Thinking the Unthinkable: The Limits of Traditional Crisis Management and the Necessity for New Approaches

Arjen Boin, Ph.D.School of Governance, Utrecht UniversityPublic Administration Institute, Louisiana State University

Outline

Introduction Future Shocks and Transboundary Crises The Challenges of Transboundary Crisis

Management Implications for Institutional Design

The New World of Crisis

Chernobyl, Kobe, Mad Cows, Canadian Ice Storms, Buenos Aires blackout, 9/11, SARS, Asian tsunami, Hurricane Katrina, China Earthquake (2008); H1N1 flu epidemic; Financial crisis, BP oil spill, Icelandic Ash, Fukushima; EHEC

Defining Transboundary Crises We speak of a transboundary crisis when

the functioning of multiple, life-sustaining systems or critical infrastructures is acutely threatened and the causes of failure remain unclear.

Characteristics of TC

Transboundary crises• Pose an urgent threat to core values, critical

infrastructures• Bring deep uncertainty: Causes are not

clear, unpredictable trajectory• Cross geographic and functional boundaries• Challenge governmental structures: No

ownership• Generate periods of intense politicization• Play up tensions between public and private

Increased Frequency: Driving Trends

1) Changing threat agents2) Increased societal

vulnerability

Increased societal vulnerability Growing complexities and interdependencies

Heightened mobility

Changing societal and political climate

Urbanization

Concentration of assets

Changing Threat Agents

(Bio) Technology jumps New forms of terrorism Climate change Global power shifts

Paradoxes

While public leaders can do less to prevent crises, they are increasingly held responsible. But they often do not know what to do (or what the public expects of them).

Trends increase vulnerability of modern societies, while increasing crisis management capacity (more can be done than ever before).

In Summary:

Prevention is hard if not impossible New forms of adversity are likely Failure is not an option (politically,

socially and economically) Government is not geared towards

dealing with transboundary crises

What does that mean for crisis management?

Key analytical distinctions

Operational v. Strategic Routine Emergencies v. Unimaginable

Crises Localized v. Transboundary Threats

Critical constraints

The symbolic need for a command & control myth

The institutional vulnerability of modern mega-cities

The culture of the risk society The politics of crisis management

Challenges for Strategic Crisis Management Preparing in the face of indifference Making sense of crisis developments Managing large response networks Meaning making: What’s the story? Accountability: Restoring trust after

crisis

Task 1: Preparing for Crisis

The costs of permanent preparedness Planning vs flexibility The politics of preparedness

Task 2: Sense-making

The crucial question: How to recognize a crisis?

Answer: It’s surprisingly hard.

Why sense-making is hard

We lack the knowledge and tools to understand, map, and track TBCs

Information has to be shared across organizational, sectoral, and geographical boundaries

Psychological factors limit individual and group capacity to recognize and grasp Black Swans

Task 3: Managing large response networks Working with limited information Making critical decisions in authority

vacuum Communicating to a confused and

distrustful public Coordinating across borders

Task 4: Meaning-making

What’s the story? Reducing public and political uncertainty

Bush after 9/11 v. Bush after Katrina Core claim: it’s not about the true story,

it’s about the best communicated story It is hard to explain a TBC without

undermining the legitimacy of complex, interdependent systems

Task 5: Crisis termination

Crisis: It ain’t over till it’s over (Katrina) Operational termination v. political

closure Key lesson: political closure depends on

accountability dynamics How to organize accountability across

boundaries?

A Challenge of Design?

Rise of transboundary crises “Impossible” crisis management

challenges Bounded bureaucracies: not designed to

deal with crises, certainly not for the crises of the 21st century

What needs to be done?

Institutional Design Options

Building resilient societies Building transboundary crisis

management capacity:• Supranational• Inter-agency

The Promise of Resilience

Resilience: the magical solution Modernization undermines and

facilitates resilience Primary condition: trust (social capital)

Resilience: The Feasible OptionRapid recombination of available

resources by:

Citizens First-line responders Operational leaders

Requires reconceptualization of crisis leadership

Leadership for Resilience

Support and facilitate emerging resilience

Organize outside forces Explain what is happening Initiate long-term reconstruction

Bottom line: Immediate relief is not an option

Engineering resilience: A leadership responsibility Basic response mechanisms in place* Training potential responders (how to

think for themselves) Continuous exercising Planning as process Create mobile units media-style Prepare for long-term aftermath Create (international) expert network

Creating Dynamic Capacity

Shared cognition Surge capacity Networked coordination Formal boundary-spanning structures

1. Shared cognition

Detection/surveillance systems Analytical capacity Real-time communication Decision support systems

2. Transboundary Surge Capacity Professional first responders (who can

operate across boundaries) Supply chain management Fast-track procedures Integrated command center

3. Networked coordination

Shared language Known partners, mutual knowledge A culture of collaboration Mutual trust

National Incident Management System (NIMS) Builds on successes of ICS (developed

for and by the fire-fighting community) Offers a shared structure, professional

language, way of working Built around defined authority relations,

functional organization, modular approach

Rapidly institutionalized across the US (Katrina v. Gustav)

NIMS: Fit for TBCs?

Designed for local events, dealt with by local/regional response organizations

ICS has not been systematically evaluated (effectiveness remains unproven)

Military/uniformed character Unclear how ICS can be used during

TBCs such as epidemics, terrorist attacks or financial crises

4. Formal boundary-spanning structures Defining authority Rules for collaboration, sharing

resources Rules and mechanisms for up and down-

scaling Rules for initiation and termination

U.S. National Response Framework (2008)

Defines responsibilities, structures and procedures for large-scale disastersAll hazards approachStrategic perspective

US Response: Structures and Principles All disasters are local The state is the primary actor Feds can help, but only if the states want

it NRF prescribes procedures for

requesting help and scaling up Embrace of NIMS

NRF: Pros and Cons

Concerted effort to define responsibilities Formally sound Sound policy for training and practiceBut…- All difficult problems are placed at the

state level- Not always clear who is in charge- No attention for international dimension

of TBC

What does the EU have available? An unnoticed success story A wide variety of capacities

(mechanisms, venues, agencies)

Recent developments: The Solidarity Clause, Reorganization of Commission DGs (Internal Security, EEAS, strengthening of ECHO); Erasing of Internal-external divide

EU Advantages…

Wide range of competences Strong on civilian capacities Skilled at cooperation and coordination Trusted venues Single contact point Set to grow

EU Disadvantages…

Incomplete, fragmented competences Unclear political commitment; politics

will affect CM Leadership is a ‘hot potato’ Communication is difficult;

multiculturalism

In summary: Future design challenges More TBCs are likely Contemporary government structures

are ill suited Needed: TBCM capacity & enhanced

resilience Required: (Re)design of institutions

Thank you!