The Use of Household Surveys to Study the Dynamics of International Migration

in the Arab Region

Samir Farid

Regional Workshop on International Migration Statistics

Cairo, 30/6/2009 - 3/7/2009

Contents

1. Introduction2. Changing Arab Demographics3. Changing EU Demographics4. The MED-HIMS Project

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1. Introduction• Fundamental changes in human

affairs come both as:

– unpredictable discontinuities, and as

– generally unfolding trends.

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• Discontinuities are more common than is generally realized.

• Incremental engineering progress are very much in evidence, but there are surprising and stunning discontinuities.

• Some political discontinuities of the past 60 years have been even more stunning.

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• Demographic changes are usually slow and regular.

• But demographic discontinuities can and do occur, and can be as abrupt in relative terms as major technical and political shifts.

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• Unpredictability does not prevent us from identifying those discontinuities whose magnitude and impact would be so large that they could alter the complex strategic balance between, and within, countries.

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• Auguste Comte, the 19th-century scientist, is widely credited with the dictum:

“Demography is destiny.”

• It is a wonderful aphorism- but it promises too much and offers too little.

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• A more operational formulation might suggest that:

–Demographic forces can alter the size and composition of regularly established population groupings.

–Demographic considerations can alter the strategic balance between, and within, countries.

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• For our purposes here, we will try to examine the changing demographics of the Arab Region and the European Union.

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2. Changing Arab Demographics

• Over the past half-century, the population of the Arab region has grown on a scale and at a tempo without historical precedent.

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Table 1. Total population at mid-year, Arab Countries, 1950-2050

Rank 1950 2008 2030 2050

Country Population Country Population Country Population Country Population

1 Egypt 21.8 Egypt 76.8 Egypt 104.1 Egypt 121.2

2 Sudan 9.2 Sudan 39.4 Sudan 58.4 Sudan 73.0

3 Morocco 8.9 Algeria 34.4 Iraq 47.4 Iraq 61.9

4 Algeria 8.8 Morocco 31.6 Algeria 44.7 Yemen 58.0

5 Iraq 5.3 Iraq 29.5 Yemen 40.8 Algeria 49.6

6 Yemen 4.3 Saudi A. 25.3 Morocco 39.2 Saudi A. 45.0

7 Syria 3.5 Yemen 23.1 Saudi A. 37.3 Morocco 42.6

8 Tunisia 3.5 Syria 20.5 Syria 29.3 Syria 34.9

9 Saudi A. 3.2 Tunisia 10.4 Somalia 15.2 Somalia 21.1

10 Somalia 2.3 Somalia 9.0 Tunisia 12.5 Tunisia 13.1

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Rank 1950 2008 2030 2050Country Population Country Population Country Population Country Population

11 Lebanon 1.4 Libya 6.3 Jordan 8.6 Palestine 10.3

12 Libya 1.0 Jordan 6.1 Libya 8.4 Jordan 10.1

13 Palestine 1.0 UAE 4.5 Palestine 7.3 Libya 9.7

14 Mauritania 0.7 Palestine 4.2 UAE 6.8 UAE 8.5

15 Jordan 0.5 Lebanon 4.1 Mauritania 4.9 Mauritania 6.4

16 Oman 0.5 Mauritania 3.2 Lebanon 4.9 Kuwait 5.2

17 Kuwait 0.2 Kuwait 2.9 Kuwait 4.3 Lebanon 5.2

18 Comoros 0.2 Oman 2.7 Oman 3.9 Oman 4.6

19 Bahrain 0.1 Comoros 0.9 Comoros 1.3 Comoros 1.7

20 UAE <0.1 Djibouti 0.8 Djibouti 1.2 Djibouti 1.5

21 Djibouti <0.1 Qatar 0.8 Qatar 1.2 Qatar 1.3

22 Qatar <0.1 Bahrain 0.8 Bahrain 1.0 Bahrain 1.2

23 W. Sahara <0.1 W. Sahara 0.5 W. Sahara 0.8 W. Sahara 0.9

Total 76.6 337.8 483.5 587.0

Table 1. Total population at mid-year, Arab Countries, 1950-2050

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– The population of the Arab region rose:• from 77 million in 1950, • to 280 million in 2000, • and 338 million in mid-2008.

– It is estimated to be around 345 million in mid-2009; and

– It is expected to increase to more than 587 million in 2050.

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• The Arab region has the world’s second-fastest growing population, after sub- Saharan Africa.

• Demographic transition is occurring in all 22 Arab states at varying rates.

• The transition in both fertility and mortality is changing the age structure of the populations of the region.

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• As in most developing countries, development efforts have been spread unevenly among the different segments of the population.

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• Statistical indicators in the region still convey a picture of a striking contrast between the rural and the urban demographic and social patterns, and of the families living in these two different contexts.

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• There are differences in the spread of education, particularly among females, in the provision of health services, and in the possibilities generated by the development process for upward social and economic mobility.

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• One consequence of the region’s recent demographic trends is an increasingly notable youth bulge.

• One in every three people living in the region is between ages 10 and 24.

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• This young population provides momentum for continued population growth in the region, despite declining fertility.

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• This large crop of young people also needs jobs and training—in a region currently plagued by high unemployment.

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• The Arab countries are not creating jobs fast enough to match the increase in the working-age population.

• The unemployment rates for youth just entering the work force- especially for young women- are extremely high.

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•The ILO estimated that over 20 percent of young men and over 30 percent of young women in the Arab region were unemployed in 2005.

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•The situation is particularly dire in several Arab countries, with unemployment ranging between 20 percent and 30 percent of young men, along with between 30 percent and 50 percent of young women.

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• Immigration has also played an important role in population change in some parts of the region over the last half-century.

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• Economic expansion following the jump in oil revenues in the 1970s attracted millions of workers from ‘labour-rich’ non-oil producing countries to seek jobs in the ‘oil-rich’ countries within the region.

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• Currently, Arab sending countries face less migration opportunities to the Gulf states due to:– Completion of the infrastructure

stage.– Reduced need for unskilled

labour and increased need for high specific skills not always available in sending countries.

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• A stream of migration out of the region— especially from North Africa, to Europe is also creating large Arab communities in several European countries.

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•Recent studies indicate that Europe is the single largest destination of first-generation emigrants from countries in the Middle East and North Africa, and hosts a little under half of all such emigrants worldwide.

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• The Arab oil countries, i.e. the Gulf States and Libya, constitute the second largest destination, with the rest of the world, mainly North America, ranking far behind.

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• In recent decades, migrants have sent home billions of dollars in remittances that support their families and add significantly to their country’s national income.

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• With more jobs and opportunities in Europe than in the Arab region, the stream of migrants has continued, despite European efforts to slow it down.

• For example, migration from Morocco to southern Europe has been increasing in recent years, especially to Spain and Italy.

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• As the Arab region’s total population increases, so will its elderly population.

• This, in turn, will create new demands for health care and financial security.

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• The elderly will remain a smaller share of the total population, compared with Europe, where one-third of the population will be age 60 or older by 2050, according to recent UN projections.

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• But the numbers entering the older ages in the Arab region will continue to expand.

• Between 2000 and 2050, for example, Egypt’s population 60 years and older is expected to grow from 4.6 million to 23.7 million.

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• Thus, it can be said that emigration from the Arab countries is and will remain an important demographic wildcard.

• It affects the age and sex structure of populations as well as the size in both sending and receiving countries.

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3. Changing EU Demographics• Member states of the EU face an

emerging and potentially dramatic shift in their demographics.

• The sub-replacement birth rate and increased longevity among Europeans will create a financial crisis in member states’ social programmes as the number of pensioners soars and the number of workers declines.

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• The EU population was estimated at 500 million on 1 January 2009.

• IN 2008: – Live births = 5.4 million– Deaths = 4.8 million

• Total increase in EU in 2008=2.2 million, of which:– 0.6 million from natural increase, and– 1.6 million from migration.

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• All European countries have fertility rates that are less than replacement levels, 2.1 children per woman.

• This situation highlights the fact that many social institutions were developed under the assumption that there would always be more children than elderly; this assumption no longer holds.

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• From 2015:–Deaths will outnumber births, –Population growth will only

result from positive net migration;

–Under zero-migration scenario, the EU27 population will start to shrink.

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• The EU27 will face a population that is growing older.

• The population aged 65+ will jump from 13% in 2008 to 30% in 2050.

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• As Europe's population ages the number of those of working age (defined as 15-64) will become smaller.

• Between 2005 and 2050, EU27 will lose 19 per cent, or 64 million, of its current working-age population.

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• For EU27, such a drop in its working-age population is more than the entire present-day working-age population, 55 million, of EU27's most populous country, Germany.

• The working-age population of Germany itself is projected to drop to 45 million by 2050.

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• To sustain the existing social system, Europe: - needs to raise the birth-rate dramatically to at least the replacement level of 2.1 children per woman;- and it needs more tax paying immigrants to fill the gap until the population achieves long-term sustainability.

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• Past immigrants have been mostly coming from countries around the Mediterranean and many of the needed future immigrants will likely come from the southern Mediterranean countries.

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• Thus, it can be said that emigration from the southern Mediterranean countries to the EU is and will remain an important demographic wildcard. It affects the age and sex structure and the size of populations on both sides of the Mediterranean.

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• Both the Arab region and Europe with their history of thousands of years of conflicts, interaction and cultural exchanges need a comprehensive and balanced approach to migration.

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• This requires policies and measures addressing a broad range of challenges and opportunities through dialogue and cooperation between the Arab (sending) countries and the European (destination) countries.

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• Unfortunately, comprehensive, scientific data regarding the determinants and consequences of international migration and the migration intentions of the rapidly increasing young people in the Arab countries are not available.

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3. The MED-HIMS ProjectIn a series of workshops organized by MEDSTAT II, it was agreed that ‘Specialized household surveys provide data on the determinants and consequences of international migration that cannot sufficiently and efficiently be collected by other methods.’

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• In collaboration with MEDSTAT II, ‘Project Documents’ for conducting such surveys have been prepared by the statistical offices in Egypt, Jordan, Palestine and Syria.

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•It was also agreed that these migration surveys should be implemented within a regional coordinated migration survey programme for the MED countries.

•MEDSTAT II developed background papers on the objectives and scope of the proposed ‘Mediterranean Household International Migration Survey’ (MED-HIMS).

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• The MED-HIMS project will aim to overcome the lack of data on international migration from the MED-MENA region by collecting reliable and representative multi-topic, multi-level, retrospective and comparative data on the characteristics and behaviour of migrants.

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•The MED-HIMS project will concentrate mainly on out-migration, return migration, and intentions to migrate, as well as ‘emerging issues’ of international migration for which data are required such as circular migration, migration of highly skilled persons, irregular migration, and remittances.

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• Information on socio-economic status of the household and on characteristics of local communities in sample areas will also be gathered.

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• The proposed MED-HIMS project will aim to improve the setting of priorities and the planning, implementation and evaluation of international migration programmes.

• The MED-HIMS will be designed to meet a number of objectives which may be summarized as follows:

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1) to collect data in order to understand the nature of MED-migration and the demographic and socio-economic characteristics of migrants;

2) to collect data on migration histories and the migration experiences and practices;

3) to collect data on migration intentions and potential destination;

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4) to assess the impact of migration on household economic behaviour and practices;

5) to assess the impact of remittances and their utilization and their impact on socio- economic development in the MED-region;

6) to assess the impact of migration on unemployment and labour dynamics;

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7) to assess the impact of migration on the skill-level of return migrants;

8) to assess the overall awareness of migration issues and practices;

9) to assess migrants’ future plans; 10) to elucidate the processes leading to

the decision to migrate;11) to evaluate the effectiveness of

governmental interventions aiming at preventing illegal emigration;

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12) to develop specific methodologies for collecting and analyzing international migration data; and

13) to improve data utilisation by promoting and encouraging their use by planners, policy makers, and managers of international migration and development programmes.

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• Separate arrangements will have to be made for the establishment of a ‘MED-HIMS Central Unit’ for the management of such regional survey programme and for the provision of technical assistance and financial support.

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Thank you.