G.R. No. L-24101. September 30, 1970MARIA TERESA Y. CUADRA, minor represented by her father ULISES P. CUADRA, ET. AL. Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. ALFONSO MONFORT, Defendant-Appellant.

FACTS: Maria Cuadra and Maria Monfort, both minors, were classmates in elementary. On July 9, 1962, they were assigned by their teacher, together with three classmates, to weed the grass in the school premises. Maria Monfort found a plastic headband. She jokingly said aloud that she found an earthworm, clearly to frighten Maria Cuadra and tossed the headband to Maria Cuadra. The object hit Maria Cuadras right eye. To prevent the pain, she rubbed the injured part and treated it with some powder. The next day, her eye became swollen and told her parents about the incident. She underwent surgery twice (July 20 and August 4, 1962) and stayed in the hospital for twenty-three days. Despite medical efforts, she completely lost the eyesight of her right eye. Cuadras parents then instituted a civil suit against the father of Maria Monfort in behalf of their daughter. Defendant was ordered to pay for actual damages, moral damages and attorneys fees, plus the costs of the suit.

ISSUE: Whether or not Adolfo Monfort is liable for the act of his minor child which caused damage to another.

RULING and RATIONALE: No. Article 2180 provides that the father, in case of his incapacity or death, the mother, is responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company. The basis of this vicarious, although primary, liability is fault or negligence, which is presumed from that which accompanied the causative act or omission. The presumption is merely prima facie and may therefore be rebutted. This is the clear and logical inference that may be drawn from the last paragraph of Article 2180, which states that the responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.

In the case at bar, there is nothing from which it may be inferred that Alfonso Monfort could have prevented the damage by the observance of due care, or that he was in any way remiss in the exercise of his parental authority in failing to foresee such damage, or the act which caused it. On the contrary, his child was at school, where it was his duty to send her and where she was, as he had the right to expect her to be, under the care and supervision of the teacher. And as far as the act which caused the injury was concerned, it was an innocent prank not unusual among children at play and which no parent, however careful, would have any special reason to anticipate much less guard against. Nor did it reveal any mischievous propensity, or indeed any trait in the childs character which would reflect unfavorably on her upbringing and for which the blame could be attributed to her parents.

DISSENTING: Maria Monfort is already 13 years old and should have known that by jokingly saying aloud that she had found an earthworm and, evidently to frighten the Cuadra girl, tossed the object at her, it was likely that something would happen to her friend, as in fact, she was hurt. There is nothing in the record that would indicate that Alfonso had properly advised his daughter to behave properly and not to play dangerous jokes on her classmate and playmates, he can be liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. There is nothing in the record to show that he had done anything at all to even try to minimize the damage caused upon by his child.

Hermana R. Cerezo, petitioner, vs. David Tuazon, respondent.

Facts: Around noontime of26 June 1993, a Country Bus Lines passenger bus collided with a tricycle.October 1, 1993, tricycle driver Tuazon filed a complaint for damages against Mrs. Cerezo, owner of the bus line, her husband Attorney Juan Cerezo, and bus driver Danilo A. Foronda. Plaintiff alleged that he was in his proper lane when Foronda, driver of the Country Bus, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously operate the said motor vehicle in a negligent, careless, and imprudent manner without due regard to traffic rules and regulations, there being a Slow Down sign near the scene of the incident, and without taking the necessary precaution to prevent loss of lives or injuries, his negligence, carelessness and imprudence resulted to severe damage to the tricycle and serious physical injuries to plaintiff thus making him unable to walk and becoming disabled, with his thumb and middle finger on the left hand being cut.Issue: Whether or not the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction because there was no service of summons on Foronda. Moreover, Tuazon failed to reserve his right to institute a separate civil action for damages in the criminal action.Ruling: Instant petition for review denied.The of the Court of isAFFIRMEDwith theMODIFICATION.Ration: Mrs. Cerezos contention proceeds from the point of view of criminal law and not of civil law, while the basis of the present action of Tuazon is quasi-delict under the Civil Code, not delict under the Revised Penal Code.Because of a negligent act, an aggrieved party may choose between the two remedies for civil liability arising from a delict under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, or may give rise to an action for a quasi-delict under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. An action based on a quasi-delict may proceed independently from the criminal action.Tuazon chose to file an action for damages based on a quasi-delict. The trial court thus found Mrs. Cerezo liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.Article 2180 states in part:Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.Mrs. Cerezos liability as an employer in an action for a quasi-delict is not only solidary, it is also primary and direct.The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary.Where there is a solidary obligation on the part of debtors, as in this case, each debtor is liable for the entire obligation.Hence, each debtor is liable to pay for the entire obligation in full.There is no merger or renunciation of rights, but only mutual representation.Where the obligation of the parties is solidary, either of the parties is indispensable, and the other is not even a necessary party because complete relief is available from either. Therefore, jurisdiction over Foronda is not even necessary as Tuazon may collect damages from Mrs. Cerezo alone.Although liability under Article 2180 originates from the negligent act of the employee, the aggrieved party may sue the employer directly.When an employee causes damage, the law presumes that the employer has himself committed an act of negligence in not preventing or avoiding the damage.This is the fault that the law condemns.While the employer is civilly liable in a subsidiary capacity for the employees criminal negligence, the employer is also civilly liable directly and separately for his own civil negligence in failing to exercise due diligence in selecting and supervising his employee.The action can be brought directly against the person responsible for another, without including the author of the act.The action against the principal is accessory in the sense that it implies the existence of a prejudicial act committed by the employee, but it is not subsidiary in the sense that it cannot be instituted till after the judgment against the author of the act or at least, that it is subsidiary to the principal action; the action for responsibility of the employer is in itself a principal action.Thus, there is no need in this case for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over Foronda.The trial courts acquisition of jurisdiction over Mrs. Cerezo is sufficient to dispose of the present case on the merits.

[G.R. No. 132266. December 21, 1999.] CASTILEX INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION,Petitioner, v. VICENTE VASQUEZ, JR. and LUISA SO VASQUEZ, and CEBU DOCTORS HOSPITAL, INC.,Respondents.

FACTS:

1. On 28 August 1988, at around 1:30 to 2:00 in the morning, Romeo So Vasquez, was driving a Honda motorcycle around Fuente Osmea Rotunda. He was traveling counter-clockwise, (the normal flow of traffic in a rotunda) but without any protective helmet or goggles. He was also only carrying a Students Permit to Drive at the time.

2. Upon the other hand, Benjamin Abad [was a] manager of Appellant Castilex Industrial Corporation, registered owner of a Toyota Hi-Lux Pick-up. On the same date and time, Abad drove the said company car out of a parking lot but instead of going around the Osmea rotunda he made a short cut against the flow of the traffic in proceeding to his route to General Maxilom St. or to Belvic St.

3. In the process, the motorcycle of Vasquez and the pick-up of Abad collided with each other causing severe injuries to the former. Abad stopped his vehicle and brought Vasquez to the Southern Islands Hospital and later to the Cebu Doctors Hospital.

4. On September 5, 1988, Vasquez died at the Cebu Doctors Hospital.

5. After the police authorities had conducted the investigation of the accident, a Criminal Case was filed against Abad but which was subsequently dismissed for failure to prosecute. So, the present action for damages was commenced by Vicente Vasquez, Jr. and Luisa So Vasquez, parents of the deceased Romeo So Vasquez, against Jose Benjamin Abad and Castilex Industrial Corporation

6. ABAD, who was presented as a hostile witness, testified that at the time of the incident, he was driving a company-issued vehicle, registered under the name of petitioner. He was then leaving the restaurant where he had some snacks and had a chat with his friends after having done overtime work for the petitioner.

TRIAL COURT- In favor of Spouses Vasquez and ordered ABAD and CASTILEX to pay damages jointly and solidarily liable

CA- AFFIRMED the ruling of the trial court holding ABAD and CASTILEX liable but held that the liability of the latter is "only vicarious and not solidary" with the former

ISSUE:

Whether an employer may be held vicariously liable for the death resulting from the negligent operation by a managerial employee of a company-issued vehicle.

HELD:

NO. The court a quo and the Court of Appeals were one in holding that the driving by a manager of a company-issued vehicle is within the scope of his assigned tasks regardless of the time and circumstances.

We do not agree. The mere fact that ABAD was using a service vehicle at the time of the injurious incident is not of itself sufficient to charge petitioner with liability for the negligent operation of said vehicle unless it appears that he was operating the vehicle within the course or scope of his employment.

It has been held that an employee who uses his employers vehicle in going from his work to a place where he intends to eat or in returning to work from a meal is not ordinarily acting within the scope of his employment in the absence of evidence of some special business benefit to the employer.

To the mind of this Court, ABAD was engaged in affairs of his own or was carrying out a personal purpose not in line with his duties at the time he figured in a vehicular accident. It was then about 2:00 a.m. of 28 August 1988, way beyond the normal working hours. ABADs working day had ended; his overtime work had already been completed. His being at a place which, as petitioner put it, was known as a "haven for prostitutes, pimps, and drug pushers and addicts," had no connection to petitioners business; neither had it any relation to his duties as a manager. Rather, using his service vehicle even for personal purposes was a form of a fringe benefit or one of the perks attached to his position

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the appealed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the modification that petitioner Castilex Industrial Corporation be absolved of any liability for the damages caused by its employee, Jose Benjamin Abad.

SPOUSES FERNANDO AND LOURDES VILORIA, PETITIONERS, VS. CONTINENTAL AIRLINES, INC., RESPONDENT.

Facts: In 1997, while the spouses Viloria were in the United States, they approached Holiday Travel, a travel agency working for Continental Airlines, to purchase tickets from Newark to San Diego. The travel agent, Margaret Mager, advised the couple that they cannot travel by train because it is fully booked; that they must purchase plane tickets for Continental Airlines; that if they wont purchase plane tickets; theyll never reach their destination in time. The couple believed Magers representations and so they purchased two plane tickets worth $800.00.Later however, the spouses found out that the train trip isnt fully booked and so they purchased train tickets and went to their destination by train instead. Then they called up Mager to request for a refund for the plane tickets. Mager referred the couple to Continental Airlines. As the couple are now in the Philippines, they filed their request with Continental Airlines office in Ayala. The spouses Viloria alleged that Mager misled them into believing that the only way to travel was by plane and so they were fooled into buying expensive tickets.Continental Airlines refused to refund the amount of the ticket and so the spouses sued the airline company. In its defense, Continental Airlines claimed that the ticket sold to them by Mager is non-refundable; that, if any, they are not bound by the misrepresentations of Mager because theres no agency existing between Continental Airlines and Mager.The trial court ruled in favor of spouses Viloria but the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the RTC.

Issue: whether or not the principal, Continental Airlines may be held liable for the tort committed by its agents?

Ruling: In actions based on quasi-delict, a principal can only be held liable for the tort committed by its agents employees if it has been established by preponderance of evidence that the principal was also at fault or negligent or that the principal exercise control and supervision over them.airline company is not completely exonerated from any liability for the tort committed by its agents employees. A prior determination of the nature of the passengers cause of action is necessary. If the passengers cause of action against the airline company is premised onculpa aquilianaor quasi-delict for a tort committed by the employee of the airline companys agent, there must be an independent showing that the airline company was at fault or negligent or has contributed to the negligence or tortuous conduct committed by the employee of its agent. The mere fact that the employee of the airline companys agent has committed a tort is not sufficient to hold the airline company liable. There is novinculum jurisbetween the airline company and its agents employees and the contractual relationship between the airline company and its agent does not operate to create a juridical tie between the airline company and its agents employees. Article 2180 of the Civil Code does not make the principal vicariously liable for the tort committed by its agents employees and the principal-agency relationshipper sedoes not make the principal a party to such tort; hence, the need to prove the principals own fault or negligence.

On the other hand, if the passengers cause of action for damages against the airline company is based on contractual breach orculpa contractual, it is not necessary that there be evidence of the airline companys fault or negligence. As this Court previously stated inChina Air Linesand reiterated inAir France vs. Gillego,[24]in an action based on a breach of contract of carriage, the aggrieved party does not have to prove that the common carrier was at fault or was negligent. All that he has to prove is the existence of the contract and the fact of its non-performance by the carrier.

Spouses Vilorias cause of action on the basis of Magers alleged fraudulent misrepresentation is clearly one of tort or quasi-delict, there being no pre-existing contractual relationship between them. Therefore, it was incumbent upon Spouses Viloria to prove that CAI was equally at fault.

However, the records are devoid of any evidence by which CAIs alleged liability can be substantiated. Apart from their claim that CAI must be held liable for Magers supposed fraud because Holiday Travel is CAIs agent, Spouses Viloria did not present evidence that CAI was a party or had contributed to Magers complained act either by instructing or authorizing Holiday Travel and Mager to issue the said misrepresentation.

[G.R. No. L-25142. March 25, 1975.]PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC. and FELIX PANGALANGAN,Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. PHIL-AMERICAN FORWARDERS, INC., ARCHIMEDES J. BALINGIT and FERNANDO PINEDA,Defendants-Appellees.

Doctrine: The terms "employer" and "owner and manager of establishment or enterprise" as used in Article 2180 of the Civil Code do not include the manager of a corporation owning a truck the reckless operation of which allegedly resulted in the vehicular accident from which the damage arose.

Facts:

Fernando Pineda drove recklessly a freight truck owned by Phi-American Forwarders, Inc, when it bumped the bus driven by Felix Pangalanan which was owned by Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines. As a result of this, Pangalanan suffered injuries and the bus was damaged and cannot be used for 79 days. Among the defenses of the Phil-American Forwarders was that Balingit, the manager of manager of the company, was not Pinedas employer. Balingit moved that the complaint be dismissed on the ground that the bus company and the bus driver has no cause of action against him. The lower court dismissed the action as to Balingit. This was appealed by the plaintiffs.

Issue:

Whether the terms "employers" and "owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise" used in article 2180 of the Civil Code, formerly article 1903 of the old Code, embrace the manager of a corporation owning a truck, the reckless operation of which allegedly resulted in the vehicular accident from which the damage arose.

Held:

The Court ruled that those terms do not include the manager of a corporation. It may be gathered from the context of article 2180 that the term "manager" ("director" in the Spanish version) is used in the sense of "employer."Hence, under the allegations of the complaint, no tortious or quasi-delictual liability can be fastened on Balingit as manager of Phil-American Forwarders, Inc., in connection with the vehicular accident already mentioned because he himself may be regarded as an employee or dependiente of his employer, Phil-American Forwarders, Inc.

The bus company and its driver, in their appellants brief, injected a new factual issue which was not alleged in their complaint. They argue that Phil-American Forwarders, Inc. is merely a business conduit of Balingit because Balingit and his wife were the controlling stockholders. That argument implies that the veil of corporate fiction should be pierced and that Phil-American Forwarders, Inc. and Balingit and his wife should be treated as one and the same civil personality.We cannot countenance that argument in this appeal. It was not raised in the lower court. The case has to be decided on the basis of the pleadings filed in the trial court where it was assumed that Phil-American Forwarders, Inc. has a personality separate and distinct from that of the Balingit spouses.[G.R. No. L-29025. October 4, 1971.]Spouses MOISES P. PALISOC and BRIGIDA P. PALISOC,Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. ANTONIO C, BRILLANTES and TEODOSIO V. VALENTON, owner and President, respectively, of a school of arts and trades, known under the name and style of "Manila Technical Institute" (M.I.T.), VIRGILIO L. DAFFON and SANTIAGO M. QUIBULUE,Defendants-Appellees.

Facts: Plaintiffs-appellants as parents of their sixteen-year old son, Dominador Palisoc, and a student in automotive mechanics at the Manila Technical Institute, Quezon Boulevard, Manila, had filed on May 19, 1966, an action for damages arising from the death on March 10, 1966 of their son at the hands of a fellow student, defendant Virgilio L. Daffon, at the laboratory room of the said Institute.Defendants, per the trial courts decisions are:" (T)he defendant Antonio C. Brillantes, at the time when the incident which gave rise to his action occurred was a member of the Board of Directors of the institute; 1 the defendant Teodosio Valenton, the president thereof; the defendant Santiago M. Quibulue, instructor of the class to which the deceased belonged; and the defendant Virgilio L. Daffon, a fellow student of the deceased.

(T)he deceased Dominador Palisoc and the defendant Virgilio L. Daffon were classmates, and on the afternoon of March 10, 1966, between two and three oclock, they, together with another classmate Desiderio Cruz were in the laboratory room located on the ground floor. At that time the classes were in recess. Desiderio Cruz and Virgilio L. Daffon were working on a machine while Dominador Palisoc was merely looking on at them. Daffon made a remark to the effect that Palisoc was acting like a foreman. Because of this remark Palisoc slapped slightly Daffon on the face. Daffon, in retaliation, gave Palisoc a strong flat blow on the face, which was followed by other fist blows on the stomach. Palisoc retreated apparently to avoid the fist blows, but Daffon followed him and both exchanged blows until Palisoc stumbled on an engine block which caused him to fall face downward. Palisoc became pale and fainted. First aid was administered to him but he was not revived, so he was immediately taken to a hospital. He never regained consciousness; finally he died.

The trial court found defendant Daffon liable for the quasi delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. However, it absolved from liability the three other defendants-officials of the Manila Technical Institute, in this wise:". . . Their liabilities are based on the provisions of Article 2180 of the New Civil Code which reads:Art. 2180. . . .Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students and apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody."

Issue: Whether the officials of the Manila Technical Institute are liable for the damages caused by their pupils while they are in their custody.

Held: The Court finds the appeal, in the main, to be meritorious.

The lower court therefore erred in law in absolving defendants-school officials on the ground that they could be held liable under Article 2180, Civil Code, only if the student who inflicted the fatal fistblows on his classmate and victim "lived and boarded with his teacher or the other defendants officials of the school." As stated above, the phrase used in the cited article "so long as (the students) remain in their custody" means the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at attendance in the school, including recess time. At any rate, the law holds them liable unless they relieve themselves of such liability, in compliance with the last paragraph of Article 2180, Civil Code, by" (proving) that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage." In the light of the factual findings of the lower courts decision, said defendants failed to prove such exemption from liability.

The parents of the student at fault, defendant Daffon, are not involved, since Daffon was already of age at the time of the tragic incident. No liability attaches to defendant Brillantes as a mere member of the schools board of directors. The school itself cannot be held similarly liable, since it has not been properly impleaded as party defendant.

The rationale of such liability of school heads and teachers for the tortious acts of their pupils and students, so long as they remain in their custody, is that they stand, to a certain extent, as to their pupils and students, in loco parentis and are called upon to "exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child."This is expressly provided for in Articles 349, 350 and 352 of the Civil Code. 12 In the law of torts, the governing principle is that the protective custody of the school heads and teachers is mandatorily substituted for that of the parents, and hence, it becomes their obligation as well as that of the school itself to provide proper supervision of the students activities during the whole time that they are at attendance in the school, including recess time, as well as to take the necessary precautions to protect the students in their custody from dangers and hazards that would reasonably be anticipated, including injuries that some student themselves may inflict willfully or through negligence on their fellow students.

CITY OF MANILA VS GENERO TEOTICO AND THE COURT OF APPEALS [G.R. No. L-23052. January 29, 1968.]SYLLABUS

1. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF CIVIL CODE, THOUGH A GENERAL LAW, PREVAIL OVER MANILA CHARTER, SPECIAL LAW. Insofar as its territorial application is concerned, Republic Act 409 is a special law and the Civil Code is a general legislation; but as regards the subject-matter of the provisions of sec. 4, Rep. Act 409 and Article 2189 of the Civil Code, the former establishes a general rule regulating the liability of the City of Manila for damages or injury to persons or property arising from the failure of city officers to enforce the provisions of said Act; while article 2189 of the Civil Code constitutes a particular prescription making provinces, cities and municipalities liable for damages for the death or injury suffered by any person by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets and other public works under the control or supervision of said municipal governments. In other words, sec. 4 of Rep. Act 409 refers to liability arising from negligence in general regardless of the object thereof, whereas Article 2189 of the Civil Code, governs liability due to defective streets in particular. The Civil Code is decisive herein because the present action is based on the alleged defective condition of a road.

2. PLEADINGS; ANSWER; ALLEGATIONS NOT SET FORTH IN ANSWER, CANNOT BE RAISED FOR FIRST TIME ON APPEAL. The assertion that P. Burgos Avenue is a national highway for which the City of Manila is not liable, was made for the first time in the petitioners motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals. It was not alleged in the answer. Such assertion raised a question of fact which had not been put in issue in the trial court and cannot, therefore, be raised for the first time on appeal much less after the rendition of the decision of the appellate court.

3. ID.; FINDINGS OF FACT OF COURT OF APPEALS, CONCLUSIVE. The determination of whether or not P. Burgos Avenue is under the control or supervision of the City of Manila and whether the latter is guilty of negligence in connection with the maintenance of said road is a question of fact a question already decided by the Court of Appeals and the factual findings of said Court are not subject to a review by the Supreme Court.

Prior Proceedings:CFI Manila (RTC)- Sustained defendants and dismissed complaint of TeoticoCA- Appeal made by plaintiff Teotico, decision of TC was affirmed but City of Manila made to pay damagesSC- Appeal by certiorari, Decision of CA affirmed

Facts of the Case: Genaro N. Teotico was at the corner of the Old Luneta and P. Burgos Avenue, Manila, within a "loading and unloading" zone, waiting for a jeepney to take him down town. As he stepped down from the curb to board the jeepney, and took a few steps, he fell inside an uncovered and unlighted catchbasin or manhole on P. Burgos Avenue. Due to the fall, his head hit the rim of the manhole breaking his eyeglasses and causing broken pieces thereof to pierce his left eyelid. Teotico was taken to the Philippine General Hospital, where his injuries were treated.

As a consequence of the foregoing occurrence, Teotico filed, with the Court of First Instance of Manila, a complaint for damages against the City of Manila, its mayor, city engineer, city health officer, city treasurer and chief of police.

Issue: (1) What would govern the present case, Section 4 of RA 409 or Article 2189 of the NCC?(2) Can the City of Manila be held liable to Teotico for damages?

Held and Ratio: (1) Article 2189 of the NCC should be applied.

Article 2189 of the Civil Code constitutes a particular prescription making "provinces, cities and municipalities . . . liable for damages for the death of, or injury suffered by, any person by reason" specifically "of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision." In other words, said section 4 refers to liability arising from negligence, in general, regardless of the object thereof, whereas Article 2189 governs liability due to "defective streets, "in particular. Since the present action is based upon the alleged defective condition of a road, said Article 2189 is decisive thereon.

(2) Yes. Under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary for the liability therein established to attach that the defective roads or streets belong to the province, city or municipality from which responsibility is exacted. What said article requires is that the province, city or municipality have either "control or supervision" over said street or road. Even if P. Burgos avenue were, therefore, a national highway, this circumstance would not necessarily detract from its "control or supervision" by the City of Manila, under Republic Act 409.

This authority has been neither withdrawn nor restricted by Republic Act No. 917 and Executive Order No. 113, dated May 2, 1955, upon which the City relies. Said Act governs the disposition or appropriation of the highway funds and the giving of aid to provinces, chartered cities and municipalities in the construction of roads and streets within their respective boundaries, and Executive Order No. 113 merely implements the provisions of said Republic Act No. 917, concerning the disposition and appropriation of the highway funds. Moreover, it provides that "the construction, maintenance and improvement of national primary, national secondary and national aid provincial and city roads shall be accomplished by the Highway District Engineers and Highway City Engineers under the supervision of the Commissioner of Public Highways and shall be financed from such appropriations as may be authorized by the Republic of the Philippines in annual or special appropriation Acts."

MARGARITA AFIALDA VS BASILIO HISOLE AND FRANCISCO HISOLE

[G.R. No. L-2075. November 29, 1949.]

SYLLABUS1. DAMAGES; LIABILITY OF OWNER OF ANIMAL FOR DAMAGE CAUSED TO ITS CARETAKER. Under article 1905 of the Civil Code, the owner of an animal is not liable for injury caused by it to its caretaker.

Prior Proceedings:Lower Court- Action for damages dismissed against plaintiff for lack of cause of actionSupreme Court- Appeal

Facts of the Case: Deceased, Loreto Afialda, was employed by the defendant spouses as caretaker of their carabaos at a fixed compensation; that while tending the animals he was, on March 21, 1947, gored by one of them and later died as a consequence of his injuries; that the mishap was due neither to his own fault nor to force majeure; and that plaintiff is his elder sister and heir depending upon him for support.Plaintiff seeks to hold defendants liable under article 1905 of the Civil Code (Now Article 2183, NCC)

Issue: Is the owner of the animal in this case liable for the damage caused by his animal to its caretaker?

Held and Ratio: NO. The NCC provides that the owner of an animal is answerable only for damages caused to a stranger, and that for damage caused to the caretaker of the animal the owner would be liable only if he had been negligent or at fault under article 1902 (2183) of the same code.

In the present case, the animal was in the custody and under the control of the caretaker, who was paid for his work as such. Obviously, it was the caretakers business to try to prevent the animal from causing injury or damage to anyone, including himself. And being injured by the animal under those circumstances, was one of the risks of the occupation which he had voluntarily assumed and for which he must take the consequences.

Furthermore, it is essential that there be fault or negligence on the part of the defendants as owners of the animal that caused the damage. But the complaint contains no allegation on those points.

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