this slide is: unclassified 1 maritime homeland defense / security mine countermeasures presented to...

This slide is: Unclassified 1

Maritime Homeland Defense / Security Mine Countermeasures

Presented to the 2011 Spring Regional Conference of the Mine Warfare Association

11 May 2011

This brief is Unclassified Mr. Marvin Heinze

NMAWC Maritime Homeland Defense

Navy Mine and Anti-Submarine Warfare CommandA Warfare Center of Excellence


Our Discussion Today

• Mission / Requirements• Capability / Capacity • Exercises • Preparation• Related efforts

This slide is Unclassified


Mine Warfare in the United States…It happens…

• Lake Ponchartrain, 2004– Floating IED discovered ivo visiting

dignitary

• Sacramento River, 1980– “Patriotic Scuba diver’ closes the

shipping channel

• Chesapeake Bay, June 1942– U-701 lays 15 magnetic mines– 3 ships sunk – 2 ships damaged


MHD MCM Policy / Mission

• DoD is the lead MOTR agency for mine countermeasures in the Maritime Domain (NSPD41/MOTR)

• Navy has DoD maritime mine countermeasure capability, implying– MCMRON and MCM forces will be

needed to counter mine and UWIED threats

– No civil authority MCM capability

• Specific domestic MCM Mission not defined – Interagency equities and priorities

– CONPLANs have general mission

• DHS will plan for the prevention and detection of sea mining…(MOTR)

This slide is: Unclassified

VCOM NMAWC+

MIW Battle Staff

USN MIW Operational Framework

SMCM Class Advocate

SMCM Class Advocate

COMTHIRDFLTCOMTHIRDFLT

COMCMRON SEVENCOMCMRON SEVENCOMCMRON FIVECOMCMRON FIVE

COMSECONDFLTCOMSECONDFLT

COM NMAWC

VCOM NMAWC

USW COE (ASW + MIW)

COM NMAWC

VCOM NMAWC

USW COE (ASW + MIW)

COMSEVENTHFLTCOMSEVENTHFLT

COMFIFTHFLTCOMFIFTHFLT

CTF xxCTF xx CTF xxCTF xx CTF xxCTF xx CTF xxCTF xx

COMCMRON TWOCOMCMRON TWO

COMSIXTHFLTCOMSIXTHFLT

CTF xxCTF xxCTF xxCTF xx

COMFOURTHFLTCOMFOURTHFLT

Deployable staff supports NCC MIW operations and training


MHD/S MCM Response Capability

SMCM• Ships in San Diego

• Long response times

• Limited capability

•Confined water

AMCM• MH-53E in NORVA

• Limited capability

•Confined water

• Deployable

UMCM• UUVs, Divers, MMS

• EOD PLT, MMS PLT

•Neutralization

• UUV PLT

• Rapidly deployed

• Confined water Capable

Command and Control• MIWC in San Diego

• MCM CDR in San Diego

• Rapidly deployable

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This slide is: Unclassified

Follow on

• Leadership– NMAWC VCOM and staff

• Aircraft– 4 - 6 MH 53E

– Various MCM equip

• Ships– 2 - 4 Avenger class SMCM

• Marine Mammals– MK 7/8 MMS

– 6+ dolphins

Today’s MHD/S MCM Response Capacity

Initial

• Leadership– MIWC LNOs

– COMCMRON staff

• UUVs– 2 X UUV PLT

• Mk 18 UUVs

• Divers– 2 X EOD MCM PLT

– 1 X VSW Dive PLT

7


Experimentation / Exercises in MHD/S MCM

2008-2009• 4 events in 2 years

– Change detection– Experimentation

• Low Frequency Broad Band

• Synthetic Aperture Sonar

• High clutter limits current mine hunting effectiveness• Improving change detection techniques and procedures

– Use of data fusion center

• Advanced new sonar technologies– LFBB Sonar for detection of buried mines – Synthetic aperture sonar for improved target discrimination

• MHD MCM CDR training

2010• Bay Shield 10

– MCM CDR Training (MHS)• Frontier Sentinel 10

– MCM CDR Training (MHD)– Experimentation


Exercise Bay Shield 10 Quick Look

NMAWC OBJECTIVES

Integrated training for MCMRON 2/DIV

MCM planning and execution using Port Folder and “change detect” tactics

Exercise MCM Force in MHS Mission

Conduct MCM Ops within a multi-agency Unified Command structure

Goods USCG/USN interaction and

integration MCMRON 2/NMAWC engagement

with the COTP/UCP

Valuable CONUS MCMC training for MCMRON 2/ DIV 31

Preparations for Frontier Sentinel

Others

Large number of contacts overwhelm mine hunting capacity

Incident Command System proficiency needed

Limited UCP secure comms

Areas of MCM ops

2 Mines Found


Frontier Sentinel 10 Overview25 May – 11 Jun 2010

PURPOSE

Bilateral homeland defense/ security exercise to conduct information / intelligence sharing, conduct mine

countermeasures operations, conduct sea trial experimentation, conduct bilateral maritime defense planning and response to

synchronize the operational planning process.


Frontier Sentinel 10 Participants

US Navy: COMSECONDFLT NMAWC COMCMRON TWO ONRHM14 DET NOMWCEODMU ONE & SIX

US Coast Guard: SECTOR Hampton RoadsDOG (MSRT, MSST)

Canadian Navy: JTF Atlantic2 x MCDVFleet Diving Unit

NMAWC OBJECTIVES

Exercise TF 25 in MHD mission

Train MCMRON TWO

Conduct Sea Trial Experiments

Improve confined waterways TTP


Trident Fury 2011Esquimalt, Canada

Participating Forces

Overview

-What: TF11 is a Bi-Lateral exercise involving US and Canadian Forces.

- Where: Esquimalt Harbor, Esquimalt Approaches and Constance Banks

- When: 02-13 May 2011

Objectives

- Conduct Bi-Lateral MCM operations

- Conduct integrated MCM operations

- Exercise interagency interoperability

- Improve confined waters MCM tactics

- Evaluate MCMRON2 as MCMC

- Assess MCM capability and capacity


Baseline Survey Port Folders

Change Detection Results

Homeland Defense Port Surveys and MIW Port Folders

Bottom SedimentsBottom Roughness

Doctrinal BottomClutter Density

Baseline imagery New imagery

Contact in new imagery needs to be prosecuted

• Quick response guide for MCMC

• Port folders cover 17 DoD ports– all complete as of Dec 2010– bi annual updates started

• Posted on Enterprise Knowledge Management (eKM)

• Port Folders accelerate port opening

• Change Detection reduces the number of contacts requiring identification

• Change detection results:– Eliminates 35-55% of mine-like objects

– Reduces clearance time by ~30%

• Port Folders accelerate port opening

• Change Detection reduces the number of contacts requiring identification

• Change detection results:– Eliminates 35-55% of mine-like objects

– Reduces clearance time by ~30%


Related MHD MCM efforts

• Naval Postgraduate School– 2008 -“A Systems Approach to Defeating MIEDS in US Ports”

• Homeland Security Science and Technology Advisory Committee – 2009 -“MIEDs in Ports and Harbors” study

• Center for Naval Analysis– 2008 -“Mine Warfare Homeland Defense and Security”– 2011 - “Mine Clearance in support of Homeland Security”

• NORTHCOM Capabilities Requirements Division– 2011 – “Maritime Mine Countermeasures Study”



MHD MCM way ahead

• Better define specific requirements– Defense– Whole of government

• Improve confined waters equipment– Neutralization UUV– One pass Detect to Engage– Determine best MHD employment of MCM Mission package

• Assist DHS efforts to prevent mining– Better threat awareness– Effective surveillance– Cooperative efforts with port entities



Questions?


USS SAMUEL B ROBERTSSADAF 02- Moored Contact USS TRIPOLI

LUGM I- Moored Contact

USS PRINCETONMANTA- Bottom Influence

Mine Cost Ship Damage

$10,000 $100 Million


$1,000 $57 Million


$1,000 $10 Million

Mine Warfare Direct Costs



Mine Warfare Indirect Costs

• Economic/Political Effects– 90%+ US trade transits US ports– Significant cost

• Global Commerce Effects– ~33% World trade transits US ports– Significant effect on trade

• Power projection– 90% of military sustainment by sea– Significant effect on defense

operations

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