thesis preliminary

8/18/2019 Thesis preliminary

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Introduction

Euroscepticism is a term that often appears in media and everyday politics. We can read about

the growing influence of Eurosceptic party groups, an increasingly Eurosceptic public

opinion, the “Eurosceptic earthquake”, “Eurosceptic challenge” or “Eurosceptic victory” - just

to mention a few news headlines.1 The adjective has become so frequent that journalists,

politicians, or the average European citizen no longer require an explanation of the concept,

because they believe – and are often left to believe - that its meaning is obvious. In reality, the

complete opposite is true. Academic research about Euroscepticism since the 1990s has come

up with so many definitions, theories, sub-types and classifications, that the term itself has

become vague, far too inclusive and inherently negative.2 Although there have been several

attempts to shift perception of Euroscepticism into a more realistic and less normative

direction in recent years, the revision of the old definitions and methods has largely been

neglected outside and sometimes even inside the realm of political science. Nevertheless, by

now it has become evident, that sticking to 10 or 15-year old concepts that no longer capture

reactions to the process, speed and direction of European integration will not help us

understand the reasons behind the growing dissatisfaction and opposition that the EU is facing

since the beginning of the 21st century.

After a series of failed referenda in connection with the Constitutional and the LisbonTreaty, followed by the multi-year Eurocrisis, and now exacerbated by the huge influx of

immigrants and refugees, the perception that the European Union is becoming weaker, less

united and more ineffective is now shared not only by a handful of national leaders, scholars

or well-known critics, but by a constantly growing percentage of the EU’s 500 million people

as well. According to the latest Eurobarometer survey, no more than 37% of the respondents

have a positive image about the Union. Trust in institutions of the EU has decreased with 8

percentage points in about half a year, while 54% feel that their voice is not heard in decision-making. (Standard EB 84, 2015: 6-9) This rather pessimistic public opinion is not only

traceable in public surveys, but also through elections to the European Parliament. (Treib,

2014) In several Member States, anti-EU parties have obtained either the majority of the

national votes (e.g. France, Greece, Denmark, UK), or came out as the second or third

strongest political force as a result of the latest EP elections in May 2014. Consequently, 36%

1 See for examples: The Guardian (2013), BBC News (201a, 201!), "eu#ers (201$)2

See defini#ions of %arious s&holars in su!se'uen# &hap#ers of #his s#ud The pro!lema#i& &haraer of*uros&ep#i&ism+ was poin#ed ou# ! numerous au#hors, e -ra#. / anio (200), e&on#e (2010, 201$), 4e

5ilde (2010: 263)


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of the 751 MEPs now belong to party families or alliances that either oppose their countries’

membership in the European Union or seek to implement serious reforms regarding the

current institutional system and policy-making. (European Parliament, 2014) I believe that

this unprecedented surge of critical and extremist voices vis-á-vis the EU’s current and future

shape is a good indication that studying Euroscepticism is, and will be a crucial element of

understanding the functioning of contemporary European politics and the European Union as

well.

Taking that into consideration, the purpose of this thesis will be to contribute to the

existing literature on Euroscepticism. Apart from the fact that we can clearly witness a rise of

Eurosceptic tendencies as mentioned above, there are two more reasons why I have chosen to

elaborate on this topic. First of all, having read through the bulk of the articles written about

this phenomenon, I have noticed a declining interest in Euroscepticism in recent years. In the

current situation, when new input would be strongly required to address the formulating status

quo of critical political forces, re-evaluating Euroscepticism once again can be of great

relevance after the hiatus in academic literature. Giving a more up-to-date picture and

summarizing the accumulated knowledge does, on the other hand, not represent an added

value on its own. Therefore, the second reason and the main justification of my choice is the

belief that the findings of this thesis will point out certain problems in previous works and

offer an alternative approach to the issue, thus leading to a more comprehensive

understanding of Euroscepticism.

The thesis will consist of a theoretical and an empirical part. The following chapters

(Chapter 1 and 2) will first of all describe Euroscepticism, point out its various interpretations

and classifications, while summarizing the main ideas of previous works. A special attention

is given to the problematic character of the concept and the discrepancies of the most widely-

known typologies in connection with party-based Euroscepticism. Building on the

conclusions made at the end of the Chapter 2, the research questions and the methodology ofthe thesis are presented in Chapter 3. After the critique of the mentioned typologies, another –

largely ignored - way of measurement will be introduced there, in the form of a single scale of

Euro-attitudes. By using this mostly untested approach on the party system of a particular

country, I intend to show, that creating a single continuum of party positions (instead of using

separate categories) will give a more accurate image about the differences between

perceptions of European integration. The empirical part (Chapter 4) of the thesis will cover

the application of this theory on the party system of the Czech Republic. As the country has


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traditionally been characterized by scholars as a strong base of Eurosceptic attitudes3, both

among the public and on the side of political parties, the Czech Republic can be an ideal

candidate for such an analysis. Recent changes in the Czech party system and the emergence

of new political formations also provide a relevant basis for the research, as a comprehensive

work covering all parties and their behaviour towards the EU has not been published yet.

By implementing the above-described methodology, this thesis not only intends to

present an up-to-date picture about the Czech Euro-attitudes, but also to give a new impetus to

the study of Euroscepticism and the recurring questions of European integration in a period,

when the EU is facing an increasing level of insecurity and uncertainty, making reactions

against it rather unpredictable in years to come.

3 See Chap#er 3 of #his #hesis and referen&es ! ope& / 7udde (2002), ope& (200), 89#er (2013:

162), anio (201:1), 4os#;l / )


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1. Euroscepticism

The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the concept of Euroscepticism and to give an

overview about its appearance and interpretation in European politics and in political science

literature. After a closer look at the origins of the concept itself, I will attempt to point out the

main theoretical deficiency behind many of the existing definitions on one hand, and the

rather cumbersome applicability of the term itself, on the other. Then, combining the works of

Easton (1975) and Kaniok (2012), I will approach the subject from an alternative perspective

and present a narrow, but more accurate definition of Euroscepticism, which will serve as a

substantial element of this thesis. Although I intend to build on this exact meaning of the

definition throughout my work, I have decided to not to use the word “Eurosceptic” in the

empirical part of the thesis at all, for reasons that I will reveal at the end of this chapter.

1.1. The origins of the concept

If there has ever been consensus among scholars in the abundant literature of Euroscepticism,

then an agreement regarding the origins of the term is definitely the first to be mentioned.

According to Harmsen and Spiering (2004: 15-16) the adjective “Eurosceptic” has appeared

as a product of British journalism and was used interchangeably with the older them “anti-

marketeer”in an article of The Times from 1985. Alternatively, Milardović (2009: 40) refers

to another source from 1986, where the adjective is applied to Margaret Thatcher, who “was

seen in most of the EEC as Eurosceptic at best”. It is not surprising that it was the British

Prime Minister, who acquired this label sooner than anyone else. The attitude of the United

Kingdom towards the entire process of European integration has been rather reserved and

neutral from the beginning, which can be explained by a broader sense of opposition not only

to particular institutions, but to a “Franco-German dominated continent” as well. (Harmsen &

Spiering, 2004: 16) As the growing competences of the EC began to appear also in the

political field in the 1980s - pushed forward by an ambitious Commission led by Jaques

Delores -, the pure economic character of the integration was changing rapidly, to the

detriment of the general British interests, which have always been in favour of a rather loose

free trade area without excessive regulation.

Similarly to the existing consensus about the British origins of the term and the meaning

of “eurosceptic”, scholars tend to agree on the triggering effect of the Maastricht Treaty,

which has changed public perception about European integration drastically and spread

opposition from the British Isles to the continent. (Vasilopoulou, 2011: 225) As Dalton and


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Eichenberg (2007: 132) describe, the European Communities until this point was a primarily

economic entity, and as such, public attitude towards it was influenced by economic factors.

Citizens of the Member States evaluated the EC according to their own financial well-being

and the macroeconomic development of their countries. Based on the results of

Eurobarometer surveys, the authors highlight a generally positive trend in support for

European integration starting from the ratification of the Single European Act, up until 1991.

Then a huge decline can be observed, which they attribute to the altered economic cost/benefit

calculations, brought about by the introduction of the criteria for the Economic and Monetary

Union and their effect on domestic taxation and national fiscal policies. However, these

economic and utilitarian aspects cannot be blamed alone for the declining public support.

As Franklin et al. (1994: 458) pointed out; it was not a weakening general enthusiasm

for European integration that caused the downfall of positive attitudes, but rather the

crystallization of specific support or opposition towards particular (new) aspects of the

integration process that the Maastricht Treaty has introduced. Crespy & Verscheueren (2009:

378) came to the same conclusion when explaining that Maastricht had a qualitative, rather

than a quantitative impact on the levels of support. The reason for such a change is evident: as

soon as the European Union set foot on so far untouched territories outside the Single Market,

the so-called “permissive consensus” - which left the steer of the integration process in the

hands of national and transnational political and business elites without much interaction or

interest from the side of the population - has come to an end. The European project has started

to become increasingly politicized on domestic levels, compelling national leaders and parties

to turn their attention to the demands of their electorate in terms of European issues, for the

first time since the 1950s. (Hooghe & Marks, 2016: 5-7)

On the other hand, from the perspective of this chapter, the main question about

Maastricht is not how it affected public opinion, but whether we can consider these symptoms

as the first real signs of Eurosepticism, notwithstanding the traditional British attitudesdescribed above. As the treaty has expanded the use of the Qualified Majority Voting in the

Council, established the concept of European citizenship, strengthened the role of the

European Parliament and acquired certain competences on the field of foreign policy and

justice, it undoubtedly took a step towards a political union, even though the second and the

third pillar was kept originally on an intergovernmental level. According to Paul Taggart

(1998: 367), the debates that surrounded Maastricht were of such nature, that rejecting the

treaty would have caused a serious re-evaluation of the whole process of integration andwould have meant the disintegration of the contemporary form of the EU. He further argues


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that being a secondary issue for ordinary citizens in the previous decades, the ratification

process has provided a unique chance for the population and political parties of certain

Member States to express their real attitude vis-á-vis the idea of a more integrated union in a

more open way than ever before. In this respect, the expressed contempt against the treaty was

considered as a sudden and unexpected emergence of Euroscepticism. However, using this

term in a growing number of scientific journals from the mid-1990s has quickly required

proper definitions in political science which would distinguish the usage of the concept from

that of ordinary newspapers and politicians.

As a result of such attempts, Euroscepticism was almost exclusively used as an

expression, which focused on all kinds of opposition, critique and negative posture vis-á-vis

the EU and the progress of European integration, irrespective of the fact, whether the meaning

of that opposition or critique was carefully defined or was left unattended. However, as

research progressed, certain trends have started to appear in the way this opposition was

measured and relocated into a broader framework of attitudes. In this respect, I have

differentiated between four “waves” of research connected to attitudes towards the EU:

• Phase Zero or Pre-Maastricht phase: in the late 1980s, literature has focused mainly

on general public opinion connected to European integration, measuring support

towards the Single Market and its economic aspects

• Phase One or Post-Maastricht phase: in the early 1990s, the main subject under

scrutiny was still the general public, but focus has shifted towards measuring negative

opinion

• Phase Two: from the mid-1990s until late 2000s literature was dominated by political

parties as subjects, measuring mainly opposition and negative postures

• Phase Three: from the end of 2000s, both the general public and political parties are

analysed as subjects, measuring opposition and support at the same time, often re-

evaluating the results of Phase Two

What is to be deduced from the list above is the existence of two separate dimensions that

needs to be studied: the first being the level of subjects or actors who project opposition or

support, and the second being the scale of attitudes (only negative or including positive as

well) that we can focus on (Závecz, 2011: 7-8). When we talk about subjects, we can

differentiate between those authors4 who have dedicated their research to the analysis of

public opinion towards the European Union, and those who have put their emphasis on

(Ga!el 1, u!!ers / S&heepers 200$, S@rensen 200, 4al#on / *i&hen!er 200>, 7&aren 200>)


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political parties and their perception of European integration (see examples later). When

comparing the number of articles and the extensiveness of the research between them, we can,

without doubt, conclude that the large majority of Eurosceptic literature (in the broader sense)

has been written about political parties.

Even though, as I have stated earlier, the analysis of public opinion after Maastricht has

received outstanding attention (Phase One), it is no coincidence that the majority of scholars

in the late 1990s have shifted their focus towards the examination of parties. Measuring party

attitudes has proven to be a more tangible and comprehensible topic for political scientists

than a research agenda built on public surveys and referendum results, all of which can be

influenced by multiple factors connected to personal financial and social background,

satisfaction with the governing parties or general (dis-)trust in political institutions – and thus

cannot be considered very accurate in relation to European questions. (Crespy &

Verscheueren; 2009: 378 Leconte, 2015: 253) Although attempts have been made later on to

conceptualize popular patterns of opinion by using various longitudinal and cross-sectional

analyses, most typologies of behaviour in relation to the EU have appeared in articles that

predominantly analysed political parties. Since my research will also contribute to this group

of works, I will mainly focus on the theorization of party attitudes, providing a comprehensive

picture about party-based Euroscepticism in the next chapter. However, it is important to

define first, how the term Euroscepticism can be grasped in the framework of this study.

1.2. Difficulties of conceptualization and usage

As I have stated earlier, definitions and classifications started to appear, one after another,

without much interaction or reflection among them and their creators from the 1990s

onwards. To explain the high level of fragmentation in the literature written about the topic, I

would like to highlight three characteristics, which ultimately prove that the whole concept of

Euroscepticism is not only inherently problematic, but that in many cases, it should have beenused more carefully and/or avoided completely in academic journals. (Arató & Kaniok, 2009:

6-8; Crespy & Verscheuren, 2009: 381-383; Leconte, 2010: 254) Firstly, as stated above, the

word itself originates from British journalism, and not from the field of political or social

sciences. Even though it entered those fields in the middle of the 1990s and acquired a

tangible framework of meanings, it has never lost its embeddedness in the world of media,

where its usage and its user does not have to meet any standards of factuality, neutrality and

preciseness. By projecting a different picture for political scientists and for the average

citizens, Euroscepticism could never get rid of its unscientific, propagandistic and blurred


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character, and thus it could not imply the need to be properly explained outside the realm of

scholarly papers. The dangers of this are apparent: there is no limitation as to who and on

what basis can be called a Eurosceptic in the press, and what perceptions it will induce in the

target audience5. This also leads us to the second characteristic, which is closely connected to

the uncontrolled usage of the adjective “Eurosceptic”, that is, to the essentially normative

implication of the term.

Since the first appearance of this concept in everyday use, a person or a party that was

associated with Eurosceptic ideas has been deliberately stigmatized and put out of the sphere

of legitimate politics. (Fuchs, 2009: 10; Kaniok, 2009: 34) Up until the middle of the 2000s,

opposing, rejecting or criticizing certain policies of the European Union or the direction of the

integration was interpreted as a reaction against the “normal” state of art.. Euroscepticism was

perceived as pathology, an undesired by-product of European integration that needed to be

confronted, not only by “pro-European” politicians, but by political scientists as well.

(Leconte, 2010: 255) However, substantial changes can be traced in the usage of the word,

especially after the failure of the constitutional process in the second half of the 2000s.

Whereas political parties were often avoiding and objecting to be called Eurosceptic and

thereby becoming stigmatized throughout the '90s (except for peripheral and single-issue

parties), in the past 10 years even mainstream parties have identified themselves publicly with

Eurosceptic positions6, which clearly indicates a shift of meaning and perception of European

integration. Even though this normative turn is visible in election results, especially in respect

of the growing number of Eurosceptic formations of the European Parliament, reasoned

critique against the EU has still not been accepted as a fully legitimate and necessary part of

European decision-making to date. (Troub, 2014: 1551)

The third, and from our perspective, the most relevant characteristic and flaw of the

term is its inability to be objectively conceptualized. Despite the hundreds of articles,

conferences and edited books written about the topic in the past 20 years, no consensus hasbeen reached about the exact meaning of this phenomenon. Ranging from the most minimalist

interpretations that considered Euroscepticism as simply a lack of support for European

integration, up to very specific approaches that tried to limit its scope to the absolute rejection

of the project itself, definitions had one huge fault that eventually caused the theoretical side

of the research to come to a deadlock at the beginning of the 21 st century. According to

Kaniok (2012: 43-44), the main reason for this failure lies in the method how these definitions

$ Some sour&es here? -ain, sour&es please


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were created. He suggests that Euroscepticism can only be explained once we have

determined the object of that scepticism a priori. In other words, to find out who is

Eurosceptic and who is not, we have to explain what kind of polity the European Union is,

identify the concept of support for such an entity and only then can we move on to search for

the types of opposition that exists.

The majority of the definitions and classifications have, however, failed to follow this

logic and tried to grasp only the negative spectrum of attitudes, without specifying support

and drawing the contours of the European Union itself. As a result, several different, yet

overlapping types and versions of Euroscepticism emerged, based on what elements,

institutions, policies and principles of the Union the respective authors have chosen as the

object of their analysis on one hand and how inclusive their interpretation about opposition

was, on the other. Some of their underlying concepts like “the EU as it is” (Kopecky &

Mudde, 2002) “unqualified opposition”, or “core policies areas of the EU” (Szczerbiak &

Taggart, 2003) – just to mention a few - are not only subjective and vague in meaning, but are

impossible to compose the fundaments of any proper framework for further elaboration and

reflection as well. (Crespy & Verscheuren, 2009) As I have found Kaniok's observation

accurate in this matter, I intend to conceptualize Euroscepticism using his theoretical

approach in my thesis. Therefore, our first task in the process of definition is taking a step

backwards, and to explain, how the European Union can be interpreted.

1.3. Defining Euroscepticism

1.3.1. Step 1 - Conceptualizing the European Union as a political system

After presenting many possible options for describing the polity dimension of the EU,

including federation, regulatory state, confederation among others, Kaniok identifies the

European Union as a political system. (Kaniok, 2012: 37-38) Although the concept was

devised by Easton almost 60 years ago, its neutral and minimalistic character on one hand,and its ability to capture dynamic processes without imposing any finality (unlike the term

federation or confederation) on the other makes it a usable definition to work with in case of a

complex entity such as the EU. By default, a political system has the following

characteristics: a stable set of institutions for collective decision-making system; decisions of

these institutions do have impact on distribution of economic resources; citizens seeking to

realize their political desires through this decision-making system; and presence of continuous

interaction between political outputs and new demands.(Kaniok, 2012:37, based on Easton,1957) Even though this very simplified view about the EU does not tell us anything about the


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multitude of layers, inputs and outputs that compose the polity dimension, it provides a

defensible and solid basis for our next step, which is the identification of support in relation to

this political system.

1.3.2. Step 2 – Identifying specific and diffuse support of the EU

At this point, however, I will not continue with a minimalistic description of support that

Kaniok (2012: 42) has used, but instead I will approach the concept from a broader viewpoint,

using Easton's differentiation between specific and diffuse support in relation to any political

system. The Eastonian method is practical for our analysis, as the author identifies support as

an attitude, by which a person orients himself to an object either favourably or unfavourably,

positively or negatively. (Easton, 1975: 436) As the definition incorporates a whole spectrum

of attitudes, even negative ones, there is no further need to locate the meaning of “opposition”and consequently, to separate Euroscepticism from the rest of the scale, as both positive and

negative positions are part of the same dimension. What can and should be separated, is the

two ways in which support is understood. Firstly, by specific support Easton means the

perceived outputs and performance of political authorities. In other words, it measures how

decisions, policies, actions, utterances or the general style of these authorities affect one's

opinion. (Ibid, 437) In terms of the European Union, specific support can be measured in

relation to the decisions produced by European institutions; public speeches and performanceof representatives of these institutions (members of European Parliament, European

Commission, etc.), or the effectiveness of certain policies (e.g. monetary policy, the CAP,

external and internal policies). Consequently, the critique of these outcomes are also

considered a part of specific support, namely of its negative side. Soft Euroscepticism

(Szerbiak & Taggart, 2003), instrumental Euroscepticism (Lubbers & Scheepers, 2005),

policy-based or functional Euroscepticism (Riishøj, 2007), utilitarian or economic

Euroscepticism (Dalton & Eichenberg, 2007; Sørensen, 2008) have all referred to this

dimension of support, either fully or partially. The relevant word here is “output”, which

indicates that those definitions of Euroscepticism that focus on negative reactions to a specific

institutional, financial or policy outcome and the general performance of the European Union

at a given time, do not tell anything about the standpoint of an individual/political party

towards the principles, goals and legitimacy that constitute the basic pillars of the EU's

existence (the inputs). Consequently, identifying Euroscepticism as the negative evaluation of

any specific decision or of the performance of any EU institution is more than problematic.


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The result will be a non-measurable label that anyone may get for simply voicing any

dissatisfaction towards the Union.

Alternatively, if the term Euroscepticism is to be used at all, it should definitely refer to

a different kind of support, or more precisely, the lack of such support. This is where the

concept of diffuse support becomes relevant. According to Easton, diffuse support refers to

“what an object is or represents” and not “what it does”. It consists of attitudes that help

members of a political system accept or tolerate outputs to which they are opposed, or the

effects of which they see as damaging to their wants. In reality it means, that irrespective of

our evaluation regarding policy outcomes or general performance, the underlying acceptance

of the given political system does not change, because we still support it for its own sake.

(Ibid, 444-445) Therefore, diffuse support is more long-term, more value-based and less

likely to fluctuate than specific support. If we apply the theory on the European Union, diffuse

support can be understood as the acceptance of the principle of European integration on one

hand (legitimacy) and trusting its institutions to “do their job” and get the preferred outcomes

from them without intervention, on the other (trust). These two dimensions – legitimacy and

trust - are deliberately differentiated by Easton himself, and for the better, as in terms of the

EU, these concepts indeed refer to objects that should be measured separately.

Following this line of thoughts, defining Euroscepticism as lack of diffuse support for

the European Union could theoretically be captured from two perspectives. First of all, it

means that a certain individual or political party does not support and/or rejects the principle

of European integration. Secondly, Euroscepticism could also be manifested in the lack of

support and/or rejection of the regime of the EU, that is, a lack of trust in the institutional

structure and the belief that the current form of the Union is incapable of giving the preferred

outcomes. (Based partially on Fuchs 2009: 22-23) At this point, however, it is necessary to

look deeper into these definitions. While identifying Euroscepticism with the first dimension

seems accurate7, the second interpretation might cause some problems. First of all, how canwe truly capture the meaning of the regime of the EU or how do we measure trust in certain

institutions? Although public surveys, such as the Eurobarometer are capable of showing

“levels of trust” for the Commission, the European Parliament or, towards the EU in general,

these results cannot be used in our analysis, as their definition of trust does not match that of

>

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in#era#ion+ Dn shor#, !o#h of #hese in#erpre#a#ions are in line wi#h #he defini#ion #ha# D use


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Easton8. On the other hand, the general attitude towards the effectiveness of institutions to

produce the preferred outcomes is very close to the definition of specific support. Even Easton

(1975, 448-450) himself admits that empirically, trust - as the second type of diffuse support -

can easily shade into specific support and therefore he leaves the task of finding appropriate

measures to make the distinction between them for further research 9. Acknowledging the

above-mentioned vagueness of the whole concept of “regime of the EU”, I suggest that the

“trust” dimension is not suitable for measuring Euroscepticism because of its likely “spill-

over” into specific support. From this point, my focus will be on the legitimacy dimension,

which, on the other hand, offers a much safer and supportable ground to build my research on.

1.3.3. Step 3 - Locating Euroscepticism in the dimension of diffuse support

As I have identified legitimacy in terms of the EU's political system as accepting or rejectingthe principle of European integration, the question arises, what that principle really is. Giving

an adequate definition in this case is crucial, as one of the main flaws of the Eurosceptic

research so far has been a too narrow interpretation of this question, which was a result of an

inherently one-sided perception about the history and finality of the European project itself.

Once we start analysing the historiography of the integration, it becomes clear that the

majority of the works dealing with the development of the European Communities and then

the EU have simply concentrated on one single explanation about the origins and the outcomeof the process: the neo-functionalist narrative. From that perspective, European integration is

a linear development with the specific aim of achieving a fully integrated political union at its

end point, through the gradual transfer of competencies from national to supranational level.

Consequently, the principle of intergovernmental co-operation and those statesmen, who were

propagating a more decentralized view of Europe with less power transferred to Brussels,

while keeping the primacy of the nation state, have been stigmatized as anti-European simply

because they wanted to slow down or modify the direction of the process. (Crespy &

Verscheueren, 2009: 379-380) This rather limited perception about the definite purpose of the

integration has left a significant mark on the study of attitudes towards the EU since the very

beginning. As most of the scholars dealing with Euroscepticism have not questioned the

legitimacy of this narrative (or not even mentioned it) and accepted the gradual

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spe&ifi& suppor# #he iden#if #he *F as i# is and as i# is de%elopin+ despi#e #he fa #ha# suppor# for #heeneral reime of #he *F should !e &onsidered as par# of #rus#, #ha# is, of diffuse suppor# (!ased on Au&hs 200:

22)


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“communitarization” of competences as the only correct way of integration, every attempt to

oppose further transfers of national sovereignty or to return to an earlier stage of the

integration has been seen as a manifestation of Euroscepticism.

There are numerous flaws in this interpretation. First of all, both the institutional design

and the political development of the Union is a mixture of supranational and

intergovernmental elements, which have been driving the whole process simultaneously, often

through the contention of the two main institutions: the Commission on one side and the

Council on the other. By ignoring those periods in the history of integration where

intergovernmental institutions (the Council and the European Council) had the main role in

directing the process, one will arbitrarily build his research on a biased choice. Moreover,

considering the critique of the neo-functionalist and federal narrative as a sign of rejecting the

whole project is not far from denying one of the key elements of every political system that

has the power to make decisions: the right of disagreement and legitimate debates concerning

the way those decisions are made. (Kaniok, 2012: 35, 42) In the literature of Euroscepticism,

the re-evaluation of this narrative started only in the late 2000s. The scholars cited earlier in

this chapter (Crespy and Verscheuren 2009, Kaniok 2006-2012, Leconte, 2010-2015) had

made a significant contribution in addressing this previously unnoticed shortcoming that

affected the majority of definitions and typologies to a great deal.

To avoid the inclusion of attitudes that in reality cannot – based on the works of these

authors – be associated with the opposition to the underlying principle of European

integration, I will define the object of legitimacy dimension within diffuse support as follows:

despite previous interpretations, the main principle of European integration is not the gradual

and irreversible transfer of sovereignty to a centralized, European level of decision-making,

but rather the very idea of giving up part of the national competences to a supranational entity

and accepting the decisions of that entity, irrespective of how the decisions are made.

(Kaniok, 2006: 76) Hence, the main line of division in this definition lies in the act ofaccepting or rejecting the existence of an authority, which supersedes that of the nation state.

If we return to our initial approach, by which I intended to locate Euroscepticism on the

negative side of diffuse support, we can finally identify the concept in a precise way:

Euroscepticism is the lack of diffuse support for the underlying principle of European

integration; a set of positions, attitudes and reactions, whose main element is a rejection to

the idea of giving up parts of national competences to a supranational entity and accepting

the authority of such entity.


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1.3.4. Applicability of the definition

Having established this definition as the result of the logic described above (explaining the

polity, defining support for the polity, locating opposition as negative side of support) gives

us an advantage of clarity and simplicity, not to mention that every step and choice in theprocess of identification can be supported by arguments of scholars, who have not been

proven wrong about the validity of their theories up to date. Nonetheless, it does not mean

that this method of definition could replace the existing ones in the foreseeable future, for two

reasons. First of all, despite the detailed and well-argued critique of Taggart & Szczerbiak's

(2002) seminal work, the vast majority of the empirical studies about Euroscepticism have

applied and are still applying their definition and their division of Hard and Soft

Euroscepticism. Although many alternatives have appeared in the past 14 years to tackle theobvious deficiencies of this binary typology, its “attractiveness” has remained uncontested,

contrary to all efforts. Secondly, the general applicability of my definition (and of those that it

was built on) is largely unlikely in a field, where the term Euroscepticism has become almost

inseparably connected to any and all forms of criticism towards the European Union.

Proposing a very minimalistic definition and limiting its range to the opposition of only one,

specific (yet core) aspect of European integration will cause confusion when any reference is

made to other works which use the term in a more encompassing way. This problem is also a

crucial point to tackle in case of my thesis. In section 1.1. and 1.2. of this chapter I have

already used the adjective Eurosceptic in a broad sense and the analysis of typologies will also

require me to do the same in upcoming chapters, causing possible misunderstandings and

inconsistency. What is more, whatever definitions we might use, it must be noted that

Euroscepticism not only refers to the phenomenon itself that is being studied, but also to a

quasi-separate field or dimension of political science, which consequently uses

Euroscepticism as terminus technicus, or an umbrella expression for all works which deal

with oppositions towards the EU. In order to avoid further confusion, I have decided to keep

my original definition in the rest of the thesis, with the stipulations that

• whenever a competing interpretation is being discussed, I will use the word

Eurosceptic and Euroscepticism based on the meaning that the respective author or

authors have assigned them

• whenever the topic under discussion has to be placed into the broader category of

research which uses the term Euroscepticism as a terminus technicus, I will use the

word in its all-encompassing sense.


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2. Party-based Euroscepticism

Once again, we must clarify first; that there is a contradiction between the expression “party-

based Euroscepticism” and the multitude of academic works that either deliberately or by

reference fall under this category. Although the research about party attitudes indeed started

in the mid-1990s as an analysis of only negative postures, later works have expanded their

agenda by including both support and opposition connected to the European Union. As the

label still prevails for both types of works, I have also identified the research in this thesis as a

contribution to party-based Euroscepticism, because it largely builds on the critique of already

existing classifications, despite its broader focus.

Before evaluating any of these existing typologies, it is important to note that from the

moment when the first articles appeared about party-based Euroscepticism, two mainquestions have started to dominate the discourse. The first was dealing with the underlying

reasons and explanations for a party's negative posture (why?), while the second one was

connected to the possible ways this opposition can be manifested and measured (how?).

(Taggart & Sczerbiak, 2003: 5) Going through the relevant works in the field, I have

identified and summarized the possible answers to both questions.

2.1. Explaining negative postures – strategy or ideology?

One of the first explanations was given by Taggart in his already cited article from 1998,

where he analysed political parties of Western European states and concluded that

Euroscepticism – which he identified as the idea of contingent and qualified opposition, as

well as incorporating outright and unqualified opposition to the process of European

integration (Taggart, 1998: 366) - is predominantly manifested in protest-based, anti-systemic

and extremist parties on the peripheries of domestic party systems. As these parties have little

chance of gaining access to real power in government, they use anti-EU rhetoric as a tool to

differentiate themselves from mainstream ones and thereby gaining more protest votes. For

these parties, Euroscepticism is not more than “an ideological appendage to a more general

systemic critique” or a proxy, through which an already existing ideological predisposition

towards the political establishment can be expressed. (Taggart, 1998: 372) Taggart also

observed that parties closer to the centre of the party systems are less inclined to show

Eurosceptic tendencies, which – if such tendencies are present - are mainly a result of internal

party factionalism and its influence is hard to measure objectively. His observations implied

two important points for further research: 1. With the exception of small, single-issue anti-EU


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formations, Euroscepticism is not driven by new ideological considerations. 2. Parties at the

peripheries (extreme right and left) are more disposed to Eurosceptic attitudes than central

ones, which implies that Euroscepticism is not dependent on the party’s rightist or leftist

orientation generally.

The idea that opposition (whether qualified or unqualified) is mostly influenced by a

party's position in its party system and is a result of tactical or strategic considerations is also

shared by Nick Sitter, who argues that European integration cannot be interpreted as a new

political cleavage (based on the Lipset-Rokkan model) that reshapes domestic party

competition, but is rather a result of “politics of opposition”. (Sitter, 2002) According to this

theory, as the integration process is largely driven by state governments, opposition to certain

policy outcomes or measures is the privilege of non-government parties, who can use critical

remarks vis-á-vis the EU when competing with the governing coalition, or can ultimately

avoid Euroscepticism completely when aspiring for government participation. In this sense,

not only extremist parties might take up Eurosceptic positions for strategic reasons, but pro-

integration ones as well, although to a much more limited extent. (Sitter, 2002: 12) Whether

and to what degree an opposition party decides to take on a critical posture towards the EU

depends on four factors: the weight of the party's identity and ideology, the implications of its

pursuit of core policy preferences, the incentives it faces in its pursuit of votes and the

constraints of coalition politics. (Sitter, 2003: 249) Although Sitter admits that ideology has a

long-term impact on a party's stance towards integration, he concludes that competition

between government and opposition gives a better and more up-to-date indication about a

party's position in relation to the EU.

While party strategy and inter-party competition can indeed influence a party's decision

to take up Eurosceptic attitudes, other scholars have found a more significant correlation

between a party's ideological position on the Left-Right dimension and their scope of EU-

criticism. Unlike Sitter or Taggart, who described Euroscepticism as a phenomenonsurpassing the traditional cleavages, Hooghe et al. (2002: 971-972) have come to the

conclusion that Left/Right contestation can explain party positions on certain EU-wide

policies that are connected to redistribution and market regulation. In this sense, centre-left

parties are prone to support integration in social policy, unemployment policy, environmental

regulation and strengthening the powers of the European Parliament, whereas right-wing

formations generally vote only for further market integration, but oppose the above-

mentioned, “leftist” policies that attempt to regulate capitalism. Thus, if we do not countextremist parties from both sides of the axis which are generally anti-EU, the authors


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definitely find right-of-centre groups more Eurosceptic than centre-left ones. They elaborate

this thesis further on by stating that certain ideological dispositions on the so-called “new-

politics” or materialist/post-materialist dimension (which brings up questions related to

ecology, immigration or national sovereignty) can be used as an even more precise indication

to a party’s stance: so-called TAN (traditional/authoritarian/nationalism) parties have a much

bigger inclination to take up Eurosceptic positions as protectors of national sovereignty than

GAL (Green/Alternative/Libertarian) parties, which are not driven by clear antipathies or

defensive strategies, but rather by policy goals that do not interfere with those of European

integration in general. (Hooghe et al., 2002: 975-976)

However, these findings have been recently challenged in a study by Van Elas and Van

der Brug, who came to a different conclusion with regard to left-right position and

Euroscepticism. Having conducted a longitudinal analysis over a period of almost four

decades, the authors have shown, that while during the 1970s and 1980s Euroscepticism was

primarily a phenomenon on the left, the Maastricht Treaty has changed this tendency, making

right-wing parties take up Eurosceptic positions as well, and transforming this linear

relationship into a U-shaped one by the end of 1990s. (Van Elsas & Van der Brug, 2015: 210-

211) The fact that this change has occurred as a result of the steps taken in Maastricht

indicates that new developments in the integration process can modify the attitude of the

parties, irrespective of their position on the left-right scale. The authors explain this not only

by describing the EU as a moving target, but also by acknowledging the same characteristic of

the ideological dimension, which constantly gives both the political Left and Right new

meanings and policies to focus on, as the integration progresses. With such results, the paper

concludes that it is not possible to identify a clear connection between Euroscepticism and

party ideology, as it may vary over time, leading to a different U-shape in different periods.

(Van Elsas & Van der Brug, 2015: 211)

After presenting these rather contradictory assumptions about the main driving forcesbehind Euroscepticism, the question remains, whether it is possible to come up with a single

explanation, emphasizing the role of either party strategy or ideology. Instead of

concentrating on only one or the other, some scholars have tried to integrate both elements

into their theoretical approach. Taggart and Szczerbiak (2003: 19) explain Eurosceptic posture

with a party's wider ideological profile and values on one hand, and the perceived interests of

its supporters on the other. However, while they attribute a clear role to ideology, they also

highlight the impossibility of “reading off” a party's position on the EU based only on theirparty families and Left-Right orientation. In other words, they still consider inter-party


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competition as a more influential element, while grasping the effect of ideology is rather

impossible with their methodology. This was one of the main motives behind Kopecky's and

Mudde's work, who deliberately devised a typology that is capable of distinguishing the

effects of ideology from that of party strategy, by creating a matrix with horizontal and

vertical axes, measuring these two components separately. By pinpointing the position of

parties both in Western and in Central-Eastern Europe in this system, the two scholars have

concluded that ideology plays the main role in determining a party's attitude towards the idea

of European integration as such, but strategy can greatly influence their stance on the specific

support of the EU's current and future trajectory. (Kopecky & Mudde, 2002: 319-320)

Even though these two models date back neither almost 15 years already, neither these,

nor any additional conceptualization has brought any consensus to the debate over the role of

ideology/strategy since then. On the contrary, Mudde (2011) has even attempted to draw the

outlines of two separate intellectual schools connected to Euroscepticism, which exist parallel

to one another without much interaction. According to him, the so-called North Carolina

School comprises those scholars that derive Eurosceptic attitudes from traditional and post-

materialist cleavages, therefore putting the stress on party ideology and the above-described

GAL-TAN dichotomy (Hooghe et al. as the main contributors), while the Sussex School is

home to those, who emphasize the impact of a party’s position in its local party system and

inter-party competition – Sitter, Taggart and Szczerbiak being the key publishers, but

Topaloff (2012) should also be mentioned here. Ironically, by the time Mudde has come up

with the idea of the two schools, the discussion about the possible sources of party-based

Euroscepticism has considerably lost its previous salience, which is also visible from the

references that the author used in his paper: there is no article or book listed after the year

2009. Indeed, publications from the end of the 2000s onwards have either accepted the

influence of both elements without further elaboration, or simply ignored the question

altogether10. As an exception, Kaniok (2006: 38) mentions in an additional factor of influence:a certain society’s degree of Europeanization. Based on this hypothesis, certain socio-political

factors (e.g. dominant religion, the country’s relationship with European integration from the

beginning of the process, activism or isolationism in international politics) can reaffirm or

discourage the success of Euroscepticism in a specific country. Accordingly, differences

between national party systems and the way a nation’s own cultural and historical

characteristics are perceived and projected by political parties have been analysed by many

10 Aor #he former, see e&on#es summariEa#ion (2010: 10?6111) -mon o#her re&en# wors, nei#her Au&hs

(200), nor 4e 8ra# (2013) fo&uses on #he effe of ideolos#ra#e on par#6!ased *uros&ep#i&ism


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scholars, but to what extent these variables influence levels of Euroscepticism, has proved to

be rather intangible and non-measurable.

After summarizing the findings mentioned above, we can answer our initial question

regarding the sources of party-based Euroscepticism, which was defined here as a broader

term, covering different levels of opposition. Based on previous works, a party’s decision to

take up Eurosceptic attitude may depend, to different degrees, on the following factors:

• A party’s underlying ideological background; cultural, historical, national and social

values that determine its main profile, its perception of traditional and post-materialist

cleavages

• A party’s position in the national party system – proximity to the centre in the given

system or to the extreme poles, both on Left and the Right

• A party’s position in government or in opposition

• The party’s position on the political establishment – being a mainstream or an anti-

system party

To summarize it, researching the possible reasons for a party’s Eurosceptic posture did not

provide all-conclusive results, but at the same time has identified a whole range of factors that

can influence the type and strength of this opposition. Most of the classifications that I am

going to describe and evaluate build on rather selectively chosen arguments of the above-mentioned, while other typologies disregard the underlying reasons completely and focus only

on the manifestation and measurement.

2.2. Typologies of (Euro-)support and Euroscepticism – the state of the art

As soon as the first definitions of Euroscepticism appeared in literature in the end of the

1990s, there was a need to create methods by which this opposition can be measured and

compared within a political system. The result was the quick establishment of numerous

typologies and system of classifications within a few years' time, using different methods to

operationalize and gauge support and/or opposition of political parties in relation to European

integration. Based on the logic of their approach, I have identified two main types of

classifications that comprise all the relevant theories published in academic journals. The

principle of distinguishing them is the nature of relationship between the sub-types or labels

within the respective typology. Accordingly, we can talk about the following scenarios:

• single-scale typologies: the sub-types or labels in the typology are part of the same

continuum, and there is a measurable degree of difference between them


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• non-scale typologies: the sub-types or labels in the typology are not part of the same

continuum and/or there is no measurable degree of difference between them

Apart from this method of distinction, we could also group the typologies by considering the

dimension of attitudes they cover (only opposition, or both support and opposition), but I havefound the connection between the labels and the existence/non-existence of a single

continuum a more influential factor when comparing the results. In this section, I will

concentrate on non-scale typologies, as the most commonly cited, used and reflected methods

in academic papers belong to this category without a doubt. After carefully analysing and

comparing them, I will give an overview about their main characteristics and ultimately point

out their main faults. Then, I will devote the next part of the chapter to introduce and propose

alternative methods in the form of a single-scale typology which will be used in the empiricalpart of the thesis.

The first and the most influential typology to be analysed is that of Szczerbiak and

Taggart (2002), who have introduced the concept of Hard and Soft Euroscepticism, which has

inarguably become the most widely-used and successful classification in literature so far. The

distinction between the two types of Euroscepticism is in fact an already modified version of

Taggart's (1998) earlier definition, which identified Euroscepticism as the idea of contingent

or qualified opposition, as well as incorporating outright and unqualified opposition to the

process of European integration11. This was later decomposed into these two dimensions:

• Hard Euroscepticism was explained as the outright rejection of the entire project of

European and economic integration and opposition to the respective country joining or

remaining members of the EU.

• Soft Euroscepticism, on the other hand is when there is not a principled objection to

European integration or EU membership but where concerns on one (or a number) of

policy areas leads to the expression of qualified opposition to the EU, or where there is

a sense that „national interest‟ is currently at odds with the EU trajectory. (Szczerbiak

& Taggart, 2003: 6)

The authors themselves and other scholars have used this typology several times to map party

systems in Western, then in Central and Eastern Europe and put political parties matching

11

-l#houh Taar# in #his seminal ar#i&le has alread iden#ified #pes of poli#i&al par#ies #ha# &an #ae up*uros&ep#i& pos#ures, D will no# lis# #his &lassifi&a#ion amon #he #poloies here, as #he differen#ia#ion amon

#he iden#ified par# #pes does no# #ell an#hin a!ou# #he &on#en# or deree of #ha# *uros&ep#i& pos#ure i#self


21/6621

these criteria into the respective group12. However, the Hard-Soft dichotomy has been

severely criticized later on for its apparent shortcomings. The most detailed critique was given

by Kopecký and Mudde (2002: 300), who have found four weaknesses in this typology:

1. The category of Soft Euroscepticism is defined in such a broad manner that virtuallyevery disagreement with any policy decision of the EU can be included.

2. The distinction between the two types of Euroscepticism is blurred when Hard

Euroscepticism is identified by the principled objections to the current form of

European integration in the EU.

3. There are no clear criteria, based on which these two types can be separated

4. These categories do not differentiate between the ideas of European integration, on the

one hand, and the European Union as the current embodiment of these ideas, on theother hand.

Based on these arguments, the authors propose a different way of classification, which is able

to measure support as well as opposition, and which can differentiate between the principle of

European integration and the current manifestation of that principle in the form of the

European Union. Kopecký and Mudde explain the separation of the idea of integration from

today's form of EU by using the already analysed theory of Easton about diffuse and specific

support, whereby supporting or rejecting the principle is measured as diffuse support, whilesupporting or rejecting the EU “as it is” can be explained as specific support. Using these two

dimensions, the authors create a matrix of two axes with four possible prototypes of party

positions. Accordingly, while the horizontal axis measures diffuse support, the vertical one is

created for mapping specific support.

12 - ood &ompila#ion of #hese ar#i&les &an !e found in #he #wo edi#ed %olumes of Hpposin *uropeI+

(SE&Eer!ia / Taar#, 200)


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Figure 1. A two dimensional system of attitudes - Source: Kopecký & Mudde (2002: 303)

The four new labels that are created are capable of combining the two types of support,

measured on the separate axes. Thus, their definitions are as follows: (Ibid, 302-303)

• Euroenthusiasts: parties or groups that combine Europhile (supports the principle of

integration) and EU-optimist (supports the EU in its current form) positions.

• Eurosceptics: parties or groups that combine Europhile and EU-pessimist positions.

They support the general ideas of European integration, but are pessimistic about the

EU’s current and/or future reflection of these ideas.

• Europragmatists: combine Europhobe and EU-optimist positions: they do not support

the general ideas of European integration underlying the EU, nor do they necessarily

oppose them, yet they do support the EU.

• Eurorejects: combine Europhobe and EU-pessimist positions. They subscribe neither

to the ideas underlying the process of European integration nor to the EU.

Although not as widely used, this typology has become the main competitor of the Hard-Soft

classification in academic papers. It was able to address the main problem of Szczerbiak and

Taggart's method, which is essentially related to the conceptualization of Soft Euroscepticism

and its vague and blurred meaning. Another positive development compared to the Hard-Soft

dichotomy is the fact that the authors recognized the importance of incorporating dimensions

of support into their typology, which enabled the comparison of all parties in a national party

system, thereby describing party differences in the whole spectrum, not only in a fragment of

it. By using the combination of the two dimensions, they also tackled one more issue: the

Support for Europea n integra tion (d iffuse support)

Europ hile Europ hob e

S u

p p o r t f o r E U

( s p e c i f i c

s u p p

o r t )

Eu-o p tim ist Euroenthusia sts Europ ra gmatists

Eu-p essimist Euroscep tics Eurorejec ts


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influence of ideology and strategy behind the four categories. In this typology, party positions

deriving from diffuse support (Europhile or Europhobe positions) are assigned to be a result

of a party's underlying ideology and basic principles, while the EU-optimist and EU-pessimist

categories can be attributed to strategic considerations. After having a detailed research about

party positions in Member and (then) Candidate States, the authors came to the conclusion

that whereas a certain political formation can change its position on the vertical axis (moving

back and forth between the categories of Euroenthusiasts and Eurosceptics or between

Europragmatics and Eurorejects respectively) as a result of strategy, they do not relocate on

the horizontal axis (from Euroenthusiasts to Europragmatic or from Eurosceptics and

Eurorejects and vice versa) because it would mean a complete redefinition of their ideological

predisposition in relation to European integration. (Ibid, 319-320) My previous research on

political parties of Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary has also reaffirmed this

hypothesis (Péter, 2013)

Despite the seemingly logical method that the authors proposed and a number of useful

results it produced, this typology can also be subject to criticism from multiple perspectives.

As a reaction to the authors' critique, Szczerbiak and Taggart (2003) have reflected

thoroughly on Kopecky and Mudde's work. While admitting the validity of their arguments in

terms of the Hard-Soft dichotomy, they laid out a few points that can be problematic when

using the two-dimensional, 4-type method. First of all, they have a reservation towards the

usage of the term Eurosceptic as one of the sub-types in the typology. This argument is

essentially the same as the one I have brought earlier in connection with the minimalistic

definition I attributed to Euroscepticism in this thesis. Namely, that the general semantic

interpretation of this term is much broader, therefore it can be confusing to narrow down its

meaning on one side and referring to other works with the same word on the other.

(Szczerbiak & Taggart, 2003: 8) The second point that the authors bring is referring to the

category of Europragmatists, which they find illogical. They argue that the parties put underthese label (HZDS from Slovakia, FKGP from Hungary13) do not conform with the definition

of the category (rejection of the idea of integration, but supporting the EU) but are simply

there because their positions on Europe is hard to read and interpret, and could not fit into any

other group. Szczerbiak and Taggart also highlight the far too inclusive character of the

Euroenthusiast category. They argue that this label “does not capture the fact that just as

13


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opposition to the European integration project as embodied in the EU can be both principled

and contingent, so can support for it.” (Ibid, 9)

Finally, it is important to reflect on the way how European integration as a principle is

separated from the “current and future form of the European Union” in the typology. Here, I

resolve to Flood's critical remark (2002: 6), who stated that since the principle of international

co-operation between European countries is always supported in some form or other as an

alternative to the EU, Euroscepticism cannot mean anything else than EU-scepticism.

Consequently, any other form of co-operation which is not envisioned in the framework of the

EU – even if it would be a well-reformed EU – does not comply with the idea of European

integration. In this respect, detaching the principle from the EU itself is not only unnecessary,

but impossible as well.

After reflecting on Kopecky and Mudde's main points, the authors of the Hard-Soft

typology have accepted their criticism about the original definitions behind Hard and Soft

Euroscepticism. Therefore, they have reformulated the terms in the following way:

• Hard Euroscepticism might be defined as principled opposition to the project of

European integration as embodied in the EU, in other words, based on the ceding or

transfer of powers to supranational institution such as the EU. Note, that this definition

is the equivalent of Kopecky and Mudde's Eurorejectionists and that of Kaniok's

Eurosceptics (see later) – and consequently, of the one used in this thesis.

• Soft Euroscepticism (or Euroscepticism in the 4-type system) might be re-defined as

when there is not a principled objection to the European integration project of

transferring powers to a supranational body such as the EU, but there is opposition to

the EU's current or future planned trajectory based on the further extension of

competencies that the EU is planning to make. (Ibid, 12)

By redefining their original categories, Szczerbiak and Taggart's typology has ultimately

reached its final stage, despite further criticism from other scholars. On the other hand, Conti

and Verzichelli (2002) has deliberately chosen the Hard-Soft dichotomy as the basis of their

typology, which they expanded with three more categories, in order to mirror the whole scale

of positions, including support and neutrality. By adding Functional and Identity

Europeanism to the system, the authors have solved one of the issues that Szczerbiak and

Taggart have criticized in Kopecky and Mudde's typology: the lack of distinction between

principled and contingent support. In this respect, the Euroenthusiast category in that system

is represented by two separate labels in Conti and Verzichelli's. While keeping the original


25/662$

concepts of Hard and Soft Euroscepticism, the authors have defined categories of support as

follows. (Conti, 2003:17)

• Functional Europeanism is where there is no commitment to further integration,

unless it is proved to serve domestic interests or different party goals. Otherwise,commitment to European integration is mainly in terms of defence of the status quo.

• Indentity Europeanism: There is claim in favour of further competence shift from the

national to the supranational arena, of Federal Europe and of a European citizenship.

Further integration is a fundamental party goal.

As we can see from these definitions, Functional and Identity Europeanism are in fact mirror

images of Soft and Hard Euroscepticism respectively, in terms of princpled and contingent

support/opposition. What separates and binds the two dimensions together at the same time isa category, where neutrality and/or a lack of any articulated attitude towards European

integration is captured. This label, which the authors identify as “ No commitment/no mention”

may refer to parties which express policy-specific preferences in respect of the EU, but

overall it is impossible to define the broad party attitude.

After defining these categories and comparing their relation to one another, I came to

the conclusion that Conti and Verzichelli's typology could theoretically be described as a

single-scale one as well, with a measurable minimum and maximum at the ends (HardEuroscepticism and Identity Europeanism), while positioning the rest of the labels in between.

Figure 2. Conti and Verzichelli's typology depicted on a scale - Source: author

However, the problem of such a scale would be the non-interpretable character of the „No

commitment/No mention” label, which does not fit into the dimension of support/opposition

and cannot be measured properly. Moreover, the authors themselves have chosen a different

method of systematization, which takes into account the ideological or pragmatic/strategic

reasons for taking up any of these attitudes. The result is a matrix with two axes and four

categories as combinations, closely resembling that of Kopecky and Mudde.

HardEurosceptics

Soft Eurosceptics Nocommitment/No

mention

FunctionalEuropeanists

IdentityEuropeanists


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Figure 3. Conti and Verzichelli's two-dimensional matrix, modified version – Source: Conti (2003: 21)

Behind the similar structure, however, we find different logic. As I have tried to merge

Kopecky and Mudde's classification with this system, it becomes visible that, except for the

labels connected to principled support or principled opposition (Identity

Europeanism/Euroenthusiasts and Hard Euroscepticism/Eurorejects), the rest of the typology

is not compatible or interchangeable. The explanation lies in the different concept behind one

of the two axes. The vertical dimension measures the attitude towards the European Union in

both cases, but the horizontal dimension differs: while Kopecky and Mudde's system

illustrates principled support or principled opposition (that is, two positions in one dimension

of support), the typology described above takes a step backwards and measures the

dimensions of support itself and not the positions within that support. As a result of this,

Functional Europeanism is impossible to grasp using the labels of the previous matrix, as

contingent support is not operationalized in that system, only contingent opposition. Another

contradiction is induced by the position of Soft Euroscepticism. In Kopecky and Mudde's

theory, contingent opposition to the EU presupposes the existence of a general, diffuse

support for European integration, while here no such connection and conditionality is drawn

between principled and contingent support. I find the lack of such conditionality the biggest

flaw of Conti and Verzichelli's typology, because it ultimately makes Soft Euroscepticism

non-distinguishable from Hard Euroscepticism. Accepting the principle of transferring power

to a supranational body must be a sine qua non or a step zero for identifying a party as Soft

Eurosceptic, otherwise, in the lack of such acceptance, the party remains in the Hard category.

App roach towards Europea n integ ra tion

Princ ip led Contingent

o

r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d s t h e E U

Positive

Negative Soft Euroscep tic ism

Identity Europ ea nism(Euroe nthusiasts)

Func tiona l Europ ea nism(Euroe nthusiasts/ Eurosceptics)

Hard Euroscep tic ism(Euroreje cts)


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What becomes apparent after the analysis of these three typologies is the high degree of

overlapping in terms of categories, and the way they are created. Even though the scholars

cited above have interpreted certain phenomena differently, the method they used to establish

the categories - irrespective of their number – is essentially the same: they build on the

differentiation between the concepts of principled and contingent support/opposition14.

However, the problem with this approach is visible in all three cases: whereas identifying

principled support and principled opposition towards integration is relatively easy – being in

fact a binary decision -, the actual manifestation of contingent/unqualified/specific opposition

vis-á-vis the EU cannot be grasped in a consistent manner. Based on the definitions that these

authors proposed, Soft Euroscepticism (or Euroscepticism in Kopecky and Mudde's typology)

can mean any objection towards “one or more policy areas”, or towards the “current and

future shape of the EU”. In that case, the question might arise, where can we draw the line

between a Soft Eurosceptic party and a Functional Europeanist one, for instance? What

degree or type of criticism is needed to classify a political formation as Eurosceptic, and

alternatively, what degree of support will qualify as Europeanist/Euroenthusiast? These

questions have already been put forward in the first chapter of this thesis and have influenced

the way I approached the whole concept of Euroscepticism in the process of definition. As I

have stated there, the theoretical background behind my definition and the approach itself was

inspired by the work of Petr Kaniok, who proposed a typology, which addresses the

underlying problem of contingent/specific opposition, namely by separating it from the

concept of Euroscepticism completely.

The major advantage of Kaniok's (2006) classification is the method itself, how he

reaches the definition of Euroscepticism through those steps that I have also used in the

previous chapter: by defining first the polity dimension of European Union, then identifying

support to such polity and finally locating Euroscepticism. Despite the fact that Kaniok does

not build on Easton's differentiation of diffuse and specific support, his definition stronglyreflects the legitimacy dimension of diffuse support, which he also identifies with the

principle of European integration. Accordingly, opposition to such support equals the

rejection of the principle of transferring parts of national sovereignty to a supranational entity.

(Kaniok, 2009: 32) As Euroscepticism, from this point on, includes only those attitudes which

do not accept the principle of power transfer and the existence of a higher authority, the rest

of the positions that were previously considered as Soft Euroscepticism

1 -l#houh ope& and 7udde defined #hese as diffuse and spe&ifi& suppor#, #hese &on&ep#s refer #o #he same

dimensions


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(unqualified/contingent opposition) are no longer part of this dimension. On the contrary, in

Kaniok's typology, these attitudes are measured in terms of positive support for European

integration and belong under the label of Eurogovernmentalists. Altogether, the author

proposes three categories with the following definitions: (Ibid, 38-39)

Europeanists: supporters of the supranational interpretation of European integration.

This group does not see the integration process in terms of benefits and utility for the nation

or the party itself; key, rather, the integration as such is a goal, including its deepening and

broadening. This approach sees European integration as a good thing in and of itself; the party

thus inclines to the establishment of strong supranational institutions.

Eurogovernmentalists: supporters of the intergovernmental paradigm of the integration

process. Their basic difference from Europeanists lies in their reservations about the existing

model of integration and criticism of it. There is an absence of any notion of the necessity for

building or identifying political entities like a European nation or European identity.

Eurogovernmentalists see European integration as a political tool and not as a goal in itself.

Their support for European integration thus contains no vision of a final end.

Eurosceptics: reject the notion that the European continent should see a transfer of

political power from the national state to a supranational body in the context of the EU, which

would carry out the functions of the state and would possess the attributes of the state. The

motivations for this critique may be varied.

At first glance, this typology solves the majority of the concerns that I have raised above

in relation to the previous categorizations. Firstly and most importantly, it defines

Euroscepticism in a precise and clear manner and thus makes it possible to draw a visible line

between real Eurosceptics and those parties that criticize certain policies or decisions of the

EU. Secondly, it acknowledges the existence and legitimacy of both the neo-functionalist and

the intergovernmental paradigm of European integration, which have been influencing the

process parallelly since the very beginning. Thirdly, by incorporating these two paradigmsinto the labels which represent support for European integration, and not opposition, the

typology proves that attitudes defined as Soft Euroscepticism or Euroscepticism in the

previous classifications cannot and should not be considered as a milder and softer version of

principled opposition. The validity of this argument is tested on the level of European

Parliament, where the author has observed the voting patterns of different parties belonging to

these three categories. By comparing the results of a great compilation of roll-call votes in

plenary sessions, Kaniok concludes that Europeanist and Eurogovernmentalist parties votemuch more in accordance on the same issues than Eurogovernmentalist and Eurosceptic


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parties, which proves that parties belonging to the first two categories share more common

similarities in terms of their attitude towards the EU than any of these parties with

Eurosceptics ones. (Kaniok, 2006)

Although I do not challenge the validity of these results, I have one reservation towards

this typology. As Kaniok's research concentrated on party manifestos on one hand and voting

patterns in the European Parliament on the other, the perceived results do not tell anything

about the behaviour of political parties in their domestic political arena. Inarguably,

measuring attitudes towards the EU by choosing MEPs in the European Parliament as

subjects, who decide about Europe-wide issues and negotiate with other pan-European party

group members seems to be a logical decision, but there is no guarantee that the observed

patterns will be the same once we turn our attention to national party systems. My assumption

is quite the opposite: based on the fact that the European political sphere is very different

from national ones, and party groups and individual members alike face different degrees and

types of constraints and political motives on these separate levels, I believe that a similar

analysis of parties in their national party system could bring surprising results – as one such

study has indeed have (see next chapter for elaboration). Apart from this observation, I

consider this typology as the most coherent and usable one from all non-scale categorizations

described in this chapter so far, despite the fact that it has not been used or re-tested yet since

its creation in 2006.

To finish the identification and description of the most referenced typologies in

literature, I will now share some observations. As we could see, all non-scale typologies in

this chapter have built their methodology on the differentiation between opposition and

support towards European integration, establishing labels or sub-categories which measured

either certain versions of support or certain types of opposition. Only Kopecky and Mudde's

typology has the ability to merge together the two sides, but doing so has led to a bold

simplification of specific support into the binary choice of being either EU-optimist or EU-pessimist. Conti and Verzichelli's method grasps the differences better between degrees of

support (functional vs. identity), but does not link together the categories of support and

opposition in any way. Kaniok, on the other hand aims for the opposite: not to link, but to

properly separate dimensions of principled support from that of principled opposition.


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Figure 6. Measurement of positions of the described non-scale typologies – Source: author

There is an interesting pattern in the way these typologies have reflected on the previous ones

and how they tried to overcome the supposed weaknesses by first incorporating the broadestpossible dimension of positions, only to arrive back to a more narrow interpretation in the

end. The conclusion that I would like to draw from this observation is the fact that typologies

whose primary purpose was to separate a broad pattern of opinions and classify them in terms

of support and opposition have encountered several difficulties which made me question their

utility and coherence in empirical use. It is also no surprise that those non-scale typologies

that I have not analysed in this chapter (because of their general applicability to measure

public and party opinions alike without taking into account the differences between these

levels) do not even include references to support, but only establish further categories for

Euroscepticism. (Riishøj, 2007: 508-509; Leconte, 2010) Therefore, based on the critique that

I presented for the described typologies, I have three final remarks:

1. Categorizing various positions towards European integration by separating dimensions

of specific/qualified/contingent support and specific/qualified/contingent opposition

gives the false impression that political parties are coherent units with stable attitudes

(either positive or negative) which can be captured by broad and vaguely definedlabels.

2. The only coherent and uncontested category of the above analysed typologies is the

one which refers to a principled opposition towards the transfer of competences from

the nation state towards a supranational entity. Although this position is captured by

alternative labels (Hard Eurosceptics/Eurorejects/Eurosceptics), they describe the

same phenomenon. Separating this category from the rest in any typology (even in a

binary method) is substantiated and necessary.

Typology M ea surement of positions

principled a nd c ontingent op po sition

Kopecky & Mudde, 2002

Conti & Verzichelli, 2003

Kaniok, 2006 principled supp ort and p rincipled op po sition

Szczerbia k & Tagga rt,

2001-2003

diffuse support, diffuse opposition, specificsupport, specific o p po sition

principled support, principled opposition,

co ntingent supp ort, contingent o p po sition


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3. Taking these two points into consideration, I conclude that these non-scale typologies

are only able to differentiate between principled opposition and the rest of the attitudes

in a coherent way, while capturing any other position will lead to problems of

definition.

If non-scale typologies indeed suffer from these shortcomings, would it be possible to

overcome them by using a single scale of attitudes which do not separate opposition and

support from each other, but measures them in the same dimension? This is the hypothesis

that I would like to propose in the end of this chapter and prove in the empirical part of my

thesis.

2.3. Single-scale typologies in previous literature

Having introduced the most relevant non-scale typologies for gauging support an

thesis preliminary

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