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BACHELOR THESIS
Spring 2012 Kristianstad University
International Business- and Bank & Finance Program
To what extent are Swedish
companies following the
traditional internationalization
theories when entering Africa?
Authors
Isak Johansson
Therese Svensson
Supervisor
Agneta Moulettes
Examiner
Christer Ekelund
ii
Abstract
Globalization has been a hot topic recently. Many firms experience that their domestic
market is too limited for them to conduct their business in. This restriction leads to
firms seeking customers on different markets, in different nations, where the
companies’ supplies meet the consumers’ demands. Therefore, companies are
constantly seeking new places to do business in. Developing economies have been in
the scope of many firms recently, with China being in the frontline with its massive
labour force and cheap labour costs. However, attention is heading towards the African
continent, with its rich natural resources and, like China, large labour force.
The purpose of this dissertation is to see how Swedish firms have tried to establish
themselves on the emerging African market. In order to achieve this, an abductive
research approach has been selected. Qualitative interviews with important people in
four Swedish companies have been conducted.
The empirical findings suggest that Swedish firms have great opportunities to enter the
African market and continue to develop there. Furthermore, there is no method of
expansion that is better than another. It all comes down to what specific assets that
characterize the company in question. Whether it is a service-oriented company, a
manufacturing company or an exporting company will perhaps decide what entry mode
would be most suitable.
To our knowledge, there is no dissertation that deals with this topic. Consequently, this
paper will highlight this research area.
Key words: FDI, Africa, Swedish companies, internationalization, traditional
internationalization theories
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Acknowledgement
First, to our tutor Agneta Moulettes, who has guided and helped us through this stressful
period of time. To Annika Fjelkner, for giving us helpful advice as well as enabling our
writing skills to improve. To Timurs Umans, for his availability and information
updates, which has helped us understand what is demanded from us.
Furthermore, to Marie Englesson, Björn Falk, Lina Jorheden and Mats Jörnell for being
very cooperative and understanding during the whole interview part of the dissertation.
Finally, to our beloved family members and friends for reviewing this dissertation and
supporting us during this demanding semester.
Thank you.
Kristianstad, 2012
____________________ ____________________
Isak Johansson Therese Svensson
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction ................................................................................................................... 6 1.2 Purpose ........................................................................................................................ 8
1.3 Research questions ...................................................................................................... 8 1.4 Research philosophy ................................................................................................... 9 1.5 Research approach ...................................................................................................... 9 1.6 Theoretical limitations .............................................................................................. 10 1.7 Outline ...................................................................................................................... 10
2. Theoretical framework ................................................................................................ 11 2.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................... 11 2.2 Choice of theory ........................................................................................................ 12 2.3 Foreign Direct Investment ........................................................................................ 12
2.3.1 Acquisitions and Greenfield investments ........................................................... 13
2.3.2 The pattern of FDI ............................................................................................. 14 2.3.3 Why FDI when profitable and less riskier alternatives exist? ........................... 15
2.3.4 Benefits and costs of FDI ................................................................................... 15 2.4 Exporting and licensing ............................................................................................ 16
2.4.1 Exporting ........................................................................................................... 16 2.4.2 Licensing ............................................................................................................ 17
2.5 First mover-advantages ............................................................................................. 18 2.6 Economies of scale ................................................................................................... 18 2.7 The Uppsala model ................................................................................................... 19
2.8 Summary of theories ................................................................................................. 19 3. Methodological considerations and research techniques ............................................ 22
3.1 Choice of methodology ............................................................................................. 22 3.2 Atlas Copco, Atsoko, Findus and Samres ................................................................. 22
3.2.1 Data collection ................................................................................................... 23
3.3 Operationalization ..................................................................................................... 24
4. Empirical findings ....................................................................................................... 27 4.1 Atlas Copco ............................................................................................................... 27
4.1.1 Atlas Copco’s strategy ....................................................................................... 27
4.1.2 Atlas Copco’s target groups and competitors ................................................... 28 4.1.3 Experienced difficulties and obstacles ............................................................... 28
4.1.4 Lessons learnt from previous expansions and predictions of the future............ 29 4.2 Atsoko ....................................................................................................................... 29
4.2.1 Atsoko’s strategy ................................................................................................ 29
4.2.2 Atsoko’s target group and competitors .............................................................. 30 4.2.3 Experienced difficulties and obstacles ............................................................... 30
4.2.4 Atsoko’s predictions of the future ...................................................................... 30 4.3 Findus Sweden AB ................................................................................................... 31
4.3.1 Findus’ strategy ................................................................................................. 31 4.3.2 Findus’ target group and competitors ............................................................... 31 4.3.3 Experiences difficulties and obstacles ............................................................... 32 4.3.4 Lessons learnt from previous expansions and Findus’ predictions of the future
.................................................................................................................................... 32
4.4 Samres ....................................................................................................................... 32 4.4.1 Samres’ strategy ................................................................................................ 32
4.4.2 Samres’ target group and competitors .............................................................. 33
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4.4.3 Experienced difficulties and obstacles ............................................................... 33
4.4.4 Lessons learnt from previous expansions and Samres’ predictions of the future
.................................................................................................................................... 33 5. Analysis ...................................................................................................................... 35
5.1 Analysis of Atlas Copco ........................................................................................... 35 5.2 Atsoko ....................................................................................................................... 36 5.3 Findus Sweden AB ................................................................................................... 37 5.4 Samres ....................................................................................................................... 39 5.5 Comparison of analyses ............................................................................................ 40
6. Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 44 6.1 Summary and concluding discussion ........................................................................ 44 6.2 Critical review ........................................................................................................... 44
6.3 Ethical aspects ........................................................................................................... 45
6.4 Limitations ................................................................................................................ 45
6.5 Further research ........................................................................................................ 46
Bibliography ................................................................................................................... 47
Appendices
Appendix 1: Interview guide ........................................................................................... 51 Appendix 2: Interview questions .................................................................................... 52
Appendix 3: Interviews ................................................................................................... 54 Appendix 3.1 Interview 1, Lina Jorheden, Business controller, Atlas Copco ............ 54 Appendix 3.2 Interview 2, Björn Falk, CEO, Samres ................................................. 58
Appendix 3.3 Interview 3, Mats Jörnell, Head of export, Findus Sweden AB ............ 66 Appendix 3.4 Interview 4, Marie Englesson, CEO, Atsoko ........................................ 73
List of figures Figure 1.1 Abductive research process ............................................................................. 9
Figure 2.1 A decision framework ................................................................................... 18
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1. Introduction
In this chapter, the dissertation will be introduced. In addition, the purpose, research
questions, research philosophy and research approach will be presented. Finally,
theoretical limitations and outline will be described.
“Foreign direct investment in Africa -- which can make an
important contribution to the economic development of the
continent-- has increased only modestly in recent years, as the
image of Africa among many foreign investors still tends to be one
of a continent associated mainly with political turmoil, economic
instability, diseases and natural disasters”. – United Nations (1999
p. IV)
Even though international trade has existed for many, many decades, its significance for
the current global economy has increased lately. There are many upcoming economies
on the horizon – such as Brazil, India, China and many countries in Africa. Some of the
up and rising economies in Africa include Rwanda, Tanzania, Senegal and South
Africa. With China showing an impressive GDP rate of 10.3% during the second
quarter of 2010 despite the global recession of 2009, many nations will wish to copy
their winning formula (CNN, 2010). Furthermore, Brazil is also displaying impressive
growth rates, recently over passing the UK to be the sixth largest economy (The
Guardian, 2011). However, Brazil is still struggling to maintain its middleclass, with
many immigrating to Europe. If they can find a solution to the scarcity of jobs in the
middleclass, many experts believe Brazil can climb even higher up the ladder (BBC,
2012). Another up and rising player in the global economy is India. Being labor
intensive and cost effective, India has developed greatly in recent decades. Even though
they have suffered from domestic issues, that have affected the growth negatively, IMF
is still anticipating a growth of 6.9% in 2012, according to Business Standard (2012).
Furthermore, the African market has not received as much attention as it perhaps
deserves, being plagued by political and economic instability for many years which
keeps foreign investors away. We find it interesting to see as to why such a rich
continent of natural resources and labor force has been overlooked. These emerging
economies create many new possibilities for companies wishing to expand their
markets.
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Since we believe the African market offers a lot of opportunities for companies to take
advantage of, along with being relatively unexplored, we chose to focus on this
continent. Also, many of the internationalization theories explained in later chapters
have been used in expansions to Asia as well as other foreign markets before.
Therefore, we wonder if these are applicable to companies’ expansions towards an
unexplored African market today. Furthermore, we are going to focus on growing
economies such as Tanzania, Rwanda, South Africa and Senegal (Regeringen, 2011).
Most of these countries are dominated by great poverty and rely a lot on their exports,
where over 80% is exported to non-African countries (Regeringen, 2011). South Africa
is the country that has developed the most out of these four. Studying a relatively
developed country, such as South Africa, along with developing countries, as the other
three, will perhaps offer us deeper understanding of our research question. Also,
comparing countries in different phases of internationalization and development may
offer different answers or patterns. At this time, there are already a few Swedish
companies in a variety of industries located in these countries, which make these
countries specifically interesting. It would be completely unnecessary investigating
countries where Swedish companies are absent.
To expand globally is of significant interest for many companies today. A new trend
when it comes to global investment flows is mostly in FDI in developing countries
(Cotton & Ramachandran, 2001). According to Cotton et al. (2001), one of the most
important reasons behind the development of the global economy is the increased
participation of developing countries in foreign investment. With the world constantly
growing more global, many firms experience that their domestic market is too limited
for them. This creates an incentive to expand to new markets abroad where the firms’
supply meets the consumers’ demand.
There are different methods the firms can use to enter foreign markets and they all bear
different risks and costs. We are focusing on three different alternatives; Foreign Direct
Investment (FDI), exporting and licensing. An important factor to take into account
when entering a new market is the timing of entry. The theory of first mover-advantages
will be developed in the next chapter when we describe the choices of theory.
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The latest decade the aim has been focused on Asia when handling with FDI and
expanding abroad. Many companies have relocated their companies there or exported to
those locations. We want to see if Africa can offer the same array of opportunities as the
Asian market has shown. The history of good experience when establishing in Asia
brings good strength to continue establish in developing countries and lowering the
resource gap (United Nations, 2005). Furthermore, in a world economy where
cooperation’s are constantly seeking new places to conduct their businesses, the
emerging African market will probably be in the scope of many firms in the time to
come.
For the dissertation we want to see how Swedish companies can develop and survive in
a relatively new market. Swedish firms have the latest decades expanded to new foreign
markets and the Asian markets have lately been of high interest for many of them.
Many firms take the opportunity to absorb the competence and technology that other
countries have. One large market that is relatively undeveloped is the African one. This
is why we choose to look at the Swedish companies and in which ways they can, and
how they actually do, establish themselves in this region, more specifically in the ones
we have named above. The outcome of this dissertation will shed some light on how
Swedish companies are expanding to African markets.
1.2 Purpose
The purpose of this thesis is to explore how Swedish firms can establish themselves in a
new market and if they are following the traditional internationalization theories. We
are focusing on the African market, and more specifically in South Africa, Tanzania,
Rwanda and Senegal. It is no secret that firms wish to expand their businesses to new
markets to reach more consumers. Then, what is the best possible way for a Swedish
company to enter the African market? Is there a specific industry that is more suitable
for those markets than others? Is expansion to Africa more suitable for SMEs (Small
and Medium Enterprises) or large corporations? The outcome of our research will
highlight significant factors that Swedish firms need to consider before entering these
new markets, as well as after to be able to survive.
1.3 Research questions
To what extent are Swedish companies following the traditional internationalization
theories when entering Africa?
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- Are the traditional internationalization theories still applicable to new companies?
1.4 Research philosophy
Interpretivism claims that the social life is far too complex to be generalized into law-
like assumptions, contrary to what the positivistic approach argues (Saunders, Lewis &
Thornhill, 2009). This ideology focuses on the human factor, rather than items
(Saunders et al., 2009). We have chosen the interprevistic approach, since our aim of
this dissertation is to see the emerging patterns of Swedish firms trying to establish
themselves in Senegal, Rwanda, Tanzania and South Africa. This is because we believe
that it is not sufficient to simplify this problem by creating a general model for Swedish
firm to follow. We believe that many factors can influence a Swedish firm’s chances in
Africa. Furthermore, we are of the opinion that we will gain a deeper understanding of
the firms’ reasoning by doing personal interviews. Basically, a complex topic like ours,
calls for the interprevistic approach.
1.5 Research approach
This dissertation has an abductive research approach. The dissertation is based on the
collection of qualitative interviews, which makes this approach suitable. Abductive
research, as shown in Figure 1.1, begins with examining existing theories. The middle
stages of the abductive research approach is matching these old theories with new ones,
and applying this onto real-life observations. After this point, a conclusion is drawn,
where an assumption or something similar to a generalization is created. Since it is
impossible to say that any Swedish company is applicable to the conclusions of a
qualitative study, due to the fact that only a limited number of companies are examined,
an abductive research approach is appropriate.
Figure 1.1 Abductive research process
(International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics Management)
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1.6 Theoretical limitations
Our dissertation is focusing on the different entering modes a firm can use for
penetrating a new market and which modes they are actually using. Thus, our
theoretical limitations will be restricted to theories dealing with companies expanding
internationally. To examine the whole African market would make the dissertation to
broad. Consequently, we have chosen to focus on Rwanda, Tanzania, South Africa and
Senegal.
1.7 Outline
This dissertation is divided into six major chapters. The first chapter introduces the
dissertation, declares the research purpose and research question. This chapter ends with
a short discussion of theoretical limitations. The second chapter introduces our choice of
theories and ends with a summary and conclusion of these. The third chapter presents
our research philosophy, research approach and an introduction of our examined
companies. Also, our choice of operationalization is described. Chapter four is
describing our empirical findings from our conducted interviews. Chapter five analyzes
chapter four’s findings and ends with a short summary. Chapter six consists of a
concluding discussion, limitations, further research and critical review.
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2. Theoretical framework This chapter will present an introduction of the reviewed literature. Additionally,
traditional as well as new internationalization theories that are relevant to this
dissertation will be presented. Finally, a summary of these theories will be found as
well.
2.1 Introduction
Traditional internationalization theories consider how establishment abroad can be
achieved. FDI, exporting, first mover-advantages and economies of scale are examples
of traditional internationalization theories. The reason why we choose to focus on these
is because we think they are the most central ones to our research question and
dissertation. These theories describe different methods used and possibilities required to
branch out to new markets.
Previous research discusses how companies reason when choosing their mode of entry.
When firms choose their mode of entry, they make the important choice of how to
market their product. This can be an important process when it comes to a firm’s
survival in the foreign market (Eckeledo & Sivakumar, 2004). According to Dunning &
Lundan (2008), three factors conclude what entry mode a company should undertake.
These are ownership-specific advantages, location factors and internalization factors;
the OLI-model. They find that the required level of local representation from the
company is decisive when choosing mode of entry. Also, determining factors include
firm specific assets and how these assets are used. It is argued by Dunning et al. (2008)
that the more a company fills these criteria; a wholly owned subsidiary is preferred. In
other words, a more active mode of entry is preferred when a high level of commitment
is necessary, suggestively FDI. Furthermore, depending on certain company goods and
assets, a certain mode of entry is of interest. For instance, if the company is in the heavy
machinery industry, export is probably not of interest, because of expensive transport
costs. If this is the case, a firm may opt to move production to the desired country.
Further research (Buch & Lipponer, 2007) argues that FDI and export should be
considered as complements rather than substitutes. This suggests that the decision is not
an absolute, and that a company may well conduct both strategies.
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2.2 Choice of theory
There are already some established modes of entry a company can use to
internationalize and expand to another country or market. The methods we think are the
most important are the ones that are covered in the following subchapters. There are of
course some theories that are more relevant to our research than others. To be able to
answer our research questions properly, we will not look to models that explain
international trade. Instead, we will focus on models that deal with internationalization
and expansion abroad. Therefore, we have chosen theories such as FDI, licensing,
exporting, first-mover advantages and economies of scale. We will use these theories as
a foundation to our dissertation. Usually, a firm is facing a decision whether to directly
invest in a foreign market, export or license its products. This is the main reason why
we chose these three modes of entry as a base. Additionally, a firm will seek to seize
certain advantages towards its competitors, and the theories of scale economies and
first-mover advantages can be used as a tool in this case. This is why we choose to
focus on the previously mentioned theories, since they are very much likely to be used
for an internationalizing company. Any further theory that could be of use is based on
these traditional theories.
2.3 Foreign Direct Investment
FDI is when a firm can choose to directly invest in a foreign firm either through
purchasing a certain percentage of that firm, or acquire the whole firm entirely. Either
way the firm chooses, the purchasing firm is facing a big risk since this method can be
very expensive (MSNBC, 2006). Also, a firm can choose to open their own factory in
another country – a so called Greenfield investment. Even if FDI is a high risk and high
cost-method it has in recent decades become more and more of a useful tool for firms to
expand abroad, whether to a bordering market or further away. FDI has become
something of an alternative to international trade, which allows businesses to expand.
This method has increased highly the past decades and in 1998 it stood for more than
half of all the private capital flows to developing countries (Alfaro, Chanda, Kalemli-
Ozcan & Sayek, 2004). This is clearly shown from recent studies when displaying the
figures of this increase. The average outflow of FDI has been raised from $25 billion in
1975 to $1.4 trillion in 2000, only to fall down to some degrees the following years and
then skyrocket up to a staggering $1.8 trillion in 2007 (McGraw-Hill, 2011). The almost
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insane growth of FDI has even outgrown the increase rate of world trade itself, with
FDI showing a growth of eight times itself from 1992 to 2008, while the world trade
“only” had an increase of 1.5 times during the same period of time. The FDI stock has
by 2008 exceeded $15 trillion, which is the accumulated amount over the years
(McGraw-Hill, 2011). These figures represent the impact of FDI in the global economy
With foreign capital entering a developing market, important feats can be obtained by
the host country. To continue to grow as a country, it is important to be open to
developments and new challenges. Nowadays, most developing countries welcome
foreign capital as it is closely linked to a countries economic growth (Alfaro et al.,
2004). FDI is a necessary driver in a developing country’s economic growth (United
Nations, 2003). Furthermore, even though Africa possesses a rich variety of natural
resources, it has not attracted as much FDI as one would predict. This indicates that it
requires more to attract foreign capital, namely political and macroeconomic stability
(Musila & Sigué, 2006).
2.3.1 Acquisitions and Greenfield investments
When a firm is entering a new market abroad through FDI, either an acquisition of an
existing firm or a Greenfield (also known as “organic acquisition”) investment is
possible. When establishing a firm abroad, the costs increase more than if the firm
would be producing in the home country, mostly because of lesser knowledge about the
market (Görg, 2000). An acquisition of an already existing firm is when a company
purchases a certain percentage of that firm, or the whole firm entirely. A large part of all
FDI inflow consists of mergers and acquisitions, namely 89% as of 2007 (United
Nations, 2007). However, in developing countries, the ratio of mergers and acquisition
is not as high. Granted, this is simply because there are not that many firms to be
acquired in this limited, however growing market. As that market is growing, the
number of firms will also grow, which will in turn lead to more mergers and
acquisitions.
However, when conducting Greenfield investment, the firms get the chance to build up
their own companies on the new market. The firms have their own businesses, but they
only have their own knowledge. With this form of FDI, the firms have to start from zero
and work their way up in the industries. This kind of method takes more time and effort
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and to succeed they need great knowledge about the new market. Since every market
has its own culture, it could be difficult to get established without the right knowledge
and competence. This is a reason why many firms fail when conducting Greenfield
investments (Wang, 2009). Wang (2009) continues to say that it is hard to transfer
certain company culture and organizational style when merging with a local firm.
Therefore, it would be easier to invest organically if company culture and so on are of
importance. Generally, firms opt for a merger or an acquisition rather than an organic
investment due to several factors. Firstly, it is a lot faster to acquire an existing firm
than to open up an own factory. Secondly, many firms believe that if they do not
acquire a local firm, their competitors will. For instance, in an oligopoly, it is common
that competitors follow each other’s steps. A firm can simply not afford not to imitate
the competitors’ moves, since it could lose its position in the market. Usually, the
oligopoly-case deals with price-rises and price-cuts, but the general behavior can be
compared with the pattern of FDI. Thirdly, foreign firms are likely to possess valuable
strategic assets, such as brand loyalty, customer relationships, patents, distribution
systems and production systems, and so on (McGraw-Hill, 2011). Assets like these are
not easily created without the proper knowledge about the market culture or market
demand, which a foreign firm is likely to possess.
2.3.2 The pattern of FDI
The theories of strategic behavior and the product life cycle can explain why and how
firms conduct FDI. As discussed before, in an oligopoly, it is crucial to keep up with the
moves of the competitors to not lose advantages. This example is applicable when
generalizing the pattern of FDI. A firm is almost forced to acquire foreign firms if they
want to keep up in the global market. If they do not, their lack of activity will weaken
their position. According to Vernon (1966), the product life cycle theory tells us that a
firm will invest in a foreign market when production has been standardized and when
that market has grown large enough to be able to support local production. Practically,
this means that a firm that used to produce a certain product in its own country will seek
to put production in another country where production costs and labor costs are cheaper.
In other words, the same good that used to be produced domestically and exported is
now being produced abroad and imported. Furthermore, it is safe to say that the labor is
cheaper than in Sweden, which suggests Swedish companies will look to invest there.
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However, recent studies claim that something called political and economic nationalism
can hinder FDI. Political nationalism is an increasing problem because of the difference
in language and religions (Johnson, 1965). According to Akhter (2007) the economic
nationalism in today’s global world can be hazardous for enterprises. Boycotting of
foreign products and denying the access of foreign suppliers have led to warnings of the
increasing economic nationalism in the European Union. According to Jakobsen and
Jakobsen (2011) this phenomena will always exist, even when openness towards FDI is
constantly spreading around developing nations. All in all, this should not stop the
development of FDI into Africa, since the links in between economic growth and FDI
are well established in most cases (Alguacil, Cuadros & Orts, 2010).
2.3.3 Why FDI when profitable and less riskier alternatives exist?
As we will show in the coming chapters, exporting and licensing are significantly
cheaper and less risky alternatives to FDI. As mentioned earlier, FDI could be very
expensive. Not only does a firm have to purchase another firm, other costs come along.
Additionally, lack of knowledge of market culture is a constant risk a firm is facing
when entering a foreign market. These two risks can eliminate the firm’s chances to get
established, if not managed carefully.
2.3.4 Benefits and costs of FDI
It takes two parties for FDI to occur; one giving nation and one receiving nation. Within
the dynamics of FDI, there are different benefits and costs depending on if the nation is
a giver or receiver. The receiving nation will benefit from transfer of resources,
employment effects, balance-of-payment effects, and effects on competition and
economic growth (Alfaro et al., 2004). In short, the presence of foreign businesses will
lead to an increase in competition and, thus, an increase in the quality and variety of
goods produced. However, the receiving country will also suffer some setbacks from
the presence of foreign capital. The backsides of receiving FDI are adverse effects on
competition domestically, adverse effects on balance of payments (also widely known
as trade deficit) and the seeming loss of national sovereignty and autonomy (McGraw-
Hill, 2011).
Furthermore, the company that is conducting outward FDI is also facing certain costs
and benefits. The benefits can be summarized into three parts. Firstly, an increase in
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foreign earnings from FDI will naturally be beneficial. Secondly, an increase in
employment will also give the company conducting outward FDI an extra boost.
Thirdly and finally, it is possible to gain important knowledge from a foreign market in
terms of production and management through outward FDI (Renard, 2011). By being
present in a foreign market, it is possible to absorb these feats. On the contrary, there are
naturally costs of conducting outward FDI. Firstly, it is risky and expensive in the
beginning when investing in a foreign market or company. It takes some time before
returns on investment will pay off. Secondly, since FDI is an alternative, or at least a
complement, to exporting, the very presence of the company in a foreign market will
result in a drop in exports instead. It comes as no surprise that there are both pros and
cons with FDI.
2.4 Exporting and licensing
When a firm wants to expand internationally without risking a lot beforehand, either
exporting or licensing is a good option.
2.4.1 Exporting
Exporting is when a firm is producing at home and shipping them to a buyer abroad.
Thus, production costs and transportation costs are the only major concerns for an
exporting firm. To make matters easier, the exporting company can hire a native sales
agent in the importing country. Hopefully, this will eliminate any cultural differences
that may hinder the business. It has been argued by Decker and Zhao (2004) that
cultural differences may lure companies away from the opportunity to export. They
continue to conclude that the cultural differences factor is important in the decision
process, however not decisive.
When a foreign firm exports on a new market it often brings out new knowledge to the
market. Knowledge as marketing and technology is important and this could help the
host country to increase their export competitiveness (Cotton et al., 2001). Exporting is
also a positive method when the firm’s products are of low weight. Naturally, the
transportation becomes more expensive when shipping heavier goods. On the contrary,
trade barriers, such as quotas or tariffs, make exporting less attractive, regardless of
weight. Trade barriers often lead from exporting to FDI or licensing. Also,
governmental interventions can either promote or dampen import/export. The United
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States’ import quota on Japanese cars in the 1980s and 1990s led to an increase of FDI
from Japan instead (McGraw-Hill, 2011).
2.4.2 Licensing
A licensing contract is an agreement in which another party is allowed to produce and
sell a company’s products. Valuable know-how and secret company knowledge is at
risk when allowing another company to produce and sell its products. Sometimes, a firm
is successful due to a secret recipe or a certain production method. When this is shared
in between companies, this may be copied and then used to the original company’s
despair. If it is impossible to protect the know-how under licensing, FDI will be
selected. Also, a firm loses its tight control over production, marketing and management
when licensing. It is also a possibility that a reason why a company is successful is due
to its specific manner of how the business is run. If tight control is lost, the profitability
might drop. Finally, when a company’s know-how is difficult to transfer through
licensing, this method will look unattractive to companies (McGraw-Hill, 2011).
Figure 2.1 below is easily illustrating a suggestion of the different steps in a company’s
process of deciding whether to export, license or directly invest in a foreign market.
According to this figure, export is only lucrative when transportation costs and tariffs
are low. Meanwhile, licensing is only an attractive option if important company know-
how is safe and well-protected under the licensing contract. In addition, if tight control
over the firm is necessary, it is better to do FDI rather than export or license.
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Figure 2.1 A decision framework
(Based on: McGraw-Hill, Irwin, International Business, 2011, p.258)
2.5 First mover-advantages
As we briefly mentioned in the introduction chapter, the timing of entry in a new market
could be crucial. Preferably, a company will seek to develop strong customer-relations
and establish a strong brand name. When this has occurred, it will be hard for a later
industry-entrant to penetrate that market (McGraw-Hill, 2011). It has been argued that
certain products have a greater tendency to create a first-mover advantage than others
(Zantout & Chaganti, 1996). It is important for a firm to always be one step ahead and
offer good products to stay on the foreign market (Rhaman & Bhattacharyya, 2003).
According to Chen & Pereira (1999), a pioneering brand has long-term market share
advantages. However, it is no guarantee that a first-mover will be successful; as an early
industry-entrant may lack the proper skills, knowledge and, naturally, experience to
fully seize all the opportunities. A lesson could be learnt here for the next wave of
movers, and what pitfalls to avoid (CNN, 2006). There is no a guarantee to succeed as a
first-mover; an advantage in one country could be a disadvantage in another.
2.6 Economies of scale
The theory of economies of scale is closely related to the first mover-advantage theory.
If a company is established early in an emerging industry, it can seize economies of
19
scale and thus gain a huge advantage to future industry entrants. The theory of
economies of scale discusses that a firm can reduce its overall production costs by
spreading the fixed costs over a large number of produced goods (McGraw-Hill, 2011).
If a firm manages to both enter an industry in the early stages, and as well seize
economies of scale, that firm has gained a major advantage to its competitors. This can
be a great opportunity for Swedish firms if they take the step out and expand to African
developing countries. This model is perhaps more in touch with major production
companies, where a great output will spread the fixed cost over more units, rather than
service companies.
2.7 The Uppsala model
Many Swedish firms have been internationalized through this model. In short, the
model states that a firm will seek to penetrate a closely located foreign market through
export before expanding further away (Steen & Liesch, 2007). By following this
procedure, a company will gradually gain knowledge of foreign markets in order to
avoid certain pitfalls that we have mentioned earlier. An issue with the Uppsala model
is how this gradual expansion affects the companies’ investment behavior (Forsgren,
2002).
2.8 Summary of theories
We raise the question whether the previously mentioned theories are enough for a
Swedish company trying to enter the African market. First of all, the firms are facing a
decision whether to export, license or FDI, or perhaps do a little bit of everything. There
are numerous reasons and factors behind this choice, as we now know. According to
Figure 2.1, export is only necessary if transportation costs and trade barriers are low.
Additionally, if valuable and secret company know-how is impossible to withhold under
a licensing agreement, FDI should be selected. Subsequently, the firm will now have to
carefully consider all the aforementioned risks that bear with the decision of FDI, if they
should follow this figure. According to us, this figure is by no means an absolute and
should not be followed blindly by Swedish companies. The mode of entry a company
selects may defy this model, and still be successful.
FDI is usually the preferred option if tight control over management, marketing and
production is important, despite its higher costs and risks. Often, the management style
20
is the key to success and this is hard to duplicate. On the contrary, a successful product
is much easier to copy in production than something as abstract as a way of managing
the firm. Since the African market is considered as an emerging one, we argue that
certain opportunities must be seized in order to tackle competitors in the very
beginning. This is where theories such as economies of scale and first mover-
advantages come in. In order to gain a favorable strategic market position, these
opportunities must be taken advantage of.
To our knowledge, there is no evident research investigating Swedish companies’
possibilities in South Africa, Rwanda, Tanzania and Senegal. Furthermore, it is by no
means a certainty that the traditional internationalization theories offer enough of an
explanation for these firms’ establishment in these countries. Since the aim of this
dissertation is to find out how Swedish firms have made themselves successful in
Africa, how they achieved it and how future companies from Sweden may do it, it is
necessary to investigate the traditional methods of internationalization. It is an
interesting thing to investigate if Swedish companies fulfill the criteria created by
Dunning et al. (2008), regarding what mode of entry to choose. Another interesting
angle is to find out if the conclusion made by Buch et al. (2004) is a possibility, namely
that a Swedish company may use both export and FDI, instead of just choosing one of
the two.
While internationalization is heading towards developing countries (Alfaro et al., 2004),
there are many obstacles and threats to overcome along the way (Musila et al., 2006).
Recent studies show that economic nationalism may block many companies from
expanding towards certain countries (Akther, 2007). According to Decker et al., (2004),
cultural differences may as well lure exporters away, which makes the preparations
before expanding all the more important since it is a lot riskier. These issues are not
examined when simply studying the traditional internationalization theories. Therefore,
it is necessary to personally investigate some companies that have actually faced and
overcome these problems. This dissertation will provide a unique perspective as to how
Swedish firms have been, and are, reasoning when trying to enter these African nations.
Again, to our knowledge, there is no dissertation that has covered this topic. Moreover,
we ask if the traditional internationalization theories are sufficient when trying to
understand how Swedish firms have expanded to Rwanda, Tanzania, South Africa and
21
Senegal since they offer very broad suggestions. Finally, our dissertation will contribute
to new research on this field for a couple of reasons. Firstly, the outcome of this thesis
will highlight to what degree a Swedish firm is following the traditional
internationalization theories when entering the African market. This has not been
covered before. Existing research has been directed mainly to the Asian market.
Therefore, this dissertation will offer a possible comparison of how a Swedish firm is
internationalizing in Asia and in Africa. Secondly, the outcome of this thesis will also
give us an answer as to whether the traditional internationalization theories are enough,
or if a Swedish firm is perhaps using different, nonconventional internationalization
theories. Together, these two reasons will make this dissertation useful for further
research as well as offering an interesting answer to our research question. Furthermore,
we raise the question whether new companies may follow the traditional
internationalization theories, or if they internationalize in other ways.
22
3. Methodological considerations and research
techniques The third chapter of the dissertation presents the methods used in the study. In this chapter,
choice of methodology and selected companies is presented. Furthermore,
operationalization, trustworthiness, authenticity and generalizability is presented.
3.1 Choice of methodology
The largest part of our dissertation will be conducted by collecting primary data,
sampled from interviews with appropriate firms. When collecting secondary data, you
are to a great extent forced to like what you find. While, making qualitative interviews
with relevant companies, we can get broader information and answers which will help
our dissertation develop. By using the traditional theories as a frame and by asking
questions about the theories in the interviews, we predict to find some differences when
entering a new market and some new perspectives about establishing in a foreign
market. We searched online for Swedish companies active in Africa and found many
interesting prospects. We e-mailed the ones we thought were appealing to our research
and briefly introduced ourselves and our project. The responses we got were very
positive and the respondents thought our topic was interesting. Subsequently, we made
all the necessary arrangements for our interviews, i.e. decided dates and how the
interview should be conducted (personal meeting, telephone/Skype or e-mail).
We have conducted interviews with both established Swedish companies as well as
newcomers in the African market. We wanted to investigate how they got there and why
they are there. Moreover, we will also look to companies who might just be beginning
to expand to Africa. We have chosen to gather our data through interviews made face to
face, if possible. A focal point when doing our interviews has been to make the
respondent develop his or her answers to allow us to get a deeper understanding to our
research questions. Since some of our respondents are located abroad or too far away
from us, Skype has also been used.
3.2 Atlas Copco, Atsoko, Findus and Samres
As the heading above reveals, these are the companies we have interviewed to examine
how Swedish firms have established themselves and how they will try to establish
23
themselves in Africa. All four companies operate in different industries; mining,
cosmetics, food and services. Also, they are in different stages in their
internationalization process, which is interesting because it allows us to see if they
follow the same pattern as the already established ones, as well as the
internationalization theories discussed in the literature chapter. Furthermore, these
companies are of different size, with some being rather large while others are smaller.
We do not argue that the outcome of this research based solely on these four companies
is applicable to any Swedish company, since every company is unique with different
company culture, management and so on. However, it is possible to study how these
companies are internationalizing and later compare with other similar ones and see if a
mutual pattern is found. Also, since we ask “To what extent are Swedish companies
following the traditional internationalization theories when entering Africa?”, we
believe an answer is possible to find from all four companies. Again, the outcome of
this thesis is based on these companies’ experiences, and is perhaps not applicable to
any other company. However, we still believe lessons could be learnt for future
companies wishing to internationalize in similar ways, and thus is our research question
possible to answer through these four companies.
3.2.1 Data collection
Two out of four interviews were conducted face to face with the respondent. This
allowed us to have a more natural conversation where we could ask counter questions
based on the respondent’s answers, which is not possible if a questionnaire is sent out.
The other two interviews were made over the phone, due to distance issues. Similarly,
doing an interview over the phone, also allows us to have a more personal touch to the
interview, rather than a questionnaire or a chat-interview. Moreover, a live interview
allows us to further explain the questions to the respondent if they are misunderstood or
perhaps badly written. As mentioned earlier, we opted for a looser structure when doing
our interviews, since we preferred to let the respondent speak freely. The method we
used is often called a semi-structured interview, where a list of questions is being used
as a reference point by the interviewer. The interviewee is granted a rather free space
anyway, but the interviewer is always seeking to follow the reference questions. Also,
during the interview, the interviewer will ask follow-up questions that he or she finds
important based on the respondent’s answers (Bryman and Bell, 2011).
24
3.3 Operationalization
As stated before, our aim is to find out how Swedish companies reason when deciding
to expand to Africa. When we contacted our respondents’ companies the very first time,
we introduced ourselves and what we were doing, and asked if we could speak to
someone with the proper knowledge of this topic. Out of four respondents, two were
CEOs of their respective companies. The other two were perhaps not the head of the
entire company, but they still possessed the relevant knowledge and experience to be
able to provide our dissertation with interesting and enlightening responses.
Furthermore, they were higher up the hierarchy than just a mere employee – namely
head of exports and business controller respectively.
The first interview we carried out was with Lina Jorheden1, the Head of Funding and
Financial strategy at Atlas Copco, a large industrial company. This interview was made
over Skype since the respondent was located in Tanzania. Atlas Copco has been
operating in Africa since the 1920s, and, therefore, some of our questions had to be
altered to be applicable to current research. To examine Atlas Copco was very
interesting due to the fact that they are an established player in Africa, and also a very
large one. The respondent from Atlas Copco has been working there since 2010 and had
very interesting information, to be revealed in later chapters.
The second interview was with Björn Falk2, the CEO of Samres, a call center company
based in Lund. They recently gained positive attention in Swedish media for teaching
Swedish to potential employees in Senegal, to be able to receive calls from Sweden
(Expressen, 2012). Basically, when an elderly person calls for a transportation service,
the phone call is answered in Senegal by Samres employees. A recent rising
phenomenon has been the export of services, rather than goods. According to us, this
makes Samres a very interesting case study.
The third interview was conducted in Bjuv with frozen food and vegetables company
Findus. This interview was at the headquarters of Findus in Bjuv. Our respondent is
named Mats Jörnell3 and he is the Head of export of Findus Sweden, which belongs to
the Nordic cluster of Findus. Along with two other European clusters, they become
Findus Group. Findus Group is a leading player in the frozen food industry. Since our
1 Lina Jorheden, Business controller, Atlas Copcp, interview 17 May 2012
2 Björn Falk, CEO, Samres, interview 21 May 2012
3 Mats Jörnell, Head of export, Findus Sweden AB, interview 23 May 2012
25
focus in this dissertation is Africa, we will only focus on Findus Sweden and their
factory in Bjuv. This factory produces the entire assortment of products, and they export
to South Africa. This is why this specific factory is relevant to our study. Also, it was a
fortunate coincidence that this factory was close to Kristianstad. As was confirmed in
our interview with the head of export, Findus has only been on the market in South
Africa a little over three weeks, as of late May. It was very interesting listening to Mats
Jörnell, since he possessed significant knowledge about Findus’ activities in its
internationalization to South Africa.
Our fourth and last interview was conducted over the phone with the founder of beauty
and cosmetics company Atsoko – Marie Englesson4. Atsoko is in its very beginning as a
company, and its only market is in Tanzania as well as in Rwanda. We were
recommended to talk to Marie Englesson through Lina Jorheden of Atlas Copco since
she thought, and we agreed, it would be a fitting company for our dissertation. Atsoko
completes this phase of our dissertation and we are very satisfied with all our
respondents’ answers as well as their cooperation.
We basically asked all four respondents the same questions, to be able to compare their
answers. Naturally, some further questions were introduced while conversing during the
interview. However, the questions we used as a foundation were all the same. Since we
wanted to know how long they have been operating on the African market, in whatever
country they were present in, this was a core question in our interviews. Knowing how
long a company has been active, it is possible to see if it follows traditional
internationalization theories or whether it defies them. Furthermore, another important
question we asked our respondents were if great planning before the decision of
entering one of these African countries was made. This is an interesting question to
investigate, since it could highlight why Africa was the target, instead of other emerging
economies. Moreover, we believe it would be interesting to know if there were any
significant obstacles along the way, since cultural and national differences are known
for being potential business obstructers. Further questions were asked to find out if the
company had learnt from potential previous mistakes when expanding internationally.
Also, how they think their markets will develop in the near future and how their
4 Marie Englesson, CEO, Atsoko, interview 23 May 2012
26
companies will adapt to those developments. Conclusively, these were the questions we
wanted to ask our respondents. For a full list of the interview questions and our
rationale behind them, see the appendix.
3.4 Trustworthiness, authenticity and generalizability
According to Bryman and Bell (2011), qualitative research is sometimes criticized for
being to subjective. Since the interviewers form their questions from what they think are
important and significant, the critics of the qualitative research claim this causes a
biased result. Thus, the results’ validity and reliability are questioned. Instead, different
criteria should be used as measurement when conducting qualitative research – namely
trustworthiness and authenticity. However, the authenticity criteria have not reached
wide popularity, and will therefore not be included here. Trustworthiness consists of
four subparts; credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability. Credibility
involves how the research has been conducted, i.e. in a good manner. Moreover,
transferability deals with the fact that qualitative research is focused more on depth
rather than width (Bryman et al., 2011). That is, fewer people are interviewed where a
deeper understanding of the research question is preferable. In other words, the outcome
of a qualitative research can be used as a base for further research. Dependability entails
that an auditor is being closely attached to the research process, during its entire time,
but more frequent towards the end. This is to see whether the researchers are conducting
their research properly and they are saving all records. This has not been a popular
method since it requires a great deal from the auditor (Bryman et al., 2011). Finally,
confirmability is dealing with the researchers’ objectiveness in the research.
Acknowledging that a complete and utter objectiveness is impossible, it is a good
measurement if the research has been conducted in good faith. These four parts sum up
the trustworthiness criteria.
We believe our research has been conducted in a trustworthy manner. First of all, this
dissertation is supported by relevant scientific articles. Secondly, there is room for
future researchers to base their dissertations on our paper, which makes this dissertation
transferable. Thirdly, we have been keeping regular contact with our tutor, who has
supervised this whole dissertation, guiding us to the right path. Finally, we have been
objective towards our topic, since our research question and interview questions have
been open ended as well as neutral.
27
Moving on to the generalizability criteria of qualitative research, it is being argued that
the conclusion of a small number of interviews is insufficient to be able to create a law-
like generalization. Of course, the respondents in our interviews are not supposed to
represent a wide population or segment. However, there are quite interesting things to
learn and apply to other cases, despite the limited number of samples. Bryman et al.
(2011) states that “it is the quality of the theoretical inferences that are made out of
qualitative data that is crucial to the assessment of generalization” (qtd. in Bryman &
Bell, 2011, p. ). In other words, it is possible to link the respondents’ answers to
theoretical conclusions and, thus, create something similar to a generalization.
4. Empirical findings
In this chapter, our findings will be presented. Descriptions of our respondents’
strategies, target group, competitors, experienced difficulties and predictions about the
future are presented.
4.1 Atlas Copco
Atlas Copco is a Swedish industrial company operating in the mining industry of
Tanzania. Already in 1920, Atlas Copco established their company on the African
market. The Tanzanian market offers great mining possibilities and the East African
market is the biggest reason why Atlas Copco got established there. Today Atlas Copco
is established in 80 different markets and the company sells their products to more than
170 countries. The company is still growing and this shows from the opening of new
factories in Senegal, Mozambique, Mali and Burkina Faso.
4.1.1 Atlas Copco’s strategy
Since Atlas Copco has been present in Africa for almost a century, they are well aware
of how to expand on the African markets. Every year they are establishing a new
industry and most of their expansion is in Africa. One third of Atlas Copco’s expansion
is from acquisitions, when they buy companies who possess important technology or
products. An important acquisition was when the company bought Dynapac, a road
construction company. The other two thirds of Atlas Copco’s expansion are from
28
organic investment, when they open up an industry and let another company take care
of it. This is done as opposed to sending down a project group from Sweden. When
giving managers, who possess local market expertise, responsibilities, it eliminates the
potential problem of insufficient local market competence. When that industry has
matured and they have reached their target group, Atlas Copco will move their legal
units and management there and take over.
4.1.2 Atlas Copco’s target groups and competitors
Many of Atlas Copco’s clients are international companies. They use the African
market to widen their business activities. Atlas Copco only produces a small part of its
entire sales. The major part is sold on from import, where China and India are
significant importers. Since mining is the largest industry in Tanzania, there are also
other companies present there. Some of the biggest companies and exporters have also
seen the great opportunity of mining and expanded to the Tanzanian market. Some of
the biggest are from Canada and they have been there for 10-15 years.
4.1.3 Experienced difficulties and obstacles
When we asked Lina Jorheden about the potential difficulties and business obstacles in
Tanzania, she offered a couple of answers. She testified that it is very difficult to run an
operation in Tanzania from a remote location, which is the main why Atlas Copco have
60 managers, or so, on the location site. Furthermore, Tanzania is still adapting to the
economic reforms done recently. The free market view is seen with skeptical eyes and
western companies are seen as capitalists profiting on the locals. Moreover, it is
sometimes a struggle for foreign enterprises to get the proper taxation forms and work
permits from the authorities. There are definitely differences in the way the market
economy is seen between authorities in Tanzania and in Sweden. Moving on, a positive
aspect is that Atlas Copco shares the same western values as most of their customers,
who mainly are large international companies. Because of this, business is conducted in
a legitimate manner and there is zero tolerance for corruption. This is not always the
case when dealing with local firms or companies from China and India, according to
Atlas Copco’s experience.
29
Unlike the situation in many South American countries, nationalizing industries is not a
threat in Tanzania. Instead, there are complicated laws regulating how a company may
conduct their business. There have been cases where mining companies have been
making deals with the Tanzanian government, with profitable terms (i.e. low taxation).
However, this is not how Atlas Copco has been conducting their business, which
perhaps has caused them some problems.
4.1.4 Lessons learnt from previous expansions and predictions of the future
According to Atlas Copco’s experience, expansions to markets where local market
knowledge is possessed, has been a key component in their internationalization process.
They prefer it this way, rather than sending down a project group who conduct the trial
and error-method. This makes the establishment process a lot easier, since cultural
differences and local demands are known.
Atlas Copco is hoping that the African market may follow the development of the
Chinese market, which has seen a very rapid growth. However, it is noted that there are
differences between Tanzania (and Africa in general) and China. Tanzania is still
ranked as one of the poorest countries in the world, and this is something that Atlas
Copco has noted. Furthermore, they believe that the force of globalization is strong
enough to include Africa with its rich variety of resources, both natural and human.
4.2 Atsoko
Atsoko is a newly started beauty and cosmetics company, only active since 2011. They
are operating in both Rwanda and Tanzania, exclusively. Atsoko’s target group is
women in Rwanda and Tanzania. The owner of the company, Marie Englesson, earlier
worked at a telecom company established in Africa and experienced all the
opportunities the African market displayed.
4.2.1 Atsoko’s strategy
Marie Englesson states that it is very hard to predict how things will develop in Africa
and, therefore, a plan is difficult to create as well as follow. She continued that Atsoko
has conducted a method called trial-and-error which means that they try out a product
30
and simply see if it sells. This is done, since it is very hard to plan everything in detail.
As a foreign company, it is hard to get work permits and leasing contracts
4.2.2 Atsoko’s target group and competitors
Since Atsoko is selling beauty and cosmetic products, they are focusing on women.
There are not many international or domestic competitors in this industry in these
countries. Mainly, the firms who operate in Atsoko’s markets are local companies.
However, a few Arabic and Indian businesses can be seen as a threat with similar
products. Conclusively, the competitors are only a small number, though
4.2.3 Experienced difficulties and obstacles
Atsoko has been experiencing that the lack of regulations of how business is to be
conducted has caused them some problems. Marie Englesson states that the rules are not
very clear and it is difficult to find people to trust as well as to work with. Furthermore,
the language barrier has also been an obstacle in Atsoko’s internationalization process,
since English is not spoken by everyone. Moreover, Marie Englesson believes that it is
important to be as straightforward, clear and simple as possible when doing business.
The cultural differences are a further obstacle, since it is hard to read people and
understand their intentions. These misunderstandings come from both parties since the
trust for the other party is lower when doing business than in other, more developed
economies. For instance, there are institutions and authorities in more advanced
countries that will take action if business is conducted illegally or appropriately. The
fact that a local investor is necessary by law when starting a company in Tanzania is
another difficulty the firm has faced.
4.2.4 Atsoko’s predictions of the future
Marie Englesson believes that Atsoko will adapt to the Rwandan and Tanzanian
markets. She continues to say that the company culture and company values have to fit
in these markets. When Atsoko has got further established in Rwanda and Tanzania,
markets in Ethiopia and Uganda will be of interest for potential expansion. Marie
Englesson also believes that these markets are suitable for many Swedish firms, since
Sweden is often faced with neutrality and positivism. Here are lessons to learn from
Dutch, French and British companies.
31
4.3 Findus Sweden AB
Findus is one of the most famous brands in Sweden. The company has three clusters,
Scandinavian, France-Spain and England-Ireland, and together they form Findus Group.
The company has 6000 employees and their primary products are frozen food, like
vegetables and fish. Findus Group is famous for their strong brand and their high quality
products. Findus is exporting their products to many different countries such as, China,
the US, Germany and Australia, and their latest big importer is South Africa.
4.3.1 Findus’ strategy
Findus started to make an analysis of different markets to see where their products
would suit, by investigate price levels and other important factors. Findus was first
approached by South African companies when they experienced shortcomings of
certain products. According to Mats Jörnell, one important factor in the decision of
expansion is to have a good partner and distributor. According to Findus’ experiences,
having a good business partner and distributor is vital when expanding. One of Findus’
old trading partners in South Africa helped them to find a retailer where Findus could
market their products. Mats Jörnell believes that a good dialogue between Findus and
the distributor will make the distributor work harder to market Findus’ products. A
competitive advantage of Findus is that they harvest high quality vegetables in Sweden
and only transport them a short distance to the freezer, where they are later exported.
According to Findus, they would lose their competitive advantage and argument if they
would harvest in South Africa instead of Sweden’s high quality soils. Findus does not
market themselves as a Swedish company. Instead, they state that they are now
available in South Africa. For instance, their slogan they used to market themselves in
South Africa was a play of words of their brand name – Find Us.
4.3.2 Findus’ target group and competitors
The American food company McCain is a large competitor to Findus in South Africa.
However, one of McCain’s competitive advantages is that they are competing with
lower price levels, while Findus competes with higher quality. Consequently, Findus’
target group is consumers who want to pay for high quality products. Other competitors
are local companies in South Africa. The government has campaigns for the local
brands, and this is something Findus respects.
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4.3.3 Experiences difficulties and obstacles
According to Mats Jörnell’s experience, finding a good distributor is a difficulty since
many have hard times keeping their promises and honoring their agreements. Moreover,
local regulations and laws have been an obstacle in Findus’ internationalization to South
Africa. This is where a good business partner can help Findus out and eliminate many
of these obstacles. Findus have experienced that there are specific demands of how the
package should be designed, depending on the content of the product.
4.3.4 Lessons learnt from previous expansions and Findus’ predictions of the future
Findus have experienced that their products need to have the taste of local cuisine if
they are to be successful. Additionally, the lack of a good distributor has hindered
Findus’ expansion to the Gulf area as well as to China. Furthermore, local regulations,
language barriers and cultural differences can obstruct internationalization, according to
Findus’ experiences.
Mats Jörnell believes that it is important to be careful when trying to predict the future
when dealing with new establishments such as this one. Even though Findus have been
receiving positive feedback from consumers, they have only been active a couple of
weeks. Mats Jörnell feels that it requires at least three months before it is possible
predict the future in further detail.
4.4 Samres
Samres is a call-center company, with the alignment of public transportation. Samres’
CEO is Björn Falk. They take care of the orders of transportation; they plan the trips
and take care of all the administration around this. They started in Sweden in 1993 and
have since that grown and expanded as a company. Samres began their
internationalization in 2005 when they expanded to Estonia. In 2008, they expanded to
the Moldavian market. By January 2012, they answered their first phone calls in their
office in Dakar, Senegal.
4.4.1 Samres’ strategy
After two successful expansions to Estonia and Moldavia, Samres saw that they had
great opportunities in foreign establishment. Samres conducted a survey to find
33
potential markets. They looked for a market in the same time zone and with good
technologic infrastructure. The crucial factor was that the location had a great
educational site. Consequently, Senegal was chosen. Furthermore, since Samres works
with administration of transportation in Sweden, it is important that the employees can
speak Swedish. Since English is not the primary language in Senegal, they required
people with at least two years of English education before they taught them Swedish.
Samres saw this skill as a measurement of how well applicants could learn a new
language. Samres is conducting their business as if it would have been conducted in
Sweden, and this is a big different from how local companies do.
4.4.2 Samres’ target group and competitors
Samres got the idea of expanding to Africa when they saw that other call-centers were
established there. French-speaking call-centers are established in North Africa and
Senegal, in addition to some English-speaking companies. One of the largest languages
in Africa is French, which makes it understandable why those corporations are on those
markets. However, while these corporations have many employees, Samres have a
different niche. They are a much smaller firm with a specific orientation. Between all
the competitors, Samres competes with higher salaries.
4.4.3 Experienced difficulties and obstacles
The largest concern for Samres has been that French is the primary language. It is only
the large, international companies that are fluent in English. Of course, a translator is a
possibility. However, Samres has experienced that this is time consuming as well as a
struggle since misinterpretations are possible. Since Samres rarely exports anything to
Senegal, issues such as tariffs, taxes and quotas have been absent. On the other hand,
arranging Swedish visas for the Senegalese workers have been a concern.
4.4.4 Lessons learnt from previous expansions and Samres’ predictions of the future
Björn Falk states that it is very important that the communication between the
management and the workers is clear, since one thing in Sweden can mean another
thing in Senegal. Samres has noticed that there are many different cultures, all being
different to another country’s culture. Consequently, this is why it is vital to have a
good understanding for each other.
34
Björn Falk is positive when it comes to the development of the African market. Since
immaterial products can be produced without large factories, more responsibility is put
on the employees and the management. Björn Falk thinks that this makes it possible to
put production almost anywhere, which in turn will allow Africa to grow faster than it
has grown on other markets. However, one potential blocker of economic growth is the
interventions of governments in certain countries.
35
5. Analysis Our analysis of our empirical findings is presented in this chapter. The chapter ends
with a comparison between the results.
5.1 Analysis of Atlas Copco
According to Dunning et al. (2008) a company will seek to conduct FDI if three
conditions are fulfilled. Since Atlas Copco is internationalizing mainly through FDI, it
is interesting to examine whether they follow these criteria. Firstly, the location in
Tanzania offers great mining possibilities since they possess these resources. Also, in
Atlas Copco’s experience, local representation in Tanzania is necessary. Previously, the
whole East African region reported to the headquarters in Kenya, which was simply too
much work. Secondly, the internalization criteria of the model created by Dunning et al.
(2008), refers to how much production is needed within the own company. Since Atlas
Copco mainly imports and distributes, production is only a small part of their sales.
Consequently, we do not think they live up to this criterion of this model. Thirdly, since
Atlas Copco has been active in Africa for over 90 years, they possess ownership
advantages, such as production techniques, trademark and management. Even though
Atlas Copco “only” fulfils two out of three criteria, they are still successfully
conducting FDI – both organically and by acquisitions – through Africa. Moreover,
Atlas Copco follows the rationale made by Musila et al. (2006), since they only operate
in relatively stable countries. Even though many African nations possess rich natural
resources, Atlas Copco does not expand without sufficient knowledge about those
markets. Therefore, it is necessary to be aware of current political events, cultural
differences, local laws and regulations, and so on.
Moreover, since Atlas Copco has been present in Africa since the 1920’s, they have
gained important economies of scale and first-mover advantages. If a Swedish mining
company tries to enter a market where Atlas Copco is active in, they would probably
have problems conducting their business, since Atlas Copco have been in Africa for a
very long time. Consequently, this makes it hard for a new entrant to grow in a market
and compete with such big players. This is a major competitive advantage, since many
companies and clients know their brand. Furthermore, Atlas Copco possesses great
36
knowledge about the African markets and knows what they want to achieve. This is
shown from one of their strategies, which are one third acquisitions and two thirds
organic investments. Atlas Copco acquire local firms to obtain technological
advantages, which indicates that they are aware, and capable, of what is needed to be
done to further expand.
Conclusively, Atlas Copco has established themselves in Africa through FDI. They
have conducted both strategic acquisitions as well as organic investments to further
internationalize and maintain a competitive advantage. Since Atlas Copco is a major
player in the mining industry, they have both potential as well as capital to perform
these expansions.
5.2 Atsoko
Atsoko separates themselves from the other companies we have investigated, since they
started in a foreign market immediately. Furthermore, Atsoko is not only a newcomer in
Africa; it has only been registered as a company since 2011. This is a major difference
when comparing Atsoko to Findus, Samres and Atlas Copco. It is safe to say that
Atsoko does not follow the Uppsala model, where companies gradually expand through
similar markets as their domestic ones. Moreover, Marie Englesson testifies that it is
hard for a foreign company to operate in Rwanda and Tanzania since westerners tend to
be victims of overpricing. As opposed to what Alfaro et al. (2004) states about
developing countries welcoming foreign capital, Atsoko has experienced scepticism
towards them. Work permits as well as leases have been very difficult to obtain, even
though all regulations have been followed. Furthermore, according to Atsoko’s
experience, it is very hard to create a plan and execute it, since many things can change
rapidly in Tanzania and Rwanda. This is a reason why Atsoko conduct the trial and
error-method. Marie Englesson has previously worked in Africa for another company,
which has given her knowledge of what these markets demand and what they lack.
Since this industry is relatively undeveloped, as opposed to in Europe or the US,
importing and distributing beauty and cosmetics products are cheaper. Criticism is
directed towards the legitimacy of how business is usually conducted in these countries,
since Atsoko has a western management philosophy. Moreover, it can also be examined
whether Atsoko fulfils the OLI-model created by Dunning et al. (2008). The
37
localization factor is a vital reason why Atsoko is in Rwanda and Tanzania, since costs
are significantly cheaper than in i.e. Sweden. Furthermore, ownership-specific
advantages are also possessed by Atsoko, since Marie Englesson has experience from
Africa before. Also, a local investor is present in Atsoko, since local regulations require
this. It can be argued that this strengthens Atsokos ownership-specific advantages.
However, the third criterion is not fulfilled since Atsoko does not produce their products
at all. This is a similarity between Atsoko and Atlas Copco, since both companies fulfil
the same criteria of the OLI-model. However, there are still many differences, since
Atlas Copco has been present for almost a century, while Atsoko has only been active in
Africa a couple of weeks.
Conclusively, it is hard to study Atsoko’s internationalization since it is a brand new
company. However, it is interesting to note that they are immediately establishing on
exotic markets such as in Rwanda and Tanzania. To fully understand whether Atsoko
have established themselves successfully, one would have to wait a couple of years to
see how things develop. Although, we believe that Atsoko possess at least two very
important factors which can decide if they can survive – namely ownership-specific
advantages and localization advantages.
5.3 Findus Sweden AB
Findus is a major exporter of frozen food products. This means that they can export a lot
to a relatively cheap cost. Moreover, since they are an exporting company, they are
achieving economies of scale by spreading their large output on export. In addition,
Findus have taxation departments and customs departments who specify in foreign laws
which make it easier for Findus to keep track on local regulations. Moreover, we
believe that Findus could be obtaining first mover advantages, since they are one of
very few firms with similar products – at least in South Africa. According to Zantout et
al. (1996), certain products have greater tendency to create a first mover advantage than
others. When Findus conducted their surveys, they looked where their products will fit.
Since the quality of fish and meat is very high in South Africa, these products were not
of interest to export to Findus. On the other hand, they found that there was a market for
frozen vegetables. Even though it is positive to be an early entrant in an industry, it is no
guarantee that a company may be successful (Chen et al., 1999). According to Eckeldo
38
et al. (2004), the marketing process is vital in a company’s survival in a foreign market.
Since Findus market themselves as “Find Us – Now available in South Africa”, we
claim that Findus follows the reasoning of Eckeldo et al. (2004). Findus have received
praise for their quality of their products, when they have been pitching to local
distributors. Even though South Africa has a rich variety of crops, Findus still got a very
positive response when conducting various surveys. Since Findus market themselves as
a high quality producer, it is important that their products actually live up to their
promises – which their surveys indicate that they do. Furthermore, Findus have been
trying to export to the Gulf area as well as to China. However, Findus experienced that
certain differences hindered their success, which goes in line with Decker et al. (2004).
Moreover, Findus did not stop trying to expand to new markets, which is evident now
when they are in South Africa. They learnt from their previous mistakes and improved.
To be able to further compare our investigated companies, we will see how well Findus
fit the OLI-model. They arguably possess both ownership-specific advantages as well as
localization factors, since they have conducted analyses to find suitable markets.
However, since Findus are not producing in South Africa, it is questionable if they fulfil
the internalization criterion of the OLI-model. This is comparable with both Atlas
Copco and Atsoko, which is notable.
According to Buch et al. (2007), export and FDI should be seen as complements rather
than substitutes. Since Findus fulfils two out of three criteria of the OLI-model, along
with achieving economies of scale and first mover advantages, one can ask why Findus
is not conducting more active FDI. However, Mats Jörnell gave us an interesting answer
to this question, namely that Findus will lose its competitive advantage and competitive
argument if they would move production away from Sweden. Again, the reason as to
why Findus claim they have high quality products is that they come from great soils
along with short distances between harvest and freezing. Findus’ whole argument will
fall if they move their production location. However, if Findus’s production output
multiplies significantly, they are open to the suggestion to put production in South
Africa.
Conclusively, we believe Findus’ prospects look very bright. They have found a good
partner and distributor, who they believe will work hard to market Findus’ products.
39
Also, they found a demand for frozen vegetables with high quality. Furthermore, Findus
is achieving economies of scale and first mover advantages as argued above. In
addition, Findus have learnt from previous establishment attempts in the Gulf are and
China to improve their current expansion in South Africa.
5.4 Samres
Samres is a special case, since their target group is located in Sweden, rather than in
Senegal. This perspective puts Samres in an interesting position in our dissertation. It
can be argued that Samres has followed the Uppsala model, where closer markets such
as the Estonian and the Moldavian ones were targets. This way, Samres has gained
valuable knowledge and experience when it comes to international expansions, before
trying to enter Senegal. Previous expansions have showed them that if a targeted market
fills Samres’ criteria, it does not matter where this is located. For instance, if the
targeted market is in a similar time zone as Sweden and technological infrastructure is
existent, any market would be possible. Samres has organically invested in Senegal,
since they have opened up their on offices. Furthermore, Samres is not affected by
Senegalese market fluctuations in a way that a company with sales in Senegal would be.
Since Samres’ products are neither sold nor consumed within Senegal, Senegalese
market fluctuations will not affect Samres. This is a very interesting perspective, since
this is unique in our study. According to the product life cycle developed by Vernon
(1966), it can be argued that Samres has put production abroad since labour costs are
cheaper in Senegal. Furthermore, to further compare if Samres fit the OLI-model or not,
we argue that they fulfil all three criteria. Firstly, their location is definitely an
advantage, since lower costs are obtained. Secondly, Samres has ownership-specific
advantages since they have experiences from previous expansions. Finally, they have
internalized production by educating employees in Senegal, instead of consulting
another company.
Conclusively, Samres is different from the other investigated companies since Samres
produces services rather than traditional products. Also, their target group is not in the
country where production is conducted. This makes the analysis of Samres unique,
compared to the other investigated companies. Additionally, as opposed to Findus,
Atlas Copco and Atsoko, Samres has expanded gradually from Sweden, Estonia,
40
Moldavia and Senegal. We see a clear pattern, since Estonia is arguably more similar to
Sweden than both Moldavia and Senegal are. What all these markets have in common,
is that labour costs are cheaper than in Sweden. Also, we see that Samres is expanding
to one market at a time. Our interview with Björn Falk of Samres reveals that they
expand every three years, when they have obtained all experiences.
5.5 Comparison of analyses
Findus, Atsoko and Atlas Copco possess two out of three factors discussed in the OLI-
model. Meanwhile, Samres also possess the internalization factor, which the other
companies lack. What makes Samres fulfil the internalization criteria? Since Samres’
way of production differs from the rest, we believe it is easier for them to internalize
this aspect. One can assume that if Samres would have been producing items and selling
them from factories in Senegal, their costs would be significantly higher. This is a major
difference between Samres and the rest, and this is perhaps a lesson to learn for future
entrants. Samres has arguably been successful in Estonia and Moldavia, and these
experiences will be useful when trying to enter Senegal. It is important to note that no
mode of entry is better than another, it is more about if the mode of entry is the right
one for the company, what they have and what they stand for - since different firms
possess different characteristics. However, similar companies may look to Samres for
inspiration on how to successfully expand to foreign markets that differ greatly from the
home market. The Uppsala model can be used as an inspiration in this case, since this
model suggests that a company may be successfully expanding through gradual
expansion from closely located markets to farther ones. Even though the Estonian and
Moldavian markets may differ from the Swedish one, it can be argued that there are
more similarities between the Estonian and Swedish market than the Senegalese and
Swedish one. This is why we think the Uppsala model is applicable to Samres’ case.
Moreover, compared to the corporations we have studied; Atlas Copco is special in their
way, since they have been internationalized since the 1920’s. In other words, they have
been active in Africa longer than any of the internationalization theories, discussed in
this dissertation, have existed. Over time, Atlas Copco has gained crucial experiences
since they have been active for such a long time. They have grown to be one of the
largest players in their industry. Also, have had time to build extraordinary relationships
41
with clients and create brand loyalty, which new companies are yet to achieve. A
comparison can be made between Atlas Copco and Findus, although their time present
in Africa differs significantly. Since we argue that brand loyalty and good relationships
with clients are important for a company trying to enter a new market, we claim that
Findus is on the right path of achieving this. Findus promises very high quality and,
according to their analyses, they have received positive feedback. This indicates that the
consumers are satisfied with Findus’ products and their concept. If Findus can maintain
this positivism, brand loyalty is possible to create. Furthermore, if the expansion to
South Africa is successful, word might spread to bordering countries that Findus is of
high quality, and this will make matters easier if Findus decide to enter these countries
in the future. Regarding Atsoko, it will be interesting to see how their company will
develop and adapt to the Rwandan and Tanzanian markets, since it is a brand new
company. Atsoko’s approach differs from Findus’, Samres’ and Atlas Copco’s
approaches, since Atsoko established themselves in Africa immediately. According to
Atsoko’s experience, the unpredictability in the African market forces them to conduct
their business in a more casual way, with no major, detailed plans. We believe this will
make Atsoko grow, if they can absorb this knowledge in the beginning of the
establishment in these markets. In turn, this will be an advantage towards later entrants
and competitors. It is possible that when Atsoko’s markets have matured, Atsoko will
move to other, foreign markets through FDI or export.
Furthermore, our findings defy Alfaro et al. (2004) that developing countries are
welcoming foreign capital and foreign companies. All our respondents testify that they
are faced with scepticism from many directions when operating in Africa. The locals are
not used to trust either each other or large companies, as opposed to in the western
civilisation where trust is relatively high. There are cases where complicated regulations
and overwhelming paperwork consumes both energy and time for companies trying to
do business in these countries. Additionally, the communication problems that many
firms have experienced, is confirmed by our study. All four companies testify that
misunderstandings and misinterpretations are common, since cultural and linguistic
distances exist. Therefore, it is very important to be clear and simple when
communicating on these markets. Furthermore, a definite advantage is if the local
language is spoken within the expanding company, since these cultural distances will be
eliminated, or at least shortened. Moreover, we believe that Samres has an advantage to
42
their competitors when it comes to this, since their workers in Senegal speak both
French and Swedish. If Samres tries to expand to another French-speaking country, this
could perhaps help them.
Our research has established that there are many ways for Swedish firms to penetrate
certain African markets. According to our study, this is possible through FDI – both by
acquisitions and Greenfield investments – and export. Time will tell if Atsoko’s trial
and error-method will be successful. However, the expertise and experience of Marie
Englesson will certainly be an advantage for Atsoko in its process of
internationalization. Moreover, Samres’ chances of survival in the African market are
very bright, since they have specific factors characterizing their company. Firstly, their
labour costs are relatively cheap. Secondly, their target group is located in the home
country. This way, Samres is not as vulnerable to local fluctuations as other companies
perhaps are. According to us, Samres’ biggest concern would be if the Senegalese
people were hostile towards foreign companies. However, this does not seem to be the
case, since Samres is offering their employees lucrative salaries as well as on-schedule
pay checks.
When it comes to Atlas Copco’s internationalization process in Africa, it can be said
that having great knowledge about local markets – with cultural differences and so on –
as well as capital and technology, is definitely an advantage. Again, since Atlas Copco
has been active for such a long time, they have obtained these advantages by now.
Finally, regarding Findus’ establishment and chances, many lessons can be learnt. For
instance, we think it is crucial to have good partners and distributors that help you out
with local regulations, as the companies have pointed out being a big obstacle when you
establish on new markets, as Mats Jörnell also states. Moreover, Findus’ export
department are keeping track on taxes, tariffs, quotas and other regulations that could
affect their business.
To summarize, there are cases where Swedish companies are following the traditional
internationalization theories discussed in this dissertation. However, there are no cases
where a company has followed one model blindly. Instead, we see a mix of companies
in different industries, following a mix of theories, all depending on different
characteristics existent in the company in question. This indicates that a Swedish
43
company is somewhat unique in its internationalization, although lessons can be learnt
from others, preferably similar companies as their own. Conclusively, we believe that
our research question has been answered after studying and comparing these four
companies and applying the traditional internationalization theories to them. We asked
to what extent Swedish firms are following these theories, and the answer is that they
are all following these theories to different degrees. Again, it all comes down to what it
is that characterizes a company. Also, we could not create one rule to apply to any
Swedish company, since they are all different. The outcome of this thesis only reflects
these companies’ realities and may not be applicable to others. However, we argue that
lessons could be obtained by looking at how these companies have been conducting
their internationalization to Africa, by carefully adapting it to other companies wanting
to go similar ways as these four have.
Furthermore, our sub-question has also been answered. According to our interviews
with newer companies such as Samres and Atsoko, we have noticed that they are not
explicitly following any traditional internationalization theory when expanding abroad.
However, after examining different theories, we did notice similarities and patterns of
how they are expanding. This indicates that also newer companies are using these
theories as a tool for expansion, however perhaps unconsciously.
44
6. Conclusion This chapter includes summary, concluding discussion, critical review, limitations and
further research.
6.1 Summary and concluding discussion
As many developing countries are opening up towards inward foreign investment
(Alfaro et al., 2004), many companies will still struggle to expand to Africa since
skepticism towards western capitalism is still existent in many of these countries
(Jakobsen et al., 2011). However, according to our study, there are still many
possibilities for Swedish firms to expand to African markets, such as in Tanzania,
Rwanda, Senegal and South Africa. Our findings illustrate that all four examined
companies have bright prospects. They all possess different assets – everything from a
strong brand name, personal experiences to good partnerships – which will help them
continue to expand on their respective markets and in their respective industries.
Although, it must be noted that it is in some cases very early to be able to predict how
things will develop. For instance, Findus and Atsoko are still in their very beginning as
companies in Africa. Moreover, with their respective skills and experiences, the
prospects look positive, and this goes for Atlas Copco and Samres as well. A
generalization can be drawn from the fact that these four companies have optimistic
futures. It is possible to claim that other Swedish companies may find that the
opportunistic African market is suitable for their internationalization plans. Generally,
the only negative aspects with the African market are the political and economic
instabilities, as Musila et al. (2006) argues.
6.2 Critical review
Since the aim of this dissertation is to find out how Swedish firms are internationalizing
in Africa and what the future withholds, a different result would perhaps be found if
companies from other nations were examined. Furthermore, examining a fewer number
of companies would perhaps allow us to in greater detail examine how a Swedish firm
is expanding to an African market.
45
6.3 Ethical aspects
It is possible to question the ethical motives and the ramifications it brings when a
foreign company is trying to enter a market where labor costs and the general quality of
life are lower. If the locals, who may not be used to or aware of western standards (such
as health care, insurance or minimum wage), are exploited or lied to, it would definitely
be considered as unethical behavior. A company should not take advantage of another
party’s lack of knowledge. Granted, wages are naturally lower in certain countries than
in others. However, it is important to still fulfill certain aspects in order to ensure that
the employee can uphold a decent life, i.e. health care, insurance or minimum wage. For
instance, Samres offer their Senegalese employees higher-than-average wages and on-
schedule salary payments, which is not to be taken for granted in many countries.
6.4 Limitations
Since time is a factor, we were limited to only one interview per company. Furthermore,
availability and money have also been decisive factors when selecting companies to
examine. It would have been preferable to be able to meet with everybody in person, but
for various reasons, this has not been a possibility. Some companies did not have any
time slots open for us, while others simply ignored our approach. Conclusively, time,
money and availability have led us to four companies, conducting their businesses in
different industries and in different nations in Africa. Even though it would have been
interesting to investigate a larger number of companies, it would not have allowed us to
dig deep enough due to time restrictions. Furthermore, we chose to limit ourselves to
only Swedish companies active in the African market. Since this focus is a core
component in our dissertation, adding companies from other countries to this formula
would make our paper to wide.
46
6.5 Further research
It would be interesting to examine a wider number of companies, from different nations
operating in different industries to find out if the internationalization process differs
between countries.
Another interesting angle would be if a larger number of companies within the same
industry were examined, regardless of country. This perspective would shed light on
how companies in specific industries internationalize in Africa.
47
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51
Appendix 1: Interview guide
Since we conducted semi-structured interviews, to let the interviewee expand his or her
answers, we used open-ended questions. We asked all interviewees to shortly explain
how their businesses were internationalizing. Furthermore, we asked in more detail why
and how Africa was chosen as a destination for expansion. Moreover, we asked all
interviewees if there were any notable obstacles and difficulties along the way. Also, we
asked what type of mode of entry they conducted. Conclusively, with these questions as
a base, we could expand our questions based on the interviewee’s responses.
52
Appendix 2: Interview questions
We basically asked all four respondents the same questions, to be able to compare their
answers. Naturally, some further questions were introduced while conversing during the
interview. However, the questions we used as a foundation were all the same.
Question 1: Please introduce your company’s international affairs and operations.
This question, or statement, was asked in the very beginning of the interviews to get a
quick overview of the companies’ businesses.
Question 2: When did your company decide to expand t o Africa, and why?
One of the reasons behind this question was t o see how they reasoned when choosing
Africa instead of other promising economies. Another one was, of course, to find out
how long they have been there. One can draw many conclusions and predictions based
on how long a company has been active in a market. We thought these two factors were
important for our research.
Question 3: How long before entering Africa did your company plan to do so?
Here, we wanted to find out if they had made any significant research about the African
market and its possibilities before entering, or if it was just a coincidence. This question
was somewhat answered by the previous one, when we asked about why they were in
Africa. Some companies had made vast macro analysis to see whether the African
market suited their vision and business idea, and if there was a target group to reach out
to.
Question 4: What was the most difficult part of expanding to Africa?
This question was asked to see if there were any similarities between what our
respondents answered. Also, it was asked to shed some light on what to learn from in
the future, when Swedish companies may try to enter the African market.
Question 5: What were the obstacles on the way?
This question bears some similarities to question four. However, this question was more
directed towards legal obstacles, such as tariffs, quotas and taxes. Since our respondents
were in Africa in different ways (i.e. export, production etc.), different obstacles were
faced, and overcome.
53
Question 6: How do you predict your company will fit and develop in the market in the
future?
It was pivotal to us to see how the respondents reasoned when trying to predict the
future. Since we assume they are planning to stay in their respective markets, it would
be interesting to see how they think the market will evolve and how they will adapt to it.
Question 7: Why did your company choose this specific country to expand to?
Naturally, it would be interesting to find out why a certain nation or market is
interesting for a firm than another. An interesting point here is to find out if there are
any specific reasons behind this choice of action. This question takes it a little bit
further to a narrower path than the second part of question two does.
Question 8: What mode of entry was opted and why?
Some of the respondents’ companies exported to Africa, rather than produce in Africa
and sell their products. We found it interesting to see as to why export was preferred to
local production and the other way around.
Question 9: What lessons did you learn from previous expansions?
One would assume that after each expansion, one becomes a little better and a little
more knowledgeable which will eliminate some of the potential pitfalls of international
expansion for the next time around. This question was to see whether the companies
learn from their previous mistakes, if there were any.
Question 10: Do you have any further information that could be interesting to know?
This question was asked to let the respondent sum up his or her thoughts and, perhaps,
add something new that we had missed to ask.
These ten questions were used as a reference point in our interviews and they were only
edited to a minor extent to suit the respondent’s company a little better
54
Appendix 3: Interviews
Appendix 3.1 Interview 1, Lina Jorheden, Business controller, Atlas Copco
Berätta kort om företaget och de internationella affärerna.
Många frågor vänder sig till nya bolag. Atlas Copco fanns redan i Afrika på 1920-talet.
Vår närvaro i Afrika är, det vill säga, ingen nysatsning eller någon ny marknad. Vissa
frågor går därmed inte att svara på, för mig. Jag kanske kan hänvisa er till någon som
vet mer, någon som kanske var med vid expanderingen vid 80- talet. Där kan ni kanske
få djupare info, då jag är mer aktiv i dag i Tanzania. Men jag kan göra mitt bästa,
absolut!
Tanzania har en oerhört stor gruvindustri. I Östafrika är det gruvindustrin som är den
största anledning till vår närvaro. Av hela Atlas Copcos försäljning så står Afrika för
ungefär 12 %, vilket inte är en liten marginell andel. Afrika är alltså en kärn del i
verksamheten. Gruvindustrin och kompressorindustrin är två stora marknader här. Men
kompressorerna säljs mer till industribolag/tillverkningsbolag.
Vi finns i Afrika och säljer nästan till alla marknader. Vi finns i ungefär 80 men säljer
till fler an 170. Varje år öppnas en ny bransch i ett annat land. Det är främst i Afrika vi
expanderar. Förut, i Kenya, så sköttes hela Östafrika därifrån. Men nu känner vi att vi
behöver lokal närvaro. På Atlas Copcos hemsida finns pressreleaser att vi öppnar i
Senegal, Mocambique, Mali och Burkina Faso. Det händer väldigt mycket, främst i
gruvindustrin.
Sedan 2010, när jag började på företaget, kände man att man måste ha management på
plats, runt 60 stycken anställda. Att styra ett bolag i den här delen av världen från
distans är inte lätt. Numer rapporterar vi också direkt till Sverige än till Kenya, som vi
gjorde tidigare. Vi brukar göra som så att vi öppnar upp en bransch som sköts av ett
närliggande bolag som funnits där längre. Sedan när man växer och får större
omsättning, med en mogen marknad och med kundsegment som kommer fortsätta köpa
- då flyttar man legala enheter och management dit. Så här brukar vi göra överallt. Man
skickar alltså inte ner någon trupp från Sverige, utan det är närliggande bolag som
sköter det. Det är bättre att det sköts så här än att någon projektgrupp skall göra det.
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Vad är det svåraste med att expandera? Kultursvårigheter?
På 20-talet var det nog väldigt svårt! Innan Internet och allt förstår jag inte hur de
klarade av det! Men idag, med nya företag, så kan jag hjälpa er med en kontakt som jag
har. En sminkimportör och distributör. Butik i Tanzania och Rwanda. Hon möts
dagligen av utmaningarna av kulturen och regler o lagar, så hon kan nog berätta om det.
Men det jag märker är Tanzania ganska nytt som land. 50 års självständighet, men hade
stark socialism väldigt länge. Marknadsekonomi är fortfarande något väldigt nytt som
man är skeptiska emot. Generellt sett ses företag som några som roffar åt sig och är
bovar. Det är väldigt svårt att få arbetsvisum och tillstånd för att kunna betala skatt på
rätt sätt. Det finns många hinder. Marie (Linas vän/kontakt) kanske kan utveckla mer!
Det är absolut en utmaning på en så här ny marknad med marknadsekonomi. Det är ett
annat synsätt i ministerierna och de man möter på den offentliga sidan (jämfört med i
väst).
Fortsättningsvis, något som gör det lättare är att våra kunder är andra internationella
företag. Vi beter oss mot dem som vi gör i resten av världen. Man ska bete sig rätt och
riktigt, det är nolltolerans för korruption osv. Men med lokala kunder, eller bolag ifrån
Kina eller Indien, är företagskulturen annorlunda – med olika krav på bolaget. Men som
sagt, med stora internationella bolag (väst, egen anm.) emellan så är det verkligen noll
tolerans vid korruption och dylikt, vilket underlättar.
Många svenska företag på 20-talet i Afrika?
Nej, men där fanns nog några till! Inte vad jag vet säkert dock.
Framtiden då? Stärka sina aktier och utvecklas mer?
Det är en ständig diskussion med Asien och deras starka, snabba tillväxt och
fattigdomen har minskat kraftigt. Fattigdomen är dock väldigt stor här fortfarande, och
Tanzania är ett av världens fattigaste länder. Det märks! Men å andra sidan tror jag inte
att en världsdel kommer kunna vara så mkt efter andra, eftersom globaliseringen är så
stark och Afrikas resurser är så otroligt stora. Här finns fortfarande några få konflikter (i
andra länder), men det strävas mot demokrati och näringslivet har en viktig del i den
processen. Jag är positiv. Marknadsekonomin bidrar till utveckling i dessa länder. Rent
företagsekonomiskt finns en otrolig marknad. Om man kan få en medelklass som finns i
Asien, finns det otroligt med potential för att göra business även i Afrika.
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Hur ser det ut med ekonomisk nationalism, fientlighet mot väst? Stort problem?
Det är inte som i t ex Sydamerika där man kan nationalisera industrin. Här bygger man
mer upp krångliga regelverk som kostar mycket. Sverige har bistått Tanzania väldigt
länge, med skattesystem och så. Man har inte varit riktigt redo för det, stort steg. Vi är
inte oroliga för nationalisering i gruvindustrin. Det är för stora intressen från det
internationella samfundet. Men jag förstår att det ser ut som det gör idag. Gruvorna är
den största industrin och de största företagen och exportörerna finns här. Några av de
allra största, är de från Kanada. De trädde in tidigt i Tanzania, kanske 10-15 år sen.
Förhandlade bra avtal med regeringen. Låg skatt osv. När dåvarande regeringen slöt
detta avtal, gick de med på att det aldrig skulle ändras så länge gruvorna är i drift. Då
blir det svårt för en ny regering att frångå det här, eftersom deras handlingsutrymme är
begränsat. Då byggs konflikten upp emellan den ”onda internationella kapitalismen”
och den gamla socialistiska politiken. Vi som försöker verka mer med en svensk kultur
vad gäller företag, vi kanske straffas lite på grund av hur det såg ut i början. Men
gruvorna är också under stor press från media och den allmänna opinionen runtom i
världen, man kan inte bete sig hur som helst.
Är det många av era konkurrenter som har avtal med regeringen?
Nej inte konkurrenter, men kunder, och så brukar det se ut i världen. Även inom
oljeutvinning. Med naturresurser måste man förhandla med staten. Man kan ha olika
maktpositioner. I Norge så visste regeringen inte riktigt vad man skulle göra men man
lyckades få till en skatt på 60 procent på allt man utvinner, medan här, i Tanzania, är
den kanske 2-3 procent. Så ja, det ser olika ut på grund av förhandlingssituationen.
Hur började Atlas Copco gå till Afrika? Flyttade produktionen?
Vi har väldigt lite produktion. Lite i Sydafrika. Annars är det helt dominerat av
säljbolag. Det importeras och säljs. Den produktion vi har i Sydafrika är genom förvärv
vi gjort.
Kände ni att bolagsförvärven var en nödvändighet för att de kanske besatt viktig
lokal information om marknaden?
I Sydafrika tror jag det mer var en teknik man ville åt. Man exporterar globalt därifrån.
Det var alltså inte någon kännedom om lokal marknad man ville åt.
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Använder företaget samma metoder vid expansioner? Det vill säga förvärv i olika
länder?
Strategin är att 1/3 ska vara förvärvstillväxt, acquisitions, och 2/3 organisk
förvärvstillväxt, Greenfield investment, generellt över en cykel. Förvärven sker ofta
genom att vi vill ha en ny teknik eller produkter som ligger nära våra egna, alternativt
att vi vill in i ett liknande segment det vi har. Till exempel för fem år sen köpte vi
Dynapac som är ett svenskt bolag inom vägbygge. Vi sålde också mycket till
Construction-kunder via våra riggar som gör tunnlar och portabla kompressorer. Vi
trodde detta segmentet passade oss så vi köpte Dynapac. Vad gäller organisk expansion.
Vi öppnar ofta upp en bransch i ett grannland som ett annat bolag tar hand om som
sedan blir ett eget bolag. Vi förvärvar väldigt sällan för att komma in på en geografisk
marknad. Endast om det är ett samarbete med en distributör med mycket kontakter och
stort nätverk. Då säljer vi till dem istället som sen säljer vidare. Då kanske vi själva vill
in i marknaden och köpt upp distributörerna. Det är dock sällan och undantag.
Några speciella läxor vid tidigare expansioner?
Vi expanderar sällan geografiskt genom förvärv. Det beror ju på om det är en liten
distributör i ett land där vi redan finns, eller ett nytt segment, eller ett globalt företag
osv. Det har funkat bäst när vi öppnar kontor i länder som vi redan haft bra kännedom
om segment och marknad. Man skickar alltså inte ner någon som inte har varit där.
Även om ett grannland har bra koll på hur de funkar med kunder o så, så kan lagarna
skilja sig mycket åt från land till land. Man måste se till att ha lokal expertis för skatter
och legala krav för bolagsverksamhet. Där behövs oftast hjälp från huvudkontor eller
global nivå. Det är oerhört viktigt att det sker på rätt sätt. Så om man bara tittar på rent
operationell etablering och att vi säljer, då är närprincipen är bäst (som tidigare
diskuterat). Då måste man ha stöd med allt det formella.
Övrig information som kan vara relevant?
Det är stora skillnader emellan Tanzania och Sverige. Producerar i Sverige och har,
naturligtvis, funnits där länge. Tanzania är en ny marknad med många skillnader. Man
kan lista en massa. Men jag tror att det som kan ge mest för uppsatsen är om ni pratar
med min kompis Marie som jag nämnde innan. Hon har färsk information. Startade
ifrån Sverige, men marknad är i Rwanda och Tanzania. Hon bor delvis här. Hon kan
hjälpa er mer, tror jag!
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Appendix 3.2 Interview 2, Björn Falk, CEO, Samres
Berätta kort om er verksamhet och era internationella affärer.
Samres affärsidé är att vi organiserar anropsstyrd trafik, det betyder att vi tar hand om
beställningar och vi planerar resorna och vi sköter all administration runt omkring det
här.
Vi har gjort detta i Sverige sedan 1993. Sedan 2005 har vi etablerat produktion
utomlands, call-center verksamheter utomlands för den svenska marknaden och det är
först i Estland 2005, sedan Moldavien 2008 och nu Senegal 2011-2012. Det är vårt
första steg av utlandsverksamhet att vi skaffar oss produktionsanläggningar utomlands,
cell center anläggningar, utomlands.
Sedan 2011 har vi också haft uppdragsgivare, kunder, utomlands. Där har vi en stor och
betydelsefull kund i Oslo och sen har vi en liten kund i Estland. Så man kan säga att vi
har två typer av utlandskontakter. Det ena är produktion och det andra är kunder. Dessa
två hänger egentligen inte alls ihop. Möjligen det estniska hade vi inte kunnat få om vi
inte hade haft verksamhet i Estland. Så där finns en liten koppling. Vi startade
produktionen i Estland och fick kunden långt senare.
När bestämde ni er för att expandera till Afrika? Varför Afrika och inte till
exempel Asien och Sydamerika i stället?
Vi bestämde oss för att etablera och gå till Afrika 2010. Varför, det var så att vi gjorde,
inför den etableringen. Eller vi får dra hela historien. Vi började med att bestämma oss
att etablera oss i Estland och det beslutet fattade vi 2003-2004 och vi var i gång 2005.
Sen hade vi kört i Estland i ungefär 2 år och under den tiden så var den ekonomiska
utvecklingen i Estland explosionsartad, snabb, bra, löneutvecklingen gick uppåt och vi
konstaterade att förr eller senare så kan vi inte vara kvar i Estland. Estland kommer inte
vara ett lågkostnadsland, vi måste söka oss vidare. Då gjorde vi viss research och
bestämde oss då för att etablera oss i Moldavien. När vi hade gjort etableringen i
Moldavien och lyckats med den, då konstaterade vi att kan vi lyckas i Estland, kan vi
lyckas i Moldavien, då kan vi i stort sett lyckas var som helst om det finns rimliga
förutsättningar. Då vände vi på det och sa så här: ”Var skulle vi då etablera oss? Var
tror vi att det finns rimliga förutsättningar?”. Så ställde vi upp dem, vad är rimliga
förutsättningar? Vad måste vi ha? Och då sa vi att det måste vara ett land dit vi kan åka
och tycka att det är någorlunda sjyst. Det kan inte vara politisk instabilitet, dem
59
länderna faller bort. Det måste vara ett land som har interneten, teknisk infrastruktur
som gör att vi kan ta emot telefonsamtal och det land som borde finnas ungefär i vår
tidszon. Vi har mest att göra på dagtid och då vill vi inte jobba, vill inte att dem
anställda ska jobba på natten, så då funkar inte Asien. Utan då får man lix om Europa
och söder ut. Sen sa vi att det ska vara ett land där vi tror att vi relativt länge kan ha bra
kostnadsfördelar och ett land där vår kostnad blir en bra lön. Att en låg kostnad för oss,
blir en bra lön. Det ska vara en stor skillnad där. Det var det i Estland från början men
det är det inte i Estland idag. Idag så är våra löner i Estland okej, men vi kan inte
överbetala folk i Estland. Det gör vi däremot i Senegal. Där kan vi lix om gå in och vara
löneledande. Vi betalar folk mer än vad någon annan kan tänka sig göra. Det är även
samma sak i Moldavien, där är vi kraftigt löneledande. Detta gör att vi får låg
personalomsättning och vi kan använda lönen på ett annat sätt än vad vi kan göra om vi
pressar den. Så dem här var villkoren och då gjorde vi en scanning utav en massa länder
i före detta sovjetunionen, några länder i Europa i övrigt och i stort sett Afrika norr om
Kongo. Det är ganska översiktligt att vara tänkbart. Och då fick vi, det var innan den
arabiska våren, då föll hela Nordafrika bort på grund utav politiska skäl och sedan hade
vi kvar ett par länder. Vi tittade på Georgien, vi tittade på Ghana och Senegal och så
vidare. Och när vi tar det sista steget, då blir det en del praktiska frågor, eftersom vi
måste ha en bra lärarplats. Varpå den här 3-4 ställena som vi kan hitta en bra lärare alla
uppfyller baskraven, det funka och där hittade vi den lärare som vi tyckte tros kan fixa
det här och det blev i Senegal.
Är ni nöjda med Senegal?
Ja, ja det tror vi. Vi var lite svettiga när det var de här oroligheterna inför presidentvalet
för ett par månader sedan. Då hade det ju kunnat gå snett och det hade kunnat drabba
oss illa. Nu är det oroligheter i Mali, som då är grannland till Senegal, det är också lite
sådär. Har vi otur så sprider det sig och det kan påverka oss. Men samtidigt har Senegal
varit politiskt stabilt i väldigt lång tid. Så att, i princip, ja vi är nöjda. Det har gått bra
och det har gått ungefär som vi tror. Sen har man alltid stött på lite mer, vissa saker är
lite jobbigare än annat.
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Hur länge pågick planeringarna?
Hur länge var det innan vi startade? Konkret, så började vi med research 2008. 2010
gjorde vi planer på att fatta beslut, jag var nere första gången december 2010.
Dessförinnan hade en av mina kolleger varit nere. I januari 2011, så började vi rekrytera
personal för utbildning, vi gick i gång med språkträningen i mars 2011 och dem
besvarade dem första telefonsamtalen i januari 2012. Snabbheten gick fort beroende på
hur man ser det, var vi började med det och när vi gick i gång. Nu är vi i produktion och
det har vi varit sedan mars-april.
Vad upplever du var det svåraste med att etablera sig i Senegal? Kultur? Språk?
De största hindren?
Det svåraste hindret är nog att man pratar franska. Många pratar engelska men det finns
ett antal funktioner som du inte klarar dig utan franska. Så om man inte ska gå på dem
stora internationella advokatbyråerna så pratar folk franska. Om man inte vill ha dem
stora revisionsbyråerna så pratar dem också bara franska. Bokförarna pratar bara
franska. Alla andra sådana här praktiska frågor så pratar folk franska. Vi som har varit
nere och jobbat där, vår ekonomichef och IT-chef pratar lite franska, men i övrigt så kan
inte vi franska och det är ett jätteproblem. Vi sitter och förhandlar med dem och vi
måste gå via en tolk eller hitta någon som översätter, det är krävande. Det tar tid och det
är komplicerat och så vidare. Sen får man ibland dokument som dem tror är översatta
till engelska, som är helt oläsliga, dem är översatta med Google translate. Man kan få
dokument och undra vad är detta, vad menar ni? Så språket kan jag säga är det.
När ni sökte folk så var det krav att dem skulle ha två års utbildning i engelska,
var detta för att underlätta?
Nej det är faktiskt något helt annat. Vi tar deras engelska kunskaper som tecken på hur
bra dem är på att lära sig språk i allmänhet. Så i princip skulle dem kunna vara bra på
tyska eller något annat språk så hade det också funkat. Det finns en liten fördel med att
dem pratar engelska, lättare för oss som inte pratar franska. Men i princip så lär dem ju
sig svenska sen kommunicerar vi på svenska. Men däremot är det så att om du lärt dig
engelska bra så kan du förmodligen lära dig svenska och eftersom engelska inte är deras
modersmål. Hade vi etablerat detta i ett engelsktalande afrikanskt land så hade vi fått ta
ett annat språk än engelska. Detta är bakgrunden till detta med engelskakunskaperna.
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Brukar ni köpa upp andra, förvärv och så vidare?
Vi ägnar oss inte åt det, vi växer rent organiskt och vi startar upp det, utvecklar och
driver det själva. Vi köper inte bolag alls.
Det finns inga planer på det alls?
Nej inga riktiga planer på det, skulle det komma en situation där det fanns något
intressant och köpa så är det klart att man inte skulle säga nej och det gäller ju att man
håller ögonen öppna men det finns inga sådana planer och vi har aldrig gjort det men då
har vi inte sagt att vi inte skulle göra det. Men det är ingen del av affärsiden.
Hur ser det ut med konkurrenter? Med konkurrenter från Skandinavien och
Europa som också har call-center i Afrika? Är det vanligt?
Ja det är det, det finns rätt mycket call-center, det var ju ett skäl till att vi
överhuvudtaget kom på att man kunde vara i Afrika. Framförallt fransktalande företag
har call-center i Nordafrika och även i Senegal dem jobbar då mot Frankrike och mot
franskatalande Kanada, så där finns det mycket. Det finns även engelsktalande call-
center i Afrika. Det finns en sådan bransch. Det vi då gör är att det hänger på
lönenivåerna, att på ett sätt så priskonkurrerar vi men vår nisch är lite annorlunda. Vi är
mycket, mycket mindre än dem andra cell-centrarna, det finns andra call-center med
1000-tals anställda. Vi är mycket mindre och vi är mycket mer specialiserade, vi gör
bara anropsstyrd trafik, vi gör ingenting annat. Alla hos oss ska lära sig det, lära sig
hantera våra kunder och allting sådant, specialiserande utbildning och vi är beredda att
betala rejäl premium. Sedan finns det ju chans att ett annat svenska call-center skulle
kunna etablera sig där och sno vår personal, det kanske är så, men det har inte hänt. Om
vi har rätt för oss så är vi det enda svensktalande cell-centret i Senegal. Jag tror inte det
finns något annat svensktalande call-center i Afrika, vad jag vet.
Eftersom ni betalar bra premie och så vidare så känns det svårt och matcha det
sen.
Ja men sedan kan någon annan bestämma sig för att de kan betala ännu mer premie men
då börjar man fundera på varför dem måste vara just där vi är, då kan dem ju lika gärna
gå någon annanstans.
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Anledningen till att ni är där är väl för att det är lite lägre lönekostnader?
Oh ja, visst. Lönekostnaderna i Senegal är ju lägre än i Moldavien och vi tror att dem
kommer vara det under en längre tid så att vi kan fortsätta att vara konkurrenskraftiga
under en längre tid, men givetvis inte för alltid. I artikeln i Expressen så är det någon
där som säger att jag kommer inte stanna här tills jag pensionerar mig och det är ju
självklart och det vet vi också. Tittar man 20 år framåt i tiden så kommer situationen att
vara helt annorlunda. Vi behöver inte ha den tidshorisonten.
Har ni planer på att gå till andra länder i Afrika?
Inte just nu, men egentligen är det ju så om man tittar på vår historia så är det ju klart att
vår erfarenhet just nu är ju att det går att etablera sig. Om vi har klarat av att etablera oss
på tre rätt olika ställen, det innebär ju att avståndet inte har någon betydelse. Det finns
inga genetiska skillnader mellan människor som gör att de inte kan lära sig svenska och
sådant där och i princip skulle man kunna lägga sig var som helst.
Det tar cirka 3-4 år mellan era expansioner och då måste man kanske insupa
erfarenheterna och lära och ta till sig någonting.
Så är det, vi har blivit bättre, vi vet ju vilka misstag vi begick på de olika ställena, så vi
har ju blivit bättre och bättre på att göra, av de misstag man gjorde, hur man
kommunicera med folk och vad man säger till folk när man anställer dem. Vilka
förväntningar bygger man upp? Det är oerhört viktigt därför det är inte alltid vi säger
någonting så måste folk tro på det. Dem måste förstå i vilket sammanhang vi kommer in
och det gör man inte så lätt. Sen har ju vi svensk kultur på hur man förhandlar, hur man
kommer överens om saker och ting och den är ju inte världsomspännande och där finns
det ju skillnader och vi har ju bestämt oss för att på Samres är det svenska normer som
gäller.
Hur har det gått?
Det har gått jättebra, det har ju krävt en del diskussioner. Så när vi säger att det här är
den lön vi betalar, så är det de som gäller. Vill man inte ha det så får man gå någon
annanstans. Det är inte ett förhandlingsbud. Å andra sidan så är det så att pengarna
kommer, det är inga omvända förhandlingsbud heller. Du får alltid precis det vi har
sagt. Det är ganska normalt för ett svenskt företag I Sverige, men så är det inte. Så har
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det varit i både Estland och Moldavien, något som har skiljt ut oss från en del andra
företag. I båda länderna finns också call-center men just det att våra
anställningskontrakt dem gäller. Lönen betalas och vi betalar sociala avgifter, så att när
man blir sjuk så får man sina sjukpenningar. Vi har försökt att implementera det som vi
uppfattar som bra svenska normer. Detta blir ju på något sett en konkurrensfördel.
Problemet är att det här som för oss är fullständigt självklart är inte det och det räcker
inte med att säga att vi kommer betala löner i tid utan det är först när man faktiskt gjort
det i ett, två eller tre år som folk upptäcker okej jag jobbar på det stället och där kommer
lönen alltid den 25:e och den finns på mitt bankkonto, det är inga problem.
Det borde ju vara en ganska attraktiv egenskap.
Jag tror att det är en attraktiv egenskap men den är ganska svår att kommersialiseras, det
handlar om förtroende på något sätt som vi bygger upp.
Men det kan ni kanske lyckas bygga med åren?
Ja, jag tror att det gör att folk kanske drar sig lite mer för att sluta även om de skulle
hitta ett mer attraktivt jobb, därför att gillar man trygghet så väljer man att vara kvar.
Vad har ni lärt er från tidigare expansioner? Vilka misstag har ni gjort?
Att man måste vara övertydlig med vad man menar, att inte tro att saker och ting är
självklara. Det som vi tror är självklart bara för det är så i Sverige, det är inte självklart.
Man måste diskutera med oss och förstå vilket socialt sammanhang dem befinner sig i.
Även i Estland, det är annorlunda. Så fort det är annorlunda så rikserar man att det som
finns i Sverige är självaklart och det kan ibland vara svårt att se vad det här är. Det
handlar om ledarskap och organisation. Svenska företag generellt och vi också är ju
ganska öppna men det innebär ju inte att vi är mjuka. Det är en sak att lyssna på någon
och sen bestämma och sen komma fram till någonting bra men det innebär j inte att när
vi gjort det så är vi mindre fasta i det än någonannan är. Däremot så har vi ett annat sätt
att kommunicera, ett annat sätt och beskriva det och kanske ett annat sätt att genomföra
beslut. Men vi förväntar ju oss att folk gör det ändå, men vi säger ju kanske det på ett
annat sätt. Det här är ju en svårighet som finns. Vi måste lära oss att vad det är vi säger
betyder, men det måste även medarbetarna. Den här typen av skillnader finns och det
har vi lärt oss att de är olika. En sak till vi lärt oss är det är inte så att det finns ett
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Sverige och ett utland utan det finns många utland. Också det skiljer sig såsom kultur
och vad som är viktigt och oviktigt mellan olika länder.
Har du någon övrig upplysning som kan vara viktig för vår uppsats.
Det finns en del artiklar gjorda om just detta. Det som händer nu, även utanför Samres
är dels svenska företag som etablerar sig i Afrika för att ha produktion. De flesta
produktionsföretagen är ju produktion av prylar. Tjänstesektorn är mycket mindre men
det är nog där det kommer, typ call-center med andra tjänster man kan utföra på distans
tror jag är en jätte potential. Svenska företag som gör det är nog få, men det finns då
franska och en del amerikanser som varit med rätt länge. Även på marknaden med
företag som etablerar sig där för att sälja, vilket är en väldig skillnad. Ericsson har en
stor anläggning/kontor i Dakar, men det är egentligen för försäljning och byggnation
dem har ju ingen traditionell produktion i Afrika även om dem är många gånger större
än vad vi är i Afrika. Det som händer då är att dem tar sina prylar, datorer från Sverige
till Afrika men mer av det dem gör är tjänsteliknande och det görs på plats i Afrika.
Betalar ni skatterna till Senegal eller till Sverige?
Senegal. Dels så betalar man personalskatter och sociala avgifter och så vidare, det är
egentligen det stora. Sen på bolagsresultatet, vinsten av bolaget, så betalar vi då
bolagsskatt i alla dem här länderna och vinsten beskattas en gång, den beskattas där och
sen beskattas den inte i Sverige. Sen finns det prissättning och det följer ju reglerna för
allmänheten, transfer pricing. Som finns med ganska omfattande regler, hur man får
sätta internpriser i koncernen. Vi använder en marknadsprissättningssystem, så vi tar ett
pris på vad en svensktalande medarbetare utomlands skulle kosta och det finns sån
marknad som går att titta på vad det här kostar och då blir det ju ingen skillnad var man
sitter någonstans, det blir ju egentligen ett globalt pris. Av Samres totala bolagsskatt så
betalar vi hälften utomlands och hälften i Sverige
Fanns det några handelshinder i Senegal? Tariffer och så vidare för utländska
bolag? Är det högre skatter för er?
Nej, snarare tvärtom. Där har vi en väldigt stor fördel eftersom vi i princip inte skickar
prylar. Vi har skickat ner datorer och nätverksgrejer och sådant. Saker vi konfigurerat i
Sverige och skickat ner. Där var det inga sådana handelshinder men det var en viss
pappersbyråkrati att få igenom det. Det är inte så mycket tullavgifter som pysslet med
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att få igenom det, det tar tid. Det största handelshindret vi har sett är nog egentligen
tvärtom, att få folk från Senegal och Moldavien att få inresetillstånd till Sverige, det har
varit komplicerat. Det beror då på att Sverige inte alltid haft ambassad och att svenska
processerna för att få visum är knöliga och komplicerade. Så vi har mer den typen av
handelshinder, än stämplar och papper som ska igenom tullen.
Är du optimistisk för framtiden i Senegal?
Ja, det tror jag. Jag tror att dem här handelsströmmarna kommer att driva utvecklingen i
Afrika rätt mycket och jag tror att mer och mer av det som produceras blir
platsoberoende, värdet i produktion blir mer och mer immateriell. Och då kan man
producera det var som helst. Tidszonen är beroende för oss men det finns säkert andra
tjänster där man kan göra det på andra ställen. Tjänsteinnehållet ökar av produkter så
blir det kunskapen av det immateriella blir värt mer. Det immateriella kan man
producera var som helst och då blir produktionen mindre låst vid stora fabriker och
transportvägar och viktigare blir det att man har duktiga medarbetare och en bra
organisation och den typen av saker. Det gör att jag tror att utvecklingen i Afrika
kommer att gå mycket, mycket fortare än den gjort på andra ställen. Dem kommer att ha
nytta av dem här utvecklingen. Dem länder som halkar efter är de länder som avsiktligt
förstör sina möjligheter. Det går ju att förhindra utvecklingen genom att aktivt bekämpa.
Jag tror inte att Zimbabwe kommer bli en lysande afrikansk stat förrän man ändrat det
politiska systemet. Med länder som är någorlunda ringa tror jag det här kommer lysa
igenom rätt mycket.
Hur är det med välkomnandet av utländskt kapital och så vidare från både
regering och folk?
Det vet jag inte, vi har inte haft några politiska kontakter alls egentligen. Vi för ju inte
in kapital på det sättet, vi betalar folk, utbildar dem och sen investerar vi ju väldigt
mycket i medarbetarna men vi köper ju inte stenkrossar och tryckpressar och sådant
som kostar pengar som vi skall investera i. Sen drar vi ju nytta av IT-infrastrukturen,
den är ju jätteviktigt för oss. Men vi har inga politiska kontakter så vi har inte märkt det
alls.
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Appendix 3.3 Interview 3, Mats Jörnell, Head of export, Findus Sweden AB
Mats Jörnell började med att presentera sig. Hans arbetstitel är Head of export och det
innefattar all export som Findus gör från Sverige och ut globalt. Dock finns det några
områden som en arbetskollega i har hand om.
Internationell verksamhet och var Findus Exporterar
Findus Sverige AB tillhör det nordiska klustret och företaget drivs härifrån i Bjuv. Vår
VD heter Jari. Ett annat kluster inom Findus är Frankrike-Spanien och det tredje är
England-Irland. Alla dessa tre klustren bildar tillsammans Findus Group, och de
omsätter omkring 13-14 miljarder, beroende på valutakurs. Företaget har 6000 anställda
och verkar i huvudsak inom frysta livsmedel såsom fisk, färdigrätter och grönsaker.
Dessa produkter är våra huvudområden där vi har en väldigt hög kvalitet och väldigt
starka varumärken. Koncernen har två olika varumärken; Findus och Youngs. Findus
återfinns i Norden plus Spanien-Frankrike och det andra varumärket Youngs, som är ett
fiskvarumärke, finns beläget i England. Båda bolagen har tillsammans skapats under ett
ägarskapsförhållande. Lion Capital, som är en private equity firma, äger dessa bolag.
Findus huvudkontor är här i Bjuv, här finns det 3 fabriker vi har även en i Helsingborg
och bara i Bjuv har vi 130 000 tons produktion.
Varför har ni ert huvudkontor i Bjuv?
Det kändes som en bra idé på 1960-talet. Det är bra att befinna sig i ett bördigt område,
med närhet mellan fabrik och leveranser. Idag är det precis samma tankesätt, närhet till
grönsaksproduktionen. Vi jobbar mycket med högkvalitativa ärtor, vilka vi inte behöver
frakta långt – detta är en kvalitetsfaktor. Bjuv ligger också nära E6:an och E4:an. Hade
man byggt Findus idag så kanske man hade lagt företaget i Landskrona, hursomhelst så
är det inte särskilt långa avstånd det handlar om.
I de länder som jag räknat upp hittills, är där vi har våra kontor och kommersiella
organisationer. I stort sett resten av världen tillhör exportavdelningen. Vi har tre olika
affärsområden inom export. Den första är industri (ärtor). Vi exporterar ärtor till
Sydafrika, Tyskland, Usa, Kina, Australien och Nya Zeeland. Väl handlad commodity
med hög kvalitetsnivå, vilket är tack vare det bra klimat och jordar vi har här. Företaget
tjänar 200 miljoner SEK på detta affärsområde. Det andra området vi har är food
service, restaurangartiklar. Där exporterar vi främst till Tyskland och Australien men
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även lite till övriga Europa. Det sista området och kanske det vi fokuserar mest på är
retail försäljning. Det är kanske där man ser Findus varumärke mest – i frysdisken på
till exempel ICA. Där är vi väldigt framgångsrika på Wok-rätterna, som utvecklades
redan på 90-talet.
När bestämde ni er för Sydafrika?
Vår första kontakt med Sydafrika var i och med försäljning av ärtor. Landet hade
problem med skörd av ärtor ett år och då kom de till oss med en förfrågan om vi kunde
sälja till dem. Det året hade vi överskott av ärtor så vi bestämde oss för att sälja några
tusen ton till dem. De var otroligt glada över den kvalitetsnormen våra produkter har
och då sålde vi inte ens våra bästa ärtor till dem – och de var ändå de bästa de hade
smakat! Det är just det som är vår styrka i företaget, att våra produkter, ärtor i det här
fallet, har korta fraktavstånd mellan skörden och nedfrysningen. Det i sin tur leder till
att våra råvaror behåller sin färskhet. Vi gjorde en marknadsundersökning med hjälp av
en konsult för att se var vi kan passa in med fisk, wok, grönsaker och färdigrätter.
Konsulten undersökte då olika prisnivåer etc. Vissa områden som till exempel fisk är
svårt, detta på grund av bland annat höga tullar. Med grönsaker, wok och färdigrätter
har vi en klar konkurrensfördel. Där har vi en mervärdes-produkt där vi adderar något
till produkten, till exempel fiskgratäng. Vi kände alltså att det fanns en plats för oss i
och med att detta inte fanns mycket av på marknaden. Men vi hade ännu ingen partner.
Det är helt avgörande enligt mig. Vi har köpt mycket fisk från Sydafrika, från samma
firma i 15-20 års tid. Vi bestämde oss för att åkte dit och presenterade Findus koncept.
Det var ett long shot, men de tyckte att det var kanonintressant med provsmakningar
osv. Vi fick en riktigt bra fit med dem och vi har en bra relation, för de tror på det vi står
för – fresh food frozen. Man tar ju grönsaken när den är som bäst och fryser den. Det vi
fick kompromissa om, var att vi inte fick sälja fisk, eftersom det var deras område. Vi
kan ju inte konkurrera med dem. De säljer sitt (fisk) och vi säljer vårt (wok, grönsaker
och färdigrätter). Vi gjorde en strategisk lansering och de valde en trading partner (typ
som ica), som de tyckte att Findus skulle passa bäst i. Eftersom vi fraktar från Sverige
så blir vi ju inte billigast på marknaden i Sydafrika. Det är inte heller vår tanke, med
tanke på den kvalitén på våra produkter vi har och erbjuda. Då gäller det att hitta en
matvaru-kedja och en målgrupp som passar den prisklassen vi har. Vi lyckades hitta en
bra kedja som hjälper oss att exponera oss på bästa möjliga sätt. Vi jobbade 1,5 år med
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att planera lanseringen, efter det är det stor kick-off i media. Jag ska skicka över
pressreleasen.
Har ni hunnit få någon respons ännu?
Vi har varit igång i tre veckor. Det går bra ur butiken, vissa såklart bättre än andra. Den
bästa feedbacken är att de flesta säger att det är en oerhört bra kvalité på produkterna
och att de kommer fortsätta köpa Findus. När man köper färska grönsaker så rensar man
ju de hemma i tillagningen, men det gör vi på bästa effektiva sätt i produktionen, vilket
gör att de frysta grönsaker man köper av oss, konsumerar man i stort sett allt utav. Man
behöver inte rensa och kasta något. Vi försöker förse marknaden med nyskapande och
vår position vi försöker bygga heter Success on a plate – Succé på tallriken. Vi har
skojat lite med loggan Findus = FInd Us. Vi vill inte uppfattas som ett svenskt
varumärke, inte utpräglat i Sydafrika. Det finns nämligen ett väldigt nationalistiskt
tankesätt i Sydafrika. Regeringen kör kampanjer för att främja deras lokala
produktioner. Det måste vi respektera med samtidigt måste man respektera att
konsumenten har andra kvalitetskrav. Men Sydafrika har många höga kvalitéer inom
kött och fisk. Det vi alltså säger är att ”Nu är vi tillgängliga här!” och inte ”Vi kommer
ifrån Sverige med en stor svensk flagga”.
De har inget särskilt emot Sverige. Ingen har något ont och säga, de är åtminstone
neutrala eller positiva.
Det måste ju hjälpa er?
Det är ingenting vi spinner på.
Varför valde ni Afrika och inte till exempel Sydamerika?
Våra makroanalyser visar oss var det finns fryskonsumtion. Hur stor är den och hur
mycket växer den? Hur ser handelsstrukturen ut och hur pass centraliserad är den? Vilka
marginaler jobbar man med? Utifrån det så kommer vi fram till vissa intressanta
marknader. Korea och Malaysia är också några intressanta marknader. Latinamerika är
också intressant, snarare än Sydamerika. Även Sydafrika dök upp.
En bra relation är vital för ett inträde i ett land. Man kan ha en relation som gör att ens
distributör jobbar mer aktivt för att lyckas med Findus. Och det tror jag vi har nu och
det har varit helt avgörande. Vi har en fantastisk dialog med vår partner. De har varit
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här och tittat och förstått vad vi vill åstadkomma och dem känner att vi har något stort
på gång.
Men som svar på er fråga så kan jag säga att om vi hade varit någon annanstans så hade
de kanske frågat varför vi inte befinner oss i till exempel Ryssland. Ryssland är
tillsammans med Kina en enorm möjlighet, men bara för det är stort betyder inte det att
det är en bra idé. Det är problem med Rysslands sju regioner, att kunna hitta någon
distributör i varje region eller en som har hand om alla. Även tullar som kan ändras
väldigt snabbt och radikalt.
Ni exporterar bara till Sydafrika, har ni ingen produktion?
Nej, ingen produktion. Vi kan tänka oss det på sikt. Vi exporterar ju grönsaker från
Sverige, som är odlade med en annan kvalitetsnivå. Vårt konkurrensargument kommer
falla om vi börjar odla i Sydafrika, eftersom vi står för kvalitet från Sverige. Vår
positionering är att vi är en högkvalitativ leverantör av smak. Kvalitén ska ju leda till att
de smakar bättre. Vi får den feedbacken.
Hur ser det ut med konkurrensen i Sydafrika och närliggande länder? Är ni först?
Jag ska vara försiktig med att säga något om närliggande länder. Vår distributör vill
flytta våra produkter till andra länder, och de får de gärna göra. Där finns andra aktörer
McCains (USA), global aktör med potatis. De är också duktiga på grönsaker, speciellt i
Sydafrika. De är en stor spelare på det, vi har även sålt ärtor till dem. De är en
konkurrent som finns idag och som vi får tampas med. Dem konkurrerar med pris och
vi med kvalité.
Det finns alltså marknadsandelar för er att ta upp?
Man har inte fullt utforskat möjligheten att få konsumenten att tillgodose en hög
kvalitativ produkt inom grönsaker. Vi erbjuder hög kvalité hela året runt.
Känner du att ni uppnår first mover-advantages och skalfördelar i och med ni är
tidiga på marknaden?
Det är en fin teori, men det finns redan frysta konkurrenter. Det finns inte fler från
Skandinavien och det finns inte heller obegränsat med utrymme. Så vi har ersatt en
redan befintlig aktör och tagit deras plats i frysdisken. Findus riktar sig, till skillnad mot
befintliga aktörer, till en bredare målgrupp. Det är en absolut fördel. Dock är det här
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inte applicerbart överallt. T ex i Serbien hade våra ärtor kanske inte gått hem, där de
kanske kostar dubbelt så mycket som de lokala ärtorna. Vi ska mötas igen i Sydafrika i
september och planera ytterligare steg.
Vad har varit det största hindret på vägen?
En utmaning är att hitta en distributör. Det låter kanske enkelt, men att åka runt,
presentera sig och få en bra uppfattning är viktigt. Distributörerna säger ofta att de kan
fixa vad som krävs, men det är inte alltid dem kan det. Den svåraste biten är
förpackningsutvecklingen, med alla lokala lagar och bestämmelser som Sydafrika har
på den biten. Lagarna är inte komplicerade endast mot utländska, utan de har lagar som
säger att förpackningen måste se ut på ett visst sätt. Distributören kan hjälpa en att få
bort majoriteten av dessa problem, men man måste uppfylla alla krav annars får man
inte lov att sälja. Det är många små detaljer som kan hindra. De är dock inte omöjliga,
men kan vara väldigt tidskrävande. Man har ju konkurrenter som lägger klagomål som
säger att det inte är det finaste. Men då visar vi dem att det är de, ibland annat våra
broschyrer. Vi blir också ifrågasatta när vi kommer in med mycket statements. Då
känner sig bland annat konkurrenterna sig hotade och kan ta till action.
Hur ser det ut med skatter, tariffer och tullar? I och med er export.
Vi har bra koll på det i och med att vi exporterar så mycket i Findus. Vi har en bra insikt
inom detta. Vi har en tullavdelning som jobbar med det här, de tar fram tullkoder på
våra produkter och tittar och säger att de borde vara si och så mycket. Det är krångligt
att exportera mat. Vi hade en halv telefonkatalog med intyg, livsmedelsverksintyg och
så vidare. Första gången är alltid jobbigast, men efter ett tag så har man mer koll.
Hur kommer er bransch att utvecklas i Sydafrika de närmsta 5-10 åren?
Den dialogen som kommer från konsumenterna är att fryst och färskt är viktigt. Vi anser
att storskalig produktion är bättre än småskalig, då den småskaliga belastar miljön än
mer. Vi anser ju att den djupfrysta är den bästa, odlingsmässigt. Vi odlar inte
ekologiskt, utan vi kör efter Low Input State Agriculture. Vi använder inte för mycket
bekämpningsmedel. Vi är hoppfulla att vi som företag kan gå vidare med våra
distributörer osv, framförallt i Sydafrika. Man har kanske mer utvecklingsmöjligheter i
Sydafrika än i Sverige, som är ett mer utvecklat land.
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Så det känns bra?
Nu gäller det att vara försiktig, då vi endast är tre veckor in i lanseringen. Man behöver
minst 3 månader för att få ett rebuy från konsumenten, en återkommande konsument. Vi
har en bra partner och bra produkter så min magkänsla känns bra!
Ni kör endast export?
Vi exporterar från de flesta av våra fabriker. Det är lite mer en slump att Sydafrikas
import kommer just från Bjuv. Men vi har alla produkter de önskar här. Det underlättar
ju även logistiskt att allt är här ifrån.
Är export den bästa metoden?
Förmodligen kan vi producera det effektivare där nere. Men när du pratar effektivitet
behöver man storskalighet. Kanske 50 000 ton för att dra runt en bra anläggning. Vi har
sålt 500 ton dit, så vi är en bra bit ifrån. Det kommer kanske senare i skedena. Vi kan
kanske bli effektivare genom att producera vissa bitar där, men då ska man kanske titta
på fler länder i Afrika på hur man tar tillvara på det man kan flytta. Men innan dess
måste vi ha större volym, ungefär 10 gånger mer.
Vad har ni lärt er från tidigare samarbeten och exporter? Kulturskillnader och så
vidare.
Alla länder har ju sin kultur. Inom Skandinavien så skiljer det sig också. Affärskultur
kan man lära sig och anpassa sig, men konsumenten måste vara beredd och köpa
produkten. Så där börjar man. Det gäller alltså att få konsumenten att vilja ha ens
produkt. Det är ganska få globala frysta varumärken. Vi är ändå ute och försöker
exportera i många olika länder. Det är större skillnad på hur man gör affärer än det är på
konsumenterna. Våra produkter kräver viss lokal smakanpassning i vissa länder. Helt
annan mentalitet i gulfområdet och i Kina. Vi har försökt där länge. Där är det
krångligare. Där är många saker i vägen. Både kultur och lagliga bitar.
Vad gjorde vi då bra i Sydafrika som vi inte lyckades med i gulfområdet? Det är svårt
att säga. Men relationen och närheten till distributörerna. Det är, återigen, oerhört
viktigt.
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Tror ni att ni kommer gå till andra Afrikanska länder senare?
Vi är redan i Algeriet, Tunisien och Marocko sen 2009. Vår tidigare franska exportchef
ledde till att vi etablerades där, i och med att de talar franska där. Det är en oerhörd
fördel att kunna kommunicera med dem.
Har du några övriga upplysningar?
Det vi gör är inte raketforskning. Utan vi gör en makro- och marknadsanalys för och se
om vi kan hitta en fit. Hur tar man bäst hand om detta? Prata med distributörer,
utvärdera vem som är pålitlig. Ta hjälp från exportrådet och andra konsulter. Göra
gråzonen lite mer svart och vit. Man behöver resurser och organisation, då det kan ta
lång tid från idé till verkliga affärer. En bra informerad ledningsgrupp och VD som vet
vad ni gör och varför, strategiskt. Man ska ha ett långsiktigt tankesätt när man vill
exportera. Det krävs från logistik- och tullavdelningarna. Och där kan man få hjälp
.
Afrika är ju en växande marknad. Får de bara ordning på politisk och ekonomisk
instabilitet så kan det ju bli en guldgruva för många företag.
Det har ju kineserna redan uppfattat, som investerat i halva kontinenten redan. Afrika
kan gå liknande vägar som Kina. Inte exakt, men liknande. Afrika är mer kortsiktiga än
långsiktiga Kina. Det är en väldigt intressant marknad. Vi håller oss borta från politiska
diskussioner, men man är ju medveten om läget.
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Appendix 3.4 Interview 4, Marie Englesson, CEO, Atsoko
Berätta om din verksamhet och dina internationella affärer
Vi håller på med ett företag där vi då ska öppna kosmetikbutiker nere i Tanzania och
Rwanda.
Vad har du för position i företaget? Är det ditt egna företag?
Ja det är mitt egna företag som jag startat själv.
När bestämde ni för att expandera dit och varför valde ni just Afrika?
Jag har tidigare jobbat på ett Telecom företag som är verksam nere i Afrika. Då jobbade
jag som inköpare. Det var väl då man insåg vilka möjligheter som fanns där.
Vad är det svåraste med att expandera just i Afrika?
Det är att marknaderna saknar regleringar och det är ganska oklart vilka regler som
gäller och det är väldigt svårt att hitta folk som man kan lita på och jobba med.
Hur länge pågick planeringarna för att expandera dit?
Cirka ett halvår till ett år.
Var det en jobbig process? Var det mycket och tänka på, fixa och planera?
Ja, det är kanske det man inser att det är väldigt svårt och planera, så vår strategi har väl
varit mer att gå ner och åka ner och testa och se vad som funkar och liksom lite mer trial
and error så att man kan planera att nu gör vi så här, för det händer hela tiden massa
saker som man inte hade räknat med.
Mötte ni några hinder på vägen? Kultur- och språksvårigheter?
Svårt och prata engelska, man får ju tänka lite på att när man kommunicerar med folk så
måste man vara så enkel, rak och tydlig som möjligt. Så när det gäller kultur så kan det
vara svårt och läsa folk och förstå vilka avsikter dem har. Å andra sidan så är det så att
när man gör affärer så kan man inte lita på folk riktigt.
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Är det från ert perspektiv eller deras? Att dem inte litar på er eller ni inte litar på
dem?
Det är nog på båda håll tror jag. Just med tillit tycker jag är rätt så svårt, folk är väldigt
kortsiktiga och folk är vana vid att inte lita på folk. Så det är nog nästan de stora
skillnaderna som jag tycker att Sverige eller mer mogna marknader där det finns vanliga
regler som gör att om man inte följer ett avtal så finns det institutioner men det finns ju
inte på samma sätt där utan det blir då att man måste lita mer på folk.
Tycker du det ser ljust ut att expandera till den afrikanska marknaden och att det
kommer att kunna utvecklas med tiden?
Ja, vårt företag finns ju inte på några andra marknader utan det finns bara i Tanzania
och Rwanda. På något sätt anpassas vårt företag efter den lokala marknaden. Kulturen
och värderingarna man försöker bygga upp i företaget ska ju på något sätt fungera där.
Hur gick ni till väga när ni expanderade? Startade ni företaget från grunden där?
Ja, vi gjorde så att vi hade ett företag registrerat i Sverige och sedan så startade vi upp
ett dotterbolag nere i Tanzania där vi då har lokaldelägare. Vi har tanzaniska och
svenska investerare, detta för att man inte kan som utlänning starta upp i Tanzania utan
en lokaldelägare, det finns massa hinder som till exempel arbetstillstånd och att kunna
få hyreskontrakt vilket är väldigt svårt att få som utlänning. Det är väldigt svårt och
starta upp någonting utan att ha en lokaldelägare.
Har du planer på att utveckla er eller expandera till andra länder i Afrika?
Ja det tittar vi på, vi tittar främst på två i Östafrika, egentligen kanske inte de här två
länderna har så mycket gemensamt, det är inte som EU eller så där men på något sätt
finns det någon typ av drag där och någon typ av kommunitet i Östafrika. Så vi tittar i så
fall på Uganda och Lindi och eventuellt Etiopien. Men det är lite längre fram, vi har
tillräckligt med Tanzania och Rwanda just nu.
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Hur länge har ni varit etablerade på marknaden? Är det nystartat?
Företaget var registrerat förra våren, sen så tog det ytterligare ett tag innan vi bestämde
exakt vad vi skulle göra och vad som var möjligt och nu öppnade butiken för bara några
veckor sedan, så det är helt nystartat.
Finns det några konkurrenter på marknaden?
Ja det finns det, några lokala ägare som har liknande kosmetikbutiker, det börjar komma
mer seriösa affärer men det är mindre affärer som tar in mindre partier av varor och så
säljer dem de lokalt. Det finns några indiska och arabiska affärsplatser, som vi kanske
skulle kunna se som konkurrenter. Det finns liknande produkter men inte riktigt samma
saker.
Hur är välkomnandet på marknaden av regering och folk? Blir det enklare när
man använder sig av lokaldelägare?
Det är väldigt stor skillnad på Rwanda och Tanzania. Tanzania känns det väldigt mer
som att dem försöker göra det så svårt som möjligt, på lite olika håll. Det kan vara så att
man försöker få till hyreskontrakt eller annat så får man betala mycket mer än de lokala
för folk tror att vi har en massa pengar. Sedan det som är svårast just i Tanzania är
arbetstillstånd, där dem i princip förhalar och förhalar. Vi har hållit på och försöka få
arbetstillstånd i 9 månader nu fast vi har investerat, byggt upp ett bolag och anställt folk
lokalt så undrar man vad det är som gör att vi inte får arbetstillstånd då. I Rwanda är det
lättare, regleringsmässigt. Men till exempel märker man mycket från skatteverken att
dem, man försöker följa alla deras lagar och regler men så tycker dem det är väldigt
intressant när man betalar in skatt så blir det nästan att dem försöker granska lite extra
noga.
Varför exporterar ni inte och anlitar någon distributör eller leverantör på plats?
Är det viktigt och vara på plats i dem länderna?
Det finns väldigt dåligt med bra distributörer. Vi är ju egentligen en distributör och det
är inga egna märken som vi tillverka. Det finns inte många bra lokala distributörer.
Företag säger samma saker och det är ju ett problem att vi som säljer smink och dem vi
köper av har haft väldigt dåliga erfarenheter då när dem skeppat varor och kanske gett
kredit och sedan har deras köpare aldrig betalt dem. Det är väldigt ojuste då det inte
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finns några riktiga bra lagar eller möjligheter då att följa upp då med lagliga medel, det
gör det väldigt svårt.
Har ni lärt er av några misstag när ni expanderat dit? Eventuella fallgropar att
tänka på om ni ska expandera till andra länder sedan?
Man måste ta det lite försiktigt när man ger sig in på de här marknaderna. Om man
bestämmer sig för att göra något i Sverige så kan man köra på ganska hårt och lägga in
massa pengar, man gör en plan och sedan går det mer eller mindre enligt plan A men i
Afrika så kan det bli helt fel och man kan verkligen stöta på saker som man inte alls
hade räknat med. Det kan vara personer som ställer till med problem, anställda. Det kan
vara myndigheter som plötsligt hittar på någon ny reglering så man får ta det lite lugnt.
Så man kan inte köra på för hårt om man inte har råd med det.
Har du några övriga synpunkter, framtidsutsikter eller om er verksamhet som kan
vara relevant för folk som forskar kring svenska företag i Afrika?
Det man märker när man är nere i Afrika är att i Tanzania finns det en del svenska
företag men jag har jobbat rätt mycket i Västafrika och andra länder också och svenska
företag är inte så närvarande om man jämför med till exempel franska, holländska och
brittiska kolonialländerna men jag tror faktiskt att svenska företag kan. Det märker man
ganska bra på att vi inte har just samma historia som dem andra länderna så då kanske
vi kan bli lite mer väl mottagna, just att vi är ganska lugna och förståndiga för det mesta
så tror jag att det skulle kunna gå bra för svenska företag. Men vi har samtidigt ganska
mycket att lära oss, vi är inte så många, vi är inte alls lika starka. De franska och
holländska företagen har mycket hjälp av sina gamla relationer med de här länderna och
vi har inte riktigt samma gamla stöd.