the_napoleonic.pdf comparative public administration

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The Napoleonic traditionB. Guy Peters

Department of Political Science, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh,Pennsylvania, USA

Abstract

Purpose This paper intends to provide a framework for understanding the concept ofadministrative tradition, and then applies it to Napoleonic administrative systems.

Design/methodology/approach The analysis involves the creation of a number of dimensionsthat can be used to analyze traditions, and the paper demonstrates the range of application of thedimensions.

Findings Provides findings from a number of studies of public administration.

Originality/value This framework is applied primarily to industrialized democracies in this paperbut can be used across the full range of administrative systems, and is a significant augmentation of

existing frameworks for comparative analysis.Keywords Public administration, Public sector organizations, Europe, Organizational structures

Paper type Research paper

Administrative systems are, in some ways, the easiest components of the public sectorfor comparative analysis (Peters, 1988a, b). Public administration in all politicalsystems is organized in a more or less bureaucratic manner, and is responsible forimplementing public policy, as well as some additional functions such as policy advice.Despite the apparent similarities of the institutions of public administration, there arealso important differences and those differences have crucial significance for the abilityof governments to perform their tasks efficiently and effectively. Further, one format

for public administration is not necessarily superior to others, but its effectiveness maybe a function of how well it fits with other political and social patterns.One way of creating a more comprehensive explanation of the structure and behavior

of public bureaucracies is to develop the concept of administrative traditions. Byadministrative tradition we mean an historically based set of values, structures andrelationships with other institutions that defines the nature of appropriate publicadministration within society, a definition representing more than a little influence of thenormative institutionalism. This concept brings together several characteristics ofadministrative systems and demonstrates how these elements fit together to create moreor less coherent institutions. These characteristics are, as intimated above, in partinherited from the past as well as containing some contemporary adaptations to changedcircumstances. Administrative traditions within the developed democracies can be

grouped into several broad patterns, although each country has its own particularinterpretation of the tradition. Even with the differences within the tradition, however,these patterns provide a means of understanding and interpreting public administration.

The concept of tradition combines some elements of explanation for administrativebehavior. For example, traditions have some elements of an administrative culture (seeChan and Clegg, 2002) but yet do not depend entirely or even primarily on cognitiveexplanations. Further, the concept of administrative traditions contains some elementsof institutionalism, but neither is it entirely structuralist in its view of how individuals

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and organizations behave in government. The concept of administrative tradition hassome affinity with historical institutionalism in that it assumes that there is apersistent pattern of behavior that influences administration in the contemporaryperiod. There is also a strong sense that administrative structures are embedded in the

broader political system and are engaged in a political process, but administrativetraditions are distinguishable from state traditions. That is, the nature of publicadministration may be influenced by the political system but also will developindependently.

Although the concept of tradition sounds entirely historical and somewhat static, Iwill argue that despite their formation in the past, and development over decades andindeed centuries, traditions do have contemporary relevance and continue to influencepatterns of behavior in public bureaucracies. For example, this special issue willexplore the manner in which one major administrative tradition labeled here theNapoleonic tradition influences contemporary administrative reform, and mayprivilege some types of reforms but reduce the probabilities of others. The underlyingadministrative traditions may also influence the way in which these countries, andothers, have adapted to their membership in the European Union.

Further, although the roots of the tradition are generally quite stable traditions arealso dynamic. This dynamism is seen in part by the adaptations made by individualcountries to the four basic patterns identified below, and the apparent divergence ofadministrative patterns. Further, traditions have themselves changed over time.Administrative systems within those systems have adjusted to the increasedadministrative workload produced by the modern welfare state which is also themodern administrative state. Further, the administrative systems and their traditionshave had to adjust first to mass democratization and then more recently toreinterpretations of democracy that permit greater individual influence over publicdecisions. Thus, there is both continuity and change and that mixture is why this

concept is appealing as a mechanism for comparison and explanation.Although the concepts may be related and there are cultural elements involved,

administrative traditions are more that just political culture, or even administrativeculture (see Peters, 2001, chapter 2). The notion of tradition does involve what people,especially political and administrative elites, think about administration, but it alsoinvolves a number of institutional features of public administration, as well as therelationships between state and society in administering public policies. The concept oftradition also is more oriented toward political elites and their involvement ingoverning while much of the literature on political culture is oriented toward the masspublic.

Administrative traditions may also be considered as just a restatement of theconcept of style used to describe policy making in various states (Richardson, 1982;

Van Waarden, 1995). While policy style appears to be a strong candidate forsubsuming the idea of tradition for comparing administrative systems, there are alsocrucial differences. One is that the idea of style focuses more on the state as an entityrather than on administration, and on policy making rather than implementation. Thepublic bureaucracy does have a definite role to play in the policy making process butpolicy style as conceptualized by scholars such as Jeremy Richardson involves anumber of other factors, especially the role that societal interests play in the process.Knill (1999) has used the term administrative tradition when examining the reactions

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of European Union countries to EU policy initiatives. Despite a focus onimplementation of EU directives, Knills definition of traditions (more implicit thanexplicit) comes closer to policy styles than it does to administrative traditions. Hediscusses the degree of fit between policies coming from Brussels and existing policy

trajectories of the countries in question and the apparent ease of including theEuropean policy initiatives in national governing styles.

I have been stressing the public dimension of public administration whendescribing these traditions, but some attention must also be given to the administrativeelement. Some aspects of thinking about administration and management in differentcultures are applicable to both the public and private sectors (Hofstede, 1984; Tayeb,1988). For example, some cultures are more amenable to formal bureaucratic controlswithin organizations than are others, and likewise other cultures may emphasize theneed for participation within organizations, whether public or private. As was true forother aspects of this concept there are some elements of continuity as well as someelements of change. Even for those cultures that are heavily hierarchical, for example,

general trends of democratization and increased participation (Inglehart, 1990) in socialand political life may make that bureaucracy less acceptable.In summary, the idea of an administrative tradition is anchored in the past, but it

also can involve dynamic elements. I am arguing that we must understand wheresystems of public administration have been in order to understand where they aregoing. Further, we need to understand where the administrative systems can go, or atleast can go most readily, if we are to understand change. While administrativetraditions are not totally determinate, they do establish some parameters for action,and any proposed reforms that press the edges of those parameters are likely to besuspect and hence more difficult to adopt, and more difficult to implement.

Dimensions of administrative traditionsIt would be easy to discuss administrative tradition by presenting a set of descriptionsof individual administrative systems, such as those in southern Europe. While thosedescriptions could be valuable, they would be prone to giving differential attention toaspects of the existing systems, and would become simply descriptions in anotherformat. Further, there is the danger of producing stereotypes of administrative systemsthat may contain some elements of truth, but may also make comparisons among thosesystems more difficult. Finally, the strictly descriptive characterizations ofadministrative systems would be primarily national, and would be less likely toidentify the underlying elements of traditions that cut across national systems andlink, as well as differentiate, a number of national administrations.

In order to overcome some of the limitations of simple descriptions of administrative

traditions I will first develop a set of dimensions that are useful for understanding arange of administrative systems, including perhaps even non-Western traditions (seeBurns and Bowonwata, 2002). The dimensions developed here consider therelationships of state to society and to individual citizens, the nature ofadministrative work, and patterns of control that exist within administrativeorganizations (again, often public as well as private). Further, as I will attempt todemonstrate later in the paper, these dimensions tend to fit together to form coherentunderstandings of how public administration should function.

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In this paper I will be presenting the general ideas of these dimensions and developingthe concepts for one of the four major traditions in European public administration: theNapoleonic tradition (see Wunder, 1995). This tradition is based on the model of thepublic sector developed by Napoleon I in France, and was spread throughout a good deal

of southern Europe, as well as through the French colonial empire.Although the French administrative system remains the epitome of this tradition,

these other countries have adopted many of the same ideas about, and approaches to,public administration. There are some significant deviations from the fundamentalmodel, but there is also some administrative DNA that helps to shape the patterns inthe other systems. But although we know there have been historical influences of thetradition, do they persist, and do they affect the adaptation of contemporary systems toboth significant reform pressures and the influences for convergence coming from theEuropean Union?

State and society I

The first dimension addresses the fundamental question of the relationship of the stateto the society. This is a crucial defining characteristic of state traditions (Dyson, 1980;Torstendahl, 1991) but also has substantial relevance for the conduct of publicadministration. Although there are certainly more subtle differences than are possibleto discuss in this short space (see Peters, 2002, 2004a, b), we can begin with a ratherstark dichotomy between organic and contractarian conceptions of the relationshipbetween state and society. In the organic conception the state is assumed to be linkedfrom its inception with society, and the two entities have little meaning apart from eachother. This almost metaphysical conception of the state and its role in governance canbe contrasted with a contractarian notion in which the state arose from a consciouscontract, expressed through a constitution or other constitutive arrangements, betweenthe members of the society and the institutions that will govern them (see Elazar, 1994).

In the contractarian conception the state is not a natural entity but rather is a humanconstruct and thus also malleable, and capable of being changed by the parties to thecontract. The contracting partners in these relationships are not individual actors at asingle point in time but rather are the members of the society in the future as well as thepresent, and the contract therefore is generally more implicit than explicit.

The Napoleonic tradition certainly embraces the more organic conception of thestate, with the state being conceived as a means of integrating society, and subsumingsocial difference in the general entity that is the overarching source of governance.That conception became evident in the riots in France in 2005 in which theuniversalistic conception of citizenship had prevented even knowing relative levels ofunemployment among social groups, much less addressing the differences. Thathaving been said, the Napoleonic conception is beginning to erode, e.g. in Spain with

the movement toward regionalization and perhaps even genuine federalization. Thesechanges entertain the notion that the state is more a product of human design than anorganic representation of society. Likewise, frequent constitutional changes, andchanges of fundamental laws such as electoral laws, may make the notion of theenduring, organic state somewhat questionable.

Although defining the nature of the public sector in general, relationships betweenstate and society also have direct impact on the manner in which public administration islikely to be conducted. In particular the organic conceptions tend to ascribe less of an


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autonomous role to society and to citizens with the state having an obligation to defendsociety. The state and its administrators therefore know relatively few bounds, and astate-centric conception of governance is the consequence (Peters and Pierre, 2002).There are prescribed procedures for exercising that power, but the power itself is

inherent in the state. Thus, in a contractarian conception any residual rights tend to liewith the citizens, while in the state centric view they rather naturally lie with the state. Inthe context of reform, therefore, the state-centric position may hamper the introduction ofmore citizen-focused reforms, e.g. a consumer orientation in public programs.

Law vs managementA second feature that defines administrative traditions is the choice betweenmanagement and law to define the fundamental tasks of administration. This isanother rather stark dichotomy and will require some refinement. Even in thedichotomous form, however, this concept captures an important dimension ofdifference among administrative systems. One way of defining the principal role of the

public administrator is to consider him or her as charged with administering publiclaw. This legalistic conception of public administration assumes that law is readilyunderstandable and that all individual administrators must apply the law to cases.Good administration in this essentially Weberian world of administration, is thereforeemploying the law appropriately and effectively to achieve public purposes. Of course,the simplicity of applying the law declines the higher one rises in the hierarchy of thestate, and policymaking and policy advice becomes more crucial to the role of the civilservant. Further, political issues become more important at higher levels of theadministrative hierarchy, but even then the fundamental legalistic conception changeslittle among the top officials.

The alternative view of the role of the public administrator is that of the manager.This view of the job of a civil servant does not deny the importance of following the law

but does imply that the first responsibility of the senior public servant is to get thingsdone, and to make the organization for which he or she is responsible perform as wellas possible when implementing the laws on the statute books. At this point the twoconceptions of the role of the civil servant merge to some extent, given that themanagerial efforts are directed at implementing the law, with management being ameans to that end. Still, as much of the implementation literature (Pressman andWildavsky, 1976; Winter, 2003) emphasizes, the law is the beginning point rather thanthe ending point for managerial public administration. The implementation literaturealso demonstrates the degree of discretion available to civil servants at all levels ofgovernment (Page, 2000), and hence the extent to which law is not a definitive guide forcivil servants.

Cutting across these two conceptions is the role of senior public servant as policy

advisor. One may question the extent to which this role is a relatively moderninvention, arising as the public sector expanded in response to demands first ofwarfare and then of welfare. The role of civil servants in providing policy adviceexpanded to meet these demands at the same time that the demands began tooverwhelm the capacity of politicians to cope with the volume and complexity of policymaking (Rose, 1976). The role of policy advisor has some degree of congruence withboth of the above-mentioned dominant roles. On the one hand, existing laws anddrafting future law is certainly one aspect of policy advice. On the other hand, policy

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advice is often a great deal more than legal drafting; it is advising about how goals canbe achieved, and even on the possible political consequences of the policy choices.Those consequences may be expressed in both substantive and political terms (seeBovens et al., 2001), thereby linking advice from bureaucrats to the political arena

rather directly.All of the above having been said, the managerialist conception of the role of the

public servant is becoming more widely spread than in the past. The ideas of the newpublic management (Bouckaert and Pollitt, 2003; Hood, 1991) have been diffusedwidely, in part to meet the financial and managerial challenges posed by the expandedrole of the state. The politics of reform discussed in the remaining chapters in thisspecial edition demonstrate the continuing skepticism of some Napoleonic systems tomanagerialism in the public sector. These ideas are, however, ideas in good currency,and have penetrated even the German and French systems (and similar systems) thathave resisted managerialist ideas in the past (see Schroter, 2000; Stolfi, 2006). Theseshifts in the perceived role of the senior public service toward management will alsohave an impact on the relationship between politics and administration, the next of thecharacteristics of administrative traditions to be discussed.

Administration and politicsA third dimension of administrative traditions to some extent involves specificationand elaboration of the first two. This dimension is based on the relationship assumedto exist between politicians and their civil servants. The basic question is the extent towhich public servants are expected to be autonomous from political pressures,administering the law sine ira et studio, or conversely the extent to which they, andespecially civil servants toward the top of the hierarchy, are expected to be politicallysensitive, if not politically active, in making and executing law. Further, there is thequestion of the extent to which administrative and political careers are separate. In

some countries, for example, the parliament contains a large number of career publicservants who are simply on leave while pursuing a political career. They can return tocivil service careers once their political adventures are over, and having those politicalcontacts is rarely detrimental to their careers; indeed the effect is often quite positive.

Just as the question of the dominance of law or management defines one aspect ofthe involvement of civil servants in the processes of governing, so too does the questionof how political and administrative leaders are supposed to work together in the policyprocess. In all administrative traditions there is a conception, albeit developedsomewhat later in some, that at least some part of the civil service should be apoliticaland be charged simply with administering the law in as fair and impartial a manner aspossible. That having been said, there is some point of proximity to political leaders inmost administrative systems where it is clear that appointments have to take into

account politics.To some extent the role of senior civil servants is inherently political. Even if they

are not partisan appointments, and efforts are made to make them anonymous toparliament and the public (Hood, 2001), these officials inevitably perform tasks that areimportant for the success of the government of the day. Given that importance, thegovernment of the day will want to exercise some form of control over these officials(Peters and Pierre, 2002). That control may be extremely overt, e.g. the capacity toname their own officials, or it may be subtle, having senior officials moved sideways,


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with the news being announced in the most oblique manner possible. Theincompatibility of a minister and a civil servant may have nothing to do withpolitical party preferences, but simply be differences in personality or cast of mind,e.g. Mrs Thatchers search for civil servants like us (Hennessey, 1989). Still, there are

marked differences in the extent to which civil servants are politicized and in theirvulnerability to dismissal or forced retirement if there are changes to partisan controlof government.

The degree of politicization of the civil service is widely argued to be increasing,even in countries that have prided themselves on having a strong merit system and aneutral public service (Lacam, 2000; Peters and Pierre, 2002). Likewise, the ideas of thenew public management already mentioned tend to denigrate the concept of a career,neutral civil service and to favor of a more committed, and perhaps temporary, publicservice. The diffusion of these conceptions of management in some ways reduce thedistinctiveness of administrative traditions but these traditions also are very resilient.It may well be, in fact, that over time the challenges to administrative traditions posedby NPM may reinforce, rather than erode, traditions. There is some evidence of abacklash against the dominance of these ideas, and some restatement of older ideasabout what constitute appropriate levels of political involvement in the recruitment ofpublic servants and in the execution of law (see below).

The Napoleonic tradition tends to have fewer barriers between the political and theadministrative than most other traditions. Administrators often have political careers,both as active politicians and as appointees to positions in ministerial cabinets andsimilar structures that are linked to political leaders. Indeed many politicians begintheir careers as civil servants trained by the state and then move into political careers.That having been said, some of the same concerns about politicization have been raisedin French, Italian and Spanish administration as have in other countries, in partbecause of the need to direct administration in a system highly constrained by law.

The careerImplied in the above discussion of politics and administration is a conception of a civilservice career being at least partially distinct from not only political careers, but alsofrom private sector careers. One feature that has tended to differentiate administrativetraditions is the extent to which there is a distinct bureaucratic career, and the extent towhich individuals tend to remain in administrative positions for their entire workinglife. Historically one element of the formation of the state bureaucracy was itsdifferentiation both from the household of the monarch and from the private sector.The further structural differentiation of the bureaucracy led to creation of separatelegal categories for public servants, most clearly identifiable in Germany with thecategory of Beamten for senior level public servants other public employees areemployed under general labor law. The corps system in France and systems in theNapoleonic tradition also differentiates elite public servants from rest, and also createsdifferentiation even within the elite (see Eymeri, 2000).

Although the civil service often is differentiated from other careers in society, thereare significant differences in the extent to which interchange between public andprivate sector careers is acceptable within the tradition. At one end of a continuumpublic positions that would in most societies be occupied by career public servants arein the US occupied by political appointees who move in and out of government

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frequently. Likewise, the Scandinavian public sectors have been open to recruitmentfrom outside a career public service, and there is less differentiation than in mostindustrialized democracies. On the other end of the continuum the Canadian publicservices continues as a clearly defined career systems with little movement in and out.

In addition to the degree of separation from the private sector, within the civilservice itself, there are marked variations in the definition of the career and the mannerin which individuals are recruited, promoted, rewarded and managed in the course oftheir careers. For example, in the German case mentioned above recruitment to theadministrative elite tends to occur at the inception of the career. Likewise, in France thesenior civil service is selected from the Ecole Nationale dAdministration, with fewopportunities for later entry into the elite positions. In principle other administrativesystems are more open to internal recruitment and the ability of lower level civilservants to work their way up through the system, but even in those systems mobilityis the exception rather than the rule.

The in and out pattern mentioned for American public employees points to anotherimportant aspect of the career. For the US the interchange between the public andprivate sectors occurs throughout the individuals working life, but in other systemsthere is a tendency for public employees to move to the private sector but to do so onlyonce. The most important example of this movement is in France, with pantouflageused to describe the movement of elite public servants into the private sector, often at arather early age. The importance of this pattern is that the civil service continues toconstitute an all-purpose elite for the society and to some extent constitutes a networkthat links the two sectors and provides for state involvement in a range of privatesector economic and social activities. Also in the Napoleonic tradition Spanishbureaucrats can move into the private sector for limited periods of time, but unliketheir French counterparts are expected to return.

UniformityOne common value for public administration is equality. Citizens should be treatedfairly and equally according to their needs and their eligibility for services (Walsh andStewart, 1992). Especially in democratic regimes, the equal treatment of citizens isalmost a defining element of good administration. While equality is an important valueso are democracy and self-determination, and citizens should have some opportunity toshape their own policy regimens. The opportunity to exercise that influence may leadto different policy choices for different parts of the country, if not for individualcitizens. In addition, the willingness to accept differences in administration may permitgreater efficiency, given that policies as implemented will reflect differing conditionsand preferences and hence may not encounter as much opposition as might uniformpolicies perceived to be more alien and Draconian.

As well as reflecting values of and about citizens, the definition of a desired level ofuniformity in policy and administration also says something about the nature of thestate itself. Governments may attempt to create uniformity of services and policy intheir territory, believing that this will build a cohesive and integrated political system,and also ensure greater equality for citizens. Conversely, other constitutionalarrangements may permit or encourage greater divergence of administrative systemsnot only to permit virtual experimentation with policy, but also as a means ofcontrolling potentially dictatorial central governments (Jacob, 1974). That is clearly


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part of the logic of federalism, and some nominally unitary states provide opportunitiesfor variation in policy and administration, e.g. Sweden and the other Nordic countries.

Uniformity also has been a strategy for state-building. In the case of France this wasclear in the attempt of Napoleon, and to some extent the monarchs before him, to create

a unified nation from a set of feudal structures that had varying degrees of allegianceto the previous monarchy. As in Napoleons famous statement, it was necessary tomake Frenchmen. This top-down strategy of state-building assumed that reducingdifferences was the best way to generate commitment to the state. Of course,state-builders in federal states have assumed quite the opposite, and have attempted tocreate loyalty through recognizing differences, while at the same time providing for thepublic goods and services that are more appropriately provided in a more uniform andcentralized manner.

The perceived need for uniformity in the case of France was manifested in colonialadventures as well as in administration at home. We can, for example, contrast theBritish tradition of indirect rule in India and much of its African empire with theFrench and Spanish tradition of direct rule, uniformity and incorporation. The UKruled several of its colonies with a few hundred people, tending to use indigenouspower structures to impose their control. In India, for example, a significant portion ofthe subcontinent was ruled through the indigenous royalty rather than through directimposition by the colonial power. In contrast, French colonial policy tended to attemptto create new components for metropolitan France, and that style persists in the DOMand TOM that exist within France, and within the European Union.

The reform ideas discussed in this special issue are a major challenge to ideas ofuniformity in administration. One aspect of the contemporary reform agenda has beento enhance opportunities for citizens and lower echelon public employees to make morechoices for themselves, and also for more autonomous organizations to makeindependent choices about public services. Likewise, ideas about contracting and the

use of social actors to provide public services also increase diversity in public services,and hence may not be as acceptable in states with a long-term commitment touniformity.

State and society IIWe have already discussed one aspect of the relationship between state and society,relevant primarily at the most macro level of political analysis. There is also anotherimportant aspect of this relationship more directly relevant for the day-to-dayoperations of government and public administration. This aspect of the relationshipdefines the role that societal actors can legitimately play in making and implementingpublic policies. Some state, and administrative, traditions grant a legitimate position tosocietal interests, and have attempted to integrate social actors into the policy process

as aids and complements to state power. Further, given their connections withimportant segments of society, the involvement of these social groups is also as analternative source of legitimation for government action. For example, corporatistinterest intermediation provides a limited range of interest groups the right to take partin policy making, with the expectation that they will trade that right to participate forsome complicity in the decisions taken. More recently network models of governing(Kickert et al., 1997) have created an alternative conception of the involvement of socialinterests in governing.

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The alternative conception of the role of societal interests in relationship togovernment is that their involvement in governing to some extent undermines theauthority of the state, and represents an unwarranted incursion into state prerogatives.Political systems operating with this conception of the state and its relationship to

society tend to limit access to interest groups and those groups must expend a gooddeal of political energy in the politics of access. In almost any democratic system it isdifficult to exclude social interests entirely, so the question becomes which interestsand under what circumstances are they be admitted. At the extreme hegemonic partiesin authoritarian systems create their own unions or their own associations to(presumably) represent the interests of segments of society. Even in democraticregimes governments may be involved in fostering and legitimating interest groupsthat support the general policy thrusts of the state, and perhaps the government of theday. LaPalombara (1966), for example, advances the idea of parantela organizationsthat are closely linked with the hegemonic party.

The above discussion is largely concerned with the state as an entity and itsrelationships with societal interests. There is also a specific administrative elementinvolved in this dimension. First, perhaps the principal point of contact betweensocietal interests and the state is the administrative system. Most people (professionalsas well as the general public) tend to think about interest groups lobbying andattempting to influence legislative decisions, but there are many more administrativedecisions in the public sector than legislative decisions (Kerwin, 2002; Page, 2000).Advice about new legislation often comes from the bureaucracy, and thereforeparticipation on advisory committees or in other opportunities to shape the views ofbureaucratic organizations on policy provides societal interests the opportunity toinfluence legislation. That influence may be indirect influencing the legislaturethrough influencing the bureaucracy, but it is still influence. Further, organizations inthe public bureaucracy may be more willing to accept involvement of interest groups

than are political leaders, given that their source of legitimacy is not as threatened aswould that of elected officials. Indeed, the expertise of the bureaucracy may beenhanced by involving other experts from the private sector, and consultativeorganizations within the bureaucracy often embody those social interests and mayprovide regular access for social actors who might have more difficulty accessing thelegislature.

Also, interest groups are crucial in implementing a variety of public programs so ifthey have a more legitimate status they are also more likely to be effective in that role.

Just as the ideas of new public management have diffused widely and are makingmanagerialism more common in a variety of settings, so too are ideas about using theprivate sector in implementing policies on behalf of the public sector. This involvementof not-for-profit organizations in governance is justified in part simply by the need to

save on the costs of administration, with the use of not-for-profit organizations beingespecially useful in this regard. The use of non-governmental organizations also mayhelp legitimate the implementation of these programs in an era in which government isnot highly regarded by much of the public. Even if government were in general morehighly regarded for some programs the familiarity of interest groups may make theirinvolvement in the decisions important for legitimacy of the decisions.

This aspect of state-society relationships might have been thought to covary withthe first variable describing these relationships. More state-centric, organic systems


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might be thought to exclude influences of interest groups and seek to preserve theirautonomy in the face of pressures from interest groups. That is not, however,necessarily the case. It may also be that the organic conception of linkage between stateand society results in the acceptance of a more legitimate role of interest groups and

with that a diminished capacity of the state to exercise autonomy. Likewise, while wemight expect government institutions within state traditions based on a more or lessformal contract between state and society attempting to maintain their autonomy inthe face of what might be considered excessive pressures from a society that does nothave any particular respect for the State as the embodiment of a higher public calling.

In the Napoleonic tradition interest groups, although a necessity, are oftenconsidered almost as illegitimate interventions into the governing role, and autonomyof the state. These interests therefore are not incorporated into administration as innorthern Europe, and public administration tends to be selective about which interestsit will work with, generally those willing to accept the tutelage of the state. Stateautonomy is often maligned as a concept but yet is a crucial goal for someadministrative traditions, and the Napoleonic tradition has emphasized state powerover the role of society. We do need to consider, however, whether the development ofnetwork governance and other mechanisms for participation have enhanced the role ofsociety in these cases.

AccountabilityThe final dimension that I use to differentiate administrative traditions is the mannerin which accountability is enforced within the public sector. This dimension ofadministrative traditions is closely related to the earlier dimension of law versusmanagement, given that legal mechanisms are central feature of accountabilityregimens within several traditions. There is also some element of the politics andadministration dimension in this dimension, given that accountability may be a more

political exercise for controlling bureaucracy than it is purely administrative (seePollack, 2003). Although there are those similarities to those other dimensions ofadministration, there is also something distinctive in the manner in whichaccountability is pursued within various traditions.

Accountability and control are central, if not the central, variables in the analysis ofpublic administration (Day and Klein, 1987; Hood et al., 2004). Many complaintsarticulated concerning the power of bureaucracies center on the perception that theseinstitutions are unelected, unaccountable, and have powers that many average citizencurrently believe are unfettered. Likewise, corruption and abuse of administrativediscretion for personal gain have been cited as central to problems of legitimacy andtrust in societies. Citizens have more proximate connection with the bureaucracy thanthey do with most other institutions in the political system so they are more likely to be

personally aware of malfeasance by bureaucrats than they might of elected politicians,leaving aside well-publicized cases such as those of Bill Clinton and French ministersresponsible for AIDS-infected blood who were held personally responsible for thatpolicy failure (see Bovens et al., 2001).

Powers are delegated to bureaucracies in all political systems, and consequentlyaccountability mechanisms must constrain and monitor the exercise of that discretion.The popular perception of almost absolute bureaucratic power is held despite thecontinuing and increasing efforts by political leaders to demand that public servants be

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more accountable, individually and collectively, for their actions. One reaction to theperceived problems in the public bureaucracy can be identified in attempts to reformthe public sector. For example, some new public management reforms implementedover the past several decades have been directed at creating new mechanisms for

accountability (Bouckaert and Pollitt, 2003; Christensen and Laegreid, 2002). Forexample, even rather modest reforms such as citizens charters are intended in part tohold the individual civil servant accountable for his or her actions (Tritter, 1994). At thesame time other aspects of NPM reforms appear to have reduced accountability andhave necessitated further attempts to impose controls over bureaucracy (Peters, 2001).

In the Napoleonic tradition accountability is, in contrast to the ideas of new publicmanagement, accountability is formal and legalistic. While certainly there are politicalelements and a role for parliament and even the public, the principal elements forcontrol are through legal instrumentalities such as the Conseil dEtat and its analogs.Further, many of the controls are exercised ex ante, so that administrators often mustgain approval prior to making decisions, rather than acting decisively and then be heldaccountable later. This pattern may ensure the strict legalism of actions, but alsomakes effective administration more difficult.

ConclusionTo understand contemporary administrative behavior it is crucial to take currentpressures such as the ideas of the new public management. It is also important torecognize the underlying ideas about the state in general and public administration inparticular that have helped to shape administrative systems. This paper has developeda concept of administrative traditions to gain some greater ability to understand theunderlying ideas about administration. Rather than simply providing culturaldescriptions of administration, the use of a number of dimensions facilitatescomparison across systems and also helps understand change and reform within

individual cases.This paper has concentrated on what I have called the Napoleonic tradition in

administration, derived from the French model but now diffused widely in southernEurope and many other parts of the world. That tradition is presented here somewhatin isolation from others, given limitations of space, but were there room for morecomplete comparative analysis the distinctiveness of the tradition would be apparent.In particular, the emphasis on law, on formality, and on uniformity distinguish thistradition and make the implementation of many new public management reforms nowso central to administration in other systems difficult, if perhaps not impossible insome instances. This tradition is a powerful legacy of the past that continues to have apervasive influence, sometimes positively and sometimes negatively, in contemporaryadministration.

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Corresponding authorB. Guy Peters can be contacted at: [email protected]

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