the truth of antiphon the sophist

The Truth of Antiphon the SophistMargaret E. Reesor

There have been many, and often incompatible interpretations of An-tiphon's Truth. Some scholars have argued that Antiphon was advocat-ing an ideal society. Saunders wrote that Antiphon was proposing 'asociety with a sort of "tribal" mentality, relying wholly on individualempirically established rules of conduct, without the complications im-ported by general notions.'1 Others have held that Antiphon was animmoralist who denounced the rule of law and urged a return to na-ture.2 Recently, Barnes concluded that Antiphon was giving us adescription of society as it existed in his own day, and was not mak-

1 T. J. Saunders, 'Antiphon the Sophist on Natural Laws (B 44 DK),' Proceedingsof the Aristotelian Society 78 (1977-8), 231. See also M. Gigante, Nomos Basileus(Napoli: Edizioni Glaux 1956, reprinted Amo Press 1979), 170; E. A. Havelock,The Liberal Temper in Greek Politics (London: Jonathan Cape 1957), 260-4; C.Moulton, 'Antiphon the Sophist, On Truth/ Transactions of the Amencan Philo-logical Association 103 (1972), 348-9.

2 M. Nill, Morality and Self-interest in Protagoras, Antiphon and Democntus (Leiden:E. J. Brill 1985), 53; G. B. Kerferd, The Sophistic Movement (Cambridge: Cam-bridge University Press 1981),116-17, supports Guthrie in holding that Anti-phon's general thesis is that 'a morality enforced by law and custom iscontrary to nature and nature's way is to be preferred.' See W. K. C. Guthrie,History of Greek Philosophy III (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1969),112, and Kerferd's earlier article, The Moral and Political Doctrines of Anti-phon the Sophist. A Reconsideration,' Proceedings of the Cambridge PhilologicalSociety 184 (1956) 26-32.

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204 Margaret E. Reesor

ing any 'moral or political recommendations at all/3 and Furley wrotethat Antiphon 'criticizes and rejects justice on the ground that to bejust is to damage or neglect one's own natural interest.'4

My own interpretation of the Truth rests primarily on two descrip-tions of justice: 'Not wronging anyone if one is not being wronged one-self' (το μη άδικεΐν < μηδ > ένα μη άδικούμενον αυτόν, 87 Β 44, col I,12-15), and its antithesis: 'Wronging some one if one is not beingwronged oneself.' Taking these as a basis, I shall draw attention to otherpassages in the Truth which illustrate the premises: 'Not wronging any-one even if one is being wronged oneself,' and 'Wronging some oneif one is being wronged oneself.' I shall point out the incompatibilitybetween the descriptions of justice which are applicable to the lawcourts and those which are favorably regarded in a social context. Thisincompatibility has been responsible for much of the confusion whichhas surrounded the interpretation of the Truth. By establishing thesefour premises, I am able to explain the relevance of the much-discussedpassage in which Antiphon attacks racial prejudice between Greeksand barbarians.

I shall argue that seeing, hearing, speaking, walking and desiringare specifications for what Antiphon calls 'things that are innate bynature.' A man who 'when left alone without witnesses regards thosethings which pertain to nature as important' would presumably fol-low his own volition in speaking, acting or desiring. There is no rea-son to believe that this would entail breaking the law or rejectingcustom. In fact, the evidence seems to indicate that Antiphon was notan immoralist, but an exponent of the freedom of the individual.

Antiphon was providing a pessimistic analysis of contemporary so-ciety, not a prescription for an ideal society. Most acts performed bymen in society were 'hostile to nature,' because they involved 'thesuffering of more pain when it is possible to suffer less, and the ex-periencing of less pleasure when it is possible to experience more.' Cus-toms were bonds upon the nature of the individual. True freedom tosee, hear and speak, was found only when one was alone. In nature,many men suffered the disadvantages of physical impairment, and all

3 J. Barnes, The Presocratic Philosophers II (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul1979), 214

4 D. J. Furley, 'Antiphon's Case against Justice/ in G. B. Kerferd, ed., TheSophists and their Legacy (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag 1981), 81



The Truth of Antiphon the Sophist 205

experienced death. Since the mood of Antiphon's Truth is similar tothat in Gorgias' Helen, I shall include in this paper a comparison ofthe two treatises.

II

Antiphon defined justice as 'not transgressing the customs5 of the cityin which one is a citizen' (87 B 44, A, col 1, 6-11). In a later passage,he describes the position of a man who gives testimony against anotherman in a court of law:

To bear witness to the truth concerning one another is consideredjust and no less useful for the pursuits of men. However, the manwho does this is not just, since not wronging anyone if one is notbeing wronged oneself is just. (44, B, col 1, 3-15)

In this case, he is wronging the man against whom he is giving evi-dence, because he is wronging some one who is not wronging him,and he himself is wronged by the man against whom he has givenevidence, because he is hated by him for having given evidence tothe truth. And not only because of hatred, but throughout his wholelife he must be on his guard to protect himself from that man againstwhom he gave evidence, for he has an enemy who will speak anddo him harm if he can ... It appears that to condemn, to deliver judg-ment, and to arbitrate with a view to a settlement are not just. Forbenefitting some harms others; and in this, those who are benefittedare not wronged, but those who are harmed are wronged. (44, colI, 30-8, II, 1-12, 25-36)

5 The Greek is τα νόμιμα. M. Ostwald (Nomos and the Beginning of the AthenianDemocracy [Oxford- Oxford University Press 1969], 54) writes as follows: 'Andgeneral if not universal acceptance is especially in evidence in the most gener-al senses of the term (i.e., νόμος), when it refers to a way of life, to the nor-mal order of things, to normal procedures, and to normal behaviour, or whenit describes the authority on the basis of which or by which norms are issued,or the condition of law-and-order, in which the νόμοι are obeyed.' J. S. Morri-son ('Antiphon/ in R. K. Sprague, ed., The Older Sophists [Columbia: Universi-ty of South Carolina Press 1972], 218) translated these words as 'the customs';Moulton, 331, as 'laws'; Saunders, 216, as 'the observances'; Barnes, 207, as'regulations'; Furley, 83, as 'the laws and customs.'




In this passage, the man who bears witness to the truth is wrong-ing a man who never wronged him (δτι ουκ άδι<κο>ΰντα εαυτόνά<δι> κει). This may be stated in general terms as: 'Wronging someone if one is not being wronged oneself.' The antithesis of this is spe-cifically stated: 'Not wronging anyone if one is not being wronged one-self (το μη άδικεΐν <μηδ>ένα μη άδικούμενον αυτόν), the latter isnot a definition of justice,6 but it is a description of a class of actionsto which the word 'just' is applied. Similarly, 'wronging some one ifone is not being wronged oneself,' is a description of another class ofactions to which this term is applied.

The plight of the man who has suffered a wrong, and takes the manwho has wronged him to court is also considered. The law does notkeep the man who suffers from suffering, nor the man who has in-flicted suffering from doing so. When the wronged man goes to court,he has to persuade the jurors that he has suffered, and beg to win hiscase (44, A, col 6, 9-30). The act of taking a man who has wrongedone to court may be described as: 'Wronging some one if one is beingwronged oneself.'

The third passage to which I shall draw attention reads as follows:And people who defend themselves when attacked and do not be-gin the aggression, and those who are good to their parents even iftheir parents behave badly to them, and those who offer others thechance to take an oath, but do not take an oath themselves,7 a mancan find many of those things that I have mentioned hostile to na-ture (πολέμια τήι φύσει), for they involve the suffering of more painwhen it is possible to suffer less, and the experiencing of less pleas-ure when it is possible to experience more, and being ill-treated whenit is possible not to be ill-treated at all. (44, A, col 4, 32, col 5, 1-24)

The first specification in this passage seems to belong to the class ofactions denoted by 'Not wronging anyone if one is not being wrongedoneself,' and the second and third to 'Not wronging anyone even ifone is being wronged oneself.'

6 Cf. Barnes, 214.

7 Saunders, 224, explains this as follows: 'Waives his right to take an oath (incourt), thus allowing his opponent's case to appear in a more persuasive light,and in addition runs the risk of being supposed to be afraid to take an oathowing to guilt.'




The last passage that is relevant to the discussion is an attack onracial prejudice between Greeks and barbarians* (44, B, col 2, 1-35).It contains the lines: 'In this we have become barbarians towards oneanother, since by nature in every respect we have been born alike, bothGreeks and barbarians' (44, B, col 2, 7-15). Unfortunately, the contextof the passage is not known, although it is generally agreed that itcomes from the Truth. The man who assumes that there is a differ-ence between Greeks and barbarians, and because of this differenceregards the barbarian as inferior to the Greek, we may assume, wrongsa man who has not wronged him.

We seem, therefore, to have four descriptions of justice:

Justice

Not transgressing the customs of the city in which one is a citizen

(a) (b) (c) (d)

wronging someone if one isnot beingwrongedoneself,e.g., to bearwitness to thetruth con-cerningone another ina court of law.

wronging someone if one isbeing wrongedoneself, e.g.,to take a manwho haswrongedoneself tocourt.

not wronginganyone evenif one is beingwrongedoneself,e.g., not toretaliate.

not wronginganyone if oneis not beingwrongedoneself, e.g.,not to beginthe aggression.

Classes (c) and (d) are described as 'hostile to nature,' for 'they involvethe suffering of more pain when it is possible to suffer less, and theexperiencing of less pleasure when it is possible to experience more.'The passages in which (a) and (b) occur seem to indicate that thesealso are 'hostile to nature.'

8 Moulton, 345, points out that 'the contention that Antiphon attacks class dis-tinctions rests very heavily ... on the acceptance of textual conjectures.'




There is an obvious incompatibility between the descriptions ofjustice that are applicable to the law courts and those that are accepta-ble in social relationships. The law courts required (a) wronging someone if one is not being wronged oneself, for example, 'bearing witnessto the truth concerning one another in a court of law/ and (b) wrong-ing some one if one is being wronged oneself, for example, 'taking aman who has wronged oneself to court.' Presumably, (c), the contradic-tory of (b) with the specification 'not taking a man who has wrongedoneself to court,' would be a sign of weakness. Furthermore, (d), whichis the contradictory of (a), and may be specified by 'not bearing wit-ness to the truth concerning one another in a court of law/ would beequivalent to shirking one's duty to the state. There is no suggestionthat (d) is a prescription for an Utopia. On the other hand, (a), an actof aggression, and (b), an act of retaliation, particularly if it is directedtowards one's parents, are unacceptable in a social context. We seemto have an incompatibility between the νόμος which signifies the cus-toms and laws of the state, and the νόμος which indicates the normsof behaviour.

Since 'not wronging anyone if one is not being wronged oneself'is the contradictory of 'wronging some one if one is not being wrongedoneself,' and the latter is specified by 'bearing witness to the truth con-cerning one another in a court of law/ it seems reasonable to supposethat 'not wronging anyone if one is not being wronged oneself/ maybe interpreted as a description of a man who is not fulfilling his dutiesas a citizen. Some support for this supposition is to be found in Euri-pides' Orestes, a play which may be dated to 408 BC.9 In the secondhalf of the play, Orestes, Pylades and Electra decide to kill Helen topunish Menelaus for failing to support Orestes at his trial before thecitizens (1164-6, 1171). This is clearly an example of 'wronging someone if one is being wronged oneself' ([b]). When the three conspira-tors decide to take Hermione hostage, and even to kill her if that shouldbe to their advantage (1189,1199), their act may be described as 'wrong-ing some one if one is not being wronged oneself' ([a]). If we look fur-ther, we find specifications for the two other descriptions of justicein Antiphon's Truth. Orestes states that his father would have beggedhim not to murder his mother (288-91). Agamemnon is presented as

9 Moulton, 355-6, found 'a parallel to Antiphon's view' in the description ofOrestes' trial before the assembly of the citizens in Euripides' Orestes (887-952).




an advocate of non-retaliation, that is, 'not wronging anyone even ifone is being wronged oneself' ([c]).

To find a specification for the last of Antiphon's descriptions: 'Notwronging anyone if one is not being wronged oneself' ([d]), we haveto turn to Euripides' portrayal of Helen and Menelaus. Both charac-ters in the play seem unable to feel indignation either at Clytaemnes-tra's murder of her husband, Agamemnon, or Orestes' murder of hismother, Qytaemnestra. Menelaus says that, after he heard of Agamem-non's death, he was looking forward to seeing Orestes and Clytaem-nestra (371-3). When he heard of Clytaemnestra's murder, he hurriedon to find Orestes (373-6). He asks only to be spared the horrors ofthe murder (393, cf. 482-4). It is particularly significant that Menelausdid not testify in the assembly of the citizens who tried Orestes (1056-9).

If the scenes depicting Helen and Menelaus are considered in iso-lation from the rest of the play, there is no reason to interpret the wordsof these characters in terms of Antiphon's description of justice. If,however, as seems probable, passages in the play illustrate the otherthree descriptions of justice, we might expect to find the fourth onehere also. If the words of Helen and Menelaus do indeed illustrate thefourth description, Euripides saw in the premise: 'Not wronging any-one if one is not being wronged oneself,' not a description of justicein a Utopia, but a description of the act of a man who refuses to makea committment, and practices non-involvement.

But is this the obvious interpretation of the passage which reads:

To bear witness to the truth concerning one another is consideredto be just and no less useful for the pursuits of men. However, theman who does this is not just, since not wronging anyone if one isnot being wronged oneself is just. (44, col I, 3-15)

If there is in the text a basis for an ideal society, as some scholars haveheld, it is to be found in the premise: 'not wronging anyone if one isnot being wronged oneself is just.' And yet a specificahon for this, 'notbeginning the aggression,' is said to be 'hostile to nature' (44, A, col5,1-17). We might conclude that there is not and can never be a socie-ty which is not hostile to nature, but that a society based on the premise'not wronging anyone if one is not being wronged oneself would beless hostile to nature than the Athenian society that Antiphon knew.The freedom to regard 'those things that pertain to nature' as impor-tant (44, A, col 1, 16-23) is less restricted in a city in which justice isdescribed as 'not wronging anyone if one is not being wronged one-self,' if indeed this justice is observed by all the citizens of the city.




Since no man ever received a wrong from another, there would be noneed of courts, and the whole question of retaliation would not arise.We cannot be sure, however, that Antiphon ever recognized thisdescription of justice as the basis for an ideal society, or that he wasadvocating such a society.

Ill

In the second half of my paper I shall ask whether there is any evi-dence to support the contention that Antiphon was an immoralist whodenounced the rule of law and urged a return to nature. A much dis-cussed passage near the beginning of the Truth has been used by thosewho favour this interpretation:

Justice is not transgressing what is customary in the city in which oneis a citizen. A man would treat justice10 most advantageously for him-self, if in the presence of witnesses he should regard the customs asimportant, but when left alone without witnesses those things thatpertain to nature (τα της φύσεως)... If a man while transgressing whatis customary is undetected by those who have agreed to uphold it,he is free from shame and penalty, but if he does not escape detec-tion, he is not. (44, A, col 1, 6-23, col 2, 3-10)

If we follow the usual interpretation of this passage, we may say thatto regard those things that pertain to nature as important is a desira-ble state, but one which because of the restrictions imposed by cus-tom can only be practised when one is alone. We may state furtherthat to regard those things that pertain to nature as important is equiva-lent to not regarding the customs of the city as important. In otherwords, it is equivalent to breaking the law, or rejecting custom. I donot believe that this is a necessary or correct interpretation of the pas-sage. To support my own interpretation I shall provide an analysis ofthe passages in the Truth which refer to nature.

If he prevents any of those things that are innate to nature from func-tioning, beyond what is possible (των δε τήι φύσει ξυμφύτων εάν τιπαρά το δυνατόν βιάζηται), if he escapes detection from everybody,

10 For this translation see Furley, 83.




the evil is no less, and if everybody sees him, no greater. (44, A, col2, 10-20)

The Greek has been variously interpreted. Morrison provides the trans-lation: 'If, on the other hand, a man does what is really an impossibili-ty and violates one of the inherent demands of nature.'11 Saunderstranslates the first clause as: 'If he forces against the possible one ofthe things that have naturally grown along with us.'12 Nil! suggests:If anyone violates any of those things innate to φύσις, acting contraryto what is possible.'13 Moulton writes that the words παρά το δυνατόνmust mean 'beyond the limit or the permissible.'14

It seems clear that 'those things that are innate by nature' include'life,' for Antiphon writes a little later: 'Loving and dying belong tonature (εστί της φύσεως), and living has its source in those things thatare advantageous, and dying in those things that are not advantageous'(44, A, col 3, 25-33, col 4, 1). But they may also include such functionsas seeing, hearing and desiring, for we read in the passage that fol-lows the one quoted above:

The purpose of my investigation is to establish that many of thosethings that are just according to custom are hostile to nature. For ithas been laid down by custom in the case of eyes what they shouldsee and not see, and in the case of ears what they should hear andnot hear, and in the case of a tongue what it should speak and notspeak, and in the case of the hands what they should do and not do,and in the case of feet where they should go and not go, and in thecase of realization (νους) what it should desire and what it shouldnot. In no way are those things from which the customs deter menmore dear or more akin to nature than those things to which theydirect them. (44, A, col 2, 23-33, col 3, 1-25)

Seeing, hearing, speaking, walking and desiring are specifications for'those things that are not hostile to nature/ and probably for 'thosethings which are innate to nature' as well. There are two kinds of res-

11 Morrison, The Older Sophists, 219

12 Saunders, 216

13 Mill, 54

14 Moulton, 335




traint placed upon 'those things that are innate to nature': the restric-tions placed upon them by custom, and the violent restraint that maylead to their destruction. Those things from which the customs determen may be specified by such acts as 'stealing/ or 'not respecting one'sparents/ and the acts to which they direct them by their contradicto-ries. The fact that an act, such as 'stealing/ is not more dear to naturethan 'not stealing' should warn us against attributing to Antiphon animmoralist philosophy.

I shall now turn back to the text with which I began this part ofmy discussion:

A man would treat justice most advantageously for himself, if in thepresence of witnesses he should regard the customs as important,but when left alone without witnessess those things that pertain tonature (τα της φύσεως) ... If a man while transgressing what is cus-tomary is undetected by those who have agreed to uphold it, he isfree from shame and penalty, but if he does not escape detection,he is not. (44, A, col 1, 12-23, col 2,3-10)

Here, as in the previous passage, we are dealing with the restraintsof custom and law. Only when he is alone, can a man follow his ownvolition in seeing, hearing or speaking. We cannot infer from this thatthe man who was alone, without witnesses, necessarily would breakthe law, or transgress custom.

Since shame and penalty bring distress and pain, an act accompa-nied by more shame and a greater penalty is less advantageous thanone accompanied by less. The man who is detected while transgress-ing what is customary may receive varying degrees of shame andpenalty. Acts which are according to custom performed in the presenceof witnesses are more advantageous because they are accompanied byhonor and reward. Here too there are degrees in the amount of painand pleasure experienced. Antiphon wrote that the purpose of his in-vestigation was to establish that many of those things that are just ac-cording to custom are hostile to nature (44, A, col 2, 23-30). It follows,therefore, that some of those things that are just according to customare not hostile to nature. We may then classify 'those things that aresubject to custom' as either advantageous or disadvantageous, and'those things that are subject to custom and advantageous' as eitherhostile to nature or not hostile to nature. The criterion for decidingthat something which is subject to custom is advantageous is pleasureand pain, and the criterion for deciding that it is not hostile to naturewould be simply that it does not involve 'the suffering of more pain




when it is possible to suffer less, and the experiencing of less pleasurewhen it is possible to experience more.'

The theme of freedom and restraint appears in the next passagethat I shall consider:

Living and dying belong to nature (εστί της φύσεως), and living hasits source in those things that are advantageous (από τωνξυμφερόντων), and dying in those things that are not advantageous.Those things that are advantageous subject to the customs (τα δε ξυμ-φερόντα τα μεν υπό των νόμων κείμενα) are bonds upon nature, butthose things that are subject to nature (τα δ' υπό της φύσεως) are free.Those things that cause distress, by a right account, do not help na-ture more than those things that cause joy. Nor would those thingsthat cause pain be advantageous more than those things that causepleasure. For those things that are truly advantageous ought not toharm but to benefit. (44, A, col 3, 25-33, col 4, 1-22)

We may interpret the word 'nature' in the phrase Tjonds upon nature'from the passage which immediately precedes it (44, A, col 2,30-3, col3, 1-18). Those things that are advantageous subject to customs res-trict and impede the natural acts of seeing, hearing and the naturalexercise of movement and desire.

Saunders saw in this passage two kinds of advantages: 'those thingsthat are advantageous subject to the customs,' and 'those things thatare advantageous by nature.'15 He went on to connect 'those thingsthat cause distress, or pain, and do some harm' with the advantagessubject to the customs, and 'those things that cause joy, or pleasure,and benefit' with the advantages subject to nature. It is hard to under-stand, however, why 'those things that are advantageous, subject tothe customs/ which have varying degrees of pleasure and pain, andwhich may or may not be hostile to nature, should be called 'thosethings that cause distress, or pain, and do some harm.'

Antiphon writes that living and dying belong to nature, and thatliving has its source in those things that are advantageous, and dyingin those things that are not advantageous. In accordance with thesespecifications, we may write that sight and blindness, hearing and deaf-ness belong to nature, and that sight and hearing have their sourcein those things that are advantageous, and blindness and deafness in

15 Saunders, 222-3




those those things that are not advantageous. Then Antiphon mustexplain why some of these are advantageous, and others not advanta-geous, or why we prefer some to their contraries. All those that arenot advantageous are described as those that cause distress and pain,and do some harm; all those that are advantageous as those that causepleasure and joy, and benefit. Pain and distress and injury are thecriterion for deciding that blindness and deafness are not advantageous.I would conclude, therefore, that 'those things that are subject to na-ture' should not be equated with 'those things that are advantageoussubject to nature,' and that 'those things that are subject to nature' areof two kinds: those things that cause distress and pain, and harm, andthose that cause joy and pleasure and benefit.16

There is nothing in the reconstruction that I have made which sug-gests that Antiphon was a hedonist. It is true that in 'those things thatare subject to nature' we prefer those that bring joy and pleasure, andthat benefit. In 'those things that are subject to the customs' there areso many possibilities for short-term or long-term pleasure and pain,and for accepting or rejecting acts which are hostile to nature, that noclear detailed picture of what Antiphon is advocating can be construct-ed. What is clear, however, is that 'those things that are advantageoussubject to the customs' restrict and impede 'those things that are sub-ject to nature.' Only when man is alone, without witnesses, can hefollow his own volition in speaking, acting, or desiring. Only then canhe be truly free.

IV

Did Antiphon have a serious purpose in writing his Truth? What wascharacteristic of the writings of the sophists? To answer these ques-tions I shall point out some similarities between the Truth and Gor-gias' Helen. Both state their purpose in writing.17 Both use exhaustiveclassification. Antiphon defined justice as: 'Not transgressing the cus-toms of the city in whch one is a citizen/ and described four classes

16 For a similar interpretation see W. Kranz, 'Das Gesetz des Herzens/Rheinisches Museum Fur Philologie 94 (1951), 231.

17 Diels-Kranz, 87 B44, A, col 2, 23-30, and 82 B 11 (2)




of justice. Gorgias listed the various kinds of λόγοι.18 Antiphon drewhis specifications from everyday experience, and used as a criterionfor defining what is advantageous subject to nature, and what is notadvantageous, pleasure and pain, joy and distress. Like Antiphon, Gor-gias drew upon everyday experience, and paid a great deal of atten-tion to the emotions.

More significant, however, is the resemblance between the twodocuments in tenor and mood. Gorgias excuses the adultery of Helenon the grounds of infatuation. He uses the analogy of the man whois overcome by fear and flees from battle. If the sight sees the enemyin arms, it is disturbed and disturbs the soul so that men often fleein terror when danger is imminent (16). Further, since the productionof statues and the making of images provide a pleasant sight to theeyes, it is natural that some things should cause pain, and that othersshould cause yearning in the sight (18). Why, then, he asks, is it sur-prising if the eye of Helen finding pleasure in the person of Alexanderproduced an eagerness and conflict of passion in her soul (19)? Wemay conclude that terror on the battle field, like the infatuation ofHelen, is a natural phenomenon. Since, however, Gorgias says at theend of the Helen that he wrote the treatise for amusement, we are prob-ably not meant to take this remarks too seriously.19

Does the Truth of Antiphon produce a similar effect? In the Truththe body of a man has positive powers - living, seeing, hearing, walk-ing and desiring, but it has been established by custom what he shouldsee, or where he should walk. Only when he is alone, without wit-nesses, is he free to act according to his own volition. The actions whichare approved by the community in a social context, non-aggressionand non-retaliation, are 'hostile to nature.' Moreover, what is requiredby law, 'wronging some one if one is not being wronged oneself/ and'wronging some one if one is being wronged oneself/ is not accepta-

18 82 Β 11 (13)

19 It may be objected that Gorgias was a rhetorician rather than a sophist. Wecannot be sure, however, that a clear distinction between rhetoricians andsophists was ever made in the fifth century BC. Morrison may be right in say-ing that in this period leaders in rhetoric, like Gorgias and Thrasymachus,were just as much sophists as Protagoras and Prodicus. See J. S. Morrison,'An Introductory Chapter in the History of Greek Education/ Durham Universi-ty Journal n.s. 10 (1948-49) 55-63.




ble in social relations. We have then contradictory definitions ofjustice.

The criterion for what is advantageous and not advantageous, whatis hostile to nature and what is not hostile to nature, is the pleasureand pain of the individual. What is lacking is a basis for a coherentpolitical and social system, and a justification for the individual's rolein it. As a result we feel some doubt about the validity of the politicalprocess, and wonder whether there are recognizable grounds for ethicalbehaviour. But perhaps this pessimism about conventional moralityalso is not meant to be taken too seriously. The Truth has all the charac-teristics of a sophistic document.

I shall close the paper by commenting on two other issues. First, inan article written in 1963, Morrison argued that the subject of Anti-phon's Truth was language. He based his thesis on a reconstructionof the opening sentence of the Truth, and translated it as follows:

εν τω λέγοντι ουδέ γε νους εϊς, 6ν τε ουδέν αύτφ οοτε ων δψει ορά<ό όρω>ν μακρότατα οΰτε ων γνώμη γιγνώσκει ό μακρόταταγιγνώσκων.20

When a man says a single thing there is no corresponding single mean-ing, nor is the subject of his speech any single thing either of thosethings which the most powerful seer sees with his sight or of thosethings which the most powerful knower knows with his mind.

In my reconstruction of the Truth I have found no traces of a theoryof language. I can explain the opening sentence of the Truth if a differ-ent connotation is given to the word νους. Von Fritz collected passagesin Homer that demonstrate 'the inextricable connection of an intellec-

20 J. S. Morrison, "The Truth of Antiphon/ Phronesis β (1963), 40. H. D. Rankin,Sophists, Socrates and Cynics (New York: Barnes and Noble Books 1983), 68: 'Noone single thing is knowable which corresponds with any of the things theacutest observer can see or the subtlest thinker conceive.' B. Tsiiimbas, DieStellung der Sophistik zur Poesie im V and IV Jahrhundert bis zu Isokrates (Munich1936), 48, connects this sentence with Parmenides 28 B 8, 1, and Empedocles31 B 17, 21.




tual element with an element of volition in the concept of νους.'21 Hestates emphatically that all the different meanings that the words νόοςand νοεΐν have in Homer can be derived from one concept, the reali-zation of a situation.22 Dihle pointed out that 'νόος, "planning," canbe used, together with or without θυμός, as the noun to denote man'sattitude in general.'23 In the Truth itself, Antiphon writes: 'it has beenenjoined- in the case of νους what it should desire and what it shouldnot' (44, A, col 2, 31, and 3, 15-8). The act of desiring requires a reali-zation of the situation at hand. Without altering Morrison's text, I wouldlike to suggest another translation of the sentence: 'When a man saysone thing, there is no single realization, and nothing of those things that themost powerful observer sees with his sight or of those things that themost powerful knower knows with his mind is one thing to him.'

Antiphon was not arguing that words, such as 'justice,' and 'ad-vantageous,' had many meanings, but rather that when a man uttersthese words he cannot regard them as applicable to a single situation.As we have seen, the general definition of justice: 'Not transgressingthe customs of the city in which one is a citizen,' may be broken downinto four separate and contradictory descriptions, and each of theserequires the realization of a specific state of affairs. The word 'advan-tageous' requires the realization of different situations when it is ap-plied to 'those things that are subject to the customs,' and 'those thingsthat are subject to nature.' Morrison's reconstruction of the Greek inthe opening sentence is consistent with my interpretation.

Second, I shall comment on the identity of Antiphon and the prob-able date of the Truth. The evidence for identifying Antiphon theSophist with Antiphon of Rhamnus was clearly stated by Morrison.24

Antiphon of Rhamnus was born at the time of the Persian Wars (490-79BC), and was said to be about the same age as Gorgias.25 He was put

21 K. von Fritz, 'Nous and Noein in the Homeric Poems/ Classical Philology 38(1943), 82, col 1

22 Von Fritz, 91, col 2

23 A. Dihle, The Theory of Will in Classical Antiquity (Berkeley: University ofCalifornia Press 1982), 27

24 J. S. Morrison, 'Antiphon,' Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society 187(1961) 49-58

25 See Genos of Antiphon, in Morrison, 'Antiphon/ in The Older Sophists, 121.




to death in 411 BC, after the overthrow of the Four Hundred.26 Manyscholars, however, have rejected this identification because of the seem-ing incompatibility between Antiphon's democratic bias in the Truth,particularly 44, B, col 2, and the known conservative stance of the ora-tor, and the further incompatibility between Antiphon's attack on cus-tom in the Truth and the role of the orator as a strong exponent ofcustom-law. I do not believe that the problem can be resolved to every-one's satisfaction. If I am correct in believing that Euripides' Orestesreflects some aspects of the Truth, the date of the Orestes, 408 BC, issignificant. The play was written only three years after the death ofAntiphon of Rhamnus, and, if indeed he was the sophist Antiphon,it may have been presented as a tribute to him. The similarities be-tween the Helen of Gorgias and the Truth suggest a date in the latetwenties for the Truth. The Helen was probably written prior to theproduction of Euripides' Trojan Women in 415 BC.27

Department of ClassicsQueen's UniversityKingston, OntarioCanada K7L 3N6

26 The evidence for the identification of the two Antiphons was reconsidered byW. K. C. Guthrie, History of Greek Philosophy III, 292-4, and H. C. Avery, OneAntiphon or Two?', Hermes 90 (1982) 145-58.

27 The Helen of Gorgias was recently translated with an introduction and notesby MacDowell. See D. M. MacDowell, Gorgias. Encomium of Helen (Bristol:Bristol Classical Press 1982). M. Pohlenz ('Die Anfänge der griechischen Poe-tik/ Nach Gott. Ges. [1920] 167, note 1) and M. Orsini ('La cronologia dell' "En-comio di Elena" di Gorgia e le "Troiane" di Euripide,' Dioniso 19 [1956] 82-8)argued that lines 981-97 of Euripides' Trojan Women were an answer to Gor-gias' Helen, and that consequently the Helen should be dated before theproduction of the Trojan Women in 415 BC. Segal dates the Helen to the lastquarter of the fifth century. See C. P. Segal, 'Gorgias and the Psychology ofthe Logos/ Harvard Studies m Classical Philology 66 (1962), 100 and 137, notes11, 12 and 13.

S. Luria ('L'Argomentazione di Antifonte. In Ox. Pap. XV 1797,' Rivista diFilologia e d'lstruzione Classica 5 [1927] 80-3) attempted to reconstruct Antiphon'sTruth from Gorgias' Concerning Non-being. Although his reconstruction is in-teresting, there is insufficient evidence to support it.

For a translation of Antiphon's Truth see J. Barnes, The PresocraticPhilosophers II, 207-10.



the truth of antiphon the sophist

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