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Jnl Publ. Pol., 5, I, 107-120

Review article:

The Structure and Organization of Government: Concepts and Issues

B. GUY PETERS* University of Pittsburgh

The most basic question about the structure and organization of

government is Why we should be concerned about this question at all?' Many of us trained in political science programs during the behavioral

revolution were taught to believe that the structures of government were

insignificant as a focus for research. The structures of government became

encapsulated in an opaque black box; that part of the political system

where decisions were made. Fortunately, this view no longer prevails and

there is increasing interest in structural questions, in part generated by

the increasing interest in the state as a focus for political inquiry (Dyson,

I980; Benjamin and Elkin, I985). Much of the work on the state as yet,

however, leaves that concept largely undifferentiated and has not dealt

systematically with the structure of the state apparatus. Thus, concern for

the development of state theory, as well as the concerns of those interested

in public policy, has returned structural questions to a more central

position in political science.

Government structure can first be seen as a dependent variable. For

example, as Pollitt (I984) points out, one aproach to the machinery of

government has been to hypothesize that economic scarcity will influence

organizational developments within government. Rockman (I984) has

made a more specific point, arguing that scarcity has tended to foster the

development of policy analytic units within government organizations,

particularly line agencies, so that they can attempt to counter

macro-economic priorities being imposed upon them by central financial

agencies. Kochen and Deutsch (I980) have developed a number of

hypotheses relating characteristics of the tasks of public organizations to

the structural forms which are most suitable, especially along the

dimension of centralization and decentralization.

The 'size' of government may also influence organizational patterns

(Peters and Heisler, I 983; Rose, I 984). In particular, one might

* An earlier version of this paper was presented at the inaugural meeting in Britain of the Inter- national Political Science Association Study Group on the Structure and Organization of Govern- ment, Broomcroft Hall, University of Manchester, November, I984. The author expresses his

appreciation to the University Center for International Studies of the University of Pittsburgh for support for this project.

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io8 B. Guy Peters

hypothesize that size would be exponentially related to the growth across

time of the number of organizational units within a single government. There are limits to the ability of any one organization to manage large volumes of work or multiple policy areas; as government grows organizations may proliferate. Insofar as the structures of government can be analyzed as a dependent variable, structure can come back into

'scientific' political science with no loss of rigor, but with an increase of

isomorphism to the political realities being studied. Structures of government can also be used as independent variables to

explain policy outcomes or political behavior. As Caiden points out:

The implied rationale (of many efforts at administrative reform) is that administration really does matter, that it is not something that can be ignored or cast aside, and that an improvement in administration will pay handsomely in the attainment of other objectives. (Caiden, 1970, 200)

For one obvious example, a federal system of governing would be expected to have less uniformity in the implementation of policy than unitary systems. Likewise, more highly differentiated and decentralized bureaucracies such as in the United States should be expected to be more susceptible to pressure group influence than more unified bureaucracies such as the United Kingdom. The important tasks, therefore, are to develop appropriate concepts and appropriate operational indicators of those concepts for describing structures of government, and to develop theoretical linkages between structures and outcomes in the policy process.

The importance of the structure of government, as both independent and dependent variable, is made even more strongly by March and Olsen (I 984) as a part of their discussion of the new institutionalism. They point out that much of the contemporary theory of politics assumes that government is influenced by societal factors, e.g., interest groups or

ethnicity, but that the reverse is not true. They argue, however, that the institutions of government are important for structuring patterns of interaction in society:

An institutional theory would specify how historical processes are affected by specific characteristics of political institutions, and it would provide greater theoretical understanding of the inefficiences of history (March and Olsen, I984,

743)

I. What is the structure of government?

Just what it is we are to be talking about? There are several alternative ways in which the words structure and organization of government have been used. The most restrictive is to talk just of the organization of

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Concepts and Issues IO9

cabinets and the division of portfolios and power among members of the

cabinet. For example, Blondel (I982) has produced a very interesting

book discussing the nature of top executive structures in the modern

world, with categories ranging from hierarchical governments generally

dominated by a single ruler, through collective governments such as the

British cabinet system, to divided governments, including both the

United States and the Communist countries. This is an interesting and

important aspect of the structure of government, but seems excessively

restrictive and misses much of the important structural change which is

occuring in the nature of contemporary political systems.

Another form of rather restrictive study is typified by the Hood and

Dunsire (I98I) statistical analysis of properties of departments in British

central government. This is an important component of the entire

question of the structure of government, but takes for granted larger

structural questions within government, e.g. the number and type of

organizations. In addition, there are studies dealing with very similar

issues in the context of the United States federal government (Peters and

Hogwood, forthcoming). However, concentration on internal structuring

does not link these types of concerns to broader organizational issues

within government.

At the other end of a dimension of specificity is Lijphart's (I984)

analysis of 22 democratic systems, which includes some of the same

factors about the structure of the political executive as Blondel, but also

includes party structure, legislative behavior, and the heterogeneity of the

population. Building on his earlier work (Lijphart, I977; i968), this study

explored the existence of two alternative models of democracy; the

majoritarian (Westminster) model and the consensual (consociational).

The classificatory system developed by Lijphart earlier has been shown to

have some utility for explaining patterns of public policy in democratic

countries (Peters, Doughtie and McCulloch, 1977), but this whole-system

approach may be too broad and too related to the structure of political

inputs to serve as a basis of a conceptualization of the organization of

government for itself. It would seem to run the danger of the structures of

government again being reduced to a black box for transmitting the

demands of society into policies with little understanding of how that box

itself functions. Despite the importance of the linkages of government to

mass politics and mass society, it would appear that there is a need to

develop a better understanding of politics within government itself, and

the impact of structural variables on these politics.

A third approach to the structure of government is the 'machinery of

government' literature (Pollitt, I984; Doerr, 198I; Hood, I978; I979),

concerned with the macro-level organization of systems of governing.

However, there is perhaps excessive attention given to the departments of

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IIO B. Guy Peters

central government and insufficient attention given to both non-

departmental bodies and their importance in the formulation and

execution of public policies, and to the relationship of central government

to other levels of government.

One very broad approach is provided by Hall (1 983) in a discussion of

the capacity of governments to innovate effectively. He enumerates three

levels of structural factors important in explaining innovation. The first is

the structure of the state itself, including such attributes as the

relationship between the political and career executives and the internal

decision-making structures of government departments themselves. The

second is the relationship between state and society, the leverage which

government has over the society. (Other authors working from the

perspective of corporatism, or from that of the autonomy of the state

(Nordlinger, I98I; Benjamin and Duvall, I985), are more interested in

the power which society has over the state.) Finally, Hall is interested in

the structure of society, which may make it more likely for the state to

intervene effectively. For example, government may be more effective in

implementing an incomes policy in a society with industrial unions rather

than craft-based unions. It would appear that the first two dimensions

employed by Hall are essential for an understanding of the structural

aspects of governing systems, but that the third may well go beyond our

immediate concerns.

Sundquist (I 978) undertook to answer the same type of question that Hall did: what factors explain the relative success of government in

making policy interventions? Comparing the United States with Western Europe, he argued that four factors explained the relatively greater

success of European countries in planning for, and controlling, population

movements: (i) different levels of bureaucratic capability; (2) differential

degrees of bureaucratic discipline; (3) differences in the institutional

environment of planning; and (4) differences in the stability and authority of party programs. He concludes by arguing that:

It may well be that institutional differences that have evolved quite accidentally are more important than differences in geography or resources or ideology in making the United States stand out among the industrial democracies as the one with by far the most conservative domestic policies (Sundquist, I978, 79).

While one may question whether European countries are quite as

homogenous as they appear from America, the comment provides an

interesting starting point for further analysis.

A broad conception of the subject matter of the 'structure and

organization of government' is the most appropriate for research. In

addition to the division of ministerial offices and the internal structuring

of government departments, it should contain additional information

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Concepts and Issues I I I

about the structure of the governing system, including the relationships,

division of power, and responsibilities of central government and

subnational governments. We should also be concerned with the manner

in.which government organizes its own work and the extent to which non-departmental bodies, such as public corporations and quasi-public corporations, are utilized to implement public policy, which do appear to

make a difference in the manner in which government performs and in

which government is regarded by citizens (Barker, 1982; Hague, Mackenzie and Barker, I975; Sharkansky, 1979. In addition, we should look at those structures as mechanisms for the state to influence society;

mechanisms which are picked for administrative convenience or to mask

the true size of the public sector may be less effective as well as less

responsible. Public corporations organized in a corporate format to gain

the presumed advantages of a business-like structure may be less effective in implementing a government program than an executive department performing the same function (Vernon, I984). Finally, the structure of

organized participation in government should be included, without repeating the corporatist and corporate pluralist literature (Schmitter, 1974; Schmitter and Lehmbruch, I 982; Lehmbruch and Schmitter, 1982;

Heisler, I979). Structure can facilitate participation, and it produces variations in the manner in which groups are represented in government

(Peters, I984).

.2. Alternative approaches to structure and organization

We can turn to alternative approaches for understanding. This paper will deal only with the analysis of existing structures of government and not with questions of reorganization and pressures for change, which would require one or more additional papers. In addition, many of the

assumptions and approaches to the existing machinery of government are implicit in attempts at reorganization, so that the two bodies of literature

are by no means extremely disparate. A number of approaches to

understanding and explaining existing government structures have been

advanced.

2.1 Traditional Explanations

Traditional scholars of the British 'machine' tend to be highly descriptive and to some extent oriented toward the practitioners of the art of

government (Chester and Willson, I968). The emphasis on history and institutions contrast with scholars attempting to develop more abstract theoretical explanations of government structure. Much of the older literature on the machinery of government in other countries (Short,

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I 1 2 B. Guy Peters

I923; Anderson, I945) is also descriptive, formal and legalistic. This can

be very useful in gaining an idea of the lay of the land in order to

understand better the structures one is trying to conceptualize, or in the

case of the practitioner, to manipulate.

2.2 Growth of government

A second group of explanations, related changes in the scale of

government activities (Rose, 1975; King, 1975) to changes in the

structures of government. Several hypotheses, for example that increasing

demands would be related to greater internal specialization, could be

developed from this approach. But concentrating on merely the growth of

government as a source of change in political structures is a limited

approach to the impact of political change on government organization.

Overload is the extent that an excess of growth occurs, however

conceptualized and measured. To the extent that it is different from

overload, financial scarcity for governments can also be expected to have

significant structural effects (Rockman, I984; Levine, 1978; Tarschys,

I 98 I ). Likewise, technological change has been found to be important for

explaining the existence of certain types of organizations (Grafton, 1984).

Because there are a number of political and social pressures on

government which are not captured by the overload concept, it may be as

important to identify the type of demands being placed upon government

as their quantity. In the longitudinal analysis of a single government

which has experienced a variation in load, the use of that concept may be

appropriate, but for the development, of comprehensive theories of the

comparative government structure, it is an inadequate measure of the

impact of politics on structures.

2.3 Organization theory

This vast field has been applied much more frequently to private sector

organizations than to the public sector (Rainey, 1984). Most applications of organization theory to the structure of government have been of a single

type, the use of contingency theory to attempt to explain the structure of

government departments or local governments (Pitt and Smith, 198I;

Greenwood and Hinings, I976; Greenwood, Hinings and Ranson, I975a;

Greenwood, Hinings and Ranson, 1975b). These empirical studies have

met with limited success; the factors usually found to be related to organ- izational structures do not correlate strongly with characteristics of

public organizations. As Hood (1979) shows, contingency approaches

have even less ability to prescribe the right type of organization for a par-

ticular environment. Similarly, Kaufman and Seidman (I970) found no

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Concepts and Issues II 3

connection between environment and organizational form in a number

of agencies in the US federal government, concluding that variations in

form were a function of micro-political forces rather than the task environ-

ment, as is assumed in the contingency approach.

Organization is contingent insofar as public organizations do need to

deliver different public services in different manners. Kochen and

Deutsch (I980) have developed a number of hypotheses relating the

characteristics of services to structures. Studies of social service delivery

(Yates, I978; Lipsky, I980) have noted that these organizations rely on

street-level personnel much more than would be expected in a

hierarchical organization, and hence have developed different structures

for accountability and control.

Any number of different types of organization theory seek to explain

behavior within public organizations (Braybrooke and Lindblom, I963;

Cohen, March and Olsen, I972; Niskanen, 1971), but much less done to explain the structure of these organizations or sets of organizations. In

Kimberly's (1976) characterization, these are research in organizations

rather than on organizations.

Contingency theory is, of course, not the only organization theory to be

applied to the structure of government. At a high level of abstraction,

population ecology models of organizations may be useful in explaining

the survival or death of public organizations (Aldrich, I 979; Hannan and

Freeman, I977). The assumptions behind this approach are somewhat

more deterministic than those usually found in analyzing public sector

organization. Most approaches to the public sector stress making choices

about organizations rather than pressures arising in a population of

organizations. Using these models for the study of departmental and

sub-departmental bodies, we would have a very good reason to expect a

drop in the number of organizations to follow a rapid increase. New

organizations are more vulnerable to political pressures, and mistakes will

inevitably be made when establishing new organizations.

Another organizational theory school is that of implementation,

centered at the International Institute of Management in Berlin (Hjern

and Hull, I982; Hanf, I982; Hjern and Porter, I98I), which directs

attention from readily identifiable institutions to underlying structures.

Their basic concept is the implementation structure, 'administrative entity

which programme implementors use for accomplishing objectives within

a programme' (Hjern and Porter, i98I, i i). An implementation

structure will typically involve components of several public and private

organizations. This meta-unit focus emphasizes the implications of

organizational formats for programme accomplishment. It has certain

similarity to the economic theory of teams, in that it posits the existence of

organized networks which exist within and across formal organizations.

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I14 B. Guy Peters

Within a network, members can have more in common with each other than with the organizations of which they are nominally the employees. On empirical research, this approach requires a great deal of careful attention to the margins of identifiable government organizations. Concentration on service delivery also does little to help us understand the upper echelons of public organizations.

2.4 Social Action Theogy

Social action theory argues that governmental structures, like any other aspects of the social world, cannot be understood without an adequate knowledge of the assumptions upon which they are premised (Harmon, I980). Thus, it is similar to verstehen approaches to the social sciences; it requires the observer to understand the meaning of acts to the participants, as well as the meaning for social behaviour (Weber, I949;

Kaplan, I964, 32-33). Government officials designing public organiza- tions have a range of ideas, beliefs, opinions, and traditions which affect their efforts. These ideas are in part the mythology and proverbs about public administration, and in part a function of the society and culture in which the organization functions. Many things which appear quite unexpected to the outside observer - such as the dependence of the executive branch in the United States on a large number of political appointees rather than civil servants - can be understood within the milieu of that country.

It is very difficult to deny that political structures should be understood within their own context; the difficulty is making comparisons, since any governmental structure or attempts to change the structure would have to be understood almost sui generis. The approach may be quite useful within a single country within a relatively constrained time period, as Pollitt argues (I984, 174-7), but its utility diminishes as comparative analysis becomes the concern.

2.5 Political economy and policy analysis

Political economy and/or policy analysis have been given relatively less attention as approaches for analyzing the structures of government, given that the majority of such work is concerned with the processes of decision-making rather than the structure influencing those processes. For example, authors such as Niskanen (I971), Tullock (I965), and Simon (1978) have been concerned primarily with the behavior of individual bureaucratic decision-makers working within a public bureaucracy.

Studies in decision-making do not, however, exhaust the concerns of

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Concepts and Issues 115

political economists (Moe, I984). Williamson (I97I; 1976) has argued

that the internal form of a firm had a great deal to do with its

decision-making. He distinguishes two basic organizational forms, the

unitary (U) form and the multi-divisional (M) form. In the U-form,

specialized units such as sales, finance and personnel perform their

particular functions for all product lines of the firm. In the M-form,

operating divisions will be responsible for specialized functions affecting

their own product lines. The correspondence between business structure

and public organizations is clear. The U-form organization can be seen as

a government with a number of relatively strong central agencies

imposing internal standards on the operating divisions of government,

while M-form organization would be a more decentralized government,

with each of the component parts making potentially different decisions

about things such as personnel, budgeting, etc.

Williamson has also developed a series of hypotheses about the effects of

organizational forms on the behavior of the firm. In the first place, he

considered the control loss which might emerge as a U-form organization

expanded (Jackson, i982, 65-7). Not only would there be control loss as

each organization expanded the number of hierarchical levels, but also as

horizontal communication deteriorated, e.g. the Office of Personnel

Management would find it more difficult to coordinate effectively with the

Office of Management and Budget because of its own internal layering.

This structure is also hypothesized to make strategic planning difficult, as

the operational goals of the individual units within the firm or government

are incommensurable, and power struggles about different goals develop.

A strong executive is required to manage an organization such as this. In

the business world, it is hypothesized that the M-form organization is a

superior form of organization, as each part of the firm is in itself a

quasi-organization, and has the same types of incentives for profit and

efficiency as does the firm as a whole.

It is by no means clear that the same logic would operate in the public

sector. In fact, central agencies (Campbell and Szablowski, I979) have

been developed to try to prevent operating divisions of government from

acting too much as quasi-firms and to impose some coordination on what

might otherwise be a very chaotic pattern of governance. The

fundamental difference would seem to be the presence of measurable

profit in the case of the firm to serve as a guide for action, whereas other,

less directly measurable criteria are used by operating agencies in

government to extract resources from the center.

The economic theory of teams is also related to Williamson's models of

firm structure. Teams are theoretical constructs, although unlike

implementation structures they exist within organizations rather than

between organizations (Marshak, I955; Radner, I962). The team is a

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iI6 B. Guy Peters

subset of the entire organization which derives its utility primarily from the success of the team rather than from the entire organization; as such it presents problems similar to those of displacement of goals in sociological organization theory (Merton, 1940). The theory of teams has important points of contact with the emerging agency theories of organizations (Moe, I984; Mitnick, I980). One of its basic questions is how to structure organizations to allow for the optimal utilization of information, and

particularly, the impact of centralization or decentralization on the use of information.

2.6 Theories of the State

There is a proliferating literature on the theory of the state, especially the state in capitalist society (Dyson, 1980; Skocpol, I979; Offe, I984;

Benjamin and Elkin, I985). But the value of the state literature for our undertaking appears limited, inasmuch as little work has been done on the internal structure of the state. The dominant concern has been the relationship between the state and its international environment (Duvall and Freeman, I98I; I983) and between the state and society (Skocpol, I979; Nordlinger, 198I; Therborn, I978). To the extent that state theorists have been concerned with the internal structure of government it has been in the differences between state structure in dependent and advanced industrial capitalism (Benjamin and Duvall, 1985). Much of the theoretical work on the state and society has been concentrated on the question of the relative autonomy of the state vis-a-vis either the capitalist classes, for those working from a Marxist perceptive (Therborn, I978;

Milliband, I969), or organized interests in the society, for those working from other perspectives (Nordlinger, I980). The assertion of a higher degree of autonomy for the state than is usually assumed constitutes an interesting contradiction of much of the corporatist literature on state-society linkages.

The concept of state autonomy may be useful for our analysis of the structure of government, for it provides another way of looking at the policy-making capacity of contemporary governments (Sundquist, 1978;

Hall, I983). There may well be structural features of the political system which contribute to the relative decisional autonomy of state actors, and thereby make the government a more effective policymaker. Hall (I983)

has argued that the power of a government to innovate in policymaking would be higher if: (a) power was concentrated in a relatively few hands; (b) power lies in the hands of actors who are free of vested interest in the policy area; (c) organizational structures enhance access to information and expertise in the policy area; and (d) organizational arrangements in government enhance the probability of informal alliances between

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Concepts and Issues 117

political executives and career civil servants. To some degree, his analysis

of decisional autonomy uses some of the same factors Rose ( 974) found

useful in explaining the effectiveness - or lack of effectiveness - of party

government (see also Peters, I98I).

2.7 Management

Government here is approached from the perspective of a political

executive, or government manager attempting to have his or her program put into effect; this is the perspective of 'government against subgovern-

ment' (Rose, I980). Whereas the implementation literature cited above

looks at implementation from a bottom-up perspective, this is to some

degree implementation from a top-down perspective. Some of the factors cited by Rose (I 974) as to why party government is difficult to sustain, as

well as many of the features cited in the barriers to implementation literature (Hood, I976; Edwards, 1980) are structural aspects of

government. This approach to government structure appears particularly

useful because it is directly concerned with the impact of structure on

government performance, and more exactly, government's capacity to

put the wishes of its political leadership into effect (Fesler, I983). It is,

however, of little use in explaining the development of government

structure, especially given that many government structures, such as those designed by the United States constitution, seem more suitable to prevent anything from happening. It may be, as Sundquist argued, that

government structures develop almost accidentally, although there does

appear to be at least the nub of theory guiding the reorganization of

governments, and perhaps their formation (March and Olsen, I983;

Aberbach and Rockman, I984).

When management is understood as the capacity of governors to

achieve political ends, and not simply as business school techniques, it

does appear as the most useful means of examining structures as an

independent variable. Such a perspective allows us to integrate concern

with structural features, e.g. central agencies (Campbell and Szablowski, I979), influencing managerial effectiveness of political executives, procedures and techniques, and the characteristics of individual political

executives. Given the variety of ways of conceiving of the structure of government

and conducting research to increase understanding, the question thus

arises: which approach deserves priority today? My own conclusion is

that at present the most promising approach for further development is

the managerial, 'top down' approach to governmental structure. It

recognizes that the purpose of government is to supply direction to the

society and economy, and that structural features may affect the ability of

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iI8 B. Guy Peters

elected officials, in democratic political systems nominally the legitimate

governors, to supply such direction effectively. Such an approach to the

structure of government is quite overtly political. Other approaches may

produce somewhat more elegant theories of organization, but the

managerial approach appears to capture the relevance of organization for

policy.

NOTE

i. In this paper the words 'structure' and 'organization' of government are used synonymously. Both

terms are used because they both appear frequently in the literature. The phrase 'machinery of

government' is not appropriate because of its somewhat mechanistic connotations, and because its

use is confined largely to the Anglo-Saxon parts of the world.

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