training and development of the german general staff iii - brennecke
TRANSCRIPT
Enliali Copy
Project # 6
TRAINING A iD DEVELOPMENT OF
GERIAN GENERAL STAFF OFFICERS
VOL III
Historical. Division European Coimand
Operational History Branch
Diviso,~JOL -3h l4)
This DocumentIS A HOLDING OF THE
ARCHIVES SECTIONLIBRARY SERVICES
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSASDOCUMENT NO. -754 COPY NO. 2.
CGSC FORM 160 Army-CGSC-P1-1367-29 Mar 51-5M13 Mar 51
a
'*1Z
MAS # P-031b
Kurt BREMNJEKEGeneral der InfanterieDirector of the Schoolfor Commanding Generals
Project # 6
GMffN GERAL STAFF
Vol III
TThEING AMU DEVELOPMENT OF
Translator: G.C . 'VA RST.)T
Editors Lt Col VRN
HISTORICAL DIVISIONEUROPEAN COMMWI
4tTh! 2i ~
k ..
y
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This is Vol III of 30 volumes concerning
the Training and Development of German Gene-
ral Staff Officers. It is divided into ti,
general portions, manuscripts numbered P-031a
are the results of studies solicited from in-dividual writers by the Historical Division,
ECM and consist of Volume's XXII to XXX in-clusive. The evaluation and synopsis givenin Volume I does not consider these volumes,Inasmuch as this material is considered tobe of imedtate value to the General StaffDepartment of the Anny as well as to serviceschools from the level of Command and GeneralStaff College upward, these volumes are sub-miitted as they are produced rather than wait-ing for completion of the project.
Volumes I to X wI were completed for Historical
Division, EWOM by individual writers underthe, supervision of the Control Group and con-sist of manuscripts numbered P-031b. Thisparticular series has been evaluated and co-
ordinated by the Control Group.
LOUIS M. NIAROCKCLt Colonel, ArmorChief, Foreign Military
Studies Branch
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IIDE COAI I1N THE G BWA COPY
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LIST OFOI' 1~TRII3I1TORS
Vol 1* TRAINING A1MID DV LOP1ANT OF G B~tN GENIRASTAFF O _ Gt. S
Author: Karl ALLMENDINGBR,General der Infanterie.
Vol II Author: Guenther BLPMNTRITT,_._,._..General der Infanterie.
Vol III Author: Kurt B1RENNF1OKE~,General der Infanterie.
Vol IV Author: Horst Freiherr von BUrTLAR,Generalma j or.
Vol V Author: Waldemar ERFURTH,General der Infanterie.
Vol VI Author: Friedrich Joachim FA&NGOHR,General der Infanterie.,
Vol VII
Vol VIII
Author: Hans : LBER,General der Infanterie.
Author: Herman R)ERTSCH,General der.Infanterie.
Vol IX Author :
Vol
Peter von GROEBEN,Generalleutnant.
K Author:, Fran HAIflR,.r.__.Generaloberst.
Vol xi Author:. Wolf HAUSER,Generalmajor.
Vol II
Vol XIII
Author : Helmut IV&IKA3AP,SGeneralmajor.
Author : Rudolf LANCHABUS R,Generalmiaj or.
*An Introduction and Epanatory Notes by Hans von G FF I3E G, Ge .alder Infanterie, and Commentaries on the Individual Contribuntion byGeorge von SOD NSTER.N, General der Infanterie, are included in Volme I.
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Vol XIV Author: 1IThelmn LIST,Generalfeldmarschall.
Vol XV Author: August Viktor von QUAST,,._..r_. Generalmaj or.
Vol XVI Author: Walter REISSIN(ER,Oberst i. G.
Vol XVII Author: Hans Georg RICHE~RT,Oberst i. Gs
Vol XVIII Author : Albrecht SC11IJ8RT,General der. Inf ant eri e.
Vol XIX Author : Hans SPETR,Generalleutnant.
Vol XX Author : Hernnann TESKE~,Oberst, i. G.
Vol XXI Author: Siegfried 7STPHALJ,General der Kavallerie.
Vol XXII Author; Fritz BM3SE HREOerstEi.G
Vol XIII Author: Werner von TIPPELSKaRCH,Oberst i. G.
Vol XXIV Author : Leo Freiherr Geyr von SCH PPFNURG,General der Parer.
Vol XXV Author:. Hans SPEfl)E3L, Thr.Generalleutnant.
Vol XXVI Author : ilhelm SP DK,General der Flie ger.
Vol XXVII Author : A].her4 1KSS L~NG,Generalfeldmarschall.
Vol XXIII Author:; Heinz GUJD RIAN,Generaloberst.
Vol XXX Author: Kurt~ MLZER, Dipl. Ing.Generalleutnant (Lu ftwaf fe )
Vol XXXV Author : Erich BRNBN$RGER,General der Arillerie.
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The Author
Kurt BBZ&NN CI,,General der InfanterieBorn: 16 December 1891Ringelheiheim, Harz, Germany.
After undergoing training in the Officer CandidateSchool, Metz, in 1910--U1, BRENNOCKE in the latteryear received his omnmission as a second lieutenantin the lth Infantry Regiment with which regimenthe served on the western front throughout WorldWar T.
Remaining in the service after the war, BREN ECKEwas awarded Geeral Staff Corps status in 1935 andpromoted colonel in the same year. Promoted bri-gadier general, BREN1NECK was assigned to SixbhArmy Group Headquarters at Hannover as Chief ofStaff in 1938. Immediately after the outbreak ofWorld War II he was transferred to the Fourth
Army again. as chief of staff. After the Polish and
French Campaign, in both of which he took part,
he was assigned to Army Group North on the eastern
front in October 1940. On 1 February 19h2 hewas promoted it general (Inf.) and at the end
of the same month was relieved of his post and
transferred back to. the eastern front as Commander
of the XXIQCII Infantry Corps. In June 19h3 the
General returned to Germany to take up an assign-
ment as director of the school for commanding
generals. This post he held until capturecFI3yAmerican forces in Tyrol on 6 May 19h5.
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CONTENTuS
Page
PREFATORY REMRKS . .. .
I. THE TRANSITION FROM THE GNERAL STAF OF THEIW .IAL ARMY TO THE GEERAL~ STAFF OF THEwVEIM REIPUJBIC * * * * . " 0 " " *
Ii. SL CTION, DUCATION AMI TRAINING OF (~ERL
III. THE FITNESS OF THSYST [. . " ". . + f
Ilye EXPBI~t1AES . " . " . " . s " " . " . . . .
V*. CONCLUSION s " s " " " " . ." " " r " " r a .
ih
64
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Von GREIFFENBERGGeneral der Infanterie
PREFATORY IBi KSARKS
After a historical description of the evolution of the General
Staff in the Imperial AnUy and under the Weinmar Republic, BR N1 CKE
reports on selection, education and training of General Staff officers
after 1918.
Inasmuch as the author was himself for six years an instructor
and a director of courses in various posts of General Staff training
and, during the war, was the commandant in charge of the courses in
the "Conduct of Field Operations for Higher OffLcers, t he undoubtedly
has had a great deal of experience in military instruction and is in
a position to assess the subject accurately..
His report accordingly gives a reliable, clear and sufficiently
detailed picture of the organization and state of General Staff training
and it was given at the time, The various systems, curricula, detach:.
merits to branches of the services, etc., in "tWehrkreis Traiing,,? in
the officer training courses and in the Military Academy have been
carefully examined and critically assessed. As a general rule, the
author's evaluation is correct. 'Where a diverging opinion may be held,
as in some matters of detail, the remarks in Part; ) are pertinent.
In the second part of his report, BRENNEC asks himself whether
the. General. Staff has stood the test of events. From the military point
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of view, he replies 'with an unconditional affirmation; in respect to
politics, however, the answer is qualified by the effects of the mis-
understood dictum which states that officers should have nothing to do
'with politics. The fact that there were officers who did not come up
to expectations, especially at the time of the collapse and during their
term as prisoners of war, is openly adntted and intelligently inter-
preted. In a special chapter entitled "Conclusions", BR N EC lists
selfless devotion, the habit of forming mature judgments, and the pre-
vention of dilettantism. as the objective of all training programs.
He concerns himself more extensively 'with proposals for sound organ-
ization of training, in 'which he includes curriculum and composition
of the teaching staff, and concludes 'with remarks about the necessity
for an ,Armed Forces General Staff and the latter's itssions in countries
vhi ch are free to defend themselves.
A eulogy of the onetime German General Staff and some sober thoughts
regarding the future of mankind and, in particular, of the Occident
form an impressive conclusion to the author's very readable report.
/s/ Von FFENBERG
i2~
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I. THE TRANSITION FROM THE' GENERAL SIAFF OF THE IMTPERIL ARMY
TO THE CEONRATJ STAFF OF THE M1EMR REPUBLIC
The fact that it was possible to retain in the 100,000-man army
the Tirit of the German General Staff in the form it existed before
1918, when it was characterized by generations of unselfish devotion
to its duty to the German people, was due principally to the then
Brigadier General Von SEECKT. It is true that it had not been possible
to retain the "Supreme General Staff", in the talks preceding the sign-
ing of the Treaty of Versailles. As an ideological source of military
power, it seemed dangerous to the nations who were, at that time, our
enemies. It must accordingly be regarded as a very fortunate thing
that it was at least possible to continue the tradition of the former
General Staff, in spite of hostility both in Oermany and abroad, through
the General Staff officers retained in the 100,000-man army. The
General Staff officers of the old school, who were taken into the new
army after 1918, are deserving of special thanks for their efforts in
aiding General Von SEEOKT to accomplish this mission.
On 24 June 1919, Field Marshal Von HINDENBrJG, the last chief of
staff of the Field Army, resigned. On 25 June, Von SECT, too, handed
in his resignation, which was refused as early as 27 June: "The Minister
of War requests Your Excellency to withdraw his resignation since, at
the present time, it is impossible to dispense with your services."
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On 28 June 1919, Von S~CIrW had a conference with GneaJ Ra. I1RDT,
the Prassian Minister of War. Afterwards, he made the following note:
{"Shall I continue as chief of staff?"
On 30 June 1919, Von SIXCKT, retrospectively considering the
negotiations on military questions at Versailles and Weimar, wrotee:
"I tendered my resignation. My desire to resign was plain and dated
before Versailles. Now, however, the Minister of War has asked me to
reconsider and, as a result of the dissolution of the Supreme Command,
to fill the post, but not to assume the title, of chief of staff and
to direct this agency in some new form. I have not refused, because
I cannot decline to do this last service for the General Staff, in
wvhich I filled so many different posts, and because I may be able to
be of some use in personal questions. Nothing has been decided so far,.."
On 3 July 1919, the order went out:
"Brigadier General Von SECIK will take over the
peacetime assignments of Chief of Staff of the Armyuntil the dissolution of this agency in accordancewith the peace treaty."
During the next few months the peace treaty was not in effect and,
for the time being, the General Staff continued to function, at least
in theory,
On 7 July 1919 Von SCOKT wrote to Field Marshal Von I{INDENBURG:
"I had the honor of advising Your Eccellency thatI had tendered my resignation. At the request of theMinister of War, I have decided to withdraw my requestto be relieved' of my duties' for the time being ad totake over the mission of Chief of Staff of the Armyuntil the dissolution of this agency in accordancewith the stipulations of the peace treaty. I beg Your
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Excellency to accept the following brief explanationfor this. decision. The principal motive for mydecision is that I amL convinced that, at this time,I can be of use to the General Staff, in which Iserved for so long and in so many capacities, andthat iti i incumbent upon me to protect the in-terests of its officers during the transition tonew conditions. If I can succeed in retining,not the for, but .the spirit, then I can regardmy endeavors as something more than digging thegrave of the General Staff, A contributary factorin making me reach my decision is the example whichYour Excellency himself has given us and which hastaught me to subordinate my personal feelings again
and, for the last time, to the principle of militaryservice. The personal feelings with wehic , atthis time , begin my mission, which once was asomwe of pride and honor,, need not 'be described.Your Excellency mill take them for granted. I
find it impossible, however, to start my rk with-.
out expressing the deep veneration e:xisting forthe last great cbief of staff, It will prevail aslong as there ex ts a Gernan General Staff.With eternal gratitude, I remain your obedient
servant, (signed) V.s."
The upheavals that took place during the follcwing months were not
without influence upon--some former general staff officers., They felt
they had to take an active part in the arguments which took place be-
tween the political parties. Von S KT, who did not regard matters in
the light of an ossified past, but rather as the drning of a new age,
nevertheless felt called upon to issue a warning against an infringement
of one of the fundamental principles of the General Staff, namely that
its officers should "remain in the background and be more than they
seemed." A number, of direetives were issued in this sense. One of
them stated:
"The outward form changes. The spirit remainsthe same. It is the spirit of silent, selfless
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accomplishment of duty in the service of the Amy.General Staff of fi ers must be nameless..,."
Another directive said:
#At the moment of entering upon my duties. atthe head of the General Staff, I feel it is nec.essary that fEul understanding of cow~ets andunity in thinLrg and purpose should .eLst betweenGeneral Staff officers. The General Staff can lookback with deep inner pride at a centu of work well-done durng, war and peacetime. Today we must turnour thoughts back only long enough to gather powerfrom the glorious past for new accompis nts.The misfortunes of the ' present time must liIiisebe a source of new energy for us. We do not havetime, at present, to complain or to accuse;indeed, we do not have time enough to be tired -
we must work.
Our duty is clear. We .must collaborate toreconstruct and keep the Reich together, to pro-vide foundations, and to develop the new A y. Weuist ope n our eyes to the necessities which thenew times have imposed upon us and, with a firmwill to succeed, build a new future upon newfoundations. I take it for granted that allGeneral Staff officers have recognized the truthof this and are animated by this desire . Thefact that an indivi5 ual remains in the GeneralStaff is taken to i'ean that he approves.. A manis as good as his word. It is on this basis thatwe shall continue to collaborate.
:ach of us today is faced by a grave dexi-si on which he must take for himself in a spiritof sober self-eamination and a consciousness ofhis own responsibility. In spite of this, I feelcalled upon, in capacity of senior officer int1 te General Staff, to direct a word of warning toall its menbers; I rely upon your confidence inme to which my long years of service in the Armyand ithe Genseral staf give me a rigt.Nobody is desirous of influencing the personal con-victions of an individual, or his attitude towardthe many controversial questions of the day. Itis said that e have been wounded in our honor.wThe-honor of the Army and of its officer' corps
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is finuly founded upon years of loyal peacetime workand, as the seed of future times, it is to be foundon battlefields fertilized by human blood the worldover. In the final analysis each man must be hisown jidge 'in the matter of personal honor. Neitheran enemy nor a peace treaty can take it away. Ourhonor is intact as long as we do our duty. There-fore, I cell upon my comrades in the General Staffto do their duty and work.
But before we begin, we need still anotherthing.. This is self-discipline, overall discipline,and modesty. If we are to work, we must withdrawfrom the hustle and bustle of the day. The factthat officers bw have acquired an understandingof questions of public interest and that they parti-cipate in the political life of the people, is astep forward. That, however, so many of them feelobliged to acquaint the masses with their views,and raise their voices in the current battle ofwords, is a bad practice and, violates the besttraditions of the General Staff. Calm, unselfishwork, dedication to the cause at the expense ofthe individual, these are the qualities whichhave made the General Staff into what it was, isand must remain. Qualities whichI value just ashighly will in no way be diminished by mentioningthem in this context;. They are justifiable self-confidence and a willingness to assume responsi-bility.
It is in this spirit that I shall attempt,with the assistance of all my comrades, to effectthe transition from the General Staff into itsnew form. I request confidence and demand obedience."'
In 1919, Von SEEMXI did something which at first glance appears to
be insignificant but which has great importance in the fmrther evolution
of the General Staff and its educational and training programs. On 3
September, Colonel Von HW1 EN, at the instance of Von SEC1, wrote a
memorandum containing basic principles for the foundation of the Reich
Archives. Von SECKT had ordered the organization of the Archives on
12 July.
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"The fact that, in this way, the fantasticamount. of documents connected with the WorldWar wifl be saved, is justification enough.Actually, however, his decision achieved agreat deal more. When Prince Eugene foundedthe Vienna War .Archives, he desired it to beregarded as a basis for vindication and assource material for use in the trainjig ofofficers. In Prussia, the first one to tryand organize military archives. was SCIHARNHORST,but his attempt failed. His era, which gaverise to the theories of CI1AUSMETZ, added athird concept to the two advanced by EUGENE -namely, the necessity of theory, derived fromabstract thought. From SCHARNHORST on, allPrussian chiefs of staff tried in vain toestablish military Archives. MO1TX andSCHIIEFEN, in particular, made earnest ef-.forts. In 1913, the objective had almostbeen achieved. Then came the war. Afterthe war, SEECH protested against the lossof this intellectual property as a resultof enemy decrees."f
This is what Friedrich von RABENAU writes about the creation of
the RLch Archives.
In the middle of 1919, the struggle to organize transfer of
General Staff officers to the *200,000-man and 100,000-man army began.
On 24 August, GROEER wrote to the Reichswehr Minister NOSI as follows:
o..I know that Your Excellency appraisesthe great services of the General Staff attheir true value. In this connection, I dis-.regard altogether the performance of the GeneralStaff during the war.... the enemy himself hasalready judged the General Staff very adequatelyin that he states in the peace treaty: "The Sup-reme General Staff is dissolved and may not bereorganized under any form whatsoever." I amthinldng rather abot the self-abnegation andthe success which has characterized its
* 200,000 during the transition period until the 100,000-man armywas reached.
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activities since the Revolution. I do notbelieve it is exaggerating to say that it ischiefly due to the General Staff that wehave so far escaped having Bolshevism here.At a time when all authority had brokendown, and nearly all governent agencies hadresigned themselves to letting the ship ofstate drift ,helplessly while they wrungtheir hands.., it is these officers who wentto work with boundless energy and great self-denial and who, -ithou t any material backingwhatsoever, took up the good fight againstthe forces of irrationality, unlimited self-ishness and crime. The services renderedby General Staff officers in this respectshould not be forgotten. That is why Iregard the distinction made between "triedline officers" and "General Staff offcers"as basically wrong. ...
It is interesting to compare these lines in defense of the General
Staff. with' a letter written by SEECKT in which he, too, energetically
defends General Staff officers. On 30 August 1919 he writes:
"To His Excelency the Reichswehr Minister:I have been informed that the justified effortsto have as many General Staff officers as pos-sible. coniinue their service in the new Anny aremet with objections such as "preference must begiven first of all to tried line officers" orphrases like "the General Staff is very un-popular at present and has lost its signifi-cance",..,.. I deny that there is an inherentdifference between General taff officers andline officers and I regard the efforts made toestablish such a difference by artificial meansas deplorable and reprehensible. The GeneralStaff offices is a line officer and, as a matterof fact, has been selected fom among the bestline officers. This is not merely true intheory, but has always been a matter of practiceand will remain so.. The outstanding capacitiesof General Staff officers provide the bestguarantee that keen intellect will animate thelittle Army of the future, My interest in these
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officers is, at the same time, a guarantee thatthey -will give satisfaction."
On .1 August 1919, the constitution of the new Germanaei oh had
been ratified. The secret doubts of the General Staff officers, con-
nected with the fact that they would have to swear allegiance to the
new constitution, are set aside by Von CIF in a declaration stating:
"I have been advised by some people thatthey doubt whether the oath, demanded of meiibersof the Army, can be reconciled with the thingswe believe in and with our past. I can notshare these doubts. Anyone who has decided toserve in the Army for the good of the country,even tnder a republican form of government, mustlook upon the oath to the constitution as thelogical conclusion to his decision..."
On 1 October 1919, the new Reichswehr Ministry was constituted and
at the same time General Von SEECKT was assigned to the Reichswehr
Ministry and, on 214 bvember 1919, appointed Chief of the Troop Office,
the affairs of which he had directed since 11 October. The post of
chief os staff accordingly comes .to an end as of 2. Mvenber 1919 and,
with it, the General Staff in the form in which it exdsted previously.
At first the missions of the Chief of the Troop Office took in not
only those of the former chief of staff of the Army, but also included
part of the activities of the former Ministry of War.
At the end of 1919, Von S@QXT, in a speech made to the officers of
the General Staff, expresses his conception of the post of Chief of the
Troop Office in respect to General Staff officers. He regards himself
as "the head of the officers' corps of the General Staff and as being
responsible for the preservation of its traditions." He continues:
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"...At no time shall I permit anyone todeny me the right to address the General Staffofficers in the form which I regard as suitable.It is under these conditions and with thisassurance that I took this post and I shall re-main in it only, so long as I believe that I amable to fulfill this mission.. As individuals,neither you nor I are important; it is the causethat counts. Our position in such that we cam-not afford internal strife. In this ses it isour duty to extend the scope of our endeavorseven beyond General Staff circles. Our officers'corps suffers from insecurity - not merely ex-ternal insecurity, but in particular fromspiritual insecurity. We shall not survive theturmoil of the days to come unless we succeedin staying or in becoming united.. You knowthat on many sides the accusation is made thatthrough our collaboration we lend stability andaid to a regime to which we are inwardly opposed...Only through collaboration is it possible to re.-t4n any hope of influencing trends. Oiwardlythis influence may seem slight - but withoutcollaboration it would be inexistent,,. Whatwe want is above politics -- it is the good ofthe country. On this point we all agree. Onlythe ways and means to attain our objective aresubject to doubt. However, I am in duty boundto give you my opinion. If we succeed in -sur-viving the next few months without a generalcollapse, I shall feel we are on the way to animprovement of the situation. We shall surmountthese dangers..., if all those, who in theirhearts are interested in seeing the Reich recover,remain together and do not engage in separatistactivities. I apply this call for unificationto our work. The Army, the corner-stone of anyfuture progress, must again become what it oncewas; a compact, willing and uniform structure.Order and discipline within its framework is anecessity..."
At a time when the question of "the responsibility of the General
Staff officers" has attention focussed un it through court proceedings
and public interest, it is periissable to mention here,. although it is
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somewhat beyond the scope of this report, the conception of Von SE OXT
regarding his responsibility as chief of staff to his former commander
in chief, Field Marshal Von MAC1NSEN, as it is given in a letter.
He concerns himself with the question of surrender of war crininals and
gives proof of chivalry and loyalty which does him credit. Von S EBKT
writes on 6 February l920
E...The decision to refuse to make thesurrender. as a matter of principle is stead-fast. From what I know about the persons con-cerned and from my memories of the eventswhich preceded signing of the peace treaty,however, there is no certainty that the govern-ment will not change its mind... This does notalter the fact that, in practice, it will beimpossible for any government to effect the sur-render. If needs be, the Reichswehr will pre-vent the surrender of these men by force *.:.,
I think I can promise that a voluntary surrenderwill giver be made. I do not deny that thereare sentimental grounds which speak in favorof the measure, and that these have some Neight.But I regard it as necessary to see that nosteps are taken by anyone concerned which couldbe interpreted as an acknowledgement of our ob-ligation. Serbia and Rumania request that theField Marshal be delivered to them. As far asI am concerned, Rumania must be eliminated fromthe question, but in the matter of Serbia I amready to cover the Field Marshal in my capacityas the then chief of staff for all and anythingfor which me may be blamed, Please call upon mein any connection whatsoever. In spite of thesadness of the occasion, it gives me great plea-sure that I am once more in a position to servemy commander in chief."
This recognition by Von S ECKT of the fact that as chief of staff
he was responsible, underwent a fundamental change in the second World
War, as far as General Staff officers were concerned, in the stipula-
tions contained in the "Handbook for the General Staff service in
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wartime." Even today, however, the feeling of mioral co-responsibility
in the sense of comradely loyalty and. a cbivalrous viewupoint in
respect to one's superior officers is still part of an officer's make-
up, in spite of formal legal concepts.
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II. S L CTION, EDUCATION AND TRAINING OF GENERAL ST AF
OFFICERS . M 1918
Chapter I related how the tradition of the old General Staff was
carried over into the new 100,000-man army, in spite of the confusion
of the revolution. Chapter II continues with the selection, education
and training of those officers who, in the 100,000-man army, had to
carry out the missions of General Staff officers. Here again the per-
sonal influence of General Von S9ITC1 must be stressed. General
Freiherr Von FRITSCH said of him on l5 October 1935, on the occasion of
the one hundred and twenty-fifth anniversary of the War Academy, which
had in the meantime been revived:
"...On this occasion and in this placeit is .particularly fitting that I expressthe thanks of all to the greatest teacherwhich the postwar period gave the Army andthe War Academy, General Von S]ICKT,*..The General Staff, revived after thecollapse, bears the stamp of your personal-ity even in its youngest members, General."t
In 1922, of the h,000 officers of the 100,000-man army, there were
still more than 1,000 who had become officers without attending a
military academy. Recognizing that it was necessary to achieve a
rapid increase in the intellectual level of the officers' corps, as
early as 26 November 1919 Von SCECIT had already announced an examination
in a directive from the Troop Office for June 1920, "in order to obtain
a general opinion of the military science and overall educational
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attainmnts of the officers." Strong objections were at first raised
against this directive in the line and it was pointed out that the
officers' co rps was already overburdened with the daily tasks of re-
construction, that questions relating to garrison quarters had not yet
been cleared up, ard that there was a shortage of housing. Howeger,
this directive provided the basis for the Wehrkreis examination later
introduced to select officers for the General Staff candidate courses.
In 1920, the first guiding principles were published for special
General Staff candidate training.
The Versailles Treaty forbade the institixtion of a War Acadeny.
Even the preparatory training for the General Staff service, at first
organized in a makeshift fashion, was, at least in the beginning, im-
peded by control on the part of the former enemy powers. !3ren in 1922,
General 1NLLET specifically demanded discontinuation of General Staff
training. In the meantime, permission had been given for all Wehrkreis
to train their awr.liary officers for General Staff work. In spite of
all opposition, it was possible to retain the designation of "General
Staff officer" until the retirement of Von SEECKT. After that it was
changed to the more colorless term of Command Group.* The rank insignia
remained' the same, however.
It deserves to be mentioned that, during the first years of training,
the rising generation of General Staff officers made great personal
sacrifices to the cause of the General Staff. The lot of General Staff
* "Fuehrerstab".
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officers in those days included yearlong separation from wife and
children (made necessary by assignment to courses and later by frequent
changes in garrisons) and serious pecuniary hardship.
In accordance with directives issued by the Troop Office and the
Personnel Office, selection of field officers to take part in the
1ehrkreis Examination was handled largely by the regimental commander
within the Infantry and Cavalry divisions. This method has its dis-
advantages, since it goes ithout saying that the regimental commander
is loath to give up tested line officers and risk vacancies. For this
reason and because a systematic classification by age groups was 'necess-
ary for General Staff officers, the Troop Office, in cooperation with the
Anny Personnel Office, later appointed the participants in the examina-
tion on the basis of seniority.
Preparation for the Etxaehrs mination, in accordance with
directives from the Anny Training Branch was handled by the chiefs of
staff of the ehrkreis headquarters. It took the form of correspondence
courses and, especially, of tactical: problems taken from the various
levels of command, mostly ;from that of the reinforced infantry regiment.
Later, during the winter, there were one or two meetings of the candi-
dstes at the Wehrkreis headquarters and these lasted for several days.
In addition to tactics, other exaiEnation subjects were reviewed and the
candidate's knoi ledge tested by means of preliminary examinations.
A large part of the preparation, especially that which did not con-
cern purely military subjects, had to be left up to the individual. This
MS ?-031.b
was facilitated when the officers in question were stationed in locali-
ties which had universities or other institutions of higher learning
and good public libraries.
Problems for the Wehrkreis Examination were selected by the Amy
Training Branch in cooperation' with other branches and offices, and
this resulted in a uniform foundation for the examination.' As far as
I can remember the major subjects in which the candidates were examined
were tactics (reinforced infantry regiment), history, military im-
struction (technique of weapons), and foreign languages. Tests in
physical culture were likewise given. The standards were, in the main,
those formerly demanded at the Military Academy. Officers who had
elected to serve in the Army Ordnance Office were tested in additional
subjects.
The Wehrkreis Examination itself was taken in seclusion at the
Wehrkreis headquarters. It lasted for several days. Shortly before
the examination took place, the problems were delivered to the Wehrkreis
headquarters. Solutions had to be given within a set number of hours,
Insnediately after the examination, the solutions - without preliminary
corrections were turned over to the Training Branch. CorZection of
the examination papers was done in the Troop Office, under supervision
of the Training Branch, by three examining and evaluating officers from
the Troop Office and other offices. These officers worked independently.
This was an unconditional guarantee of an unbiassed evaluation of the
-17
MS # P-031b
work. Final examination of the results by the Training Branch provided
a final decision and, on the basis of the first evaluationists
(drawn up in accordance with the quality of the work) as completed by
the three examinors, the permanent order of acceptance was established.
The training branch thereupon submitted to the Army Personnel Office,
through the Chief of the Troop Office, a list of candidates to be
called in to attend the courses.
The importance of the preparation - as depicted above - was
constantly pointed out by the Troop Office. Like the courses which
followed, it was handled by particularly well-qualified General Staff
officers. The instructors were carefully briefed during special rides
to ensure unifonnity. This was necessary in order to conserve one of
the principal advantages of the old General Staff, i. e., training in
absolixte uniform fashion. From an historical point of view, it is
interesting to note that the importance of the preparation was not
valued as highly before the first World War. The proof is to be found
in the "Lebenserinnerungen " (lMemoirsh#) of Karl LITZ ANN (quoted in
SCKEI B FTE, "M.N UN IEEE" - "The Man and His Ideas" by
Oberstdivisioneer E. BIRCHER and Walter BODE). Here we find:
"The post of Director of-the War Acadaywould have satisfied me (LITZ NN) if our WarAcademy had played the role, for 'which it wascut out. This was not the case, however. Itsnecessity was aiitted, perhaps, but its im-portance was not sufficiently recognized.
* Approximately the equivalent of a Brigadier General. RankCis no longer used.
-18_-
MS # P-031b
If things had been different, not only wtuldthe best instructors in the Army been givento the Academy, but care would have beentaken to see that they received the recogni-tion due to them. As it was, nobody wasparticularly eager for an assignment of thistype and there were even instructors whowere definitely averse to taking up dutieswhich enjoyed so little favor in the Army.,..For the rest, too, the Academy's budgetwas pared down to a minimum. ..This wasnot the fault of the chief of staff of theArmy, whose authority extended over theWar economy. Count SCHLI FN, the thenchief of staff, was much too farsightedto underestimate the value of an efficientWar Academy. The fault lay in Army tradi-.tions, in accordance with which even thelowliest practical performance was ratedhigh above theoretical achievements.
Shortly before my assigment asumpire at the Imperial maneuvers inMecklenburg, in 19014, I was able towin over Count S 1i LIJFFFEN, during a per-sonal talk, to reforms which I, in myposition as the director responsible,held to be necessary, and which he hadrejected when I had submitted them inwriting. Count SCHLIEFFBEN, whilegranting me an audience, declared thatit was impossible to accede to mywishes. In reply to my request to giveme his reasons for rejecting my pro-posal, he replied: "His Majesty isnot interested in the War Academy."
The methods of selection which have been described above were
based, in the first instance, on knowledge and skill and affected
officers within a specific category of seniority. In addition, special
reports regarding qualifications evaluated character traits. According
to the practice of that tires, this was the only way to do things, al-
though it was not perfect. The instructors of the subsequent courses
_19--L
M&S # P-031b
had a great responsibility in that they had to take care of the further
evaluation of the characters of those participating. The question to
be answered was whether, in addition to the esteem he enjoyed among
his superiors, the participant 'would also be respected by his co-
workers on the staff. Even after the experiences of the second World
ear, this still is based upon a positive reply to the cardinal question
of -whether or not the subject is "a good guy,f' a man without sordid
ambitions, and not one who regards himself as better than his comrades
in the Army. Does he know his job? Does he take care of his men?
Does he understand their needs? Is he on friendly terms with his com-
mander, since otherwise the men may become aware of friction between
the two? Is he capable of organizing the work of his collaborators
in a uniform fashion so that the troops do not suffer from duplication
in the work of the staffs over them? As far as an assessment of the
individual's character was concerned the final selection, after the
third course, was based upon the judgment of the unit commanders
covering three years, the opinion of the director and instructor in
Courses D I, D) II and ) III, and the impressions gained by the com-
petent superiors when they were occasionally present at map exercises,
in classrooms, on tactical rides, and the final ride. During the
third year, the evaluation of the Chief of the Training Branch who, as
a rule, assisted at map exercises and on the final ride, and that of
the Army Personnel Office, representatives of which iere in c onstant
touch with the class-work, was added to the above. On ocassion, the
MS # P--031b
Chief of the Troop Office, himself, attended the courses in order to
obtain a personal impression. In special and difficult cases, use
was also made of the "evaluation by class-mates." 'While it is true
that the opinions of persons, 'who had no daily contact with the parbi-
cipants, were based only upon positive or negative individual im-
pressions, still the system was as nearly perfect as could be expected.
As far as character went, few mistakes were made.
In accordance with the results of the Wehrkreis xamination, the
men selected were called up to take part in the first course (D I) for
assistant chief of staff by three to four out._of sevenWehrkreise a
year. As long as serious weaknesses in character or in performance were
not discovered, the men stayed in this divisional training until the
end of the second course (D II) - i.e., two years with the same
division. On an average from nine to twelve men participated in the
D I aid D II courses; subsequently, their number was increased. After
the D II course, rigid selection reduced the number of students, be-
cause it was impossible to call up more than twenty participants from
the three or four Wehrkreise altogether for the third year. Even men
uho were qualified had to be rejected.
Subjects taught in the D I and 1 II courses were: tactics,
military history, training in the use of weapons, military supply
service, Army organization, communications system, commitment of air
forces and foreign languages. In addition to this, there were special
lectures on naval and sea tactics, coastal transportation, medical and
-21_-
MS # P-O3lb
veterinary services, and counterintelligence. While tactics and mili-
tary history instruction was given by teachers whose main task it was
to give these courses (I L General Staff officers) the other subjects
were taught by instructors and lecturers from the respective
Wlehrkreise.
In this connection, mention may be made of the fact that it would
have been better if a supplementary written examination had been held
between the D) I and the D II courses. Some ehrkreise did this on
their own initiative. Such an examination stresses the importance of
the training and private study in the examination subjects. In
addition, it makes it easy to discern unqualified students at an early
point. If such an examination is not held before the]) II course, it
should at least be held after it, in addition to the final ride. It
is the duty of the directors of courses and of the instructors to see
to it that, even in this method of training, the academic spirit is
retained.
The third course (also oalled course 'IR?') closed the assistant
chief of staff training. The fact that this phase of the training,
directly subordinated to the Chief of the Troop Office through the
Training Branch, was undertaken under close supervision of the central
military authorities of the Reich, was of particular value for those
passing through this final stage of preparation for the General
Staff. As: stated before, it gave the highest superiors numerous op-
portunities to form a personal opinion regarding the way in which the
--22..
MS # P-031b
training was given and the personality of those taking the course. The
students in this course had at their disposal the facilities of the
universities, the libraries of the Reich capital, and the Reich
archives in Potsdam. Students availed themselves of these facilities
in varying degrees. The time spent in the classrooms and in doing
home work was in itself quite a strain on the intellect. Greater
advantage of the existing possibilities would have been taken if, for
instance, it had been possible to have university professors give
more lectures, suitable for the purpose, in the classroom, and also
if, within reason, attendance at especially pertinent lectures at
the universities could have been made compulsory.
hile the "Thursday lectures" which students of the third course
had to attend were, at least in part, very good, they were not suffil-
cient for the purpose. As a rule, these lectures were held early on
Thursday during the winter months, which accounts for the name given
them. Important lecturers spoke on political and historical subjects
and on current events in a wide range of fields.
Classroom training during the third. course covered:
Tactics,Military History,General Staff work,Transportation system,Military supply service,Naval warfare,H ntii-aircraft defense" (the tlerm was
necessary because there was noGerman air force),
-23--
S # P-031b
Military organiz ation,Organization and. commami of
foreign arnmies,Counterintelligence,Army technique,Economic situation,Situation of internal and'
foreign politics andforeign languages.
In addition to this due time m~s given to riding and gymnastics.
Tactics and military history, which were major subjects, were
taught by instructors, whose chief occupation it was to teach these
subjects, while the rest of the subjects were in part given in the
form of lectures by part-time instructors and in part (the transporta-
tion system, military supply service, anti-aircraft defense and the
command of foreign armies) in conjunction with the tactics instructor
and in the form of map exercises. The schedule for the major subjects
(tactics, from 10 to 12 hours a week; military history, 4 to 6 hours
a week) as determined by the Chief of the Troop Office, in general
formed the basis for the weekly schedule. In 'practice, however, these
figures were merely guiding points. Sometimes the students were pre-
vented from attending because of their duties or part-time instructors,
who were unable to come, had to be replaced in a hurry. This and the
fact that certain minor subjects constantly grew in importance, led to
the appointment of full-time instructors in other subjects, too, when
the WIar Academy was subsequently recreated.
In the third course (for instance, from 1924/25), the following
home work had to be done
MS # P-0 31b
Planning of a one-day divisionalexercise either on or in theneighborhood of maneuver fields;
Planning of a three-day divisionalmaneuwer in open terrain;
A map exercise; and, in the caseof some students, a tacticalride and a lecture on militaryhistory.
In the I) I and D) II courses, home work of a like nature, distributed
between the two courses, was demanded. In the I) I course, the subject
to be covered was the reinforced infantry regiment and thereafter,
and in D II, the organization of the infantry and cavalry division.
Subsequently the armored and motorized formations were added.
Tactics instruction in the two lower courses, in the main, kept
within the above-mentioned organization. Beginning with 1930, a shift
in the subjects taught was made to cover an occasional exwnination of
the command principles of large formations (corps and army).* That is
why command of a division within the organization of a corps should be
taught in course]) II.
Classroom instruction was supplemented in the three courses by
tactical rides, exercises, and instruction tours. As a rule there
was a tactical ride, even in October, the so-called "Get acquainted
trip." It was the purpose of the trip to give the instructors a first
opportunity to assess the sidll of the students and to give the latter
hints in the planning of sitrilar practice rides. That is wrhy these
rides had to be planned and guided by the instructors themselves.
Participation in practice exercises and test firing at neazby maneuver
MS # P-031b
areas and artillery ranges formed part of the courses. fring the
weinter -- to offset the "de-ad center"' obser~abe in all couirses --
a 'winter tactical ride was held. In addition to furnishing tactical
instruction by means of terrain and map exercises it served as a
stimulant to the men, because they had to engage in tinter sports.
Some years, at the end of the course (mostly at the end of April/May),
a tactical ride on horseback was held. This, too, in addition to
tactical instruction, aimed at freshening up the men and testing their
powers of resistance, The final tactical ride took place mostly at
the beginning of June and as a rule in an unfamiliar Wehrkreise.
During this ride,'the students were subjected to a final test of their
character and performance. The higher officers of the General Staff
(Chief of the Truppenamt, and sometimes the Chief of the Heeresleitung)
participated in these rides for at least a few days, as a rule. After
this ride, there usually came a visit to Navy or industrial installa-
tions. It was necessary to distribute and plan these last trips
systematically on a higher level, even while the students were taking
the D I, D II and D III courses, to avoid over-.lapping and repetition.
The value of the practice and instruction rides to the training
was proved again and again. Here one point is of particular im-
portance: these rides - in contrast to the situation prevailing in
garrisons where contact between instructors and students was limited
to gatherings in the lecture-room and social occasions - afforded an
opportunity for instructors and students to get to know each other on
a personal and friendly basis. Instructors and students were given a
MS # P-03lb
chance to find out what they were really like. In retrospect, it would
seem better, at least in the first course, not to hold the "tGet
acquainted trip" in the form of a practice tactical ride, but rather
to visit the various schools and training groups, as a basis for the
instruction to take place later. In this way the latest developments
and concepts would be given on a practical basis from the very outset.
Such visits are always profitable - for example, to the armored forces
school, the artillery school, assault gun school, the infantry school,
the signal communications and engineer troops school; and, in addition
to this, a visit to an artillery testing range might be made4 In the
higher courses, such a visit can be limited to exceptional cases - for
instance when fundamental improvements are being tested.
The systematic arrangement of such rides, as well as overall dis-
tribution of the subject matter, was facilitated after all courses had
been coordinated with the '1(erlin Officers' Courses" (from the fall of
1932) # These Berlin Officers' Courses were a further step in the
direction of a War Academy. In the main, the subjects taught in the
three courses remained unchanged. Besides the third course, courses
I and II now also numbered on the average ho students, and were given
in two lecture-rooms in Berlin. The creation of the post of
"coommandant" of the courses made it possible to obtain a more thorough
and continuos supervision as well as a uniform organization of the
instruction setup and methods. This had been made necessary, too, by
the fact that in the folo'wing years the Training Branch, as weU as
MS # P-0 alb
the Chief of the Troop Office, himself, were kept very busy with the
organization of the Army. What was particularly advantageous about
the Berlin Officers t Courses was that now all of the courses were in
close touch, from the very beginning, with military headquarters and
the students were able to take advantage of the excellent facilities
which Berlin offered not only as far as training was concerned, but
also in matters which had nothing to do with the military. Later,
although only after the War Academy had been re-established, the
proximity of the Air Forces War Academy in Gatow led to an animated
exchange of ideas which was very fruitful as far as mutual understanding
was concerned. The cooperation of important personages for lectures
was secured by the Reich government (Foreign Office, Vinistry of
Economy and other ministries).
In concluding this section a few words about instruction methods
are in order:
In tactics, the methods and principles of command were brought
out in wrijtten papers, approximately every 1h days, and in map exercises
by the Tactics instructor, as far as the D I and D II courses were
concerned'. In the main, the instruction at first covered the infantry
division. In subsequent years, the armored unit was added. As a rule,
the corps was given by the instructor. In subsequent years, the third-
course students, as has been mentioned, studied corps and army command
methods.
As a result of the military and political situation, the instruction
given the students, as well as the overall training given t he troops,
~2~
MS # P-.031b
up to the end of the twenties, gave more time to "defensive measures"
and "delaying action" than to "attack." In both of the first two
courses, special importance was given to "sample" map exercises and
"sample" tactical rides, inasmuch as most of the students had received
little or no preparation or practice. In order to make a more detailed
study, in the D I and D II courses, the students took one side yhile
the instructor played the part of the enemy. The principles of foreign
military tactics as opposed to German tactics were studied in the
) II course. In the]) III course special attention was paid to_ this.
Considered from a retrospective viewpoint, it would have been an
advantage, in the third course, to give more thorough instruction in
"mobile warfare" of large units (for example, transition from defensive
to offensive action, from delaying operations or withdrawal to
offensive). A clearer and more comprehensive training in the field of
tactical and strategic conduct of warfare against an enemy superior in
strength would have been desirable. On the basis of the experience
gained in the war such expressions as "without considering the cost"
*hich, it is true, were unusual, at least as far as Army parlance went,
should be rooted out completely, On the contrary, operations should be
planned in such a way that success is attained with a minimum of
losses. Instruction methods must be guided accordingly.
One of the most important subjects of the tactical instruction of
the candidate General Staff officers was and is the giving of commands.
Special problems served the purpose of imparting this instruction.
They were concerned above all with commands, which normal tactics
_~29..
MS # P-031b
instruction did not take up in detail because of a lack of time
(for instance, artillery commands, commands covering panzer commit-
ment; coordination with the Luftwaffe, blocking orders, etc.') It was
sound practice, even during normal map exercises and tactical problems,
to request the participants of the courses to reply to questions
covering "deci sions'" and "commitment of forces" in the exact wording
of paragraphs 2 and 3 of the command, This prevented meandering and
encouraged concentrated logical thinking and speaking.
Problems which covered several days (i.e., which demanded more
than one decision) were likewise very valuable. They permit the
student to enter into details and are closer to actual conditions.
Staff exercises train the men in General Staff activities. If
given iith imagination and prepared from the viewpoint of the techniquw
of signal communications, they give the candidate General Staff officer
a good picture of the problems awaiting him in the field of conduct of
operations. Jing such exercises "at home" also has its value.
Occasionally, however, they should be undertaken wvith a signal communi-
cations unit as a sort of tsignal communications exercise." This method
makes the concepts of space and time in the giving of commands clearer.
Signal communications units have always welcomed these occasions since
the uncontrolled decisions of the assistant chiefs-of-staff created
conditions very close to reality.
Special map exercises were organized by the instructor for the
training of Ibis. As a rule these took place only during the third
YN20rr
MS # P-O3lb
course and were concerned with military supplies.
Special tactical problemswere provided for Ic training as well,
in addition to staff exercises and problems in the giving of commands
(special directives for reconnaissance, etc.)
As a rule they were concerned with a 'wide variety of information
about the enemy, all of it close to actual conditions. It was left
up to the students to make a "mosaic" out of this information. On the
basis of this mosaic, they had to draw up a logical and reasonable
picture of the enemy's situation and his intentions and this had to be
presented in the form of a verbal intelligence report either to the
Chief or the commander. As far as overall training was concerned the
importance of making the right decisions about the enemy should be
emphasized again and again. Time is lacking in the courses and, as
a result, map exercises are apt, for example, to skip paragraph 1
(Enemy) of the command It has been proved advisable to demand it
word for word and to see to it that it does not deteriorate into a
mere repetition of messages received. It should take the form of an
analysis of enemy intentions. In this connection, it is importanb
that the candidate General Staff officer sees things not as he wishes
to see them but as they are. He must not enter apparent successes to
his credit as if they were real ones; on the contrary, he must be able
to discern and evaluate the possibilities for action still remaining
to the enemy. Mistakes in this respect were so common that they were
regarded as routine.
-1-
MS # P-031b
In this regard, the question arises whether the training theme
of "General Staff service"t can be exhaustively handled by means of
the above-mentioned methods, Quite apart from the fact that theo-
retical instruction of this sort -- in spite of the efforts of an
imaginative instructor - can only inadequately present the problems
cropping up in practice for the General Staff officer, the v ide
field covered by problems arising in the various peacetime positions
is not touched upon. These problems are of such a varied and chang-
ing nature that they cannot be covered by theoretical exercises.
The only possibility, accordingly, besides the above-mentioned ex-
ercises and problems, is to discuss the "Handbook for General Staff
Service in Wartime" in detail wtth the candidates and perhaps to
bring out a similar handbook covering General Staff service in peace-
time. Even in such a book it will be impossible to cover all cases
coming up in practice. This is why it would be desirable to give the
candidates a year of detached duty before transferring them to the
General Staff, where they Fill have to be fully responsible for their
actions This will give them a chance of learning, under able gtid-
ance, and during peacetime General Staff service, what they will be
faced with in practice. This transition period affords another oppor-
tunity to test the candidates' characters. Furthermore it makes it
possible to determine whether a candidate who has proved his ability
in theory can also meet practical requirements.
This method of continuing preparatory training for the General
Staff service during "a practical year" should be given precedence
.. 32r
MS # P-031b 3
over a renewed assignientt in the troops. Tnowedge of practical duty
izith the troops during this "practical year" can be refreshed without
difficulty by means of a few lengbhy detachments between courses to the
most important arms and as a supplement of detached duty mtth the
troops.
The purpose of the instruction in military history was to enlarge
the imaginative capacity of the students in order to make it possible
for them to put themselves in the place of great comanders of the
past. Special attention was paid to the moral factors which account
for success in war. No other peacetime subject matter was so apt to
point out the importance of these factors. The thing to be repeatedly
stressed in this connection was that tin serious situations, character
accounts for more than knowledge and skill." (Freiherr Von STSN.)
Constant comparisons were made which linked up the events of the
past with those of the most recent military history. This was to pre-
vent one-sidedness in assessing the case in hand, on the ground that
there is nothing so prejudicial to a military career as cut-and-dried
notions.
Only occasional use was made of the so-called "applied method"
i.e., the use of selected situations in the field of strategic and
tactical problems. They are useful in so far as they force the
student to put himself in the situation of the person handling the
assignment. However, because of the different conditions prevailing
in former wars, in contrast to the rapid development of recent times,
-33-
MS # P-O3lb
they can only lead to decisions .ehich are approximately correct for a
commander of the past. Ihe method should therefore only be used when
a specific principle,. good for all times, is to be stressed. In this
respect, arrogance should be avoided so that instructors and students
do not begin to think themselves cleverer than the greatest generals
of the past. "As a rule things which appear to be illogical and in-
expedient are absolutely justified as soon as the motives behind them,
the thousand and one difficulties and obstacles which opposed execrtion
of a mission in watimte, become known." (Von MOJTK, Der Italienisohe
Feldzug, 18 9, Preface.) Unless this attitude is cultivated, there
comes into being the sort of high and mightiness vwhich BIS[IM K dis-
approved of in some of MOLTKE 's department heads during the ar of
1870-1871.
In connection with this, GLUSEIITZ says:
"There is no great general withot great ambition.He is never arrogant, however. His distinctionis inward."
These words are appropriate guides for the General Staff officer and
his education and training.
Instruction in military history, as it delves into the past, un-
covers principles relating to the conduct of operations, which are of
lasting value. The thing is not to see "eternal" principles every.
where, otherwise one succumbs all too easily to the dangers inherent
in set patterns. Technical' progress *Il change the course of opera-
tions and the nature of battles. It requires imagination on the part
of General Staff officers to recognize the truth of this.
-341-
MS # P-031b
It is one of the missions of miitary hstoryonthe. one hand, to
encourage, and on the other hand, to curb.
It was important to show the students the means and ways used in
historical research. The facilities afforded by the Reich archives and
the Anny Library were, a great help in this. The personal attention paid
the individual. student by the instructors in this connection bore
fruits even in the lecture on military history which the student had to
give. The topics selected for these lectures were a further aid in
determining the fitness of the candidate. It ms less important to
depict selected periods or campaigns in their historical context than
to use the past as a source of lessons for the present and the future.
The choice of periods, campaigns, or battles to be commented upon
by the instructor or given in the form of a lecture by the students
deperded almost exclusively upon the objectives of the instruction at
that particular time. The idea was to bring out the points in the
various periods which were of most use in attaining the aims of the
instruction program. The overall circumstances were briefly given by
the instructors in their lectures. As far as the interests of pure
military science are concerned, this method gave results which were
amply sufficient. But the study of history is not sufficient to give
the candidate General Staff officer a basis for political judgment.
As far as the transportation system was concerned, the idea of
giving the funamentals in the D I and ) II courses (to begin with, the
technical conditions and the inter.dependence, a thorough understandirg
MS # P-031b
of which is necessary to give orders) was sound. The overall inter-.
relations should be taken up in the second part of the 1) I course and
in particular in the]) III course where instruction in the utilization
of the railways and roads in large-scale strategic operations,
especially to prevent the fronts from bogging down, should be given.
Instruction in air transport questions, with emphasis on combined
operations, should be added. On the whole, this subject is related
to the field of strategic conduct of operations. That is why it should
not be allowed to lose itself in technical details. It is the duty of
the tactics instructr (a director of the course) to see to it that
this subject field produces good results in tactical and strategic
training. In a comparative study of military history, questions of
railway transportation and roads also play an important part.
The foundations of the instruction in "Troop supplies" are to be
laid in the 1) I course; the ) II course covers supplies ,ithin the
framework of the division, while the third course handles supplies in
relation to corps and armies.
Questions of supply should also be taken up in connection with
suitable problems in tactics, providing the latter are not concerned
wth specialized aspects of the subject, and especially in connection
with problems rwhich cover a n umber of days. Consultation in advance
between the two instructors is necessary if a situation rich in possi-
bilities for the instruction is to be created.
.36..
MS 1/ P-031b
In addition to exercises of this sort, iihich cover troop supplies
from the practical angle, the foundations of the war potential in
materials of one's own nation and those of foreign countries should be
examined in lectures given by businessmen and this should be done dis-
passionately, without attempting to embellish the picture. By means
of such lectures the students will be given an opportunity to form their
own opinions regarding the capacity, the inter-dependences and inter-
relationships of world economy. This subject field also has influence
upon the students' capacity to form overall political judgmenIts. That
is vahy special attention should be given to it. The same careful
attention should be paid to the treatment given in courses to the
development of ordnance engineering and its possibilities both in one's
own nation and abroad. In this field, wishful thinking is harmful.
Since the First World ar, the matter of cooperation with the air
forces has constantly increased in importance, as far as General Staff
training is concerned. The fact that Germany had no air force of its
own made it impossible to give this subject the importance in the
training that it deserved until comparatively late. In the future,
close coordination with the Air Forces Academy will be necessary in
order to achieve an exchange of experiences and to tackle problems in
common. Combined operations of the air forces (parachute and airborne)
with ground forces and, in particular, with armored and motorized
formations will continue to increase in importance. The instructor
in air force methods must not remain aloof from other
_3.7_-
MS # P.-031b
subject fields. On the contrary, he should collaborate closely with
the tactics instructor so that, in every problem taken up, sufficient
consideration is given to one's own air force and those of the
enemy. Brief rmnarks in the situation report such as ttthe enemy has
air superiority" are inadequate today; this is especially true, if the
command does not draw the necessary conclusions.
The basic technical data and the principles governing commitment
of air forces should be given - as has been done previously -- in the
first course. During the second and third course, instruction can
then be given in cooperation between ground forces and air forces in
ground and air operations and in reconnaissance.
In naval warfare, the basic principles of naval tactics were
iven in the D I and 1) II courses, wherever the ehrkreise had naval
liaison officers available. Questions of naval strategy were reserred
for the third course.
Such technical details as, for instance, transport by sea, debark-
ation operations in ports, emergency harbors and on the shore, as well
as tactical questions concerning coastal defense and an attack upon
an enemy-defended coast, were given only brief treatment because of
a lack of time. In view of the experience gained in the last war and
in view, too, of future developments in this field, more emphasis will
have to be placed upon this aspect of the command. In addition to a
knowledge of the command principles governing cooperation in this
field, the General Staff officer will have to learn the command technique
appropriate for the purpose.
_38-
MS # P-031b -3
The remaining subjects, such as questions concerning the organiza-
tion of Germany's armed forces and that of the armed forces of foreign
countries, the economic situation, the internal and foreign political
situation, counter-intelligence and questions of applied science in
the Army, were as a rule given in the form of lectures by lecturers
from the respective offices or by lecturers specially selected for the
purpose. This line of instruction was essentially informative. It was
altogether inadequate as far as helping the student to form his own
opinion was concerned, especially in the field of economy, the economic
war potential and foreign and internal political questions. At the
most, the overall connections and questions such as "how it was in
former-times and how it was likely to be in the future? were barely
touched upon. It was apparent, however, that the lectures in economics
held by the only professor in the Amy (Professor LLHNJ.T) at least
made an attempt to go deeper into the subject matter.
Finally, mention should be made of the fact that (at least in the
years immediately following 1918), with few exceptions, the study of
fdreign languages was more or less regarded as a necessary evil. The
experiences gained in the war and in prisoner of war camps, as well as
a glance into the future, would seem to indicate that a change is
urgently needed in this field.
Here the matter of "1discussion' should be taken up, Justified
value was placed upon a period of open discussion at the end of each
lecture and' instruction hour, during which doubts could be expressed
-39-
I[S # P-031b -htO-
and important questions talked over. This gave the students practice
in thinking and expressing themselves in a logical fashion. Unfortun-
ately, here, too, time was lacking. That is why the courses insti-
tuted the so-called questiori-box.tf Questions regarding points in
doubt or suggestions for a general discussion could be placed in this
box. Thereupon the pertinent instructors were called in for a
"discussion classl during which these questions were answered. These
discussions did a lot of good.
On the whole, the above-mentioned methods of theoretical instruc
tion in the class-room, supplemented by homework, did not make too
great a demand upon the students' intellectual capacities. As has been
stated, a certain amount of relief was obtained through the tactical
rides interspersed between classes. In due course, however, it became
advisable to institute a free day for private study, the so-called
"study-day", once a week. The students could use this day to do their
homework, to digest the contents of the lectures they had attended, or
whatever they pleased. The free day was also useful in that it penitted
the students were often separated from their families by transfers and
detachments. Before, between, and after the courses, close touch be-
tween the candidate General Staff officers and the troops was maintained
through detachments to branches of the service. In view of the fact
that officers spent a great deal of time in detached duty just getting
to know the arms in one division with which they were unfamiliar, these
MS # P-031b
detachmi rts were effected under pressure. It was not always possible
to use the maneuver period, which was the most favorable time for the
student to get acquainted with an arm. As a result very often-the
troop commander could at best report that an individual had 'shown
interest*"
A basic requirnent should be that the candidate General Staff
officer command a unit, himself, under fire with live ammunition, at
least in the major weapons (armored forces, artillery and infantry).
The following classification of attachment to arms with which the
student is unfamiliar is advisable:
a. Command details (to. the armored forces, artillery and in-fantry). In the summer, before the start of the assignment to the
courses, and until ibd including the fall maneuvers.
b. Orientation details to the auxiliary arms of the infantry orarmored division and to the air forces:
Signal Corps and reconnaissance battalionbetween the first and second courses, upto and inclusive of fall maneuvers;
engineer troops and assault gun units be-tween the second and third courses, upto and inclusive of the fall maneuvers;
Air Forces and other large special units(such as artillery divisions) after thethird course, up to and inclusive ofmaneuvers.
Such supplementary instruction as may be necessary during the
"practical year" (see above).
During the detachments to the arms, assignment to the divisional
staffs should be forbidden.
MIS # P-031b
The section on instruction methods may be closed with a brief
consideration of the question of the further education of the General
Staff officers. It was preponderantly iii the hands of the chiefs of
staff of the Vehrkreise. In addition, each vinter, as a rule, two
strategic-tactical problems were posed by the Chief of the Troop
Office, and these had to be solved within a stated time. The oral
comments made by the Chief of the Troop Office were extremely valu-
able, although lack of time made them rare. On these occasions it
was possible to give the latest experiences and concepts of the
higher levels in more detailed form than was the case in the usual
written commentaries. For the rest, the supplementary education of
the General Staff officers as left up to the officers themselves.
They could do historical research, sit in on university lectures as
gests, or read the specialized magazines. Practice rides, staff
exercises, arnd the calling-in of General Staff officers, who were not
instructors, to submit problems for the Wehrkreis examination,
practical staff duty, exercises and maneuvers completed the training.
It may be said that this additional education did everything that
was feasible at the time. It must be noted, however, that it limited
itself in substance to the military field. Only when a man possessed
a great deal of will-power, enabling him to overcome the burden of
his daily work, which increased as the years went by, and in places
where civilian universities offered facilities, was it possible to
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MS # P-031b -4
obtain a capacity for judging matters in the wide field of general
education, which is so necessary to the General Staff officer.
MS # P'-031b
III. THE FITNESS OF THE SYSTEMg
Was the General Staff officer successful in handling the missions
which, after the education and the training he had been given, he was
supposed to be able to undertake? Did he stand the test of World War II?
It is difficult to reply to these questions. We are still too close to
the events preceding 1l9tS and to those following upon the collapse. Were
they demons who had been freed from their chains and who fought against
everything that had been regarded as good and desirable during the passage
of time? Wat was the meaning of all this in relation to the divine and
therefore significant world order? How can we evaluate the efforts of
individuals and that of the General Staff as a whole in this struggle? Was
it a demoniac will to govern, or intelligent arrangement, that brought
about the fact that ,in. the final analysis the General Staff officer - and
not only the youngest generation - was isolated in this struggle, which
had been going on since 1933; that often he was left to face the severest
conflicts of conscience alone and -ithout support of any kind; and that, in
the most critical times, no enlightement or warning was given him regarding
somber pertents in the future; that he was allowed to become entangled in
the deluding pacifying methods of the time, which for the most part he had
no means of controlling; that his qualities, such as clear thinking, re-
gard for the troth and devotion to the cause of the people to the point of
MS # P-031b
self--denial, were note harnessed to fight the demons? This is asking
questions about questions: WPe are still too close to the events concerned
to give a clear-cut answer. That is why we are not justified in casting
aspersions.
One thing mutt be said: The German General Staff officer did his
duty as a soldier until the very last and, often enough, until he was
killed. He went under with his people. On the whole, his escutcheon, and
that of the people themselves, remained unbesmirched. The theory of
ttcoliective guilt,,t, which avoids a just verdict on political grounds, is
powerless to alter this.
When I remind myself of the times in peace and in war when I had
General Staff officers as my collaborators, I can say in grateful acknoww-
ledgment that not one of these officers had anything the matter with his
character, They were "?good fellows." True, know-how and skill were
present in varying degrees. This occasionally came to light where the lack
of reserves trained systematically in peacetime had led to a curtailed war-
time training. But even in the field of skill I never knew of anyone who
was a complete failure. There may have been cases elsewhere. That is ,=il1
natural. 'When this happens, the best thing is to separate quickly, in the
interests of both parties concerned. Otherwise, there is trouble and this
hurts both the troops and the cause. As far as I know, General Staff
officers separated in this way made good in their new assignments, especially
at the front.
MS # P-031b6
On the mole, there were no difficulties in the field of tactical
command. In strategy, however, performances were not all equally good.
Outside of a lack of talent, this may also have been due to insufficient
training as a result of time shortages. In my opinion, strategical skill
demands a certain maturity in the art of tactical command. Anyone who is
not a past-master in tactical command, with its elements of space, time
and strength, will experience difficulties in the sphere of strategy.
In the previous section, I spoke about the question of specialized
training in some of the special fields of General Staff activities. It is
here that the guidance and the supervision of the Chief is especially im.-
portant. The spheres covered by specialized service, which are often
difficult, demand more than a preparation in special courses. The offi-
cers in question also need time to become thoroughly acquainted with their
task and during this phase they need assistance. In selecting officers for
these specialized fields it must be remembered that not all of them have an
inner disposition and liking for such specialized fields.
The knowledge and ability to judge matters not immediately connected
M ith the military field varied. On the whole, it may be said that training
in judging political matters maturely and in understanding matters, which
were only indirectly connected with the military field, was insufficient.
In part, the misunderstood concept of "non-political soldiers" may have
been to blame for this. Political party activities were often confused
with knowledge of and a capacity to judge national politics. It is
cL6-
MS # P-031b
imperative, however, that higher officers, in the future, be able to form
an independent and intelligence opinion in all these fields. Only on this
basis will they be able to correctly estimate possibilities and impossibil-
ities. It is only in this way that, when decisions involving the life or
death of the people are concerned, the 'NO V' of the soldier mill have the
necessary weight. Narrow-minded experts are too easily over.-ruled by
fanatics. In accordance with the hitter experiences of recent times, it
would be a good thing if, in the fxture, the highest military 'leaders -
at least the commander-in-chief of the branches of the armed forces --
were given the constitutional right, or better still, the duty, to make a
report to parliament whenever a decision of the highest political signi-
ficance, such as that involving war or peace, is about to be made. It is
true that, in our present situation, we Germans, on the basis of the pro-
visional draft of a constitution as proposed by the parliamentary council,
have little hope of seeing anything like that. The persecution of high
and the highest German military leaders by all kinds of tribunals should
have opened the eyes of the high commanders of the foreign armed forces.
In order to make a decision involving war or peace mature judgment in all
decisive fields of national politics is necessary. And Wnhat is true for the
leading statesman. is true no less for his assistants and advisers, the
General Staff officers. That is why all high staffs, beginning with army
staffs, should in future have an expert in international law attached to
them, who must he consulted in all questions. involving the articles of
S 1 P-031b
war and international law.
'In conclusion to this section on the fitness of the system, we must
answer the difficult question of vhy General Staff officers, at the time
of the collapse in 19k5, did not always conserve the inner and outward
attitude to which they had been loyal up to the very end of the war. Was
this a sign that even before that time their personal military attitude
had been doubtful; that they had merely been able to conceal these weak-
nesses in a skillful manner? There is no doubt that all this emphasizes
the importance of assessing character when candidates are selected and
during the period of education and training. But we must be justl NI;where
in history has the military profession fallen so low after a catastrophe
as in our country. All hopes and apparently all ideals, too, had been
destroyed; there was unspeakable misery for the families; a defamation
campaign occurred both within the country and outside of it, This fate
involved a generation, which, as far as training and the growth of its
character was concerned, had developed under hothouse, conditions. These
human beings - even the General Staff officer is only a human being -
now lied in a uvacuum without atny hope whatsoever. Because of their
education or because of the attacks which had been made in the recent past
against a Christian viewpoint, the inner fortitude given by confidence in
the victory of good over bad was lacking in most of these men. The de-
famation campaign,, unlimited as it was in its effects, contributed to
confusing the judgment of events and the necessities of the hour. Stress
448-
MS # P-031b
should have been laid upon all true, noble inner values and their outward
application. Disillusionment follovwed disillusionment as these men, many
of whom were still young, struggled against their confining surroundings,
and their nostalgia for space, freedom and unlimited development. It is
not our desire to varnish the truth. That is why, however, for the sake of
justice, we must ask whether we senior officers always were a good example
for them in the troubled times when we were prisoners of war or whether
we were primarily and chiefly concerned with our own concerns. Should
the young be the obly ones to pay for mistakes? Who is to judge? There
is, however, one thing that we must and will do, in memory of the count-
less General Staff officers who gave their lives, and that is to state
that in success and in failure the overall performance of General Staff
officers was good. Individual cases of failure - and those are the only
ones there were - cannot alter this verdict..
.49-
MS # P--031b
IV. EXP RIENCES
Even in the first section, a critical attitude was assuximed in regard
to various individual questions involving organization, education and
training and an attempt was made to find acceptable proposals for changes.
After the re-establishment of the War Academy, and during the last war, a
nunber of changes had already been made to conform with progress. We shall
accordingly limit ourselves here to summing up and completing hat has
been said about the most important fields:
1. One of the major tasks of the preparatory training is concerned
with educating the candidate General Staff officer to the concept of un-
selfish devotion to his duty in the service of the people, in tact and
modesty, to a high degree of comradely feeling for his commander and the
troops, and hard iork.
The training *fust enable him to make mature judgments in all questions
involving tactics and strategy and lead to complete mastery of the technique
of command. Operations in the third dimension must be given greater con -
sideration in ftture.
A knowledge of specialized f .ield;s such as technique must be acquired
to be able to judge the limits of what is possible and impossible and to the
extIent that it is necessary as a basis for conduct of operations. This
MS # P--031b
puts a limit on the extent to which details can be examined during the
instruction. An exhaustive treatment of the material should be limited
to the special training given officers -who are particularly suited for
it, as was done in the training formerly given to candidates to the
Ordnance. Office.
An effort to educate and train General Staff officers as experts
even in these other branches of knowledge will inevitably and in dilettan-
tin, at least as far as the majority is concerned. Even today the top-
ranking military leadership in all armed forces is the "general" and not
the texpert. " The same holds true for those 'who assist and advise him.
2. The best place to locate the training is a university city, so
that its staff and curriculum can be used, There should be an Air Forces
and Naval academy in the neighborhood.
It is advisable, even if at first only on a temporary basis, to give
the training in one place. This is of value as far as uniformity of
comprehension, the teaching methods and the curriculum is concerned.
3. It is proposed to organize the training as follows :
Creation of three courses with two class-rooms each with a capacity of twenty participantseach.
Overall direction wuld have to be assured bya commander, with a small staff.
Starting from scratch there would at firstbe four, and then, in the second year, t-wo class-rooms for training in the most recent general staffcourses.
MS # P1-031b
After the third-year course comes a"practical year" (Section II).
During the fourth year, training isgiven to especially qualified participantsin the third-year course, at the Armed ForcesAcademy.
The theoretical training year runs from1 October to 1 April.
For these General Staff officers destined to become specialists (for
instance, in supply' and administration, as Ic, or in the transportation
system) special courses lasting from two to four weeks will be given
beginning with the fourth year, during which they will receive a more
thorough training in the respective specialized field. During this or,
in addition to it, they will participate in field -trips bearing on the
specialized subject. During the "practical year" they might already see
service in positions of the specialized field.
4. It is proposed that the curriculum cover the follcowing subjects:
First year:
Tactics: Organization and principles of commit-.went of the infantry division, the ariiire div ontd the motorized infantry division.
Principles governing cooperation with theair forces.
-Military History: Ancient times to 1871(a seletion and connections with the present,
Histo: The most important politicalcorreao ions and lessons in statesmanship whichstill apply, for the same period.
MS # P-.031b
Foreign Languages: Expansion of materialpreviously learned with a view to taking themilitary interpreter examination after the thirdyear. If the subject has already passed themilitary interpreter examination, he should begraded for it at the Wehrkreis examination andthe grades obtained should be placed directlyafter those obtained in Tactics. By order ofimportance, evaluation should be made asfollows: Russian, other Eastern languages,English, French, other European languages(including 4speranto).
Second year:
Tactics: The infantry division, thearmored division and the motorized infantrydivision in the organization of the.: infantryand armored corps, both in indepndent omt-ment and in Joint commitment with air forceformations.
ilitary History: The period from 1871to 19T(8 sIection, as above.
Histo : 1871 - 1918, same themi asduring iis year.
Naval Warfare: Principles for oqoperationduring ie3 ous ope rations; naval transports.
Air Forces: Air transport; for the rest,refer'to Tactics.
Economics: Principles of war economy inthe c3i economy of one's own and foreigncountries. Principles of atomic economy.
Geography: Geopolitic and militarygeographical conditions in Europe.
Foreign Languages: Expansion of materialpreviously learned, Beginning of details toforeign language courses abroad after 1 June.
MS # P-031b
Third. year:
Tactics: The infantry and axmored corpsfrom atactical ar strategic viewpoint and. incooperation wj.th air forces, parachute and airborne units. Principles governing commitmentof rocket and atomic .weapons in the tacticaland stiiteglc sense. Leadership of largeaxtiller fonations.
Military History: Lessons in the strategyof the econd aorl 'far.
isto: The period from 1918 to 19h!. Sametheme as tn first year.
Geography: Geopolitic and military geo-graphical coniitions in foreign continents.
Economics: Continuation of second year.
Naval Warfare: (in relation to tactics)coastal) warare.
Foreign~ aiagiages: Continuation up toeCamination for mlitary interpreter or diploma..Trips abroad.
Law: International law and military law intheir relationship to conduct of operations.
As far as the rest of the subjects are concerned, the previous dis-
tribution among the class-years may, in the main, be retained. Special
lectures covering subjects such as emergency defense against air attacks,
atomic bonjbing, chenical 'warfare and bacteriological warfare should be in-
cluded in the curriculum.
5. Composition of the faculty:
g. Chief subjects, permanent staff (exclusive of commandantand his staff%:
MS # P-031b
for Tactics - 1 instructor perlecture-room (who, atthe same time, headsthe faculty).
for Military History -1 instructor per doublelecture room,
for Transportation -1 instructor only.for Procurement - I instructor only.for Air Forces - 1 instructor only.for Armored Forces - I instructor only.for Artillery - 1 instructor only.
for Signal Communications -1 instructor only.
b. Secondary subjects, instructors retainedon a firm basis:
for History - 1 instructor only.for Geography - 1 instructor only.for Eiconomics -1 instructor only.for Economic Technology - 1 instructor only.for Foreign Languages - 1 to 3 instructors
per language.
for Physical Culture -1 instructor only.
c. Secondary subjects, instructors without permanent status:
One each for the rest of the subjects.These instructors are called upon or detached from
time to time in accordance with the curriculum andthe schedule. Special compensation will be un-
necessary, if the instructors are military men. -
Military Geography has newly been added to the curriculum because, with
History, it serves to create mature political judgment. In view of the
efforts being made to promote varld peace, commitment beyond the borders of
the country, especially for the '"strategic reserves of the United Nations," '%,
may at any time become necessary. At least for General Staff officers, a
knowledge of conduct of operations and combat conditions in distant areas
is a necessity. Geographical situation, the borders of foreign countries,
MS # P-031b
communications, the possibilities afforded for concentrating troops for
action - even by air - the condition of the terrain and its surface
covering (obstacles, the possibilities for a surprise attack) ill play a
large part in the strategic and tactical considerations weighed in pre-
paring for a war. Familiarity with these subjects, at least on the map,
and if possible also on the actual terrain, is accordingly a necessary
part of the peace time training of General Staff officers, It should be
expressly stressed that such training should not be confined to theory,
but should be given from a practical viewpoint 'with the aid of strategic
situations. It would be the duty of the General Staff of the West-European
Union and, subsequently, perhaps of the World General Staff, to issue
directives for training along these lines from time to time. These dlirec-
tives would bear on potential zones of tension wherever they were to be
found..
6. Is the period from 1 October to 1 June adequate for this expanded
program?
It should be, if there is systematic organization of the courses and
provided the folowing limitations are placed on homework:
a, Organization of a divisional maneuveron a maneuver field only during the second course.
b. During the third course a tactical map
exercise or a terrain orientation.
This saves so much time that there will be occaeiion4 . afternoons or
evenings 'which can be used for instriction or lectures.
MS # P.-031b
The day allotted to study, (Section II), and afternoons normally
free, will have to be retained, otherwise the strain on the students will
be too great and the "academic spirit"f will be lost.
Prolongation of the courses beyond 1 June wtuld not be in line with
the need for attachments to the various branches of the service, which
should be of sufficient length, and with the necessity of giving both
instructors and students a vacatioh, and giving the instructors time to
prepare their courses.
7. Menbership
For normal times, twenty students per lecture room is sufficient.
This number of students makes it possible for the director and the in-
structor to occupy themselves w ith individuals.
1.th the exception of crass failures, to be determined on the basis
of the general opinion of the faculty and by means of written examinations
based on matter previously studied in tactics, history and foreign lang-
uages, and to be held between courses, this nunber of students could be
maintained up to the third course. Especially qualified participants in
the ehrkreis examination, which it had been impossible to add to the first
course because of a lack of vacancies, could be accepted for the following
year.
8. It is difficult to find the proportion of participants to be
called up,, on the basis of their membership in the various branches of the
service. Only a particularly great demand for individual branches can
MS # P-031b
exert an influence on this question. It depends on the future I organization
of the various armed forces. "Will they be organized as national defense
formations with a preponderantly defensive mission and, in addition, with
a strategic reserve geared to the highest degree of mobility both on the
ground and in the air, and likewise equipped to undertake anry kind of
attack?
In general, however, character and performance should be the decisive
and the exclusive factors and all General Staff officers having received
the three-year training should be qualified for use in all branches.
9. General Staff of the branches of the armed' forces - Armed Forces
General Staff. In the future, too, each branch of the Armed Forces will
have to have its own General Staff or Admiral Staff. Current developments,
however, would seem to poiut to the necessity of a special "Armed Forces
General Stafff.
In education and training, the Armed Forces General Staff officer keeps
pace with the General. Staff officers of the branches of the Armed Forces.
He keeps up a close relationship with them in and out of the service and
from time to time he revisits their circle, for example, in the capacity
of chief. He has an advantage over them in that he has attended the courses
of the Armed Forces Academy. In the future, a military university of this
sort will be a pressing necessity, It should stress strategic questions
on a world-wide basis and thoroughly investigate military-polti+ al and
military economic issues as they affect world security. That is why it
MS # P-031b
must include members of the general staffs of all branches of the Armed
Forces. In this connection, it should be pointed out that it may be ad-
visable to detach even higher rrLllitary conmanders -- above divisional
commander, perhaps -- for a year as guest students to the Armed Forces
Academy, before their appointment.
The Armed Forces Academy furnishes the General Staff officers destined
to lead the national armed forces and those to be attached to the Defense
Council of the West-European Union as representatives of the nation. It
also furnishes the officers destined to lead the Strategic Reserve when it
is committed.
Over and above this, it is not only Armed Forces Genera Staff
officers, but also General Staff officers of all branches of the Armed
Forces, which, even in peacetime, will have to see service as exchange
officers in taffs and formations of the armed forces of the European
Union. This is a requirement vihich ill not only enlarge an individual's
horizon and lead to uniform concepts of international principles of the
conduct of warfare, but which wil also allay suspicions regarding the
inttentions of individual nations and, consequently, it should serve the
cause of wvorld peace.
10. The General Staff Reserve. Experience has shown that warfare
requires considerable reserves even in General Staff officers. Inasmuch
as it has not been possible to train such officers in peacetime in suffi-
cient numbers, it will be necessary to institute a more or less improvised
MS # P-031b
form of training during the war, with all the disadvantages that this
entails,
Eperience showis that in a nuniber of fields (in particular in the
administrative and supply, counter-intelligence and the Ic fields), govern-
ment officials and business-men are soon able to perform general staff
duties in acceptable fashion. These men will have to be rounded up and
prepared for the role they wvil. have to play in time of war. This ill
require yearly orientation courses in the general principles governing
tactical and strategic conduct of warfare and in the special requirements
of the individual field concerned. Occasionally these men should participate
in conferences, field trips and maneuvers, This method will release a
considerable numiber of regular Army General Staff officers for other
missions.
11. In conclusion, let us take up two points always being touched
upon in regard to the General Staff, both in the Axny and in public.
a. Retroactive promotions: Modern warfare, with its attacks
by air, its partisan raids and armored breakthroughs, has broadened the
concept of a front from that of a line, as it was formerly understood, to
an area of considerable depth. For a logical thinker, this means that the
wartime difference between service in the General Staff and service at the
front, has more or less vanished. In addition to the exacting work he has
to do for the Army, the modern General Staff officer is often called upon
to share the troops' daily dangers and nervous tension. These are things
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MS # P-31b -61-
that must be taken into account if, as in previous days, a demand is raised
for the General Staff officer to prove his iorth at the front before
giving him retroactive promotion, in spite of the fact that his performance
as an officer of the General Staff is satisfactory. True, the General
Staff officer, as far as possible, should again and again be given an
opportunity to experience the feeling of responsibility of a command at
the actual front. But the requirement for retroactive promotion should
be: the best line officer and the best .General. Staff officer should re-
ceive retroactive promotion in accordance with their performance. A
prerequisite for this is that the man concerned be suited for a position
corresponding to the higher rank on the basis of character, skill and
physical resistance. Age is an important factor here because high-ranking
officers - especially in critical moments - will depend principally on
the maturity of their character and the clarity of their judgment. Only
mature characters will fill the demand for aid and counsel in serious
situations embodied in Clausewitzt s words: "Accurate evaluation of the
enemy, a willingness to risk opposing him at first with only limited forces;
the energy required in reinforced marches, the rapid attacks made on three
sides at once, the increased activity which great men achieve in moments
of danger; these are the reasons behind such victories." The need of a
maturity such as this puts a limit on the desire to rejuvenate (the General
Staff) by means of retroactive promotions. It is difficult to establish
a set ruing.
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b. The uniform: A. General Staff officer acquires respect on
the basis of his character and of his performance in the service of his
superiors and the Army. A special uniform to increase the regard in which
he is held is unnecessary. Traditions must bow to the necessities of the
present. During the last war General Staff officers were permitted to
forego the customary general staff stripes on their trousers while in
service; service at the front was actually meant by this, however (cf, par.
ila). With the former German General Staff in mind, I am led to the con-
elusion that it would be better to extend this permission to peacetime.
From the viewpoint of ' the service, however, it may be advisable to have
a special mark of identification. Even in peacetime, General Staff officers
used, on specific occasions, for distance, on field maneuvers or when
escorting their commanding officer, to wear a fourragere. In the passage
of time, the fourragere has come to be a general attribute of assistants to
the chief. The carmin and silver interlacing was distinctive of the
General Staff officer. In memory of honorable traditions, the General Staff
collar patch might be retained. It might be a good thing to select as
shoulder patches those of the last field unit in which the General Staff
officer saw service before his transfer. This might foster. the relation-
ship between the front and the General Staff, and vice versa.
The simplest and the most modest solution, however, is that serving
in various other nations: the oval insignia placed, for example, on the
left upper arm. Cut in carmin cloth and with a silver oak leave border,
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it coud have the insignia of the service in its center, such as, for
example, the command post flag of the staff in question or any other
fitting letters or special insignia. In this way the fourragere could be
dispensed with the remainder of the uniform, as described above, be
kept unchanged.
MS # P.-031b
V. ONCLUSION
A German officer, who has served almost two decades in the General
Staff, cannot be blamed if he is reluctant to write, or even to contribute
to the w.iting of an obituary of the General Staff. The words of Von
S CKT in his "Gedanken eines Soldaten" (ttA SOLDI R'S THOUGHTS) are
preferable:
"A history of the General Staff wouldhave great appeal, not only from the militaryviewpoint, but also, and even more so, from theviewpoint of its human interest; it would bethe history of wiork done calmly and capably,and would touch on every aspect of humanfailtings; it would relate the str glie betweengenius and bureaucracy; degci1Tf5ithe secretreasons behind victory and defeat' and it would
6e e devoid of tragedy. This history will neverbe written, and it is better so; General taffofficers should be nameless.
However, in order to be complete, we must conclude our report by a
glance at the situation of former German Staff officer in the present.
This is not a pleasant picture. It is possible to overlook the effects of
defamation based on erroneous conceptions and blind hatred. None of this
touches the honor of the German General Staff officer. His heart continues
to beat for his people which, in many cases, he has served for more than a
full generation. But his thoughts revolve around the fate of his people
and, over and above it, the fate of the world. His sober intelligence
MS # P-.031b
is in favor of peace among the peoples of the world. He would be the
very last one, once the representatives of the nations have succeeded
in establishing such a peace, to deny it his allegiance. In every
soldier conscious of his responsibilities there is a great deal of sound
pacifism. But he is concerned with the question of sound reasoning and.
good judgment in the wrld, regardless of whether, as a result of short-
sighted agitation, he is still excluded from sharing in the reconstruction,
or is already engaged in -nrking at the jointer's bench, the bench vice,
behind a plow or at intellectual tasks. Shall we ever succeed in sacri-
ficing the personal wishes of a nation to the vast concept of universal
peace? And will it be possible, in such a case, to retain the freedom
of the individual and that of peoples, which, however, is limited by a
consideration of common interests? Videant consules: May we have profited
by the mistakes made at Versailles:
We are at the beginning of a new era. The signs pointing to these
changes have also been recognized by German General Staff officers. Two
wars lost, in spite of a great many battles won, have taut them a bitter
lesson, They know now that to wage wars for political power means suicide
for Germany. In re-evaluation of the world politics, a thing for which
even political experts lacked the necessary farsightedness, German General
Staff officer cannot be blamed for the passionate love of his people, which
gave him the incentive to help in destroying bonds which ran counter to
natural laws? His intelligence spans the past and affords him a clear
MS # P-031b
glance into the future.
The last war has expanded the measure in which vast stored-up tension
can be relieved. World history has entered the orbit of battlefields
transcending the borders of single nations. We are no longer concerned
with nations, but with continents. Technical developments in the field
of transportation have created means of bringing peoples into such close
contact that their needs can be not only by vast unions. As a result, the
problem of peaceful co-exdstence among peoples has assumed primary impor-.
tance. Arising crises demand quicker solutions than formerly. The time
to solve them is shorter.' Modern radio technique makes it possible to move
people in the direction of good or bad in a matter of minutes. It is not
far from an orderly world to chaos.
However, at the end of the second World War, a war which should not
be designated as a war of liberation, European man stands among the ruins
of Germany and Europe in a world that is largely hungry and cold. And
if any German still believed that when the big powers were occupied with the
question of Germany, only Germany itself was concerned, that German can now
discern behind this problem, other problems; the West against the East,
Socialism against Capitalism, etc. All these opposing powers are ready
for the ultimate and decisive struggle.
And Germany? It is almost as if STRSEES NN s words regarding the
German tradegy are about to be realized again; ttI t is as if, whenever the
world reaches fulfilent and becomes mature for a while, the German has
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to carry the burden of the harvest 'without enjoying its fruits."t Perhaps
later generations will see these things more clearly than we do: i.e.
that the preliminary battles fought by the Germans in the great conflict --
battles which include the fighting against the present difficulties of
our people - had a significance reaching far beyond Europe. They will
then, let us hope, find that Germany, which at present bleeds from a
thousand wounds and has been burdened to the point of prostration, has
profited by its past mistakes.
And the future? No one can say with any certainty 'what form the
coming conflict will take. The tension existing may increase until war
results, but it need not. One thing is clear: Germany will derive no
pleasure from the conflict. Itill not be a spectator but a theater of
war, even though the stress is located in the Near or Far East. The
terrible eqansion of this conflict, however, will defy imagination, even
if the battles are fought with ideas, i.e. with honorable intellectual and
ethical means, such as might have served to promote the ideal of world
peace; because the objective is political empire over continents, Not
Europe, merely, but Asia, too, and perhaps even Africa. From the viewpoint
of economics, this will not mean merely steps for humanity to survive
isolated famines, but the overall interlacing of world economic communication
channels, which, today already, are extremely intricate, and cooperation
in national possibilities and international necessities. From a spiritual
viewpoint, however, the question is concerned with a thing that was, is and
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must remain vital to us: Western culture. Here we are concerned with the
question of whether this culture is to disappear before it has fulfilled
its promise; whether it shall be trampled down before having reached its
final form and full perfection. Oswald SPENGLER's vast vision has become
a horrible reality: the Decline of the West threatens.
In the midst of this tension of ideas and anxiety, surrounded with
political conflagrations, stands the German people and the former German
Genral Staff officer. In his case especially, the questioh confxrnting
him is: that will happen? That form will the weapons fashioned in the
witches t kettles of the, world and used in the decisive struggle between
good and evil, between God and the devil, take? .ll it take the form of
cosmic rays, atom bombs, atom clouds? Shall cheical poisons or biological
means of destruction, directed by the infected brain of man, complete the
destruction o f humanity in a final and apocallyptic chaos? A former General
Staff officer knows how to estimate their destructive effects. He is
afraid of their effect on his people which, itself defenseless, is exposed
to them. It is with grave anxiety that he sees the increasing lethargy
with which the dangers threatening are regarded. He asks himself anxiously
for how long civilization as a irhcole, and world peace, can be protected by
the universal fear of the frightfulness of the possibilities confronting
us.
His people is equipped neither for defense against air attacks nor
against atom bombs, because this is militarism and execrable, There is
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no border guard to protect its frontiers. Germans are deemed unworthy to
join the ranks of an international army to put out a conflagration wherever
it starts. A former General Staff officer knows only too well that, in the
final analysis, a lack of defenses means national suicide. Is it regarded
as clever and advisable to have a stunted, dying Germany in the outpost
areas of potential conflicts? F nis Germainae -- finis uropae? Are
things still being condcted on a Christian basis or is the enemy, who
deals in human lives and human destinies as if they were commodities, al-.
ready among us? Even ideas which serve the defensive needs of the people,
thought up by experts, threaten to rekindle vengeance and hatred.
But in spite of the temperance with which former General Staff'
officers were taught to think, warm hearts cannot be stilled. In spite of
the defamation program of which he is a victim, as a German, he still
feels that he shares in the general responsibility. He has not lost his
belief in justice and in the good sense of the world. There are still
reasonable voices in the world:
"Our first concern should be with problems of defense. Military
cooperation is the field in which commin action is most necessary and is
of immediate usefulness. Although they are still incomplete, the steps
taken so far to build up a common organization of defense, are to be
praised. The' Western nations need a common pattern of military rearmament.
They will have to try and organize their military doctrines and their
training methods on a uniform basis; supply problems and technical tasks
US # P-031b
ill have to be undertaken on an overall basis and research must be
coordinated; the contribution to be made by each country in armament
materials will have to be planned by a central agency. It is essential
to achieve., as completely as possible, an integration of national armed
forces, their strategy and tactics, their development and supply methods."
('Die Gespaltene Welt"' A5A World Divided7 by Anthony Eden, former
British Foreign Secretary, in the Neue Zureicher Zeitung of 6 October
198..) These are reasonable 'words, -which take a sober account of actual
conditions and draw the inevitable conclusions. But even in regard to
then the question anxiously asked is: "And Germany?"
Is it the intention to leave this people, 'which has for centuries
been a protective wall, a breakwater and a bridge, in a state of poverty
and fear, with the re'sult that it will form a fertile soil for the satanic
forces in the world to thrive upon? Is it further intended to let the
beneficial vigor and the energy of this people, the forces making for
orderliness, the fo'ixce inherent in a belief in the future, and the positive
forces of a soldierly spirit which, in its essence, has been fashioned and
affirmed by the very historical tasks confronting us today lie idle?
Would this not be underestimating the striking., power .but also the powers of
resistance of the demoniacal forces alerted for battle? Not the least
of their characteristics is inhuman brutality, aided by exremely healthy
nerves, an affinity for Nature and frugal needs.
All such ideas are forced upon us by the times in which we live.
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It is only natural that they oppress a General Staff officer more than
other people because of his former activities as an expert in such matters.
If his intellectual development is to be examined down to the present
day, then they have their place in the theme.
But let us descent from the heights of a trust in reason and reconcil-
iation to the still murky valleys in which Germans live, face to face with
their daily need. In conclusion, let us listen tor General Von SIEGiKT.
Perhaps he still has something, which is calid even for today, to tell us
and all true soldiers. In October 1919, Von sEEG1T addressed himself to
German General Staff officers with a proclamation in which he stated:
t*:,** The League of Nations has selectedas its objective everlasting peace among peopleson the basis of general disarmament. Whetherour former enemies wil follow our lead in dis-armament is uncertain. I cannot see any signsof it and my knowledge of history prevents mefrom looking upon the ideal of everlasting peaceas anything but a dream... We must live up tothe promise we gave when we placed our signatureupon the treaty. Trivial attempts to get aroundit are as unworthy as they are useless. There
is, however, one thing that no enemy can takeaway from us: our capacity for thinking like men.It is our task to see that this is not lost, andto this end I call for the support of all officersof the General Staff. Our first objective isinner strength. At no tine were German officersand, in particular General Staff officers, bullies,adventurers and war-mongers. They must not bethese things today, but the memory of the greatdeeds achieved by German arms must be kept alive.If this is done, then the people will not de-generate through debilitating dreams of peace.'When Fate again calls the German people to arms,and that day will certainly come, it must not
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.find a people of weaklings.... I expectevery General Staff officer to strivecontinuously to achieve the highest degreeof military ski11 and to set an example tothe rest .of the Army. He must sow the seedof manly thought even beyond the confines ofthe Ary itself and even when he no longerwears the uniform he must feel himself onewith the work of the General Staff.... Itis with satisfaction that I see that inaccordance with any wishew almost all GeneralStaff officers have so far refrained fromentering politics. This is certainly notthe time to publicize differences of meaning,just as it is harmful to seek culprits forthe disasters of the past. If this is doneby others we must keep aloof, even thoseamong us iho find this difficult to do.Again, and more than ever before, I mustdemand self-control and self-sacrifice fromthe General Staff for the sake of our commonwelfare.. *f
/s/ Kurt BIENNEGKE
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