyears,andclearlydefinehowandwhenproblemsfoundduringtheseinspectionsarereportedandrepaired.TheRRChasalsonotaddressedthisissueforpipelineundertheirauthority.TherealsoappearstobealoopholeintheRRCpipelinesafetyrules(Title16,Part1,Chapter8,SubchapterA,Rule §8.1(c)(2)) that would allow large companies that also operate pipelines that fall under federalregulationstobeexemptedfromthemorestringentstaterules.AccordingtoourconversationswiththeRRC,todatenocompanieshaveappliedforthisexemption.RegulatoryRecommendations

• The federalOffice of Pipeline Safety should implement a rulemaking to clarify the pointwhere onshoreregulatedgasgatheringlinesbegin(49CFRPart192.8).Thatpointshouldbedefinedtoensuretherearenounregulated gas pipelines off of well pads in class 2, 3, or 4 areas, or other “identified sites”where largegroupsmaygather.•ThefederalOfficeofPipelineshouldimplementarulemakingtoincludeallTypeAgatheringlines(49CFRPart192.9)under the full requirementsof the IntegrityManagementprogram(49CFRPart192SubpartO)thatcurrentlyonlyappliestotransmissionpipelines.• The RRC should use their own authority on intrastate pipelines in Texas to adopt the recommendationaboveregardingintegritymanagementrequirementsforTypeAgatheringlines.•ToavoidanyconflictoverwhethertheCityofFortWorthhasjurisdictiontoadoptpipelinesafetystandardssuch as depth of cover, use of warning tape, and automated pressure monitoring the RRC or the statelegislature should amend current rules to allow municipal government to adopt stricter pipeline safetystandardsonintrastatepipelinesaslongastheyarecompatiblewithstateandfederalregulations.• The RRC should undertake a study of the production pipelines that occur before the first point ofmeasurementonoroffthewellpadsinFortWorthtodetermineifthosepipelinesareputtingpeopleatthe

“CurrentlythesepipelinesareexemptfromfederalIntegrityManagementrulesthatrequiresomeformofinspectionataminimumofeverysevenyears,andclearlydefinehowandwhenproblemsfoundduringtheseinspectionsarereportedandrepaired.”

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samelevelofriskasregulatedgatheringandtransmissionpipelinesandthereforeneedtobeunderthesamepipelinesafetyregulations.

•TheRRCshouldmakeitclearintheirrulesthattheexemptionavailableunderTitle16,Part1,Chapter8,Subchapter A, Rule §8.1(c)(2) will not be granted if it will allow a company to operate pipelines underregulationslessstringentthanwhattheRRChasset.

•TheFortWorthCityCouncilshouldscheduleaworksessiontogetapresentationonthefinalPipelinesandInformedPlanningAllianceReportwhen it is released,and thendecidehow toproceed toadopt thepartstheythinkareimportant.AtaminimumtheyshouldadopttheConsultationZoneprocessintoCityCode.

Theconstructionphaseofpipelineinstallationisacriticallyimportanttimetoensurethelong‐termintegrityof thepipeline.Belowarea fewof the issuesdealtwithduringtheconstructionphasethataffectspipelinesafety.Thesevarioussafetyprecautionspertainmainlytogastransmissionandregulatedgatheringpipelines.Somegatheringandproductionlinesarenotrequiredtofollowthesestandards.ChoosingPipePipesectionsarefabricatedinsteelrollingmillsandinspectedtoassuretheymeetgovernmentandindustrysafetystandards.Generallybetween40and80feetinlength,theyaredesignedspecificallyfortheirintendedlocationinthepipeline.Avarietyofsoilconditionsandgeographicorpopulationcharacteristicsoftheroutewilldictatedifferentrequirementsforpipesize,strength,wallthicknessandcoatingmaterial.Notallpipeissteel.Somelowpressuregathering,transmissionanddistributionpipelinesuseothermaterialssuchasothermetals,andnonmetallicmaterial,suchasplasticorcomposites.PipeBurialMechanicalequipmentsuchaswheeltrenchersorbackhoesisusedtodigthepipetrench.Occasionally,rockdrillingandblasting is required tobreak rock inacontrolledmanner.Thematerial that isexcavatedduringtrenching operations is temporarily stockpiled on the non‐working side of the trench. Thismaterialwill beusedagain inthebackfilloperation. Insomelimited locations,horizontaldirectionsdrilling(HDD)aswellasboringisusedtoplacepipeundergroundwithouttheneedoftrenching.

Thetrenchesaredugdeepenoughtoallowforanadequateamountofcoverwhenthepipeisburied.Federalregulations require that transmission pipelines and regulated type A gathering lines be buried at least 30inches below the surface in rural areas and deeper (36 inches) in more populated areas. In addition, thepipelinemust be buried deeper in some locations, such as at road and railroad crossings (36 inches) andcrossings of navigable bodies of water (48 inches), andmay be less in other locations such as when it isinstalledinconsolidatedrock(18to24inches).Thedepthofburialmustbeaccordingtotheseregulationsatthetimeofburial,butthereisnothingthatrequiresthisdepthbemaintainedovertime.

WeldingofSteelPipelinesTocarryouttheweldingprocess, thepipesectionsaretemporarilysupportedalongtheedgeofthetrenchandaligned.Thevariouspipesectionsare thenwelded together intoonecontinuous length,usingmanual,semiautomaticorautomaticweldingprocedures.As part of the quality‐assurance process, eachweldermust pass qualification tests towork on a particularpipeline job, and eachweld proceduremust be approved for use on that job in accordancewith federallyadopted welding standards.Welder qualification takes place before the project begins. Each welder must

PipelineSafetyRequirementsDuringDesignandConstruction

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complete severalwelds using the same typeof pipe as that to beused in theproject. Thewelds are thenevaluated by placing theweldedmaterial in amachine andmeasuring the force required to pull theweldapart.Itisinterestingtonotethataproperweldisactuallystrongerthanthepipeitself.Forhigherstresspipelinesover6inchesindiameter,asecondlevelofquality‐assuranceensuresthequalityoftheongoingweldingoperation.Todo this,qualified technicians sampleacertainnumberof thewelds (thesamplenumbervariesbasedonthepopulationnearthepipeline)usingradiologicaltechniques(i.e.,X‐rayorultrasonic inspection)toensurethecompletedweldsmeetfederallyprescribedqualitystandards.TheX‐raytechnicianprocessesthefilminasmall,portabledarkroomatthesite.Ifthetechniciandetectscertainflaws,theweldisrepairedorcutout,andanewweldismade.Anothermethodofweldqualityinspectionemploysultrasonictechnology.CoatingSeveraldifferenttypesofcoatingsmaybeusedtocoatthepipeatthefactoryandthejointsmadeinthefield,with themost common at this time being fusion bond epoxy or polyethylene heat‐shrink sleeves. Prior toapplication,thebarepipe isthoroughlycleanedtoremoveanydirt,millscaleordebris.Thecoating isthenapplied and allowed to dry. After field coating and before the pipe is lowered into the trench, the entirecoatingofthepipeisinspectedtoensurethatitisfreefromdefects.LoweringandBackfillingOncethepipelineisweldedandcoated,itisloweredintothetrench.Loweringisdonewithmultiplepiecesofspecialized construction equipment called sidebooms. This equipment acts in tandem to lift and lowersegmentsoftheassembledpipelineintothetrenchinasmoothanduniformmannertopreventdamagingthepipe.

Oncethepipelineisloweredintotheground,thetrenchisbackfilled,toensurethatthepipeanditscoatingarenotdamaged.Thisisgenerallyaccomplishedwitheitherabackhoeorpaddingmachinedependingonthesoilmakeup.

Careistakentoprotectthepipeandcoatingfromsharprocksandabrasionasthebackfillisreturnedtothetrench.Inareaswherethegroundisrockyandcoarse,thebackfillmaterialisscreenedtoremoverocksorthepipe is coveredwithamaterial toprotect it fromsharp rocksandabrasion.Alternatively, clean fillmaybebroughtintocoverthepipe.Oncethepipeissufficientlycovered,thecoarsersoilandrockcanthenbeusedtocompletethebackfill.

Asthebackfilloperationsbegin, theexcavatedmaterial is returnedtothetrench inreverseorder,withthesubsoilputbackfirst,followedbythetopsoil.Thisensuresthetopsoilisreturnedtoitsoriginalposition.

ValvesandValvePlacementAvalveisamechanicaldeviceinstalledinapipelineandusedtocontroltheflowofgas.Somevalveshavetobeoperatedmanuallybypipelinepersonnel,somevalvescanbeoperatedremotelyfromacontrolroom,andsomevalvesaredesignedtooperateautomaticallyifacertainconditionoccursonthepipeline.Ifapipelineshouldfail,howquicklythevalvescanbeclosedandthedistancebetweenthevalvesaresomeofthemaindeterminationsforhowmuchgasisreleased.OperatingPressureMaximum allowable operating pressure (MAOP) is the maximum internal pressure at which a natural gaspipelineorpipelinesegmentmaybecontinuouslyoperated.MAOPissetatlevelsmeanttoensuresafetybe

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requiringthatthepressuredoesnotcauseunduestressonthepipeline.Howthispressureisdeterminedisdefined in federal regulations and is based on a number of different factors such as the location of thepipeline,pipewallthickness,previouspressuretests,andthepressureratingsofvariouscomponents. TestingGenerally, but with certain exceptions, all newly constructed natural gas transmission pipelines must behydrostaticallytestedbeforetheycanbeplacedintoservice.Thepurposeofahydrostaticpressuretestistoeliminateanydefectthatmightthreatenthepipeline'sabilitytosustainitsmaximumoperatingpressureplusanadditionalsafetymargin,atthetimeofthehydrostatictest.Apipelineisdesignedtoaspecifiedstrengthbased on its intended operating pressure. Hydrostatic pressure testing consists of filling the pipeline withwater and raising the internal pressure to a specified level above the intended operating pressure. Criticaldefectsthatcannotwithstandthepressurewillfail.Upondetectionofsuchfailures,thedefectsarerepairedortheaffectedsectionofthepipelineisreplacedandthetestresumeduntilthepipeline"passes".

Hydrostatic testing is not the only means for detecting pipe defects. For example, inline inspection (ILI)technologiesareusedthatpermittheidentificationofspecifictypesofdefects,suchascorrosion.ButbecausenotalllinescanbeinspectedwithILItoolsandbecauseoftheneedtofindtypesofimperfectionsthatarenotcurrentlydetectedbyILItechnology,hydrostatictestingisanacceptedmethodfordemonstratingthefitnessofapipelinesegmentforservice.

ConcernsDuringPipelineConstruction

In2009thefederalOfficeofPipelineSafety(OPS)heldaspecialworkshoptogooverthenumerousproblemsthey found during just 35 inspections of new transmission pipelines under construction. These inspectionsfound significant problemswith thepipe coating, thepipe itself, thewelding, the excavationmethods, thetesting, the design, etc. The findings and presentations from this workshop can be found at:http://www.regulations.gov/search/Regs/home.html#docketDetail?R=PHMSA‐2009‐0060 OPS’s findings callintoquestionthecurrentsystemofinspectionsfortheconstructionofnewpipelines.Thisconstructionphaseiscriticalfortheongoingsafetyofthesepipelinesforyearstocome.ItisuncleartoushowinvolvedtheRRCisininspectingtheconstructionofnewpipelines.RecommendationsRegardingPipelineConstruction

TheRailroadCommissionofTexasshouldprovideclearpubliclyavailabledocumentationregardingtheirinvolvementduringconstructionofnewintrastatepipelines.ThatdocumentationshouldeitherprovideevidencethattheyhavetheinvolvementnecessarytocatchthetypesofproblemsidentifiedbyOPS,oraretakingthestepsnecessarytodoso.

CorrosionProtectionUnprotectedsteelpipelinesaresusceptibletocorrosion,andwithoutpropercorrosionprotectioneverysteelpipelinewilleventuallydeteriorate.Corrosioncanweakenthepipelineandmakeitunsafe.Luckily,technologyhas been developed to allow corrosion to be controlled in many cases to extend pipeline life if appliedcorrectlyandmaintainedconsistently.Herearethethreecommonmethodsusedtocontrolcorrosiononpipelines:

PipelineSafetyRequirementsDuringOperation

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• Cathodic protection (CP) is a system that uses direct electrical current to counteract the normalexternalcorrosionofametalpipeline.CPisusedwhereallorpartofapipelineisburiedundergroundorsubmergedinwater.Onnewpipelines,CPcanhelppreventcorrosionfromstarting;onexistingpipelines,CPcanhelpstopexistingcorrosionfromgettingworse.•Pipelinecoatingsandliningsareprincipaltoolsfordefendingagainstcorrosionbyprotectingthebaresteel.• Corrosion inhibitorsaresubstancesthatcanbeaddedtoapipelinetodecreasetherateofattackofinternalcorrosiononthesteelsinceCPcannotprotectagainstinternalcorrosion.

SupervisoryControlandDataAcquisitionSystem(SCADA)ASCADAisapipelinecomputersystemdesignedtogatherinformationsuchasflowratethroughthepipeline,operational status, pressure, and temperature readings. Depending on the pipeline this information allowspipeline operators to knowwhat is happening along the pipeline, and allows quicker reactions for normaloperations,andtoequipmentmalfunctionsandreleases.SomeSCADAsystemsalsoincorporatetheabilitytoremotelyoperatecertainequipment,includingcompressorstationsandvalves,allowingoperatorsinacontrolcenter to adjust flow rates in thepipeline aswell as to isolate certain sections of a pipeline. Many SCADAsystemsalsoincludeleakdetectionsystemsbasedonthepressureandmassbalanceinthepipelines.Right‐of‐wayPatrolsRegulationsrequireregularpatrolsofpipelineright‐of‐waystocheckforindicationsofleaksandensurethatnoexcavationactivitiesaretakingplaceonorneartheright‐of‐waythatmaycompromisepipelinesafety.Fortransmissionpipelinesthesepatrolsareoftenaccomplishedbyaerialpatrols.LeakageSurveysRegulationsalsorequireregularleakagesurveysforalltypesofnaturalgaspipelinesalongthepipelineroutes.Personnelwalkordrivetherouteusingspecializedequipmenttodetermineifanygasisleakingandtothenquantifythesizeoftheleak.Verysmallleaksareanormalpartofmostgaspipelinesystems.OdorizationAlldistributionpipelines,andsometransmissionandgatheringlines(thosemainlyinhighlypopulatedareas),arerequiredtobeodorizedsoleakinggasisreadilydetectablebyapersonwithanormalsenseofsmell.IntegrityManagementIntegrityManagementreferstoarelativelynewsetoffederalrulesthatspecifyhowpipelineoperatorsmustidentify, prioritize, assess, evaluate, repair andvalidate ‐ through comprehensiveanalyses ‐ the integrityoftheir pipelines. Some form of integrity management now applies to both transmission and distributionpipelines, although gathering lines are exempt from these requirements. For gas transmission pipelinesintegritymanagementrequiresthat linesthatcouldaffectHighConsequenceAreas(mainlymorepopulatedareas)have tobe re‐inspectedby theiroperatorsevery sevenyears.This re‐inspection isdonemainlywithinternal inspection devices called smart pigs, but may also be done through pressure tests or directassessment. Once inspected the rules require that operators respond to certain anomalies found on theirpipeline in certainwayswithin certain timeframes. In the first5 yearsof thisprogram these rules requirednearly3000 repairsbemade tonaturalgas transmissionpipelines that fallwithinHighConsequenceAreas.Unfortunately,onlyabout7%ofthegastransmissionpipelinesnationwidearerequiredtodotheseimportantinspections.

ConcernsDuringPipelineOperationsAsalreadydiscussedaboveunder regulatoryauthority, there is still considerableconfusionregardingwhichregulationsapplytointrastategatheringandproductionpipelines.ThefederalOfficeofPipelineSafetyorthe

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RRC needs to provide clarity so the public knows which of the pipelines that run through Fort Worthneighborhoodsareandarenotincludedinavarietyoffederalandstateregulations.Thisisparticularlytrueregardingcorrosionprotection,odorization,leaksurveysandintegritymanagement.Recent newspaper stories and information coming from the RRC seem to indicate that a serious corrosionproblem exists on steel distribution service lines. It is commendable that the RRC has moved forward toaddressthisproblem,butitwouldalsobebeneficialiftheymadeitclearwhetherallthepipelinesthatleavethewellpadsinFortWortharerequiredtomeetthesamecorrosionandleaksurveyrequirementsasthesedistributionlines,orsimilarregulationsfortransmissionpipelines.Thereisalsoagooddealofdiscussionaboutwhetherthegatheringlinesleavingwellpadsshouldbeodorized,andwhethercertainTypeAgatheringlinesarerequiredtobeodorized.ThefederalregulationsrequirethatType A gathering lines (the majority of gathering lines in Fort Worth are Type A) be odorized in denselypopulated areas, but provides an exemption to odorization if over 50% of the pipeline downstream is insparsely populated areas. The RRC has told us that gathering lines in Fort Worth are not required to beodorized,andpipelinecompanieshaveconfirmedthatisbecauseoftheexemptioninthefederalregulations.If odorization is seen as a safety measure that is important enough to be required of similar pipelines inpopulatedareas,thenthisexemptiontothatsafetyrequirementneedstobereexamined.IfodorizationwasrequiredofgatheringlinesinFortWorththenanotherissuethatwouldhavetobecarefullyaddressed would be the various drilling operators’ ability to correctly inject the odorant into the lines atmultiplewellpadsthroughoutthecommunity.Frequentfugitiveemissionsofodorantwouldcauseneedlessemergencyresponsecalls,andcouldpotentiallyunderminethepublic’sresponsetoarealleak.Oneotherissuethatisfrequentlytalkedaboutinrelationtoodorizationiswhetherthegasbeingproducedis“wet”gas.Wetgasdoesnot refer tomoisturecontent,but to thepresenceofcompoundssuchasethane,propaneandbutane.Thesecompoundsareheavierthanair,whichcancreateamoredangeroussituationifthereisaleak.CurrentlyneitherfederalnorTexasregulationscontainadefinitionofwetgas,ordescribeanydifference in how pipelines that contain significant concentrations of these heavier components should betreated.Normallythesecomponentsareremovedatgastreatmentplants,butinanareasuchasFortWorthwhererawgasisbeingtransportedthroughpopulatedareasitisanissuethatneedstobeaddressed.TheRRChastoldusthatthegasinFortWorthisnotwetgas,butthatcouldchangeasthegasfieldsage,andwithnorequirementstotestforanddefinewetgasthisisanissuethatshouldbeaddressed.RecommendationsRegardingPipelineOperationThefederalOfficeofPipelineSafetyortheRRCshouldundertakea study to determine the benefits and risks of odorizinggathering lines in populated areas. That study should at aminimumaddresstheconcernofproper injectionofodorantatmultiplewellsites,howandatwhatconcentrationsheavierthanairgascomponentsmaychangetheneedforodorants,andtheapparent disconnect between the requirements for odorant inType A gathering lines in populated areas and the variousexemptions to those requirements, particularly related togatheringlinestransportinggasinurbanareas.

“ThefederalOfficeofPipelineSafetyortheRRCshouldundertakeastudytodeterminethebenefitsandrisksofodorizinggatheringlinesinpopulatedareas.”

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One of the leading causes of all pipeline incidents is damage to pipelines from people digging. In fact, asshownbelow, for the past 10 years this has been themain cause of deaths and injurieswhen all types ofpipelines are considered together in the U.S. and Texas10. For this reason programs designed to decreasedamagetopipelinescausedbyexcavationareextremely importanttoprotectpeopleandtheenvironment.BelowarebriefdescriptionsofthemajordamagepreventioneffortsinTexas.

ReportingofExcavationDamageandEnforcementThe Railroad Commission of Texas (RRC) has adoptedregulations that require both pipeline companies andexcavators toreportalldamagetopipelines.Thereportingofincidents is tracked on a publicly accessible database whichgives the RRC and the public the ability to analyze whichexcavatorsarehittingpipelines,thecauseofthatdamage,andwhat penalties the RRC imposed. This publicly availabledatabaseisfairlyuniqueintheentirenation,withmanystateshaving no ability to even track excavation damage. Even thefederal pipeline incident tracking system lacks the data ofTexas’ssystem.ForcomparisonaccordingtothefederalOfficeofPipelineSafety’sincidentdatabaseoverthepast tenyearsTexasaveragesabout10pipeline incidentsper year causedbyexcavationdamage.TheRRCdatabase shows an average of about 18,000 incidents per year. You can view the database at:http://webapps.rrc.state.tx.us/TPD/publicHomeAction.do

One‐CallCentersThe primary tool for avoiding damages to underground facilities is timelycommunication between those digging (excavators) and the owners of thefacilities. It is important toCallBeforeYouDig.One‐call centers facilitate thiscommunicationprocessbyenablinganexcavatortoplacejustonecall,priortodigging, to request that all underground facilities in the area of a plannedexcavationbelocatedandmarked.

10 PHMSA website: http://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/comm/reports/safety/SerPSIDet_2000_2009_US.html?nocache=3912#_all http://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/comm/reports/safety/SigPSIDet_2000_2009_TX.html?nocache=5631#all

In2009theRRCdatabaseshowsthattherewere290incidentsofexcavationdamagetopipelinesinFortWorth,with78ofthosehappeningaftertheexcavatorfailedtousetheOneCallsystem.ExcavationbytheCityofFortWorthaccountedforaround40ofthe290incidents,althoughimproperlymarkedpipelinescausedmorethanathirdoftheincidentsinvolvingtheCity.

PipelineDamagePreventionPrograms

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By simply dialing 811 or 1‐800‐545‐6005, you can reach the one‐call center where, at no cost to you,companies that may operate underground utilities in the area you plan to dig will be notified. Thosecompaniescanthendispatchlocatecrewstodetermineandsurfacemarkthelocationoftheirutilitiessothatyoucanavoidhittingthemwhenyoubeginyourexcavation.Texaslawrequiresanyonedoingexcavationtocalltohavethelocationoftheutilitiesmarkedatleast48workinghoursbeforeanyexcavationisdone,andTexas lawdefines excavation as themovementof earthby anymeans. This includes inserting,moving, orremoving any object in the ground, even fence posts, rods, stakes, picks, shovels or other hand tools to adepthgreaterthan16inches.Hittingundergroundutilitieswhenyouarediggingcancauseinjuries,evendeaths,environmentaldamageandlossof critical infrastructureand services. Strikes thatdon’t cause immediateproblems can lead to failuresyearslater.Ifyoudon’tmakethecall,youcouldbeliablefordamagecostsandrepairs,aswellassubjecttopotentialpenalties.Don’ttakethechance–Callbeforeyoudig.BestPracticesRegardingDamagePreventionIn2000anationalorganizationcalledtheCommonGroundAlliance(CGA)waslaunchedinanefforttoreducedamagestoallundergroundfacilitiesinNorthAmericathroughsharedresponsibilityamongallstakeholders.Inpromotingaspiritofsharedresponsibility,theCGAwelcomesallstakeholderswhowouldliketobeapartoftheidentificationandpromotionofbestpracticesthatleadtoareductionindamage.Any“bestpractices,”endorsed by the CGA come with consensus support from experts representing the following stakeholdergroups: Excavators, Locators, Road Builders, Electric, Telecommunications, Oil, Gas Distribution, GasTransmission, Railroad, One Call, Public Works, Equipment Manufacturing, State Regulators, Insurance,EmergencyServicesandEngineering/Design.CGA has taken the lead nationally is developing best practices to reduce damage to underground utilities,includingpipelines.Thelatestversion(Version7.0)oftheirBestPracticesmanualincludes147bestpracticesinthefollowingcategories:1.Planning&DesignBestPractices 7.PublicEducationBestPractices2.OneCallCenterBestPractices 8.Reporting&EvaluationBestPractices3.Location&MarkingBestPractices 9.MiscellaneousPractices4.ExcavationBestPractices 5.MappingBestPractices6.ComplianceBestPracticesPublicAwarenessFormanyyears,thepipelineindustryhasprovidedinformationtoavarietyofgroupslivingandworkingnearpipelinestoensuretheyknowaboutthepipelinesintheirarea,howtorecognizeandrespondtoaproblem,and ways to prevent damage to pipelines. The American Petroleum Institute developed a series ofrecommended practices for pipelines operators to use to help ensure the effectiveness of these publicawareness efforts. In 2005 these recommended practiceswere incorporated by reference into the federalpipeline safety regulations (49 CFR 192.616 and 49 CFR 195.440), and now require that pipeline operatorsconduct continuing public awareness programs to provide pipeline safety information to four stakeholderaudiences: *AffectedPublic*EmergencyOfficials*LocalPublicOfficials*Excavators

Under these regulations,pipelineoperatorsmustprovide theabovegroupswith informationabouthow torecognize, respond to, and report pipeline emergencies. The importance of using the one‐call notificationsystem prior to excavation is to be emphasized for all stakeholders. Emergency officials and local publicofficialsmust be provided information about the location of transmission pipelines to enhance emergency

ToobtainafreecopyoftheCGABestPracticesmanualvisittheCGAwebsiteat:http://www.commongroundalliance.com/

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responseandcommunitygrowthplanning.Affectedmunicipalities,schooldistricts,businesses,andresidentsmust be advised of pipeline locations. Of particular significance is the requirement that operators mustperiodicallyreviewtheirprogramsforeffectivenessandenhancetheprogramsasnecessary.Anon‐printablecopyoftheserecommendedpracticescanbedownloadedat:http://committees.api.org/pipeline/standards/docs/1162nonprintable.pdfConcernsWithDamagePreventionPrograms

WewerequitepleasedwiththerecentchangesthattheRRCmadetotheirDamagePreventionregulations.Inparticular, the damage reporting requirements and their publicly accessible database of damage done topipelines seemsprogressiveandunique in theentirenation. It isunclear and nearly impossible from the available data to knowwhether the RRC is using this information to provide adequateenforcementofdamagepreventionlawstoreducesuchincidents.The reporting system could be made more valuable to localgovernment and the public by including in the database queryresults the causeof the incidentand thepenaltiesassessed.Thiswould make it possible for the public to not only see who washittingpipelines,butalsowhy, andwhether theRRC isprovidingenoughenforcementtodeterfuturedamage.InJuneof2010therewerethreedeathsintwodaysinTexasfromdamagedonetopipelines.Thoseincidentsmadecleartheneedforconstantvigilance,educationandenforcementtokeepthoselivingandworkingnearpipelines safe. Often failure to use the One Call system is believed to be the only problem regardingexcavationdamage,butitwouldappearfromtheserecentincidentsthathowpipelinesarelocatedafterthecall ismade,andthecommunicationbetweenexcavators,andpipelineoperatorsandlocatorsalsoneedstobecarefullyre‐evaluated.ThisisparticulartrueinareassuchasFortWorthwherethedensityofpeopleliving,workingandplayingnearpipelinescontinuestoincrease.OfconcernisthenumberofexemptionsforcertaingroupsintheRRCdamagepreventionregulations(TACTitle16,Part1,Chapter18).It is also disconcerting that the City of FortWorth is one of themain culprits when it came to damagingpipelines.While it seemsunderstandable that theCityprobablydoesmoredigging inareasaroundthecitywherepipelinesarelocatedinthecourseoftheiractivitiesthenmostothers, itdemonstratesthereisroomfor improvement in their own damage prevention activities. The City’s Gas Drilling Ordinance requires allpipelinesregulatedbytheCitytoprovideasbuiltdrawingsofthepipelines“sufficienttolocatethePipelinesinthefuture.”Whilethisisagoodwaytokeeptrackofthebasictypesandlocationsofthepipelines,theCityand others should not rely on such drawings for the location of pipelines when excavation activities areplanned. The One Call system should always be used to communicate with pipeline companies to ensurenecessaryprecautionsaretakenbeforediggingbegins.Wehavealargenumberofthepublicawarenessmaterialsprovidedbypipelinecompaniestothe“affectedpublic” that livenear theirpipelines.Whilemuchof the informationprovided isvery important (callbeforeyou dig,what to do if you suspect a leak, contact information) it often is presented in such away that itappearstobemoreofapublicrelationspieceonhowsafeandnecessarypipelinesare.Wefearthatthesemultiplemixedmessagesmayunderminethepublic’sunderstandingofthe important information included.Also, the information thepublicwants isnotalways included in thepublicawarenessmaterials.TheOPS iscurrentlyworkingtoimplementinspectionstandardsfortheseprogramstoensuretheireffectiveness,andwehopethatthroughthatprocessandtheindustry’sownreviewthisvaluableprogramwillcontinuetoimprove.

“theRRC’sdamagereportingrequirementsandtheirpubliclyaccessibledatabaseofdamagedonetopipelinesseemsprogressiveanduniqueintheentirenation.”

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RecommendationsforDamagePreventionPrograms

•TheRRCshouldaddthecauseoftheexcavationincidentaswellasthefinesleviedtothedatabasefieldsintheirTexasPipelineDamagePreventionQuerysystem.

•TheCityofFortWorthshouldreviewtheiremployeetrainingandthatoftheiroutsidecontractorsandsub‐contractorsregardingdamagepreventiontoensuretheOneCall system isbeingusedbeforeallexcavationandthatsafeexcavationpracticesarefollowed.

• The RRC should review and remove most of the exemptions included in their damage preventionregulations(TACTitle16,Part1,Chapter18).

• The Citizens of Fort Worth should familiarize themselves with where the pipelines are in theirneighborhoods,andmakesuretheyusetheOneCallsystembeforedigging.TheyshouldlearnwhotocontactiftheyseesomeoneelsewhotheybelieveisdiggingwithoutusingthefreeOneCalllocateservice.

The reality is that there arepipelines of one type oranother in every area of FortWorth. Certainly the largestnetwork of pipelines is thedistribution pipeline systemthat consists of gas mainsrunning throughout the cityand the individual servicepipelines that deliver naturalgas to individual homes andbusinesses.Ifyouweretoviewthisonamapitwouldlooklikea spider web of pipelinescoveringtheentirecity.Thelargerhazardousliquidandnatural gas transmissionpipelines are more limitedthroughoutthecommunity.Onthis map of Tarrant Countydeveloped by the NationalPipelineMappingSystemthehazardousliquidpipelinesareshowningreenandthenaturalgastransmissionpipelinesareshowninred.Anyonecanaccessthesemapstoseewherehazardousliquidandgastransmissionpipelinesrunthroughtheircommunity.The“publicviewer”forthemapsisat:https://www.npms.phmsa.dot.gov/PublicViewer/. Thesystemtakespracticetonavigate,butonceapersonfiguresitoutitispossibletozoomintogetanideaof where these types of pipelines are generally located and some basic information about the pipelinesthemselves.Themapbelowshowsthemaximumscalethatcanbeviewedonthemapsandtheinformation

WhereArethePipelinesinFortWorth?

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available foroneof the includedpipelines.While these typesofmapscanprovideageneral ideaofwherepipelinesarelocatedtheyshouldneverbeusedasanindicationofwhereitmightbesafetodig.TheOneCallsystemistheonlywaytoidentifythelocationofapipeline.

TheRailroadCommissionofTexasalsohasapublicmapviewingsystemthatcanbeaccessedat:http://gis2.rrc.state.tx.us/public/startit.htm Thissystem,one of the few provided by any state agency in the entire nation, also takes some practice, but onceunderstoodcanprovidemapsofthesamepipelinesasshownabove.Thisisalsotheonlysystemweareawareofthatallowspeopletolookatgatheringpipelinesaswellaswhereactualgaswellsarelocated.TheRailroadCommissionmappingsitealsoprovidessomebasicinformationaboutthepipelinesfound,andallowsanyoneto lookup thepipelinepermitwheremore indepth information (suchaspressure,pipewall thicknessandgrade,classlocation,etc.)canbefound.ThenumberofgatheringpipelinesinFortWorthwillcontinuetoincreaseasthenumberofwellsincreasesinthecity.BelowisamapfromtheRailroadCommissionofTexas’mappingsystemthatshowwherethecurrentactivegatheringpipelinesareinTarrantCounty.ThedensityofpipelinessurroundingtheurbanareasofthecountymayprovideaviewofthepossiblefutureofhowmanypipelinesmayendupintheCityaswelldrillingreachesitsfulldensity.

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GatheringPipelinesinTarrantCounty

Risk isoneofthosethingsthatonepersoncannotreallydefineforanother,sinceeachpersonthinksaboutrisksintheirownpersonalway.Whilesomefeelthatskydivingisariskworthtaking,otherswon’tevengoupintheairplane.Inotherwords,itisnotpossibleforustosaywhethertheincreaseinthenumberofpipelinesassociatedwithurbangasdrillingissafeenoughortoomuchofarisktotake.Allwecandoistotrytoprovideenough informationso individualscanmakethatdecisionontheirown,andthenworkwithothers in theircommunitytosetpoliciesbasedonthebeliefsofasmanypeopleaspossible.Webelievethatriskismadeupoftwodifferentfactorsbothofwhichneedtobecarefullyconsideredwhendecidinghowriskyanactivityis.Thosefactorsaretheprobabilitythataneventwilloccur(chanceapipelinewillruptureorleak),andthepossibleconsequencesifitdoes.Wehavealreadytalkedaboutthevariousthingsthatpipelineoperatorsarerequiredtodotokeeptheirpipelinessafeandthereforereducetheprobabilityofaneventoccurring.One othermeasure that helps shed light on the probability of an occurrence is the past incident rates forpipelinesinagivenarea.Pastperformancecannotaccuratelyreflectfutureincidentssincemanyfactorscouldchangeovertime,butsuchdatacanprovidetrendlinesthatpointtoneededchangesinpipelineoperation,maintenance,publicoutreachandregulations. Belowaresomegraphsthatshowthenumberofsignificantincidents occurring on the different types of pipelines in the past ten years in both Texas and nationwide.Thesegraphsalsoindicatethetrendlinesforincidentsduringthisperiod.Wehavealsoincludedgraphsthatshowthecausesoftheincidents,soitiseasiertotellwhichincidentswerewithinthecontrolofthepipelineoperator.

HowMuchRiskisThereFromthePipelinesinFortWorth?

26

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ThesegraphsappeartoshowthatthetrendforpipelineincidentinTexasissimilarorlessthanthesametypesofpipelinesnationwide.TheinformationregardingthecauseofincidentsseemstoindicatethatcorrosionandexcavationdamagearelargerproblemsinTexasonsometypesofpipelines.Wealsohaveprovidedbelowthenumberofincidents,injuriesanddeaths,andpropertydamageduringthepast ten years for the different types of pipelines in Texas. Below that are the specific incidents that haveoccurredinFortWorth.

TexasSignificantIncidents*2000‐2009

MilesofPipeline

NumberofIncidents

IncidentPerMileofPipelinePerYear

NumberofDeaths&Injuries

PropertyDamage

HazardousLiquid 56,375 341 0.00060 14 $171,007,707NaturalGasTransmission 66,918 108 0.00016 12 $156,137,110NaturalGasDistribution 92,333 58 0.00006 49 $9,623,362NaturalGasGathering 6,659 16 0.00024 0 $27,448,856

*SignificantIncidentsareincidentsthatincludedeaths,injuriesrequiringhospitalization,$50,000in

propertydamagein1984dollars,andforliquidlinescertainspillvolumesandincidentsinvolving

unintentionalfiresorexplosions

**Distributionmileagedoesnotincludetheindividualservicelinestoeachhomeandbusiness

***AllnumbersbasedonPHMSAincidentdatabase

AllFortWorthReportedIncidents1984‐2009

The above charts and graphs should provide some measures of the probability of a pipeline incidenthappeningandsomeoftheconsequencesifitdoes.Itisfairlyclearfromthedatathatthechanceofapipelinefailinginanyparticularspotisvery,verysmall,butofcourseifyouaskthefamiliesofanyofthe15peoplewho were killed by pipeline incidents over the past ten years in Texas they would tell you that theconsequencesarehuge.Sowhatarethepossibleconsequencesofnaturalgaspipelinefailures,andhowcantheybequantified?

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In 2000 theGasResearch Institute contractedwithC‐FERTechnologies toproduce amodel –AModel ForSizingHighConsequenceAreasAssociatedWithNaturalGasPipelines11‐thatbecameinstrumentalinhelpingdefinepotentialimpactzonesaroundnaturalgaspipelines.Whilethemodeliscomplex,thebasicideaisthatby considering thediameterof thepipelineand thepressure it is operatingat, it is possible topredict theimpact area around the pipeline that could lead to a fatal exposure in the event of a catastrophic failure.Belowisthechartoutofthemodelthatpredictsthesedifferentzones.

ItispossibletousethisgraphtoanalyzethepotentialimpactradiusofspecificpipelinesinFortWorth.Belowis an aerial photo of a neighborhood alongOld Denton Road that has both a gas transmission (EnterpriseProducts, 30 inch diameter, Maximum Allowable Operating Pressure (MAOP) 1200psi) and gas gathering(Crosstex,16inchdiameter,1200MAOP)pipelinerunningcloseby.

The outer red circle shows thePotential Impact Radius (PIR) forthetransmissionpipelineandtheinner red circle is thePIR for thegathering line. As you can seeover60homesandalargechurchfall within the PIR of thetransmission pipeline, whileabout15homesandnoneof theactual church building fall withinthePIRofthegatheringpipeline.This dramatically illustrates howthepressureandsizeofapipelinecanaffecttheareaimpactedbya

11 www.pstrust.org/library/docs/C-FERstudy.pdf

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completepipelinerupture. It shouldberememberedthat thePIRcalculationsarebasedona rupture inanopenarea,sopeopleorhomesshelteredbywalls,treesorotherbuildingswillbeshieldedfromsomeoftheeffectsoftheinitialblastwaveandheatradiation.Beloware someadditional pictures of different neighborhoods in FortWorthwith thePIRof thepipelinesoverlaidonthem.ItshouldberememberedthattheseillustrationsarefortheMAOPthatthesepipelinesareallowedtooperatewithin.BoththeRRCandthepipelineoperatorshavetoldusthattheynormallyoperatethese pipelines at much lower pressures, whichwouldincreasethepipeline’ssafety.Someexpertshaveargued that theC‐FERModelunderestimates the impact areas around naturalgas pipelines, especially for large diameterpipelinesathighpressures,howeverthebasic

conceptprovidesagoodcontextforunderstandingthe function between pipeline size, pressure, andpotentialimpact.Anotherwayistoconsidertheactualconsequenceof a pipeline incident is by reviewing actualprevious incidents. The National TransportationSafety Board investigates many of the mostsignificant incidents and the reports of theirinvestigations can be found at:http://www.ntsb.gov/Publictn/P_Acc.htm

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Thephotosbelowalsoprovidesomeindicationoftheconsequencesofnaturalgaspipelinefailures.

Bushland,TXNov2009.Failureofnaturalgastransmissionpipeline

Failureofanaturalgastransmissionpipeline.Inthisincidenttherewasnoexplosionorfire,thecraterwascreatedbythepressureofthegascomingoutofthepipeline.Notehowfarthepipeintheupperrightcornerwasthrown.

NaturalGasTransmission

PipelineFailure.

BushlandTX,November

2009

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Failureofanaturalgastransmissionpipeline.Arrowshowspointoffailure.Notehowfarfrompointoffailurehousesweredestroyed

Firecausedbygasfromadistributionpipelineleakbuildingupinhouseandthenexploding.

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Ifyouhavemadeitthisfarinthisreportthenyouhavetakenanimportantsteptohelpensurethatpipelinesin FortWorthwill beas safeaspossiblebyeducating yourself abouthow theywork,who’s in charge, andwhat needs to be done to ensure the public’s safety is being looked after. Webelievethatpipelinesafetyislikeathree‐leggedstoolwiththeindustry,regulatorsandpubliceachservingasonelegofthestoolandeachplayingacrucialrole.Ifanylegofthestoolfalterspipelinesafetyisatrisk.The industryuses itsvastresourcesandexpertiseto install,operateandmaintainsafe pipelines. The regulators verify through inspections and data collection thatthe minimum safety regulations are appropriate and are being met, and whennecessary use enforcement authority to ensure compliance. The public, includingelectedofficials,serveasthewatchdogstopushforgreaterregulationandenforcementwhennecessary,andtomakesurecomplacencydoesn’tsetin.Thepublic canonlydo theirpartof the job if there isadequate transparency inwhat the industryand theregulators are doing. Adequate performance, inspection, and enforcement data needs to be easily publiclyavailablesocompliancecanbeverified.Adequateinformationaboutthespecifications,contents,androutesofproposedpipelinesalsoneedtobeeasilyavailablesopeoplelivinginpotentiallyimpactedneighborhoodscandecideforthemselvesifadequatesafetyprecautionshavebeentaken.Andtheinformationthatdecisionmakers use tomake pipeline safety decisions also needs to be available to the public so they can decidewhether theirofficialsaremakingdecisionswith full knowledgeof the impactsandwith thepublic’s safetyandwelfareinmind.WebelievethatRonaldReaganwasrightwhenhesaid“trustbutverify.”Onlythroughsuchverificationcantrustinpipelinesafetygrow,andonlywhengovernmentandindustryistrulytransparentissuchverificationpossible.Asstatedearliermuchof this report isbasedon informationthat ispubliclyavailable.ThefederalOfficeofPipelineSafety(OPS)hasmadegreatstrides inthepastfewyears increasingtransparencybymakingbetterincident, enforcement and inspection data available. The RRC has a robust website that includes pipelinemaps,individualpermitsandannualreports,andinformationonexcavationdamagethatisnotavailablefromthevastmajorityofotherstatepipelineregulators.ConcernsWithPipelineInformationTransparencyWhilea largeamountof information ispublicly availableandverifiable, there is still important informationmissing, which may lead to distrust of the process. With the current electronic abilities to post nearlyunlimitedmaterialsonlineindustryandgovernmentcouldcreatemoretrustbypostinginformationthattheyalreadyarerequiredtoprepare, insteadofcreatingbarriersbyexpectingthepublic togothrougha formalpublic information request process. The industry in particular provides very little information about theirparticularpipelinesandtheassociatedoperations,maintenanceandinspection.One of the very basicmeasures of pipeline safety is incident data. OPS hasworked hard to upgrade theirincidentdatabaseinthepastyears,andnowprovidesstate‐by‐statebreakoutsofincidentdataincludingthespecificsforeachincident.TheRRCprovidesdatathatshowshowmanymoreincidentsonintrastatepipelineswere reported to them than to OPS, but no specifics are provided regarding these incidents that allowsanalysisofsafetytrendsorgapsinregulations.

Neighborinvolvement,TransparencyandWheretoGetMoreInformation

35

Oneother concern is thatoften security issuesare raisedasa reason toprevent thepublic fromaccess toimportant pipeline information. It is our opinion that these concerns are often overblown, and that awellinformedpublicincreasessafetyinmanyways.

TransparencyRecommendations

•TheRRCshouldcreateapubliclyaccessibledocketsystemthatwouldincludeallinformationaboutpipelineenforcement cases and fines. It also should include any requests for exemptions or waivers and the RRCreasoningforgrantingordenyingsuchrequests.

•TheRRCshouldmakeitsincidentdatabaseavailabletothepublic.Insteadofjustreportingthenumberofincidents reported, information about the particular pipeline involved, date, location, damage caused, andcauseshouldalsobeprovided.

•TheCityofFortWorthshouldmakeallpipelinepermitinformationpubliclyavailableonline,andensurethatthemaximumallowableoperatingpressure(MAOP),pipediameter,andpotentialimpactradiusdistancesofallpipelinesareprovidedinsuchinformationbeforeapprovalissoughtfromvariouscommitteesortheCityCouncil.

• The City of Fort Worth should make all permitted pipeline routes available online before approval isprovided. To ensure the City is using its approval authority to help develop safe pipeline routes, whenapproval of crossing of City rights‐of‐way or parks are sought, the route of the entire pipeline should beprovided,notjustthelocationwherethepipelinewillcrosstheright‐of‐wayorpark.

• Pipeline operators should make specific information about pipeline routes, construction, specifications,operationsandinspectionsoftheirpipelinesavailableontheirwebsites.

•TheCitizensofFortWorthshouldcontinuetoreviewpipelinesafetyinformationandmakeelectedofficials,regulatoryagenciesand thepipeline industryawareof concerns theyhave regarding the inability toaccesspipelinesafetyinformation.

CitizenOrganizationsFortWorthLeagueofNeighborhoodAssociations‐http://www.fwlna.org/PipelineSafetyTrust–http://www.pstrust.org

RegulationsFederalpipelinesafetyregulations‐http://phmsa.dot.gov/pipeline/regsTexaspipelinesafetyregulations&undergroundpipelinedamagepreventionregulations–

http://info.sos.state.tx.us/pls/pub/readtac$ext.ViewTAC?tac_view=4&ti=16&pt=1&ch=8http://info.sos.state.tx.us/pls/pub/readtac$ext.ViewTAC?tac_view=4&ti=16&pt=1&ch=18&rl=Y

CityofFortWorth–GasWellDrillingandPipelineInfo‐http://www.fortworthgov.org/gaswells/

PipelineMapsandDataFederalOfficeofPipelineSafety’s–

TexasInfoPages–http://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/comm/StatePages/Texas.htmStakeholderCommunications‐http://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/comm/

RailroadCommissionofTexas–Pipelineandgaswellmaps‐http://gis2.rrc.state.tx.us/public/startit.htmPipelineexcavationdamagequery–http://webapps.rrc.state.tx.us/TPD/publicHomeAction.doT‐4PipelinePermits‐http://rrcsearch.neubus.com/esd‐rrc/#resultsPipelineSafetyData‐http://www.rrc.state.tx.us/data/pipeline.php

WhereToGetMoreInformation

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The principal authors of this report were Richard Kuprewicz, president of Accufacts Inc and CarlWeimer,executivedirectorofthePipelineSafetyTrust.RichardKuprewiczhasover35yearsexperienceintheenergyindustryofferingspecialfocusonappropriatepipelinedesignandoperationinareasofuniquepopulationdensityorofanenvironmentallysensitivenature.HeiscurrentlyamemberoftheU.S.DepartmentofTransportationTechnicalHazardousLiquidPipelineSafetyStandardsCommittee(THLPSSC)andisthepastchairmanoftheWashingtonStateCitizensCommitteeonPipelineSafety.Heisachemicalengineer,experiencedinproduction,pipeline,andrefinerydesign,construction,operation,maintenance,riskanalysis,management,acquisition,andhazardanalysis.Hehasalsoauthoredmanypapersonpipelinesafety,bothnationallyandinternationally.CarlWeimer has been the executive director of the Pipeline Safety Trust since 2005. The Trust is theonly

national non‐profit public interest organization that focuses on pipelinesafety issues. He also serves on the U.S. Department of Transportation'sTechnical Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Standards Committee, and thesteering committee for the Pipelines and Informed Planning Alliance. Mr.WeimerhastestifiedtoboththeU.S.HouseofRepresentativesandSenateon pipeline safety issues multiple times, organized five national pipelinesafetyconferences,runsthenationalSafePipelinesandLNGSafetylistservesthatincludeover700peoplefromaroundthecountry,andregularlyservesas an independent source of pipeline safety information for news media,localgovernment,andcitizensaroundthecountry.Mr.Weimerwaselectedin 2005 to theWhatcomCountyCouncil, and re‐elected in 2009.Hehas adegree in Natural Resources and Environmental Education from theUniversityofMichigan,aswelladegreeinIndustrialElectronicsTechnologyfromPeninsulaCollege.

AbouttheAuthors