transforming international regimes what the third world wants and why- stephen d. krasner

7/28/2019 Transforming International Regimes What the Third World Wants and Why- STEPHEN D. KRASNER

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Transforming International Regimes: What the Third World Wants and WhyAuthor(s): Stephen D. KrasnerSource: International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 1, World System Debates (Mar., 1981), pp.119-148Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of The International Studies AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2600213 .

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TransformingInternational egimesWhatheThirdWorldWants ndWhy

STEPHEN D. KRASNERDepartment f PoliticalScienceUniversityf California, os Angeles

The domestic nd international eakness fThirdWorldstateshas madethem xcep-tionallyvulnerable o pressures manating rom he internationalystem. hey haveattemptedo ameliorate hesepressures y ransformingnternationalegimes. hisquesthas beenfacilitated ytheirbility ocapture he tructuref nternationalrganizationscreatedbythe United tates t theconclusion f WorldWar II. The specific ontent fThirdWorld demands and theexceptionalunitymaintained ytheSouth have beenconditionedby thewidespread cceptanceof a belief ystem mbodyingome of theprecepts fdependency erspectives.

IntroductionDevelopingcountries avepursuedmanyobjectivesnthe nterna-tional ystem.omeobjectives ave beenpurely ragmatic,esigned oenhance mmediateconomicwell-being. owever, hemost ublicizedaspects fNorth-South elations, lobal bargainingver herestructur-ing of nternationalegimes,annotbeunderstoodnstrictlyconomic

or instrumentalerms.Bybasically hanging rinciples, orms, ules,and procedures hat ffecthe movement fgoods and factors n theworld economy, he Third Worldcan enhancenotonly ts economicwell-being ut also itspoliticalcontrol.The emphasis he South hasAUTHOR'S NOTE: I would iketo thankRichardBaum,PeterGourevitch, obertJervis, eterKatzenstein,eterKenen,RobertKeohane,JohnRuggie,Arthurtein, ndthe editorsof the International tudies Quarterly.Without heirhelp theargumentspresented erewould have been far less satisfactory. ohnKroll providedvery bleassistance n analyzing hedata on tax structures.

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, Vol. 25 No. 1,March 1981119-148? 19811S A119


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120 INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLYgiven o fundamentalegime hange s a manifestationf fourbasicfactors:he nternational eakness fvirtuallyll developing ountries;thedomesticweakness fvirtuallylldevelopingountries;he ystemicopportunitiesffered y he nternationalnstitutionshichwere reatedby hegemonic owernow ndecline; nd thepervasive cceptance fbelief ystem mbodying dependencyrientation.At the nternationalevel all states re accordedformal quality ssovereigns: he underlying owercapabilitiesof states establishnopresumptiveifferentationith egard o certain asicrights,speciallysole legitimate uthority ithin givengeographic rea. At the sametime, hepresentnternationalystems characterized yan unprece-denteddifferentiationn underlyingowercapabilities etweenargeand small states.Never have stateswith uch wildly ariantnationalpower esources oexisted s formal quals.Veryweak states an rarelyhopeto influencenternational ehavior olely hroughheutilizationof theirnationalpowercapabilities. or them, egime estructuringsan attractiveoreign olicy trategy,ecause t offers levelof controlover tateswithmuch arger esources hat ouldnever eaccomplishedthrough ormal tatecraftroundedn dyadic nteractions.Therigidityndweakness f domestic conomic ndpolitical truc-tures n developing ountriess a second factor hathas made basicregimehange mportantor he ThirdWorld.With he xception fasmall numberof countries, he economiesof the Third World aredominated yagriculturalndprimaryectorswithow evels ffactormobility. ulnerabilityshighbecause t sdifficultoadjust o externalchanges.Political ystemsre also weak;the statecannotmanipulatethose resources hatmightessen theimpactofpressures manatingfrom he internationalnvironment.nternational egimes an limitexternal acillations rautomatically rovide esources ocompensatefordeleteriousystemichanges.The third lement ccounting ortheprominencef a basicregimechange trategys the setofopportunitiesffered ythecharacter fpost-WorldWar II internationalrganizations. hese organizationshave offered pportunitieshat made ThirdWorldprogramsmorefeasible nd effective.he Third Worldhas beenable to turn nstitu-tions gainstheir reators. uchdevelopmentsre likely o afflictnyset ofregimes reatedbya hegemonic ower.Thispowerestablishesinstitutionso legitimatetspreferredorms ndprinciples,ut egiti-mation an onlybe effectivefthe nstitutionsregiven ndependenceandautonomy. hisautonomy an thenbe usedbyweak states oturn


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Krasner/TRANSFORMING REGIMES 121the nstitutionso purposes ndprinciples isdainedby thehegemonicpower.Affecting othdomesticncentives nd internationalpportunitiesin theThirdWorld's uestfor new nternationalconomic rderhasbeen a belief system ssociatedwiththeoriesof dependency.Thisintellectualrientation as beena critical actor, ccounting ot onlyfor omeof heThirdWorld's uccess, ut lso for ts xtraordinarynityon questions ssociatedwith egime ransformation.ven economicallysuccessfuldeveloping countrieswith flexibledomestic structuresand conservative oliticalregimes ave not brokenwith heGroupof77. In an atmosphere ervaded bydependenciaerspectives,uch abreakcouldundermine regime's ositionwith omestic lements. oThirdWorld tate penly ndorses henorms ndprinciplesf nterna-tional iberalism,ven f ome of them doptits rules nd procedures.The ideologicalhegemony njoyedbythe United tatesat theconclu-sion ofWorldWar II has totally ollapsed, nd the alternative orldview presented ydependency nalyseshas forged heSouth into aunified loc on questionsrelated o fundamentalegime hange.

The Variety f ThirdWorldGoalsThe emphasisn this ssayonweakness, ulnerability,nd thequestfor ontrols not meant o imply hatLDCs areuninterestednpurelyeconomic bjectives. hirdWorld tateshavepursued widevarietyfgoals. These includeeconomicgrowth,nternationaloliticalequal-ity, nfluencen international ecision-makingrenas, utonomy nd

independence,he preservationf territorialntegrityrom xternalinvasionor internal ragmentation,he dissemination f new worldviews at the global level,and the maintenance f regime tability(Wriggens, 978: 37-39; Rothstein, 979: 3). Theyhave used a widevariety f tacticsto promote heseobjectives,ncluding ommodityorganizations, egional oalitions,universal oalitions, llianceswithmajor powers, ocal warsto manipulatemajor powers, rregulario-lence,bilateraleconomic arrangements,egulation f multinationalcorporations, ationalization f foreignholdings, oreign xchangemanipulation,nd internationaloans.This essaydoes not review ll aspectsofThird Worldbehavior. tconcentratesn an areawherepolitical bjectives ssociatedwith on-trol have beenhighlyalient-ThirdWorld effortso enhancepower


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122 INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLYthroughhetransformationnd constructionf nternationalegimes.By buildingor altering nternational nstitutions,ules,principles,and norms,weaker ountriesan both meliorate hevulnerabilitym-posed by their ack ofnationalmaterial-powerapabilities nd theirweak domestic olitical tructures,nd increaseresource lows.ThirdWorldpoliticalbehavior, ike all politicalbehavior, an bedivided nto two categories: elationalpowerbehaviorwhich cceptsexisting egimes, nd meta-power ehaviorwhich attempts o alterregimes.Relationalpowerrefers o theability o changeoutcomes raffect hebehavior f othersn thecourseofexplicit olitical ecision-making rocesses.Meta-powersthecapacity ostructurehe nviron-mentwithinwhichdecisions re made.Thisstructuringan involve hemanipulationf nstitutionalrrangements,orms,ndvalues Baum-gartnernd Burns,1975).Relationalpowerbehavior ccepts he xist-ingrulesof the game; meta-power ehaviorattempts o alter thoserules.Outcomes an bechanged othby lteringheresourcesvailabletoindividual ctors and bychanging heregimes hatcondition ction.Changingheoutcome f trugglesought ith elational ower equireschanging ctorcapability.However, uchchangesdo notnecessarilyimply n alterationnmeta-power. n individualmaywinmoremoneyby earningo become better okerplayerwithouthangingherulesof poker.A politicalpartymaywinmore offices y attractingmorevoterswithoutlteringhe awsgoverninglections.A statemayprevailmorefrequentlyndisputeswith thernternationalctorsbyenhanc-ing its nationalpowercapabilitieswithout ltering he institutionalstructures,orms, nd rulesthatcondition uchdisputes.

Outcomescan also be changedby changing egimes.Meta-powerbehavior s designed o do this.Successfullymplemented,t mplieschange n relational ower s well. ndividualswhowinat pokermaylose at bridge;politicalparties hat ecure eatsunder proportionalrepresentationystemmight e excludedby single-seatistricts;tatesthat ecuregreater evenue rom artelized xportsmight e poorer fthe price of theirproductwas dictatedby those with the greatestmilitaryapability.An actorcapableofchanginghegamefrom okerto bridge, romproportional epresentationo single-seat,rom co-nomic to militaryapability,has exercisedmeta-power. ctorsmayseektoenhance heir elational owerbyenhancingheir wnnationalcapabilities, rtheymay ttempto securemorefavorable utcomes ypursuing meta-powertrategyesigned o changeregimes.


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Krasner/ TRANSFORMING REGIMES 123Most studiesof international oliticshave implicitly mphasized

relational owerbecausethey eal withwar andtheuse offorce. n thisarena,meta-poweronsiderationsreof imitedmport ecause nstitu-tional restraints, orms, nd rules are weak. Discussions of ust wardocrines represcriptive,otdescriptive. speciallywith egard othereasonsforwhichwars are begun, s opposedto theway n which heyare conducted,regimeshave had little ffect.Rules relatedto tacitmutual estraints avedevelopedduringomewars,but heyhave beeninchoate and weak. War outcomes are determined y the relativenationalmaterial apabilities ortheactors nvolved:what resourcesarenominally nder heurisdictionfthe tate, nd howwell he tateis able to mobilize nd efficientlyeploytheseresources.In issue reasother han heuse offorce, owever,egimes avebeenmore salient.Agreementn norms nd rulescan prevent uboptimaloutcomes hatwould otherwiseccurwhen ndividual ationalityoesnot maximizecollectiveutility. hese situations re associated,forinstance,withfree iders r, to citea secondexample,withprisoners'dilemmaStein, 1980;Keohane,1980b).High evels feconomic ctiv-ity re impossiblewithout redictable atterns f behavior. uch pat-terns will evolve into habits, usage, and conventionswith somenormativeonnotationsYoung, 1980).Wars nvolve elational owerstrategies ased on nationalpower capabilities;nonbelligerentssueareasaresusceptibleometa-powertrategies esigned oalter egimes.ThirdWorld tates re nterestednemployingoth elational owerandmeta-power. roposalsforregime hange, oicedby he essdeve-loped countries,eflectn effortoexercisemeta-power. he objectiveof theseproposals,of whichthe program ssociated with theNewInternationalconomicOrdersNIEO) isthemost ecentndsalient,sto transformhebasic institutionaltructures, orms, rinciples, ndrules thatcondition he internationalmovement f goods, services,capital, labor, and technology. uch transformations particularlyattractiveecausetheability f ThirdWorld tates oaccomplish heirobjective olely hroughhe xercise frelational ower s imited y heexiguity f theirnational material-power apabilities.These alonecouldnotresolve hevulnerabilityroblems fpoorer tates.Most ThirdWorldproposalsforregime hangehave beenmade ninternational rganizations. ebates within heseorganizations avebeen concernedwith nstitutionaltructures,orms,ndrules,not ustthetransfer f resources.However, heNIEO and otherproposalsforregime hangehavebeen butone ofmanykinds f nteraction etween


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124 INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLYthe North nd theSouth.Withregard o actual resourcemovements,the most mportantettings avebeennational nd bilateral, ot uni-versal. n suchsettings, eveloping tates haveusually ought o userelational ower o enhance pecific conomic nterests.heyhave nottried o alter egimes.Oil and someother awmaterials,s well s somenational egulationfmultinationalorporations,re themajor xcep-tionsto thisgeneralization.)When,for instance, developing ountry orrowson the Euro-dollarmarket,t attemptso getthe bestpossibleterms. t does not,however, hallenge heability fprivate inancialnstitutionso basetheir ecisionson maximizing rivate conomicreturns.Whena statenegotiates stand-by greement ith he nternational onetary und(IMF), it attempts o use relationalpowerto adjustthe terms ndconditions f the arrangement.t does not,however, hallenge heauthorityf the IMF to signan accord thatspecifies argets oreco-nomicpolicies.The modal form f interaction etween ndustrializedand developing reas has involved he transferf resources nd theexercise f relational ower, nd has takenplace in bilateral renas.Some examples of relationalpower and meta-power olicies innational nd bilateralas opposedtomultilateral)ettingsre shown nthefollowing able. Multilateral ettingsre furtherrokendown ntoNorth-SouthrrangementsndSouth-South rrangements.he entriesin this able are examples.However, heir requencysmeant o be inproportiono actual conditions. heupper eftnd lower ight ells rethe ones in whichmostactivityakesplace.Behavior hatfallswithin ne of thecells s not ncompatiblewithbehavior hatfallswithin nother.n recent ears heGroupof77 haspressed orgeneralized ebtreliefatleastfor he east-developedtates)at universal nternational orums uch as UNCTAD and theUnitedNationsGeneralAssembly, hile own-playinghis ssue t multilateralfinancial nstitutionsuch as the World Bank and the IMF, whereweighted oting revails Wall StreetJournalOct.4, 1976:8, 3; Roth-stein,1979: 161). Algeriapursued pragmatic" olicieswith espect oliquefied atural as exportswhileBoumediennected as the eaderoftheNon-AlignedMovement. he pursuit fdifferentoalsindifferentforumss not inconsistentr incoherentGosovic and Ruggie,1976:312,for similar onclusions).t does notreflectisagreementetweenpolitically rientedforeign ffairs fficialswho do not understandeconomics ndfinanceministryfficials horecognizehe realities"fglobal nterdependence.ather, hevariety fThirdWorld trategiesmanifests variety f objectives.


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126 INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLYThis essay is concernedwithonly one aspect of Third World

behavior-the lowerright-handell of Table 1. Developing ountrieshave soughtto alterregimesn a variety f issue areas. Theyhaveattemptedocreatenew nstitutionaltructuresr tochange atternsfinfluence, articularly oting llocations, nexisting tructures.heyhavesought o establish ew nternational orms.Andtheyhave triedto changerules.Manyof thesequestshave beensuccessful.

Third WorldMotivationsThirdWorlddemands or egime estructuringannotbe seen nanysimpleway as a reflection f economicfailure.Duringthepostwarperiodtheoverallrate ofgrowth fdeveloping reashas beenfasterthan hat f ndustrializedountries. radepatterns ave becomemorediversewithregard o partnersnd commodities.ndicators fsocialwell-being, ncluding ifeexpectancy,nfantmortality,nd literacy,havedramaticallyncreasednmany reas. Theeconomic erformanceof theSouth during hepostwar eriodhas beenbetterhan hat ftheindustrializedountries uring he nineteenthenturyHowever, heSouthcontinues o suffer rom n enormousgap inpower apabilitiest the nternationalevel nd fromocialrigidityndpoliticalweakness t the domestic evel.Creatingnew regimes hatreflectouthernpreferencess one wayto deal withthesestructuralweaknesses.

INTERNATIONAL STRUCTURESTherehave alwaysbeen small states n themodern nternationalsystem. efore he ndustrialevolution,owever,herewas ittle aria-tion in levels of economicdevelopment.Withregardto per capitaincome,the richest ountrywas onlyabout twiceas well off s thepoorest t thebeginningfthenineteenthentury.Now, therichestcountries re80to 100timesbetter ff han hepoorest. hecombina-tionof smallsize and underdevelopmentas leftmanyThirdWorld

states n an unprecedentedlyeakposition.Measuring elative owerresourcess a perennial roblem or tu-dentsof internationalelations.There s no simple tatistic hat de-quately summarizes ll aspects of nationalpowercapabilities.Re-sources, nd conversely ulnerabilities,ary fromone issue area toanother Baldwin, 1979). The best single ndicator s a measureof


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Krasner/ TRANSFORMING REGIMES 127aggregate conomic utput.Aggregate ational ccount tatisticsncor-porate wide range factivitieshat an be tappedbythe tate ooneextent r another or variety fpurposes.Sincethebeginningf the nineteenthenturyhe number fstates,particularlymallstates,has expanded.This trend ncreased ramati-callywith ecolonizationfterWorldWar I. Thefollowingable howsthedistributionftheratios f GNP ofthe argesttate nthe ystemoother tates or heyears1830,1938, nd 1970.Forinstance,he ntryin the irstolumn or1830 ndicateshat herewere our ountriesnthesystemwhose grossnationalproductswere qual to between 0% and100%of thegrossnationalproduct fRussia,the argest tate n thesystem.In 1830,the ratioof theGNPs of thelargest tate,Russia,to thesmallest tateforwhichfiguresre available,Denmark,was 41:1. In1970, he ratio of the national ncomes f the argest tate, heUnitedStates, ndthe mallest,heMaldives,was97,627: .By 1970, 4%of hestates nthe nternationalystem ad national ncomes hatwere essthanone thousandth hatof the UnitedStatesand 72% had nationalincomesessthanone hundredthf heU.S. figure.hese restaggeringdisparities.n 1970, heThirdWorld s a whole ccounted or nly11%of world GNP (Leontief, 977:8).With heexception fChina,there s no ThirdWorldcountry hatcan layclaimto greatpowerstatus.However, heGNP of the UnitedStates s 5.64timesarger hanChina's. Countries roffereds regionalhegemonic owersdo nothave mpressive ationalpower apabilities.In themid-1970s,heGNPs of ndia and Brazil the two argest ntheThirdWorld after hina) were bout thesame as those ofSpain andPoland; Iran's andthis efore heKhomeini egime) ivalled elgium's;Saudi ArabiaandNigeriahad GNPs aboutequal tothoseof Denmarkand Finland.There is littleprospect orfundamentalhange n theforeseeablefuture.n a study or heUnitedNations,Leontief as estimated ggre-gateand per capita income n theyear2000fordifferentreas oftheworld,underdifferentssumptions. o meethisoptimistic arget orLDCs growth, eontief1977: 11) argues hat twogeneral onditionsarenecessary: irst,ar-reachingnternalhanges f ocial,political ndinstitutionalharacternthedeveloping ountries,nd second, ignifi-cantchanges n the worldeconomic order.Accelerated evelopmentleading o a substantial eductionfthe ncomegapbetween hedevel-oping and thedevelopedcountries an onlybe achievedthroughcombination f both theseconditions." veniftheseconditionsweremet, hegap in power capabilities s indicatedbyGNP between he


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Krasner/ TRANSFORMING REGIMES 129North nd the South wouldstillbe enormous. eontief 1977: 8) esti-mates hat he hareofglobal ggregate utput ccounted or y he essdevelopedcountrieswouldriseto only 22% in theyear 2000.Thus, fattentionsfocused ntheGNP gapbetween heNorth ndSouth, he ituation f ThirdWorld ountriessbleak. Fewcanhopetochallenge venmedium osmall ize ndustrializedountriesn the reaof aggregate conomicactivity. ven withrapid rates of economicgrowth,heabsolutegap is nowso large hat tcannotbe closed n theforeseeable uture.UsingGNP figuress a measure fpower apability as the dvan-tagesofeasy comparabilitynd accessibility; owever, talso has thedisadvantage f obscuringpotentialvariations n power capabilitiesacross differentssue areas. Yet, evenat a disaggregatedevel, hereslittle vidence hatThirdWorld ountries an acteffectivelyyutilizingonlytheirnationalmaterialresources. n the area of rawmaterialscartelizationfforts ave failed-withtheexception foil-althoughcoffeexportingtateshavehadsporadic uccess npushing p prices ybuyingn London and New York, ndcopperproducersnwithholdingstockfrom he market. he fundamentalroblem or heexportersfprimaryommoditiess that here s a high emptationocheaton anycartel cheme, ecausethemarginal ewards fadditional evenues orThirdWorldgovernmentstrapped orresources reveryhigh Kras-ner,1974).Withregard otrade nmanufactures,hirdWorldexpor-ters ependfarmore nNorthernmarketshan ndustrializedountriesdo on manufacturedoods from heSouth. Northernountries aveimport ompetingndustriesapable ofproducinghe ameproducts,while heSouth doesnot havealternative arkets.With egardobanklending,argeThirdWorlddebtors, speciallyMexicoand Brazil,havesecured ome everage hroughheconsequences fdefault.While hishas given hem ontinued ccess to creditmarkets,thasnot enabledthem o alter hebasic nature fcredit elations r tokeep nterestatesdown.2 maller ebtors arrying eavy urdensrerollingver heir lddebt buthavingdifficultyecuring ew oans.There are two major exceptions o thesecomments bout ThirdWorld nationalpower capabilities n specific-issuereas. The firsts

1. Thecondition or eginningoclosethe bsolutegapisthat heratio f hegrowthrate f he mallerountryo thegrowthate f he argerxceed he atio f heGNP of helargerountryo theGNP of he maller.nthemid- 70s ven hefastestrowing DCs,such s Korea and Brazil whichweregrowing our imes asterhanmost ndustrializedcountries), idnotmeet his ondition or heUnited tates, lthough hey idformostEuropeancountries.2. Brazilhas recentlyeenpaying preadsofup to 1.5%above LIBOR while ndus-trializedountries avebeen ecuringpreads f0.5%or ess ven houghheEuro-dollarmarkets flushwithnewdepositsfrom il-exportingtates.


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130 INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLYOPEC, where he ombination fexcessfinancial esources ndinelas-tic demandhas enabledThirdWorldcountriesoraiseprices ightfoldin nominal termsoverthe last sevenyears.The second is nationalcontrol f multinationalorporations.Manydevelopingountries aveexcluded MNCs fromcertainsectors,nationalizedor unilaterallyaltered heconcessions f petroleumnd hardmineral orporations,and limitedheownershiphareofforeign ationals ither enerallyrin specificndustriesUN, 1978: 19-24).Control overaccess to theirterritoryas been an importantource of leverageforLDCs. Host-country ationalshavealso learned bout market ccessand technol-ogy,whichhasgiven hemmorebargaining ower Huntington, 973;Vernon, 1971: 2; Moran, 1974). However,thepressure han can beexercised yhost ountriess limited y he bility ffirmso relocatenmore hospitable ountries.3Asidefrom il and domestic egulationfMNCs, fewThirdWorldstates have any ability o altertheir nternationalnvironmentolelythroughheuseofnationalmaterial-powerapabilities. heir mall izeand limited esources,ven nspecific-issuereas, s thefirstonditionthathas edthem oattempthefundamentallteration f nternationalregimes. onventional tatecraftased uponnationalmaterial ttrib-utes is unlikely o reducevulnerabilities. meta-political trategydesignedto alterrules, norms, nd institutions ffers n attractivealternative,fonly bydefault.

DOMESTIC STR UC TURESThe second onditionhathas driven hirdWorld tates o attempt

transformationf internationalegimess theweakness f their wndomestic ocieties nd political ystems. heinternational eakness fmostdeveloping tates, s indicated ytheir mallaggregate utput ncomparisonwith hatof ndustrializedtates, uggests hat hey annotdirectlynfluencehe nternationalystem.talsosuggests hat heywillbe subject o external orces hat hey annot hange.Small states reusuallymoreheavily nvolved n the worldeconomy. n 1973, trade(exportsplus mports)was equal to 37%ofGNP fordeveloping oun-tries, 9% for ndustrializedountries. n thesameyear,48 out of 87LDCs had tradeproportions reaterhan50% International ank forReconstructionnd Development, 976: Table 3).Although mallstates, s a rule,are moreheavily nvolved n theworld economy, tatesize does not determinenternal apacity tomodulatethe pressures manatingfrom an uncertain nternational3. For an excellent eview fThirdWorldpower apabilitieswith onclusionsimilarto these ee Smith 1977).


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Krasner/TRANSFORMING REGIMES 131environment. small, adaptable state could adjustto manyregimestructures.uch a state ouldaccepts ts ackof nfluencet the nterna-tional evelbutremain onfidentf ts bilityodeal with nvironmentaldisturbances ver a wide rangeof international ules, norms, ndinstitutions.The ability o copewith nvironmentalisturbancessa functionfthemobility,lexibility,nddiversityfa country'sesources. coun-trywithhighlymobile, lexible,nddiverse actors anabsorbexternalshocks. t can adjust tspattern fproduction,mports,ndexports omaximize ts economicreturns nder differentnvironmentalondi-tions.Adjustmentsmight e directed ythe stateortheprivate ector.Thefirstlternativeequires strong olitical ystem,ne nwhich hestate scapableofresistingressuresrom omestic roups, ormulatinga coherent trategy,nd changing ocial and economic structures(Krasner, 978: h.3).The secondalternativeequires well-developedprivatemarketwithhigh evelsofcommunicationnd information.

Social Rigidity.At early tagesofdevelopment,ountries ack thecapability o absorb and adjustto external hocks.This incapacity sproducedby rigiditiesnherentn traditionaltructures.n an elegantanalysis oncernedwith roblemsfnational ependence, owitt1978)elaborates ive haracteristicsf a traditionalrstatus ociety. irst,statussociety s based upon exclusive orporategroups,which ockindividualswithin rigid tructure.econd,social action sdeterminedby personalrather han mpersonalnorms.Differentndividuals retreatedndifferentaysbecauseof scriptiveharacteristics.hird, hedivisionof labor in the society s based on assignment o specificascriptivegroups.An individual's conomicactivitys permanentlyestablishedby his group membership. ourth,the ontology f thesociety tresses heconcretend discrete. eneralprinciples hat an beappliedto a widerangeofsituations reeschewed. ifth,heworld sseencomposedof"concrete nd discrete lements-that s, ndivisibleunits-economic, social, cultural, nd politicalresources re seenasbeingfinite nd immobilerather han expanding nd flexible."Bycontrast,modernocieties remarket atherhan tatus-based.nterac-tions regoverned y mpersonal orms faction.The individual ndthe nuclearfamily, ather han thecorporate roup, re thebuildingblocksof thesocietyJowitt, 978:7-10).Modern ocieties re essvulnerableo externalhanges ecause heirfactors re moremobile.Better-trainedorkers an perform widervariety f tasks. More-developed apital markets an morereadilyreallocate nvestmentesources.t is easierfor n industrial orker omovefrom nefactoryoanother hanfor peasantto shift rom ne


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132 INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLYcrop to another,much ess move from grarian o industrialmploy-ment. n his seminal tudy f thepower spectsof nternationalrade,Hirschman1945:28) argues hat the nherentdvantagewith espectto all these spects fthemobilityfresourcesiesoverwhelminglyiththegreatmanufacturingnd trading ountriess opposed to countriesin which griculturermining redominates."The transitionromraditionalo modernocietystaking lace ntheThirdWorld, ut t sa slow nd difficultrocess. t s notunidirectionalor irreversible,s events n Iran and Cambodia demonstrate.Mostdeveloping ountries re still n whatChenery 1979: 18, 29) has calledthe arly haseofthe ransitionrom traditionalo a modern conomywhichoccurs at per capita income evelsfrom 200 to $600 (in 1976dollars). n thisphase, ocieties re vulnerableo external hock.Mostemployments still nagriculture. ross-national ata indicate hat, naverage,ndustrialutputdoesnotexceed griculturalutput ntil ercapita incomes of $800 are reached, nd that ndustrial mploymentdoes not exceed agricultural mploymentntilper capita income s$1600.Thefollowingableshowsthedistributionf theratios fagricultu-ral abor to industrialaborfor ll countries orwhich ata s availablefrom heWorldBank. Higher atios uggest reater ulnerabilityinceagriculturalabor srelativelymmobile. nly16LDCs havemoved o apatternfproductionnwhich mploymentn ndustryxceeds hat nagriculture. lmost50% of thedeveloping ountries orwhich iguresare availablehave at eastfour imes smanyworkersnagricultures inindustry.Most Third Worldcountries ave notmoved very ar longthepathfromraditionomodernity. hile here sconsiderable aria-tion mong hecountriesftheThirdWorld, very harp leavage tillexistsbetween ndustrializednd developing ountries.

PoliticalWeakness: herigidityfthe ocial and economic tructureindevelopingountriess reflectedn thepolitical ystem.Most centralpolitical nstitutionsn the Third Worldare weak.The state s oftentreated s butone morecompartmentalizednit. ts ability o extractresources rom hesocietys limited. ffortso combinediverse ocialand material nits relikely o be frustratedy he ompartmentalizednatureof the society.Economicactivityhat takesplace outsidethemarket annotbeeffectivelyappedbythegovernment.4ften he tateis unableto resist ressure rom owerfulociety roups.Low levels fskill and educationmake it difficulto formulateffectiveconomicnolicies. Under conditionsof social mobilization nd low levels of

4. See Ardant1975)for discussion f the mportancef themarket orEuropeanfiscal evelopment.


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Krasner/ TRANSFORMING REGIMES 133TABLE 3

Ratioof LaborForce n Agricultureo LaborForce n ndustryNumberof Countries

>4 3.0-4.0 2.0-3.9 1.0-1.9 1.0-0.5


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134 INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLYcharacterized ydensepolicynetworks hichfuse hepublic and theprivate ectors.These networksntegratell groupswithin he ociety.They facilitate ommunicationnd prevent talemate.The politicalorganization f the small states has allowed them to enjoy the eco-nomic benefits f full participation n the international conomy,while nsulating heirdomestic ocial structuresrom he disruptiveconsequences hatwouldensue fromuncontrolled xternal erturba-tion.

Tax Structures. ax structures ffer he opportunityo illustratedifferencesetween hepolitical apabilities f ndustrializednd devel-oping countries. ax collection s generally good indicator f theability f the tate o extract esources romtsownsociety.5 evelop-ing countries ollect smaller roportionftheirGNPs than ndustri-alizedstates nd relymoreheavily pontradetaxes; the evelof staterevenues, therefore,ore ubject o nternationalconomic icissitudes.Third World countries re poor and their overnmentsannot taxmuchof whatthere s. In 1973totalgovernmentevenuewas equal to33.5% of GDP for ndustrializedountries nd 19.9% fordevelopingcountries.Mali was able to collectonly 1.5%ofitsGDP, Nepal only5.6%. The lowestfigure orindustrialized ountrieswas 21.6% forJapan;thehighest 1.7% forSweden International ank forRecon-structionndDevelopment, 976:Table 7). There s a strongurvilinearrelationshipetween ercapitaGNP, andgovernmentevenues a per-centage fGNP, with evenue ising harply ptopercapita ncomentheneighborhoodf$2,000and then evelling ff.6There s also a strong elationshipetween conomicdevelopmentand the nature f the tax structure. rade taxes are relativelyasy tocollectbecause mports nd exports rechanneled hrough entralizedportfacilities. ven with mugglingnd corruptionoften ery eriousproblems) ariffsnd export axes are easier oobtain hatdirect axes

5. The mostglaring xceptions o thisgeneralization re levies imposedby oil-exporting nd someotherresource-producingountries n multinationalorporations.The centralized tructuref resource xtractionndustriesmakesthem asy targetsvenforweakstates.The calculations n this ection re based on UnitedNations,StatisticalYearbook,PublicFinanceTablesfor otalgovernmentevenue,otalgovernmentxpenditures,ndtrade evenues; ationalAccount nd Gross DomesticProduct ables for ross omesticproduct; nternationalMonetary und, International inancialStatistics or onsumerprice ndices, mports nd exports;WorldBank,WorldBankAtlas, 1977forpercapitaGNP.6. Hinrich's1966: 15-16) igures ereupdatedfor 6 countries or1974 nd 1975 ndshow the same pattern. he sharp decline n the slope at $2,000 capita is based onmid-1970s igures.


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Krasner TRANSFORMINGREGIMES 135which requirehighlevels of bureaucratic kill and voluntary om-pliance.The patterns againcurvilinear. cross-nationalomparisonndi-catesthat rade evenues a proportionf otalrevenue eclinesharplyfor countrieswithper capita incomesup to $2,000and levelsoff orcountrieswithhigher ercapita ncomes. omeof thepoorest evelop-ing countries eriveup to 60% of their evenue rom axeson trade,while herange or ndustrializedountriess 2% to 10%.Thefollowingequation,based on figures or hose48 countries orwhich1974datawere vailable, llustrateshenature ftheoverall elationshipetweenGNP per capitaand traderevenue:

TradeRevenue = 71.6 - 17.3 logGNP per apita)TotalRevenue (00.00)r2= .35*(*significantt .01level)

It is not surprising hat developing-countryevenuesare moreseriouslyffectedyperturbationsnthe nternationalconomic ystemthan herevenues f ndustrializedountries. herelationshipetweenchangesntotal rade nd changesngovernmentevenuewasexaminedfor heperiod1974-1975,he onlyrecent eriod nwhichworld radedeclined rom ne year o thenext.Baseduponconstant ollarfigures,separateanalyseswere performedor developing nd industrializedcountries. or the 61 developing ountries:(%Changen Revenue 974-1975) 6.25 + .61 %ChangenTrade1974-1975)

(00.00)r2= .29*(*significantt the 01 level)

(Notethat fone outlier,ndonesia, s dropped romhe alculation,heslope changes o .64 and the r2 ncreases o .36.) However,for he24moredeveloped ountries,herewas nosignificantelationshipetweenchanges n revenue nd trade r2 .008).Government evenues re but one indicator f the impactof theworld conomy n particulartates.The experience fthedevelopingcountriesn the1974-1975 ecession oes,however,uggest source ortheir oncern bout trade acillationshathas been argelygnored. neofthepersistentomplaints fThirdWorld ountries as been hat heysufferrom ubstantial rade luctuation.While hevacillationsntrade


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136 INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLYexperienced y developing ountries ave declined, hey re stillmuchlarger han thoseaffectingndustrializedountries. he Third Worldhas argued hat hesevacillations nhibit heir conomicgrowth. ow-ever,no empirical ubstantiation as been foundforthisclaim. Onestudy venreveals positive elationshipetween xport nstabilityndeconomicgrowthKnudsen and Parnes, 1975: 7-15).Whilevacillationsntrademaynot be related o economicgrowth,they re related o the tate's bility o extract evenue. olitical eaderscan be more ensitiveothreatso theirommand ver esourceshat anbeusedfor mmediate olitical urposes han hey re to threats o thelong-termconomicgrowth rospects f their ountries. hirdWorlddisaffectionith he rading egimemayberootedntheweakdomesticpolitical tructuresfLDCs whichnecessitate eliance n trade axes.

THE NICS vs OPECThere is one major exceptionto thesegeneralizationsbout weakpolitical ndrigid ocial structuresnThirdWorld ountries. henewlyindustrializingountries,rNICs,havebeen ble toadjust ffectivelyothe nternationalnvironment.ingapore,Hong Kong,Taiwan,SouthKorea,and Brazilhaveadopted aggressivexport-orientedtrategies.In Hong Kongtheprivatemarket asactedeffectivelyna laissez-fairesituation.n the otherNICs thegovernmentas beenmore ctive. nKorea and Brazilfor nstance, hestateexplicitly ecided opromoteexport-orientedrowthnd move wayfrom rotectionismnthe arly1960s. Despite domesticpressure, oth were able to maintain owereffectivexchange ates, preconditionornternationalxport ompe-titiveness.hrough he 1970s, he NICs were ble to adjustto restric-tions mposedby ndustralizedations ydeveloping ewproductinesanddiversifyingheir xports Krueger, 978:ch.2; Yoffie, 980).Fortheperiod1970-1976, orea'sexports rew t an annual verage ate f31.7%,Taiwan'sat 16.2%,Brazil's t 10.3%,Hong Kong'sat8.6%andSingapore's t 14.1%.Theaverage ate f xport rowthorow-incomecountries or he ameperiodwas -0.4%,for llmiddle-income DCs(the categorynto which the NICs fall) 3.8%, and for ndustrializedcountries .8% (International ank for Reconstructionnd Develop-ment, 978:Tables 2 and 6).The NICs are one of thetwogroups fdramatic uccess torieswithregard o economicgrowth,r at least ransfers,nthepostwar eriod.Theother soil-exportingtates. fpurely conomic onsiderationsreused to explainthebehavior fdeveloping ountries, hedifferencen


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Krasner/TRANSFORMING REGIMES 137foreign olicy rientationsfcountriesnthese wogroups sdifficultounderstand. oththeNICs and theOPEC countries avedramaticallybenefitedrom hepresentystem.WhilenoneoftheNICs have akenleading ole ntheSouth'seffortso restructurenternationalegime,number f OPEC countrieshave been at the forefrontf the ThirdWorldmovement. lgeria ndVenezuelahave akeneading oles ntheGroup of 77. Iraq, Libya, and now Iran are hardlydevoteesof theexisting lobal order.While heNICs and OPEC countries recomparablewith egard oincomegrowth nd export arnings, heir ulnerabilitieso changes nthe internationalconomyare dramatically ifferent.he NICs aremoving owardflexible conomicstructuresnd strong olitical ys-temscapable of adjusting o shifts n the external nvironment. heOPEC countries owenjoyenormous argaining ower s a result fthe nelastic emand forpetroleumnd the ow opportunityosts ofcontrollingupplies or hesurplusOPEC states.However, ewOPECcountrieswould be able to adjustto alterationsnbargaining ower.Theirdomestic actors re mmobile. heir olitical tructuresreweak.The internationaladicalismf omeOPEC countriessnot ompatiblewith conventionalrientation hich xplains hedisaffectionfdevel-opingcountriess a manifestationftheir ackofeconomic uccess.Domestic tructural eakness, manifestationftraditional ocialnorms, nd politicalunderdevelopment,ogether ecome a secondfactor hatmakes internationalegime ransformationttractive oralmost ll ThirdWorldcountries. he external nvironments inher-ently hreateningven in the absence of any direct ffort ymorepowerfultates o exerciseeverage.nternationalegimesontrolledydeveloping ountries an mitigateheexposure fdevelopingreastosystemicallyenerated hanges.Theyoffer omecontrolna situationwhere the lack of domesticadjustment apacity precludes ffectivecushioning gainst xternal hocks.

SystemicOpportunitiesDemandsfor egime estructuringaveoccupied dominant lace nNorth-South elations, ot simply ecausethis pproachcouldcom-pensatefortheinternationalnd domesticweakness fThird Worldstates, utbecausethepostwar ystem ffered eveloping ountriessettingn which opursue his trategy:heprominence iven ometa-


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138 INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLYpolitical oals hasbeena function f opportunitiesswell s needs.Thepostwar iberalregime, specially he mportance hat t accordedtointernationalrganizations, rovided he ThirdWorldwith orumsnwhich o press heir emands.The relationshipetween egimesndtheunderlyingower apabili-ties of states an be assessedwithregard otwo ssues.First, oes theregime eflecthepreferencesf tatesweighted y heir ower apabili-ties?Thecharacteristicsf the regimemaybe identicalwith r divergefrom hepreferencesfthemost powerfultates.Second, whateffectdoes the regimehaveon relative nderlyingower apabilities? hereare three ossibilities:heregimemayhave no impact; tmayreinforcethe xisting istribution;r, tmayunderminehe xisting istribution.Thesepossibilitiesre summarizednthefollowingable.The fourmost ikely lternativesre labelled nTable 4. First, hepower tructurendregimemaybecongruent:he characteristicsf heregimereflecthepreferencesf individual tates weighted ytheirnational ower apabilities)nddo not ffectapabilities. econd, heremaybe incongruence:he characteristicsf theregime o notcorres-pondwith hepreferencesf ndividualtatesweighted y heir ationalpowercapabilities, ut theregime oes not alterrelative apabilities.Third, heremaybydynamic tabilityetweenhepower tructurendtheregime: hecharacteristicsftheregimeonformothepreferencesof the strong nd reinforcehe existing owerdistribution.ourth,theremaybe dynamicnstabilityetween heregime nd the nterna-tional structure: he characteristicsf theregime o notcorrespondwith hepreferencesfthe trongnd tend oundermineheposition fmorepowerfultates.

Developmentsnthepostwar ystemuggest hatduring eriodsofhegemonicdecline,there s a propensityo move from ongruencetoward ncongruencerevendynamic nstability.orhegemonic ow-ers there s a paradox,perhaps n inevitable ialectic,nvolvednthecreationof international egimes-includingnternationalrganiza-tions. Regimes hatthehegemonic ower nitiallyreates o serve tsown interestsan be seized and restructuredy otheractors n thesystem.Fully hegemonicpowersare likelyto establisha regime hat iscongruentather handynamicallytable.Theirnationalmaterial om-inance sso complete hat hey anignore he mpact fregimesn theirrelative ower apabilities. hey re ikelyo seekbroadmilieu oals. ncontrast, normalpower s likely o attempt o create dynamicallystable egime. ince t acksthe lack resources ossessedbyhegemonic


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4-

40Zs0Z 4

(4 0

~~ ~~~. S~c~~~~~~~~C~~~~~(40o4C44-0Qt0

Q.~~

*0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~~3


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140 INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLYstate, henormal owermustbeprimarilyoncerned ith nhancingtsnationalpowercapabilities.However, situation f ongruence esultingrom egime reation ya hegemonic tate is likely o be transformedvertime ntoone ofincongruencer evendynamicnstability.hispattern fchange an betraced o several actors. irst, rom heoutset hehegemonic ower scompelledto provideinstitutional tructureswithautonomy. Theregime's urpose s to legitimate egemonic references. egitimacycannotbepromotedf he egimesperceivedsmerelynappendage fthehegemonic tate. n thepresentnternationalystem,heprimarysource f egitimacyor ules ndnorms s their oluntarycceptance yindividual tates. This practiceultimately estsupon theconceptofsovereignty,hedominantpoliticalprinciple f themodern ra. Thesovereign erritorial tate is the onlyactor whose authoritys fullyacceptednthe nternationalommunity.overeigntys ndivisible,ndinprinciple,ll sovereigntates reequal. There s, then, prima aciecase fordistributingotes qually n nternationalrganizations.Whenthisnorm s violated, s in the case ofinternationalinancialnstitu-tions,the legitimatingapacityof theseorganizationss weakened.Thus,there s a strongpropensityora modernhegemonic tate toaccept nternationalrganizationswherevotingpower s equallydis-tributedmong llmembers. owever, nequal division fvotes penstheopportunityorweaker tates oenhance heirnfluencend controlwithin hese nstitutions.A second ndogenous actor hatprompts hange ntherelationshipbetween egimesndpower tructuresthe ndependentnertiahat andevelopwithinnternationalrganizations. n exceptionally igorousanalysis fthe behaviorof internationalrganizationsoncludes hat"Sonce stablished, rganizationsakeon a life ftheir wnanddeveloptheir wn nner ynamics"Cox andJacobsen, 973:7). Thisprocess findependent rowths againfacilitatedy hebehavior fa hegemonicpowerduring eriods fregimereation. or nstitutionso egitimatenew setofrulesand norms, heymustbe givenautonomy rom hedominant ower.Objective riteriamustbeestablished or he electionof staff.Goals mustbe stated ngeneral erms.Once this s done,theorganizationan fendfor tself.t may generatets ownethos. t canrespond o differentpportunitytructures.t canwelcome ew lients.As with ndividuals, rganizationalmaturation s influencedybothgeneticharacteristicsnd environmentalressures. ver ime hepref-erences ftheorganizationndthoseofthedeclining egemonicowermaydriftpart.


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Krasner/ TRANSFORMING REGIMES 141A third actornthe volution fregimesromongruence o incon-

gruence s the pecific onsequences or nternationalrganizations fhegemonic ower's ecline. his sanexogenous onsideration, hichsgenerallyndependent f regime onsiderations. t the pinnacle f tspower, he hegemonictate sprone osupply disproportionatehareof collective oodsfor he ystem,ncludingnternationalrganizationbudgets OlsenandZeckhauser, 966).However, s itdriftsoward hestatusof a normal power it will become more reluctant o do this,providing n incentiveor nternationalrganizationso search ornewsources f upport. hehegemonic ower'snfluencen other tateswillalso decline;theywillbe less likely o support ts nitiatives-withinorganizationss wellas elsewhere. ne recent tudy fUN voting ndvariouseconomic measuresofdependence n theUnitedStates con-cludes that greatU.S. economic dvantage an no longerbe usedtogenerate oting upport n the GeneralAssembly" Richardson,1978:177). Thus, internationalrganizationsan be seizedbystateswhosenationalpowercapabilities re limited.In the postwar period,the ThirdWorld has made internationalorganizations centerpiece f its demandsforregime hange.TheSouthhas succeeded ndominatinghe gendasof allmajormultifunc-tional universalorganizations.The North has been compelledtorespondrather han initiate.Convening n internationalonferenceplaces an issueon the gendasofNortherntates.Positionpapershaveto be prepared.Votingpositionsmustbe determinedWriggins, 978:113).Debates and resolutionspresented t international orumshavealterednorms, ules, nd proceduresn a variety fways favoredbydeveloping ountries. ariousresolutions aveendorsed .7%of GNPas a target orconcessionary apitaltransfers rom heNorth o theSouth.While hisnorms morehonoredn thebreach,t sstillheldupas a goal thathas beenacceptedbytheNorth s well s theSouth. Thepercentage f concessional id transferredymultilateralnstitutionshas increased rom % in 1962to 27% in 1977 Organisation orEco-nomicCooperation nd Development, 978:xii, xiii, 266-267). n theimmediate ostwar eriod herewasnoaccepted nternationalorm orthe evelofaid, and policieswereunilaterallyetbydonors.

In thearea oftrade,developing ountries ave usedGATT tolegiti-mate oncessional reatment.uring he1960s, he ndustrializedoun-tries greed o institute generalized ystem fpreferenceshatwouldeliminate ariffs n some productsfromdeveloping ountries.Thenontarrif arrier odes and revisions o the GATT Articles fAgree-


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142 INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLYmentnegotiatedduringthe Tokyo Round provide forspecial anddifferentialreatmentordeveloping ountries,lthoughmore ymmet-ricalbehavior s expected s countries eachhigher tagesofdevelop-ment.These changesare a fundamental reakwith the two centralnorms fthepostwar rading rder:nondiscriminationndreciprocity.The South has enshrined ewprinciples mphasizingevelopmentndequity,not ust secured xceptions rom heold liberalrules.Southernpressure xercised t international orumshas securedacceptance f theprinciplehatmajorparts ftheglobal commons rethe commonheritage f mankind.Developing countries ave madeclaimson radiofrequenciesnd outer pace,eventhough hey o notnow havethe echnical apabilityo utilize hem.Mining ctivitynthedeep seabed will be controlledby an internationaluthority ndrevenues rom heexploitation fmanganesenoduleswill be taxed toprovide ssistance o theSouth. Somedeveloping ountries ave calledfor he nternationalizationfAntarctica,lthoughheirbilityopressthis laimhas been mpeded y he ack of suitablenternationalorum(Petersen, 980:401-402).Thecommonheritagefmankinds radicallydifferentrom heprevailing rinciples efore he1960s,which ecog-nized heright fa state oclaimunutilizedreasthat tcouldoccupy rdevelop.Even n the reaofmonetaryffairs,hatbastion fpostwar onser-vatism, heSouthhas had some success, t leastwithin heregime'sformal nstitutional anager, he MF. WhileLDCs didnotget n aidlink withSDRs, theydid get an allocationbased on quotas. Theindustrializedationshad originally antedvirtuallyoexcludedevel-opingcountries. he partialuseof MF goldsales to establish TrustFund whichmakes oanstodevelopingountries ith ew onditions tconcessional nterestates) s a form f nternationalaxationfor id.TheFund hasbegun o iberalize ts onditions or tand-bygreements.Inan internationalnvironment,nwhich he copeandgrowthfFundactivitieswilldependin parton continuing illingnessfdevelopingcountriesouse itsresources,heorganization asmoved ochange tsrules nd proceduresf not itsbasic principles.In general he nstitutionaltructureasbecomemoreresponsiveotheSouth. By using tsvotingmajorityntheGeneralAssembly,heSouthhas been bletocreate ew nstitutions,specially NCTAD andUNIDO, whichrepresentts interests. ven in established orums,wherevotes are not equallydivided,the South has changed votingpowerand decision-making rocedures.Mutual vetovoting rrange-mentsformajordecisionsnow prevail n all internationalinancial


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Krasner/TRANSFORMING REGIMES 143institutions,ncluding heFund. In the nter-AmericanevelopmentBank,the argest f theregional ending nstitutions,nd in theUnitedNations DevelopmentProgramthe Third Worldhas a majority fvotes. nthenewest nternationalinancialnstitution,he nternationalFundforAgricultural evelopment, otes reequallydivided etweenOPEC countries,non-oil developing countries, nd industrializedcountriesThus, in a variety f issue areas theSouthhas been able to alterprinciples, orms, ules, ndprocedures.t sdifficulto magineimilarsuccess n theabsenceof institutionaltructureshat provided uto-matic access fordevelopingcountries.By taking advantageof theautonomy hat hehegemonic ower, heUnited tates,was compelledto confer n internationalrganizations uring heperiodofregimeformationt theconclusion f WorldWar II, ThirdWorldcountrieshave been able to alterregime haracteristicsuring he periodofAmericanhegemonicdecline. The relationship etweenunderlyingnational power capabilitiesand regimecharacteristics as becomeincreasinglyncongruent.

Belief ystemsWhilevulnerabilitieshat risefrom omesticnd nternationaleak-ness provide he mpetus orThirdWorlddemands-and internationalorganizationsheopportunityo realizethem-theform nd unity fthesegoalshave been hapedby hepervasive cceptance fdependencyorientations.Most developing ountries aveexplicitlyccepted rgu-

ments hat attribute heirunderdevelopmento the workings f theinternationalconomic ystem ather hanthe ndigenous haracteris-ticsoftheir wnsocieties. hebeliefystem as been ndorsed, otonlyby individual tates,but by internationalrganizations lose to theThirdWorld, uch s UNCTAD and theUNDP, aswell s by mportantgroupswith claims to speak for the Northas well as the South.7Individual tatesmay rejectdependency rescriptionsn practicebuteven themostconservativeack a belief ystemo offern itsstead.The dependency rientationerves mportant unctions orThirdWorld tates oth nternationallynddomestically. tthe nternationallevel, dependency rguments ave provided unifyingationalefor7. An important xample is the reportof the BrandtCommission IndependentCommission n International evelopment ssues 1980).


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144 INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLYdisparateSoutherndemands.Calls forspecialand differentialreat-ment re ustified y the contentionhat theSouthhas been treatedunjustlyn thepast. Existing orms nd rules re rejecteds inherentlyexploitative. coherent ntellectualrientation as been particularlyimportantecauseof the strategyf using nternationalrganizationsto promotemeta-political oals. In sucharenasthe ability o defineissuesand control heagenda s critical. uch initiativesre facilitatedby a widely hared nd internallyonsistentnalytic ramework.Dependency erspectivesre also linked o domestic olitical ondi-tions nThirdWorld ountries. iven he imitationsn effectivetateaction, oreign olicy s an attractive ayto build upport. rominencein universal oalitionscan enhancea Third World eader'sdomesticposition.Castigating heNorthcan rallybureaucratic,military,ndpopularelements. he structuref nternationalrganizationsffordsThirdWorld statesmenn opportunityo play on theworldstage,a platformwhich they could not mount f theyhad to rely solelyon the domesticpowercapabilitiesof their ountries. ven iftheiractivitysperceiveds a minorwalk-on artbymore owerfulountries,an effectiveeadermaytransformt into a major role fordomesticpoliticalconsumptionWriggins, 978:40; Korany,1976:86; Good,1962:7).ThirdWorld eaderswho follow uch a coursemust ind deologicalargumentshat resonatewiththeirdomesticpopulations.The mostaccessible hemes eject xistingnternationalegimes. or most oun-triesn AsiaandAfrica,fnotLatinAmerica,he entral istoricalventisdecolonization. nticolonialismnd nationalismrewidely cceptedvaluesendorsed yvirtuallyllgroupsntheThirdWorldPackenham,1973:41; Good, 1962:5; Rothstein, 977:75-76, 110;Nettl, 968:591).Dependency rgumentsrewidely iffused. ThirdWorld eaderwhooptsfor nhancing upport hroughnternationalehaviorwillrejectexisting ules,norms, nd institutions.he mostvigorous upport orThirdWorlddemandsforregimeransformationas comefrom oun-trieswhere uchpoliciescontributedo domestic olitical egitimacy.External olicyhashelped o definehe nternal haracterftheregimefor tsownconstituency.The belief ystem fdependencys a keyfactor n explaining heexceptional nitymaintained ytheThirdWorld n tsquestfor NewInternationalconomicOrder.Despite the substantial iversityhatexists mongdeveloping ountrieswith espect o economic ndpoliti-cal structures,here avebeennooutrightefectionsrom heGroupof77.Thisunitys nottheresult f og-rolling.he NIEO programwoulddisproportionatelyenefit smallnumber fcountries eavilynvolvedintheexport f raw materials rmanufactures.n some cases,such s


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Krasner/ TRANSFORMING REGIMES 145policy toward OPEC, a strategy f alliance with the industrializedcountrieswouldbe more n accordwithThirdWorld conomic nter-ests. However,attackingOPEC and pointing o differencesmongThirdWorld tateswould ontradicthebasic nalytic onclusion f hedependency erspective.incethisviewpointswidely cceptedwithindevelopingcountries,not just voiced at international orums,t isdifficultor venhighly evelopedThirdWorldcountrieswith onser-vative egimesobreakwith herest f heSouth ndendorse he iberalorder. The attitudeof Third World states toward calls for regimetransformationas only rangedfrom trident dvocacy to passiveacquiescence. t hasnot ncluded utright ejectionralliancewith heNorth.

Mexico:An Illustrative asePerhaps no countrybetter llustrates he dilemmasof theThirdWorld nd their onsequences orforeign olicy hanMexico. Mexicohasexperiencedapidgrowthn recent ears.This was true venbeforethediscovery f largenew oil reserves.Between1960and 1965 theaverageannual rate ofgrowth f GDP was 7.4%; between1965and1973, .5%. Manufacturingacedthis ncrease, rowingtannualratesof 9.6% and 7.5% forthesame periods.The shareofmanufacturedproductsnMexico's export arningsncreased rom11.6% n 1961 o31.8% in 1972. Despite an exceptionallyhighrate of populationincrease, ercapitaGDP increased t3.8% annually or heperiod1960to 1965and 2.9% for heperiod1965to 1973 International ank forReconstructionndDevelopment, 976:Comparative conomicData,Tables 1 and 8).However, his mpressiveconomicperformance id not dissuadeMexican leadersfrom ctingas major critics f the existing rder.UnderthepresidencyfLuis Echeverria1970-1976),Mexico tookaleading ositionnformulatingheNew nternational conomicOrder.At the1971UN GeneralAssembly,cheverrialignedMexico with heThirdWorld.Thisactionbrokewithpast policy,nwhichMexico had

generallyakena low profile n North-South ssues.Echeverria irstproposedwhat ater ecame heCharter fEconomicRightsnd DutiesofStates t the 1972UNCTAD meeting. uring he nitial ears f hispresidency,e travelled xtensively,nd these ripsweregreetedwithenthusiasm ithinMexico (Grant,1977).Echeverria's ehaviorwas deeplyrooted n Mexico's internationaland domestictructuralroblems.Mexico's mpressiveconomic evel-


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146 INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLYopment,tleastbefore he xploitationf argeoil reserves,id ittle olessenher nternationaltructuralependencynthe United tates. n1976, 5%of Mexico's exportswent o theUnited tates,whileMexicoaccounted oronly5% ofAmerican xports. onversely,0% ofMexi-co's imports amefrom he United tates,whileMexico accounted oronly 3% of U.S. imports.Mexican development as been partiallyfinancedwith argeforeign oans. Multinational orporations,mostlyAmerican,re heavily nvolvedwith hemost ynamicxport ectors fthe Mexican economy.The United tatesnow accountsformore hantwo-thirdsf foreign irect nvestmentn Mexico and the proportionhas ncreasednrecent ears. heratio fU.S. to MexicanGNP isabout25:1 (Sepulveda, 1979).Even n the rea of petroleum,ome Mexican policymakerseetheircountry otentiallyubject ooverwhelmingmerican ressure.ftherearefurtherupplydisruptionsrom he MiddleEast,theUnited tatesmightookto Mexicoto fill n thegap. IfMexicowere nable o dothisusingherownresources, mericamight ressforgreaternvolvementbythe nternationalilcompanies.Mexicanresistanceosuchpressurescouldprecipitate majorcrisisbetween he twocountries. n suchaneventuality,he economic fnot thepolitical everageof theUnitedStateswouldbe substantial. uch a scenariomaybe unlikely, ut t snotone thatMexicanpolicy-makersanignore, iven he nternationalstructuralsymmetriesetween he theUnitedStates and Mexico.8However, omestic onditionsre a moreproximatexplanation orEcheverria'shirdWorldism. lthoughMexico's colonial xperiencesfar nthepast,thecountry's olitical ultures shapedby ts truggleswithSpain and the United States,and therevolutionarygalitarianideology hat merged rom he Revolution f 1910.At the ame time,there re deep cleavagesbetween heelite and themasses. ncome smaldistributedndthebenefitsfMexicaneconomic evelopmentavegonedisproportionatelyo themiddle lass.Therevolutionarydeologyoffers link between hemassesand theregime ut talso generatesdemandsfor ocial reform.Foreign olicyhas ongofferedMexicanpoliticaleaders device orresolvingomeofthe ensionsnherentn their olitical ystem. uringthe1960sMexico adopteda positive olicy owardCastro'sCuba andpursued raditional ationalist ostures esignedo maintainndepend-encefromAmerican olicy.Bythe1970s, owever,his tancewas tooconventionalo endmuch restigeotheMexicanregime. newpolicywas needed hat ouldreinvigorateheofficialdeologyndconsolidateties betweenthe executive nd the intellectuals. cheverria's hird

8. Based on discussionswithMexican officialsnOctober 1980.


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Krasner/ TRANSFORMING REGIMES 147Worldismerved hesepurposes.His sponsorship ftheCharter ftheEconomic Rights nd Dutiesof Statesgave elementsntheMexicanpolitical ystem n opportunityo pledgetheir oyalty nd support othe xecutive. uch pledges orm critical upport or he tabilityf heMexicanpolitical ystemPellicer,1975:52-53, 8-59; epulveda,1979:13ff., urcelland Purcell,1980).Echeverria'srelationshipwith the left was particularly trainedbecauseas Minister f StateSecurity e had been nvolved nthe ventsleading othe hooting f200students eforehe1968Olympic ames.Diaz Ordaz,theconservativeresident hogoverned rom 964-1970,had handpicked cheverria s his successor.There was a highrateofabstentionn the 1970election, nd in theFederal District MexicoCity)theoppositionPartido NacionalAgristareceived 2.9% ofthevote, omparedwith national otalof13.8% Grant,1977;7-8;Fagan,1977:692-694).All of thesefactors nclined cheverriaoward policythat ould establish istieswith he eft. rominent dvocacy fThirdWorlddemands ouldenhance omesticegitimacyecause tresonatedwith raditionalMexicanideology.However,Echeverriahardly et Mexico along the pathto radicalinternationaleadership fThirdWorlddemands.Hissuccessor, opezPortillo,pursued morerestrainedolicy.WhilereaffirmingupportforCuba andkeepingomedistance romheUnited tates,Mexicohasprojected morepositive magetowarddirect oreignnvestment.hegovernmentook care not to eopardizetheflowof oansfrom oreignbanks.Domestically, opez Portillo trengthenedheregime'sieswiththebusiness ommunity,hichhad beenstrained yEcheverria's oli-cies (Grant, 1977: 27). In fact, venunderEcheverriaMexican policywas notentirelyriented o ThirdWorld nternationalism. hilethePresidentwas presenting highly isible ttackon theexisting lobalorder,other nstitutionsn theMexicangovernment,articularlyheMinistry f Foreign Affairs,wereencouraging iscrete ilateral ieswith he United tates andmaintainingMexico's traditionaloleas anintermediaryetween heUnited tatesand therest f LatinAmerica.The Ministry f Industry nd Commercefavorednationalizationnprinciplebut was verysensitive o the need forforeignnvestment(Pellicer, 1975: 55; Purcell nd Purcell,1980:215-217).

Thevacillation nd inconsistencynMexicanpolicy s notrootednanyfailingsf tsbureaucratictructurerthe ontrastingersonalitiesor belief ystemsf tspolitical eaders.Rather,treflectsheprofoundcountervailingressureshatemerge rom desireby LDCs tosecureboth ndependencenddevelopment. exicandevelopmentscriticallytied to relationswith heUnitedStates, tsmajor trading nd capitalpartner. evelopmentwillprovideMexico with dditional ower apa-


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148 INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLYbilities. utthese apabilities, ven f heyncrease t a very apidrate,will do little o alterthe relative ulnerabilitiesnherentn Mexican-American elations. heabsolutegap isalready oo large. f theUnitedStatesgrows t 2.5% annually or henext25 years nd Mexico at 5%,the absolutegap would double and theUnited tateswould stillbe 13times argerthan Mexico. This structural ituation,which nclinesMexican eaders o seek nternational echanisms or ecuring reatercontrolof the external nvironment,ncluding he United States, sreinforced y domestic olitical deology.Especially n times f stress,foreign lements re blamedforMexico's difficultiesPurcell nd Pur-cell, 1980:214-220).A radicalforeign olicy an enhance he egitimacyofa particular ulerwith eft-leaningomestic roups.Conclusion

The countries f the Third Worldhave notsimply oughthigherlevelsof resource ransfer. heyhave wanted to restructurenterna-tional regimes.n some cases theyhave succeeded.The New Interna-tionalEconomicOrder s the uccessor fSUNFED, and theFirst ndSecondDevelopmentDecades. It willbe followedbyother rogramswith ifferentamesbutthe ame mport-control, otustwealth. heNIEO, and its antecedentsnd probable uccessors, annotbe under-stood through nalogiesto reformfforts ithin ationalpolities uchas the abor union, onsumer, elfare,nd civil ightsmovementsntheUnitedStates.Theseweremovements ased uponsharednorms; heSouthrejectshe iberalnorms f heAmerican-createdostwar ystem.Theyweremovementsontent osharepowerwithinxistingtructures;the Southwantseffectiveontrol ver newstructures.The demandsof the Southare a function f theprofoundnterna-tional and domestic weaknessof most Third World states.Thesedemandsmay emporarilybatebut heywillnotdisappear. incemoststates ftheSouthcannothopetogarnerhenational esourceapabili-tiesneeded to assert ffectiveontroln the nternationalystem, heywillcontinue opressfor nternationalnstitutionsnd norms hat anoffer hem some controlover the internationalnvironment.n thepursuit fthisgoal, theywill njoy omesuccessby aking dvantage finstitutionaltructureshatwere reatedbythepowerfulo serve heirownpurposes.nthis, nd otherways, hepower fhegemonictates sdissipated ythevery tructuresheyhave created.9

9. See Modelskifor provocative xplication f hedialectical actors hat nderminetheposition fdominant tates.

transforming international regimes what the third world wants and why- stephen d. krasner

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